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Operational rept. for quarterly
period ending
31 Oct 66.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

18
ACSFOR

1907-UT-660508

INDEXED
11-12 Nov 66

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (2 Mar 67) FOR OT

10 March 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report 6 Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division

12 98f.

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

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1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned,
Headquarters, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division for period ending 31
October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed
and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by
CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and
corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of
receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Com-
mandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the
future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted
for use in developing training material.

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
Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
a/s

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(Continued on page 2)

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**OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR
QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING
31 OCTOBER 1966**

**1st BRIGADE
101st
AIRBORNE DIVISION**



**DIPLOMATS
AND
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE, 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

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AVSD-C

12 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

TO: See Distribution

References: AR 1-19 dtd 26 May 1966, USARV Reg 870-2 dtd 19 July 1966,
and I FFV Reg 1-3 dtd 29 September 1966.

SECTION 1 (C)

Significant unit activities: Elements of the Brigade were involved in combat operations during the entire reporting period with the exception of 26-30 October 1966. Training was conducted concurrent with combat operations and during periods when units were refitting and preparing for operations.

A. Combat operations. A summary of the concept and execution of each of the Brigade's operations is given below.

1. Operation JOHN PAUL JONES. (Phases II and III).

- 36.
- a. Dates: 1 August - 5 September 1966. Days in the field:
 - b. Missions: Conduct search and destroy operations in and provide security for the VUNG RO Bay/VUNG RO Pass area. Relieve the 2nd ROK Marine Brigade south of TUY HOA. Conduct search and destroy operations northwest of TUY HOA, and provide protection to civilians in the initial stages of the rice harvest.
 - c. Location: PHU YEN Province, RVN.
 - d. Commander: BG Willard Pearson.
 - e. Forces involved:
 - (1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
 - (2) Other: 2nd Korean Marine Brigade, 47th Infantry Regiment (ARVN). (1/8 Cavalry OPCON to 1/101 through 5 September 1966).
 - f. Concept and Execution. (See Incl 1, Combat After Action Report, JOHN PAUL JONES.

2. Operation SEWARD.

- 51.
- a. Dates: 6 September - 26 October 1966. Days in the field:
 - b. Missions: To protect the rice harvest in the TUY HOA and TUY AN areas. Conduct search and destroy operations against VC/NVA forces in the area of operations. Provide security for TUY HOA South Airfield, VUNG RO Bay/Pass area and the land LOC from VUNG RO Bay to TUY HOA.
 - c. Location: PHU YEN Province, RVN.
 - d. Commander: BG Willard Pearson.

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e. Forces involved:

(1) US: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 1/22 Infantry, 4th Infantry Division OPCON through 15 October 1966.

(2) Other: 47th Infantry Regiment (ARVN).

f. Concept and Execution. (See Inclosure 2, Combat After Action Report, Operation SEWARD).

3. Operation GERONIMO.

a. Dates: Commenced on 31 October 1966 and will be covered in the next quarterly operations report.

b. Mission: To conduct search and destroy operations against VC/NVA forces in the AO.

c. Location: PHU YEN and KHANH HOA Provinces, RVN.

d. Commander: BG Willard Pearson.

B. Training. The majority of the time covered during the reporting period was spent in the conduct of tactical operations. However, during periods of refitting and preparation for combat operations, units concentrated training efforts in those areas which could be improved on, as noted during previous operations. In addition to the emphasis placed on small unit tactics, the following training was organized and conducted at Brigade level:

1. All incoming personnel, officers and enlisted men, continued to be processed through the Replacement Detachment at PHAN RANG where they received 6 days of intensified training in small unit tactics, weapons indoctrination, survival, land navigation, patrolling and physical conditioning.

2. Range firing continued on established ranges with small arms, machine guns, grenade launchers, hand grenades and mortars.

3. Flame thrower teams from each infantry battalion continued to receive proficiency training in the use of the portable flame thrower.

4. A three hour environmental driver training course was conducted for all units to train and orient personnel to cope with driving conditions in Vietnam.

5. Selected personnel within the Brigade received specialized training in the use of the sniper weapon (Winchester, Model 70 rifle) and sniper techniques.

6. Tactical air training was established to familiarize all units with proper air request procedures, types of air support and selection of targets.

7. Mobile training teams from the 2nd Battalion, 320th Artillery continued to train CIDG units in survey, fire direction, service of the weapon, ammunition handling and forward observer procedures.

8. Training was conducted for radio telephone operators in radio telephone security and procedures, use of the SOI, and operation of the CRC 106 and ARC 122 radios.

9. A three week cooks and bakers school was conducted at PHAN

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RANK to train selected personnel to fill existing vacancies within the Brigade.

10. Training in fire support coordination was conducted to establish techniques and increase the effectiveness of infantry, artillery and Tac Air support during combat operations.

11. CH 47 helicopter ladder training was conducted to establish procedures to be used by infantry battalions in future operations.

12. The Squad Leaders Combat Reaction Course (1 week duration) was established on 14 August 1966 at PHAN RANG, RVN to instruct small unit leaders in the latest combat techniques.

13. A special 4 hour course in administration was given to all first sergeants, personnel NCO's, and company clerks within the Brigade with the objective of increasing the efficiency and operation of administration throughout the Brigade.

14. A special Brigade training team was established and conducted a pre-combat orientation course for company/battery size units totaling approximately 4000 personnel of all grades of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division.

15. To assist the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division to become operational, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division conducted an integration program whereby key personnel of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division satellited on their counterparts to observe the functioning of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division on a first hand basis.

16. On 23 October 1966, the Squad Leaders Combat Reaction Course was discontinued and replaced by the Combat NCO Academy conducted by the Replacement Detachment in PHAN RANG, RVN commencing 30 October 1966. The purpose of the Combat NCO Academy is to develop superb infantry squad leaders with exceptional endurance, skilled in the techniques of counter-insurgency operations, field craft, survival and leadership ability. The school is one week in duration and only team leaders in the grade of E-5 and outstanding Pfc's and Spl's who are acting in a team leader or squad leader capacity are eligible to attend the school.

17. A seminar for squad leaders was held on 15 October 1966. During the morning, free and uninhibited discussion pertaining to Brigade training programs and small unit tactics was conducted. The major recommendation made was the conversion of the Squad Leaders Combat Reaction Course to the Combat NCO Academy, orientated toward outstanding E-4's or E-3's as fire team or squad leader aspirants. Following a luncheon in honor of the squad leaders attending the seminar, five guest presentations were given on Artillery, Army Aviation, USAF Tac Air, Chemical Warfare in Vietnam and an Engineer discussion of mines and booby traps. The two-fold purpose of the guest presentation was to inform the squad leaders of the latest battlefield techniques and allow them to explain problems existing in each field to the experts.

18. A second seminar on artillery support was conducted for selected officers on 25 October 1966. The objective of this presentation/discussion was to improve artillery support, coordination and understanding through the presentation and subsequent analysis of two artillery strikes. The results of the seminar were:

a. The artillery of the U.S. Army is extremely effective during counterinsurgency warfare.

b. The seminar resulted in no recommendation for radical change in tactics or techniques.

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c. Intensified training between combat operations is necessary to insure the infantryman fully understands the new artillery concepts.

19. To prepare for the possible contingency of conducting an airborne assault, the 2/327 Inf and C2/320 Arty conducted intensified pre-airborne refresher training and C-130 mock-up loading procedures during the period 13-19 October 1966.

20. On 28 October 1966, a special two hour class was given by the Brigade Postal Officer to all First Sergeants, Battalion and Unit Mail Clerks concerning special mail handling and postal regulations.

C. OPLAN - OPORD. The following OPLANS and OPORDS were published during the reporting period. The Brigade was not called upon to execute any contingency plans.

1. OPORD 147-66 (JOHN PAUL HONES) dated 5 August 1966 covering exploitation of 4 areolight strikes.

2. OPORD 149-66 (JOHN PAUL JONES) dated 14 August 1966 covering relief of the 2d Korean Marine Brigade by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

3. OPORD 153-66 (SEWARD) dated 24 August 1966 covering protection of the rice harvest in the TUY AN and HIEU XUONG Valley and security of the VUNG RO Bay/Pass area.

4. OPLAN 163-66 (Contingency CUNG SON) dated 16 September 1966 covering relief of the CUNG SON Special Forces camp if it should come under VC/NVA attack. (Plan not executed).

5. OPLAN 167-66 (Contingency VAN CANH) dated 21 September 1966 covering the relief of the VAN CANH Special Forces camp if it should come under VC/NVA attack. (Plan not executed).

6. OPLAN 168-66 (Operation MARSHALL) dated 23 September 1966 covering reinforcement by the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in the PLEIKU area. (Plan not executed).

7. OPLAN 169-66 (Operation NORTH CAROLINA) dated 25 September 1966 covering the reinforcement of U.S. Marine units in the DA NANG area. (Plan not executed).

8. OPLAN 171-66 (Operation ALBANY) dated 11 October 1966 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to the SONG BE area. (Plan not executed).

9. OPORD 176-66 (Operation JERONIMO) dated 25 October 1966 covering the deployment of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct search and destroy operations west of TUY HOA and south of CUNG SON.

D. Organization. See Inclosure 1 and 2 for Task Force organization and Inclosure 3, Reorganization of Rear Area Support.

E. Intelligence.

1. The following is a list of losses inflicted on the enemy during the reporting period:

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<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>JOHN PAUL JONES¹</u>	<u>SEWARD²</u>
VC/NVA KIA (BG)	140	230
VC/NVA KIA (EST)	34	142
VC/NVA KIAF (BG)	69	9
VC/NVA KIAF (EST)	101	52
VOC/NVAC	29/11	36/6
Ralliers	2	10
Detainees	384	871

WEAPONS

Individual	50	79
Crew Served	5	1

2. Intelligence Problem Areas:

Problem Area: Nonavailability of basic photo coverage of area of operation.

Discussion: Due to the limited facilities and the restrictions imposed by the weather, operations are being mounted without the benefit of basic photo intelligence of the area. Since the Brigade is highly mobile and subject to deployment anywhere throughout the country on very short notice, the current lead time of at least a week and a half which it takes to acquire photography of a new area is inadequate. Recently a separate battalion was sent on a search and destroy operation in the MINH HOA area. Photography of the area was received approximately one week after the operation ended. Basic coverage need not be exceedingly recent to be of value. Primarily it is used to determine defensive positions, major trails, landing zones, and provide other intelligence to supplement map information. The scale of the basic coverage need not be large either since the primary requirement is resolution. There are photo systems available which provide better than 5' resolution at the scale of 1/25,000 which is completely adequate for basic coverage. The advantage of small scale photography is that a single mission can cover a large area in a short period of time. For example, using an aircraft a single mission can be flown at a scale of 1/25,000 and cover an area of South Vietnam from the Cambodian border to the coast in length and a full degree of latitude in width. Such a program, in fact, was completed covering all of South Vietnam in 1963-1964. This photography is still being used, though it is outdated, by many intelligence agencies out of country simply because of the completeness of its coverage. Such a program, which, if flown every 6 months during optimum weather conditions for different sections of the country, would provide the photo-interpreter with comparative photography, ensure basic coverage, and be available on a timely basis. The number of photo missions now being flown by aircraft taking large scale photography could be reduced considerably thereby speeding up the reaction time of presently available aircraft and ensuring that intelligence of a tactical nature was disseminated on a more timely schedule.

Action Taken: A program of this nature would have to be

1-SITREP #248 050001 - 052400H Sep 66, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

2-SITREP #296 230001 - 232400H Oct 66.

SITREP #298 250001 - 252400H Oct 66.
 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

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coordinated at a higher level than this Headquarters since it would involve areas outside our present area of responsibility. This unit has requested that basic coverage of its area of operations at an acceptable scale of 1/25,000 and has suggested the above mentioned program to the O-2 Air, I Field Force Vietnam.

F. Personnel.

1. Unit Strength:

a. Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of the reporting period were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MTOX)	4517
Assigned	5666
Present for Duty	5069
Airhead - TUY HOA	(4057)
Base Camp - PHAN RANG	(1002)
Not present for Duty	597

b. Unit strengths as of 31 October 1966 (assigned).

	Off	WO	EM
1st Bn (Abn), 327th Inf	37	1	803
2nd Bn (Abn), 327th Inf	35	1	799
2nd Bn (Abn), 502nd Inf	36	1	842
2nd Bn (Abn), 320th Arty	35	3	490
HHC, 1st Bde	55	5	540
Support Bn	56	10	1401
326th Engr	5	0	200
2/17 Cav	5	0	181
181 MI	8	1	16
20th C&S	1	0	6

c. The assigned strength was 125 percent of the authorized augmented strength. The present for duty strength was 112 percent of the authorized augmented strength.

d. Of the not present for duty strength, 341 were in transit, 75 on R&R, 66 TDY, 53 leave, 23 in confinement, 30 in hospital, 7 AWOL and 2 detached.

e. Since the last report, considerable progress has been made in improving strength accounting. The two primary areas - hos - pitalized and in-transit personnel - continue to exist, however, during this quarter, the following corrective action was taken:

(1) In-transit Personnel - a vigorous program to purge from unit morning reports all personnel assigned, not joined, was initiated. One hundred and two personnel who, on arrival in Vietnam were diverted to other units, were identified. A team from USARV visited the Brigade to identify by name those men carried not present for duty. As a result of these actions, over 250 personnel were dropped from the assigned strength of the Brigade.

(2) Hospitalized personnel - a centralized control point for processing the reassignment of all medical evacuees was established by Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, on 25 August 1966. This system has worked well in insuring the reassignment of personnel who are medically evacuated out of Vietnam. On 26 October 1966, United States Army Vietnam extended this concept to provide for the reassignment to a central medical holding detachment of all personnel who are admitted to hospitals in Vietnam. Upon release from the hospital, these personnel are reassigned back to their former unit. This procedure will eliminate the

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strength accounting problems associated with hospitalized personnel and medical evacuees.

2. Casualties:

a. Casualties for the period (1 August thru 31 October 1966) were as follows:

	Operation JOHN PAUL JONES ¹	Operation SEWARD ²
KIA	23	26
WIA	132	169
MIA	0	0

b. Total casualties to date are as follows:

KIA	317
WIA	1713
MIA	2

3. Personnel Programs: The following programs were initiated and/or continued during the reporting period:

a. Memorialization: A memorialization board was established during the reporting period. This board will coordinate the memorialization of Brigade facilities at its Base Camp to honor troopers who have made the supreme sacrifice on the field of battle.

b. Athletics: In conjunction with long range athletic programs for the PHAN RANG base area, the Brigade received and distributed 30 company sized athletic and recreation kits to units in the Brigade. These kits provide a variety of sports and recreational equipment sufficient to meet the needs of a company sized unit.

c. Accuracy of Personnel Records: To insure that personnel records reflect complete and accurate data on all personnel, a comprehensive records check was initiated. Because of tactical deployment of the Brigade, it was necessary to move the records from base camp to the forward area to provide each individual trooper an opportunity to review and up-date his records. During this period 167 officers and 2637 enlisted men reviewed their personal files.

d. Sponsor Program. The sponsor program for incoming officers was continued. This program includes a personal letter from the Brigade Commander to each incoming officer and offer any further assistance required. Purpose of the program is to stimulate a feeling of "belonging" to the Brigade before arrival as well as to answer any questions the newly assigned officer may have.

e. Awards and Decorations: In addition to citing personnel in Brigade General Orders for valor in combat, the following awards and decorations were presented:

	<u>SS</u>	<u>SM</u>	<u>DFC</u>	<u>ES</u>	<u>ES(V)</u>	<u>AM</u>	<u>AM(V)</u>	<u>ACM</u>	<u>ACH(V)</u>	<u>PH</u>	<u>CIB</u>	<u>CMB</u>
OFF	16	0	0	12	38	74	1	9	12	15	63	0
WO	0	0	1	1	0	5	0	3	0	0	0	0
EM	21	1	0	65	198	29	2	134	324	188	815	8

1 - 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div S1 Section Journal dtd 9 November 1966.

2 - LOC SIT

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f. Enlisted Promotions: During the period the Brigade received and utilized the following enlisted appointment allocations:

	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9
August	403	163	79	5	1	0
September	441	139	64	0	0	0
October	66	19	7	2	0	1

g. R&R: The Brigade utilized 913 out of country R&R quotas during the period. At the present rate of allocation, 81.6% of the Brigade's personnel will be able to take an R&R. Breakdown for the period is as follows:

	Officers	Warrant Officers	Enlisted
August	12	0	301
September	9	0	300
October	13	2	276

h. USO Shows: Two USO shows visited the Brigade during the period. They performed for approximately 4 hours for the troops located at Tuy Hoa South.

i. Administrative School: A Quarterly Administrative School was established to provide the highest caliber of administrative support for the Brigade. The Adjutant General has the responsibility for conducting the program of instruction. Attendance at the school is required for unit morning report clerks, unit first sergeants, and battalion personnel staff NCO's.

j. Postal Activities: Postal Activities involved the establishment of a postal school by the Adjutant General. The purpose is to provide the best possible postal service for the personnel of the Brigade. The response to this program was evident by the comment from the postal inspection by United States Army Vietnam on 27-30 September 1966. It was noted that mail was being expeditiously processed to the troops in the field and that all aspects of postal operations and activities were being met.

k. Red Cross:

(1) The Red Cross Recreational Unit began an accelerated program during the period. The young ladies made weekly visits to TUY HOA to distribute literature and serve in the mess lines. The response to this program has been excellent.

(2) Following is a breakdown of services rendered by the Red Cross during the period:

	Aug	Sep	Oct	TOTAL
Requests received	318	368	321	1,002
Leave	37	37	28	102
Disability & Govt Benefits	7	0	11	18
Health & Welfare Reports	224	229	214	667
Personal Problems	24	24	39	87
Family Problems	8	15	36	59
Others	8	24	10	42
Total Served	308	329	338	975

l. Brigade Officers Military Justice Lecture: This two hour lecture was given to all officers in the Brigade and covered recent

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developments in the law as they pertain to military justice. The lecture also pointed out the duties and responsibilities of the trial and defense counsels in Special Courts-Martial. In addition, emphasis was placed on the regulations and directives pertaining to the administration of military justice in Vietnam.

a. Language Aids: English-Vietnamese language cards are being printed with short phrases, rank structure, weapons, days, and numbers. Distribution of these cards will be made down to team leaders.

4. Personnel Planning:

a. Coordination continued for the scheduled rotation of approximately 900 personnel during the month of December 1966. The Brigade request to spread this rotational hump from 7 November to 21 December was disapproved by Headquarters United States Army Vietnam. However, in cases where the individual's replacement has arrived he may be reassigned to CONUS in advance of his normal DEROS. This is expected to facilitate the rotation of this large group of personnel. In addition, DEROS personnel and replacements will be processed in and out of CAM RANH BAY effective on or about 1 November 1966.

b. An Army Postal Unit organized at 0 strength was attached to the Brigade on 1 October 1966. The arrival of personnel to fill this unit will permit better postal service in the forward area and release of troopers presently engaged in postal activities at the Brigade Base Camp.

5. Problem Areas: Administrative problem areas encountered during the reporting period included the following:

a. Shortages of critical MCS's, although reduced from the previous reporting period, continued to exist. Cooks, mechanics, medical specialists, and wiremen were the most critical enlisted shortages. Shortages of 2 Aircraft Maintenance Officers and 1 Medical Service Corps Officer have continued throughout the period.

b. The accelerated promotion of officers, particularly to the grade of captain, caused increased imbalances in grade. Corrective action has included the diversion of majors and captains and the requisitioning of additional officers in the grade of lieutenant.

6. Morale: Morale remained "EXCELLENT" throughout the period.

7. Commanders and Principal Staff:

a. Brigade Headquarters:

BG Willard Pearson	Bde CG
COL Chester B. McCoid	DOC
LTC Harry A. Buckley	XO
LTC Donald E. Rosenblum	S3
MAJ Jerry L. Denman	S1
MAJ Harold P. Austin	S2
MAJ Marvin Rosenstein	S4
MAJ Stephen C. Doherty	S5

b. Battalion Commanders:

LTC Joseph E. Collins	CO, 1st Bn (Abn), 327th Inf
LTC Joseph E. Wasco	CO, 2d Bn (Abn), 327th Inf
LTC Frank L. Dietrich	CO, 2d Bn (Abn), 502d Inf
LTC William R. Madden Jr.	CO, 2d Bn (Abn), 320th Arty
LTC Edward P. Abood	CO, Spt Bn

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c. Separate Companies:

CPT Richard R. Maglin	CO, 2d Sqdn (Abn), 17th Cav
CPT Robert E. Steimar	CO, Co A (Abn), 326th Engr
CPT Lloyd K. Gardner	CO, HHC, 1st Bde

G. Logistics.

1. GENERAL. There were no major changes in the concept of logistical operations during the reporting period. The Brigade's Base Camp at PHAN RANG continued to receive all classes of supply through the PHAN RANG Sub Area of the US Army Support Command at CAM RANH BAY or directly from CAM RANH BAY. Units in the forward area received Class II and V directly through the TUY HOA Sub Area of the US Army Support Command CAM RANH BAY. At the close of the reporting period a command decision was made to place the Brigade Surgeon's office under S1 staff supervision where it could be more closely correlated with the casualty reporting activities of that section.

2. ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:

a. Support Battalions:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided the command and control function of the Forward Support Element (FSE) located in the Brigade AO. It was organized into command, operations, communications and movement control elements.

(2) Administrative Detachment: Provided for personnel actions, pay, and mail service to the forces in the forward area.

(3) Supply Detachment: Assumed responsibility for the receipt, storage and issue of all classes of supply. It also included a rigger team.

(4) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive, signal and quartermaster equipment. It was organized into a shop office, a recovery team, and a contact team.

(5) Company D, 326th Medical Battalion: Established a clearing station with an 80 bed capacity, surgical section, holding section, emergency treatment section, and a dental section.

b. Laundry and Bath Service: Was provided by TUY HOA Sub Area, US Army Support Command, CAM RANH Bay. This element established a shower unit and laundry service at TUY HOA South Airfield and a shower unit at TUY HOA North.

c. Water: Was provided by Company A, 326th Engineers utilizing a 1500 gallon erdalator at TUY HOA North Airfield throughout the reporting period. Additionally a 600 gallon erdalator was established in the forward area of operations at DONG TRE for a short time. Units at TUY HOA South Airfield received water from a water point established by the TUY HOA Sub Area. At the close of the reporting period, an additional 3000 gallon erdalator was placed in service by the TUY HOA Sub Area in the vicinity of PHU HIEP, south of TUY HOA.

d. Graves Registration: Was provided by TUY HOA Sub Area which located a collection point adjacent to Company D, 326th Medical Battalion at TUY HOA South Airfield.

3. MATERIEL AND SERVICES:

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a. Supply:

(1) Class I: "B" and "C" rations were consumed regularly throughout the reporting period by forward elements. "A" ration supplements were consumed regularly by personnel at the Brigade Base Camp at PHAN RANG. "A" ration supplements were received in the forward area. Throughout several phases of the reporting period there were shortages of starches, ground coffee, fresh vegetables, ice, condiments and sugar. The amount of Class I issued equaled 808 short tons during the reporting period.

(2) Class II and IV: The Support Battalion provided the bulk of all II and IV supplies via direct support CV-2 aircraft. TUY HOA Sub Area furnished the majority of barrier materials. A total of 130 short tons were expended during the reporting period.

(3) Class III: All classes of POL were received from the TUY HOA Sub Area. Consumption for the reporting period totaled 847 short tons.

(a) MOGAS 170,625 gallons

(b) DIESEL 50,200 gallons

(c) AVGAS 21,225 gallons

(4) Class V: The Brigade began all operations with its basic load of ammunition. All units, with the exception of 2/320 Arty continued to deploy with the on individual and on vehicle portion of the basic load, while Support Battalion retained responsibility for transporting and maintaining the bulk portion of the basic load. The 2/320 Artillery assumed responsibility for deploying its entire basic load. Shortages of the following items were experienced during the reporting period:

(a) Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Yellow.

(b) Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Green.

(c) Grenade, Hand, Smoke, Violet.

(d) Cluster, Star, Ground.

(5) Maintenance: During the reporting period, command emphasis was placed on all phases of the maintenance program. A Material Readiness Assistance Team was requested from US Army Vietnam. The team conducted a courtesy inspection of subordinate units and completed its activities just prior to the close of the reporting period. This inspection revealed that some additional effort was required in the areas of small arms maintenance and records keeping. In spite of this, the Brigade achieved a decidedly low deadline rate throughout the entire reporting period.

(a) The following number of job orders were received and completed during the reporting period:

	RECEIVED	COMPLETED
1 Automotive	281	275
2 Armament	546	542
3 Signal	954	920

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	RECEIVED	COMPLETED
4 Engineer	154	145
5 Instrument	203	201
6 Service	295	291
1 Recovery	63	63
Total	2495	2437

(b) Transportation:

1. Vehicular: Land transport remained the primary means of transportation from CAM RANH Bay to the Brigade Base Camp at PHAN RANG. The use of vehicles in the forward area continued to be restricted. Approximately one third of the vehicles organic to the Brigade and attached units were utilized in the forward area. During the reporting period there was increasing use of land LOC's to convey supplies from TUY HOA to outlying areas.

2. Air Transport: Air transport by direct support CV2 flight from the PHAN RANG Base Camp to TUY HOA remained the primary means of bringing Class II and IV items, personnel and mail forward. Normally, two CV2 aircraft were received on a daily basis. In addition to sorties to and from base camp, one sortie per week was made to NHA TRANG to obtain medical supplies. In addition, several sorties per week of C-123 and C-130 aircraft were received for the purpose of hauling bulk cargo. Sorties and total tonnage flown by direct support CV2 aircraft were as follows:

	SORTIES	SHORT TONS
August	186	422
September	197	433
October	227	466

(h) Air Resupply: Throughout the reporting period, resupply to committed units was almost exclusively by UH-1D helicopter, while CH-47 helicopters were used to displace and resupply the artillery. The following tonnage was lifted by helicopter during the reporting period:

August	375
September	363
October	383

Total 1121 Short tons

4. MEDICAL:

a. A simplified medical evacuation request form was introduced during the reporting period. It simplified and expedited medevac requests. (Inclosure 5)

b. Significant Diseases:

	AUGUST	SEPTEMBER	OCTOBER
Malaria	69	45	48
Scrub Typhus	0	3	2
Gastroenteritis	29	25	45
Hepatitis	0	2	4
N-P Problems	7	5	4
Venerical Disease	98	210	307

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	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
FUO	193	48	116
Respiratory Infections	3	10	11
Heat Injury	4	7	2
Skin Disorders	25	55	82

H. Civil Affairs:

1. General: During this reporting period elements of the Brigade operated in three provinces, NINH TUAN, PHU YEN and KHANH HOA. The greatest efforts in Civil Affairs/Civic Action activities were made in PHU YEN Province, where the bulk of the Brigade operated during this period. Efforts in NINH TUAN, Province, where the Brigade Rear Area is located were directed mainly towards maintaining liaison with local GVN officials and providing some limited support to local Civic Action Projects. Operations in KHANH HOA Province were limited to providing support for tactical elements of the Brigade which operated, briefly, in that Province.

2. Civil Affairs:

a. The most notable accomplishment of the Brigade in the field of Civil Affairs, during this reporting period, was the initiation of the PHU YEN Province Team Meetings. These were a regularly scheduled series of meetings between the Province Chief, all of his US Advisors (MACV, USAID, JUSPAO, OSA, and Police), and the Brigade Commander. These meetings provided a forum for frank open discussion of mutual problems and for exchange of information on the various US sponsored programs being conducted within the province. These meetings were reinforced in their effectiveness by similar meetings at the Battalion-District Level.

b. Other Civil Affairs activities included the maintenance and expansion of price stabilization, community relations, and US-GVN cooperative efforts initiated during the Brigade's entry into its current AO.

3. Civic Action activities included the following:

a. Civic Action Projects Reported:

Health and Sanitation	84
Public Works	33
Transportation	30
Labor, Commerce and Industry	20
Agriculture and Natural Resource	19
Education and Training	14
Public Affairs	30
Community Relations	53
Psychological Warfare and Communications	14
<u>Refugee Assistance Public Welfare</u>	<u>23</u>
TOTAL REPORTED PROJECTS	320

b. "Medicine Show" operations were only conducted 3 times during this reporting period. Difficulties encountered in conducting this

* "Medicine Show" - A high impact, short duration operation built around a visiting MEDCAP (Medicial Civic Action Program) team and including security forces, psychological operations and intelligence personnel. These operations attempt, while performing civic actions, to influence the people towards GVN and gain information concerning the hamlet VC infrastructure.

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type of operation were:

- (1) Lack of troops to secure the operations.
- (2) District Officials being unwilling to divert effort from the conduct of the rice harvest.
- (3) A shortage of MEDCAP supplies.

c. These operations were a combined US/RVN operation which included civic action, psychological warfare, and intelligence personnel and which had the mission of:

- (1) Conducting civic action.
 - (2) Gathering intelligence information.
 - (3) Conducting psychological operations.
 - (4) Getting the local GVN officials closer to the people.
- One of the operations was fairly successful and resulted in 4 VC KIA (BC), 5 VC captured and 11 suspected VC being arrested by the National Police.

d. Using plans obtained from the "Remote Area Handbook", specifications were drawn up, plans made, and contracts let, for the procurement of 10 "Eagle Brand" hand operated washing machines. The purpose of this project was multifold:

- (1) To provide washing machines for local institutional (orphanage, dispensary and hospital) use.
- (2) To stimulate the local economy.
- (3) To help establish a new product which could be locally manufactured and sold.

e. A Brigade Voluntary Civic Action Fund and Fund Council was established. This should prove useful in raising funds for certain civic action projects which cannot be financed by appropriated funds.

f. The major civic action project of the Brigade during this period was the support and protection of the fall PHU YEN Province rice harvest. A total of 17343.5 metric tons of rice were harvested and reported. This represents 89% of the original Province harvest goal of 19500 metric tons. They were furnished 6 2½ tons trucks from 3 September to 25 October and 1 light tactical raft from 13-21 September to support the rice harvest. Local officials expressed satisfaction for the protection provided the rice harvest. It is believed that only a minute portion of the harvest fell into Viet Cong hands.

g. During this period, Team 9, 1st Civil Affairs Company was detached from operational control of this Brigade. This leaves only one Civil Affairs Team (CA Team 15, 1st CA Co) attached to this Brigade. This, in view of the widely separated areas covered by the Brigade, leaves the Brigade somewhat understaffed for Civil Affairs operations.

I. Chemical.

1. Chemical support provided was principally in the offensive use of Riot Control Agents (RCS) and continual flame thrower preparation. The Brigade only used one method of RCA dissemination during the reporting period, delivery of M7 A1 CS filled grenades by expended 2.75 inch rocket pods from low flying UH-1D helicopters.

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2. One extensive tunnel system was discovered containing about 1400 meters of deep tunnel. After thorough searching and mapping by engineers, the tunnels were contaminated with CS and sealed by explosives. Approximately 350 pounds of bulk CS were used in this operation, extending over a four day period. During this tunnel operation the MITY MITE blower was used to a limited degree since personnel were going to explore the tunnel system. There is an inherent danger in pumping the tunnels full of colored or white smoke and then entering for a search.

3. During Operation JOHN PAUL JONES, ending on 5 September 1966, a total of three offensive strikes were conducted. All strikes were conducted using the UH-1D to drop M7 A3 CS filled grenades. The first drop was made on a secondary target since the primary had fled by the time the RCA chopper arrived. This action pointed up the need for a more responsive system since likely targets tend to disperse unless engaged quickly. This problem was solved by putting a helicopter on RCA strip alert during the day and utilizing this same ship for flares at night. The second mission was conducted on the primary target; dug-in personnel on a hill side. As a result of unusual meteorological conditions the burning CS did not drift up over the target and the results were considered to be minimal. The third mission was conducted on a suspected VC location and was made at first light. Weather conditions were perfect and the CS cloud remained in the area for approximately 20-30 minutes.

4. During Operation SEWARD only one RCA aerial mission was flown. This mission was made against suspected VC ambush sites and proved very effective in contaminating the hillside on which the ambush sites were known to be located. In addition to the RCA strike, the large tunnel complex mentioned in paragraph 2 above was discovered and destroyed during Operation SEWARD.

5. During this operation period 2 E159 Cluster, Canister, CS bomblets were obtained from the ROK units departing this area. These E159's have an area coverage of incapacitating CS of approximately 25,000 square meters. In addition to the E159's each infantry battalion was issued two (2) E8's for ground employment of RCA CS on an immediate basis.

6. On 4 October 1966 the Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division initiated a letter to the Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam concerning the present herbicide program. The present system has proven to be not as responsive as could be on certain operations to hit known VC crop in sufficient time to kill these crops. A recommendation was made that Sector FAC's be authorized to fly specially modified O-1 aircraft so they could spray VC crops at proper times. These missions would not be flown without prior approval of the Province Chief.

J. Engineers: (A Co, 326 Engr Bn Abn)

1. Operations.

a. Number of days in tactical operations: 86.

b. Primary engineer task was the sweeping of roads for mines.

Opn JOHN PAUL JONES	2000 km of road swept
Opn SEWARD	2200 km of road swept
No mines destroyed/removed: 51	

c. Attached as Tab A to Inclosure 9 to After Action Report SEWARD (Inclosure 2) is letter, Subject: Viet Cong Mines dated 23 September 1966, which outlines the Brigade experience in route mining.

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d. The Brigade discovered, explored and destroyed an extensive tunnel system in late September and the report is attached as Tab B to Inclosure 9 to After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (Inclosure 2).

2. Training.

- a. Total number of days in training: 4.
- b. 2 days devoted to assembly/disassembly of the floating foot bridge.
- c. 2 days spent in developing technique and proficiency in ladder exits from CH-47 helicopter and rappelling from cliffs. Concurrent training was conducted on familiarization and zeroing of the M-16 rifle.

3. Civic Action Projects:

- a. 85 loads of fill material were delivered and leveled for a Vietnamese school in TUY HOA.
- b. 31 loads of fill were hauled to TIN LINH Church in TUY HOA. Project was 50% complete when work was halted due to flooding of the area.

K. Signal. Signal communications instructions were conducted concurrent with operations in the following areas:

1. General radio-telephone operating procedures and communications security.
2. In installation and operations procedures and communications security.

L. Psychological Warfare: The Brigade considers the Psychological Warfare effort to be an extremely important adjunct to ground tactical operations. Leaflets are delivered primarily by a U-10 aircraft and a CH-47 aircraft, both of which are assigned to the 5th Air Commando Squadron which is based at NHA TRANG. At times, organic aircraft have been utilized to drop leaflets or broadcast Psychological Warfare tapes. During Operation JOHN PAUL JONES, 9,083,000 leaflets were dropped and 58 hours of broadcasting time was utilized. The leaflets dropped and the tapes broadcast included 8 special leaflets and 6 special tapes. During Operation SEWARD, 5,947,000 leaflets were dropped and 60 hours of broadcast time was utilized. There were 7 special leaflets and 4 special tapes made for Operation SEWARD. Operation GERONIMO I was one day old at the close of the reporting period and on that day 143,000 leaflets were dropped in support of the operation. During the interim period between Operation SEWARD and GERONIMO I there were 425,000 leaflets dropped and 2 hours of broadcast time utilized. The majority of the broadcasts were made from aircraft, however, ground mobile speaker teams have been utilized by the front line Infantry Battalions. See Inclosure 7 with Tab A to After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (Inclosure 2).

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SECTION 2 (C)

Commanders Observations and Recommendations

Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

A. General.

Although the Brigade had an excellent kill rate during the reporting period the problem remains one of target acquisition and reduced reaction time when the enemy is detected. In order to improve the kill rate in forth coming operations the Brigade will utilize the concept of "semi-guerrilla tactics" i.e., adopt guerrilla tactics during search and destroy operations until contact is made and then operate conventionally using all available firepower, mobility and reserves. The basic principles of semi-guerrilla warfare have been published for the guidance of all concerned. (See Incl 4).

B. Operations.

1. Item: Stay behind forces.

Discussion. Following the exploitation of B52 strikes battalions were extracted from the area leaving two reconnaissance platoons with seven days rations as "stay behind" forces. After three days the platoons reported infiltration of enemy forces back into and through the area. The area was assaulted again by US forces utilizing the "stay behind" forces to secure LZ's and block routes of exfiltration from the area.

Observation. A "stay behind" force should be utilized to capitalize on the enemy's tendency to return to base areas after US forces have departed.

2. Item: Exploitation of B52 strikes.

Discussion. In exploitation of B52 strikes the Brigade conducted airmobile assaults directly into the strike area within 20 minutes following the bombing. This method of exploiting strikes was effective and reduced the time required to get combat troops into the area.

Observation. By conducting rapid airmobile assaults directly into B52 strike areas the dazed enemy is given little time to reorganize or evacuate the area.

3. Item: Displacement of Company CP's.

Discussion. The VC are capable of fixing the location and internal layout of tactical CP's. Several probes will likely be made to verify their information. After careful rehearsal the VC will conduct a well supported attack on a CP to kill the maximum number of personnel and capture as much equipment as possible.

Observation. Company CP's should be relocated at least every forty eight hours.

4. Item: Interrogation techniques.

Discussion. Interrogation techniques should be oriented to the local guerrilla in addition to the conventional KEM line of questioning. Interrogation at the local guerrilla level will aid in the production of timely intelligence for the small unit commander.

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Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

Observation. The unit commander should prepare a list of questions which he would like the MI interrogator to ask the detainees and IPW teams should be attached at battalion level.

5. Item: Booby traps.

Discussion. Personnel should be extremely cautious upon discovering an obvious booby trap since it is often the bait for a more effective, better concealed booby trap.

Observation. Discovery of a comparatively obvious booby trap warrants a thorough, careful search of the area for a better concealed more effective booby trap.

6. Item: Clearing of villages.

Discussion. An effective technique which can be employed to clear a village is to surround it at night and use artillery illumination to flush out the VC.

Observation. Use of this technique catches the enemy off guard and precludes having innocent civilians hamper troop movement.

7. Item: H&I fires.

Discussion. Since a basic problem is one of target acquisition the use of routine fires has been restricted to induce the enemy to remain in the area of operations. Additionally, judicious use of H&I fires reduces questionable ammunition expenditure and the resultant logistical support. It appears tactically unsound to use routine fires at night as a defensive technique when the Brigade has superiority in force, reserves, mobility and ammunition and is actively seeking contact.

Observation. H&I fires should be used to interdict enemy egress routes when the enemy has broken contact following an engagement, known assembly areas and when enemy forces outnumber ours and are prepared to attack.

8. Item: Casualty evacuation.

Discussion. When too many troops become involved in the evacuation of KIA and MIA, tactical momentum can be lost. Casualties have occurred as a result of soldiers attempting to aid their comrades only to become casualties themselves.

Observation. Walking wounded should be used when possible to assist the seriously wounded while the troops continue attacking the enemy, driving him off and clearing the field for casualty evacuation.

9. Item: Ground Immediate Action Force.

Discussion. Frequently when reconnaissance elements make contact, enemy forces exfiltrate the area as the airborne immediate action force is being lifted into the area. When possible a ground immediate action force should infiltrate an area on foot at the same time the reconnaissance elements are inserted into the area.

Observation. Infiltration of a sizeable ground force permits immediate exploitation of enemy contacts.

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Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

10. Item: VC mining of roads in the Brigade area of operations requires a means to counter this threat.

Discussion: In spite of patrolling and ambushes, the VC continue to mine roads in order to inflict losses on friendly units. It has been found that sweeping the roads using the AN/PRC - 3 mine detector can effectively locate almost all mines, even those that have a low metal content. To be effective the sweep must be conducted on foot. During Operations JOHN PAUL JONES and SEWARD, over 5000 km of road were swept, and approximately 50 mines were discovered. The Brigade suffered no casualties and lost but one vehicle to these mines.

Observations: Careful sweeping of roads for mines can effectively counter VC efforts to inflict losses by mining of roads.

11. Item: A means of controlling sniping at sweep parties and convoy is necessary.

Discussion: In September sniping at engineer mine sweeping parties between TUY HOA and TUY AN increased. This was countered initially by increasing the flank security travelling with the sweep party. This action did screen the actual sweep party, but the flank security became engaged almost daily and the intensity of these engagements increased in late September. During a particularly sharp encounter, tactical airstrikes were called in on the area from which the enemy fire was coming. A three day search and destroy operation was mounted in the area immediately thereafter. Although flank security was maintained, the sniping activity significantly decreased.

Observation: Sniping at convoys and sweep parties can be at least partially controlled by concerted counter actions with troops and/or airstrikes. Particularly, these measures include the use of cavalry units with convoys, cavalry platoon on strip alert, FAC or AO overhead, and the commander of the cavalry troop controlling from an H-13.

12. Item: A means was required to destroy/deny a large tunnel complex.

Discussion: The tunnel complex, with a total length of 1400 meters, was dug in very strong, stable soil. The tunnels were about 5x3 feet in cross-section and had 12 to 17 feet of overhead cover. Reports indicated that the gas generator tunnel destruction kit was not effective in destroying tunnels with more than six feet overhead cover. Initial test shots indicated that collapsing the tunnels with conventional demolition would not be practical. Bags of CS powder were used to contaminate the tunnel interiors and conventional demolitions were used to close all entrances, thus preserving the effectiveness of the contamination.

Observations: CS powder and conventional demolitions can be used to deny/deny large tunnel systems.

13. Item: Land lines of communications are required for supply routes and movement of heavy vehicles in all weather.

Discussion: During the monsoon season the bypasses which were completely satisfactory in the dry season became completely impassable to traffic. Fords which have been a matter of inches deep become torrents, in one case rising from 18 inches to more than 7 feet in less than 3 hours. In one location, large culverts were washed out three days in succession before attempts to maintain the bypass by culverts were

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Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

abandoned. Bridging the gaps above the high water mark was the only way to insure uninterrupted traffic flow. In one case, the hurried installation of a light tactical raft crossed a limited number of vehicles over a "ford" that had become ten feet deep.

Observation. During the monsoon season, fords and bypasses are only fair weather friends. Bridges and, in some cases, rafts provide the only dependable means of crossing traffic in all weather.

C. Intelligence:

1. Item: Enemy logistical shortages.

Discussion: The enemy is consistently short of medical supplies. This shortage has caused an exceptionally high rate of malaria among the enemy forces. In addition, VC and guerrilla troops are often armed with only grenades indicating a shortage of weapons among these forces. Interrogation reports and discoveries of weapons caches lend credence to the possibility that ammunition stores are in demand. The enemy, whether VC or NVA forces, traditionally has no intent to engage in sustained combat.

Observation. The lack of supplies does not have as great an impact on enemy forces as might be believed since their tactics are not based on sustained engagements. Although their recuperative powers are inferior, compensation is offered by the fact that contact on well established lines is non-existent, offering the enemy ample time to refit and reorganize at his leisure. His tendency, whether by choice or otherwise, to carry a small basic load is a distinct vulnerability.

2. Item: Duration of engagements.

Discussion. The tactics of the enemy are to avoid major contact unless he is assured of an overwhelming advantage. Normally this would include night combat, with poor visibility, and the absence of friendly artillery. Thus success in obtaining enemy kills and enemy weapons is most often obtained in short meeting engagements.

Observation. Since the enemy is bent upon avoiding sustained combat all efforts must be made to obtain maximum results from all meeting engagements. Commanders must advocate aggressive and immediate actions to preclude abrupt loss of contact and subsequent escape of the enemy.

3. Item: Food procurement by enemy forces.

Discussion. Visual reconnaissance and photographic coverage has clearly illustrated large numbers of cultivated areas and herds of cattle in unpopulated and unexploited territories. These areas are undoubtedly a source of enemy food. Denial from major productive areas has had significant effects upon enemy stores, however, it has far from starved the enemy. Observed areas of food production must also be denied the enemy.

Observation. The use of crop destruction and defoliation are a means whereby additional pressure can be applied to the enemy. Cattle in unfriendly territories should be extracted, or, when that is not feasible, destroyed by GVN forces.

4. Item: Use of LPW teams.

Discussion. The recent change in processing, categorizing, and

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Part I Observations (Lessons Learned)

handling of prisoners has resulted in modifications of operational procedures. All prisoners must be categorized by qualified Brigade personnel and appropriately processed. This system necessitates the transport of large numbers of prisoners to the Brigade CP and taxes both their facilities and IPW personnel. The dispatch of IPW teams to operating battalions serves to alleviate most of this problem.

Observations: The employment of IPW teams with committed battalions serves the dual purpose of providing immediate tactical interrogations as well as screening prisoners to determine their status.

5. Item: Liaison with allied elements.

Discussion: Daily visits with CIDG Camps and District Headquarters are conducted by members of the intelligence staff. Information obtained is often dated slightly and of varied reliability, however, experience in dealing with these sources soon prove their worth. These visits also serve to effect operational liaison and maintain rapport with these elements. Often it is possible to have CIDG units or Apache Teams conduct missions which augment our own capabilities.

Observation: These liaison visits have done much toward supplementing our intelligence picture within the AO.

D. Logistics:

Item: Medevac Request Form.

Discussion: The original form for aerial medevac request included 14 line entries. This created delays and confusion when requesting a medevac, particularly if communications were poor or were relayed through another station. The medevac request form was greatly simplified and reduced to only 7 critical entries. This increased the responsiveness of the medevac system and eliminated confusion.

Observations: Routine report format must be kept as simple as possible, particularly when widely used at the lowest level. (See Incl 5).

E. Personnel:

Item: Interpreters.

Discussion: There are insufficient ARVN interpreters. Although the Brigade has requested 23 ARVN interpreters, not more than 15 were present for duty during the quarter. In order to supplement military interpreters, the Brigade has hired civilians through the permanent hire system. To date, nine civilian interpreters have been hired to be used in nonhazardous positions. Military interpreters formerly occupying these positions have been reassigned to combat elements.

Observation: Hiring of civilian interpreters is an effective means of augmenting ARVN interpreters.

PART II. Recommendations.

A. That a minimum of four flyable CH-47 helicopters be provided to the Brigade where supporting artillery is to be moved by an air route and

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forward logistical supply points are established where no land LOC is available.

Action Taken: Request made to CG, I Field Force Vietnam and approved.

B. That the use of ARVN CIDG and other indigenous para-military forces (RF and PF units) in cooperation with US Forces continue to be maximized to conserve and augment the forces available to a US commander as well as to improve the training, aggressiveness, and confidence of the Vietnamese unit.

Action Taken: Maximum utilization is being made of para-military and ARVN forces in all possible situations.

C. That consideration be given to limiting the use of CBU in air strikes throughout Vietnam. A high percentage of the bomblets do not explode and are later picked up by the Viet Cong and used in making booby traps and mines.

Action Taken: Request by TWX 9-397A dtd 29 Sep 66 from 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division through Headquarters, I Field Force to United States Army Vietnam with information to 7th Air Force. Approval has been granted by Headquarters, 7th Air Force to exclude the use of CBU in missions flown in support of I Field Force tactical units.

D. That preparation of an LZ with Arty and Tac Air need not be habitually used since it is an indication to the enemy that we are going to make an airmobile assault in the area and this gives him an opportunity to prepare to assault US troops landing in the area or flee the location.

Action Taken: LRRP or Battalion Reconnaissance forces are being inserted approximately one day's march from proposed LZ. If the Reconnaissance element encounters VC in the LZ area an alternate LZ is designated. The objective is to enter the battle area clandestinely and surprise the enemy.

5 Incl:

- 1 - After Action Report, Operation JOHN PAUL JONES
- ✓ 2 - After Action Report, Operation SEWARD
- ✓ 3 - Staff Study and General Order, Reorganization of Base Camp
- ✓ 4 - CG letter "Semi-guerrilla Tactics" dated 20 October 1966
- ✓ 5 - Medevac Mission Request Form 117R 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div

Willard Pearson
WILLARD PEARSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Not rec'd in DA

Limited copies, not included

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AVFA-00-HIST (12 Nov 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October
1966, RCS CSFOR - 66 (C)

Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96350 23 DEC 1966

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington D. C. 20310

Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO US
Forces 96307

1. (C) Reference Section 1, para e (2). This headquarters recommended by indorsement to letter HQ, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, dated 31 October 1966, that the 1:25,000 basic photo coverage of South Vietnam be reinstituted. The time required to obtain photo coverage varies according to priority assigned and the weather. For example, new coverage Priority II requires three to seven days, while new coverage Priority IX takes one day. Photography for areas which have been covered previously within 60 days can be obtained in one day. The G2 Air is now included in planning conferences for all operations. Necessary photography is requested at that time for the AO. Trail studies and LZ/DZ studies are made from new or recent photography. Under normal conditions, adequate basic photo intelligence of the AO should be in the hands of the units in sufficient time for planning.

2. (U) Reference Section 1, para 3 a (1). As a result of liaison visits and personal contacts with USAFV, 1st Log and CBSC, and by providing assistance with I FFORCEV aircraft resources, the shortages of starches, ground coffee, fresh vegetables, ice, condiments, sugar and other items were alleviated by the end of the reporting period.

3. (U) Reference Section 1, para 3 a (4). Cluster, star, ground is in short supply and appears on USAFV's ASR. Grenades, hand, smoke yellow, green and violet have been periodically in short supply. CBSC Ammo Section advises that they are presently on hand at the ASP and have been shipped to the Tuy Hoa Sub Area.

4. (U) Reference Section 1, para 4 b. The malaria figures represent only cases diagnosed in the unit's medical company. Other cases found among patients evacuated to hospitals without prior diagnosis established, bring the malaria totals to: August 117, September 115, and October 67.

5. (U) Reference Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Seward, para 4 b, page 4-3 and para 5 b, page 4-4. Operation Seward covered a large area with extensive troop dispersion justifying the use of two

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medevac helicopters. Although the flying time averaged approximately two hours per day per aircraft, the requirement of two simultaneous medevac ships occurred frequently. The future employment of medevac helicopters should be contingent upon troop dispersion, size of the AO and amount of contact. Back up helicopters were on call from Nha Trang to reinforce the unit stand-by aircraft if needed for this operation.

6. (C) Reference Section 1, para I 6. Reply from COMUSMACV, dated 20 November 1966, stated that while the recommendation to use C-1 aircraft might be feasible, approval at Country team level would be required.

7. (C) Reference Section I, para H g. The attachment of CA teams by the 41st Civil Affairs Company is presently under study. It is expected that only one CA team will remain with the brigade.

8. (C) Reference Section 2 (C) Part I, para B7: Interdiction fire should be selective, coincident with factual intelligence data and exploited by friendly troop maneuver. The policy of selective fire, as reported by 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div, insofar as pertains to interdiction is reasonable and well founded. The "quiet battlefield" concept when applied to harassing fire is, however, subject to further discussion. In application, continued use of selective harassing fire has amounted to practically no harassing fire. Harassing fire designed to interrupt an enemy's freedom of movement, disturb him, to lower his morale, to inflict casualties and/or the threat of casualties have a definite value which was established in Korea and which has been confirmed in Vietnam. The 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div has, at times, employed a continuing heavy program of harassing artillery and mortar fire. During Operation Paul Revere III, heavy harassing fire was delivered daily by artillery with 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and it is significant to note that enemy activity in this area of operations was quite low. This cannot, of course, be totally ascribed to heavy harassing fire; however, the creditability of heavy harassing fire program is to be accorded some substantiation. The selective "quiet battlefield" policy of harassing fires as applied by the reporting unit and the opposite policy of continuous and heavy harassing fires have value and application in the counterinsurgency environment. Both policies are of merit and, to be truly effective, should be employed interchangeably.

9. (C) Reference Tab B to inclosure 9 to After Action Report of Operation Seward; subject: Tunnel Destruction/Denial. Under the circumstances described by the reporting unit, attempting to destroy tunnel

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complexes with the 175-mm gun or the 8-inch howitzer represents an injudicious employment of these weapons. The ranges involved and their concomitant large range probable errors, coupled with the tunnel design and construction, virtually precluded any chance of success. This is further substantiated by the fact that large amounts of explosives, purposefully placed by ground parties, also failed to destroy the complex. Destruction missions by heavy artillery weapons must be carefully considered and executed. Of principal importance to the success of such mission is proper selection of weapon, range and, concurrently, the reduction of range probable error. In addition, a realistic evaluation of the target and its vulnerability must be accomplished.

10. (C) Reference paragraph 16, inclosure 1, After Action Report Operation John Paul Jones. At the present there are five aircraft equipped with hoist. The Commanding Officer, 498th plans to modify all aircraft for hoist capability as soon as modification kits are available.

11. (U) Reference paragraph 2 a (3), inclosure 4, After Action Report Operation Seward. The problem concerning contaminated AVGAS has been corrected and steps taken to prevent recurrence.

12. (C) Reference paragraph 3 a, inclosure 4, After Action Report Operation Seward. Twenty four each, 3 KW AC generators are on requisition for 1/101st Abn Div. Expected availability date is late February 1967.

13. (C) Reference paragraph 3 c, inclosure 4, After Action Report Operation Seward. The problems of communication between Typhoon and Strike while located at Tuy Hoa were not unique. The problem of VHF systems stem from excessively long radio paths and mountainous terrain obstructing radio paths. Plans are being implemented to extend higher quality VHF and microwave systems to the Tuy Hoa/Pan Hiep area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Paul A. Bowles
PAUL A. BOWLES
LTC, AGC

Adjutant General

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COMBAT OPERATIONS
AFTER ACTION REPORT

OPERATION
SEWARD

1st BRIGADE
101st
AIRBORNE DIVISION



DIPLOMATS
AND
WARRIORS

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INCL 2 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

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6 November 1966

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (RCS:
MACV J3-32) (U)

THRU: Commanding General
I Field Force Vietnam
APO 96350

TO: Commanding General
US Military Assistance Command Vietnam
ATTN: J343
APO 96243

1. (U) Name of Operation: Operation SEWARD.
2. (U) Dates of Operation: 5 September through 25 October 1966.
3. (U) Location: PHU YEN Province.
4. (U) Command Headquarters: 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
5. (U) Reporting Officer: Brigadier General Willard Pearson, Commanding General, 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.
6. (C) Task Organization: The task organization of the Brigade at the initiation of Operation SEWARD was as shown below. The only significant changes to this organization during the operation were the detachment of the 5/27 Arty on 1 October and the termination of operational control of the 1/22 Inf on 13 October.

<u>1/327 Inf</u>	<u>Bde Troops</u>
<u>2/327 Inf</u>	Bde HHC (-)
<u>2/502 Inf</u>	A 2/17 Cav
	A 326 Engr
	LRRP
<u>1/22 Inf</u>	MP Plat (-)
<u>2/320 Arty</u>	181 MI Det
	20 Cml Det
B 1/30 Arty	22 Mll Hist Det
	101st Avn Sec
<u>5/27 Arty</u>	Tactical Air Control Party
	406 RED
<u>Spt Bn FSE</u>	

7. (C) Supporting Forces:
 - a. 2/320 Arty: Employed in a direct support role.
 - b. B 1/30 Arty (OPCON): Provided general support (reinforcing) fires during the operation.

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c. 5/27 Arty (-): Provided general support fire during the operation.

d. 10th Army Avn Bn: Provided two airmobile companies in general support of the operation. These helicopters flew troop lift, combat support and resupply missions.

e. 179th Avn Co: Provided two flyable CH-47 aircraft on a mission support basis for use in displacing and resupplying artillery units.

f. 183 Avn Co: Provided four and five O-1 aircraft for visual reconnaissance, artillery adjustment and radio relay.

g. 5th Air Commando Squadron: Provided airlift support for Psy War Ops.

h. 245th Psy Ops Co: Provided one loudspeaker and leaflet dissemination team in direct support.

i. 7th US Air Force: Flew 144 tactical air missions totaling 306 sorties; of these missions 18 were preplanned and 126 were immediate. The immediate strikes were requested through the Air Force Direct Air Request Net and the average response time from the initiation of the requests until time-over-target was twenty minutes. The results of these missions included 9 KBA (BC), 52 KBA (EST), 78 structures destroyed, 68 structures damaged, 2 automatic weapons positions destroyed, 7 automatic weapons positions damaged, 2 boats sunk, 2 boats damaged, and trench complexes damaged.

j. 45th Engr Gp: Provided general support along Highways 1, 6B and 7B.

k. 498th Med Det (Aml): Provided responsive, rapid evacuation support to the Brigade throughout the operation.

8. (U) Intelligence: See Inclosure 1, Intelligence.

9. (C) Mission: Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam directed the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to conduct operations to protect the rice harvest in the TUY HOA and TUY AN areas; to conduct search and destroy operations to locate VC/NVA forces in the AO; and to provide security from VUNG RO Bay to TUY HOA.

10. (C) Concept of Operation: Offensive search and destroy tactics were generally used throughout Operation SEWARD to include securing the rice harvest areas. The four maneuver battalions available to the Brigade were generally utilized by protecting the TUY AN rice harvest with one battalion, protecting the rice harvest in the HIEU XUONG Valley with one battalion, securing the VUNG RO Bay/Pass area with a third battalion, and having a fourth battalion as an immediate action force to exploit any contact or suspected enemy locations elsewhere in the AO. See Inclosure 2 (Operation Schematics) Tabs A, B, and C.

11. (C) Execution:

a. Operation SEWARD was characterized by counter guerrilla tactics, primarily encompassing small unit actions and frequent contact with small enemy forces. The search and destroy tactics utilized consisted of saturation patrolling, night movement, night ambushes, raids and the use of small unit stay behind forces and small unit immediate action forces. The terrain over which operations were conducted included

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mountainous jungles, rolling hills, dry and inundated rice paddies, sand dunes and beaches.

b. SEWARD was initiated concurrently with the termination of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES at 050500H September 1966. Brigade units were already deployed in the operational area.

c. At the beginning of SEWARD the 1/327 Inf (-), previously deployed as the 1 FFORGEV reserve to NINH HOA, continued search and destroy operations to counter enemy threats in that area. Company A, the Mortar and Reconnaissance Platoons 1/327 Inf remained at TUY HOA to protect the rice harvest in the HIEU KUONG Valley. The 2/327 Inf continued the protection of the rice harvest and conducted search and destroy operations in the TUY AN area. Concurrently, search and destroy operations were conducted by the 2/502 Inf northwest of TUY HOA. Defense of critical terrain and security of the VUNG RO Bay/Pass area was provided by the 1/22 Inf which was under the operational control of the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div (See Inclosure 2, Tabs A and B). On 7 September, A Troop, 2/17 Cav conducted an amphibious assault with one platoon northeast of TUY HOA establishing blocking positions in support of the search and destroy operations of the remainder of the troop. The 1/327 Inf (-) departed NINH HOA between 8 and 10 September after being relieved by Company F 1/22 Inf, and returned to conduct operations in the HIEU KUONG Valley. The mission at NINH HOA was soon thereafter cancelled and Company B, 1/22 Inf returned to the VUNG RO Bay area. The 2/502 Inf was extracted on 10 September from its area of operation and the battalion minus was deployed to TU BONG to counter an enemy threat to the rice harvest storage there. Company A 2/502 Inf remained at TUY HOA South Airfield as an immediate action force. On 13 September elements of the 2/502 Inf provided security for a 45th Engr Gp convoy moving on Highway 1 from NINH HOA to TU BONG, and on 15 and 16 September the 2/502 Inf returned to TUY HOA South by helicopter and began preparation for future combat operations. On the night of 17 September the command post of Company B 2/327 Inf came under attack and was overrun by an estimated one hundred VC. Ten US troops were killed and twelve wounded in the action. The 2/502 Inf conducted an airmobile assault into an AO northwest of TUY HOA on 19 September. The LRRP was also inserted in conjunction with the 2/502 Inf and discovered a VC base camp complex. The 2/327 Inf (-) moved ooth by helicopter and overland to the southwest portion of its AO and established blocking positions in coordination with the 2/502 Inf attack. Two CIDG companies from DONG TRE provided blocking forces for these battalions. The 2/327 Inf discovered an extensive tunnel complex in the area which was mapped and then destroyed by the engineers. Between 28 and 30 September the 2/502 Inf was extracted from the DONG TRE area and moved to TUY HOA South. Based on information received from an escaped POW, the 1/327 Inf raided a VC prisoner of war camp in the southwest portion of its AO and twenty-three Vietnamese Nationals were liberated in the action on 3 October. Company C and the Mortar Platoon of 1/22 Inf was deployed by helicopter into the TU BONG area to protect the rice storage there. On 4 October the 2/502 Inf deployed by helicopter and overland by vehicle to TUY AN and assumed the mission of the 2/327 Inf. Concurrently, the 2/327 Inf deployed to TUY HOA South and began refitting and preparing for future combat operations. (See Inclosure 2, Tab C). On 7 October the 2/327 Inf conducted an airmobile assault west of TUY HOA. The battalion secured critical terrain along Highway 7B and conducted search and destroy operations in zone until 10 October when it returned to TUY HOA South. This operation was in conjunction with an engineer effort to repair the road and bridges along Highway 7B. During the period 11 and 12 October, two platoons from Company A 2/327 Inf were deployed to a location near PHAN RANG to provide security for the Air Force extraction of a downed C-130 aircraft. The 2/502 Inf conducted search and destroy

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operations in an area southwest of TUY AN during the period 10 through 16 October to exploit sightings and contacts made by LRRP teams. On 13 October the 1/22 Inf was relieved in place by the 1/8 Inf, and the 1/22 Inf deployed to PLEIKU by CV-2 and C-123 aircraft and returned to the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division. On 19 and 20 October the 1/327 Inf and 2/327 Inf, respectively, were relieved by elements of the 28th ROK Regt of their missions in the HIEU XUONG Valley and for the security of TUY HOA South Airfield. On 21 October Company A 2/327 Inf conducted an airborne assault west of TUY HOA to provide security for engineer work parties repairing Highway 7B. Operation SEWARD terminated at 2400 hours 25 October following the relief of the 2/502 Inf in the TUY AN area by the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div.

12. (C) Results:

a. The 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div accomplished its mission of protecting the TUY AN and HIEU XUONG Valley rice harvests securing the VUNG RO Bay/Pass area, and conducting search and destroy operations to locate and destroy VC and NVA forces in the AO.

b. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy during the operation: 230 VC/NVA KIA (BC), 142 VC/NVA KIA (EST), 9 VC/NVA KBA (BC), 52 VC/NVA KBA (EST), 6 NVAC, 34 civil defendants, 2 VCC, 871 detainees, and 10 ralliers. In addition, 80 individual and crew served weapons, 40.5 tons of rice, ammunition and other equipment were captured.

c. Friendly losses during the operation were as follows: 26 KIA, 169 WIA.

13. (U) Administrative Matters:

a. Personnel and Administration: See Inclosure 3, Personnel and Administration.

b. Logistics: See Inclosure 4, Logistics.

c. Civic Action: The first lot of "Eagle Brand" washing machines was contracted for and delivered to the Brigade. Five of these machines have been donated to orphanages, hospitals and dispensaries in the TUY HOA area.

14. (C) Special Equipment and Techniques:

a. In order to effectively employ CS agents and flamethrowers, teams were made available at Brigade level to be employed on an "on-call" basis. A helicopter rigged for CS employment and charged flamethrowers were maintained on a thirty minute standby.

b. 1000 and 2000 pound bombs with instantaneous fuses are good expedients for clearing landing zones in certain types of jungle terrain. With the 1000 pound bomb, clearing team work is still required to improve the landing zone; however, the 2000 pound bomb can be expected to create a clearing sufficient to land one UH-1 helicopter. The use of an instantaneous fuse clears the vegetation with a nominal ground cratering effect.

c. Unloading troops by ladder from a CH-47 helicopter is an extremely slow process, and normally only landing zone clearing teams should be unloaded in this manner. When on a resupply mission where landing zones are not readily accessible, the majority of the items can be free dropped to the units and the more sensitive items can be lowered by rope.

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d. The Brigade artillery while training teams continued training of indigenous forces during the period.

15. (C) Commanders Analysis:

a. Lessons Learned:

(1) When units are operating in a limited area, patterns of action must not be established. Tactical techniques must be varied in order to prohibit enemy forces from anticipating friendly movement or reaction.

(2) Company command posts must be relocated at least every forty-eight hours to safeguard against the enemy fixing the location and conducting raids. Enemy probing action against such locations at night is likely to be followed by an attack.

(3) When small units are halted for any extended period of time, every precaution must be taken, to include extensive use of LP's, OP's and early warning devices, to preclude a surprise enemy attack.

(4) The VC frequently, having conducted a successful operation at one location, will return to the location at a later date to conduct an identical operation. This applies particularly to raids and ambushes.

(5) When a patrol moves for an extended distance, consideration should be given to establishing hasty ambushes at irregular intervals behind the patrol. In many instances this technique will prove successful in surprising and destroying a following enemy.

(6) Units must insure that available communications are separated into two or more locations. In the event communication facilities at one location are destroyed by the enemy, an alternate means of communication will still exist.

(7) Following the extraction of friendly forces from an area of operation, the enemy frequently infiltrates back into the same locations from which he was previously routed. The technique of leaving a small "stay behind" force in the area, following the extraction of the majority of the unit, is often successful in trapping the returning enemy.

(8) IFW teams should be attached at battalion level in order to speed the segregation and processing of detainees.

(9) Interrogation techniques should be oriented on the local guerrilla in addition to the conventional EEI line of questioning. This can best be accomplished by having the unit commander prepare a list of questions which he would like the MI interrogator to ask the detainee.

(10) When clearing teams are required to clear a helicopter landing zone, valuable time can be saved by having an aviation representative present to provide guidance.

(11) Personnel should be extremely cautious upon discovering an obvious booby trap. This is often just bait for a better concealed, more effective booby trap.

(12) An effective technique which can be employed to clear a village is to surround it at night and use artillery illumination to flush out the VC. This method catches the enemy off guard and precludes

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having innocent civilians hamper troop movement.

(13) During the monsoon season, fords and by-passes are only fair weather friends. Heavy rains and rapid runoff make it virtually impossible to satisfactorily install culverts to maintain by-passes. The only satisfactory answer is bridging, or in some cases, rafting.

(14) The standard Medevac Request Form was revised by the Brigade to reduce the number of items from fourteen to seven. This revised form has proven to be simpler and more efficient than the old form.

b. Commanders Notes:

(1) Although the Brigade had an excellent kill rate in Operations JOHN PAUL JONES and SEWARD (208 VC KIA (BC) 239 VC KIA (BC) respectively. Our biggest problem has been and remains one of target acquisition. Our second major problem is the need to reduce reaction time once the enemy is detected.

(2) To improve our kill rate during forthcoming operations, battalion commanders and the cavalry troop commander will fully exploit, develop, and utilize the concept of "semi-guerrilla tactics". By this I mean we must become more like guerrillas, i.e., adopt guerrilla tactics, during search and destroy operations until contact is made. Then we remove the cloak of being a guerrilla and operate conventionally using all available firepower, mobility, and reserves.

(3) Listed below are some techniques of stealth, deception, and surprise which I desire be employed more fully in our forthcoming operations. I am confident that the airborne soldier, once imbued with the necessity to "out-guerrilla the guerrilla", will, with his native ingenuity and resourcefulness, devise additional effective techniques and tactics.

(a) Clandestine Entry into the Battlefield: Move into the battlefield by foot rather than ride by helicopter, the noise and sight of which reduce the possibility of surprise. Enter the battlefield at night.

(b) Night Operations: Steal the night away from the guerrilla. Night airmobile assaults, ambushes, patrols, and movement must become routine.

(c) Stay Behind Forces: When a unit is extracted following an engagement, leave or insert a stay behind force on the battlefield.

(d) Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP's): More aggressive and frequent employment on long range missions. Insert at dusk or dawn along likely avenues of enemy movement; vary on occasion by insertion overland and resupply by air drop. Experiment with platoon size LRRP's to provide for an immediate offensive capability when enemy is sighted.

(e) Reinforce Rather than Extract: When a stay behind force or a LRRP makes contact, plan to reinforce promptly rather than extract. For this, employ an immediate reaction force (platoon) on air strip alert with helicopters on stand-by, or insert platoons in advance on the ground concurrently with the LRRP or stay behind unit. The platoon and helicopter pilots on air strip alert must be briefed in as much detail as possible and motivated to react promptly.

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(f) Reaction Force: Since the helicopter reveals the presence of US forces, ~~the~~ ships should not be the first helicopters in the area in which a reaction force is to be committed. As long as there is excellent radio communications, the first helicopter in the area should carry combat troops. Upon arrival at an LZ the reaction force should promptly move out to block enemy escape routes while final coordination is being made between the unit on the ground and the reaction force commander.

(g) Limit Helicopter Traffic: Provide stay behind forces, LRRP's, and units entering battlefield clandestinely with a minimum of 3 to 5 days rations to obviate need for helicopter resupply which promptly telegraphs to the enemy the presence of our forces. Prior to contact with the enemy use helicopters for medevac or tactical emergencies only.

(h) Resupply Techniques: Unlike the VC guerrilla who lives off the land, we are limited in our clandestine operations by the bulk and weight of C rations which limit the number of days our troops can operate without resupply by helicopter. The following are suggested ways to solve this problem:

1. Use LRRP rations when available or in combination with C rations.

2. Use rice and powdered soup alternately with C rations or the LRRP rations.

3. Cache supplies and operate clandestinely from a base carrying only one day's supplies on the soldier.

4. Resupply by helicopter at night.

5. Resupply during the day with the helicopter flying nap of the earth and supplies "kicked" out onto a DZ.

(i) Silence the Battlefield: Eliminate artillery R&I fires, long range artillery, and Tac Air strikes near friendly troops unless promptly exploited by ground forces.

(j) Dummy Position: Construct and occupy obvious positions during daylight hours and then abandon them during the hours of darkness to move to ambush sites or to attack suspected enemy positions.

(k) Doubling Back: Move out from a position in the afternoon and after darkness falls, radically change direction of march to attack a preselected target before dawn.

(l) Use of Trails: "Beat the bush" rather than move along main trails. The enemy employs trail watchers along main trails where he can generally observe advancing troops. Search along secondary and tertiary trails used by game which offer the guerrilla excellent concealment as well as an escape route.

(m) Springing the Trap: When feasible, follow or observe a single or small party of enemy to locate larger forces or determine critical intelligence such as enemy positions, supply points, CP's, etc. Maneuver forces to ensure closing the trap and killing or capturing the enemy force involved. Move on a wide front supported by reserves and firepower.

(n) Cordon and Search: Encircle a village at night as secretly as possible, then search at first light using PF, RF, or ARVN

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forces. Rehearse using same forces until this type operation can be accomplished effectively. Consider use of stay behind forces after the search.

(o) Improve Marksmanship: Marksmanship is extremely important in fighting guerrillas. Generally the enemy will offer only fleeting glimpses of himself while trying to escape the advancing US soldiers. Therefore, if a continuous and supervised marksmanship program is established -- each man firing 20-40 rounds daily except when on clandestine operations -- the enemy casualty statistic will rise, enemy morale will be lowered, and the enemy will be forced to engage US troops at a maximum range. This will reduce the effectiveness of his fire and give us time to commit immediate reaction forces.

(p) Improve Effectiveness of the Sniper: Greater emphasis should be placed on the role of the sniper. Too often we receive reports of the enemy escaping at ranges of 400-500 meters. A well trained sniper should be able to kill or wound the enemy at that range. Platoons should habitually employ the sniper.

(q) Counter Enemy Snipers: Enemy snipers are a great deterrent to US morale. Therefore, companies should organize sniper killer teams to operate semi-independently to harass the enemy. A sniper with a sniper rifle and telescopic sight could selectively kill while another team member adjusts artillery on the target.

(r) Specialized Training: To be successful guerrillas, troopers must be instilled with patience and taught the fundamentals of camouflage, concealment, light and noise discipline, and to remain still for long periods of time. Too often a potentially effective ambush is prematurely disclosed by coughing, scratching, movement to relieve oneself and other restless activities. Our troops camouflage at night but seldom camouflage for day operations. Training should give added emphasis to proper conduct of the individual during ambush operations.

(s) Squad Area of Operations: Consistent with communications capabilities, emphasize squads operating in areas of operation for 3 days without resupply. For example, one company operating by squads in zones, separated but mutually supporting, can cover a large area with thoroughness and stealth. Mission of squads: ambush at night, observe during daylight, and engage small enemy groups. Upon locating a significant enemy force the platoon/company consolidates on the squad to fix the enemy and the battalion (-), standing by as an immediate reaction force, is brought to bear on the enemy to destroy him.

(h) Once contact is made react rapidly with all available firepower and reinforcements without further regard to deception, stealth, or surprise. Following the engagement with the enemy, revert to semi-guerrilla tactics until a subsequent contact is made.

16. (C) Recommendations:

a. That a minimum of four flyable CH-47 helicopters be provided to the Brigade when supporting artillery is to be moved by an air LOC and forward logistical supply points are established where no land LOC is available and that a minimum of two med evac helicopters be provided as discussed in Inclosure 4 (Logistics).

b. That the use of ARVN, CIDG and other indigenous para-military forces (RF and PF units) in cooperation and coordination with US forces continue to be maximized to conserve or augment the forces available to a US commander, as well as improve training, aggressiveness and confidence of the Vietnamese units.

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c. That consideration be given to investigating apparent high dud rate of CBU in air strikes throughout Vietnam. It appears that a high percentage of the bombs do not explode and are later picked up by the VC and used in making booby traps and mines.

d. This Brigade continues to recommend O-1 aircraft, equipped with spray tanks, be made available to province and sector for immediate and selective use in crop denial. This will eliminate long delays in obtaining approval and insure greater responsiveness.


WILLARD PEARSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

Inclosures:

- 1-Intelligence
- 2-Schematic Diagram of Operation
- 3-Personnel and Administration
- 4-Logistics
- 5-Communications
- 6-Civil Affairs
- 7-Psy War
- 8-Artillery
- 9-Engineer

Distribution:

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- 2 - CG, USARV
- 1 - CG, USARV (ATTN: AVC Historical Division)
- 2 - CG, I FFORCEV
- 2 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
- 1 - CG
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- 1 - S1
- 1 - S2
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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

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1. (C) Terrain: The area of operations consisted of flat lowland used for the cultivation of rice; sandy beach areas bordering the South China Sea; rolling hills covered with grass and brush; and rugged forested mountains forming a northern, southern, and western barrier around the area of operations. The sparse vegetation in the lowland provided good fields of fire, but poor cover and concealment. In the mountains, the heavy forest afforded poor fields of fire, but good cover and concealment. The two main avenues of approach were along Hwy #1 (N-S) and Hwy #7 (E-W). The hydrography of the area was critical with the flooded lowlands making overland operations difficult.

2. (U) Weather: The period of the operation fell largely within the autumn transition season. Heavy rains fell as predicted on approximately twenty of the fifty operational days. Overland routes were partially flooded and air operations were restricted by the poor visibility and low ceilings. These weather conditions generally favored the enemy by concealing his activity and movement from aerial observation.

3. (C) Analysis:

a. The 5th NVA Division Headquarters remains situated in the vicinity of the Ky Lo Valley (BQ 7585). This area has not been exploited by US forces and is undoubtedly a well developed safe area in which NVA/VC forces realize complete freedom of movement.

b. The southern portion of the Hieu Xuong District is another relatively rugged and unexploited area which is presently being occupied by the 188 NVA Regiment. Discovery of two PW camps provides positive proof that PW camps are located well into enemy dominated territory and outside of friendly Artillery fans.

c. Although the total enemy strength in Phu Yen Province built up during the summer, friendly forces successfully accomplished the mission of denying enemy access to the rice produce which was harvested. The enemy, however, was able to obtain sufficient rice to sustain themselves in outlying clandestine paddies. The impact of major rice denial however, is bound to be felt during the months to come since enemy stores are significantly lower than last year.

d. The enemy has consistently returned to well known base areas via established routes and will continue to do so as long as friendly forces are not physically capable of occupying this terrain. They are thus based in areas they are familiar with, which meet logistical requisites, and allow them to maintain established local contacts. This feeling of security in the outlying areas makes the enemy particularly susceptible to a heliborne type assault in which reaction time may be sluggish.

e. It has been conclusively determined that enemy resupply is being effected from the coastal areas north of Tuy An.

f. There are indications that the local populace are responding favorable to friendly presence in Phu Yen Province. The number of informants has increased and in many cases provided accurate information leading to the discovery of enemy installations. There has also been a recent increase of enemy atrocities and terrorism used in retaliation.

g. Due to the fact that we were operating in generally the same area as Operation JOHN PAUL JONES adequate recent photo coverage of the TAOB was quickly acquired. Extensive use was made of this photography to locate small concealed LZ's and to brief LRAP personnel going into the area. In addition an extensive mosaic was made to aid in properly assessing the terrain in connection with the rice harvest in Tuy An. Due to the familiarity with the terrain, the pilots and observers were able to more readily notice small changes during visual reconnaissance. Red Haze missions are still not frequent enough or capable

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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations after Action Report, Operation SEWARD, (cont'd)

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of being controlled as to their TOT to the extent that significant intelligence can be gained.

h. The following COMSEC was provided during Operation SEWARD:

(1) 6,854 transmissions over the Command Net, Op/Intel Net, and Admin/Log Net were monitored during the period 1-15 September 1966.

(2) 3,287 transmissions through the "Strike" switchboard were monitored during the period 15 Sep - 25 Oct 1966.

(3) Telephone violations consisted of: disclosure of a VIP itinerary; compromise of a classified call sign; and disclosure of unit strength.

4. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. The location of enemy PW camps, way stations, storage areas, and base camps have often been reported but past exploitation produced negative results. Some success along these lines has been met in Operation SEWARD, particularly in one instance when a unit successfully surprised a PW camp by utilizing a devious route of entry thereby avoiding the early warning system established by the enemy. In the exploitation of entry into suspected areas all efforts should be made to utilize unorthodox means to gain maximum surprise.

b. There are indications that the enemy methods of attack on FOB's and CIDG camps may be slightly modified now. Emphasis is being placed on obtaining support from agents within the friendly perimeter. It is also anticipated that attacks will be conducted without the use of preparatory fires; the absence of preparatory fires reduces friendly reaction time.

c. The enemy has sophisticated its efforts to obtain information on friendly forces through the use of indigenous labor and friendly countermeasures must be improved.

d. With the advent of more stringent requirements in the handling of captured personnel has come added requirements for the IPW Section. It is necessary that IPW teams be attached to separate battalions in order to properly categorize captives and facilitate proper processing of these individuals.

5. (U) The following is a breakout of enemy weapons and material losses during Operation SEWARD:

a. Weapons Captured:

Mausser rifle	-	28
M-1 Garand rifle	-	4
M-1 carbine	-	19
Pistol	-	2
Flare pistol	-	1
SKS	-	8
RPG-2	-	1
M-47	-	10
M-3 36 rifle	-	1
M-1 49 SMG	-	1
Thompson SMG	-	4
M-16 rifle	-	1

b. Ammunition:

Grenades	-	65
Rifle grenade	-	1
Mines	-	16

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Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD, (cont'd)

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Claymore	-	1
Bangalore torpedo	-	4
81mm ammunition	-	2600
60mm Mortar	-	10
2.75 rocket	-	4
3.5 rocket	-	1
RPG-2 rocket	-	3
M-79	-	19
Demolitions (lbs)	-	19 lbs

c. Other:

5 gal oil cans	-	25
Generator	-	1
Motors	-	2
Cattle	-	165
Motorcycle	-	1
Threshing machine	-	1
Protective Mask	-	1
Boats (dest)	-	34
Boats (dam)	-	2
Salt (tons)	-	1.5
Fish (tons)	-	1.5
Rice (tons)	-	40.5

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Tab A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

1. (C) VC/NVA Initial Order of Battle Within 1/101 TAC:

a. At the beginning of Operation SEWARD the 95th and 188 NVA Regiments were confirmed as being present in Phu Yen Province and consequently within the 1/101 TAC. The 188 NVA Regiment was believed to be deployed in the eastern portion of Phu Yen Province (vicinity of Son Long Village, CQ - 0164) and the 95th Regiment was believed to be deployed to the west (vicinity of border of Phu Boi, Phu Yen Province BQ 6878).

b. The 95th Battalion (561st Arty Bn), 68th Arty Regiment (NVA) was confirmed in Phu Yen Province, exact location unknown.

c. The 85th VC Local Force Battalion was believed to be located southwest of Cung Son in the vicinity of BQ 9135.

d. Nine (9) District and local force units were believed to be located in the province.

2. (C) Order of Battle Findings and Summary in Operation Area:

a. Summary:

(1) The 5th NVA Division Headquarters is believed to be located in the vicinity of BQ 6892.

(2) Elements of the 95th Regiment (NVA) were contacted by 2/502 during the period 5-7 September 1966 vicinity BQ 9056.

(3) As a result of numerous "Search and Destroy" missions, personnel from elements of the 188 Regiment were captured on 8 Sep 66. Interrogation reports revealed information indicating the movement of all elements of the 188 NVA Regiment from vicinity of BQ 9656, across the Da Rang River and to the Phu Yen/Khanh Hoa Province border vicinity CQ 0225. Mission of the 188 Regiment was to move to Area 4-3 (probably northern Khanh Hoa Province) and attack ARVN/US troops in order to disrupt enemy operations permitting the acquisition of rice and food materials. See Appendix 1 for Order of Battle information pertaining to organization and strength of the 188 NVA Regiment.

(4) The 85th VC Local Force Battalion was not contacted in force during this operation. However, small elements of 377th VC Co (subordinate to 85th VC Bn) were located at CQ 115291 (20 Oct 66), BQ 030338 (8 Oct 66), BQ 960338 (9 Oct 66) and BQ 940303 (10 Oct 66). It is believed that the 85th VC LF Bn is still located vicinity of BQ 9135 with its subordinate units operating independently and separated.

(5) Elements of the 307th VC MF were contacted for the first time and as a result of detailed interrogation, information was obtained revealing dispositions of the following subordinate units: Ngoc Co - BQ 940891, Thap Co - BQ 940891, Duong Co (-) BQ 930875 on 1 Sep 66. See Appendix B for Order of Battle information pertaining to organization and strength of 307th VC MF Battalion.

(6) Small resistance groups (5-10 personnel), which were elements of the nine (9) district and local force units were contacted periodically with insignificant intelligence results.

b. Final VC/NVA dispositions at termination of Operation SEWARD are located in Appendix 3.

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Appendix 1 to Tab. A: Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
Active Action Report, Operation SEWARD

1. GENERAL INFORMATION ON 188 REGIMENT

a. HISTORY

The regiment was formed in March 1965 from cadre of the 308th Division and new recruits. In July 1965, the Regiment moved from Ha Tinh Province NVN to Quang Binh Province NVN where it began preinfiltration training. In late December 1965 the Regiment departed NVN. On 20 Jan 1966 the 188 Regiment arrived in Laos, and in early March it arrived in Cambodia Cu Fong Mt. The Regiment moved to Darlac Province in April 1966 and remained for one month. During this month the Regiment is believed to have participated in a battle in conjunction with elements of the 33rd and 66th Regiments, NVN. In May 1966 the Regt moved to Phu Yen Prov to relieve the 95th NVN Regt in place, giving the 95th a chance to reorganize after having made contact with US troops. The date of relief was reported to have been 15 June 66. During the period 20-25 June 66 the 188 Regiment sustained 459 KIA (BG) most of which were from the 7th Bn. Elements of the 188 Regt have been contacted in Hieu Xuong Valley, and at present the Regt is believed to be located on the Phu Yen Nanh Hoa border.

b. TRAINING

The 188 Regt was subordinate to the 325th NVN Div before entry into SVN. The Regt went through a 9 month training program prior to entry into SVN. This training program lasted from March to December 65. Training was conducted in the following two major areas to company level.

1. POLITICS

- The NVN
- Civilian Proselyting Policy
- Military Proselyting Policy
- Prisoners and Deserters
- War Trophies
- The Disabled and Wounded
- Hate against US Imperialists
- Land and Rice reforms
- Ethnic Minority Policy

2. MILITARY TRAINING

- Individual Combat
- Digging Trenches
- Firing Practice
- Ambush Tactics
- Raid Tactics
- Attack of Strongholds
- Attack of Helibore Operations
- Attack of Tanks
- Carrying Heavy Loads.

c. COMBAT EFFICIENCY

(1) At present the Regiment consists of 3/4 experienced personnel and 1/4 Draftees. It has been reported that there is friction between NVN and VC personnel.

(2) Morale is low because of the following reasons:

- Fear of Air Strikes
- Lack of Medical Supplies
- Lack of Food
- Prior to leaving NVN personnel are not permitted to visit

their homes.

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Appendix 1 to Tab A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations ,
after Action Report, Operation SWORD

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Malaria caused the greatest number of casualties. During the infiltration into SVN the 7th Bn lost 100 personnel who contracted malaria or deserted. Personnel who contracted malaria during infiltration were left behind. Despite losses, the regiment is a cohesive fighting organization with well trained cadre.

d. RECENT SUBORDINATION: The 188 Regt, along with the 95th NVA is subordinate to the 5th NVN Division (aka Nong Truong 5 or Agricultural Site 5), which is possibly the 325th Division. No third regiment has been identified. Last reported location of the 5th Div HQs was vic Phuoc Tan BQ 6092.

e. LOGISTICS: Front line troops carry a five day ration, and rear personnel maintain a 15 day ration supply. (1 days ration is 400 grams of rice per man). When going into combat each man carries 2 sets of pajamas, 1 set of underwear, hammock, gas mask, mosquito net and plastic sheets (raincover). Since arrival in country the 188 has had no medical resupply. Uniforms consist of Tan/Grey (Service Issue) and black (Local Issue) pajamas. Rice supply points for the regiment during May and June were at Tinh To (BQ930330) and Doc Phuong (BQ840269).

f. COVER DESIGNATIONS: The following cover designations have been used by the 188:

- (1) In NVN - Song Chu
- (2) During infiltration - Hung Dao, Cong Truong 6, Worksite 60, Infiltration Group 303 a, b, c.
- (3) Recent cover names - Hung Dao, Cong Truong 6, Worksite 60, Quang Trang, Cong Truong.
- (4) Battalions:
 - 7th - Nong Truong 2, 1st Bn, H1, H7, D204.
 - 1st Co - H31
 - 2nd Co - H32
 - 3rd Co - H33
 - 4th Co - H34
 - 8th Bn - 2nd Bn, H2, 303B, Agri. Site 8.
 - 5th Co - H35
 - 6th Co - H36
 - 7th Co - H37
 - 8th Co - H38
 - 9th Bn - 3rd Bn, 303C, Agri. Site 9, H3.
 - 9th Co - H39
 - 10th Co - H40
 - 11th Co - H41
 - 12th Co - H42
- (5) Support Companies:
 - 13th DK2 - H43
 - 14th Mort - H44
 - 15th aa - H45
 - 16th Info - H46
 - 17th Trans - H47
 - 18th Med - H48
 - 19th Engr - H49
 - 20th Recon - H50
 - Chem Unit - ?
- (6) Letter Box Designations:
 - (a) Regt HQs
 - 1 Staff - 92.201
 - 2 Pol Sec - 92.202
 - 3 Rear Service Sec - 92.203

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Appendix 1 to Tab A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

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- (b) 1st Bn - 5111/94
 1 1st Co - 92.214 (5112/94)
 2 2nd Co - 92.215 (5113/94)
 3 3rd Co - 92.216 (5114/94)
 4 4th Co - 92.217 (5115/94)

- (c) 8th Bn - 92.218
 1 5th Co - 92.219
 2 6th Co - 92.220
 3 7th Co - 92.221
 4 8th Co - 92.222

- (d) 9th Bn - 92.223
 1 9th Co - 92.224
 2 10th Co - 92.225
 3 11th Co - 92.226
 4 12th Co - 92.227

- (e) Support Units
 1 H43 - 92.205
 2 H44 - 92.206
 3 H45 - 92.207
 4 H46 - 92.208
 5 H47 - 92.209
 6 H48 - 92.210
 7 H49 - 92.211
 8 H50 - 92.212
 9 Chem - 92.204

h. WEAPONS

(1) The 183 is armed with a combination of manufactured ChiCom and Soviet weapons to include:

- (a) 82mm mortars
 (b) 12.7mm MGs
 (c) RPD 46 LMGs
 (d) AK-47s
 (e) SKS carbines
 (f) Pistols
 (g) SG-43 HMG
 (h) 75mm RR
 (i) B40

(2) - possible total of heavy weapons for the regiment is indicated below. No accurate report has been received on this matter.

WEAPON	H.1 Bn	H.2 Bn	H.3 Bn	13 Co	14 Co	15 Co	Total
82mm mortar	2	2	2		4		10
12.7mm HMG	2	2	2			4	10
75mm RR	2	2	2	4			10
HMG	6	6	6				18
B-40	4	4	4	2	2	2	12+

(3) Ammunition appears to be in adequate supply but not plentiful. Reported caches do not indicate large quantities of mortar and RR ammunition on hand and not much has been captured.

i. ACTIVITY OF REGT SINCE ARRIVAL IN PHU YEN PROVINCE:

DATE	LOCATION	UNIT
2 May	B4983675	Regt Hqs
"	B4993685	7th Bn
"	B4955705	9th Bn
"	B4838210	Rear service and Production

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appendix 1 to Tab A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
after Action Report, Operation SEMARD

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DATE	LOCATION	UNIT
19 Jun	B-926629	7th Bn
"	B-973705	9th Bn
"	C-008656	8th Bn and Regt Hqs
27 Jun	B-939564	Regt Co
Jul	B-983690	"
"	B-954605	7th Bn
"	C-060070	8th Bn
"	B-950510	9th Bn
18 Jul	B-070570	U/I Bn
22 Jul	C-000635	"
27 Jul	B-950510	"
7 Aug	"	"
9 Aug	B-927847	7th and 9th Bns
11 Aug	B-922490	U/I Bn
13 Aug	B-952553	183 Regt
15 Aug	B-932562	U/I Bn
23 Aug	B-964558	183 Regt
"	C-003473	U/I Bn
29 Aug	B-790354	U/I Co
3 Sep	B-872870	8th Bn
5 Sep	C-010290	Elements of 183 Regt
8 Sep	C-020270	7th and 9th Bns

1. STRENGTH: As of Sept 66 the strength of the 183 Regt is as indicated below.

UNIT	TOTAL STRENGTH	COMBAT UNLIFTED
183 Regt	1937	1765
7th Bn	409	377
8th Bn	409	392
9th Bn	436	398
H.43 Co (RR)	78	71
H.44 Co (Mort)	56	52
H.45 Co (Med)	107	97
H.46 Co (Sig)	68	63
H.47 Co (Trans)	157	126
H.48 Co (Med)	32	32
H.49 Co (Engr)	56	36
H.50 Co (Recon)	48	40
Regt Hqs	81	81

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
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Appendix 1 to Tab A to Inclosure I (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
after act: Report, Operation SEWARD

2. Org isational Chart, 163 NVA Regiment




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1. Organizational Chart, 307th VC Main Force Battalion.



a. The 307th VC NF Bn has a strength of approximately 300 personnel effective 4 Sep 66. Each company has approximately 100 personnel. The battalion has 2 LMG (French Tuillier) and approximately 250 rifles to include US caliber .30 M1, German Mausers, US carbines and Soviet carbines.

b. The 307th VC MF Bn was last located in vicinity B6940891 on 1 Sep 66.

c. The mission of the 307th VC MF Bn was to organize cadre in the hamlets of Phu Yen Province. The battalion was to avoid contact with the 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div at all cost.

d. Personalities:

Thap - CO of Thap Co and 307th VC MF Bn
Duong - CO of Duong Co.
Ngoc - CO of Ngoc Co
Tuan - Flat Ldr of H-3 platoon, Duong Co.
Phu - Asst Flat Ldr of H-3 platoon, Duong Co.

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appendix 3 to Tab A to Inclosure 1 (Intelligence) to Combat Operations
after Action Report, Operation SEWARD

ENEMY LOCATIONS

UNIT	LOCATION	STRENGTH	DATE
5th NVN Div HQ	BQ6892	-	22 Oct
95th NVN Regt	BQ8959	-	10 Oct
18th NVN Regt	BQ9656	1930	8 Sep
7th Bn, 18th NVN Regt	CQ 0227	400	"
8th Bn, "	CQ 0227	400	"
9th Bn, "	CQ 0227	430	"
95th Bn, 68th arty Regt	BQ7877	127	12 Aug
Duong Co, 307th VC MF Bn	BQ940891	100	4 Sep
Ngoc Co, "	BQ940891	100	"
Thap Co, "	BQ940891	100	"
U/I VC Co	CQ075935	---	5 Oct
U/I 3 VC Squads	CQ009195	---	6 Oct
"B" Concentrated platoon	CQ112934	---	15 Sep
VC Dispensary	BQ741712	30	6 Oct
U/I VC Co	BQ838845	---	28 Aug
U/I VC Bn	BQ915840	300	12 Oct
U/I VC Co	BQ684775	150	22 Sep
U/I 2 VC Cos	CQ023704	---	"
U/I VC Bn	CQ009708	---	16 Sep
U/I VC Plnt	CQ107936	---	17 Sep
U/I 2 VC Cos	CQ070703	200	12 Oct
U/I 2 VC Cos	CQ155650	200	6 Sep
U/I 2 VC Platoons	CQ093614	---	15 Sep
U/I VC Bn	CQ090595	---	24 Sep
U/I VC Bn	BQ918525	300	16 Sep
U/I VC Platoon	CQ098470	---	15 Sep
U/I VC Platoon	CQ125369	---	4 Oct
30th VC MF Bn	CQ177335	---	3 Oct

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
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57 Inclosure 2 (Operation Schematics) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation SEWARD

Operation schematics for the three phases of the operation are attached
as follows:

TAB A - Rice Harvest Protection Areas
TAB B - Period 5 Sep - 3 Oct
TAB C - Period 4 - 25 Oct


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TAB A

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
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TAB B

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TAB C

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Inclosure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

1 (C) UNIT STRENGTHS:

a. Beginning of Operation SEWARD.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the beginning of Operation SEWARD were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	4490
Assigned	5488
Present for Duty	4335
Airhead - Tuy Hoa	(3354)
Base Camp - Phan Rang	(1002)
Not Present for Duty	1153

(2) The assigned strength was 122% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 97% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the Not Present for Duty Strength; 410 were hospitalized, 403 were intransit, 237 were on TDY/SD status, 67 on leave, 22 in confinement, and 14 AWOL.

b. Conclusion of Operation SEWARD.

(1) The Brigade personnel strengths at the conclusion of Operation SEWARD were as follows:

Authorized Augmented (MTOE)	4517
Assigned	5937
Present for Duty	5057
Airhead - Tuy Hoa	(4065)
Base Camp - Phan Rang	(992)
Not Present for Duty	880

(2) The assigned strength was 131% of the augmented authorized strength. The present for duty strength was 112% of the augmented authorized strength.

(3) Of the Not Present for Duty strength; 304 were hospitalized, 310 were intransit, 158 were on TDY/SD status, 55 on leave, 21 in confinement, 9 AWOL, and 23 detached.

(4) A "Scout Dog" platoon was assigned to the Brigade on 4 September 1966, however, they did not arrive until 26 September 1966.

(5) An Army Postal unit was attached to the Brigade on 1 October. The arrival of personnel for this unit will permit better postal service in the forward area and release of troopers presently engaged in postal activities.

c. The increase in strength during Operation SEWARD was due to the arrival of 751 replacements who were reassigned to subordinate units as follows:

1/327	140	2/320	98
2/327	121	Spt Bn	71
2/502	177	Separate Companies	144

2 (C) CASUALTIES:

a. Casualties for the operation were as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
HHC-LRRP		5
1/327	3	22
2/327	9	79

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2/502	8	35
2/320	4	14
A 2/17		3
A 326 Engr	2	10
Sgt 2n	—	1
TOTAL	26	169

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b. Total casualties to date:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
317	1713	2

3 (U) PERSONNEL PROGRAMS:

a. The Red Cross Recreational Unit began an accelerated program during the operation. These young ladies made weekly visits to Tuy Hoa to distribute literature and serve in the mess lines. The response to this program has been excellent.

b. Two USO shows visited the Brigade during the period. They performed for approximately 4 hours for the troops located at Tuy Hoa South.

c. Classes were given in administration and postal operations.

d. A vigorous program to purge from unit morning reports all personnel assigned, not joined, was initiated. One hundred two personnel who on arrival in Vietnam were diverted to other units, were identified. Similarly, 187 personnel who were diverted before they departed CONUS were identified. A team from USARV visited the Brigade to identify by name every man carried not-present-for-duty. As a result of these actions over 250 personnel were dropped from the assigned strength of the Brigade.

4 (U) PERSONNEL PLANNING: Planning during the period involved the following areas:

a. Coordination continued for the scheduled rotation of approximately 900 personnel during the month of December 1966. Replacements are being closely monitored to insure their arrival is commensurate with anticipated rotational losses.

b. The Brigade hired 5 civilian interpreters to replace ARVN interpreters in administrative and rear area jobs. This will allow better utilization of ARVN interpreters attached to the Brigade.

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67 Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

1. (C) ORGANIZATION FOR SUPPORT:

a. Support Battalion:

(1) Headquarters Detachment: Provided the command and control of the Forward Support Element (FSE). It was organized into command, operations, communications and movement control elements.

(2) Supply Detachment: Was responsible for the receipt, storage and issue of all classes of supply. It also provided a rigging section.

(3) Maintenance Detachment: Provided a repair capability for small arms, artillery, engineer, automotive, signal and quarter-master equipment. It was organized into a shop office, a recovery and contact team.

(4) Co D, 326th Medical Battalion: Established a clearing station with an 80 bed capacity, a surgical section, a holding section, an emergency treatment section, and a dental section.

b. Supporting Forces:

(1) Tuy Hoa Sub Area, Cam Ranh Bay Support Command: Provided command and control of the supporting logistics area.

(2) 10th Aviation Battalion: Provided two Airmobile companies equipped with UH-1B and UH-1D helicopters for support of both tactical and logistical operations.

(3) 35th Aviation Company: Provided CV-2 aircraft to transport supplies, repair parts and personnel to and from the forward area. Inconsistent allocation of CV-2 aircraft adversely affected transportation planning and disrupted the generally smooth flow of supplies to the forward area.

(4) 179th Aviation Company Airmobile Medium provided CH-47 Helicopter Support.

(5) 498th Aviation Company (Air Ambulance); provided medical air evacuation throughout the operation.

2. (C) MATERIAL AND SERVICES:

a. Supply: Tuy Hoa Sub Area was located in the vicinity of the Brigade's Forward Support Element (FSE). This reduced movement time of supplies.

(1) Class I: "B" and "C" ration meals were consumed during the operation. Supplements to the "B" ration consisting of fresh meat, flour, bread, fresh fruit and vegetables, condiments and ground coffee were received sporadically and often in far less quantity than desired or authorized. The Brigade experienced a critical shortage of starches to include potatoes and rice. Ground coffee was unavailable for approximately five weeks. A total of 428 short tons of Class I were issued to include 104 "A" ration supplements 171,782 "B" rations and 51,040 rations of meal, combat, individual. The shortage of ice remained a problem throughout the operation. Per capita allowance of ice normally remained below one pound per man per day. The ice shortage was partly solved by the shipment of ice by "M" boat from Nha Trang to Tuy Hoa and the air transport of 4000 pounds daily from Nha Trang to Tuy Hoa South Airfield aboard the Brigades DS CV-2 aircraft. Neither expedient was able to cope with the demands of the Brigade, as all ice so obtained was shared with the rapidly expanding FVMAF troop strength in the Tuy Hoa Area. The opening of a 15 ton per day ice plant by Pacific

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

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Architect and Engineer Corp greatly alleviated the problem for a short time. However the cancellation of M-boat and air shipments of ice, plus the continuing troop build-up in the Tuy Hoa area soon created a demand exceeding the plants output.

(2) Class II and IV: Support Battalion (Rear), at Phan Rang provided 43 short tons of Class II and IV items. Jungle boots and Jungle Fatigues were received in sufficient quantity to support all combat elements of the Brigade. Barrier materials were occasionally in short supply and sandbags became an especially hard to obtain item.

(3) Class III: The Tuy Hoa Sub Area provided all types of Class III and IIIA in sufficient quantity to support logistical and tactical operations. A total of 395.9 short tons of POL were issued during the operation, to include 25,200 gallons of DIESEL and 18,400 gallons of AVGAS, and 89,200 gallons of MOGAS. Contaminated AVGAS was received on three separate occasions and curtailed activities of the Brigade Aviation Section.

(4) Class V: The Brigade entered the operation with its basic load. Tuy Hoa Sub Area maintained a 4 day level of ammunition. A total of 801 short tons of Class V were issued. Yellow, green and violet smoke grenades and signal illuminating ground star clusters were in short supply throughout the operation.

(5) Water: Company A, 326th Engineer Battalion established a water point at Tuy Hoa North Airfield utilizing a 1500 GPH Erdalator. Units at Tuy Hoa South Airfield drew water from the Tuy Hoa Sub Area water point.

b. Maintenance: The Support Battalion maintenance detachment received 117 automotive, 583 signal, 269 armament, 120 instrument, 177 service and 105 engineer job orders. Of this number, all but 5 automotive, 23 signal, 3 armament, 4 instrument, 9 service and 7 engineer jobs were completed.

c. Transportation:

(1) Ground Transportation: An average of 20 - 2½ ton trucks per day were utilized in support of the Brigade.

(2) Air Transportation:

(a) Fixed Wing:

1 CV-2 aircraft flew 637 sorties totalling 8,504 PAX and 753 short tons of cargo.

2 C-123 aircraft supported the Brigade with 3 sorties for a total of 29 PAX and 14 short tons of cargo.

3 C-130 aircraft flew a total of 16 sorties carrying 400 PAX and 83 short tons of cargo.

(b) Rotary Wing:

1 Both UH-1D and CH-47 helicopters were used in support of committed forces. Normally, two CH-47 aircraft supported the Brigade on a day to day basis. Their utilization was restricted primarily to bulk hauling of artillery ammunition and Class III.

2 Army helicopters lifted a total of 3928 short tons of supplies in support of the Brigade.

d. Other Services:

(1) Graves Registration was provided by the 229th Quartermaster Company.

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD

(2) Bath facilities were provided at both Tuy Hoa North and South Airfields by the 226th Quartermaster Company.

(3) Laundry services was established at Tuy Hoa South Airfield by the 226th Quartermaster Company.

3. (C) MEDICAL:

a. The revised Medevac Request Form was used for the first time throughout an entire operation. It proved much simpler and more efficient than the older form.

b. Stringent measures were taken to reduce the incidence of malaria. Command emphasis was placed on the rolling down of sleeves at sundown, use of mosquito bars and insect repellent, continuous insecticide spraying programs, and enforced dosage of Chloroquine Primaquine and Diaminodiphenylsone (DDS). These precautions depressed the rate of malaria significantly during the month of September 1966. The extensive area of operations, combined with an increase in FVMAF troop strength overtaxed the capability of one medevac helicopter. Accordingly, an urgent request was made for additional medevac helicopters. Eventually, a "DUSTOFF" Operations Center was established with several aircraft to provide coverage throughout the area of operations.

c. Patients Treated:

(1) WIA	121
(2) KIA	26
(3) Non-Battle Injury	157
(4) Disease	563
(5) Returned to Duty	232
(6) Evacuated to Hospital	583
(7) Remain in Holding	26
(8) Total Patients Treated	841

d. Hospitalized Personnel Categorized by Wounds:

(1) Head	13
(2) Chest	9
(3) Abdomen	3
(4) Upper Extremities	55
(5) Lower Extremities	57

4. (U) SUMMARY:

a. The organization for logistical support during Operation SEWARD was adequate.

b. One medical evacuation helicopter cannot provide adequate coverage for a Brigade deployed over an extensive area of operation. Frequently, two or more medevac mission requests are received at the same time from widely separated units. The problem becomes critical if the medevac aircraft must leave the area of operations entirely to transport patients to a supporting field hospital. This necessitates diversion of

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Inclosure 4 (Logistics) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation
SEWARD

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utility helicopters for medevac backup until the medevac aircraft returns
to the area of operations.

5. (U) CONCLUSIONS:

a. Except for continued refinements the current organic organization
for support should be continued.

b. Additional medevac helicopters must be provided when the area
of operations becomes too extensive for one aircraft to support. It is
preferable that at least two medevac helicopters be provided in order to
answer two simultaneous medevac requests from widely separated points. One
medevac helicopter can then remain in the area of operations when the other
aircraft is transporting patients to a field hospital outside the area of
operations.

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Inclosure 5 (Communications) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation SAMANG (U)

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1. (U) Background:

The 1st Brigade Headquarters Company Communications Platoon and the FASC7 had the joint mission of maintaining the communications systems established during the previous operation.

2. (C) Operations:

a. VHF Section - Provided communications between Brigade CP and Battalion Trains areas at TUY HOA South Airfield and displaced the systems to the new Battalions Trains Areas in the vicinity of PHU HIEP (3).

b. Communications Center Section - Continued to provide secure teletype service to I FFORCEV. The services were expanded from a half duplex circuit to a full duplex and another half duplex circuit to enable the Brigade to handle the increased traffic. The section also continued to provide internal motor messenger service.

c. Switchboard/Wire Section - Continued to maintain the established systems. The number of local subscribers increased to 85 while terminating lateral circuits to 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div.

d. FM Radio Section - Provided FM Radio Nets within the Brigade extending retransmission stations to CHAP CHAI Mountain with relay stations at the DONG TRE and VUNG RO BAY areas.

e. AM/RTT Radio Section - Continued to operate a secure RTT Net between TUY HOA and PHAN RANG, extending secure nets to the maneuver battalions at DONG TRE and TUY AN.

f. Maintenance Section - Continued to provide maintenance support for the Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company and attachments.

g. I FFORCEV Signal Support - 51st Signal Battalion continued to provide circuits into the area system, a secure RTT to I FFORCEV, and single side band phone patch net between TUY HOA, PHAN RANG and NHA TRANG.

3. Problem areas:

a. Equipment shortages - Twelve 3KW AC generators were requisitioned on "02" priority in November 1965 and requisitioned on 23 Aug 66 as replacements for the PE75 generators, which have proved unreliable.

b. T195 transmitters continue to present critical maintenance problems. Insufficient floats are available to maintain a continuously operational system, even though all AM radios are consolidated under Brigade control.

c. Typhoon and Strike Rear telephone circuits continue to provide marginal service with numerous interruptions.

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Inclosure 6 (Civil Affairs) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation SEWARD.

1. Civil Affairs Activities during Operation SEWARD centered mainly on improving and expanding programs initiated during Operation JOHN PAUL JONES.

a. A significant step in this direction was the expansion of the weekly meetings between the Commanding General and the Province Chief to include participants from all other US Governmental agencies present in this Province.

b. There was also increased cooperation at the District - Battalion level. As the battalions spread out and started operating independently within districts, they also tied in closely with District Chiefs and MACV Sub-Sector Advisors.

c. New MACV regulations concerning categorizing civilian detainees into one of several categories were implemented during this period as were new orders concerning death, injury and property damage to non-combatants.

2. Civic Action Activities during Operation SEWARD were highlighted by the increased activities of the Battalion S-5s and the enhanced capability of the Brigade to support these activities through close ties with in country agencies and the establishment of a Brigade Civic Action Supply Point at Phan Rang.

a. This supply point was established with about 45 tons of American Christmas Truck and Train ASSN. Supplies which were shipped to the Brigade in late August 1966. By keeping this material in the Phan Rang Base Area, it can be held ready for distribution when and where needed, while not encumbering the forward elements of the Brigade with 45 tons of additional supplies to move around.

b. Some 158 Civic Action Projects were accomplished and reported during Operation SEWARD. These included:

Health and Sanitation	49
Public Work	17
Transportation	15
Commerce and Industry	1
Agriculture and Natural Resources	9
Education and Training	7
Community Relation	23
Communication	13
Refugee Assistance	14

3. Other notable events during Operation SEWARD included:

a. The detachment of VA Team 9, 41st Civil Affairs Company from this Brigade. This leaves only one Civil Affairs Team in support of this Brigade.

b. Members of the S-5 Section of this Brigade provided area familiarization and orientation training to S-5 personnel of the 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, which had just arrived in country.

c. The full rice harvest in Phu Yen Province was completed on 25 October, 1966. This Brigade had protected and supported the accomplishment of this harvest, which yielded 17,343.5 metric tons or 89% of the Province goal of 19,500 metric tons of rice.

d. A Brigade Voluntary Civic Action Fund was established and regulations governing its operations were published.

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Inclosure 7 (Psychological Warfare) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation SEWARD (U)

1. (U) Psychological Objective: Psychological Warfare activities were oriented and directed toward enemy units and friendly civilians in the operational area.

2. (C) Operation SEWARD:

a. Leaflets: A total of 5,947,000 leaflets were dropped during the operation. See Tab A for examples of leaflets representative of those used on the operation.

b. Loudspeaker: A total of 60 hours of loudspeaker appeals were delivered by USAF U-10 aircraft, HU-1D helicopter and the Ground Speaker Team. The themes used in the appeals were CHIEU-HOI, Demoralization and Rice Harvest. A total of four special tapes were made during the operation.

c. Summary. Three personalized, specialized, and localized leaflets and four special tapes were directed toward enemy units and friendly rice harvest locations in the operational area. It is believed that psychological operations, together with the violent offensive nature of the tactical situation, contributed extensively to the demoralization of surviving enemy personnel. By the closing date of the operation, a total of ten ralliers had surrendered themselves to Brigade personnel.

d. Lessons Learned:

(1) When new leaflets are produced, particularly special leaflets, at least 200 copies of the translation should be included; these copies will be used as handouts to VIP visitors.

(2) Leaflet boxes should be coated with a water resistant substance (i.e. plastic, wax, etc) and more securely bound as a greater precaution against inclement weather.

(3) An example of the contents should be clearly displayed on the outside of all leaflet boxes along with the quantity and general classification.

(4) An augmentation to the Brigade of one school trained Psy War officer and two enlisted men has been approved. The personnel have been requisitioned and should be assigned on an expedited basis.

(5) A requirement exists for one interpreter to be available to work with the Psy War team on operations.

(6) A portable hand-held speaker is needed for use by the Ground Speaker Team.

Tab: A - Leaflets

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English Translation for 245N-35-67

THIS IS VIET CONG "LIBERATION"

These South Vietnamese citizens were found by soldiers from the U.S. 101st Airborne Division on September 24th, near Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province. They were being held in a Viet Cong prison camp where they suffered mistreatment, starvation and disease - some for almost two years. This is a good example of the "Glorious Liberation" promised by the Viet Cong "National Liberation Front". This is how the Viet Cong treat their countrymen.

Support your government against the Viet Cong. Help stop Viet Cong "Liberation".

7-A-1

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English Translation for 245N-35-67

THIS IS VIET CONG "LIBERATION"

These South Vietnamese citizens were found by soldiers from the U.S.
101st Airborne Division on September 24th, near Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen
Province. They were being held in a Viet Cong prison camp where they
suffered mistreatment, starvation and disease - some for almost two years.
This is a good example of the "Glorious Liberation" promised by the
Viet Cong "National Liberation Front". This is how the Viet Cong treat
their countrymen.
Support your government against the Viet Cong. Help stop Viet Cong
"Liberation".

7-4-2

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English Translation for 245N-35-67

THIS IS VIET CONG "LIBERATION"

These South Vietnamese citizens were found by soldiers from the U.S. 101st Airborne Division on September 24th, near Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen Province. They were being held in a Viet Cong prison camp where they suffered mistreatment, starvation and disease - some for almost two years. This is a good example of the "Glorious Liberation" promised by the Viet Cong "National Liberation Front". This is how the Viet Cong treat their countrymen.

Support your government against the Viet Cong. Help stop Viet Cong "Liberation".

7-4-3

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English Translation for 245N-35-67

THIS IS VIET CONG "LIBERATION"

These South Vietnamese citizens were found by soldiers from the U.S.
101st Airborne Division on September 24th, near Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen
Province. They were being held in a Viet Cong prison camp where they
suffered mistreatment, starvation and disease - some for almost two years.
This is a good example of the "Glorious Liberation" promised by the
Viet Cong "National Liberation Front". This is how the Viet Cong treat
their countrymen.
Support your government against the Viet Cong. Help stop Viet Cong
"Liberation".

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EVERYONE WILL PITY THESE PEOPLE

The people whose picture you see on the reverse side have just been liberated from a V.C., prison camp by members of the American 101st Airborne Division. Besides Mr. Truong, Phyl-Xuan, the Chief of My-Trung Hamlet, Mr. Truong-Tung, secretary of Phuoc-Thin Hamlet, Mr. Hoang-Kim, Chinh, the Self Defense Corps Private Second Class and Mr. Truong-Van Din, a Free-South Vietnamese soldier there are Mrs. Vo-Thi-Ham, Mrs. Lam-Thi-An, Mr. Nguyen-Hang and Nguyen-Ruong, four innocent civilians.

Their thin bodies and their haggard faces will prove that during their imprisonment they were without clothes, mistreated, and suffered miserably at the hands of the V.C. Now, all of them have been fed in a temporary camp and treated by OVN medical personnel to restore their health before returning home.

Because of the V.C. we see scenes such as these.

Help the South Vietnamese Government bring security and safety to your land, and give you a new life of peace and good will.

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
Leaflet No. 245N-17-67

Drawing of two Vietnamese working in rice field and talking. Dialogue to the effect: The harvest will go well. The free world soldiers are protecting our fields and workers, therefore we can work with peace of mind knowing we are safe from the Viet Cong attack and thievery. (NOTE: This type leaflet was used effectively to depict the hard working peasant in VC controlled areas)

FRONT: Work in peace. The 101st is protecting your rice harvest.



People, you must cut (harvest) your rice. The 101st will protect you.



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Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (U)

1. (C) Mission: 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 320th Artillery direct support of 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division. Battery B, 1st Battalion (towed), 30th Artillery reinforced 2nd Battalion (Airborne) 320th Artillery.

2. (C) Execution:

a. 5-7 Sep: All units were placed on standby alert. Units continued maintenance programs and training for the upcoming operation. Initial positions at the beginning of the operation were:

(1) Hqs Btry	CQ219411	GS 1st Bde
(2) Btry A	CQ219411	GS 1st Bde
(3) Btry B	BP987829	DS 1/327
(4) Btry C	BQ949421	DS 2/327
(5) B/1/30th Arty	CQ111675	R C/2/320

b. On 4 September, due to an operation in the NINH HOA area, Battery D (Provisional) was organized with two tubes from A/2/320th Arty and two tubes from B/2/320th Arty. This unit continued as a firing element through the end of Operation JOHN PAUL JONES and into Operation SEWARD. Their initial location was CQ078347.

c. 7-10 Sep: On 7 Sep C/2/320th Arty displaced two tubes forward to BQ970455 to support elements of 2/502d Inf. Two 3/4 ton trucks were carried forward by CH-47 and closed at 1630 hours.

d. On 8 Sep, C/2/320th Arty displaced to coord BQ945580 in DS 2/502 Inf. The unit moved by CH-47 and closed at 1630 hours.

e. On 9 Sep, A/2/320th Arty displaced by CV-2 to DONG TRE then overland to BQ956795 in direct support of 2/327th Inf. Unit closed at 1630 hours.

f. 10-16 Sep: 10 Sep B/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ090068 by convoy at 1530 hours. Closed at 1945 hours. Unit in direct support of 1/327th Inf. C/2/320th Arty began displacement by CH-47 to CQ219411 in GS 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. Unit closed at 1630 hours. B/2/320th Arty from CQ090068 to CQ166135 by road to give better coverage to the operation of 1/327th Inf. 1/327th Inf replaced by 2/502d Inf for this particular phase of the action.

g. On 12 Sep the base camp began moving to CQ205443 to make room for the development of TUY HOA South Airfield complex. C/2/320th Arty also displaced to the new CP area and located at CQ203443. Both elements closed at 1545 hours. On 16 Sep C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ078348 in DS 1/327th Inf. On this date D/2/320th Arty was deactivated. On 16 Sep B/2/320th Arty displaced from CQ166135 to CQ219411 in GS 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.

h. 17-30 Sep: On 17 Sep the Hqs element displaced back to CQ219411, its original CP area. A/2/320th Arty displaced by road from BQ956795 to coordinate BQ908704 and closed at 1630 hours. Unit in direct support of 2/502d Inf. On this date the Battalion suffered losses of one Lieutenant, one Staff Sergeant, and one Specialist Four KIA and one Lieutenant severely wounded in action with B/2/327th Inf.

i. On 19 Sep A/2/320th Arty displaced from BQ956795 to BQ908704 closing at 1630 hours. The purpose was to protect rice convoys

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Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (U)

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which would be leaving from the TUY AN area. Unit also answered calls for fire from the SF camp elements on patrols within the range of the artillery.

j. 22 Sep: B/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ111676 in direct support of 2/327th Inf. B/1/30th Arty then had its mission changed to reinforcing B/2/320th Arty. 26 Sep B/2/320th Arty displaced from CQ111676 to CQ069733 in DS 2/327th Inf closing at 1400 hours. On 28 Sep B/2/320th Arty displaced back to CQ111676 and closed at 1145 hours with the mission of direct support of the 2/327th Inf.

k. 1-20 Oct: On 1 Oct A/2/320th Arty displaced from BQ908704 to CQ219411 in GS, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. Unit closed at 1150 hours on 7 Oct 66. A/2/320th Arty displaced to BQ947422 in direct support of 2/327th Inf and closed at 1430 hours.

l. 9 Oct: C/2/320th Arty moved 3 tubes to vic coordinates CQ004355 in direct support of 1/327th Inf. One section of the Bn FDC was utilized to augment the fire direction on the following day one more tube joined the battery forward. The remaining two pieces and the one section of Bn FDC displaced back to CQ219411 in GS, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.

m. On 12 Oct C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ219411 GS, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.

n. On 13 Oct A/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ134524 GS-R B/2/320th Arty. Closed at 1230 hours.

o. On 14 Oct C/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ235279 by convoy in direct support 1/22d Inf, 4th Inf Div, and displaced back to CQ219411 when it was relieved by C/5/27th Arty.

p. 21-26 Oct: 21 Oct C/2/320th Arty displaced by CH-47 to CQ043389 in direct support 2/327th Inf covering engineer work parties.

q. 22 Oct Hqs 2/320th Arty displaced to CQ232369 and began setting up a new base camp.

r. 24 Oct B/2/320th Arty displaced to CQ239368 closing out at 1730 hours. GS 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and began training for future operations.

s. 25 Oct A/2/320th Arty and B/1/30th Arty displaced to CQ237370 and CQ237369 in GS, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and began training for future operations. Both units closed at 1800 hours.

3. (C) Problem Areas:

a. On 13 Oct 66 B/2/320th Arty had a round fall short on Highway #1, resulting in 1 US KIA and 2 US WIA. The cause was determined to be a malfunctioning in sight. In the future, after each helicopter assault or displacement the basic period test will be performed on each howitzer to detect and correct any irregularities. It is also SOP that the gunner continually watches the first three digits as they change.

b. On 7 Oct B/2/320th Arty was firing a mission for an artillery forward observer who was making corrections based on sound sensings from the infantry. On a subsequent valley, there were 2 US WIA and 1 US KIA. Extreme caution should be used when this method of adjustment is necessary and the words "Danger Close" included in the observers request. Further coordination and training which is currently being conducted should remedy this problem.

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Inclosure 8 (Artillery) to Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation SEWARD (U)

c. Missile burst: On 8 Oct A/2/320th Arty experienced a missile burst while firing high angle missions in the Harassment and Interdiction program. Ten (10) personnel were injured, seven (7) seriously. Investigation revealed no mal practice within the firing battery. Although it was an unfortunate incident it must be accepted as an occupational hazard.

4. (C) Comments:

a. To insure a better understanding of artillery adjustment all INO's have instituted training within the Infantry Battalions to train personnel down to squad level, in artillery adjustment. During periods of little activity coordination enabled the artillery to fire several short service practices. This training will reap rewards in future operations since more personnel are now capable of adjusting artillery.

b. With the arrival of the 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div this Battalion set up an orientation for the officer and senior non-commissioned officers to supply them with our lessons learned and methods of operation in a counter-insurgency operation. Officers and NCO's were attached to each of the batteries for a two day period. An orientation course for both Infantry and Artillery personnel was conducted at the 4th Div's 1st Bde CP for 3 days on 13-15 Oct to orient them on the situation and problems faced by the Free World Forces in Vietnam. The Radar Section including their equipment, collocated with the Radar of Hq 2/320th Arty until their set became fully operational. Several mortar and artillery missions were fired to orient, and train their crew for their mission.

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Inclosure 9 (Engineer) to Combat Operations After Action Report,
Operation SEWARD (U)

1. (C) Sweeping of Roads for Mines: In conjunction with the 39th Engr Bn, the Brigade swept total of 5535 km of roads for mines during Operation SEWARD. 26 mines were detected and destroyed. No losses were suffered by the Brigade to mines on roads during the operation. Incidents of sniping increased significantly on Route PURPLE in late September but after an airstrike and a counter-action by 2/502 Inf and A2/17 Cav sniping was infrequent. The MP Platoon did yeoman service in providing escort for the engineer sweepers on Route PURPLE. A letter describing the Brigade experience in Operation JOHN PAUL JONES and Operation SEWARD is attached as Inclosure 1.

2. (C) Road Opening: Significant road openings were accomplished during Operation SEWARD. Route 6B from TUY AN to LA HAI was opened in early September and two supply convoys were run to LA HAI. In mid-September a convoy was run from NINH HOA to TUY HOA up Hwy 1. This route was used several times subsequently, the last time being 25 October.

3. (C) Support by 45th Engineer Group: The 39th Engineer Battalion supported the Brigade in Operation SEWARD in many areas. They swept Routes YELLOW and BLACK daily and for much of the operation swept Route WHITE as well. In late September and early October they provided direct support to the 1/327 Inf in the HIEU XUONG Valley with 1 or 2 squads. A total of seven bridges were installed on Route PURPLE during the operation. A platoon from the 39th Engineers did the work on opening Route 6B to LA HAI. The 20th Engineer Battalion provided support in the NINH HOA - TU BONG area and supplied one company reorganized as infantry to operate with the 1/22 Inf in the TU BONG area.

4. (C) Support of the Engineers: The Brigade provided security for engineer moves to GUNG SON and to DONG TRE and back. Each of these moves required security of roads for periods of 4 to 5 days and required approximately one battalion.

5. (C) Destruction of Tunnel System: In late September Co A, 2/327 Inf discovered an extensive VC tunnel system. This system was destroyed/denied using CS powder and demolitions. The report on this tunnel system is attached as Appendix 1.

6. (C) Lessons Learned:

a. During the monsoon season, fords and by passes are only fair weather friends. Heavy rains and rapid runoff make it virtually impossible to satisfactorily install culverts to maintain by passes. The only satisfactory answer is bridging, or in some cases, rafting.

b. Sniping at convoys and sweep parties can be at least partially controlled by concerted counteraction with troops and/or air strikes.

c. CS powder and conventional demolitions can be used to successfully destroy/deny VC tunnel systems.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

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AVBD-EN

23 September 1966

SUBJECT: Viet Cong Mines

TO: See Distribution

1. Reference, Handbook for US Forces in Vietnam, dated December 1965.
2. Attached as inclosures 1 thru 8 are sketches and description of Viet Cong mines/fuses not listed in reference 1 above and found on MSR's of the 1st Brigade AO in Phu Yen Province.
3. Mining incidents along these routes usually occur at places where road cuts/craters have been repaired on hard surface roads and random placement along the travelled way of loose or natural surface roads. Anti-personnel mines are usually found on and near the shoulders of roads in areas where some cover exists against small arms attack.
4. Route clearing operations by A/326 Engineer Battalion during the past 40 days have resulted in removal/destruction in place of 8 each Anti-personnel mines and 30 Anti-vehicular mines.
5. The AN/FRS-3 Portable Metallic Mine Detector has proven very reliable in pinpointing the location of Viet Cong mines even where the small blasting cap is the only metal present in the mine. Extensive use of these detectors (1800 km of road cleared during month of August 1966) has caused an increased deadline rate which has been rectified by additional float items and expediting the maintenance effort required.
6. In conduct of the daily road clearing operations a close visual inspection preceding the detector is absolutely necessary along the shoulders of the road, around culverts and underneath bridges. Mounted clearing parties have proven unsatisfactory even on paved roads.
7. The initial sweep along a route will take substantially more time than subsequent sweeps done on a daily basis. Route clearing time is cut in half by having teams start at each end, meet and return to the starting point. The use of 2 detectors in one party and having 1 or 2 on stand-by with the clearing team when detectors are available has been advantageous. After the initial sweep and for planning purposes a rate of 3 km/hr for hard surface roads and 2 km/hr for loose surface roads has been established by this unit for the Phu Yen Province.
8. Under no circumstances should impatience cause a movement to go ahead of the clearing detail. Timely reporting of route clearance by the engineers to the Brigade TOC is a must. No method of mine detection is 100% foolproof, however, the unit and the individual can take positive measures to protect themselves from injuries due to enemy land mines. Vehicles should never travel roads subject to mining before they are cleared unless the tactical situation clearly demands the movement in spite of the risk of life and equipment. Insure that all vehicles are sandbagged and that personnel in the vehicles ride over the sandbags and do not sit on wheel wells. Remain alert

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AVRD-DN
SUBJECT: Viet Cong Mines

23 September 1966

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and watchful at all times while moving on foot along roads and trails.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

6 Incls
as

W. E. Groves
for WILLIAM E. GROVES
2d Lt, AGC
Asst AG

DISTRIBUTION:


- A - Plus
- 1 - CG, I FFV
- 2 - CG, 1st Cav Div (AM)
- 1 - CG, 101st Abn Div, Ft Campbell, Ky
- 1 - CG, 82d Abn Div, Ft Bragg, NC
- 2 - CG, The Engr Sch, Ft Belvoir, Va
- 5 - CG, 18th Engr Bde
- 5 - Engr, I FFV
- 5 - CO, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
- 2 - CO, 28th Regt, 9th ROK Div
- 2 - CO, 45th Engr Bn
- 5 - CO, 39th Engr Bn
- 2 - SA, 47th ARVN Regt
- 2 - Hqs MACV, ATTN: S343, APO 96243
- 50 - XO
- 65 - Bde Engr

For Official Use Only

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VC MINE

NOTES:

* FOUR WOODEN PEGS HOLD THE TOP BAMBOO SLEEVE FROM FOOT AND BICYCLE TRAFFIC. A VEHICLE WILL BREAK THE PEGS AND PUSH THE TOP BAMBOO SLEEVE DOWN ON THE FLASHLITE BATTERY COMPLETING THE CIRCUIT AND DETONATING THE MINE.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


INCLOSURE 1

95



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VC MINE



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


ENCLOSURE 2

97



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VC MINE



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


INCLOSURE 3

99



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VC MINE



NOTE:

* FOUR WOOD PEGS SUPPORT THE BAMBOO SLEEVE TO INSURE AGAINST DETONATION BY FOOT OR BICYCLE TRAFFIC.


FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INCLOSURE 4

101



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VC MINE

* FOUR WOOD PEGS SUPPORT THE BAMBOO SLEEVE TO INSURE AGAINST DETONATION BY FOOT OR BICYCLE TRAFFIC.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


INCLOSURE 5

113



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VC MINE



NOTE:
APPX. ACTUAL SIZE
APPX. WEIGHT 2 LBS.

NOTES

CBU FRAG BOMBLETS ARE SOMETIMES FOUND WITH ONLY A
PIECE OF PAPER OR CIGARETTE PACKAGE WRAPPER LYING ON
TOP OF THE PRESSURE PLATE.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


INCLOSURE 6

105



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VC MINE



NOTE
AP MINE FOUND OFF THE SHOULDERS OF THE ROAD

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


INCLOSURE 9

107



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VC MINE



US FRAG BOMB OR ARTILLERY SHELL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INCLOSURE 8

109

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 96347

AVHD-EN

5 November 1966

SUBJECT: Tunnel Destruction/Denial

TO: See Distribution

1. Attached is a description (Incl 1-4) of a vast tunnel complex discovered by the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, on 23/24 September 1966 in the Phu Yen Province, Republic of Vietnam, and of the methods used to destroy/deny the system. This tunnel complex, according to captured documents, was used by the 7th Battalion, 18B North Vietnamese Army Regiment, prior to that Regiment's engagement with the 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 327th Infantry, on 20-24 June 1966.

2. It is believed that the length, depth of cover, numerous entrances/exits and the type of soil make this system unique in comparison to any other tunnels/caves that this unit has encountered or those reported by units operating in War Zone D.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


DAVID A. KORPONAI
1st Lt, AGC
Asst AG

- 4 Incl
- 1 - General Data
 - 2 - Demolition Methods
 - 3 - Use of RCA
 - 4 - Photo Folio (Limited Distribution)

DISTRIBUTION:


- 2 - CO, 1/327 Inf
- 2 - CO, 2/327 Inf
- 2 - CO, 2/502 Inf
- 2 - CO, 2/320 Arty
- 2 - CO, A2/17 Cav
- 2 - CG, I FFV
- 2 - CG, 101st Abn Div Ft Campbell, Ky
- 2 - CG, 82d Abn Div, Ft Bragg, NC
- 2 - CG, The Engr Sch, Ft Belvoir, Va
- 5 - CG, 18th Engr Bde, APO 96307
- 5 - Engr, I FFV
- 2 - CG, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div
- 2 - CO, 28th Regt, 9th Inf HOK Div
- 2 - CO, 45th Engr Gp
- 2 - CO, 39th Engr Bn
- 2 - SA, 47th ARVN Regt
- 2 - Hq's, MACV, ATTN: S343, APO 96243
- 20 - Bde Engr
- 2 - Comdt, Cml Center and Sch, Ft McClellan, Ala
- 2 - Office of the Chief of Engineer, ENGTE-MI, Washington, DC.
- 60 - After Action Report (Opn Seward)
- 60 - Quarterly Operations Report

Tab B to Inclosure 9 to After Action Report for Operation SEWARD

GENERAL DATA

1. Location. BQ962656 and BQ968653. See sketch at Tab A.
2. Unit. Co A, 2nd Bn, 327th Inf, 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div.
3. Date. 23/24 Sep 66.
4. Length. Approx 1400 meters.
5. Width. 2½ ft - 3 ft.
6. Height. 4 ft - 5½ ft.
7. Cover. 12 ft - 17 ft.
8. Entrance/Exits. 18 vertical shafts, 3 trench entrances.
9. Excavation Effort - 5000 man days with approx 3300 cu yds earth removed.
10. Use. This tunnel system had the necessary space and adequate ventilation to shelter more than 1000 men. Except for an occasional width constriction where boulders were encountered, this system would also allow the VC to double time throughout its course. There was evidence to indicate that the system had not been used for 2 or more months. The system had been very deliberately abandoned with no equipment left behind; however, no booby traps were left installed.
11. Terrain. The tunnel and trench system is on an elongated open plateau bounded by a steep wooded bluff on the south and by rolling wooded slopes on the north. Parts of the plateau near the village of TRUNG THAN (3) BQ9665 are under cultivation with crops of corn and some areas are covered with dense vegetation. The most open parts of the plateau are covered with helicopter punji stakes 10' - 12' tall and in some areas dense bands of antipersonnel punji stakes are also encountered. The plateau has an extensive covered trench system much of which had firing positions and is concealed by running along the edge of the dense vegetation bordering the open space. This trench system connected the 3 otherwise separate tunnel systems. The area is completely inaccessible by ground vehicle but well used trails from 4 directions intersect in the village.
12. Artillery Bombardment. On 27 September 1966 the tunnel system was bombarded with 8 inch howitzer and 175mm gun concentrations. Forty rounds of 8 inch ammunition with delay fuzing was fired at the northernmost complex. At the range of 13,000 meters the 8 inch concentration was clustered in a fairly tight pattern approximately 200 meters by 75 meters. With the delay fuzing each shell made a crater 5 feet deep and 10 feet in diameter. Although hits were scored within 5 feet of the tunnel centerline, there was no damage to the tunnel system other than minor loose dirt shaken from the air shafts. The 175mm concentration at the southern tunnel complex from a range of 21,000 meters had a much wider dispersion, created smaller craters and did no damage to the tunnels.
13. Destruction Effort.
 - a. Material. 3900 lbs explosives and 43 ea 8 lb - bag CS powder.
 - b. Man power. 5 squad days for Engineers and 5 company (-) days for security.

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



TAB A TO INCLOSURE 1

DEMOLITION

115 1. First test shot for entrance closure.



a. Conditions. The entrance was a 4 ft. diameter vertical shaft approximately 20 ft. deep in clay soil with heavy laterite content. Two branches of tunnel approximately 3 ft. wide and 5 ft. high branched off at right angles to each other.



b. Materials Used.

- 1 ea 40 lb shape charge
- 2 ea 40 lb cratering charge
- 1 ea 2½ lb block C4
- 100 ft detonating cord
- 8 ea non electric blasting caps
- 6 ft time fuse
- 3 ea fuse lighters
- 20 ft adhesive tape

c. Procedure. The shape charge was placed as shown on sketch with the neck recessed into the wall of the tunnel for support on the rear end and supported on the front by a scissor, made of bamboo. Stand-off was approx 18".




(1) Back blast of the shape charge blew out a concave area 6 ft. in dia and 2 ft. deep, and approx 1 ft. of earth from the ceiling of the tunnel. The resulting bore hole was 2½ ft. in dia at the opening and 1 ft. in dia at 6 ft. back tapering down to 3-4 inches at 8 ft. back. It was not necessary to do any clearing out of the bore hole.

Incl 2

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(2) 30 minutes after the blast there were still gases and a heavy brown dust present in the tunnel. 45 minutes after the blast the NCOIC went into the tunnel and stayed for approx 10 minutes, after which he had difficulty breathing and was exhausted upon leaving the tunnel. One hour after the blast 2 men started priming and placing the cratering charges in the bore hole. After approx 25 minutes one man became unconscious from lack of oxygen and the other man was also suffering from lack of oxygen when extracted from the tunnel. Protective masks were worn at all times due to lingering CS used by A Co, 2/327 Inf. 2 hours after the initial blast the NCOIC reentered the tunnel and completed the priming of the charges.


(3) The resulting explosion from the two cratering charges blew earth and rock 50' into the air from the shaft and 20' into the air from an air shaft 30m away from the blast. A 200 ft. safety distance was adequate. Most of the earth and rock blown into the air settled back into the shaft which formed a crater approx 12 ft. dia and 4-5 ft. deep. The entrance shaft was completely destroyed and some collapse of the tunnel did occur. (Sketch).



No further effort was made to use this method due to the apparent danger to personnel and the unacceptable time required (approx 3 hrs/shaft). Safety requirements would also preclude the proper use of RCA.

2. Second test shot for entrance closure.

a. Condition. 2 each entrance shafts; 4 ft. dia. x 18 ft. deep and 40 ft. apart. Soils are red clay with slight laterite content and very stable.



b. Material. Same as para 1b except that 3 ea 40 lb cratering charges were used.

c. Procedure. The 40 lb shaped charge was placed between the two shafts at approx 20' from each one. The resulting bore hole was large enough to allow placement of 3 cratering charges at 8 ft depths side by side.


d. Results. The resulting crater failed to extend into either shaft and the expected displacement of earth into the shafts or cave-in of the connecting tunnel did not occur. These results give testimony to the extreme stability of the soil of this area. Subsequently a separate shot at each shaft, set up as described in para 3, was used to effectively close each shaft.

3. Final method for entrance closure.


a. Condition. Same as para b above.

b. Materials. Same as para a (2).

c. Procedure. Shaped charge was set up approx 5' from the entrance shaft and at a point that is not over the tunnel proper.



The resulting bore hole allowed placement of 2 ea cratering charges one on top of the other and approx 4'-8' below the ground surface. Charges were tamped by refilling the loaded bore hole.



Shaped charges placed on the spoil around the holes were not effective as the loose material fell back into the bore hole. Issue stand off frame was used at all times.

d. Results. The resulting blast from the cratering charges caused earth

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to heave into the entrance shaft, forming an effecting seal and probable collapse of portions of the tunnel. This procedure was used to effectively close the 18 usable entrances/exits to this tunnel complex. The resulting ground shock also closed nearby air shafts.

4. Test shot for tunnel destruction.

a. Condition. Approx 100m of tunnel 3 ft wide and 4 ft - 5 ft high with 12 ft - 15 ft of over head cover (natural), soils were red clay with heavy laterite content and boulders throughout the course.

b. Materials.

7 ea 40 lb cratering charges
1 ea dud shaped charge
7 lbs tetrytol
200m det cord
25 non electric blasting caps
4 ft time fuse
3 ea 8 lb - bags CS powder (RCA)

c. Procedure. 7 cratering charges were placed 30 ft - 40 ft apart on the floor of the tunnel, dual primed with det. cord/caps and tetrytol, and tied into a main line of det. cord. The 3 bags of CS powder were wrapped with 6-8 turns of det. cord and tied into the main line. This priming and placement took 4 men approx. 2 hrs.

d. Results. The blast blew out all air vents and entrance shafts along the tunnel. Little damage was done to the entrance shafts. Several cracks were seen on the surface but no cave in occurred except at the air vents. Examination of the interior the following day showed quantities of loose earth on the floor and an enlargement of the tunnel cross section at the area where the cratering charges were placed, but due to the depth of cover and the blow out at the air vents there were no serious cave-ins along the tunnel. The tunnel appeared to be structurally sound after this blast and was open and passible through the entire area of the blast. Except for contamination by the CS powder, which was severe enough to cause the skin to burn, the tunnel appeared to be completely useable. Because of this result no further effort was made to collapse the entire tunnel system, but the methods previously described were used to seal all entrances after contamination of the tunnels.

USE OF RCA

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1. General. The use of CS powder has been developed by a joint effort of the Brigade chemical section and the engineers on the site. On small tunnel/caves where complete destruction could be attained in acceptable time and with reasonable quantities of demolitions material the CS powder was not used. It is felt that the effectiveness and persistency of CS powder in tunnels that can be completely sealed will be indefinite. When partially exposed to air and weather, such as in covered trenches, the life of the powder blown into the earth would deny the use of these facilities for from 2 to 3 months.

2. Materials. The CS powder, Riot-Control Agent O-chloro-benzal malononitrile, CS-1 comes sealed in 55 gallon drums (which were later destroyed to deny their use to the enemy) with ten 8 lb. bags in each drum. A crescent wrench and screw driver are required to open the containers. The CS powder is further sealed in sturdy paper bags of double thickness which stand up under extensive handling. Each bag is folded one time end to end and wrapped with 8-10 turns of detonating cord with a running end of 3-4 feet left for tying into the main line of det. cord for simultaneous detonation. Approximately 25 ft. of det. cord is required for each bag.

3. Procedure. All the necessary bags are primed near the entrance shaft of a particular leg of the tunnel. The det. cord main line is directed from the surface into the shaft and run in each direction from the shaft. One man can carry 2 bags of CS in the tunnels described. These are dropped at 30 ft - 50 ft intervals along the main line of det. cord and tied onto the main line. This procedure is followed for each shaft of the tunnel system. Each main line will have a separate fuse (non electric) with a short time delay (2 - 3 minutes). As soon as all branches of the tunnel are primed the fuses are ignited at the same time so that personnel can stand clear of the entrances to avoid the minor amount of gas which blows out. Immediately after the last shot has fired the engineers start the sealing of the shafts to contain the contamination.

4. Results. After the blasting of the CS bags the fine powder could be seen suspended in the entrance shafts and on occasion the powder would be blown to the surface. A heavy concentration of the powder was present throughout the tunnel complex. The bags were completely blown to shreds and the powder could be seen embedded in the walls of the tunnel.

5. MITY MITE: The Mity Mite, a small portable air blower, has the capability of forcing colored smoke through a tunnel system. The blower produces 450 cfm of air and can be used effectively in tunnels up to 200m in length to determine the location of hidden entrances, exits or air shafts. The Mity Mite was used only briefly on this tunnel complex as engineer work parties were going to search and map the entire complex for a detailed report. Since the burning smoke grenades consume valuable oxygen in the sealed tunnel shaft it was considered best not to use the Mity Mite, thereby lessening the danger of asphyxiation to personnel working in the tunnel. A potential use of the Mity Mite is to force fresh air from the surface into the tunnels.


Incl 3

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
Tab A to Inclosure 2 to Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)



2-A-1

88

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SCALE 1:250,000

2-B-2

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 1ST BRIGADE 101ST AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96347

125

AVED

20 October 1966

SUBJECT: Semi-Guerrilla Tactics

TO: Battalion and Separate Company Commanders

1. (U) Although the Brigade had an excellent kill rate in Operations JOHN PAUL JONES and SEWARD (208 VC KIA (BC) and 236 VC KIA (BC) respectively,) our biggest problem has been and remains one of target acquisition. Our second major problem is the need to reduce reaction time once the enemy is detected.

2. (C) To improve our kill rate during forthcoming operations I desire that battalion commanders and the cavalry troop commander more fully exploit, develop, and utilize the concept of "semi-guerrilla tactics". By this I mean we must become more like guerrillas, i.e., adopt guerrilla tactics, during search and destroy operations until contact is made. Then we remove the cloak of being a guerrilla and operate conventionally using all available firepower, mobility, and reserves.

3. (C) Listed below are some techniques of stealth, deception, and surprise which I desire be employed more fully in our forthcoming operations. I am confident that the airborne soldier, once imbued with the necessity to "out-guerrilla the guerrilla", will, with his native ingenuity and resourcefulness, devise additional effective techniques and tactics.

a. Clandestine Entry into the Battlefield: Move into the battlefield by foot rather than ride by helicopter, the noise and sight of which reduce the possibility of surprise. Enter the battlefield at night.

b. Night Operations: Steal the night away from the guerrilla. Night airmobile assaults, ambushes, patrols, and movement must become routine.

c. Stay Behind Forces: When a unit is extracted following an engagement, leave or insert a stay behind force on the battlefield.

d. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols (LRRP's): More aggressive and frequent employment on long range missions. Insert at dusk or dawn along likely avenues of enemy movement; vary on occasion by insertion overland and resupply by air drop. Experiment with platoon size LRRP's to provide for an immediate offensive capability when enemy is sighted.

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INCL 4 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT

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AVRD

20 October 1966

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SUBJECT: Semi-Guerrilla Tactics

e. Reinforce Rather than Extract: When a stay behind force or an LRRP makes contact, plan to reinforce promptly rather than extract. For this employ an immediate reaction force (platoon) on air strip alert with helicopters on stand-by, or insert platoons in advance on the ground concurrently with the LRRP or stay behind unit. The platoon and helicopter pilots on air strip alert must be briefed in as much detail as possible and motivated to react promptly.

f. Reaction Forces: Since the helicopter reveals the presence of US forces, C&C ships should not be the first helicopters in the area in which a reaction force is to be committed. As long as there is excellent radio communications the first helicopter in the area should carry combat troops. Upon arrival at an LZ the reaction force should promptly move out to block enemy escape routes while final coordination is being made between the unit on the ground and the reaction force command.

g. Limit Helicopter Traffic: Provide stay behind forces, LRRP's, and units entering battlefield clandestinely with a minimum of 3 to 5 days rations to obviate need for helicopter resupply which promptly telegraphs to the enemy the presence of our forces. Prior to contact with the enemy use helicopters for medevac or tactical emergencies only.

h. Resupply Techniques: Unlike the VC guerrilla who lives off the land, we are limited in our clandestine operations by the bulk and weight of C rations which limit the number of days our troops can operate without resupply by helicopter. The following are suggested ways to solve this problem.

- (1) Use LRRP rations when available or in combination with C rations.
- (2) Use rice and powdered soup alternately with C rations or the LRRP ration.
- (3) Cache supplies and operate clandestinely from a base carrying only one day's supply on the soldier.
- (4) Resupply by helicopter at night.
- (5) Resupply during the day with the helicopter flying nap of the earth and supplies "kicked" out onto a DZ.

i. Silence the Battlefield: Eliminate artillery H&I fires, long range artillery, and TAC Air strikes near friendly troops unless promptly exploited by ground forces.

j. Dummy Positions: Construct and occupy obvious positions during daylight hours and then abandon them during the hours of darkness to move to ambush sites or to attack suspected enemy positions.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

CONFIDENTIAL

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AVBD

20 October 1966

SUBJECT: Semi-Guerrilla Tactics

k. Doubling Back: Move out from a position in the afternoon and after darkness falls, radically change direction of march to attack a pre-selected target before dawn.

l. Use of Trails: "Beat the brush" rather than move along main trails. The enemy employs trail watchers along main trails where he can generally observe advancing troops. Search along secondary and tertiary trails used by game which offer the guerrilla excellent concealment as well as an escape route.

m. Springing the Trap: When feasible, follow or observe a single or small party of enemy to locate larger forces or determine critical intelligence such as enemy positions, supply points, CP's, etc. Then maneuver forces to ensure closing the trap and killing or capturing the enemy force involved. Move on a wide front supported by reserves and firepower.

n. Cordon and Search: Encircle a village at night as secretly as possible, then search at first light using PF, RF, or ARVN forces. Rehearse using same forces until this type operation can be accomplished effectively. Consider use of stay behind forces after the search.

o. Improve Marksmanship: Marksmanship is extremely important in fighting guerrillas. Generally the enemy will offer only fleeting glimpses of himself while trying to escape the advancing US soldiers. Therefore, if a continuous and supervised marksmanship program is established --- each man firing 20-40 rounds daily except when on clandestine operations --- the enemy casualty statistics will rise, enemy morale will be lowered, and the enemy will be forced to engage US troops at a maximum range. This will reduce the effectiveness of his fire and give us time to commit immediate reaction forces

p. Improve Effectiveness of the Sniper: Greater emphasis should be placed on the role of the sniper. Too often we receive reports of the enemy escaping at ranges of 400-500 meters. A well trained sniper should be able to kill or wound the enemy at that range. Platoons should habitually employ the sniper.

q. Counter Enemy Snipers: Enemy snipers are a great deterrent to US morale. Therefore, companies should organize sniper killer teams to operate semi-independently to harass the enemy. A sniper with a sniper rifle and telescopic sight could selectively kill while another team member adjusts artillery on the target.

r. Specialized Training: To be successful guerrillas, troopers must be instilled with patience and taught the fundamentals of camouflage, concealment, light and noise discipline, and to remain still for long periods of time. Too often a potentially effective ambush is prematurely disclosed by coughing, scratching, movement to relieve oneself and other restless activities. Our troops camouflage religiously at night but seldom camouflage for day operations. Training should give added emphasis to proper conduct of the individual during ambush operations.

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AWED

SUBJECT: Semi-Guerrilla Tactics

20 October 1966

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3. Squad Area of Operations: Consistent with communications capabilities, emphasize squads operating in areas of operation for 3 days without resupply. For example, one company operating by squads in zones, separated but mutually supporting, can cover a large area with thoroughness and stealth. Mission of squads: ambush at night, observe during daylight, and engage small enemy groups. Upon locating a significant enemy force the platoon/company consolidates on the squad to fix the enemy and the battalion (-), standing by as an immediate reaction force, is brought to bear on the enemy to destroy him.

4. (C) Once contact is made react rapidly with all available firepower and reinforcements without further regard to deception, stealth, or surprise. Following the engagement with the enemy, revert to semi-guerrilla tactics until a subsequent contact is made.

Willard Pearson
WILLARD PEARSON
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

B Plus

50 - IO

25 - Bde Repl Tng Sch

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE _____

MEDEVAC MISSION REQUEST

129

1. REQUESTOR _____
2. NUMBER PATIENTS & NATIONALITY _____
3. CATEGORY A. ROUTINE NATURE OF INJURIES _____
B. PRIORITY _____
C. URGENT _____
D. TACTICAL _____
4. SECURITY OF PICK-UP SITE _____
5. LOCATION OF PICK-UP SITE _____
6. RADIO FREQ _____
7. CALL SIGN _____

DEFINITIONS OF CATEGORIES (USARV Reg 59-1)

- A. ROUTINE - Patients who require evacuation within 72 hours.
- B. PRIORITY - For patients requiring prompt medical care not available locally. Such patients must be evacuated within 24 hours.
- C. URGENT - For emergency cases which must be moved immediately to save life or limb or to prevent complication of a serious illness. Psychiatric cases therefore are not considered urgent.
- D. TACTICAL URGENT - The immediate evacuation of the casualty is absolutely essential to the accomplishment of the unit's tactical mission.

1st Bde, 101st Abn Div Form 117R, 7 Sept 66 (Revised)

INCL 5 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

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