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Lessons Learned, HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
96745

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(11) 30 MAY 1966

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Operational Report  
1 Jan - 30 Apr 1966

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Commanding General  
II Field Force, Vietnam  
APO US Forces 96227

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Inclosed is the 1st Infantry Division Operational Report on  
Lessons Learned for the period 1 January - 30 April 1966.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl  
as

*for* WH Smith 1/er  
JAMES W. BRYAN  
1ST LT, AGC  
ASST AG

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
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OPERATIONAL REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED  
1 JANUARY - 30 APRIL 1966




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24. Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation SILVER CITY
25. Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation WATCROSS
26. Combat Operation After Action Report, Operation ADLENS  
(To be published and forwarded under separate cover)

Inclosures listed below were withdrawn at HQ DA:

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1st Infantry Division  
Operational Report on Lessons Learned  
1 January - 30 April 1966

## I Significant Organization and Unit Activities.

### 1. Introduction:

The Quarterly Command Report submitted by the 1st Infantry Division in February 1966, accounts for the preceding six month period 1 July through 31 December 1965. During this period the division, minus the 2d Infantry Brigade, deployed from Fort Riley, Kansas, arriving in the Republic of Vietnam in October. Throughout the remaining months of 1965, the division was established in base camps and began operations to extend its influence into the tactical areas of responsibility. Three decisive engagements were fought at BAN BANG, TRUNG LOI, and NHA MAT which gave a clear indication that the division was prepared to accomplish its mission.

Throughout the period 1 January to 30 April 1966, the 1st Infantry Division has continued to conduct operations to locate and destroy Viet Cong forces and installations and return contested areas to control of the Government of Vietnam. When the enemy forces have chosen to fight, they have been decisively defeated. Elements of six VC Main Force units suffered heavy losses in the four major battles fought during the period. Operations have varied in size from squad patrols to two-brigade (reinforced) search and destroy operations. Although many of the operations have been conducted in assigned brigade areas of responsibility, major operations have been conducted throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) when lucrative targets are defined by intelligence. Many areas of III CTZ were entered for the first time by Free World Ground Forces, with Viet Cong safe areas losing immunity in War Zones C and D and along the CAMBODIAN Border. Full cooperation between U.S. Forces and other Free World Forces was experienced in all combined operations.

Civic Action has continued to have a high priority and projects performed under this program have been numerous and varied.

### 2. Organization:

The 1st Infantry Division continued to occupy five major base camps at DI AN, PHU LOI, LAI KHE, PHUOC VINH, BIEN HOA and BEAR CAT. The 2d Brigade base camp was relocated from BIEN HOA (YT 055110) to BEAR CAT (YT 165000) (Incl 3). This move was required to relocate the brigade from the center of the LONG BINH Logistics Area to better contribute to the defense of the southern sector of the logistics area. Relocation was completed 22 April, with the closure of the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry.

At the beginning of the reporting period, operational control was exercised over the following units:

- 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate)
- 23d Artillery Group consisting of:
  - 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery (105 T)
  - 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (8"/175 SP)
  - 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery (8"/175 SP)
- 11th Aviation Battalion
- 145th Aviation Battalion
- U.S. Army Advisory Group (III CTZ)

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The 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division arrived from Hawaii and became operational on 29 January, at which time it came under operational control of the Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division. With the assumption of OPCON, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, command and operational control were exercised over approximately 29,000 personnel.

On 15 March 1966, command of the 1st Infantry Division was passed to Brigadier General William E. DePuy by Major General Jonathan O. Seaman, who assumed command of II Field Force, Vietnam. Concurrently, Headquarters II Field Force, Vietnam assumed the responsibility of providing the senior advisor to the Commanding General III Corps (ARVN) and assumed direction of the U.S. Army Advisory Group in III CTZ. The 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate), 23d Artillery Group, 11th Aviation Battalion and 145th Aviation Battalion were released from the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division on 22 March 1966. The subsequent delay between activation of Headquarters, II Field Force, Vietnam, and assumption of operational control of these organizations was to avoid a change in control headquarters of operations currently being conducted.

Division organization is shown at Inclosure 1.

### 3. Intelligence:

a. Enemy Order of Battle. The enemy forces in the 1st Infantry Division area of influence numbered over 61,000 confirmed personnel based on MACV estimates. The units included seven main force regiments and 12 other battalions. The total number of confirmed battalions in the III Corps was estimated at 35. In addition there were 32 confirmed separate companies and 28 separate platoons. Regiments and their last reported location in the area were:

DT2 (XS 4496)	5th (YS 8194)
271st (YT 1858)	94th (YS 3684)
272d (XT 6137)	165A (XT 6130)
273d (XT 5065)	

Separate battalions listed were:

Quot Thang (XT 6520)	0230 (XT 0281)
239 Arty (XT 3764)	165B (Unk)
235 Arty (XT 6939)	241 Arty (XT 7433)
*Phu Loi Bn (XT 8625)	237 Arty (XT 3870)
243 Arty (XT 8649)	*C320 (XT 5443)
*506th (XS 5299)	*860th (YS 5281)

\*Local Force.

Of the above units contact was made with elements of the 271, 272, 273, 94th Regiments and the 506th Local Force Battalion during the reporting period by the 1st Infantry Division or units under the operational control of the division.

b. Although many reports have been received of low morale due to sickness, hunger and shortages of equipment and personnel, there have been no major indicators that the VC forces in the III Corps are any less determined than before. The combat efficiency of some of the VC units encountered had been impaired by actions against the division.

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However, captured documents indicate plans to mount new offensive actions on a large scale, indicating that the major main force units have been built up to strength again.

c. VC initiated incidents in the division areas of operations during the reporting period consisted of harassing small arms and mortar fires, small unit actions, road sabotage, hamlet and political agitation and tax collection. Main Force units withdrew farther into their base areas due to division operations and in some instances have been permanently denied the use of base areas due to their proximity to the divisional base camps.

d. The VC units can be expected to fight when they feel their important base camps are being threatened or when they feel they have the tactical advantage. They retain the capability of attacking any one of our base camps at any time with a reinforced regiment and reinforcing with at least two more regiments within 72 hours. They can conduct large scale ambushes along lines of communication and can direct high angle fire into our installations with relative ease using small well-trained mortar or artillery crews. The VC anti-aircraft capability is growing and the use of explosive projectile AAA would not be unexpected in the III CTZ if the VC consider it advantageous.

e. There were continuing indications throughout the reporting period that the VC had fairly accurate intelligence concerning 1st Infantry Division operations. However it appears that they underestimated the division capability to aggressively close with their forces and to call in massive amounts of air and other means of fire support.

f. During the reporting period, the VC made extensive use of mines and booby traps. Command detonated mines are used effectively against U.S. vehicles. Many of these mines use dud 105mm and 155mm artillery shells. Booby trapped avenues of approach into VC base areas are the rule and the VC are becoming ingenious in their use. Command detonated Claymore type mines are used extensively against personnel. These anti-personnel and anti-vehicular activities are supplemented by LOC harassment utilizing snipers.

g. The operations of the division have seriously curtailed some of the VC administrative and logistical activity. The presence of the PHUOC VINH base hinders the VC transport of supplies along the established routes from Zone C to Zone D. Additionally operations in the LONG NGUYEN, TAY NINH, PHUOC TUY, and other areas have uncovered and destroyed important VC caches of arms, food, ammunition, medical supplies and other critical items. This continuous degradation of the VC logistic capability will have a serious, prolonged effect on the ability of the VC main force units to conduct sustained operations.

h. VC losses during the reporting period included 1,598 KIA (BC), 216 VCC, and 2,313 VCS.

#### 4. Combat Operations:

a. General. The 1st Infantry Division continued military operations to extend RVN control throughout the III Corps area. As areas contiguous to base camps were cleared, operations were conducted beyond TAORs as the situation required. The number of operations conducted in War Zones C and D and the losses inflicted on the VC in . . . and

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material, further substantiate the strategic locations of the 1st and 3d Brigades. Combat operations have varied from squad ambushes and patrols to operations involving two brigades (reinforced).

b. January. The 1st Infantry Division (reinforced) conducted 18 major operations (battalion size or larger), with all operations resulting in VC contact. From 8 to 11 January, the 3d Brigade conducted Operation CRIMP (Incl 14) in the HO BO Woods area of BINH DUONG Province. The mission of the operation was to destroy the SAIGON - GIA DINH - CHOLON VC Political Headquarters. The operation commenced with a B-52 strike followed by air and artillery preparations. The infantry battalions were then landed by an airmobile assault. Operation CRIMP disrupted the VC organization in the HO BO Woods and deprived the VC of the unrestricted use of their elaborate, tunnel infested operating base.

Upon completion of Operation CRIMP, the 3d Brigade commenced Operation BUCKSKIN (Incl 15) on 12 January in conjunction with ARVN forces. The objective was to clear the area north and west of CU CHI (XT 643155) to assist in the establishment of a base camp area for 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

During the CRIMP and BUCKSKIN operations, a large number of trench installations and tunnel complexes were destroyed or action taken to deny further use to the VC. This was the first encounter by the division with tunnel complexes of this magnitude and presented a problem in methods to prevent further use. Many of the tunnels had reinforced, concrete entrance covers which were completely covered with secondary growth and were discovered when knocked ajar by an air strike or when personnel exposed the handle. Because the tunnel complexes were so extensive and difficult to destroy, the time phasing of the operations were affected. The amount of explosive necessary for complete destruction, made this method prohibitive. The method which proved most feasible was the seeding of the tunnel with CS crystals and either blowing the entrance with explosive or caving it in with the use of a tank dozer. VC tunnels, fortifications, and camps of the variety discovered during Operation CRIMP and BUCKSKIN are at Inclosures 8 and 9. The destruction of these fortifications and the presence of ARVN and U.S. Forces in this area were initial major steps in the spread of GVN influence into territory which previously had been VC dominated.

The 1st Brigade conducted a series of operations to the south and southwest of PHUOC VINH. These operations were significant in that large numbers of VC logistical concentrations were destroyed and large amounts of captured supplies were extracted or destroyed. Operation QUICK KICK I (3 - 8 Jan) was a search and destroy operation conducted approximately three miles west of PHUOC VINH. All three battalions were involved in the operation that netted 45 tons of rice. During the period 11 through 14 January, Operation QUICK KICK II (Incl 16) was conducted southeast of PHUOC VINH. Approximately 1300 tons of rice were included in the materials captured and destroyed. 1st Brigade conducted Operation QUICK KICK III (11 - 14 Jan) south of the SONG BE River. Two battalions were landed in an airmobile assault and conducted search and destroy operations in the zone.

2d Brigade commenced Operation MALLETT, (Incl 17) a major search and destroy operation in the LONG THANH District.

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Close air support sorties in January increased 722 to a total of 1,546. One hundred eighty-three TAC airlift sorties were flown in support of operations. During January, a total of 71,113 rounds of artillery were expended in support of ground operations.

c. February. Operations MALLETT and MASTIFF were the major operations conducted in February. Sixteen operations of battalion or larger size were initiated, of which 14 resulted in VC contact.

2d Brigade continued Operation MALLETT (Incl 17) in the LONG THANH and NHON TRACH Districts. The three battalion operation disrupted the Viet Cong organization and was the first in a series of operations designed to regain control of Route 15. VC tunnels, bunkers, and command post complexes in LONG THANH District east of Route 15 were destroyed. This operation destroyed Viet Cong bases which posed a threat to SAIGON.

The 1st Brigade continued its attack on VC supply installations in the PHUOC VINH area through execution of QUICK KICK IV (Incl 18) 5 - 9 February. The operation, conducted in an area approximately six miles southeast of PHUOC VINH, netted 322.7 tons of rice, 96.6 tons of peanuts, 9 trucks, and 4,600 gallons of fuel.

On 10 February 1966, the 1st Brigade initiated Operation ROLLING STONE (Incl 19 and 20) in conjunction with the 1st Engineer Battalion and 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment. The mission of the operation was construction of a road between Routes 13 and 16 in conjunction with pacification and search and destroy operations. Construction of the 30 feet wide laterite road was accomplished by the 1st Engineer Battalion, using 455 personnel and 50 pieces of major construction equipment. Although the road has military significance to U.S. forces (two forward brigades are connected by this road and thus have alternate MSR's), the primary objective was to open the area to RVN economic and military influence. Infantry not involved in the security of work parties accomplished the search and destroy and pacification missions. The armored cavalry troop provided the rapid reaction force. On the morning of 24 February, a VC Main Force, estimated between 1,500 and 1,800 personnel attacked the brigade forward area near CAU DINH (XT 8536). During the five hour attack, the brigade received fire from 60mm and 81mm mortars, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, Claymore mines, automatic weapons, and assorted small arms. Fire was returned by all available weapons. Six hundred rounds of artillery were expended in the defense of the perimeter, with the 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery, executing 167 direct fire missions. VC Main Force units believed to have conducted the attack were elements of D800, 763 Regiment, and 761 Regiment in which the enemy suffered 135 KIA (Body Count), with an addition 250 KIA estimated and resulted in a decisive victory for the U.S. Forces.

The 1st Infantry Division committed the 2d and 3d Brigades on Operation MASTIFF (Incl 19) during the period 21 through 27 February. The operation was an attack against a reported Viet Cong stronghold in the BOI LOI Woods of TAY NINH Province. Free World Military Forces had not been in the BOI LOI Woods for several years and the 1st Infantry Division troops rapidly dominated the area and disrupted VC use of the area. The operation, designed to locate and destroy Viet Cong forces and base camps in an area five miles south of the MICHELIN Rubber Plantation, was preceded by air and artillery preparations. Five of the six infantry battalions participating were landed in an

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airmobile assault, supported by 142 helicopters. Operation MASTIFF sharply reduced VC influence and demonstrated that the reported VC stronghold could not stand against Free World Military Forces.

During February, close air support sorties totaled 1,399. TAC airlift sorties totaled 90 and carried 519.8 tons of cargo and 730 passengers. Artillery expended 71,470 rounds in support of ground operations.

The QUICK KICK operations revealed another problem that occurs when large supply caches are discovered. This problem is a method of destroying rice. When possible and feasible, rice is extracted and turned over to Civic Action agencies. However, due to the nature of the terrain in which storage areas are discovered, this is not always possible. The rice must be moved to a suitable landing zone where the extraction is made using CH-47 helicopters. The cost of an operation of this nature makes it prohibitive. The rice must be destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands of VC again. Herein lies the problem since there is no suitable destruction method, particularly during the dry season when streams are dried up. Efforts have been made to burn it with fuel or powder, but neither method has proven successful. Several instances have also occurred where the VC booby trap rice caches. Photographs of rice captured and conditions under which it was extracted are at Inclosure 12.

d. March. During March the division continued to strike hard at the Viet Cong. VC lines of infiltration and supply were cut, large enemy logistical bases and safe areas were destroyed, and a hard-core regiment was engaged and defeated. Seventeen of the twenty-one battalion or larger size operations made contact with the VC.

Operation ROLLING STONE terminated on 2 March. Enemy losses included 173 KIA (BC), 62 individual weapons, 11 crew served weapons, and 33 bunkers.

2d Brigade commenced Operation HATTIESBURG (Incl 22) on 1 March, in TAY NINH Province, within a few thousand meters of the CAMBODIAN Border. During the operation, the VC organization of the PO LU Secret Zone was disrupted and major east-west infiltration and communication routes were cut. Assets lost to the VC as a result of this operation included 242 tons of rice, 400 pounds of TNT, and 40-120mm mortar rounds. Operation HATTIESBURG terminated 5 March.

Intelligence reports of increasing VC activity in the 3d Brigade TAOR caused the brigade to plan and launch a series of battalion size sweep and destroy operations north of LAI KHE in BINH DUONG Province. The 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry, executing Operation COCOA BEACH (Incl 23) in support of the brigade plan, fought the division's major battle of the month on 5 March near the village of LO KE (XT 7745) (Incl 13). Upon occupation of its perimeter, the battalion had dug in, constructed excellent defensive fortifications, and put out three 15-man ambush patrols during the hours of darkness. First contact with the hostile force occurred at 0615 when a VC company was ambushed 600 meters north-west of the battalion perimeter. This action prematurely triggered and disorganized the VC attack. Enemy assaults against the perimeter failed and the battle terminated at 1250 hours with the link-up of 16th and 28th Infantry and the complete rout of the Q272 Main Force Regiment. The defense of the LO KE perimeter was supported by 103 artillery missions and 66 TAC air sorties. Viet Cong losses included 199 KIA (BC) with an additional 300 KIA estimated.

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Operation SILVER CITY (Incl 24) was initiated by the 1st Brigade on 7 March in conjunction with 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep), 10th ARVN Division, and CIDG forces. The operation was directed at a VC logistical stronghold and safe area in vicinity of the SONG BE River in BINH DUONG Province. Units participating destroyed major VC supply installations, interdicted VC main communications and supply lines and demoralized VC forces by denying them another safe area for training, hospitalization, and logistical activities. Intelligence was collected on the political, domestic, and administrative aspects of Military Region Seven. Material losses inflicted on the VC included 165 tons of rice, 14 vehicles, and one field hospital. The operation terminated on 23 March.

Operation WAYCROSS (Incl 25) was a 1st Brigade operation conducted in conjunction with ARVN forces to locate and destroy VC forces which had raided an ARVN Compound and to recover captured equipment. The operation was initiated on 24 March and terminated 25 March.

On 30 March, the 1st Infantry Division initiated Operation ABILENE (Incl 26) in LONG KHANH and PHUOC TUY Provinces, involving the 2d and 3d Brigades and 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment.

Close air support sorties in support of 1st Infantry Division controlled operations totaled 1,785. TAC airlift sorties totaled 703 and airlifted 2,671.8 tons of cargo and 6,684 passengers. During March, 71,048 rounds of artillery were expended in support of ground operations.

e. April. The 1st Infantry Division continued operations to find and destroy Viet Cong forces and installations and disrupt enemy lines of communication. Extensive use was made of the saturation patrol technique. Company size patrols were conducted which kept the VC constantly on the move and off-guard and interrupted his plans to re-establish his influence in brigade TAORs and along friendly lines of communications. Additional objectives were achieved through coordination of saturation patrols with passage of resupply convoys. The 2d Brigade completed the relocation of its base camp to vicinity of BEAR CAT, adding greater security to Route 15 and extending the division's area of operations further into contested areas. Twelve separate military operations (battalion size or larger) were conducted against Viet Cong forces in III CTZ. D800 Viet Cong Main Force Battalion was identified through an engagement in the division area of operations.

The 1st Infantry Division conducted two large scale division controlled operations. Operations ABILENE and BIRMIINGHAM were conducted in LONG KHANH/PHUOC TUY and TAY NINH Provinces, respectively, and represented the first time U.S. forces had operated in these areas on such a large scale. Operation ABILENE (OPORD 7-66) which commenced on 30 March, deprived the enemy of large caches of supplies and resulted in the destruction of many base camps. The area of operations included rubber plantations and dense jungle. The 2d and 3d Brigades were reinforced by the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and 161st New Zealand Artillery Battery. The mission of the operation specified that units would conduct search and destroy operations in the provinces to locate and destroy elements of the 5th and 94th Regiments, their base camps and the MAY TAO Secret Zone. Although neither regiment was in the area during the operation, major supply caches were destroyed and Viet Cong influence and propaganda suffered a major setback by operations of a friendly force in the area previously considered under strong VC domination. Significant contact occurred on 11 April when C Company, 2d Battalion, 10th Infantry was heavily engaged in the dense jungle by D800 Main Force

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Battalion. The VC suffered 41 KIA (BC) during the fighting which occurred. On the morning of 12 April, engineers and medical personnel descended ladders suspended from hovering CH-47 aircraft to get down through the jungle canopy. The engineers cut down trees to construct a landing zone large enough to receive aeromedical evacuation helicopters. Material losses inflicted on the VC included 1,241 tons of rice, 59 tons of salt, 54 base camps, 3 tractors, and 5,500 gallons of kerosene. Operation ABILENE terminated 15 April.

Operation LEXINGTON commenced in the NHON TRACH District on 17 April. 2d Brigade elements conducted extensive patrols, ambushes, and search and destroy operations by company size units. VC movement, propaganda lectures, and evidence that VC were trying to rebuild base camps and fortifications previously destroyed by the brigade during Operation MALLEE, prompted the selection of this area of operations. ARVN forces participated by evacuating villages and repairing roads and bridges. 2d Brigade units inflicted the loss of 17 KIA (BC) and 7 base camps on the enemy.

Operation BIRMINGHAM (OPORD 8-66) commenced on 24 April 1966 in the previously VC safe area of War Zone C north of TAY NINH. The operations near the CAMBODIAN Border further complicated Viet Cong freedom of movement through this area. His infiltrations routes were cut, base camps and fortifications destroyed, and his control of and support by the population in War Zone C was countered. Phase I was initiated by a massive air assault involving Air Force and Army fixed-wing aircraft and CH-47 and UH-1 helicopters. The 1st and 3d Brigade headquarters controlled the maneuver elements, which consisted of battalions from all three brigades. ARVN III Corps participation included 3 Ranger battalions, one infantry battalion from the 25th Division and 3 battalions from the Airborne Division. Several CIDG companies participated along with their Special Forces advisors. Extensive search and destroy operations were conducted with only light contact being made initially. On 26 April, three large VC supply base camp complexes were discovered. It was becoming apparent that major VC supply installations were located along the CAMBODIAN Border and the eastern bank of the CAI BAC River, removed from the areas of previous B-52 strikes by several thousand meters. Four infantry battalions were deployed to the west to search the jungle areas and likely landing sites along the river. VC contacts continued to be with groups ranging from squad to platoon size with the VC fleeing after exchanges of fire. On 30 April, a battle was fought by the 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry and 2d Battalion, 16th Infantry with an estimated VC battalion in vicinity of the village of LO GO (WT 9775). The engagement was supported by artillery, close air support, and helicopter gunships. As the six-hour battle developed, a great volume of automatic weapons fire was received from CAMBODIA. Fire was returned by the infantry and a heavy volume of artillery fire was directed into the target area. These fires silenced the enemy weapons and the VC broke contact and fled. A major discovery during the operation was a VC hospital complex. The complex measured 100 X 300 meters and contained hospital wards, modern laboratory facilities, surgical facilities, 1000 pounds of medical supplies, and administrative and storage areas. VC losses through 30 April included; 82 KIA (BC), 113 KIA (Poss), 7 VC captured, 84 VC suspects, 24 weapons, 24 base camps destroyed, and 1,359 tons of rice and 184.5 tons of salt captured. Operation BIRMINGHAM continues.

During April, 1,336 close air support sorties were flown in support of the division. Artillery expended 84,104 rounds in support of ground operations.

## 5. Training:

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a. The status of training in the division is excellent. Training was conducted from the squad to company level, stressing combat lessons learned as a result of participation in operations. With the issuance of M-16 rifles to infantry battalions, required training, zeroing, and range firing was completed. The replacement detachment conducts range firing for newly arrived personnel. With the introduction of the Starlight Scope, training was conducted in its use and experiments were made of its use from OH-13 helicopters.

Classroom training and practical work has been conducted on the subjects of patrolling and ambush techniques. This has developed a positive defense capability among support units stationed at all base camps in order to reduce the number of personnel of infantry units remaining behind to provide base security during major operations. Infantry brigades are utilizing the time between major operations to conduct small unit operations with the primary objective being training and acclimatization of replacements.

Training in airmobile assault techniques is continuous. The program includes planning procedure, displacement of artillery, use of slings and nets, and the use of ladders as a means to descend from hovering OH-47 aircraft. Techniques are refined through habitual association of a specific airmobile company with a certain brigade.

Base camp support units have been provided 81mm mortars and instructed in their use by qualified personnel.

Training has been integrated into operations on the tactics and techniques peculiar to swamp and river warfare. This training included the use of small boats and construction of field expedients.

"Operation BROTHER" was a program whereby approximately 20 personnel from the 5th and 10th ARVN Divisions were integrated with the division staff sections for a week of orientation and training.

## 6. Psychological Operations and Civic Action:

During the four-month period of this report, the Civic Action and PsyOps activities of the division have had a noteworthy increase. Their value to the counterinsurgency warfare has proven to be of great benefit.

a. Civic Action. The Community Relation Councils in each division base camp area are considered to be the backbone of Civic Action. In most cases the progress achieved in bettering the relationship between the U.S. and local GVN officials stems from the friendly, congenial attitude on the part of all council members.

(1) MEDCAP continues to be the most active and beneficial Civic Action program. The results of medical treatment plus the multitude of people that are personally affected by the program enhances a true feeling among the people that the government honestly desires to assist with their problems. PsyOps is so closely interrelated with Civic Action that it is hard to distinguish where one terminates and the other begins. Medicine is wrapped in a PsyOps leaflet and distributed to patients. Vietnamese nationals receiving medical treatment during an operation are subsequently passed through a G-2/MI facility for questioning. During the reporting period in excess of 25,000 patients were treated.

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(2) The completion of the school in the DI AN and PHU HOA area reduces the current school projects to four under construction. In addition to the schools, playgrounds were fenced in and playground equipment installed. Latrine facilities were installed in existing schools, dispensaries, hospitals and orphanages. Division units are assisting the AN LOC Orphanage by the construction of the foundation for a dining hall, repairs to fences and buildings, hauling loads of firewood, providing security for the delivery of water, and providing food stuffs and clothes. The construction of wells is programed for the near future. The project supporting the orphanages has contributed a great deal towards the overall sanitation situation.

(3) Assistance was given to the PHU GIAO District Chief in the relocation of 55 families in the village of PHUOC VINH. New lots were surveyed and staked out. Roads were graded and culverts prepared through the new area. VC terrorist action on 22 March 1966 resulted in the destruction of the village market house. Assistance was given in the planning and layout of the new facility. Construction material was given to the people through the District Chief. Other projects conducted by the division are:

(a) Oil was applied to the main route from the town of DI AN to the DI AN base camp for the control of dust.

(b) Fire wood was provided to families who could not afford to purchase it.

(c) Currently 1608 children are participating in the milk program whereby each receives a glass of milk per day.

(d) English classes are given to a local Vietnamese teacher.

(e) Funds have been donated to worthy activities such as churches, the BEN SAN Leprosarium, orphanages, schools, one hospital. A total of 55,720 \$VN have been donated, usually through division chaplains.

(4) Refugees have not posed a problem to the division. The relocation of villagers is accomplished through close coordination with the appropriate province and/or district officials. Assistance in relocating families has been provided in the form of transportation, food stuff, clothing, yardgoods, soap and construction material. CARE, CRS, USAID and captured enemy supplies are the main sources of items required. During this period approximately 450 tons of commodities were distributed to the people and/or activities requiring assistance. An additional 220 tons of captured rice and peanuts were turned over to the ARVN Airborne Division.

b. PsyOps. The attachment of PsyOps teams to the division early in January 1966 provided the capability to react and exploit situations advantageous to PsyWar activities. The teams were attached from the 246th PsyOps Company stationed in BIEN HOA. In the early planning stages of combat operations, the PsyOps personnel are of great value in designing a program tailored to fit the need of the specific operational area. Information obtained about local civilians is of assistance in formulating the appropriate themes to be used. The attitude of the local civilian towards the VC as well as GVN and friendly forces is of the utmost importance in planning the campaign.

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The target audience ranges from the hard core VC to the friendly villager in the field. The success of the division PsyOps program is based on cleverly worded themes utilized in the appropriate situation and released at a time when the audience is most vulnerable.

(1) Leaflets. A variety of methods were utilized in delivering over 9,000,000 leaflets. The ones most commonly used were the C-47 and U-10 aircraft. Drops were made by UH-1 and OH-13 helicopters as well as Air Force FAC planes. Leaflets were thrown out of vehicles as convoys moved into operational areas. The individual soldier dropped them on the trails in the jungle. For the first time the division delivered leaflets by 105mm shell. Leaflets dropped were in support of Civic Action Projects as well as combat operations. MEDCAP leaflets and school dedication leaflets were examples of GA type utilized. The school dedication leaflets (10,000) were dropped in the vicinity of XT 9605 announcing that their District Chief was formally opening the new school in the BINH AN Hamlet, a joint GVN and U.S. project, and stating the time and inviting everyone to attend. A sampling of the leaflets used during combat operations is attached. The MEDCAP leaflet is best employed by dropping them along the roads leading to the area where MEDCAP will be conducted. Handing them out to patients to pass around to other Vietnamese can also be of value.

(2) Tapes and Loudspeakers. The capability of producing tapes and direct broadcasting was afforded the division by the receipt of four 1000-watt airborne loudspeaker sets. In addition to the standard tapes available, tapes were made utilizing information from captured VC, ralliers, and defectors, and replayed to their former unit or in the vicinity of their suspected locations. Mounting of loudspeaker equipment on vehicles provided the means of roving through areas exploiting situations as they developed. Loudspeakers, both aircraft and vehicle mounted, were used by GVN officials for issuing instructions to the local people during the searching of villages and hamlets. During combat operations, the U-10 aircraft for loudspeaker missions was used extensively. The C-47, "No Doze" flight, was requested and utilized when available on virtually all operations.

(3) Posters were produced and used in support of the reward program for turning in weapons, equipment and information. Another poster was prepared to exploit the shooting of two Americans while trying to construct a school for the children of BINH AN. VC treatment was the theme for another poster. In excess of 25,000 posters were used by the division during the period covered by this report. Samples of leaflets and posters utilized are at Inclosure 6.

c. The support rendered by Mr. Spencer, JUSPAO representative, and Mr. Boynton, USAID representative, assisted greatly in the division GA/PsyOp efforts. The direct and ultimate effect that the division PsyOps Program has had is difficult to determine. It is believed our efforts have contributed measurably to the number of ralliers and defectors.

### 7. Aviation:

The 1st Aviation Battalion supported the division by planning and conducting airmobile operations and aerial resupply, providing an airborne command and control capability, conducting administrative and aeromedical evacuation flights, and executing short range patrols by

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the Pathfinder Detachment. Generally, execution of airmobile operations went according to schedule. However, deviations were made when necessary due to weather or a change in the ground commander's plan of action.

During the period the battalion flew 42 combat assaults/extractions. Rotary wing aircraft flew 25,339 sorties and 9,873 combat hours. Fixed wing (OV-1) flew 2,596 missions and 903 combat hours. Organic aircraft transported 29,575 passengers and 1,863 tons of cargo. Three rotary wing aircraft were lost, one to enemy action. Forty helicopters and one OV-1 were hit by enemy fire.

The following construction projects were completed at the PHU LOI Airfield:

- Aircraft control tower
- Airfield operations building
- Improvement of the OV-1 revetment and ramp
- Airfield weather building
- Helipads in the A Company ramp area

Construction continues on the B Company ramp and maintenance hangers for both companies.

### G. Logistics:

a. General. The period covered by this report (1 January to 30 April 1966) began with the division already deployed in its five base areas, and engaged in conducting operations against the enemy. The logistical posture of the division was excellent. All tactical operations conducted during the reporting period were adequately supported and no major logistical problem areas were encountered. A total of 68,156.32 short tons of supplies and equipment were moved during the reporting period.

Division combat service support units were located in the following locations:

The Division Support Command, the logistical operator for the division, was located at DI AN, in close proximity to the division headquarters.

The 1st Supply and Transport Battalion Headquarters, including the Division Supply Office was located in the DI AN area. The Main Supply Platoon of Supply and Service Company, which operates the Class I, Class II & IV (non-repair parts), and Class III distribution points for the division was also located at DI AN. Forward supply elements previously placed in direct support of brigades continued to provide direct support for Classes I, II and IV (non-repair parts), and Class III to each brigade and its attached units. The improvised ration breakdown and POL point formed by units at PHU LOI, using pooled equipment, continued their support role. The Transportation Motor Transport Company of the Supply and Transport Battalion, remained in DI AN. Additional support was provided the 1st Infantry Division by the 20th MC Company (Med Pk POL), the 223d QM Company (Supply Depot), elements of the 4th Terminal Command, and Army of Vietnam transportation units, who worked with the supply and transport battalion. Graves Registration support to all base areas was provided by the Supply and Transport Battalion.

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The 1st Medical Battalion provided medical support to all brigades by placing a medical company in direct support of each. Support to DI AN base area was provided by the Headquarters and Support Company of 1st Medical Battalion. A medical platoon from the 61st Med was located at PHU LOI to provide medical support to that area. The Division Surgeon and Division Medical Supply Officer were also located at DI AN. Medical support to Vietnamese Nationals was provided through the civil affairs program (MEDCAP) as conducted under the supervision of the Division Surgeon. During the reporting period, combat medical service support was provided to the division and no major problem areas were found. The overall medical support provided was excellent.

The 701st Maintenance Battalion provided maintenance support to all base areas. Each brigade has a Forward Support Maintenance Company placed in direct support. Company E, 701st Maintenance Battalion was located at PHU LOI (in the proximity of the 1st Aviation Battalion, and D Troop, 4th Cav) to provide aircraft maintenance and avionics support for all division aircraft. An ordnance maintenance platoon (augmented), from the 60th Ordnance Group, which was attached to the 701st Maintenance Battalion, was placed in direct support of units located at PHU LOI. Headquarters and A Company, 701st Maintenance Battalion is located at DI AN, and provided support to units at DI AN as well as support to PHU LOI units. The responsibility of 701st Maintenance Battalion remained the same, to provide complete maintenance support to the division, to provide repair parts supply, and to maintain the division's ASL of repair parts.

b. Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Incl 7).

c. Construction. The 2d Brigade moved its base area from the vicinity of BIEN HOA to BEAR CAT. Work was initiated to build headquarters buildings, mess halls, and medical facilities at BEAR CAT, and the majority of this construction has since been accomplished. Improvement of base area defenses including the placement of additional wire obstacles and minefields continues. Work on drainage systems and ditching continues, and it is anticipated that the majority of such work will be completed prior to the arrival of the rainy season. At the close of the reporting period, the following percentages of construction were completed:

a. Horizontal Construction.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE COMPLETED</u>
DI AN (not including the airfield)	87%
PHUOC VINH	28%
LAI KHE	45%
PHU LOI	54%
BEAR CAT	29%

b. Vertical Construction.

DI AN	85%
PHUOC VINH	19%

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE COMPLETED</u>
LAI KHE	36%
PHU LOI	54%
BEAR CAT	62%

## 9. Administrations:

### a. Personnel:

#### (1) Strengths:

(a) There was a marked improvement in division strength during this period. Assigned strength as of 30 April was 110 per cent of authorized, an increase of 8 per cent from the last quarter. The present for duty compared to assigned strength remained at 94 per cent. Present for duty in comparison to authorized strength increased 10 per cent from 94 per cent the past quarter to 104 per cent this period. Casualties, both battle and non-battle, took their toll. As of 1 January, the division had sustained 170 KHA, 923 WHA and had 10 non-battle injuries for a total of 1,228 casualties. As of 30 April, these totals had increased to 458 KHA, 2,423 WHA, 30 non-battle dead and 223 non-battle injured for a total of 3,134 casualties. This is an increase of 1,906 during the report period. Division gains totaled 7,248 throughout the period. Losses due to ETS and completion of tour were 4,894. The division remains critically short in two enlisted MOS's; MOS 94B20 (cook), and MOS 96C20 (interrogator). These shortages have been reported to Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam. Division strength as of 30 April 1966 is:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGF</u>
AUTH	943	165	14,267	15,375
ASGD	1002	120	15,762	16,882
PDY	978	117	14,896	15,991

#### (b) Casualties (by month)

##### 1. January:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGF</u>
KHA	1	0	50	51
WHA	27	0	304	411
MISSING	0	0	0	0
NON-BATTLE DEAD	0	0	16	16
NON-BATTLE INJURED	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	28	0	454	482

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**2. February:**

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
KHA	3	0	76	79
WHA	28	0	447	475
MISSING	0	0	0	0
NON-BATTLE DEAD	3	0	30	33
NON-BATTLE INJURED	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	35	0	557	592

**3. March:**

KHA	4	0	57	61
WHA	28	1	240	269
MISSING	0	0	0	0
NON-BATTLE DEAD	1	0	17	18
NON-BATTLE INJURED	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>
TOTAL	33	2	319	354

**4. April:**

KHA	1	0	95	96
WHA	19	0	336	355
MISSING	0	0	0	0
NON-BATTLE DEAD	1	0	7	8
NON-BATTLE INJURED	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>37</u>
TOTAL	22	0	474	496

(c) Statistical analysis of battle casualties at Inclosure 8.

(2) Civilian personnel:

(a) An additional 629 positions have been approved for hire, to bring the division total to 823 of the 1000 currently authorized. There have been 432 local nationals hired to fill these authorized positions. There is a shortage of skilled workers in the local DI area and as a result much of the recruiting for skilled positions must be done in the SAIGON area.

(b) On 1 January 1966 the 1st Infantry Division Temporary Hire Fund was authorized 11,907,000 \$VN for the period 1 January to 31 March. This funding enabled the division to increase the number of temporary hire local nationals from a daily average of 1060 during

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the last period to 2010 for this period. It is anticipated that funding will permit the division to continue at this level or slightly higher during the next period.

## (3) Disciplines:

(a) There has been no significant change in the status of military discipline and no stragglers have been apprehended in the division area.

(b) There has been a slight increase in the number of court-martial cases which now average 40 cases a month.

(4) Burials and Graves Registration: During this period the Graves Registration Platoon handled 257 U.S. remains. Of these, 247 were positively identified, 8 were processed as positive identification doubtful and 2 were processed as unidentified.

## (5) Morale and Personnel Services:

(a) The morale of the 1st Infantry Division remains excellent. Contributing to this high state of morale has been a constant expansion and improvement of available facilities.

1. Chaplain: A new chapel was dedicated at the 2d Battalion, 18th Infantry on 19 February and on 14 March a ground breaking ceremony officially began the construction of the 1st Infantry Division Memorial Chapel at DI AN.

2. Special Services: Entertainment equipment consisting of 35 tape recorders, 120 television sets, 165 transistor radios, and 35 company recreational kits were distributed during the period. There were 6 USO shows in the division area attended by a total of 8,550 members of the division. Out-of-country R&R quotas increased from 1078 during the last period to 2741 this period. In-country R&R quotas increased from 1070 to 1800. On 22 April, in-country R&R was limited to VUNG TAU.

3. Red Cross: New cases and re-opened cases for the period totaled 3,178. The division had 3,484 personnel receive service through the Red Cross. Total service actions for the period were 3,848. Messages handled during the report period totaled 3,057.

4. USO: On 2 April 1966 the 1st Infantry Division USO Club was opened in DI AN. Bus transportation is provided between the division base camp area and the USO on a regularly scheduled basis. The average daily attendance at this facility is 500 personnel.

5. Awards and Decorations: There were a total of 3,413 awards for valor and for meritorious service during the period, these were:

Silver Star	30
Legion of Merit	7
Distinguished Flying Cross	17
Soldier's Medal	9
Air Medal (Valor)	9

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Bronze Star (Valor)	258
Bronze Star (Merit)	94
Army Commendation Medal (Valor)	155
Army Commendation Medal (Merit)	129
Air Medal	1310
Purple Heart	1395

## 10. Chemical Operations:

Prior to 1 January 1966, Riot Control Agent Policy authorized commanders to use riot control agents (RCA) only in flushing tunnels, tunnel denial, and where VC intermingled with civilians. This policy was changed and operations commencing on 1 January 1966 reflect the new freedom of employment of RCA. The Division Chemical Section and the attached 266 Chemical Platoon and 242 Chemical Squadron provided guidance and support for RCA employment.

An experimental CS munition, the E-150CS cluster, was issued to the division for troop testing. Chemical personnel rigged and dropped these clusters from UH-1D helicopters in support of ground operations. The clusters were dropped from altitudes of 500 to 2000 feet and generally had excellent effect.

Division chemical personnel have participated extensively in tunnel operations. They organized and equipped the first tunnel flushing team. Based on their experience and lessons learned during operations, training has been given to tunnel teams organized in the brigades.

The Division Chemical Section has assisted in the construction and installation of chemical (flame) mines on the DI AN base camp perimeter. These personnel have also provided demonstrations in the use of flame field expedients.

Six requests were prepared and submitted for defoliation missions to be conducted throughout the division area of responsibility. The attached chemical units have accomplished ground based defoliation and insect control tasks.

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## II Recommendations and Lessons Learned:

### 1. Recommendations:

#### a. Organizations:

(1) Recommend three airmobile companies be attached to the division. Attachment of these companies will permit an habitual association of one company with a specific brigade. An attached company will be more responsive and permit a more rapid reaction in the execution of airmobile assaults.

(2) Recommend two additional OV-1 aircraft be provided to the division aviation battalion to increase the aerial photo capability. An MTOE is being submitted requesting this addition.

(3) Recommend the Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge Platoon be reinstated in the Bridge Company TOE. This platoon was deleted from the division prior to deployment to RVN based on anticipated difficulties that would be experienced when moving equipment over existing roads. This division has encountered several situations where the AVLB could have been successfully employed in support of combat operations. MTOE 5-148E was submitted 23 April 1966, requesting reinstatement of the AVLB.

(4) Recommend a VHF system suitable for airmobile assaults replace the AN/MRC-69 as soon as possible. The present system requires too much airlift for displacement.

(5) Recommend the 1st Infantry Division Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment, 4 February 1965, be expeditiously approved. Approval of the changes will enhance counterinsurgency operations and operations by the division.

#### b. Logistics:

Recommend large generators be issued for base camp use. The heavy load being placed on light TOE generators has attributed to the generator maintenance problem.

#### c. Equipment:

(1) Recommend development of a hammock patterned along the lines of the light weight nylon hammock available on the local economy. This hammock would be a replacement for the jungle hammock currently being issued.

(2) Recommend a grenade bag similar to the item issued during WW II be procured. Present methods of carrying grenades in pockets or suspended from the harness are neither acceptable because of inaccessibility or safety.

#### d. Other:

(1) Recommend a simple and effective method of destroying rice be developed for combat units conducting search and destroy operations in areas where it is not feasible to extract captured rice.

(2) Recommend a ground radar portable enough to be carried on patrols be procured.

2. Lessons Learned:

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Mine Clearing

Item: Clearing roads and trails of mines.

Discussion: The clearing of roads and trails of VC mines is only a temporary measure unless continuous surveillance is maintained over the area. Experience has shown that the VC will return and replace the mines at the first opportunity.

Observation: Roads previously cleared should not be considered secure unless constant surveillance had been maintained on the road or it is swept for mines immediately prior to being used.

Radio Relay

Item: Radio Relay Utilization.

Discussion: Undesirable communication sites are frequently encountered in the flat and heavily forested areas in Vietnam. Utilization of a suitable VHF radio relay can extend the effectiveness of VHF equipment far beyond the normal line of site range of 30 miles.

Observation: Plans for operations must include provision for VHF radio relay units.

VC Fire Lanes

Item: Detection of VC fire lanes.

Discussion: The VC out fire lanes close to the ground. A man standing in secondary jungle growth cannot normally detect the fire lanes.

Observation: Personnel must be trained to frequently squat and look for fire lanes, particularly when approaching a fortified position or suspected base camp area.

VC Base Camps

Item: Attack of VC base camps.

Discussion: The VC normally evacuate their base camps when under attack. Frequently there are not enough defenders to man all defensive positions.

Observation: A wide enveloping maneuver is the best type of attack employed against VC base camps. In this maneuver contact can be spread to secure points, thereby taking advantage of the inability of base camp defenders to man all defensive positions. Ambushes established to the flanks and rear of the VC positions will prevent anyone from fleeing.

Airmobile Assault Communications/Radio Nets

Item: Separate radio nets for simultaneous air assault and movement.

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Discussion: The volume of traffic becomes too heavy for one net when an airborne assault takes place simultaneously with the movement of landtail elements.

Observation: Separate radio nets should be established, when frequencies are available, for use by air assault and landtail elements.

### VC Tunnels

Item: VC tunnel discovery and exploitation.

Discussion: The VC has constructed extensive tunnel systems throughout Vietnam over the past 12 years. Many of these tunnel systems are located in areas previously immune to operations by Vietnamese and FVMAF units. Many are also well concealed by the vegetation that has overgrown the openings.

Observation: Each battalion should organize and train a tunnel team to exploit the discovery of tunnel systems. These teams should be trained in the use of bulldozers and front loaders in conjunction with riot control agents and explosives as a means of sealing off tunnels, destroying trench works, and denying their use by the VC.

### Tactical/Tank - Infantry

Item: Tank - infantry team sweeps.

Discussion: Armored personnel carriers and tanks can be effectively employed in conjunction with sweeps by infantry in Vietnam. The suppressive fire of the APCs and tanks reduces the danger of sniper fire. Armored vehicles also detonate AP mines, thereby reducing casualties among the infantry.

Observation: Plans should consider the employment of the APCs and tanks of the cavalry squadron with infantry during sweep operations. Armor and infantry personnel must be trained in tank - infantry tactics.

### APC Ambulances

Item: Armored personnel carriers for medical evacuation.

Discussion: In many instances, casualties are taken during operations in jungle or rubber plantations where there are no helicopter landing zones; or where the volume of enemy fire prevents evacuation helicopter from landing.

Observation: Armored personnel carriers can be used effectively for evacuation to a safe or suitable area for medevac helicopters to land.

### Rice Destruction and Evacuation

Item: Rice destruction and evacuation.

Discussion: Disposition of captured VC rice is a major problem for units conducting initial operations into former VC "safe areas". Large quantities of rice are found in caches, with as much as 1000 tons being captured during one four-day operation. Much of the rice is

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bagged, but significant quantities are found loose. Much of the rice is discovered in heavily forested areas which provide concealment. Extensive delays are required clearing helicopter landing zones or constructing roads for trucks to move the rice to suitable and safe landing zones. The cost of extraction by helicopter makes this method prohibitive. During the dry season, insufficient water is available to destroy the rice by soaking.

Observation: Units must devise methods for destroying rice until such time as a standardized destruction device is produced. Gasoline, JP-4, napalm, unused powder increments, and water can be utilized. Flexibility in operations plans must permit ample time to be devoted for destruction or evacuation of large caches discovered during operations.

## Use of Helicopter Gun Ships

Item: Coordination between ground forces and armed helicopters.

Discussion: Positive identification of forward friendly elements and positions is difficult during operations in jungle or immediately after occupation of an LZ.

Observation: A greater degree of coordination between ground forces and gun ships must be established to insure positive identification of friendly elements. The fire from door gunners on armed helicopters must be very closely controlled when the aircraft is making a firing pass parallel to the front lines or when attacking targets on the periphery of landing zones.

## Security of Engineer Forces

Item: Security of engineer construction forces.

Discussion: Engineer construction forces along roads are vulnerable to sniper fire and ambushes. Work parties must be permitted to concentrate on the construction mission and are generally stretched out along several miles.

Observation: Armored cavalry elements are ideally organized, equipped and trained to conduct road security missions for engineer construction forces. Foot patrols conducted from 100 to 500 meters on the flanks of the road preclude sniper and ambush sites from being occupied. Engineer personnel must be trained and organized as rapid reaction forces to complement assigned security forces.

## Close Air Support Utilization

Item: Planning for use of unexpended CAS sorties.

Discussion: Aircraft ordnance must be expended before aircraft can land and refuel.

Observation: Planning must be continuous to provide suitable target locations for attack by aircraft reaching the end of their loiter time.

## Airmobile Troop Extraction

Item: Helicopter troop extraction.

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Discussion: Planning for extraction of troops by helicopter from the loading zone becomes more vulnerable as the strength of the security force diminishes.

Observation: Coordination between the lift commanders and the ground elements must be accomplished early, preferably prior to beginning of the operation and must include a detailed fire support plan. The loading zone security force must be positioned in close proximity to the loading zone, but far enough to prevent small arms and direct fire weapons from firing on the elements involved in the lift. Pathfinders should be in position a minimum of four hours prior to extraction time to effect the necessary coordination with the ground commanders, assist in positioning troops, and in preparing the loading zone.

## Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges

Item: Bridge requirements.

Discussion: The majority of bridging accomplished in support of counterinsurgency operations has been the dry-span variety, employing M-4 balk. Length of bridges has ranged from 15 to 40 feet. In many situations an armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) would have been a more expedient method of bridging.

Observation: Units should include bridging requirements in all operations planning. Engineer units deploying to Vietnam should retain AVLBs.

## Signal Communications in Jungle Terrain

Item: Signal attenuation by jungle vegetation.

Discussion: Signal absorption by jungle growth has a marked effect upon communications in RVN, in the VHF bands. In some instances, the 45 foot antenna masts (components of the AN/WRC-69) do not provide sufficient height to clear the jungle growth thereby causing a noticeable loss of transmitted signal strength at the receiving end.

Observation: Two solutions have been used to overcome this. First, VHF relay points have been established on dominant mountains (elevations of 1100 and 3500 feet) with excellent results.

Second, additional height for the antenna has been provided at both receiving and transmitting ends of a system, utilizing AB-216 towers. The towers are ideal for fixed base camp operations.

## Communications/Radio Frequencies

Item: Congestion of radio frequencies.

Discussion: All radio frequencies are extremely crowded. Utilization of the AN/WRC-12 series FM radio has relieved the problem to some extent in the FM band. However, these sets have an increased operating range, and the significant reduction in congestion and interference may be nullified due to unwanted reception of distant stations.

Observation: All units should be encouraged to operate the AN/WRC-12 family radios on high power only when FM communication cannot be established on low power.

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## Modification of VHF Equipment

Item: Modification of signal equipment to provide greater mobility and flexibility.

Discussion: TOE VHF equipment (AN/MRC-69) has proven to be extremely bulky and cumbersome in providing support for air mobile operations. Additionally, aircraft requirements become excessive since one sortie is required to move only the shelter and internal equipment. A second lift is required to displace the generator set, a component of the AN/MRC-69.

The AN/MRC-69 provides 24 VHF channels of communication. Twelve channels are normally sufficient to support a brigade sized task force.

Areas with dense jungle growth often require the equipment to be deployed and placed in the forward LZ itself. The equipment loses all mobility once it is placed on the ground. Once the 45 foot antenna masts are erected, a potential hazard exists for air traffic in the area. In addition, repositioning equipment into an area inaccessible by sling airlift often means the difference between a marginal and a quality communication system.

Observation: Modification of a portion of the forward platoon's VHF equipment will produce the desired mobility and flexibility. By removing half of the equipment from an AN/MRC-69 and installing it in a 3/4 ton trailer, considerable weight reduction results, thereby allowing the generators to be airlifted in the same sortie. In addition, all ground mobility is not lost. Remounting the equipment into an open 3/4 ton trailer has the secondary advantage of providing improved air circulation around the equipment which will significantly reduce equipment failure due to excessive heat. Excellent results have been obtained from a test model.

### Moisture in Signal Cables

Item: Moisture in multi-pair cable hocks.

Discussion: Hocks in tactical, multi-pair cable have been highly unsatisfactory for use in RVN. Cable pair cross-talk and short circuits have been traced directly to this source of trouble. This problem is not solely the result of hard, driving rain storms in RVN; it is also the result of condensation. The temperature/humidity differential is such in RVN to make this a very difficult problem. Sealing the hocks externally has been attempted, but only tends to increase condensation. Open hocks, on the other hand, are not desirable either. The problem of condensation would be solved, but the combination of rain and dust would only intensify the problem over a period of time.

Constant draining of moisture from hocks appears to be the only immediate solution to problem. This is a poor solution since it is time consuming and interrupts service completely while the contacts are cleaned and dried.

Observation: Further research is required for a suitable hock for tactical cables. One-piece commercial cable is a solution for non-tactical cable.

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## Division Headquarters Switchboards

Item: The Central Office, Telephone, Manual AN/MTC-3 is inadequate for support of a division headquarters.

Discussion: The AN/MTC-3 contains facilities for only 120 circuits, i.e., two each telephone switchboards SB-86/P. Telephone requirements exceed the switchboard capabilities. Also, the SB-86/P's require constant maintenance, especially for faulty line cords and spring activated packs for rewinding the line cord. During periods of repair, associated circuits are unusable.

Observation: The Central Office, Telephone, Manual AN/MTC-3 was replaced with the Central Office, Telephone, Manual AN/MTC-1. The AN/MTC-1 provides facilities for terminating and interconnecting 200 local or common battery subscriber circuits. Further, it requires far less maintenance than the MTC-3. Common battery capability speeds calls and permits use of telephones other than the TP-312 which requires frequent checks of its batteries.

## VC Tactics/Mines and Booby Traps

Item: Extensive use of mines and booby traps by VC.

Discussion: Plantations, jungle and LOCs near populated areas are normally heavily booby-trapped. In VC strongholds away from populated areas, few booby-traps and mines are encountered. The exception to this is along accepted avenues of approach into secure areas such as Zone C or Zone D. These access routes may be heavily mined and booby trapped to prevent rapid movement into the area. Local VC, knowledgeable of the area, are used to guide the VC force units through the area safely.

Observation: Units should be thoroughly indoctrinated in VC mine tactics and techniques.

## VC Tactics/Use of Civilians

Item: Women and children used in combat by VC.

Discussion: Females actively support VC activities and have been encountered in battle. Also young children have been used to hurl grenades into vehicles or commit other acts of sabotage. These tactics present problems for Americans who are not usually wary or alert for encounters of this nature.

Observation: Indoctrinate all personnel on this tactic and appropriate countermeasures.

## VC Tactics/Sanctuaries

Item: VC use religious installations for sanctuaries.

Discussion: The VC frequently use churches, pagodas and graveyards for sanctuaries. They also will fight from these areas where Americans are prone to be less alert or where they do not search extensively due to their social training.

Observation: Personnel should be trained to treat all areas as suspect locations until it has been searched and cleared.

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## VC Security

Item: VC security measures.

Discussion: U.S. and other Free World Military Forces have at their disposal quite sophisticated means of detecting enemy forces and can place VC units in a general location. Specific pinpointing must be done by the soldier on the ground. VC security measures are quite stringent and certain VC regiments have not been located for periods of time up to months, due to their strict discipline in maintaining a secure location.

Observation: Increased use of long range reconnaissance patrols will assist in the overall intelligence collection effort to locate VC forces.

### Intelligence Analysis

Item: Local intelligence.

Discussion: The reliability of local Vietnamese sources of intelligence is usually questionable, at best and the vast quantities of their reports often make the intelligence picture difficult. This is especially true when a unit is new in-country and the situation improves only slightly after intelligence personnel have gained experience. There is generally a considerable disparity of information on VC order of battle between U.S. and ARVN sources. This situation also exists between various U.S. units.

Observation: Extensive cross-comparison and fusion of all sources of information in one location will help eliminate misleading reports.

### VC Transportation Detection

Item: VC use various modes of transport.

Discussion: Vehicle and sampans are used extensively to transport VC supplies. A responsive system for detection and destruction of these transport facilities is needed.

Observation: All means of airborne and ground sensory devices should be exploited in detection of VC transportation facilities.

### POL Resupply

Item: POL resupply.

Discussion: Use of 55 gallon drums for high usage fuels is unsatisfactory due to time delays in handling techniques. When resupply is to be accomplished by road, use of 5,000 gallon tanker trucks is desirable. When resupply is to be by ALOC, resupply should be accomplished using 500 gallon drums and/or miniport 2,000 gallon bladders.

Observation: To accommodate large quantities of POL resupply, maximum use should be made of 500 gallon drums. The 55 gallon drums should be used only as a last resort or when small quantities of fuel are used.

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## Medical Clearing Station Location

Item: Positioning medical clearing stations.

Discussion: Locating medical clearing stations in close proximity to rotary/fixed wing landing strips has many advantages in affording quick medical aid to combat casualties. This has also posed problems in keeping these facilities clean of dirt, dust, and debris created by aircraft landing and taking off.

Observation: Landing areas for aeromedical evacuation aircraft should be marked to limit air traffic in the proximity of medical clearing stations. In addition, medical clearing stations should be positioned in areas away from heavy and/or routine air traffic.

## Battalion Surgeons

Item: Employment of battalion surgeons.

Discussion: Battalion surgeons, when employed forward, are often unable to treat casualties occurring in the forward area because the majority of casualties are evacuated from the combat zone via air ambulance, directly to a medical clearing company, by-passing the battalion aid station.

Observation: Employment of battalion surgeons should remain flexible. If lines of communication are short, surgeons may deploy forward with their unit. If lines of communications are lengthy, battalion surgeons may augment the medical clearing company. Air ambulances usually operate from the medical clearing company; therefore, battalion surgeons may accompany ambulances to the pick-up site, administering resuscitative treatment on site and during the return flight to the clearing company.

## Surgical Capability at Forward Clearing Company

Item: Surgical capability at forward clearing company.

Discussion: Frequently, zones of operations are quite distant from medical facilities which have a surgical capability. Life-saving minutes are often lost due to the time/distance factor for evacuation.

Observation: Where the time/distance factor for evacuation is excessive, augmentation of the forward medical clearing company, with a surgical capability, is extremely beneficial in providing resuscitative surgery.

## Medical Battalion X-Ray Capability

Item: X-Ray capability for the medical battalion.

Discussion: The TOE for a medical battalion organic to an infantry division does not provide for X-Ray units. Medical clearing companies are frequently operating in support of units quite distant to medical facilities with this capability. Many patients, both casualty and routine, which could normally be treated in the clearing company must be evacuated due to a lack of X-Ray equipment, which could assist medical personnel in diagnosing injuries and prescribing treatment.

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Observation: It is recommended that X-Ray equipment be provided to medical companies when operating away from medical facilities in order to permit rapid diagnosis of wounds or injuries detectable only by use of X-Ray equipment.

## Finance

Item: Payrolls for Class A agents.

Discussion: The requirement for Class A agents to report to the Division Finance Office to obtain their payrolls results in excessive travel time by individual agents.

Observation: Finance Courier Teams have been provided by the Division Finance Officer to bring payrolls to the base camps. This has resulted in a savings in man hours and aircraft utilization and has delivered the payroll to the Class A agent on a more timely basis.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AGC (30 May 66)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for the Period 1 January -  
30 April 1966, Reports Control Symbol CSGP-28 (RI)

DA, HQ, II Field Force Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96266 17 JUN 1966


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report on Lessons Learned submitted by the 1st  
Infantry Division is comprehensive, well prepared and contains valuable  
lessons, many of which are applicable throughout the theater.

2. (C) Reference SECTION II paragraph 1 a. (1), this headquarters  
concur in the observation that habitual association of one airmobile  
company with a specific brigade would enhance both the maneuver unit and  
airmobile company's ability to execute airmobile assaults. However, the  
present low level of airmobile company availability coupled with the needs  
of other major commands under operational control of this headquarters  
makes such attachment impracticable at this time.

3. (U) This headquarters concurs in the remaining recommendations  
contained in SECTION II of the basic report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
ROBERT L. ALDERMAN  
Major, AGC  
Asst AG



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HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
Office of the Commanding General  
APO San Francisco 96345

AVID-CG

27 March 1966

SUBJECT: Commanders Notes - #1

TO: Sec Distribution

1. This is the first of what will be a series of Notes, based on the observations of the Division Commander during operations, training and base camp activities.

2. TRAINING: The turn-over in the 1st Infantry Division through normal rotation, battlefield casualties, sickness and other causes is already high, and may well increase. The turn-over is greatest at the level of the squad, section and platoon where the greatest number of casualties are taken and where sickness and other disabilities are the most prevalent. There is a great store of combat experience in the 1st Division, but that experience can quickly disappear. Therefore, the Division is faced with the problem of fighting and training at the same time. All commanders will devote their personal attention to training at every available opportunity. Emphasis will be at the squad, section, platoon level. Experience and lessons learned must be pushed down by brigade, battalion, company, troop and battery commanders through an imaginative, continuous, aggressive training program. Nothing will be taken for granted.

### 3. OPERATIONS:

a. Henceforth, no rifle company in the 1st Division will advance either in the open or closed terrain with three platoons on line. Each commander at company and battalion level will always have a reserve element in hand, under control, and prepared for immediate commitment.

b. The term, or phrase, "pinned down" is no longer a part of the vocabulary of the 1st Division. Troops must anticipate that meeting engagements with the VC will involve a heavy volume of initial VC fire. At this time, naturally, commanders and troops will not be able to walk freely along the battle front. However, they will not regard themselves as "pinned down" but rather will accept this condition as the normal and natural initiation of close infantry combat. Forward elements closely engaged will automatically become a base of fire. Commanders at squad and platoon level will advance their men into the base of fire positions, by crawling if necessary. A heavy volume of fire will be returned by all hands and at any time the VC fire either slackens or stops, the base of fire will improve its position by moving forward -- even if forward movement is only a matter of 5 meters at a time and the mode of advance is by crawling. Under NO circumstances repeat, NO circumstances will forward elements in contact, withdraw in order to bring artillery fire on the VC. The base of fire will stand fast and reinforce if necessary. Contact will be maintained if necessary throughout the night.

Incl 4 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div 1 Jan -  
30 Apr. 66.

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27 March 1966

SUBJECT: Commanders Notes - #1

c. Upon initial contact, company commanders will immediately commit their reserve platoons around one flank or the other and will immediately begin artillery and mortar fire to their front. In the jungle, this fire may be started some distance in front of the position and walked back toward the position until safety requires that it be brought no further. This artillery fire, even though it may be behind the forward VC elements in contact, will be continued. It will prevent the VC from reinforcing, withdrawing or maneuvering. At no time will company commanders lose control of their forward elements or battalion commanders of their companies, so that maximum fire power can not be brought into the VC position to the immediate front.

d. During the first 5 to 10 minutes of a meeting engagement, the chances are the VC will have the advantage. He will initiate combat at a time and place of his choosing -- usually from prepared positions. After the first 5 to 10 minutes, the combat advantage will begin to shift rapidly in favor of 1st Division forces as additional fire power is brought to bear. The maximum casualty producing weapons are light, medium and heavy artillery and air strikes. Commanders of companies, battalions, and brigades, upon engagement, will immediately analyze the situation on the map and by visual observation and will bring air strikes and artillery fire into all areas through which the VC may be withdrawing, reinforcing or maneuvering. An ample quantity of artillery ammunition is available and will be used. I expect that hundreds of rounds of ammunition will be fired into the vicinity and on VC positions. The battalion and brigade commanders will bring in continuous air strikes and they will use imagination in the selection of targets.

e. Once the VC is engaged, all commanders will use initiative and imagination to commit all available forces and block all possible routes of withdrawal within their capabilities. Until such times as routes of withdrawal can be physically blocked, they will be blocked by interdiction. Encirclement will be maintained until the VC is eliminated. There will be no pulling back into a perimeter at night during such an action.

f. SATURATION PATROLLING: Increasingly, battalions will be assigned the mission of saturation patrolling in extensive areas as large as 10 kilometers on a side. Progressively, units will learn to operate independently down to platoon level. Initially, platoon operations will be done in the day time, pulling back into company perimeters at night; and after a reasonably short period of experience in this mode, platoons will operate independently night and day. The greatest payoff from platoon operations will be at night. The safety of a rifle platoon operating independently depends on two things:

(1) Repeated movement, including movement after dark so that VC forces can not conduct a planned attack, but rather must conduct an open tactical maneuver. This is not their most effective method of operating, and during such engagements they are extremely vulnerable to artillery and mortar fire. All platoon leaders and platoon sergeants will direct and adjust artillery fire during such operations.

(2) While operating independently, when contact is always imminent, platoon leaders will control and maneuver their elements so that at least a squad base of fire covers all advances across open terrain toward positions which may or may not be occupied by the VC.

Incl 4 (Con't)

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27 March 1966

SUBJECT: Commanders Notes - #1

g. In temporary defensive positions, two-man emplacements will be constructed so that there is a berm to the front and firing positions on either side with about a 45 degree angle of cross fire. This will permit the regaining of fire superiority without exposing each soldier to direct fire from the front when an attack is initiated by the VC with a heavy volume of small arms and recoilless rifle fire.

h. It will be a normal operating procedure in the 1st Division to position artillery batteries and single rifle companies in forward bases of fire. These positions will be moved with sufficient frequency so that they will normally not be susceptible to coordinated attacks by large forces. However, they will be subject frequently to probes and attacks of up to company size. The troops must be cautioned to expect and to handle this size engagement. Additionally, combat reconnaissance by platoon and company size elements will be normal. Rifle platoons are expected to be able to handle VC companies; companies to handle battalions; and battalions to handle regiments during initial engagements of 4 - 6 - 10 hours until reinforcements can be brought in.

4. HELICOPTER ASSAULT OPERATIONS: The VC in the III Corps area are known to possess 12.7mm CHICOM anti-aircraft machine guns, at least six quad-50 machine guns and an equal number of 20mm anti-aircraft weapons. It is inevitable that they will attempt at some time to spring a massive helicopter ambush by employing these weapons around a likely landing zone. Therefore, it is important that LZ preparation be conducted in such a manner to prevent the VC from conducting a successful ambush. Generally speaking, landing zone preparations have not been conducted with sufficient intensity over a short period of time to derive the maximum shock effect inherent in the artillery and aerial ordnance systems used. Furthermore, it has been customary to prepare the LZ in a sequential manner - starting with air, followed by artillery, followed by armed helicopters. Sometimes the artillery has preceded the air strikes, but this is not relevant to the problem. Henceforth, air mobile operations will be planned so that artillery will continue during the helicopter landing, probably on one side of the helicopter approach corridor and the air attack will continue on the other side, using either small fragmentation bombs or, as a minimum, 20mm strafing. The armed helicopters will be required to cover with their fire power both the near and far approaches to the landing zone within the approach corridor during the actual landing. The transport helicopters may either enter and leave through an extended corridor, or being lighter by the discharge of troops, make a 180 degree turn and take off downwind in the same direction they entered. Brigade and battalion commanders involved in conducting and coordinating air mobile operations will insist upon the use of these tactics and procedures for assault landings made against opposition, or in areas where opposition is likely to be encountered. If landings are to be made in habitated areas and landing zone preparation, therefore, is not desirable artillery and air strikes will be made in adjacent wooded areas and in every such instance at least one PATHFINDER platoon will be put on the ground 30 minutes before the main landing.

5. If at every echelon, from squad to brigade, each commander applies the standard techniques of ground combat and utilizes the full fire power available to him, the operations of the 1st Division will be successful. If on the other hand, commanders maneuver their troops and

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27 March 1966

SUBJECT: Commanders Notes - #1

handle their fire power so that the full weight of the combined arms team is not or can not be brought to bear, then setbacks will be experienced and unnecessary casualties will be taken. Every commander is expected to do his job in a cool, professional manner at all times.

/s/ W E DePuy  
/t/ W.E. DeFUY  
Brig Gen, USA  
Commanding

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*William L Ponder Jr*  
WILLIAM L PONDER JR  
Major, Artillery



HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
Office of the Commanding General  
APO San Francisco 96345

AVID-CG

18 April 1966

SUBJECT: Commanders Notes - #2

TO: See Distribution

1. During the Division's operation in Phuoc Tuy, a wide variation in the quality of battalions was noticeable. There were many reasons for this, but the most obvious cause was a difference in the utilization of non-commissioned officers. In those battalions, companies and platoons in which the non-commissioned officers had been given both responsibility and authority, the troops were habitually alert, properly dug in, weapons were clean, security was out and morale was up. In those battalions, companies and platoons in which the senior non-commissioned officers either were not present or had not been given responsibility and authority, troops tended to be more sluggish, bivouac areas were unkempt, defensive positions were either not dug or were not adequate, and security was lax. It is apparent at a moments notice whether or not the NCO system is working in a unit. Hereafter, First Sergeants and Sergeants Major will always accompany their units to the field. Commanders at all echelons will delegate to the non-commissioned officers the necessary authority to perform their duties and will hold the non-commissioned officers responsible for discharging those duties satisfactorily. Corrections will be made through the NCOs. Those NCOs who are performing well will be recommended immediately for promotion and those who do not measure up will be reported for reassignment or reduction.

2. Generally speaking, company size units are not placing security out at a sufficient distance to protect themselves against surprise, or even to locate nearby VC forces. Patrolling by company size units for their own defense is still not adequate. As a consequence, certain units have afforded the VC opportunity to deploy around them in strength, undetected, with grievous consequences to the units involved.

3. The nature of the war in Vietnam is conducive to the relaxation of appropriate security measures. All commanders, from squad up, must require patrolling, local security and digging in even though they know that 99 times out of 100, the VC may not attack or be in the vicinity. The individual soldier will not take these measures voluntarily and this is the great challenge to leadership inherent in the war in Vietnam. On the other hand, each soldier who is hospitalized or killed because of the laxness of his commander who may not have required him to take the necessary protective steps would have chosen in retrospect to have been forced to do so.

4. The vast majority of American fighting men are brave and tenacious in battle. They take care of their buddies and when pressed to the wall, will fight like tigers even after suffering multiple wounds. This fact was again demonstrated during the valiant fight by C Company,

Incl 5 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 1 Jan - 30 Apr 66.

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SUBJECT: Commanders Notes - #2

18 April 1966

2d Battalion, 16th Infantry north of Binh Gia. It is the responsibility and it must be the constant preoccupation of all commanders to see to it that these soldiers are given every conceivable advantage over the Viet Cong and that every military precaution is taken to avoid surprise and resulting casualties. Battalions and brigades must further improve their technique of calling in quickly and accurately the massive supporting fires available. The techniques for continuing these fires during medical evacuation must be developed with imagination and ingenuity. Battalion and brigade staffs, particularly S2s, S3s, S3's Air, and Air and Artillery Liaison officers, must not become preoccupied with the tactical play of infantry units so that they fail to perform their own decisively important functions of fire support.

5. Air mobile operations have often been nothing more than an air lift exercise rather than a carefully planned, well executed heliborne assault operation. Battalion commanders and company commanders have not been brought sufficiently into air mobile planning, but rather have too often been merely passengers on an administrative air movement. Hereafter, except in extreme emergencies, infantry commanders will be given one hour prior to a heliborne assault to coordinate with the air lift commander the details of an assault operation. Brigade commanders may coordinate, but will not cut the battalion level out of the planning or execution phase. For each operation, there will be an air lift commander who personally will coordinate down to battalion level. Flight leaders are not a substitute for the air lift commander.

/s/W E DePuy  
/t/W. E. DePUY  
Maj Gen, USA  
Commanding.

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WILLIAM L PONDER JR  
Major, Artillery

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Incl 7 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 30 Apr 66,  
Supply and Combat Service Support Activities.

1. Supply: The average strength supported during the reporting period was slightly under 20,000 troops. The supply levels for the division as of 30 April 1966 are as follows:

a. Class I.

TYPE RATION	DAYS OF SUPPLY	
	Objective	On Hand
(1) MCI		
(a) Forward Battalions and Separate Company	5	5
(b) DI AN Battalions and Separate Company	1	1
(c) Brigades and Division Arty	5	10 (avg)
(d) Division Reserve (S&T Bn)	5	3.0
(2) "B" Rations		
(a) Brigades and Div Arty	15*	11.8 (avg)
(b) At DI AN Bn and Separate Co	8	8
(c) Division Reserve	15	14.5

\*Revised since last report.

(3) "A" Rations 3 0\*\*

\*\*"A" Ration supplements are on hand for issue with "B" Rations.

b. Class III.

TYPE FUEL/COMMODITY	DAYS OF SUPPLY	
	Objective	On Hand
(1) At Base Areas		
(a) JP-4	5	10.1 (avg)
(b) AVGAS	5	12.6 (avg)
(c) MOGAS	5	3.1 (avg)
(d) Diesel	5	7.5 (avg)
(2) Division Reserve		
(a) JP-4	5	0.6 (avg)
(b) AVGAS	5	7.9
(c) MOGAS	5	2.8
(d) Diesel	5	2.8

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## Incl 7 Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Cont)

### (3) Package Lubes and Oils

Base Areas	15	15
Division Reserve	15	15

#### c. Class II & IV (less repair parts).

Since the last report was submitted a revised ASL has been recommended which accurately reflects the division's demands in Vietnam. This new ASL is presently estimated to be one-third filled. The establishment of a sound stock control operations will be functional by the end of the next quarter.

#### d. Class II & IV (repair parts and assemblies).

##### (1) Status of activity for the quarter.

<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>SHIPPED</u>
557.90 Tons	407.59 Tons

<u>Requisitions Received and Processed</u>	<u>Issued</u>	<u>Passed</u>
122,404	56,156	58,822

#### e. Critical Shortages.

(1) There were no critical shortages of Class I and III items.

(2) Class II & IV, (less repair parts). Items listed below are considered near critical shortages:

- (a) Helicopter slings and cargo nets.
- (b) M16 Plotting Boards.
- (c) 600 gallon air transportable water purification unit.
- (d) M2 Lensatic Compass.
- (e) Instrument lighting set, M42, for 81mm Mortar.
- (f) Tentage and Poles.
- (g) Batteries (BA58, EA1100, BB422/U).
- (h) POL handling equipment (such as: Miniport systems and fuel stand systems).
- (i) Tropical fatigues. (Boots are being received satisfactorily, but may become critical later on due to the upcoming rainy season.)
- (j) Water Purification Expendables, (i.e., ferric chloride, diatomaceous earth, pulverized limestone, activated charcoal and calcium hypochlorite).

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## Incl 7 Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)

(k) Meteorological expendables, particularly calcium hydride.

(l) Refrigeration, (approximately half of the mess halls have 65 foot reach-in refrigerators. A total of 15 each, 600 cubic foot coolers are on hand, and require cooling units).

(m) Underwear.

(n) Certain expendable and office supplies are short, but a great improvement has been shown since Support Command, SAIGON, opened its self-service supply center.

(o) Insignia, 1st Infantry Division shoulder patches and stripes.

### (3) Class V.

<u>DODAC</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
(a) D-627	60mm M1
(b) B-630	60mm Smoke WP
(c) G-940	Grenade, Hand Smoke, Green M18
(d) G-945	Grenade, Hand Smoke, Yellow M18
(e) G-950	Grenade, Hand Smoke, Red M18
(f) L-308	Signal, M1 Grenade, Green Star, para, Hand Held
(g) L-317	Yellow Star Cluster
(h) Crypto Equip DST	
(i) D-540	Charge Prop 155mm Green Bag
(j) D-541	Charge Prop 155mm White Bag
(k) D-544	Prop 155mm
(l) K-143	Mine, AP, M16A1
(m) L-495	Flare, Surface, Trip, M49

### f. Procurement.

The following items were procured during the reporting period

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>QUALITY</u>
Box Pallets	1000 each	Satisfactory
Plastic Water Cans	2000 each	Excellent

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## Incl 7 Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Cont)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>QUALITY</u>
Ice Potable	3200 blks	Satisfactory
Ice, Non-Potable	4000 blks	Satisfactory
Bread	30,000 loaves	Satisfactory

### g. Miscellaneous.

A variety of new equipment was received in the division during the reporting period. This included M16M Rifles (which were issued to all infantry battalions, and a quantity to the 1st Aviation Battalion, and D Troop, of the 4th Cav), Starlight Scopes, Miniport refueling systems, replacement M6M Bulldozers, and the new family of radios. In the area of salvage evacuation, a problem defining proper channels for evacuation of salvage items has been encountered. Establishment of these channels is being accomplished at the end of this quarter, and it is anticipated that prior to the close of the next reporting period that evacuation procedures will have been established and used.

## 2. Combat Service Support Activities:

### a. Medical Evacuation.

During the reporting period, the following numbers of personnel were treated by the 1st Medical Battalion:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>DISEASE</u>	<u>NON-BATTLE INJURY</u>	<u>INJURIES RESULT HOSTILE ACTION</u>
Admissions Direct	3043	1804	439	800
Admissions by Transfer	68	19	7	42
Disposition to Duty	1456	976	241	239
Disposition by Transfer	1559	793	202	564
Deaths	209	—	7	202

### b. Transportation.

(1) The following quantities of supplies and equipment were moved during the reporting period:

- (a) By Surface 62,181.38 short tons
- (b) By Air 5,974.94 short tons

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## Incl 7 Supply and Combat Service Support Activities (Con't)

(2) The use of rail transportation has steadily increased. The railhead at DI AN has been receiving approximately 22 railcars per week. These cars are normally loaded with approximately 50% Class I, and 50% Class II & LV. The turn around time for re-routng the railcars has improved through the efforts of the RWN Railroad. The RWN Railroad has also placed MHE and personnel to assist with off-loading of the railcars at DI AN.

(5) Extensive use of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft was made during the reporting period to effect resupply at base camp areas, and areas of combat operations. The CH-47 helicopters greatly assisted the division by delivering supplies and equipment to areas accessible only by helicopter. Maximum use of fixed wing aircraft was also made. Better use could have been made of CH-47 aircraft by external cargo rigging; however, this was not possible due to the lack of cargo slings and nets available for use.

(4) During the reporting period 22 supply convoys were made and three troop lifts were completed.

### c. Services.

#### (1) Maintenance.

(a) The deadline rate for generators within the division, during the reporting period, has been of constant concern. The high deadline rate has been the result of using tactical generators to provide power for base camp operations, operations conducted in unusual weather conditions, the lack of repair parts, and shortages of trained operators and maintenance personnel at all echelons. The Red Ball supply system has proved helpful in repair parts supply for generators. A team of Department of Army civilians from the U.S. Army Mobility Equipment Center has been working in the 701st Maintenance Battalion shops, to assist in removing generators from deadline.

(b) Repair of bulldozers, graders, cranes, shovels, scoop loaders, and air compressors has been held up due to lack of repair parts. The Red Ball Express has shown little, if any, effect on speeding up repair parts shipment on these items of equipment. The low density, coupled with a large number of items on deadline for long periods of time have hampered efforts to gain the demand experience needed to establish an effective ASL. Adding to this maintenance problem is the issue of items of different manufacture, without prescribed load lists of repair parts, or ASL's being issued concurrently, (i.e., the HD161 Bulldozer).

(c) Repair parts for the new family of radios, (AN/PRC-12 series), are in limited supply, but no serious problems have been encountered during the reporting period. An increase in demands has been noted, however, and further increases are expected with the increased use of the radios. Repair parts for Starlite Scopes are limited with very little repair capability being located within the division maintenance battalion. The 701st Maintenance Battalion is evacuating Starlite Scopes to CONUS until repair parts become available in-country.

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Incl 8 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div 30 Apr 66  
Statistical Analysis of 2820 Battle Casualties as of 30 April 1966

A statistical analysis of the 2820 battle casualties sustained as of 30 April 1966 by the 1st Infantry Division reveals the following:

a. The 2820 battle casualties were comprised of:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KFA</u>	<u>WFA</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>KFA</u>	<u>WFA</u>
Hq Co 1st Inf Div	1	2	1st Bn 28th Inf	35	180
1st Admin Co	1	7	Hq Co 2d Bde	0	6
Hq Co & Band Spt Comd	0	3	2d Bn 16th Inf	56	249
1st S & T Bn	0	12	1st Bn 18th Inf	23	150
701st Maint Bn	2	4	2d Bn 18th Inf	37	240
1st Med Bn	1	1	Hq Co 3d Bde	1	1
1st Avn Bn	5	3	2d Bn 2d Inf	84	316
1st MP Co	3	5	1st Bn 16th Inf	33	223
1st Sqdn 4th Cav	33	229	2d Bn 28th Inf	41	226
1st Engr Bn	10	82	Hq Btry Div Arty	0	13
121st Sig Bn	0	10	1st Bn 5th Arty	5	46
Hq Co 1st Bde	0	2	8th Bn 6th Arty	7	28
1st Bn 26th Inf	37	140	1st Bn 7th Arty	1	19
1st Bn 2d Inf	34	119	2d Bn 33d Arty	5	48
			<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>456</u>	<u>2364</u>

b. The following is a breakdown of battle casualties by hour:

<u>HOUR</u>	<u>CASUALTIES</u>	<u>KFA</u>	<u>WFA</u>	<u>HOUR</u>	<u>CASUALTIES</u>	<u>KFA</u>	<u>WFA</u>
0100	33	4	34	1300	193	31	162
0200	38	6	32	1400	200	73	157
0300	26	3	23	1500	212	18	194
0400	62	7	55	1600	144	17	127
0500	47	4	43	1700	171	25	146
0600	55	10	45	1800	255	53	202
0700	172	35	137	1900	120	17	103
0800	91	25	66	2000	32	4	28
0900	157	14	143	2100	73	11	62
1000	200	33	167	2200	55	5	50
1100	176	30	146	2300	73	4	69
1200	157	26	131	2400	13	1	12
				<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>2820</u>	<u>456</u>	<u>2364</u>

c. The five most critical days for battle casualties were:

- (1) Dec 5 - 159
- (2) Nov 12 - 134
- (3) Feb 24 - 129
- (4) Apr 11 - 125
- (5) Nov 20 - 66

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d. The most prevalent location of wound:

	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>% OF CAS</u>
(1)	Leg	44	757	801	28.4
(2)	Arm	15	521	536	19.0
(3)	Head	147	271	418	14.9
(4)	Chest	117	104	221	7.8
(5)	Back	22	155	177	6.3
(6)	Stomach	33	56	89	3.2
(7)	Other	78	500	578	20.5
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>2364</b>	<b>2820</b>	<b>100.0</b>

e. Source of wounds is broken down as follows:

	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>% OF CAS</u>
(1)	Mortar	107	730	837	29.7
(2)	Mines	108	547	655	23.3
(3)	Small Arms	170	433	603	21.4
(4)	Sniper	29	291	320	11.3
(5)	Booby Trap	13	239	252	8.9
(6)	Other	29	124	153	5.4
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>2364</b>	<b>2820</b>	<b>100.0</b>

f. Grade distribution of the battle casualties is:

	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>CAS</u>	<u>% OF AUTH</u>	<u>% OF CAS</u>		<u>AUTH</u>	<u>CAS</u>	<u>% OF AUTH</u>	<u>% OF CAS</u>
Lt Col	41	3	7.3	.1	E-3	162	14	7.7	.5
Maj	112	8	7.1	.3	E-7	357	59	16.5	2.0
Capt	338	39	11.5	1.4	E-6	1156	313	27.1	11.1
Lt	443	116	26.2	4.1	E-5	2788	492	17.6	17.4
WO	165	4	2.4	.1	E-4	4840	622	12.85	22.2
E-9	37	3	8.1	.1	E-3-1	4907	1147	23.4	40.7

g. The majority of the battle casualties were sustained by individuals possessing the following MOS:

<u>MOS</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>CAS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>% OF AUTH</u>	<u>% OF CAS</u>
11	Infantry and Armor	2210	6298	35.1	78.4
12	Combat Engineer	52	506	10.3	1.8
13	Artillery	108	1256	8.6	3.8
31	Communications	21	467	4.5	.7
91	Medical	90	611	14.7	3.2

h. A breakdown of the 2820 battle casualties by situation are as follows:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
(1) S & C	314	1522	1836
(2) Defense	52	290	342
(3) Convoy	37	244	281
(4) Patrol	25	108	133
(5) Base Area	3	98	101
(6) In Flight	9	31	40
(7) Admin Mvt	0	27	27
(8) Occupy Ambush Site	6	21	27
(9) Attack	5	19	24
(10) Other	5	4	9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>2364</b>	<b>2820</b>

i. The following is a breakout of non-battle casualties by month:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>FBK</u>	<u>MBK</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Oct	3	33	36
Nov	3	21	24
Dec	1	43	44
Jan	4	15	19
Feb	2	18	20
Mar	5	19	24
Apr	5	28	33

j. The following is a breakout of battle casualties by situation and source of wounds:

<u>SITUATION</u>	<u>MINES</u>	<u>SMALL ARMS</u>	<u>MORTAR</u>	<u>BOOBY TRAP</u>	<u>SNIPER</u>	<u>OTHER</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
S & C	395	435	546	207	175	70	1828
Defense	35	61	154	7	54	31	344
Convoy	147	36	51	28	17	2	281
Patrol	51	24	19	7	9	23	133
Base Area	7	10	55	2	18	9	101

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION  
OFFICE OF THE G-2  
APO U. S. FORCES 96345

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

NUMBER 19

16 February 1966

Attached as inclosure 1 are samples of VC tunnels, fortifications and camps.

FOR THE AC of S, G-2:

1 Incl  
as

/s/William M Mann Jr  
/t/WILLIAM M. MANN, JR  
MAJOR, GS  
OPNS O

DISTRIBUTION:	"RED"
AC os S, G-2	60
CO, 1st MI	1
CO, 11th RRU	1
CO, 23d Arty	1
CG, 173d Abn Bde	1
CO, 11th Avn Bn	1
CO, MACV CICV	1

"A TRUE COPY"

*William L Ponder Jr.*  
WILLIAM L PONDER JR  
Major, Artillery

## VC TUNNELS, FORTIFICATIONS, CAMPS

Information in this report has been compiled from reports submitted in accordance with letter, AVID-I, this headquarters. Subject: VC Tunnels, dated 8 November 1965.



















Fortifications, base camps, storage areas, and tunnel complexes usually form integrated systems. Size, configuration, and elaborateness vary according to the number of people using the complex, the importance and function of the complex, and the probability of having to defend the complex. Defensive systems usually have tunnels and trenches for escape and for shifting defense forces. Sleeping quarters and command posts are centrally located underground. A water supply, either a stream or well, is readily available. Frequently wells are dug in underground rooms or tunnels.

Entrances to underground systems are well camouflaged. Some systems have natural foliage embedded in concrete trap doors. Others use animal mounds or ant hills as entrances. In populated areas, entrances are frequently hidden under fire places, in charcoal kilns, in animal stalls and in storage huts.


Tunnels and underground systems are usually well ventilated. In large tunnels ventilation holes are often the shafts which were dug to help extract dirt during construction. Air shafts are quite often filled with bamboo and sticks and other material which forms a porous fill. This allows the air to pass while preventing the shaft to be used as an entrance.

Underground complexes have been found three, four and, in one case, 6 levels deep! One tunnel, over a mile long, was 4' x 4' throughout its entire length. Some underground chambers are large enough to hold 100 people comfortably with sufficient headroom for the average Vietnamese to stand.

LEGEND

1. TRENCH 
2. TUNNEL 
3. BUNKER 
4. UNDERGROUND SHELTER 
5. FOOD STORAGE 
6. BOOBY TRAP 
7. MINE 
8. PUNJI PIT 
9. WELL 
10. VEGETATION 
11. EXIT 
12. TRAP DOOR 
13. FOX HOLE 
14. MOUND 
15. THORN BUSHES 
16. VINE FENCE 
17. OBSERVATION/LISTENING POST 
18. BRIDGE 


TUNNEL AND BUNKER COMPLEX



NOT TO SCALE


TUNNEL SYSTEM

TOP VIEW




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PROFILE OF TUNNEL SYSTEM





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PROFILE OF A TUNNEL SYSTEM





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SAMPLE TUNNEL SYSTEM




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EXTRACTION SHAFTS




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
DUG IN SHELTER




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B. OP BUNDR - SIDE VIEW.




C. COMMAND BUNKER. SIDE VIEW




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SQUAD SIZE BASE CAMP




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SQUAD SIZE  
BASE CAMP




ALL TUNNELS ARE  
3'6" WIDE  
5' TO 6' DEEP


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
COMPANY SIZE  
BASF CAMP




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PORTIFIED VILLAGE



FIGHTING POSITION AS SEEN FROM ABOVE



EXAMPLE OF FORTIFIED VILLAGE

NOT TO SCALE

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HEADQUARTERS  
2D BATTALION, 28TH INFANTRY  
Lions of Cantigny  
APO U.S. Forces 96345

22 January 1966

**SUBJECT:** Tunnel, Trench & Emplacement Report

**TO:** Commanding Officer  
3d Infantry Brigade  
1st Infantry Division  
APO U.S. Forces 96345

## I. TRENCHES

The general configuration of all trenches were as follows:

Width:	1½ to 2 feet
Depth:	3½ to 4½ feet
Length:	From 100 meters to 6,000 meters
Configuration:	Trenches were dug with square edges; approximately every 20 to 30 feet there is a small hole dug into the side of the trenches that gave over-head cover. These holes were usually 3 feet deep by 2 feet in diameter. The amount of dirt between the top and the ground level was never less than 2½ feet.

**Bomb damages to trenches:**

One large bomb crater was observed directly in a trench line. The bomb crater caused damage to approximately 30 to 40 feet of the trench, causing only a slight inconvenience to anyone using the trench system. (See Imagery Interpretation Report dated 3 Jan 66 and 31 Dec 65 for more detailed information.)

**Locations:**

1. Trench system at coordinate XT614243 ran from northwest and southeast for an undetermined distance. At the above coordinates, the trench is approximately 6 feet inside of the woodland giving complete fields of fire over the open area at coordinate XT613242.
2. Trench system at coordinates XT621221, running generally east and west with no specific terrain feature being followed, however it must be considered that if this trench were occupied the fields of fire would include the large open area at XT620213 (Not shown on map).
3. Trench system, within 6 feet, on south side of road starting at coordinates XT635207 running northeast for an undetermined distance.

Incl 11 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 30 Apr 66

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SUBJECT: Tunnel, Trench & Emplacement Report (Cont'd)

22 Jan 66

4. Trench system running generally east and west for an undetermined distance at coordinates XT625215. This trench did not follow any specific terrain feature.
5. Trench system at coordinates XT567240 running generally northeast and southwest. This system did not appear to be following any specific terrain feature.
6. Trench line, coordinates XT659259 to XT661253, along a north-south road not shown on the map. There is an old trench on one side of the road and a new trench on the other side.
7. Trench line on both sides of a road at XT628197 running for an undetermined distance.

## II FOXHOLES

The general configuration of all foxholes were as follows:

Depth: Approximately  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to  $4\frac{1}{2}$  feet  
Width: Approximately 2 by 2 feet  
Configuration: The foxholes have a small overhead cover hole dug on the sides of each. These holes will afford at least 2 feet of dirt cover from the top of the hole to ground level.

### Locations:

All roads and paths were found to have foxholes at least every 30 meters. A total number and specific location would be impossible to give. Variations in the foxholes were such that some were camouflaged, some had small log and dirt tops covering part of the openings. A number of more elaborate positions were found at specific locations such as road junctions and the edges of clearings. The positions varied from "L" shaped, automatic weapon positions, to foxholes with overhead cover.

## III TUNNELS

The general configuration and construction of tunnels were as follows.

Location: XT62552230  
Physical Configuration: See Context of Dimensions  
Length: Unknown. The distance followed underground, approximately 300 to 400 meters.

### Entrance:

The entrance was 18 inches by 12 inches, covered with a plaster or concrete reinforced by wire. The entrance was within 1 1/2 feet of a tree. The entrance went straight down, to a depth of approximately 4 1/2 feet and then the tunnel started out to the north.

Incl 11 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div, 30 Apr 66

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SUBJECT: Tunnel, Trench & Emplacement Report (Cont'd)

22 Jul 66

## Dimensions of the Tunnel:

The interior dimensions of the tunnel varied from  $1\frac{1}{2}$  feet wide and 2 feet high to 2 feet wide and  $2\frac{1}{2}$  feet high. At one point the interior of the tunnel closed to a diameter of 12 inches. At this point there was a concrete plug (looked like an elongated tub stopper) with a steel handle attached. This stopper could have been pulled in after an individual, effectively blocking the passage of the tunnel.

The depth of the tunnel varied from 5 feet below the ground surface to approximately 10 feet below the surface. The change of level was accomplished in two different ways.

- (1) The tunnel came to a dead end with a trap door leading down approximately 4 feet to the continued tunnel.
- (2) By digging of the tunnel up or down in a gradual slope to change the level as much as 6 feet in a distance of 40 to 50 feet.

At all times while the tunnel was being checked, the air was fresh and adequate. The air resupply was accomplished by having periodic breather holes along the way. The breather holes were not obvious within or without of the tunnel. Apparently the tunnel was dug in segments, with an entrance/exit every one or two hundred feet to pull out dirt. The intermediate openings were then sealed with logs, dirt, and leaves making a porous but solid walls and exteriors.

The path that the tunnel followed varied from straight distances of 100 feet to "S" curves and 90 degree turns. An attempt was made to track the direction of the tunnel using a compass and estimated distance in each direction. This method was found to be too inaccurate because of the variations in distance estimates and inaccuracy of the hand held compass for such exacting azimuths.

A total of three (3) branch tunnels were found, however two (2) were checked and lead to dead ends. The third branch was not followed and therefore no information is available.

The tunnels located at XT630204 terminated after approximately 60 meters.

A tunnel living quarters was located at coordinate XT663264 to XT664251. There were over 100 underground living quarters within the coordinates indicated above. The general configuration was as follows:

Depth:	8 to 15 feet below the ground surface
Dimensions:	15 by 15 feet
Contents:	At least 200 pounds of rice, along with cooking utensils, was found in each living quarters. These underground living areas were located close to houses but offered more elaborate protection than that of the home shelters found previously.

Incl 11 to Operational Report on Lessons Learned, 1st Inf Div 30 Apr 66

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SUBJECT: Tunnel, Trench & Emplacement Report (Cont'd)


22 Jan 66

## IV BOMB DAMAGE TO TUNNELS

The tunnels found by the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry had no bomb damage. It can be concluded by the depth and hardness of the tunnel walls that an extremely close explosion would be needed to damage a tunnel to any degree.

/s/Kyle W. Bowie  
/t/KYLE W. BOWIE  
Lt. Colonel, Inf .  
Commanding

"A TRUE COPY"



WILLIAM L. PONDER JR  
Major, Artillery

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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

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