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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (21 Jan 71)

FOR OT UT 703139

25 January 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st
Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31
July 1970 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

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Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HQ, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
Camp Red Devil
APO San Francisco 96477

AVEL-C

12 Aug 70

SUBJECT: Operational Report + Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) for period ending 31 July 1970 (U)

Assistant Chief of Staff For Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

A. Missions:

1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) (Inclosure 1, Task Organization), in cooperation and coordination with ARVN and GVN territorial and Regional forces, conducts search and clear, reconnaissance in force, rocket suppression operations within assigned area of operation.

B. Operations: The following major operations were conducted by the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) during the period 1 May 1970 to 31 July 1970.

(1) Operation Greene River (19 Jan to 22 Jul 70)

Operation Greene River was in full operation at the beginning of the reporting period. It consisted of search and clear, reconnaissance in force and ambush operations throughout the brigade tactical area of responsibility (TACR). The maneuver battalions of the brigade directed their efforts toward strengthening FSB's and strong points, and increasing the security of key installations throughout the province. In addition, several joint operations were conducted to the west to increase security and control along the western frontier. These operations consisted of armor and cavalry thrusts and artillery fire support operations to open lines of communications in west central Quang Tri Province including highway nine as far as Ca Lu and Highway 556 from Ca Lu east through the Ban Long Valley. Of particular significance was the construction of Route 558 from Mai Loc to FSB Holcomb which opened this FSB to medium artillery.

(2) The major operational tasks performed by the units of the 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech) were:

(a) 1-11 Infantry:

The operations of this battalion consisted of search and clear, reconnaissance in force, fire support base defense, rocket suppression and security operations in AO Green, Hai Lang District and FSB Fuller.

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(b) TF 1-61 (M):

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Task Force 1-61 performed the mission of providing security for C2 and A4 and conducted search and clear, and reconnaissance in force operations in AO Orange. In addition, the TF conducted a combined operation in the ARVN 7th Mechanized AO with RF Company 174.

(c) TF 1-77:

This battalion provided security of the Cua Viet Naval Facility to include patrols and ambushes north of the Cua Viet River until 9 July 1970. Also during the period TF 1-77 conducted reconnaissance in force, rocket suppression and search and clear mission in AO Blue. Joint operations of a similar nature were conducted with nine PF platoons and six RF companies in Triou Phong and Hai Lang Districts. Near the end of the quarter, from 7 July through 21 July, TF 1-77 provided security for three artillery units at Vandergrift Combat Base while they supported ARVN/US joint ground operations around Khe Sanh in response to air cavalry contacts. Following the successful accomplishment of that mission the battalion was assigned the mission of securing the engineers in reopening of Route 556 through the Ba Long Valley. This effort was noteworthy in that it reestablished US/ARVN control in the Ba Long Valley, long one of the major infiltration routes into the populated areas of the central piedmont and coastal lowlands.

(d) TF 3-5:

Task Force 3-5 was responsible for extensive security missions in AO White, Dong Ha Combat Base (DHCB), Mai Loc and Cam Lo Sub-sectors. These missions were accomplished through extensive reconnaissance in force, and search and clear operations. From 6 May to 8 May, TF 3-5 provided route and FSB security from Cam Lo along Route 9 to FSB Ca Lu where a joint US/ARVN fire support operation was being conducted from ARVN forces in the area of FSB Langly and Tun Tavern. Throughout the period until 23 June, the TF provided security for 59th Land Clearing Company (LCC) near Mai Loc. From 24 June to 7 July, TF 3-5 provided security for the 14th Engineer battalion in reconstructing Route 558 from Mai Loc to FSB Holcomb. This road opened FSB Holcomb (previously accessible to air mobile artillery only) to access by medium self propelled artillery providing artillery support for units in the Ba Long and Da Krong Valleys.

(3) Significant Contacts

(a) 1-11 Infantry:

1. At 040700H May 1970 D/1-11 Inf, while securing FSB Fuller, received a total of 32 120mm mortar rounds, 11 of which impacted inside the perimeter. Counter-battery fire was immediately placed on suspected enemy locations with unknown results. Friendly casualties were 1 US KIA and 1 US WIA. On 10 May 1970, D/1-11 Inf relinquished responsibility for the security of FSB Fuller to the 2nd ARVN Regt, and departed FSB Fuller by foot. While enroute to the Khe Gio Bridge sporadic 120mm mortar and small arms sniper fire was received. A UH-1H medevac aircraft crashed into the column of D/1-11 Inf, killing the pilots and crew and two soldiers from D/1-11.

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2. At 190840H July 1970 in AO Green, B/1-11 Inf, while sweeping northwest of FSB Holcomb, observed 5 NVA/VC. The enemy was engaged by small arms fire, artillery and gunships. Four NVA bodies were found a short distance away, one of which was identified as an NVA officer. That night four to six cooking fires were sighted. Artillery immediately was fired into the area and two secondary explosions were observed.

(b) TF 1-77

On 15 July 1970 B/1-77, while escorting a convoy enroute to CB Vandergrift from QTGB, received several rounds of small arms fire and three RPG's. Organic weapons, gunships and artillery were fired into the suspected enemy location. While the area was being swept, 1 NVA engaged B/1-77 with RPG's and grenades. Gunships engaged the enemy locations. Results of the contact were 1 US KIA, 3 US WIA and 1 NVA KIA.

(c) TF 1-61:

1. During the month of May TF 1-61 experienced an extremely high incidence of mining activity in AO Orange. Mines were often covered by RPG fire and on other occasions RPG fire was used to lure tanks and APC's into mines. Both friendly and enemy casualties were light during this portion of the reporting period. Attack by fire, during this period, on C2 and A4 accounted for the majority of the US casualties. On 28 May A/1-77, operating as part of TF 1-61(M), encountered an NVA squad and in 45 minutes had killed 5 NVA while suffering 5 US WIA. On the last day of May A/1-61(M) made contact with a platoon of the enemy and inflicted 3 NVA KIA.

2. The month of June and July followed much the same pattern as May with mine incidents, attacks by fire and small contacts making up the bulk of the activity. Early on the morning of 29 June a two platoon NDP of C/1-61(M) and A/1-77 came under attack by an estimated NVA platoon. With the aid of gunships, artillery and a flareship the attack was repelled. The results were 3 US KIA, 3 US WIA and 2 NVA KIA.

3. Results for the period were:

<u>US KIA</u>	<u>US WIA</u>	<u>NVA KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>
6	62	33	0

(4) Cumulative results for the reporting period were:

(a) Friendly:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>
37	320	0

(b) Enemy:

<u>KIA</u>	<u>PW</u>	<u>IND WEAPONS</u>	<u>CREW SERVED</u>
106	0	24	9

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C. Significant Activities

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(1) RF/PF Leadership School

The RF/PF Leadership School established by the brigade in December 1969 continued to train selected RF/PF NCO and Officers in leadership and small unit tactics. During the reporting period 98 RF NCO's, 23 RF Officers and 92 PF NCO's successfully completed the course of instruction.

(2) Route Classification and Engineer Reconnaissance

During the reporting period A/7th Engineers completed an extensive reconnaissance and classification of the major and minor roadnets within Quang Tri Province. This was extremely valuable during the road reopening operations conducted on routes 566 and 556. The prior reconnaissance enabled the actual operation to move along at a much more rapid rate than would have been possible without that reconnaissance. The bridge classification provided bridge necessary data for movement throughout the province with heavy vehicles.

(3) Civic Actions:

(a) Plow for Peace:

1. Operations: Because of the dislocation of the civilian population during the war, agricultural development has been seriously curtailed. Upon returning to their land, as security has allowed, villagers found the land overgrown with a thickened sod. Tractors and disc harrow plows were necessary if the people were to be able to quickly reestablish their agrarian livelihood. A comprehensive plan designating all areas to be plowed and priorities was developed by the province government. District governments were responsible for acquiring permission to plow from the property owners and for insuring that boundaries and restricted areas were designated. At this time, 450 acres have been plowed at four locations in the province.

2. Evaluations: The 450 acres of land plowed this year, along with the 550 acres plowed last year, have all been put to use. Within a matter of weeks after land had been plowed at a selected location, the additional work of hoeing, bedding or seeding had been accomplished. The immediate benefit of this project, the response of the people towards our efforts and the beneficial impact it has on the economy have made this one of the most successful projects ever undertaken.

(b) War Victim Relief:

1. Operations: Intrusion into the populated areas by main force units caused extensive damage in late May and again in early July. An immediate response by the representatives of the Ministry of Social Welfare provided food and clothing for the civilian population, followed by tin roofing and money to repair damaged homes. Brigade assistance was offered from the outset, but not until all its assets had been tapped did the province

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government request assistance. Lumber and transportation assistance were then provided to repair individual and public dwellings.

2. Evaluation: The restraint exercised by the brigade in waiting until officially requested to provide assistance proved to be the proper course both in showing respect for the responsible government agencies and insuring the needed support was rendered. On both occasions the brigade's immediate action was to notify the Province Chief that we were aware of the situation and would accept any request for assistance from him which we had the assets to fulfill. Independent requests from charitable agencies and lower government officials were firmly refused with the insistence that the Province Chief would meet their needs or he would make the request for additional assistance. Research after both relief operations were completed showed that government assets had been fully utilized before a request was received at the brigade.

2.(a) Lessons Learned

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence

(1) Volunteer Informant Program.

(a) Observation

The Volunteer Informant Program (VIP Fund) was producing only a slight response from Vietnamese Civilians as regards the turning in of enemy ordnance in return for Vietnamese Piasters.

(b) Evaluation

The Counterintelligence Section, which administers the VIP Fund, in coordination with the PSYOPS Team and representatives of the Explosive Ordnance Detachment (EOD), began making unscheduled trips to likely areas where the location of such ordnance might be known by local civilians. At each location, a representative of the CI Section was prepared to pay for ordnance while the PSYOPS Team broadcasted the purpose of the visit. As ordnance was turned in, the CI Representative paid the appropriate amount to each individual and made a record of each payment. No individual was required to identify himself in any way. The EOD Representative insured that the collected ordnance was properly and safely disposed of. This program was so successful that more money had to be requested as the amount on hand was quickly exhausted. For the period of this report total expenditures have been 26,800\$SVN.

(c) Recommendation

That the program be continued as organized and, personnel permitting, expanded.

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c. Operations.

(1) Utilization of Mechanical Ambush.

(a) Observation.

The enemy has continued to make rather extensive use of high speed foot trails. In order to prohibit his movements, the mechanical ambush has been employed in conjunction with manned ambushes. It was noted, however, that with the increased wide-spread use of this weapon by Allied forces, knowledge of the system was beginning to receive increased attention by the enemy by devising ways to avoid or reverse the weapon's intended effects. This was noted in several manners:

1. Locating the power source (battery), neutralizing the power flow, then dismantling the mechanical ambush for future use.
2. Locating the power source, temporarily neutralizing the power flow, turning the claymores around towards routes of approach utilized by allied units when checking mechanical ambushes and then attempting to ambush the US element with command detonation.
3. Deploying anti-personnel devices under or near claymores so as to immediately detonate when personnel are dismantling mechanical ambushes.
4. Deploying manned ambushes on routes of approach used by allied elements when checking or dismantling mechanical ambushes.

(b) Evaluation.

For the proper employment of the mechanical claymore ambush several points should be considered. The ideal site for the ambush is a channelized foot trail or a single tank trail bordered by dense vegetation. An area conforming as much as possible to this type terrain should be selected as the ambush site. Two separate ambushes should not be located in the same vicinity. If this occurs and one ambush is tripped the second ambush may be discovered by the enemy since he undoubtedly searches the area after detonation. Finally, caution must be exercised to insure that proper deceptive measures are used while establishing the ambush. These should include the location of a false ambush site to channelize the enemy into the killing zone of the actual ambush and camouflaging all the components of the ambush as well as erasing all traces of friendly movement in the area.

(c) Recommendations.

That on all phases of the utilization of mechanical ambushes no set patterns be established to include routes to and from deployment areas and times for deployment and pickup of mechanical ambushes. That extensive planning and evaluation of an area be made prior to choosing ambush sites. That any of a large number of misleading or early warning techniques be utilized to foil the enemy while in the process of tampering with mechanical ambushes, i.e. trip flares deployed around and under claymores and batteries, false battery hook ups easily found if trip wire is detected by enemy with the actual battery

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hook up and power source located in a well hidden area, and location of early warning devices such as PSIP's around mechanical ambush sites to detect prolonged activity in the area.

(2) Controlled Burning of Areas.

(a) Observation.

During the hot, dry summer months vegetation is very flammable and is therefore conducive to uncontrolled burning.

(b) Evaluation.

The utilization of fire to clear thickly vegetated areas in the hot, dry months of summer gives the ground commander an added weapon to his arsenal. Incendiary rounds from mortars and artillery pieces can provide pinpoint spots of ignition for fires. Thermite and white phosphorus grenades, as well as flame rockets, flame throwers, and flame tracks, can all be utilized to burn off suspected enemy locations and deny the enemy concealment. Care should be taken when igniting the fires to insure that prevailing winds are away from the friendly forces in the area to be burned.

(c) Recommendation.

Burning can be used as a means to clear areas of thick vegetation and to deny the enemy concealment but must be controlled.

(3) Employment of CS Gas in Danger Areas.

(a) Observation.

Certain areas of thick vegetation along avenues of approach or trails offer the enemy choice ambush sites.

(b) Evaluation.

These areas should be cleared prior to moving through.

(c) Recommendation.

The use of CS grenades, the M-79 grenade launcher CS round, and the employment of the E8 CS chemical launcher to clear possible ambush sites and danger areas can be very effective. Some logical precautions should be taken when employing this type of ordnance. All friendly personnel in the vicinity of the launch site should have their protective masks. The E8 launcher should be fired taking into consideration the direction of the prevailing winds. Finally, the CS rounds of both the M-79 and the E8 launcher provide enough heat to start fires, particularly during the hot, dry summer months; therefore rounds should not be fired in areas where a fire will cut off the maneuvering elements routes of withdrawal.

(4) Battlefield Preparation for Cross Country Movement.

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(a) Observation.

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Mechanized units are often limited in their ability to maneuver in broken terrain.

(b) Evaluation.

1. Narrow roads and tank trails in mountainous portions of the AO limit trafficability of large armored vehicles, increase reaction times and channelize movement to the easily mined shoulders of the road.

2. Stream lines and ravines are used by the enemy as an effective tank obstacle to prevent mechanized units from closing with them or to stop pursuit.

(c) Recommendations.

1. That roads and tank trails be constructed at least 12 feet wide on their straight portions and sufficiently wide on curves and bends to allow armored vehicles to traverse them freely and that a qualified tank commander accompany the engineer element in the planning of the road.

2. That continuous engineer support be made available to construct and maintain fords and ditch crossings to insure trafficability in assigned AO's.

3. That fords and crossings be made wide enough and numerous enough so as to prevent channelization of movement.

(5) Field Fortifications.

(a) Observation.

During the initial occupation of artillery positions, ammunition and personnel are without the protection of berms and overhead cover.

(b) Evaluation.

The construction of ammunition and personnel bunkers is a time consuming operation due to the lack of engineer equipment to support the unit. This task should be completed at the earliest possible time to preclude unnecessary loss of life and/or equipment to enemy action.

(c) Recommendation.

That units include 72 and 48 inch galvanized culvert and suitable material for a floor base in their combat loads for constructing ammunition and personnel bunkers. After the floor base and pipe are erected, then sandbags are used to add the required protection. This method allows the unit to erect necessary overhead cover in a minimum amount of time and labor.

(6) Wearing of flak jackets.

(a) Observation.

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Most personnel injuries by shrapnel were a result of personnel not wearing flak jackets.

(b) Evaluation.

While it is recognized that in the extremely hot weather of the tropics a person cannot wear a flak jacket when engaged in hard physical labor, i.e. digging fighting positions, infantry on ground sweep through rough country, it is important that flak jackets be worn when possible such as on convoy moves, and stationary positions (FSB).

(c) Recommendation.

Recommend that the flak jacket be worn by all personnel in the field when the tactical situation permits.

(7) Utilization of the Bangalore Torpedo to clear choke points and fording sites.

(a) Observation.

Choke points along a route often contain mines.

(b) Evaluation.

The bangalore torpedo is an excellent means of clearing ford sites and choke points. If bangalore torpedos are utilized at ford sites mining incidents may be prevented.

(c) Recommendation.

Recommend that bangalore torpedoes be used to clear choke points and fording sites suspected to contain mines.

(8) Use of a mine sweep dog.

(a) Observation.

During mine sweep operation a unit utilizing a mine dog team allowed the security element to recon by fire with main tank gun (90mm) and caused the dog to bolt.

(b) Evaluation.

If a field unit, particularly an armored element, fires its weapons without prior warning to the mine dog handler the animal will run to escape the noise. Mine dogs are difficult to control while large caliber weapons are being fired.

(c) Recommendation.

Recommend that when a unit is conducting sweep with mine dog, the handler be alerted when the security element is going to recon by fire.

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(9) Mine Dog Teams.

(a) Observation.

It has been found that the continual use of mine dog teams on a route reduces the incidence of mining.

(b) Evaluation.

The enemy, in his fear of the US Army war dog, attributes the animal with greater capabilities than it actually possesses. Observing a mine dog working a road on a regular basis, the enemy assumes his mining is useless and becomes less persistent in his efforts.

(c) Recommendation.

Mine dog teams can be used on a regular basis on roads that are frequently mined.

d. Organizations: None

e. Trainings: None

f. Logistics.

(1) Water Resupply.

(a) Observation.

Water resupply continued to pose a major problem during hot, dry summer months. Temperatures ranged well over 100 degrees necessitating a heavy consumption of liquids.

(b) Evaluation.

Aerial resupply of water is required when maneuver elements operate in inaccessible places. The 5 gallon collapsable water bag has been found to be the least acceptable due to lack of durability, and the requirement for backlog. Artillery canisters used as containers have been found quite durable and do eliminate the backlog requirement, however they present limitations due to their empty weight. The most acceptable method is the container, air-dropable, water 3 gallon. The unit was designed for durability. The bag is expendable, it is easily handled, and quite dependable. Water resupply to units in the field is accomplished by the use of three gallon containers.

(c) Recommendation.

1. Sufficient aircraft be made available to handle this seasonal demand on water.

2. Container Air-dropable, Water 3 gallon be made available in sufficient quantities to meet this demand for an expendable and durable water container.

(2) Combined Operations with Regional Forces/Popular Forces.

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(a) Observation.

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RF/PF forces are not organized to conduct prolonged combat operations.

(b) Evaluation.

During combined operations with RF/PF forces, the RF/PF's were not supplied with field rations and relied on purchasing their rations from the local populace.

(c) Recommendation.

Combined operations with RF/PF forces should not be of extended duration. Since these forces are area defense type units usually employed for night ambushes or local sweeps, their logistics system is not geared for prolonged combat operations. If a joint operation with US forces is planned for longer than one week, the US forces should assume the support function.

1. Attached to US.

2) In the event of a sweep.

(a) See report.

3) When the unit is in the field at night can often be identified by the sound of a unit.

4) See report.

No matter what time of day, a certain amount of confusion is noticed when a unit changes call signs and frequencies. This confusion is evident with all the supporting elements under a period of adjustment and confusion in the field. The confusion becomes paramount at night, especially when elements such as LP and ambushes are located some distance from the parent unit.

(a) Recommendation.

RF changes should be effected sometime during the daylight hours and not at night, as has historically been the case.

1. Report 1.

(1) Field Maintenance.

(a) Observation.

Significant maintenance backlog developed between the time a unit received its field call and the call for a maintenance support element.

(b) Evaluation.

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Maintenance support can be provided on a more timely and effective basis if it is included in initial planning of an operation.

(c) Recommendation.

That maintenance support elements should be included in the initial taskforce make up.

(2) Operation of M-548 Cargo Carrier.

(a) Observation.

It has been noted on numerous occasions that M-548 vehicle operators are detecting minor parts failure and sub-system malfunctions during rest halts. In the majority of cases, if these items had gone undetected they could have caused major maintenance problem.

(b) The M-548 vehicle operator must perform preventive maintenance inspections at all convoy halts since during operation maintenance cannot be performed when vehicle is moving.

(c) Recommendation.

That periodic rest/maintenance halts be programmed for in road marches that include M-548's, at least every 30 minutes or as the condition permits.

(3) Overloading the M-548 Cargo Carrier.

(a) Observation.

Loading the M-548 to full rated capacity (6 tons) and then operating the vehicle over unimproved terrain causes severe strains to be placed on the steering and suspension system.

(b) Evaluation.

M-548's carrying maximum load is causing the steering to over-heat and the body to settle on the suspension system which increases the probability of throwing a track.

(c) Recommendation.

For extended road marches limit the M-548 load to 4½ tons.

1. Medical.

(1) Medical Triage.

(a) Observation.

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Multiple indirect fire attacks on FSB O-2 initially produced confusion and inefficiency in triage and medevac procedures.

(b) Evaluation.

This resulted from medical teams going out to the site of wounded, rather than land evacuating wounded to the aid station where multiple patients could be treated and priorities set for air evacuations.

(c) Recommendation.

This problem was solved by establishing a functional ambulance crew to triage and transport to the aid station.

(2) Dust-Off Evacuation.

(a) Observation.

Occasionally medevac is delayed due to improper information passed to Dust-Off.

(b) Evaluation

- Multiple calls are sometimes made for one patient creating a question as to number of patients requiring Dust-Off.

(c) Recommendation.

All units insure that their SOP's contain current procedures for requesting MEDEVAC in their operating areas, and that selected individuals are thoroughly trained in these procedures.

(3) Physical Profiles.

(a) Observation.

Profiles are often written in such a manner as to make the trooper completely useless to his commander.

(b) Evaluation.

Such profiles frequently come from clearing company and hospital surgeons. Temporary profiles, for prolonged periods, are especially misused. Duty limitations are not specifically outlined, rather the code as suggested in AR 40-501 is used and this often excessively restricts the profiled trooper.

(c) Recommendation.

Bn Surgeons should review all temporary profiles and if limitations and duration of profile do not appear consistent with the diagnosis, it should be discussed with the Bde Surgeon.

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(h) Medical Treatment of US personnel.

(a) Observation.

Personnel are frequently referred to the next higher treatment facility for consultation, treatment, and/or convalescence. Upon return to their units, it is often required that continued medical care be administered these individuals by the Battalion Surgeon.


(b) Evaluation.

Proper continued medical care for those patients previously treated at the higher medical facilities requires a thorough and immediate knowledge of the diagnosis, therapy, prognosis and recommendations made by the medical facility involved. During this reporting period, a significant and often frustrating delay has been noted between the time of discharge and receipt of this necessary data at the Battalion Aid Station. Usually, the patient has insufficient technical knowledge of his diagnosis and treatment to clarify the problem nor do the medical records reflect the desired information.

(c) Recommendation.

Patients discharged from higher medical facilities should have a narrative summary inclosed in their medical records for use by the Battalion Surgeon.

- 2 Incl
1. Task Organization
2. Operation Green
River Overlay


JOHN G. HILL, JR.
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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AVII-OCT (12 August 1970) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div
(MECH) for Period Ending 31 July 1970, (RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps, APO San Francisco 96349 30 AUG 1970


TO: Commanding General, USAHV, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The OHLI for the 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (MECH), has been reviewed by this headquarters in accordance with AR 525-15.
2. (C) This headquarters concurs with the report with the following comments.

a. Reference item concerning Combined Operations with Regional Forces/Popular Forces, page 10, paragraph 2f(2); concur. An operational ration was authorized for RVNAF; however, Military Region 1 is presently allocated only 250,000 operational rations per month for all services and is directed, in turn, to suballocate among the services, sectors, and divisions. The local RF/PF advisors should be queried during the planning phase for an operation to insure that available Vietnamese operational rations are issued and used before requesting supplemental support from the US unit.

b. Reference item concerning inopportune SOI Changes, page 11, paragraph 2g(1); nonconcur. Daylight hours are habitually a high traffic period for radio nets. Any change during this period would disrupt communications. Additionally, it is desirable to have the SOI changeover time to coincide with the change of the crypto day to avoid confusion and provide better communications security.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. H. SMITH
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

CF:
CG, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (MECH)

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AVHAT-OPS (12 Aug 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf
Div (Mech) for period ending 31 July 1970 (U).

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 12 OCT 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558


1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1970 from Headquarters, 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters except as indicated in paragraph 2b below.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Water Resupply," page 10, paragraph 2f(1): This Headquarters is concerned about the high usage of freefall containers. Because of the high usage and dollar value, ICCV was directed to manage this item by allocation. ICCV sent a message to customers requesting their future requirements for the container. Monthly allocations were developed from forecasts, consideration of historical demands by organization, and the application of the 50% reduction factor against recorded demands. The 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M) was notified of their monthly allocation of 477. The airdrop containers cost a total of \$11.43. An alternate, less expensive means of providing water must be considered. The five gallon collapsible water bag costs 92 cents each and serves the same primary purpose as the three gallon freefall container. Unit has been so advised. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Inopportune SOI Changes," page 11, paragraph 2g(1)(c): concur. SOI control is within the purview of the commander who issues the SOI. Determination of the optimum changeover period must be based upon evaluation of the existing situation at that level. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Major General
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
XXIV Corps
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M)

GPOP-DT (12 Aug 70) 3d Ind (U)


SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Infantry Brigade, 5th Infantry
Division (Mech) for Period Ending 31 July 1970, RCS CSFOR-65
(R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APC San Francisco 96558 17 NOV 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
CPT. AGC
Asst AG

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Incl 1 (Task Organization) to Operational Report - Lessons Learned
1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech) Period Ending 31 July 1970:

1-11 Inf

1-61 Inf (Mech)

TF 1-77 Armor

A/4-12 Cav

TF 3-5 Cav

Bde Control

C/2-34 Armor

HHC, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (M)

5-4 Arty

75th Spt Bn

F/75th Ranger

Bde Security Plt

43rd Inf Plt (Scout Dog)

A/7th Engr.

298th Signal Co.

407 RRD

517 MID


86th Chem Det

48th PI Det

This task organization reflects the permanent OPCON/attachment relationships within the brigade. Forces are tailored by cross attachment on a mission type basis.

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Inclosure 2 (Operation Green River Overlay: Period 1 May 1970 - 31 July 1970)
to Operational Report - Lessons Learned 1st Inf Bde, 5th Inf Div
(Mach), Period Ending 31 July 1970



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