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NOTE N-689

FIGHTING IN CITIES OVERSEAS (U)

W.S. Payne
J.G. Taylor

May 1970

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
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FOREWORD

(U) This note was written in response to a request to the Institute for Defense Analyses from the Office of the Deputy Director for Defense Research and Engineering (Tactical Warfare Programs) for an investigation of the problems confronting military units in overseas urban warfare. The principal response to that request is IDA Study S-345, Promising Areas of Research and Development for Tactical Operations in an Overseas Urban Environment. This note supplements Study S-345.

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ABSTRACT

(U) This note describes and discusses overseas urban military operations considered typical of those in which United States forces have recently engaged or may engage. Examples given were selected as representative of organized combat, restricted operations, and advisory and counterinsurgency operations. Salient features of seven urban operations in which the United States has participated overseas since World War II are tabulated in an appendix.

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I. INTRODUCTION

(U) Cities have been fought in and over for centuries. Cities lie athwart the great lines of commerce and on road and river networks along which armies move during warfare. National capitals, and frequently provincial capitals, are prime targets, representing as they do the seat of political authority and the administrative headquarters of government. Other cities may be targets because of their industrial capability or their position in the transport and communications system. Still other cities may be attacked simply because they are in the line of advance. However, when a city can be isolated, bypassed, or avoided without tactical or strategic loss, this generally will be done. Thus, in World War II Brest was attacked and captured so that the Allies might have a reserve port on the Brittany coast; the nearby ports of St. Nazaire and Lorient, manned by German forces of 12,000 and 15,000 respectively, were not attacked, however, but were contained throughout the war. (Later General Omar Bradley commented that it would have taken more Allied troops than could be spared at the time to contain the enemy forces in Brest for any length of time.)

(U) In some instances important target cities may be spared through tactical and logistical circumstances, humanitarian impulses, fouled or disobeyed orders, or a combination of these. In 1944, Paris was spared destruction in part because the occupying German commander chose to defend it at the outskirts and in part because he disobeyed Hitler's order to leave it in flames if it could not be held. While the defenses were not inconsequential, the nature and size of the German forces there were inadequate for the task of preventing the Allies from sweeping into Paris. The commander refused to lay the torch to Paris prior to submission or withdrawal because of the city's great art treasures and historic sites.

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(U) Sometimes a city may be subjected to seige because it cannot be captured or because the attacker chooses this tactic to avoid casualties or simply to destroy the city. Grant laid seige to Vicksburg only after being repulsed twice within a week by Pemberton. In the second attack Union casualties were about 1000. Grant then constructed an ever-tightening series of earthworks and trench systems encircling the Confederate defensive works about the city. He brought in heavy guns and large mounted mortars with which he shelled the Confederate lines and the city. About a month and a half later the tightly contained city and its forces surrendered. The great seige of Leningrad in World War II was undertaken from somewhat different motivations. In the late summer of 1941, as the German attack in the north appeared to be stalled at the outskirts of Leningrad, Hitler decided on seige. The directive from the German general headquarters said in part (Ref. 1):

The Fuehrer has decided once more that a surrender on the part of Leningrad, or later of Moscow, will not be accepted even if offered by the enemy.

Hundreds of thousands of Leningrad citizens starved or froze to death and hundreds of thousands more died in bombardments before the seige was broken about two and a half years later. A small but significant supply line across the frozen Lake Ladoga was a major element in the survival, and perhaps the Hitler ultimatum was also a major element.

(U) During modern warfare, as in World War II, the Korean War, and, to a considerable degree, the war in South Vietnam, once a city becomes a battleground for organized regular forces a characteristic pattern of combat may be observed. Indeed, similarities may also be observed even in combat in places as disparate as Western and Eastern Europe, the Philippines, and Southeast Asia. And indeed, similarities with urban quasi-combat operations of a very different nature, such as civilian evacuation and riot control, may be seen. Urban combat operations may be regarded as having a set of characteristics, of which the characteristics of urban quasi-combat operations, differing in objectives and participants, form a subset.

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II. ORGANIZED COMBAT

A. DEFENSES

(U) In the city battles of World War II, the city defenses ordinarily were established at a little distance out, guarding the approaches to the city. These defenses were not mere outposts but were so designed as to provide a defense in depth along the natural approaches to the city. Thus, in the attack on St. Malo in August 1944, a U.S. infantry battalion attempting to move into Dinard--across the river from St. Malo and part of the St. Malo objective--found all roads to have roadblocks of concrete, rock, felled trees, and barbed wire, each covered by a score or more of German troops in well camouflaged strongpoints. In addition, underground pillboxes, concertina wire, iron rail fences, and minefields were encountered along the way. Around St. Malo were two bands of defenses, the outer of which was a series of strongpoints of wire entanglements, antitank obstacles, minefields, and machine-gun emplacements. The inner band, running in part into the suburbs and much tighter, presented minefields, barbed wire, a series of steel gates, and ditches protected by machine guns in pillboxes.

(U) Similarly, moving on the port city of Brest on the Brittany coast in late August 1944, elements of the U.S. VIIIth Corps ran into a formidable defense in depth in front of the city. The defense system was also composed of two bands. Both the outer and inner lines consisted of field fortifications, antitank obstacles, concrete works, and gun emplacements, the outer being in greater depth. Worked into the defense system were a number of durable old French forts that remained in some of the suburban areas of the city. These were made into separate and tough bastions. For example, in front of one was a minefield

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made of 300-pound naval shells fitted with pressure igniters and covered by fire from rifles and 20-mm guns.

(U) Characteristically the cities contained an older walled city within; some of the cities, like Brest, were fortresses in the true sense. Their walls were thick, high, and tough, usually fronted by moats, and they frequently contained the headquarters of the defensive forces. Often, as at Brest, they were the last strongholds that had to be captured. This was the case also in the South Vietnamese city of Hue, which was the scene of city fighting in 1968 along the pattern common to that in World War II.

(U) In World War II, defense fortifications were prevalent within cities. As noted above, the inner bands of the two-band defensive systems protecting the approaches to Brest and St. Malo were partly within the suburbs. Reinforced concrete dugouts were frequently found at street corners. These dugouts had openings for heavy machine guns that covered the streets with grazing fire. In Brest, some of these dugouts were no higher than 10 inches above street level. The gun openings were nearly at street level. In Manila, machine guns were sometimes concealed behind stone walls bordering a street and could fire through small slits made in the walls; in addition, dual-purpose naval guns were emplaced so as to provide flat-trajectory, point-blank fire into much of the suburbs. In the business and government districts of cities the same pattern of reinforced concrete pillboxes, antitank obstacles, mutually supporting machine-gun emplacements, and mines was to be found.

(U) Similar defensive patterns were found in the city of Seoul in the Korean War, too. There, across the streets of the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) advance, were barricades, chest high, made of rice bags filled with earth. Behind and to the sides were antitank guns and machine guns, and in front were antitank mines. Riflemen were posted in adjacent buildings overlooking the barricades.

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(U) Another common obstacle confronted in the city battles of World War II and, in fact, in heavy city fighting since then--as in Hue during the Tet offensive of 1968--was that presented by the rubble and debris of damaged buildings and houses. Thus, in Aachen, Germany, an infantry battalion fighting its way through the center of town "...had to plow through the maze of rubble...in its path..." (Ref. 2).

(U) Added to these obstacles were the rifle and machine-gun emplacements in the various buildings. In some cases the buildings were old or ancient, such as the Chateau guarding the entrance to the walled city of St. Malo, and in some instances they were modern reinforced-concrete, earthquake-proof structures, such as many of the government buildings in Manila. Throughout the cities there were a variety of open places, and these were frequently covered by rifles and automatic weapons. The open spaces in front of protected buildings generally were covered by grazing machine-gun fire.

(U) There is considerable similarity in the defenses of various buildings that served as key strongpoints facing U.S. forces in their major urban combat operations in World War II--St. Malo, Aachen, Brest, and Manila, for example. The Citadel, the last and major position to be faced at St. Malo, was a casemated strongpoint of connected block-houses based on an existing French fort. Its thick outer wall was made of concrete, stone, and steel. In front of it were barbed wire, lines of steel rails embedded in concrete, and an antitank ditch. Visibility from the fort had been improved and fields of fire had been established by the removal of some houses in town. Inside the Citadel were a number of machine guns and mortars, and a few field pieces. These were mutually supporting and could even cover the inner court of the strongpoint. In Manila, one of the most difficult buildings to contend with was the modern, five-story, earthquake-proof Post Office, made of heavily reinforced concrete. There were within some of the rooms machine-gun positions protected by fortifications ten sandbags thick and about seven feet high.

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B. TACTICS

(U) The tactics that were followed in the great city battles of World War II, in the Korean War, and in the 1968 Vietnamese Tet offensive are strikingly similar in general pattern and differ mostly in degree. However, not all of these city battles were similar in their relation to the broader tactical situation. At St. Malo, Brest, and Aachen, the U.S. forces were on the offensive, moving rapidly. Pinning the defenders of the port cities St. Malo and Brest to the water and encircling completely the inland German city, Aachen, they succeeded in capturing all three target cities. Much the same pattern emerged some time later in the Pacific theater as U.S. forces encircled Manila and methodically destroyed the defenders. On the eastern front, the German forces, after rapid advances during the summer of 1942, paused in front of Stalingrad and then started to crunch slowly into the city, only to be ground down by the defenders. The Germans then found themselves nearly encircled, and they were captured by a large counter-attacking Russian force after about three months of very violent and ferocious city fighting. This battle was unmatched among the urban battles of World War II in number of participants and casualties and perhaps in destruction; in violence it was possibly matched only by Warsaw's uprising against its German occupiers a little later.

(U) In the Korean War, Seoul was overrun early by the North Koreans, and was then retaken by U.S. and ROK forces advancing northward after the Inchon landing. The North Koreans had partially withdrawn from Seoul but had left sizeable and aggressive units defending. In this instance, the recapture of the city involved typical city fighting but was accomplished in a rather short time (about three days). The battle for the city was not the extended sort observed in World War II or in Hue during the Tet offensive of 1968. In this latter battle the city was captured by North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces, some of whom had infiltrated Hue and some of whom attacked from outside the city. The city was rather quickly captured but was never truly subjected, for it was at all times severely contested until it was eventually recaptured by U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)

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forces after bitter and protracted fighting within the city. In this instance neither the NVA forces at the outset nor the U.S. and ARVN forces later were able to isolate the city during their operations. The attack on Saigon was unlike that by the NVA on Hue, for it was carried out to quite an extent by reinforced irregular forces, was not sustained for so long a period at such an intensity, and was not nearly as successful. Still it was city combat, and it did exhibit much of the characteristic pattern of other city battles.

(U) As observed above, the tactics in modern city fighting have followed a rather common pattern. In moving along the approaches into well defended cities, as in the U.S. operations in World War II, it became necessary to move through these defensive approaches into the suburbs and city by attacking and taking a series of intermediate objectives, rather than overwhelming the defenses simultaneously. In moving into Brest, the committed divisions found they had "...to probe to locate and systematically destroy pillboxes, emplacements, fortifications, and weapons, moving ahead where weak spots were found, overwhelming pillboxes with flamethrowers and demolitions after patient maneuver and fire. Small sneak attacks, the repulse of surprise counterattacks, minefield clearance, and the use of smoke characterized the slow squeeze of American pressure" (Ref. 3).

(U) In most of these city operations there were dominating strongpoints that required reduction. There were the strengthened old forts at Brest, the Chateau and the Citadel at St. Malo, and the old walled city, Intramuros, and a few government buildings at Manila. At Hue there was the Citadel. For the Germans at Stalingrad there was a series of three factories on the Volga at the north end of the city. But in most of these cases, and in Stalingrad and Aachen in particular, a great many individual buildings and structures--and indeed apparently even some of the rubble heaps in Stalingrad--became lesser dominating positions and had to be destroyed or isolated before advances could be made.

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(S) In Hue and Manila the waterworks and the power stations were key targets for the U.S. and its allies to take and protect. One will observe that in both these instances the operation was the recapture of a friendly city occupied by the enemy. Obvious key targets for the NVA when it captured Hue were South Vietnamese government officials, many of whom the NVA murdered.

(U) In all the examples cited combat was typically at short range. Even on the approaches into a city the fighting was frequently localized at individual strongpoints that had to be dealt with individually and systematically, with infantry units closing in to complete the job. Within a city, of course, the nature of the physical layout prohibits flat trajectory fire--or line-of-sight observation--for distances ordinarily possible in open country. The very nature of city construction--housing sections, business sections, residential sites--provides contesting troops with a myriad of protected and concealed bases for fire, observation, bivouac, and other activities. The devastation of a city may reach such a level that several sectors are essentially flattened, but typically fighting occurs through and around the few remaining structures or shells of buildings and houses. The following description by Clark (Ref. 4) indicates at what close range the fighting can be done:

At Stalingrad each separate battle resolved itself into a combat between individuals. Soldiers would jeer and curse at their enemy across the street; often they could hear his breathing in the next room while they reloaded; hand-to-hand duels were finished in the dark twilight of smoke and brick dust with knives and pickaxes, with clubs of rubble and twisted steel.

This also fits aptly a good deal of combat in the Warsaw uprising (August-September 1944). In this sort of operation, in which city defenders are close to being obliterated, the need for accurate gunfire in the face of dwindling stocks of ammunition leads to very short-range tactics. Lack of ammunition in Warsaw "...necessitated special tactics which imposed the greatest self-control on everyone.

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The soldier well understood he must shoot only at close range and at certain targets" (Ref. 5). The Poles and the Russians found also that to fight close to the Germans denied the Germans the use of artillery in support of their own troops.

(U) For much the same reasons as noted above, the structure of a city controls the size and nature of the combat units and tactics involved there. In the city of Brest the U.S. soldiers were "...involved in street fighting against troops that seemed to contest every street, every building, every square." Machine-gun and antitank fire from well concealed positions made advances along the thoroughfares suicidal and attackers had to move from house to house by blasting holes in the building walls, clearing adjacent houses, and repeating the process to the end of the street. Squads, and in some instances platoons, fought little battles characterized by General Robertson, the 2nd Division Commander, as a "corporal's war." A typical obstruction was a concrete-reinforced dugout no higher than ten inches above ground, which was built on a street corner with an opening for a heavy machine gun at street level. Eight men (with two flamethrowers, a bazooka, and two BAR's) made a wide detour, neutralized several small nests of resistance, came up behind the pillbox, and flamed the position until thirteen Germans surrendered (Ref. 6). In Manila on occasion only two or three men could engage the enemy in a building because of the compartmentation of the building. In Stalingrad the counter-attack was successfully employed by Russians using small units known as "storm groups." In the words of the commander of Stalingrad defense forces, Marshal Chuikov, "...these were small but strong groups, as wily as a snake and irrepressible in action. When the Germans occupied an object, it was quickly subjected to attack by storm groups. The Germans rarely stood up against an attack by bullet and grenade, backed up by bayonet and dagger. Fighting went on for buildings and in buildings--for a cellar, for a room, for every corner in a corridor. Streets and squares were empty" (Ref. 7).

(U) Particular attention had to be paid to the sewer systems and cellars in many of these battles, for not infrequently the enemy would

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pop up and attack from sewers behind units running down a street or from cellars when the units were moving from building to building through breaches in the walls.

(U) Sniper fire has been typical of city combat. (The naval units that comprised the bulk of the Japanese defense in Manila, however, employed practically no sniper fire as such; they relied heavily on automatic weapon fire.) Sniper fire was not exclusively the trademark of the defenders, for it was frequently countered by snipers with the attacking force. For example, the Germans brought in the instructor of one of their sniper training schools to seek and destroy some of the Russian snipers, who, it is claimed, had up to as many as 300 kills each to their credit.

(U) The prevalence of the small-unit action did not preclude the profitable use of combined-arms actions in the severe confines of a city. For example, in Aachen a tank or tank destroyer accompanied each U.S. infantry platoon, and as the tank kept a building under fire a small assault team of riflemen would attack into the building. Once the team was in the building and closing with its defenders, the tank would take the next building under fire. During this time the battalion machine guns, light and heavy, would fire up the street. Within the building the assault team would engage the enemy behind "a barrage of hand grenades." If the resistance was too severe, two-man teams with demolitions and flamethrowers would be employed. Light artillery and mortars would sweep forward a few streets in front of the assault teams while heavy artillery would fire at the enemy's lines of communication (LOC) beyond. The Marines, in capturing Seoul, had to overcome the barricades mentioned earlier. First, aircraft would strafe and rocket the barricades, and then, while a base of fire was provided by mortars and infantry, engineers would destroy the minefields. Next, tanks would take the barricades under fire and breach them. Riflemen would follow and clean out snipers. These tactics were characteristic of the attacking troops in cities; but there were some small variations of the pattern, of course, to meet particular contingencies. Thus, when the attackers were confronted with particularly stubborn structures,

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they would bring artillery fire to bear at close range and for extensive periods of time. This tactic often was augmented or replaced by demolition teams.

(U) There are in cities open spaces, such as parks, cemeteries, and athletic fields, that might permit some maneuver and what might be termed a modest range for fire. However, one usually finds these so well covered by fire as to deny their use for much of any activity except cautious night movement to an objective. With the widespread use of helicopters in current Vietnamese operations, urban open spaces assume a more significant tactical role, especially as observed in some of the Saigon fighting. Helicopter need for end use of such spaces led to skirmishes in and about the Saigon racetrack. (Few rooftops can support these craft.)

(U) The emphasis on small-unit independent action required considerable initiative and responsibility on the part of small-unit leaders; in addition, such tactics necessitated flexibility in command and control. Thus, to maintain contact between units in Aachen, a regimental commander "...each day designated a series of checkpoints based on street intersections and some of the more prominent buildings. No unit advanced beyond a checkpoint until after establishing contact with the adjacent unit. Each rifle company was assigned a specific zone of advance; company commanders in turn generally designated a street to each platoon" (Ref. 2). By the same token, the structure of the city as well as the nature of the tactics required very tight control--and accuracy--of supporting fire.

(U) It is not clear whether the combat pattern was a 24-hour affair. In Stalingrad the Germans had clear air superiority so that the Russians utilized the night for movement, deployment, and attack. And, apparently, a good deal of the NVA resupply and reinforcement at Hue took place during the night. Here again the attackers had complete air superiority, and even when poor weather limited U.S. air operations the U.S. and ARVN ground forces sought and received many spooky missions (missions by aircraft equipped for ground illumination) during the battle.

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C. FIREPOWER

(U) In most of the combat situations discussed so far, the nature of the firepower has been rather similar. We have commented on the use of combined arms and the role of artillery, and we have alluded briefly to the flamethrower and to the significant part played by engineers' demolitions. Not much has been said about air power, for it has not always played a significant role. Indeed, in the Manila campaign General MacArthur forbade its use in an effort to protect the city and its civilian inhabitants. In Stalingrad the defenders were without it and eventually blunted the attack and broke the siege; but this is not to say that they did not suffer from the opponent's air power, for at the very least they lost a complete sector of the city and most of its inhabitants from the initial air bombardment by the Germans on the first day of the attack on the city. (This bombardment was directed at the workers' quite flammable residential section.)

(U) At Aachen, Brest, and St. Malo air attacks were requested by the attacking forces but the immediate goal of most of the attacks--the destruction of stubborn defensive structures--seems not to have been met. At St. Malo medium bombers dropped 500-pound general-purpose bombs, 100-pound incendiaries, and 1000-pound semi-armor-piercing bombs on the Citadel, but an assault team that was able to get over the wall briefly "...saw no damage that could have been caused by the air attack" (Ref. 8). Not mentioned in this account is the fact that the fire from the Citadel was stilled long enough for the assault team to get over the wall for a brief time before it had to retreat in the face of concentrated fire. The ancillary effects of frequent bombardment were noticeable. The German commander at Aachen noted, after capitulation, that his major problems were the U.S. air and artillery superiority.

(U) Chuikov's comment indicates that the German air superiority at Stalingrad was more than ancillary, for it influenced his tactics considerably. He noted that the Germans "...could not fight at night, but we had learned to do so out of bitter necessity: by day the enemy's planes hung over our troops, preventing them from raising their heads. At night we needed have no fear of the Luftwaffe. More often than not

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in the daytime we were on the defensive and beat off German attacks, which very rarely took place without tank and air support" (Ref. 7).

D. DAMAGE

(U) The major weapons in these city engagements were many. In the small-unit actions hand grenades, rifles, demolitions, portable antitank guns or explosives, and flamethrowers were prevalent. Tank-infantry teams were used constantly, though in some instances it appears tanks were vulnerable and not as flexible as in open terrain. Artillery of all sorts was also used extensively; while it was effective in helping to destroy much of the city, it seemed frequently to do so by sheer numbers of rounds. For example, a breach in the wall around Intramuros, the old walled city in Manila, was accomplished by 150 rounds of high-explosive indirect fire from 8-in. howitzers; and later in this attack a 155-mm howitzer at a range of 800 yards used rounds to make a break about 50 feet long in the topmost 10 feet of the wall. This wall was about 40 feet thick at the base, 20 feet thick at the top, and about 16 feet high. As the attack ended unfuzed high-explosive shells fired from 155-mm howitzers were the preferred way of opening fissures in the walls. Once opened, the fissures were then enlarged by firing high-explosive shells with delayed settings. While apparently two days of pummeling by high-velocity shells from 3-in. tank destroyers and 8-in. shells from artillery guns had no great effect on the medieval Chateau at St. Malo, 8-in. howitzers aimed singly at specific targets at point-blank range had penetrated several firing apertures and destroyed some of the larger guns and machine-gun emplacements in the Citadel, the last holdout and reportedly the toughest fort at St. Malo. This, plus the general feeling of malaise and drop in morale of the defenders, who were surrounded and trapped and subjected to fairly continuous bombardment, is given as the reason for the surrender of this "near impregnable" strongpoint.

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(S) Each of the cities in these urban battles shared another common distinction. By the end of the engagement each city was devastated. Stalingrad was a smoking shell; in the last few days (before the Russian counteroffensive by reserves brought up on the flanks of the Germans) the infantry of both sides was mostly underground--in cellars, drains, and tunnels--the armor was on the surface, and snipers perched in precarious nests above the ruins. Aachen was a city "...as dead as the Roman ruins;" dead animals and burst sewers and gas mains emitted a great stench in parts of the city; utility wires dangled over streets littered with broken glass, wrecked trucks and armored vehicles, guns, and rubble. Manila was a shambles and would have to start from scratch; there could be no swift return to normalcy. Warsaw was likewise torn apart. Hue suffered severe damage; the Citadel was battered, and approximately 9000 homes had been destroyed and 7000 damaged (Ref. 9). An observer who saw the city shortly after the fight noted that essentially every house had received some gunfire. In the Manila campaign civilian casualties amounted to 100,000 (Ref. 10); in Hue the number was of the order of 6000 (Ref. 9).* Manila's population at the time of the battle was 800,000; Hue's was 120,000.

(S) It is of interest to note that in Manila and Hue the rules of engagement for U.S. forces were fairly restrictive at the outset: structures were to be preserved. But in both instances the occupying troops chose to use any strong building, be it hospital, church, pagoda, historic relic, school, or whatever, as a heavily armed defensive strongpoint. The mounting casualties of the liberating forces soon led to the relaxation of early restrictions.

(U) In St. Malo, Brest, and Aachen, the bulk of the civilians was evacuated from the city at the outset of the engagement. The civilian toll in the other battles was heavy.

(U) The city fighting in all instances was hard and bitter; in some instances it was savage, and in some it was reported as plain "dirty", extending to rape, pillage, and murder of hostages, civilians, and captives.

* Another source reports casualties in Hue to have been somewhat less than half this.

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E. SUMMARY

(U) In summary, the city fighting observed in modern warfare between organized units generally has been characterized by small-unit action with an attendant independence of units, proximity of opposing forces, limited ability to maneuver, limited observation, limited fields of fire, stressed command and control, difficulty of locating enemy positions, savagery of fighting, and infantry tactics tied to subterranean, surface, and above-surface levels.

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III. RESTRICTED OPERATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

(U) U.S. forces have been, are now, and likely will be engaged in urban operations that are rather different from the operations just discussed. (The range of such operations that may occur and that are of concern here is covered in IDA Study S-345 under "Spectrum of Operations.") Our forces, as we have noted, have participated in several such operations since World War II. These operations, too, share a certain set of similarities, and, as noted in Section I, Introduction, they have also exhibited some of the characteristics common to the pitched city battle discussed above. But it is important that we recognize the rather clear differences between these city operations and those we have discussed in Section II, Organized Combat. These differences reflect different national strategies since World War II and are most sharply seen in the objectives of an operation and frequently in its participants, and hence in the kinds of tactics, firepower, and other usual military functions employed.

(U) In World War II our country was a member of an alliance locked in major general war against another alliance, and our aim was the unconditional surrender of the enemy. Ours was a national strategy embracing an unlimited war. Since the advent of the nuclear arsenals following World War II and since the advent of the cold war, a strategy of nuclear deterrence has prevailed between the super powers that has significantly influenced relations among all nations.

(U) International activities have been influenced equally by the emergence from colonial status of a large number of new and somewhat delicate nation-states. These new states have been for the most part rather unstable politically, underdeveloped economically, and anxious for modernization. They are, unfortunately, fertile ground for

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competing power-seeking factions frequently motivated by external forces.

(U) Thus, while a nuclear exchange has been avoided, there has been since World War II a series of international and intragovernmental incidents, mostly violent, ranging from the Korean War through insurrections and tribal warfare to some bloodless coups d'etat. Many of these incidents have involved a developing nation, one or more of the major powers, and some sort of military activity in a city or cities. Some of these incidents involved United States forces.

(U) United States operations in such incidents were reflective of a national strategy that:

- Sought to avoid a direct (and likely nuclear) confrontation with the other super power and yet not to concede ideological gains or areas of interest to it or other cold war antagonists.
- Sought to abide by commitments made under policies of containing communism and of aid, including operations by military units, to "friendly" regimes in developing nations.

(U) These operations exhibited two important common characteristics. The first and perhaps more important of these characteristics was the limited nature of the operations. Objectives were limited both politically and militarily, and while they sometimes permitted a rather high intensity of fighting, as in Korea, they did not always in fact anticipate or opt for violence. They frequently aimed at a limited application of force or even a mere show of it. Sometimes the only aim was a continuing advisory role, including participation in noncombat and civil activities. But while objectives were always limited, variations in them influenced the actual purpose, mission, and activity of military forces.

(U) Limitations of another sort have been present in most of the international conflicts since World War II, including those in which the United States has been involved. These have been well described by Raymond Aron (Ref. 11):

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What authors today call limited war is both a non-general war...and a war in which the belligerents employ only a fraction of their forces... What is new in the Atomic Age is that the same weapons are not employed in the various kinds of wars.

(U) The second common characteristic of these operations was the need to couple U.S. forces with local units, either with or without much prior planning. As one would expect, there was some variation in the makeup of the local forces that U.S. units were expected to support.

(U) The nature of the opposition encountered by U.S. units in these operations was also inconstant from one operation to another. Opposition ranged from strong in Seoul and Hue--where enemy forces consisted of regular organized units which were well trained and well equipped except for their lack of aircraft--to latent or none in various developing nations where the U.S. mission was advisory. In Saigon and Kontum during the 1968 Tet offensive U.S. forces faced organized irregulars who were supported by regulars, and in Saigon U.S. forces must often contend with well-trained guerrillas. In Santo Domingo rebels and rioters opposed the United States, and in Panama the opponents were rioters. In Beirut U.S. units faced the threat of opposition by regular army units and rebels.

(U) While most of the city operations since World War II do reflect the two broad common characteristics just noted, they otherwise seem to exhibit three separate patterns of similarities influenced by

1. City combat, like that of World War II but more limited in its objectives, in which combined-arms units fight each other to a military decision.
2. City operations in which objectives and missions are more stringent than in pattern 1, and in which U.S. forces are not confronted with organized regular military units.
3. City operations in which U.S. participation is confined to advising foreign governments and their military forces.

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(U) It will be seen that there is no sharp discontinuity between the city battles during World War II and those following it. Many of the characteristics of World War II fighting continued in modified form even in those kinds of operations described below and generally viewed as stability operations.*

(U) We shall not dwell here on city combat operations falling into the first pattern, as exemplified by the battles for Seoul, Hue, and Kontum. Such operations were considered in the discussion of pitched city battles by organized units (Section II). They are mentioned here because they do share with other operations since World War II the limited objective characteristic.

B. FEATURES OF STABILITY OPERATIONS

(U) In July 1958 the Lebanese government, which had been faced with a series of riots and the threat of an armed insurrection, requested United States assistance after other alternatives seemed hopeless. U.S. Marines, and later Army units, were sent into Beirut to help the local forces quell the riots and to stall any threat of an armed uprising against the government. The insurgent movement was backed by and had received some volunteers and materiel from Syria. Indeed, at the time of the request to the United States, Syrian forces were poised at the Lebanese border in a threatening manner. The U.S. objectives were simple and limited, but not without risks. They were to provide some additional strength until local forces could be brought to bear against the insurgents and at the same time to dissuade the Syrian government from moving organized army units into Beirut in support of the insurgents. The limited objectives were fulfilled and the operation essentially went no further than a show of force.

* Stability operations are defined by the U.S. Army to be: "That type of internal defense and internal development operations and assistance provided by the armed forces to maintain, restore, or establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and without which progress cannot be achieved" (Ref. 12).

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(S) Some rather pointed and uneasy remarks have been made that the initial objectives of our intervention in the Dominican Republic in April 1965 have not been made clear (Ref. 13). It appears from the chronology in the official report on stability operations in the Dominican Republic (Ref. 14), that U.S. forces were first requested by our ambassador and members of the U.S. Mission in Santo Domingo because they thought communists might take over the government of the Dominican Republic unless the military junta that had appealed to the ambassador was provided support. (The government had been subjected to threats and riots by dissident elements in the population, and the junta had moved in and was attempting to establish a de facto government.) On the other hand, it is quite clear that troops were needed to evacuate U.S. and other foreign citizens from Santo Domingo as the riots spread. In either event, the objectives of our participation were limited to the evacuation of the citizens and to the application of sufficient force to bring about some stability in the city and permit a government to form and normal activities to resume. As the operation proceeded, the implementation of the objectives underwent some major adjustments directed by officials in the theater and by higher officials in Washington. These adjustments, of course, influenced the actual military operations in various degrees, but the objectives themselves and the role of our forces remained limited.

(U) Our brief but highly publicized and strategically touchy action in the Congo in November 1964 was carried out under extremely tight restrictions. The United Nations peace-keeping mission, which had been in the Congo attempting to preserve some semblance of stability since July 1960, had departed from the Congo the previous June. The country, consisting of some 200 tribal groups, was still beset with internal and bitter conflict despite efforts by many to maintain unity. By November hundreds of white hostages--some U.S. citizens--were threatened with murder by one of the warring factions. U.S. military intervention was limited to providing the airlift for Belgian paratroops into Stanleyville for the rescue mission and to evacuating those rescued. The objectives of the U.S. mission in this instance were extremely narrow in scope compared with those of the U.S. mission in

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Santo Domingo, for example, though in both instances removal of civilians from a city in which fighting was occurring was a prime reason for the presence of U.S. military elements.

(U) U.S. forces have generally been committed to a stability operation to assist a friendly government in coping with a situation that is beyond the capacity of the local forces alone. Our forces entered Santo Domingo to help control an expanding domestic upheaval, they entered Beirut to help quell potentially dangerous insurgent activity, and they entered South Vietnam as advisors to the local military services in their struggle with guerrillas. In each case, the activities of U.S. units had to be coordinated with the local government and its units. In Beirut this went rather smoothly despite language problems and the absence of prior joint planning. The success in Beirut was in large part due to: immediate consultations among the commander of the landing forces (the commanding general, Second Provisional Marine Force), the U.S. ambassador, and the commander-in-chief of the Lebanese armed forces; prior planning for such a contingency* within the U.S. forces (Amphibious Group Two); and the assignment of Lebanese officers to the Marine force staff and each of its battalions. Our forces in the city of Santo Domingo were expected to coordinate with local units, but here the picture was rather different in that the local forces were not unified, there were contenders for and pretenders to the presidency, and our units were not too well informed. However, as the irrationality or rather the complexities of the local political problem became better understood, other Latin American forces were brought into the operation through the Organization of American States (OAS) and, along with our units, were placed under a joint commander designated by the OAS.

(U) Support of and coordination with local forces was required from the outset in the campaign in South Vietnam. However, major

*The Lebanese government earlier had appealed to the United Nations Security Council to take some action against the influx of arms and men, and shortly thereafter it had alerted the United States that it might seek assistance.

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urban combat occurred well after U.S. troops had been committed to these campaigns. The task of combined urban operations was therefore less difficult than would have been the case had U.S. troops been abruptly introduced into the foreign cities.

(C) The United States presence in many areas, whether by long-established treaties or under fairly new Military Assistance Programs, frequently has been subjected to hostile criticism in a trend of growing nationalistic sentiment during the 1950's and 1960's. Military incidents have resulted. Thus, in Panama City in January 1964 a series of riots erupted over a flag-raising incident and spilled over into the Canal Zone. U.S. troops on hand were brought into action, first, to protect the area and prevent rioters from swarming into the Canal Zone and, second, to break up rioters in the city of Cristobal, to which the disorder had spread. The thrust of the U.S. objective was quite limited, and this in turn placed tight restrictions on troop action. The mission assigned to the units was limited essentially to the protection of the Canal Zone. Throughout the operation the rules of engagement were monitored and somewhat modified by very high levels in the U.S. command structure. This same sort of control was characteristic also of the Santo Domingo operation. Aid sought from the local police and troops--the Guardia Nacional--rather early in the riot was slow in fruition.

(U) In all the operations cited here, there was a wide range of objectives. But it is the very limited nature of these objectives--and the nature of the participants as well--that characterizes these urban military operations and allows some generalizations to be made about them as distinct from the city fighting of World War II.

C. DEFENSES AND TARGETS

(U) Buildings generally were used as bases of fire and defensive positions even where these were no more than sites from which rocks, debris, bottles, and crude Molotov cocktails could be thrown on our forces by rioters and rebels in operations short of organized combat. Not infrequently the enemy used churches, museums and other cherished

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buildings as defensive bases; in fact, this was fairly standard practice in Vietnam during Tet in 1968.

(C) Besides power and water installations, key targets for all contestants were generally major radio stations. In fact, in Santo Domingo the rebel-held radio was a constant source of trouble for the U.S. operations. (And it is interesting to note that the Prague radio stations were the key targets of the Soviet forces that moved into that city in 1968.) In Hue, however, the key targets were the upper echelons of the government bureaucracy. Many South Vietnamese government officials were murdered in Hue, most during the early days of the fighting.

D. TACTICS

(C) Sniper fire, as in World War II, was prevalent in all operations in which some sort of engagement took place. Thus, in the Panama riots, sniper fire was a constant source of trouble, and U.S. casualties included 25 wounded by gunshot and four killed.

(C) Sniper fire did not appear to be characteristic of city insurgencies until actual riots broke out. Terrorism in incipient insurgencies usually eschewed sniper fire for occasional bombings and small riots.

(C) Tactics were dominated by the restrictions on engagement felt necessary to meet a touchy situation, to spare civilian lives, or to counter a particular kind of opposition. Thus, in Panama, U.S. military units could not proceed beyond the boundary of the Canal Zone to break up mobs as they formed in the Republic of Panama. Barriers, control points, and cordoning operations were frequently required to maintain neutral zones, to contain riots, or to seal an area. Areas had to be cleared of dissidents, combatants, provokers, and onlookers so that some sort of order could be restored. In Santo Domingo, in fact, checkpoint operations became a major effort in both manpower and delicacy. A cordon stretching from the edge of the city to a bit inland had been established to seal off the rebel-held area from the rest of the city and also as an aid in the evacuation of U.S.

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citizens. Checkpoints were set up to permit the local population into and out of the area, and, of course, to control the transport of weapons and contraband into or out of rebel territory. Searching of cars, personnel, their luggage, handbags, and packages at these points was time consuming and placed a rather large demand on troops. (A count at one checkpoint showed about 1000 pedestrians and 600 vehicles in an hour.) The checkpoint task was exacerbated by occasional sniper fire directed at the troops manning these points.

(S) Utilities, some government buildings, hospitals, schools, and the like had to be protected. (In Santo Domingo, unfortunately, the rules of engagement placed some of the key rebel targets out of bounds.) And, of course, U.S. and other citizens being evacuated had to be protected.

(U) Maneuver in many streets was hampered by rocks and bricks thrown from buildings occupied in part by nonbelligerent civilians. Some streets, in a sense, became killing zones and it was important to keep civilians out of these as well as to protect any small maneuver elements in them; the presence of civilians as well as the kinds of targets made fire accuracy very important. Fire discipline had to be exceedingly tight. This was particularly difficult in riots and moderate combat, as in Panama and Santo Domingo, where rebels taunted and goaded U.S. troops from the refuge of noncombatant crowds. Generally U.S. troops were under orders to fire only when fired upon.

E. FIREPOWER

(S) Support fire was generally lacking. In Panama the only firepower permitted was bird shot and strictly controlled rifle fire by marksmen to counter the sniper fire from the buildings facing the Canal Zone. In Santo Domingo, where street fighting was rather extensive, the LAW and M-79 (40-mm grenade launcher) were used frequently against rebel strongpoints; the highest caliber weapon used in Santo Domingo was the 106-mm recoilless rifle. Thus, in this operation, which contained more actual combat than any of the other quite limited operations, the use of close air support, naval gunfire, mortars, and

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artillery was not permitted. Tanks were brought ashore at Beirut and Santo Domingo and, while unused, did provide a show of strength that was felt to be salutary. In Panama, considerable use was made of riot or tear gas in an attempt to contain rather large crowds. In Hue, CS was employed in limited quantity by NVA units as well as by U.S. troops. Although it was available, CS was prohibited in Santo Domingo; tear gas was used in small quantities by the rebels there.

(C) Aircraft were deployed with the ships lying off Beirut and were used for visual and photographic reconnaissance, but not in a strike role. Helicopters were used in Santo Domingo for logistic as well as some reconnaissance missions; they were also used briefly for gun platforms, but this was quickly discontinued. Aircraft and air-lift were the U.S. contributions to the Stanleyville operation.

F. OTHER FUNCTIONS

(U) Civil affairs activities were usually extensive. Although the populace generally remained in the cities, the usual services and businesses ceased because of fear, the destruction of buildings and homes, and inability to get to work. Thus, refugee handling, sanitation services, feeding, medical and other activities had to be carried out by or with the help of the military forces.

(U) It is interesting to note that in Santo Domingo the sanitation issue was a critical one much as it was in the pitched-battle type of city fighting, but for different reasons. In Santo Domingo the garbage and trash went uncollected by the regular local drivers because of fear, confusion, lack of vehicles, or the partition of the downtown area. In Hue the garbage and corpses mounted because the ferocity of the fighting made removal and burial very difficult. In both instances, U.S. forces were required to carry out the tasks to prevent a possible epidemic.

(S) Intelligence on the nature of the trouble, on the disposition of forces, on identification of the enemy, and on the physical structure of the city was poor to very bad in Santo Domingo. At

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Beirut there was a similar lack of information on the nature of the opposition and little up-to-date data on the landing site. And lack of intelligence and city information seems to have beset some U.S. activities in Saigon during the 1968 Tet.

(C) In folding in U.S. troop operations with either local or other foreign nationals, it usually fell to the U.S. forces to support some of these other units in both initial equipment and resupply. Thus, in Santo Domingo, the U.S. furnished essentially all class I, III, and IV supplies and considerable transportation to some of the other national units.

(U) Firepower and maneuver restrictions, coordination with local police and troops, and the presence of masses of innocent civilians demanded tight discipline and complicated command and control.

(S) Throughout the Panama operations, the information media--radio, TV, loudspeakers, and newspapers--incited and misinformed the general public. In Santo Domingo, as noted earlier, a rebel-held radio station constantly spread anti-U.S. sentiment.

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IV. ADVISORY OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

(U) Elements of the U.S. military services, the Army in particular, have participated as advisors to the military forces of several countries, especially the developing nations, for a number of years under our Military Assistance Program. This mission of the military has not involved U.S. units directly in city fighting, but it has brought them face to face with the problems of incipient urban insurgency as well as with the duty to advise the host government on how to deal with urban uprisings and urban fighting should they occur.

(U) While counterinsurgency operations by current doctrine are considered as but one class of stability operations, they are mentioned in the context of advisory operations here only because a considerable and very important part of our advisory task deals with counterinsurgency.

(U) In addition to their continuing advisory operations, which must take account of the peculiarities of urban fighting, elements of the armed services have provided foreign governments with advice on city combat or near-combat problems on a short-term basis to meet specific crisis-oriented situations.

(U) The short-term advisory operation is generally characterized by the local need for crowd control techniques and a command and control system to overcome an anticipated spate of small riots during an election or some memorial celebration.

(U) The continuing advisory operation that must contribute counsel on urban insurgency problems merits close attention. For some time now, insurgency--an attempt, on a scale less than an organized revolution, to change drastically or overthrow a government--has been perhaps the most vexing and widespread political and military problem among the developing nations.

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Insurgent movements have occurred largely in the cities because of the obvious success of urban insurgency in Algeria and because in many countries control of the principal cities is tantamount to control of the nation. It should be observed that while ultimate victory came to the Algerians by March 1962 when France signed an agreement giving them the right to self-determination, earlier stages of the insurgent movement against France had been essentially crushed. In 1955-56 the terror raids of the FLN, the primary insurgent group, were quite successful. But by 1957 "...FLN underground activities in the cities suffered severe setbacks when General Jacques Massu, of the French 10th Paratroop Division, succeeded in virtually wiping out the FLN potential in the large coastal cities" (Ref. 15). This French success was primarily due to firm implementation of the filot system in which one person in each family group was made responsible for the location of all other members of the family at any time. These people were responsible to floor chiefs, who were responsible to building chiefs, who reported to block leaders. It was a very tight chain.

(U) Two major objectives of an insurgent movement have been observed to be organization and the allegiance of the population. The insurgent has generally sought the latter through terrorism, which Trinquier notes is the " ...basic weapon of modern warfare, particularly in the cities..." (Ref. 16).

(U) The primary objective of counterinsurgency forces should be the disruption and destruction of the insurgent organization, and this requires a first-rate urban intelligence system. Cross puts it this way: "Probably the most effective instrument to bring to bear against a campaign of urban violence is an efficient police intelligence service..." (Ref. 17). Trinquier adds that "an intensive propaganda effort" and a "broad social program" should respectively accompany and follow the police effort to destroy an urban insurgency. These steps are, of course, somewhat different from conventional military activities and thus place considerable demands on U.S. military personnel participating in urban counterinsurgency operations.

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V. SUMMARY

(U) In summary, the characteristics of urban operations since World War II have fallen generally into three patterns, having some aspects in common.

1. The first pattern has the characteristics of city fighting of the World War II type, except that the objectives of the battle are limited. As we noted above, this kind of urban combat is characterized by small-unit action, proximity of opposing forces, limited ability to maneuver, limited observation and fields of fire, complex command and control, ferocity of fighting, and three-dimensional tactics. The combat operations in Seoul, Hue, and Kontum fall into this pattern.
2. The second pattern or class shows some of the above characteristics, viz., proximity of opposing forces, limited observation and ability to maneuver, complicated command and control, and three-dimensional tactics. In addition, this pattern contains the following significant traits: restrictions on the level of firepower and on tactical maneuver; irregulars, guerrillas, and civilian opponents mixed in with the non-combatant population; combined operations with local units; heightened civil affairs activities; population control; and a range of combat from rather extensive maneuver and fire to the mere threat of combat. The operations in Saigon, Santo Domingo, Stanleyville, Panama, and Beirut fall into this pattern.
3. The third class of operations (through counsel, and not active participation) is characterized by increased police functions, heightened requirements for intelligence, psychological operations, civic action programs, and development

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of command and control systems. This kind of operation is typified by our Military Assistance Program in a variety of developing nations.

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APPENDIX

SOME UNITED STATES MILITARY OPERATIONS IN OVERSEAS CITIES SINCE WORLD WAR II

(U) The United States has been involved in several military operations in overseas cities since World War II. These operations have ranged from urban disorders such as the Panama riots of January 1964 to fierce fighting to recapture a friendly city such as the battles for Seoul and Hue. Such operations have been documented in varying amounts of detail. For example, the Santo Domingo operation has been covered fully, whereas little has been written about the Beirut operation.

(U) The following descriptions of seven operations (Panama, Beirut, Santo Domingo, Saigon, Xuan Loc, Kontum, and Hue) have been compiled and tabulated from the literature. Where appropriate, the operational problems that were encountered have been described. Intelligence has clearly been the major problem area. Difficulties have been encountered, however, in communications, firepower (to counter snipers without extensive destruction), command and control (especially in operations involving Allied or indigenous military and police forces), force structure and organization, population and resources control, civil affairs, and psychological operations. All these problems, where documented, have been detailed for each of the operations tabulated on the pages following.

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I. PANAMA, 9-16 January 1964
(Panama City Population ~ 350,000)

Kind of Operation	Containment of civil disturbance. Flag-raising incident and subsequent damage in Canal Zone (C.Z.). Crowd of 5000 to 6000 formed in Panama City.
U.S. Objective	To clear C.Z. of Panamanians and seal border against intrusions.
Forces	• Panamanian: Crowds of up to 6000 civilians. • C.Z. police: 80. • U.S. Army: 2 companies at Cristobal, 2 companies at Panama City (~ 3000 men available).
Casualties	• Panamanian: 21 killed, 228 wounded. • U.S. Army: 4 killed, 153 wounded.
Damage	• Canal Zone: \$1,508,000 loss. • U.S. Army: 83 vehicles, \$430,000 in building damage.
Constraints	• U.S. forces were not permitted to enter Panama to disperse crowds. Panama National Guard inactive. • Restrictions on use of weapons. Countersniper fire (controlled single shots, fired by marksmen) was not authorized by USCINCSO until 2 hr after troops arrived. It was subsequently agreed with the President of Panama that U.S. forces would not return sniper fire.
Weapons	• Panamanian: Sniper fire; fires and looting; barrage of rocks, bricks, and Molotov cocktails; burning cars. • C.Z. police: Tear gas until exhausted, then revolvers and shotguns fired over the heads of and in front of crowds. • U.S. Army: CS and CN grenades and bulk chemicals to disperse crowds; .30-caliber rifles and 4- and 7½-gauge shotguns to counter snipers.
Communications	This was considered the most serious problem, especially at the beginning of the trouble when secure means of communication were lacking between USARSO, Army Operations Center, USSOUTHCOM, Joint Operations Center, and troop units.

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PANAMA (Continued)

Command and Control	Centralized control in Army Operations Center extended to decisions regarding passage of individual vehicles at checkpoints. Subordinate commanders exercised little command responsibility.
Population and Resources Control	Checkpoints along C.Z. border.
Security	Five facilities in C.Z. were guarded without incident.
Psychological Operations	Reports over Panama radio, TV, and loudspeakers and in newspapers, designed to incite and misinform Panamanians, were not countered by Panama authorities.
U.S. Tactics	Operating in narrow alleys and streets lined with buildings of 3 or 4 stories was more difficult than clearing open roads and parklike areas along the Canal Zone-Panama City border. U.S. forces were exposed to missiles thrown from upper stories.

SOURCES: U.S. Army Southern Command, U.S. Army Control of Riots and Civil Disturbances in Panama, 9-16 Jan. 1964, (U), (unpublished, 65 pp., available at Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History), (S).

Report on the Events in Panama, January 9-12, 1964, prepared by the Investigating Committee appointed by the International Commission of Jurists, Geneva, Switzerland.

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II. BEIRUT, LEBANON, July-September 1958 (Population ~ 700,000)

Kind of Operation	Show of force. Lebanese government asked U.S. assistance in quelling riots and threat of armed insurrection. Syrian forces at Lebanese border.
U.S. Objective	To provide some additional strength to local forces and to deter Syria from invading.
Forces	• U.S. Marines: ~ 6000 • U.S. Army: ~8000 by D+7
Casualties	U.S. Marines: None
Constraints	• Lebanon asked U.S. to redeploy units outside city so that the city would not appear invaded. Some U.S. redeployment was done, but U.S. forces remained in the city. • U.S. had to negotiate with landowners for leases for storage and deployment areas. • U.S. had to negotiate with Lebanese Army to occupy some sites needed for security of U.S. forces.
Weapons	Unknown opponents fired scattered shots at U.S. forces.
Intelligence	• Intelligence was a problem complicated by the political and religious overtones of the situation. • Identification of friends and foes was difficult in a fire fight. Integrated U.S.-Lebanese MP patrols were used after 5 to 7 days. • U.S. lacked qualified linguists and felt that use of local people as interpreters was undesirable in the political turmoil. The reliability of the local people was questionable because of their personal political and religious alignments.
Command and Control	Lebanese officers were assigned to each U.S. battalion and the general staff.

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BEIRUT, LEBANON (Continued)

Population and Resources Control	Curfews were imposed at times.
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SOURCE: S. S. Wade, "Operation BLUEBAT", Marine Corps Gazette,
July 1959.

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III. SANTO DOMINGO, 28 April 1965 to 23 September 1966 (Population ~ 370,000)

Kind of Operation	Rescue and evacuation; restoration of peace and normal conditions; prevention of communist state in western hemisphere (stability operation). Pure military operations dominated activities for a relatively short period.
U. S. Objective	• To evacuate U.S. and other nationals, restore order and defeat communists. • U.S. military objectives and orders changed rapidly in early stages of the operation because of the instability of the military situation between loyalist and rebel forces and the constantly changing political atmosphere.
Phases of Operation	• President Johnson flashed a message to the USS Boxer on 28 April authorizing 556 Marines to land and proceed to the U.S. Embassy to protect U.S. lives. The U.S. cordoned off 9 sq mi as an "International Zone." • In 5 days, 2964 U.S. citizens and 1373 other nationals were evacuated. • On 30 April, the first elements of the 82nd Airborne Division arrived at San Isidro Air Base. First action occurred at Duarte Bridge, where scattered sniper fire was encountered. U.S. forces cleared bridge, checked for mines, and crossed bridge to establish a bridgehead in a 6-block semicircle. This was done with cautious house-to-house search, close-range small-arms fire, and grenades. A company moved south and secured the vital power plant. • Night operation to establish a corridor of communication and link forces on east and west of city was successful. When the decision for this operation was made, however, overriding political considerations did not permit securing all key installations (e.g., radio station, telephone exchange, national palace). The radio station and the main water valves were 2 blocks from the corridor. • On 23 May, the Interamerican Peace Force was formed under the command of a Brazilian general. • As the situation stabilized, camps were prepared and occupied on the outskirts of the city to permit the return of schools, public buildings, and private dwellings to their intended use.

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SANTO DOMINGO (Continued)

Forces	• U.S. maximum strength (June 1965): 23,000 (13,700 Army, 8200 Marines, 1100 Air Force) supported by 11,500 Navy. • OAS: 1800 (1200 Brazilians and 600 Nicaraguans, Hondurans, Paraguayans, and Costa Ricans). • Estimated rebel strength: 1000 to 1200 military, 100 armed civilians.
Casualties	• Civilians: An estimated 2000 were killed and 3000 wounded from 24 April through 15 June. • Rebels: An estimated 550 were killed. • Loyalist armed forces: 230 killed, 400 missing. • Loyalist police forces: 70 killed, 200 missing. • U.S. forces: 24 killed, 164 wounded (through 15 October). • OAS forces: 7 wounded.
Constraints	• Minimum force was to be exercised. The use of mortars, artillery, tanks, CAS, and naval gunfire was banned. • Riot control agents were authorized only as a last resort against mobs. • U.S. forces fired only when fired upon and when a target was in sight. Disciplined, experienced soldiers fired aimed single shots. • Night illumination rounds were only to be used in special situations. • There was a proliferation of rules of engagement and changes in them. • Flights over the city were prohibited on 4 May. • Small-arms fire was to be returned with small-arms fire. Use of 106-mm recoilless rifle to flush snipers was prohibited. • Troops were insufficient in number to occupy the city completely, so they assumed control of all key facilities and installations (e.g., access roads and bridges, airfields, the port, telecommunications, buildings symbolic of government, public utilities, banks, and newspapers). • A token shutdown of water to rebel-held zone was abandoned for humanitarian reasons. • Negotiations with an agency of the Dominican Republic for the use of government-owned installations were impossible because there was no recognized Dominican government. Suitable privately owned facilities were few, and their owners were hard to locate to negotiate acquisition. • No U.S. Army passes to the city were issued to the troops because of anti-U.S. feeling. Troops

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SANTO DOMINGO (Continued)

Constraints (Cont'd)	remained in tent compounds outside the city when they were not on duty. • Rebels used churches for weapons emplacement (e.g., Santa Maria Cathedral, containing irreplaceable treasures), thereby preventing the use of destructive counterfire. • To cause minimum damage, U.S. fire had to be highly accurate.
Weapons	• U.S.: The LAW, 40-mm grenade (M-76), and 106-mm recoilless rifle were considered extremely effective for close-in fighting requiring accuracy and target discrimination. The 106-mm recoilless rifle was the largest weapon used. Operational objectives precluded naval gunfire, CAS, artillery, armed helicopters, and mortars. CS was not permitted. Tanks were considered good psychological weapons. To blow holes in walls, engineer demolition, 3.5-in. rocket launcher, LAW, or 106-mm recoilless rifle were used. • Rebels: Pistols, rifles, automatic rifles, submachine guns, light machine guns, a few heavy machine guns, rocket launchers, mortars, several artillery pieces, 3 light tanks, and 3 armored cars. • Most fighting was done at 100 yd or less.
Intelligence	• Operations plan was not up-to-date and intelligence was lacking. Limited planning resources had not been diverted to plan for Dominican Republic contingency. • U.S. forces lacked maps, except Esso road maps, when they entered the city. Sewers and electrical and water systems were mapped by engineers after arrival of U.S. forces. Information on city utilities requested from DIA could not be located unless USCOMDOMREP could provide the names of the U.S. firms that had installed the utilities. Aerial photographs taken during the operation were used to plan street fighting, enforce cease-fire, and pinpoint obstacles. Army maps were finally obtained on 6 May but were not up-to-date. Some features shown on the maps did not exist and vice versa. These maps progressed through four editions before they were considered reasonably accurate. • There was little demand for small-scale maps, but the demand for Esso and Texaco road maps

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SANTO DOMINGO (Continued)

Intelligence
(Continued)

- and for maps at 1:12,500 scale (and blowups of parts of these) appeared insatiable. An average of 1 map was issued for every four soldiers. Blowups to a scale of 1:6250 were issued to each line company command post, and to 1:3125 for detailed tactical planning.
- Information was lacking on radio station locations, frequencies, and personnel, on telephone central location, and on vital facilities. Strategic analysis of information was not in plan nor was it available to the commanders and their staffs conducting the operation.
 - Prelanding reconnaissance had been faulty. Coral in drop zone selected would have been disastrous had drop occurred.
 - Intelligence information on rebels had to be developed after arrival of U.S. forces. Embassy files had been burned.
 - 28 airborne, ground-based, and ship-based jammers were used against 21 known rebel radio frequencies. Main radio station was finally put off the air by destruction of transmitting capability by 5 Loyalist aircraft.
 - Rebels reportedly had caches of arms and ammunition throughout the area.
 - Rebels are not known to have used any form of military communication that is the normal target of the Army Security Agency.
 - Rebels were described as being bottled up when, in fact, they held most of the city on the arrival of the 82nd Airborne Division. Most of the information this Division had before its deployment was from radio and television. At the time the Division was alerted, there was little reliable information available to it on the political and military situation in the Dominican Republic.
 - A communications intelligence study of the civilian system was furnished in time for examination prior to the deployment of the 82nd Airborne, but it was found to be too general to be of real value.
 - A problem in the line of communication was observation of rebel activity, especially at night.
 - Counter mortar radar was used to locate source of mortar fire hitting rebel zone and provided evidence that the source was Loyalist forces.
 - In the city, it was very confusing to try to

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SANTO DOMINGO (Continued)

Intelligence (Continued)	determine the source and direction of firing from its sound. No substitute for experience at this was found. • U.S. forces were short of linguistically trained special agents for counterintelligence. • U.S. forces were restrained from using mines in storm sewers. The sewers were finally secured by wire barriers and 24-hr surveillance, a tedious but necessary task. • Language barrier was critical problem in investigations of indigenous population. • Surveillance along the line of communication was enhanced by installing 500-watt spotlights. • Detection of ambushes was almost impossible. Shots echoed and their location by sound was difficult. U.S. troop movements were usually under observation, and thus possibilities for hostile action were numerous. Snipers were the number one enemy. They hid in shadows of buildings or in concealed positions and often fired out of windows from well within rooms, using automatic weapons, pistols, and other small arms. • The 82nd Airborne was directed to land--not paradrop--at San Isidro Airport, but the military command in the Dominican Republic did not know at the time (29-30 April) whether or not the airport was in rebel hands.
Communications	• Satisfactory communications for intelligence operations were not set up until 7 days after operation began. • Message handling was a big problem. • For 5 days there was no voice security equipment to meet the requirement for communication with the White House. • Initial voice communication with the continental U.S. was limited to 2 channels, supplemented by 3 leased circuits that passed through the rebel-held central telephone building. Voice communication from the U.S. Embassy was at the mercy of rebel forces. • U.S. forces laid 140 mi of cable during their first month in the Dominican Republic. • A large amount of tactical VHF/UHF/FM radio equipment was used in the rather small area occupied by U.S. forces, and the initial lack of frequency control authority generated mutual interference problems. • The PRC-10 was for short range and was useless in Santo Domingo, a built-up area.

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SANTO DOMINGO (Continued)

Command and Control

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff retained control of deployment.
- U.S. forces shot down Dominican aircraft during attack on radio station.
- Helicopters were useful in C&C.
- There was a necessity for integrated effort of all U.S. forces and coordination with OAS forces. Independent actions by Dominican Republic forces had to be monitored.
- While the USS Boxer was being used as command ship, its antennas had to be lowered during flight operations, putting it out of communication.
- For the first time in history, the U.S. turned over direct field command of its combat force to a foreign commander--the Brazilian commander of the Interamerican Peace Force.
- The tendency of the Latin American OAS troops to be trigger happy was almost disastrous to negotiations.
- Complete integration of U.S. political, military, psychological, socioeconomic, public affairs and information efforts was required.
- The JCS required detailed reporting. This made the requirement for detailed maps urgent.
- The most serious hindrance to the effectiveness of the Interamerican Peace Force was the inadequacy of the personnel, both Latin American and U.S., assigned to the staff of the Unified Command. U.S. personnel were unacceptably deficient as to both linguistic ability and previous experience in Latin America, although people with the necessary qualifications existed in the U.S. armed forces. It was recommended that the U.S. armed forces prepare and keep current rosters of Spanish-speaking personnel with prior experience in Latin America for possible future use in stability operations. The language requirements in joint command staff extend beyond foreign speech to an acceptable reading of high-level foreign correspondence and directives.
- The cease-fire agreement worked out by the Ambassador with the rebels on 1 May included a "no movement from present position" clause and the establishment of boundaries for the International Safety Zone. Without coordination with the responsible military commander, the boundary of the then-current Marine positions was drawn on an Esso map by a member of the U.S. Embassy. The line thus drawn included less area than the Marine positions actually encompassed.

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SANTO DOMINGO (Continued)

Mobility	• The most valuable and versatile elements of the U.S. force were the UH-1 air-mobile units. They lifted 106-mm recoilless rifles, sandbags, and other equipment to otherwise inaccessible places, delivered communications packages to warships, and transported persons and things for many organizations. Their visible capability to lift combat troops to any point in the interior of the country was considered a major factor in preventing the spread of the revolution outside Santo Domingo. • Santo Domingo is an old city with many narrow and winding streets that are not adaptable to heavy military traffic. The relatively few wide thoroughfares passing through the main commercial areas of the city do not necessarily create an ideal main supply route (MSR). A survey of all streets for size, condition of roadway, and amount of civilian traffic was conducted jointly with the National Police to pick the most desirable route. The route sought was to bypass congested areas. With new personnel coming into the command, the MSR had to be marked. But signs placed along it in certain hostile areas rarely stayed more than 24 hr. • The role of armor is greatly restricted in a stability operation in which troops are subjected to sniper fire and ambush tactics. The congested area in which part of the armored force operated reduced tank mobility. U.S. policy limited the use of the tanks' main armament. The value of the armor was its psychological impact on the population.
Logistics	• U.S. had to furnish supplies of Classes I, III, and IV to the Latin American forces. Most of the Latin American forces arrived without equipment--particularly transportation and communication equipment--and supplies. • There was a shortage of POL. POL was brought in over the beach because the main POL discharge point was opposite the rebel area. A ship-to-shore pipeline was constructed.
Population and Resources Control	• To control movement of the population, checkpoints were established. Observation posts were set up over storm sewers to prevent their use as passageways. Observation posts to detect mobs were maintained on rooftops.

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SANTO DOMINGO (Continued)

Population and Resources Control (Continued)	• Lights were installed at checkpoints and outposts to prevent sneak attacks under cover of darkness, in which rebels would crawl within grenade range, toss a grenade, fire a machine-gun burst, and then dodge into a building. These lights had to be removed when rebels protested to United Nations Security Council. Loudspeakers were used to direct people to food distribution points and concertina wire was used to funnel the people to the proper areas. A ration card system was instituted. • The high point in checkpoint traffic was 103,000 pedestrians and 33,600 vehicles in 12 hr. Each vehicle was searched, each male frisked, and items carried by females were searched. The problem of frisking females went unsolved. Mine detectors were of some use in searching people. • Checkpoints came under frequent hostile fire. Sniper fire was used to facilitate passage of personnel or contraband through checkpoints. When fired upon, U.S. personnel sealed checkpoint and took cover. • 20 to 60 men were required per checkpoint. Civilian movement was unrestricted except during curfew from 2200 to 0500 daily. In spite of heavy traffic, everything passing a checkpoint was searched. Tactical troops supplemented military police at checkpoints. • National Police enjoyed little respect from the average Dominican. Joint National Police/U.S. military police patrols reduced hostility. • Blackmarketing was a problem. • Mobs and riotous elements of the population continued to attempt to cause trouble until the end of December 1965. A mere show of force was usually sufficient to handle mobs, but U.S. commanders should emphasize mob and riot training. It was desirable to have indigenous police at the scene of potential riots. • The language barrier was a handicap for the Provost Marshal's Office in dealing with the local population and the National Police.
Security	• A half-million sandbags were used for U.S. defensive positions. A quick method of filling and emplacing sandbags is needed. • Miles of concertina wire were used. A quick method of emplacing concertina wire is also needed.

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SANTO DOMINGO (Continued)

Security (Cont'd)	• Trip flares and warning devices were extremely useful in sewers, in church catabombs, on building stairways, and on rooftops overlooking U.S. positions. • Observation posts were placed on rooftops, steeples, and other good vantage points. • It was essential to the welfare of the city that the single generating plant that supplied 85% of the commercial electric power in the Dominican Republic and the centralized city water supply (with a single tank holding 4 million gallons) be protected. • Motorized patrols were sniped at in the downtown area. Because of the many possible places of concealment, this sniping was hard to counteract. During darkness, motorized patrols were replaced with observations posts and walking patrols.
Psychological Operations	• Psychological warfare, the key to stability operations, was the rebels' main weapon. The U.S. showed it had much to learn about denial operations against the communications media and about countering propaganda. • The U.S. lacked a professional press and public affairs setup. An integrated Department of State/DOD organization is needed to handle operations of a politico-military nature. • The U.S. lacked competent Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking personnel on the scene. • Newsheets were hand-distributed by loudspeaker teams in the city and airdropped over outlying cities of the Dominican Republic. • Dominicans were offered potable water but refused it because of its chlorine taste. • Loudspeaker teams in 3/4-ton trucks were considered highly effective. • A major civic action/welfare operation was required to return the city to normal. • The offices and presses of the leading newspapers were in rebel hands. Newspapers with anti-U.S. and anti-OAS/Interamerican Peace Force propaganda flourished. • The Latin American contingents, by virtue of their native histories, language, and socio-economic background, were in a far better position than the U.S. contingent to carry out psychological operations in Santo Domingo. They did not conduct any; they had no psychological operations units.

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SANTO DOMINGO (Continued)

Psychological Operations (Cont'd)	• Many Dominicans were anti-U.S. Considerable effort was required to explain the presence and actions of U.S. forces.
Civic Action	• A significant problem for the 82nd Airborne Division was its inability to implement a desired civic action program. The Division had the capability to assist in such a program, but high authorities indicated that the political situation was too unstable to permit organized civic action during the first 6 months. At battalion level, the Division lacked training in civic action concepts. This would have impaired small-unit capability to handle civic action adequately. • Limited civic action programs carried out by Special Forces were reported to be highly successful, presenting a different U.S. image to the Dominican people. • Major civic action programs that met command criteria and that were completed include: food distribution (~ 1500 tons), water supply and distribution, medical treatment and sanitation, village road construction, building of bridges, houses, and schoolhouses, youth activities, and band concerts.
Force Structure	• U.S. forces suffered an initial shortage of military police. In a stability operation, the priority of military police should be on a par with that of combat units. • Army engineers had to be expert on city water and sewer systems and electrical grids. • Telecommunication experts were needed. • Civic action units were useful. The broad civic action program included medical care and sanitation, clothing, food, water, restoration of electric power, provision of money. • Street fighting absorbed large numbers of troops. • Support forces were often inappropriately tailored. • The shortage of personnel with linguistic skills and experience in the area was critical. • Medical needs were low for battle casualties, high for treatment of children. A Spanish language capability was helpful to medical personnel. • It was evident that the Military Assistance Program had not contributed sufficiently to

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SANTO DOMINGO (Continued)

Force Structure (Continued)	the development in certain Latin American countries of military units suitable for integration into a balanced multinational force. • There was an early need for infantry, military police, and long-haul communications personnel. • The final force organization required a disproportionate number of support units, including signal, military police, medical, and logistic. • Although the airborne brigade was considered good because of its discipline and esprit de corps, the light infantry brigade was preferred for this operation because of its organic communication, transportation, and maintenance capabilities. (The airborne brigade required augmentation.) • Special Forces units were considered valuable in a variety of tasks, generally covert ones. • A trained political officer was found to be mandatory in counterintelligence. • An engineer real-estate section was needed to cope with claims arising from U.S. military use of private property. • Contingency plans should have provided for early introduction of an engineer utility detachment.
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SANTO DOMINGO (Continued)

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IV. SAIGON, 31 January-18 February 1968 (Population ~ 2,500,000)

Kind of Operation	Joint U. S./Vietnamese military police and local police action. Viet Cong infiltrated city and attacked government and military facilities.
U. S. Objective	To clear city of enemy forces and maintain normal functioning of city.
Forces	• Enemy: Less than 3 battalions were sent into city and ~3 divisions were deployed outside. Attacks in Cholon—Tan Son Nhut area were conducted by 10 battalions, to be reinforced within 48 hours. • Allied: 716th Military Police Battalion had ~800 of its 1000 men in action by daybreak, 1 February. By 3 February, allied forces included 7 U. S. infantry battalions, 6 U. S. artillery batteries, 24 Vietnamese ranger, marine, airborne, and Regional Force battalions, 20,000 Vietnamese National Police, 3 Vietnamese police battalions, and 1 Vietnamese artillery battery.
Casualties	• 716th MP Battalion had 27 killed and 44 wounded in 12 hours, 31 January. • Vietnamese police had 87 killed and 326 wounded.
Damage	• As an example, action on 2 February at Newport Bridge, District Headquarters, and the Vietnamese marine battalion compound resulted in heavy civil damage, including 38 civilians killed and 75 houses destroyed. • Acres of the city were burned.
Weapons	• Enemy: Mortars, rockets, Claymore mines, machine guns, and semiautomatic and automatic weapons. • Allied: Tanks, helicopter gunships, bombing by aircraft. The 90-mm recoilless rifle was used to blast holes in buildings, followed by the M-79. These weapons had to be flown into the city because the military police were not authorized to use them and had not been equipped with them.

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SAIGON (Continued)

Intelligence	• The Viet Cong attack revealed in damaging detail the quality of Allied strategic intelligence and the almost total lack of quality of allied tactical intelligence. For example, the Allies had discounted the threat of Viet Cong units in the Saigon area, believing that they had been decimated (their 1967 casualties were estimated at three times those of 1966), yet these Viet Cong units formed the spearhead of the attack. • U. S. units had been phased out, leaving primary tactical responsibility for the security of the Capital Military District to an ARVN ranger group. • Intelligence had indicated that the Viet Cong would resupply and reinforce during Tet and would launch an attack after Tet. • Viet Cong commando leaders, wearing civilian clothes and using false identity cards, entered the city 4 days before Tet to reconnoiter. They entered without weapons and obtained them from caches in the city. • The Viet Cong buildup of weapons and ammunition in and around Saigon began in November. The Viet Cong made a study of commercial traffic into Saigon and smuggled weapons, ammunition, and demolitions into the city in vehicles typical of the prevailing traffic (e.g., trucks carrying vegetables and produce on Highway 1, trucks carrying rubber and firewood on Highway 13). Small arms and ammunition were concealed in hollowed logs, coconuts, pineapples. Once the vehicles were past the highway checkpoints, they were not stopped in the city. • 4000 Viet Cong troops infiltrated Saigon (population 2.5 million plus 800,000 in the suburbs) while 20,000 ARVN soldiers were there on Tet leave. The infiltrators were extremely hard to detect. • The enemy buried caskets of weapons before Tet in a cemetery near the residence of the U. S. Ambassador. • The enemy tunneled into buildings by using the sewer/water system. (U. S. forces lacked good city maps and sewer/water system plans.) • Available Saigon maps were neither detailed nor of sufficient accuracy to be of use in the conduct of tactical operations to pinpoint locations. Numerous roads, alleys, and buildings were not shown. It was therefore
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SAIGON (Continued)

Intelligence (Cont'd)	difficult to pass via radio information on enemy locations and the best routes of approach. This problem was even more critical for tactical troops than for military police. • Floor plans of certain key buildings would have aided in their recapture. • Indicators of the enemy's presence in an area (e.g., the absence of civilians and normal traffic on the streets and the closing of shops) went unheeded. • No single agency monitored road conditions. • Police and ARVN failed to join in the early fighting, perhaps because they believed a coup was taking place and were reluctant to commit themselves, perhaps because they were undermanned during Tet, or perhaps because they hesitated to oppose a heavily armed enemy with their pistols and carbines.
Communications	• Constant communication was needed between patrols and headquarters. When men were out of their vehicles they were out of communication. Pack-mounted PRC-25 radios would have solved this problem. • With most telephones out of order and the few remaining in service hopelessly overworked, intelligence information was nonexistent outside the city.
Logistics	• U. S. forces had to supply the local police with rations and ammunition.
Population and Resources Control	• Curfew was instituted (an 11 p.m. curfew was still in effect in October 1968), patrols were made, and streets were barricaded. • Before Tet, traffic leaving the city was checked but infiltrators had no difficulty entering. • 13,000 cars per day traveled the Bien Hoa Highway (Highway 1A), making a thorough check impossible.
Security	• Billets were too dispersed to be given adequate protection. Some billets were unknown to the military police. The 716th Military Police Battalion was guarding 130 billets in the initial phases of the attack, 160 on the fifth day. • All POL was stored in one area. After the

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SAIGON (Continued)

Security (Cont'd)	enemy attacked the POL storage area, POL became unobtainable. • The ammunition depot was inadequately protected. • At the start of Tet, the military police were spread over 50 sq mi attempting to protect installations ranging from BOQ's and warehouses to the pipeline and customs station at Tan Son Nhut. • The military police had to man guard posts that ARVN and local police would have manned in non-Tet periods.
Civil Affairs	• Large sections of the city were reduced to rubble where rats bred unchecked, causing the plague menace to rise alarmingly. • Mounds of festering rubbish made the city stink like a vast garbage dump. • Food stocks dwindled and food prices soared. • Difficulty was experienced in getting fire-fighting equipment to the scene of fires. (Now Chinook helicopters equipped with 2 large fiberglass buckets are used to dump 900 gallons of water on fires in crowded urban areas.)
Enemy Tactics	• Viet Cong would withdraw quickly, drawing Allied forces into forward positions. Viet Cong then pinned down the Allied troops, outflanked them, and infiltrated their lines. This gave the impression of a much larger Viet Cong force than really existed. • On the night of 31 January, a 17-man Viet Cong squad seized part of the American Embassy compound. Other enemy troops attacked other key points in the city, including the Presidential Palace, the radio station, Joint General Staff Headquarters at Tan Son Nhut, and BOQ's. Supporting enemy forces entered the city through Cholon and the racetrack area. • The enemy attacked during Tet, when more than half the ARVN troops in Saigon were off duty and half the local police force was off duty for the holidays. • The enemy made commando-type attacks in the city while holding his large main force (3 divisions) in reserve ready to exploit any advantage.

SAIGON (Continued)

Enemy Tactics (Cont'd)	• Targets attacked included government installations, facilities essential to the conduct of the war, and facilities that were by nature difficult to secure and defend (e.g., Tan Son Nhut Airport, the Presidential Palace, National Police stations, power plants, and the radio station). • Viet Cong troops familiar with the city were used (the 1st and 6th Local Force Battalions). These troops needed no extensive covert assistance to enter the city, and they moved about as ordinary citizens. Some personnel of the enemy sapper battalion were taxi drivers intimately familiar with the city. • Because the enemy seized and held the race-track, which was the center of a good road network and within 82-mm mortar range of Tan Son Nhut Airport, U. S. forces were denied control of a large landing zone within the city. The enemy occupied buildings near his objective (e.g., a textile mill near Tan Son Nhut Airport and an unfinished building across from the Presidential Palace), from which he launched his attack on his objective. • The Viet Cong used rooftops as fire bases for automatic and semiautomatic weapons and RPG's. • Enemy headquarters were established in Cholon at An Quang Pagoda.
Allied Tactics and Mobility	• The usual military police practice of one-vehicle patrols and the dispatch of single vehicles to trouble spots was abandoned because a single vehicle was ineffective in a firefight. If it was disabled it became defenseless. Vehicles (1½-ton trucks with crews of three) were dispatched in pairs. • When military police responded immediately to requests for aid and did not make use of reconnaissance, dispersion, cover, and concealment, they ran into trouble. • U. S. civilians firing indiscriminately from their billets were at times more dangerous than the Viet Cong. • The military police were overaggressive at first, firing without an identifiable target. They showed unfamiliarity with house-to-house fighting, enter and search procedures, the rules of engagement and target acquisition. (Normal military police training does not include street and house fighting and how to

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SAIGON (Continued)

Allied Tactics and Mobility (Cont'd)

- employ weapons, supplies, and resources in urban operations.)
- Where enemy fire from snipers and automatic weapons was prevalent, the military police used the V-100 Commando Car to resupply ammunition, to extricate friendly troops pinned down or cut off, to escort convoys, to draw fire from suspected sniper positions, to destroy or neutralize sniper or light machine-gun positions (especially elevated ones), and to recover the dead and wounded. This vehicle was not used against rockets or .50-caliber machine guns.
 - Military police requested armored vehicles to extricate their wounded from alleys in the field of enemy fire. The wounded were believed to have died before armor could be borrowed from a cavalry unit.
 - It proved dangerous and unwieldy to dispatch 25 men to an unknown situation in a built-up area. After a change in tactics, 11- to 13-man teams were sent to make contact with the enemy and explore his capabilities. They traveled in 3/4-ton trucks, armored personnel carriers, or V-100 Commando Cars, not in 2½-ton trucks.
 - One platoon was night-landed on the roof of the U. S. Embassy.
 - Areas around buildings held by the Viet Cong were cordoned off and the occupied buildings were kept under siege. For example, the building across from the Presidential Palace was besieged for two days until all Viet Cong were killed or captured. The An Quang Pagoda in Cholon was encircled, hit by air strikes, and seized after 4 hours.
 - Vietnamese marines, rangers, airborne troops, and National Police were each given a sector of the city for which they were held responsible. They were ordered to search and clear their sectors thoroughly. U. S. forces ringed the city, preventing entry and exit.

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SAIGON (Continued)

SOURCES: Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade, APO 96491, Lessons Learned During VC/NVA Tet Offensive (U), Memo to Commanding General, U. S. Army, Vietnam, Attn: AVHGC-O, 15 February 1968 (CNF).

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V. XUAN LOC, 1-3 February 1968
(Population ~ 4000)

Kind of Operation	Defense of city against enemy infiltrators.
U.S. Objective	To clear city of Viet Cong and prevent further infiltration.
Phases of Operation	• Attack began with rocket and mortar barrage (60 rounds). • Viet Cong attacked from three directions at once. • A Viet Cong force firing semiautomatic and automatic weapons from a church in the center of town was silenced with a .50-caliber M-60. • The airstrip was attacked. • Listening posts and observation posts established in house adjacent to MACV compound kept enemy from getting within hand-grenade range. • Attacks were directed at U.S. and ARVN military installations.
Forces	Enemy: The initial attack was by 2 Viet Cong battalions. Another battalion may have joined battle later.
Casualties	• Enemy: 114 killed, 5 captured • ARVN: 15 killed, 27 wounded • U.S.: 2 killed, 19 wounded • Civilians: 2 killed, 113 wounded
Weapons	• Enemy: mortars, rockets, semiautomatic and automatic weapons, grenades. • U.S.: tanks, spooko aircraft, artillery (1000 8-in., 175-mm, and 105-mm rounds were fired in 48 hr).
Intelligence	• The information of agents was used with good results. • The area was illuminated with flares from spooko aircraft.
Communications	Whip antennas on PRC-25's were not flexible enough and many broke.

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XUAN LOC (Continued)

Command and Control	• U.S. troops brought in for support were unfamiliar with the city. The sector S-2 had to accompany tanks as guide and interpreter. • U.S. artillery was firing on Viet Cong in the open, with an aerial observer adjusting fire. ARVN ordered cease-fire because an ARVN unit was being fired on. Viet Cong movements in the open continued to be seen, and Viet Cong got away. It was later determined that U.S. artillery had not been firing into an ARVN area. • There were several instances of Allied fire on own forces. (Allied troops were scattered around the town with gaps between them.)
Civil Affairs	Reports of Viet Cong movement and actual sightings caused many rural people to leave homes and flock to Xuan Loc.

SOURCES: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, File on Xuan Loc During Tet (C).

Tet Offensive (U), II Field Force Vietnam After Action Report, 31 Jan-18 Feb 1968 (C).

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VI. KONTUM CITY, 29 January--2 February 1968 (Population ~25,000)

Kind of Operation	Fierce city fighting, civilians intermixed with combatants. Search and destroy tactics.
U.S. Objective	To destroy all Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army forces within the city.
Phases of Operation	• Enemy infiltrated and occupied key positions (government and religious buildings, ARVN positions, houses and tunnels adjacent to targets). • Enemy fired mortars and rockets against city and artillery positions. • U.S. forces arrived and began clearing operations in house-to-house street fighting to dislodge enemy from basements, lofts, rooftops, and tunnels.
Forces	• Enemy: An estimated 500 to 1000 men. • ARVN: 2 scout companies (understrength) and 1 battalion. • U.S.: Advisory and support staff, 6 rifle companies, 1 tank company, 2 artillery batteries (105- and 155-mm), and spooky and UH-ID gunship.
Casualties	• Enemy: 625 to 1200 killed. (Note inconsistency with estimated force size) • U.S. & ARVN: Figure not available. • Civilians: 48 killed.
Damage	~700 houses destroyed, ~100 damaged, 30% of population homeless, religious buildings damaged.
Weapons	• Enemy: mortars, rockets, small arms. • Allies: artillery, spooky and UH-ID gunships, 81-mm mortars, 105-mm howitzers, 106-mm recoilless rifles, tanks. (The 81-mm mortars were used against snipers, the 105-mm howitzers against enemy hiding in buildings, and the tanks against buildings in areas of high fire density.)

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KONTUM CITY (continued)

Intelligence	• There was no information on Viet Cong infiltration before the outbreak of hostilities. • Information on the enemy order of battle and disposition in the city was lacking until the enemy buildup was completed and military compounds and the airfield were surrounded. • In ARVN uniforms stolen from laundry, two enemy companies moved into unoccupied ARVN bunkers unnoticed while a third company, also in ARVN uniforms, infiltrated downtown crowds. • The city had been infiltrated by Viet Cong agents. • Intelligence was not available during the operation because qualified interpreters were lacking. • ARVN had destroyed records at the beginning of the attack.
Communications	• The lack of visual contact increased the control problem for rifle companies at night. (It was recommended that all radios, including squad radio, be on company command net to increase control of night operations.)
Command and Control	• Control of gunships was lacking. They fired into friendly areas. • ARVN and U.S. artillery fired on friendly units throughout the action because they were unable to identify them. • The lack of prior planning and coordination of ARVN and U.S. units resulted in a fractionated operation with no common headquarters, no fire coordination center, and no one to report to. Each compound or unit was on its own, unaware of the situation of other compounds or units.
Population and Resources Control	The language barrier made ARVN/U.S.-manned checkpoints ineffective. There were no qualified interpreters. U.S. forces could not communicate with and interrogate civilians.
Security	Civilian structures near military installations were occupied by North Vietnamese Army troops and used by them as fire bases.

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KONTUM CITY (Continued)

Psychological Operations	• It was necessary to warn the population about duds. • The large number of enemy dead caused a health hazard. Spraying and immunization was necessary.
Civil Affairs	• The fighting took place in the presence of the local population and many refugees from the countryside. • Mortar fire closed the airfield several times.

SOURCES: Department of the Army, 45th Military History Detachment, APO SF 96375, After Action Report: Attack on Kontum Provincial Capital (Interviews and Enclosures) (U), (C).

Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, APO SF 96262, Combat Operations After Action Report, 301121 Jan. 1968--121200 Feb. 1968 (U), (C).

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VII. HUE, 31 January--25 February 1968 (Population ~ 140,000)

Kind of Operation	Recapture of a friendly city infiltrated and occupied by enemy. Fierce fighting to clear Citadel and the area south of Perfume River.
U.S. Objective	To clear city of enemy forces and seal off infiltration routes into city.
Phases of Operation	• Enemy infiltrated and occupied principal buildings in MACV area. • To minimize the destruction of sacred and historic edifices in the early part of the operation, U.S. forces had limited use of supporting fire. • After a week of fighting, the enemy had 2 battalions well established in the Citadel, another battalion in blocking position, and could resupply and reinforce them at will. • Entrenched between the walls of the Citadel, the enemy repulsed attacks with heavy fire. (The outer stone wall was 1-m thick and 5-m high. It was separated from the inner wall by a dirt fill 17.5-m to 75-m wide.) • Both sides ceased fighting at night.
Forces	• Enemy: 16 North Vietnamese Army battalions (2 divisions). • ARVN: A regiment, a battalion, and several companies and task forces. • U.S.: 6 Marine companies and a cavalry brigade.
Casualties	• Enemy: An estimated 2600 to 5100 killed. • Allied: 532 killed, 2370 wounded. • Civilian: 2000 to 6000 killed.
Damage	• City virtually in ruins. Every house damaged, ~ 10,000 destroyed, ~ 46,000 homeless persons. • Tons of debris and rubble in streets. • Enemy sappers dropped 6-span bridge linking the Citadel to South Hue.
Weapons	• Enemy: B-40, 60-mm mortars, 82-mm mortars, rockets, grenades. • Allied: 8-in. naval gunfire from cruiser,

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HUE (Continued)

Weapons (Continued)	spooky aircraft, Ontos, jeep-mounted 106-mm recoilless rifles, 8-in. and 105-mm howitzers, twin 40's, quad 50's, LAW, and M-41 tanks. Supporting fire was restricted by weather and very close range of house-to-house fighting. Weather prevented air support in the first week. On 7 February the South Vietnamese Air Force dropped 24 500-lb bombs on Citadel southwest wall. On 14 February, an increased attack on the southwest wall was made by the South Vietnamese Air Force, U.S. Marines, and the U.S. Air Force. Artillery and naval guns fired on the northwest and southwest walls (200 rounds of naval gunfire and 2 hr of firing by 8-in. and 105-mm howitzers were recorded). Five hours of firing by 106-mm recoilless rifles were required to blast a hole in the prison wall. Naval gunfire breached the 15- to 20-ft Citadel wall.
Intelligence	• Intelligence was lacking on what was to become a great surprise attack. Aerial surveillance of the city outskirts turned up nothing unusual on the night before the attack. • The enemy buildup outside the city had been going on for 4 months. • Elements of the 6th North Vietnamese Army Regiment infiltrated the city, their uniforms concealed under holiday dress and their weapons hidden in baggage and boxes of produce. An enemy sapper unit was already in the city. The attack was begun by two rocket salvos. The enemy took virtual control of Hue by daylight, except for ARVN area and MACV compound. Viet Cong flag flew over the Citadel for 24 days. • Enemy infiltrated fresh troops each night. • U.S. Marines sent to Hue were unfamiliar with the situation there. • U.S. Marines used maps taken from police station walls. These police maps showed buildings numbered. U.S. maps were not useful, their scale of 1:50,000 being too small. Map inaccuracies of 200 to 300 m were too great for the use of certain weapons.
Communications	• Antennas made radiomen good targets. • Line-of-sight radio restricted communication in the city. From inside buildings, it was hard to communicate 3 or 4 blocks.

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HUE (Continued)

Command and Control	• There was often a lack of cooperation between the Vietnamese government and the MACV advisor team. • With some key people dead or missing, it was unclear who was running the Hue defense operation. ARVN was mainly concerned with defending the Citadel. • U.S. Marines were used to rescue Vietnamese families. • Allied outposts could not be resupplied and had to be abandoned. • Because the tactical operations center had been knocked out at the beginning of the attack, Hue was cut off from outside information for a time. • No system to handle contingencies or disruptions had been set up in the city before the attack. • It took a week to gain permission from Corps and Army commanders to fire on certain areas.
Psychological Operations	• It was necessary to warn the population about unexploded ordnance. • Aerial broadcasts were used to guide civilians to evacuation points.
Civic Action/Civic Affairs	• Emergency reserves of rice, reportedly stored in warehouses, were never found. Refugees were issued 380 bags of rice per day at Catholic Church. • Refugees and the homeless poured southward from the Citadel. ~ 5000 took refuge at one church, ~ 17,000 at Hue University. • The local government ceased to function. • Public utilities were lacking. (Mortar fire and rockets put the water distribution system out of order.) • The enemy opened the prisons. • Many civilians were wounded. U.S. forces had to clean up the hospital and furnish guards before Vietnamese doctors would work. • Dead bodies were everywhere. Burial presented cultural and sanitation problems. The Vietnamese refused to use a long trench dug for burial of corpses because of their disapproval of mass burial. Digging of individual graves was slow. Diggers had to be protected from suspected Viet Cong among the armed corpses. As smell and danger of disease increased, front-end loaders were used to scoop up bodies and drop them in the holes dug. • The sick and wounded refugees were filthy and

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HUE (Continued)

Civic Action/Civil Affairs (Cont'd)	in need of sanitation. They were inoculated and the city was dusted. The first phase of city cleanup and rehabilitation was completed 25 March. More than 6000 unburied or improperly buried civilian and enemy dead were interred. Tons of debris and rubble were cleaned from the streets. Water and electric service was restored. Unexploded ordnance was disposed of. The second and third phases of the rehabilitation began in March, including the repair and reconstruction of public and private buildings. After 5 months of relief, ~ 14,000 of the 46,000 made homeless remained in temporary camps.
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SOURCES: Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, January 1968 (U), (S).

Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, March 1968 (U), (S).

"War Lull Helps Hue Rebuild", The Washington Post, p. A-30, 4 August 1968.

George W. Smith, USA, "The Battle of Hue", Infantry, pp. 16-26, July-August 1968.

Department of the Army, 45th Military Detachment, After Action Report: Attack on Hue (U), 19 March 1968, (C).

Interview with Marines involved in Hue operation, Marine Corps Educational Center, Quantico, Virginia, 31 July 1968.

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Combat Operations Research Group
101 Lincolnia Road
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