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AGO ltr 16 Jul 1976; AGO ltr 16 Jul 1976

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OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

AGDA-A (M) (5 Feb 71) FOR OT UT 71B007

16 February 1971

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**SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: COL W. F. Williams, CO,  
3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, Period 27 March 1970 to 2  
October 1970 (U)**

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.
2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Col W. F. Williams, subject as above.
3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.
4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report, should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General**

1 Incl  
as


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AVHDO-DO

15 JAN 1971


**SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - COL W. F. Williams**

**Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development**  
**Department of the Army**  
**Washington, D. C. 20310**

Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by Colonel W. F. Williams. The report covers the period 27 March 1970 to 2 October 1970, during which time Colonel Williams served as Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

**FOR THE COMMANDER:**

1 Incl  
as (trip)  
2 cy w/d HQ DA

  
Clark W. Stevens Jr.  
Cap of AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE, 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96371

AVBB-CO


25 September 1970

SUBJECT: Debriefing Report (RCS-CSPOR-74) (U)

Commanding General  
United States Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVHGC-DST  
APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) The highpoints of my tour as Commander of the "Go Devil" Brigade included a general decline of enemy activity, the Cambodian operations, an expansion of the Vietnamization effort, the redeployment of the Brigade and turnover of military effort in the Brigade's TAOI to GVN forces.
2. (U) The Brigade's mission has been threefold. First, to conduct offensive operations in the unpopulated regions in the TAOI, targeted against Main Force, Local Force, and NVA units and their logistical system. Secondly, to upgrade territorial forces to the point of assuming total responsibility for military security of the area. Finally, to plan and implement actions necessary to transfer those critical combat and combat support missions to GVN forces previously performed by US forces.
3. (U) This report is in three sections: the first section is a report following the prescribed format; the second is my personal evaluation of the combat readiness of the RF/PF forces in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces; and the third is my appraisal of the GVN effort in Long An, Hau Nghia and south-western Bien Hoa Provinces.

3 Incl  
1 - Section I  
2 - Section II  
3 - Section III

  
W. F. WILLIAMS  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

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**III. Section III - Appraisal of GVN Effort in Long An, Hau Nghia, and southwestern Bien Hoa Provinces**

**CONFIDENTIAL****DEBRIEFING REPORT (RCS-CRFOR-74) (U)**

<b>Country:</b>	<b>Republic of Vietnam</b>
<b>Debriefing Report by:</b>	<b>Colonel W.F. Williams</b>
<b>Duty Assignment:</b>	<b>Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division</b>
<b>Inclusive Dates:</b>	<b>27 March 1970 - 2 October 1970</b>
<b>Date of Report:</b>	<b>25 September 1970</b>

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**CONFIDENTIAL****I.(C) Section I - Report Following Prescribed Format to Senior Officer's Debriefing Report****1. (C) Insurgent****a. Organization**

(1) Communist organization in Long An Province is Sub-Regional in structure. National Highway 4, the major provincial line of communication, divides the Province into Sub-Region 2 and Sub-Region 3. Each Sub-Region has operational control of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) Main Force units.

(2) Hau Nghia Province is similar to Long An Province; that is, it is also Sub-Regional in structure. The portion of Hau Nghia that falls within 3d Brigade's AO is part of Sub-Region 2. Sub-Region 2 has operational control of North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong Main Force units.

(3) Communist organization in Nhon Trach District, Bien Hoa Province is also Sub-Regional in structure. Nhon Trach District is in Sub-Region 4, Military Region 7. Sub-Region 4 also has operational control of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Main Force units.

(4) Tab A shows those enemy units opposing Allied Forces in the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division's TAOI.

**b. Command and Control**

Ultimate control of Communist activities in Nhon Trach District, Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces, and all Vietnam rests with the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN). Sub-Regions 2, 3, and 4 are directly responsible to COSVN for the conduct of military affairs in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces and Nhon Trach District. However, the Current Affairs Committees of Long An, Hau Nghia, and Bien Hoa Provinces frequently exercises direct control over the Sub-Regions.

**c. Strategy and Tactics**

During the period 1 Jan 70 to 31 Aug 70, enemy combat forces in the Brigade's TAOI suffered substantial losses of men and equipment and have recently had to restrict their efforts primarily to economy of force operations. The operations include sapper attacks, stand off attacks by fire, ground attacks on isolated and poorly defended or lightly manned OVN outposts, and counter pacification activities. According to documents and PW's, the enemy had planned a big offensive during the Spring of 1970 which was to go on through the summer months. However, due to Allied cross border operations into the enemy's base and supply areas in Cambodia, the enemy was confronted with the task of protecting these areas and had to abandon many planned operations in Vietnam.

**d. Armament**

The individual weapon for the enemy soldier is the AK-47, predominantly of Chinese Communist manufacture. The K-54 pistol is the primary side arm for enemy officers. Heavy weapons for NVA and Main Force units consist of various combinations of RPG-2, RPG-7, RPD machine guns and 60mm or 82mm mortars. Support elements for NVA and Main Force units possess 107mm and 122mm Rockets, 57mm and 75mm Recoilless Rifles, and 82mm Mortars. At the present time these weapons are very

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limited in numbers. Local Force units and guerillas are armed with a combination of individual and heavy weapons. Individual weapons have included AK-47's, M-16's, CICO's, Enfields, M-1 Carbines, Springfields, and M-79 grenade launchers. Heavy weapons include some 60mm Mortars, and RPG-2 and RPG-7 Rocket Launchers.

### e. Logistics

(1) Enemy arms and supplies were brought into Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces primarily from the Parrot's Beak region of Cambodia. The recent cross border operations into Cambodia have greatly reduced the enemy's capability to resupply his men with food and equipment. Due to these operations the enemy is faced with the problem of re-establishing his base camp areas in Cambodia and depending on the local populace for his subsistence. Also, the enemy is forced to depend on existing small caches near the area of operations until his supply channels in Cambodia are once again functional. This situation forces the enemy to avoid contact and detection while awaiting resupply. In Nhon Trach District the enemy receives a major part of his supplies from SR-4. His food is usually bought from the local populace.

(2) The individual enemy soldier travels very light. He carries a small amount of rice with him and is given a small amount of money to supplement his meals from the local economy. The basic load of ammunition for the individual soldier appears to be approximately 120 rounds of AK-47 ammo. However, in many cases the soldier hides his weapon because he has no ammunition.

### f. Transportation

(1) The primary transportation route in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces is the Vam Co River which splits into the Vam Co Tay that runs west into IV MR and eventually into Cambodia, and the Vam Co Dong which flows through Hau Nghia and Tay Ninh Province. Highway 4 is the primary road which joins the Mekong Delta to Saigon. Along the northern border of the Brigade AO is Highway 1 which connects Tay Ninh with Saigon.

(2) Transportation in Nhon Trach District is restricted almost entirely to roads and waterways. There are two main roads in the District, LFL-25 and HL-319. HL-319 divides the center of the district and stretches in an east-west direction. Waterways abound in the southern portion of the district and in areas to the south of the district. Water travel is the primary means of movement in that area. The Nha Be, Long Tan, and Thi Vai Rivers are the primary water transportation routes.

### g. Communications

The enemy communications capability in an area is a function of Allied operations. If our operations allow free movement in an area, the enemy will utilize landline telephone. Due to extensive US and GVN activity in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces the enemy has been relying on low-powered radios, primarily the Chicom K-63 model. In light of the lack of wire discovered by Allied forces during the past year in our TAOI and the capturing of several K-63's it can be safely assumed that radio is the primary mode of enemy communications.

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### **h. Intelligence and Counterintelligence**

(1) Organized intelligence is conducted on the Sub-Regional level. SR-2, SR-3, and SR-4 have intelligence sections which have two primary functions: to conduct reconnaissance of a given area for possible military exploitation; and to intercept radio transmissions over Allied networks and exploit them by warning of impending air or ground operations.

(2) It is known that agents working for the enemy have penetrated US and GVN base camps and district headquarters. However, the extent of counterintelligence activities is not known. It appears to be used primarily as part of a warning system providing information that Allied operations will be conducted in specific areas and to describe the defense structure of friendly installations.

(3) Intelligence gathering at Sub-Region levels and below consist primarily of ground visual reconnaissance and the questioning of local inhabitants concerning locations of US and GVN forces.

#### **1. Enemy Units and Locations - Tab A**

#### **2. (C) Local Government Stability Actions**

##### **a. Forces - (See Appraisal of GVN Effort and Combat Readiness of RF/PF Forces)**

##### **b. Intelligence and Counterintelligence**

(1) Intelligence and counterintelligence organization at the GVN Province level approximately parallels that of the US at Brigade level. The Province has an intelligence staff headed by a field grade officer and a Military Intelligence Detachment responsible for providing interpreters to assist interrogation of both GVN and US prisoners and for document exploitation. The intelligence staff section maintains Order of Battle on enemy units and manages its own agent networks throughout the Province.

(2) Each Province has attempted to place personnel into various units and cells of the insurgent force. To date this capability is very limited and has produced no tangible results. However, it does show increased promise for future intelligence capabilities.

(3) Each Province is expanding its capability to obtain additional intelligence from the civil populace. As government protection increases, the civilian populace is providing more information concerning insurgent activities and units. The number of civilians loyal to GVN appears to be definitely on the increase and Provinces are actively attempting to recruit additional loyal informants.

(4) Intelligence communications throughout the Provinces are not secure except by personal contact. The GVN forces in the Provinces do not have secure radio capability either between units or with US units. Therefore, intelligence information is not disseminated to units in the field as completely or as rapidly as occurs with US intelligence.

(5) The Vietnamese Security Defense Program is not as extensive as that of the US. Sensitive security is practically nonexistent for units in the field.

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Internal defense measures continue to be a problem with isolated outposts in the Provinces. There seems to be a tendency to decrease alertness if the enemy has not been active for a period of time. There also appears to be a lack of intelligence updating for the isolated units; consequently, they tend to lose touch with the current strength and capability of the enemy.

## c. . Civic Action and its Effects

### (1) Role of Civic Action

Civic action has been part of the overall mission in support of the GVN Pacification and Development Plan.

### (2) Military Civic Action Projects (MILCAPS)

MILCAPS encompass the following: Construction guidance and distribution of construction materials, education efforts, corrective surgery, health and dental care, distribution of food and clothing and support of other GVN programs that entail civic action. These projects have been conducted in coordination with GVN forces to an increasing degree. Examples of such programs include:

(a) Integrated Civic Action Programs (ICAPS) and Night Civic Action Programs (NITECAPS), have been coordinated with the POLWAR Section Chief.

(b) Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAPS) are being coordinated by the Province Hospital in Long An and by the Public Health Advisor in Hau Nghia. Both of the above programs are working well.

(3) The Cambodian operation influenced the Civic Action Program in that much of the program had to be handled in a more severe combat environment. A large part of the effort included refugee control. During the period of the Cambodian conflict, the Brigade assisted over 1,000 Vietnamese refugees on their way from Cambodia to Vietnam. The Brigade also assisted in the resettlement of over 400 refugees within Long An Province.

### (4) Effect of Civic Action

Civic action and psychological operations have played a significant role in support of the GVN. The civic action effort has made the people more aware of the social and political system of South Vietnam. As a result, support of the Viet Cong has continued to erode as more and more people are influenced and helped by the US/GVN MILCAPS.

(5) The following is a summary of civic action activities for the period 1 April 1970 through 25 August 1970:

#### (a) MILCAP Operations

MEDCAPS	DENTCAPS	ICAPS	NITECAPS	PATIENTS
1,131	157	350	249	59,178

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(b) Various construction projects undertaken during the five month reporting period required the 3d Brigade to furnish raw materials. One hundred fifty bags of cement were used in the building of two schools and the repair of 15 more. During the reporting period 160 sheets of tin roofing and over 1775 board feet of lumber were used in bridge repair projects throughout the AO and in the construction of over 80 dwellings within the refugee village in Long An. Four thousand sand bags were used as weights for the light tin and aluminum roofing on schools. School repair required over 100 gallons of paint. Seven hundred bricks and 15,079 cubic meters of laterite were used in laying foundations for dwellings within the refugee village and other housing projects throughout Long An. One hundred and forty four carpentry and farming tool kits were distributed in our area of operations. The Rural Development Cadre were of considerable help in teaching the proper utilization of these kits.

(c) Commodities were distributed for use by schools, orphanages and other civic action projects in the following amounts:

Food	1,320 lbs .
Clothing	990 lbs
Health items	3,020 lbs

(d) Educational efforts were directed towards providing teachers for 60 periods of instruction to instruct 1,125 pupils in the rudiments of conversational English.

(e) The Brigade found through a survey of the district chiefs and educational advisors a need for various items of school equipment. Three blackboards were provided for Revolutionary Development cadre schools in Tan Tru District. Two hundred note pads, 100 reams of paper, 100 boxes of chalk, 10 cartons of pencils and 25 boxes of crayons were given to the educational advisor of the civil affairs platoon at Sector level for distribution.

(f) In addition to their normal complement of MEDCAPS and DENTCAPS, the 3d Brigade battalions provided special treatment for a variety of illnesses and disabilities. Three people were taken from a hamlet to Cho Ray Hospital in Saigon where I-rays were taken and treatment was initiated. Surgery was performed at Cho Ray Hospital to correct three hare lips. Two individuals received artificial limbs at the National Rehabilitation Center and the training required to use their new appendages effectively. One club-footed child was taught to walk at the same facility. All of these efforts aided in strengthening the people's belief in a concerned GVN.

### d. Political Action (Propaganda and Psychological Operations)

#### (1) Media Employed and Effectiveness

Propaganda efforts have taken the form of face-to-face communications, leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts from the air and ground in support of combat operations and the Long An and Hau Nghia Province Pacification and Development Program. Major stress was placed in rapid propaganda exploitation of enemy personnel and

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equipment losses and intelligence of a perishable nature.

(a) The effect of these psychological operations efforts has been to develop support for the GVN by convincing the civilian population that the GVN is responding to their needs. Conversely, the people's support of the Viet Cong has been significantly decreased.

(b) The effect of propaganda on the enemy has been to lower his fighting spirit to the point of causing him to defect or surrender in significant numbers. 3d Brigade propaganda efforts have created dissension between the Viet Cong and the NVA and between leaders and subordinates.

(c) Major themes employed in propaganda efforts have been Chieu Hoi, GVN Image, Redeployment, Surrender/Scare Hardships, Health, Sanitation and Pacification.

(d) One of the basic themes of Communist propaganda against the Chieu Hoi Program is that the Hoi Chanh will be mistreated to the extent of being beaten, tortured or even killed when he rallies. An effective technique in countering Communist propaganda efforts in this area has been returning of Hoi Chanh to their villages and hamlets to give first-hand accounts of their rallying experiences. By conducting periodic interviews in the local Chieu Hoi Centers, it is possible to select those individuals best able to make a favorable impression. When the Hoi Chanh knows and can identify families of other VC or sympathizers, the program is much more effective. The mere fact that the rallier is alive and well disputes the enemy's contentions. Ideally, the same Hoi Chanh should be returned periodically to demonstrate his continued good health and progress. MILCAP activities provide an excellent vehicle for unobtrusive integration of this PSYOP operation with routine military activity, thus minimizing the attention drawn to the returning Hoi Chanh as an individual. The fear of enemy retaliation against the Hoi Chanh's family is the most important factor to overcome. If the rallier refuses to make a personal appearance, tapes can be used; however, they remain far inferior to face-to-face contact. However, when targeted specifically against the enemy units scattered over large areas, tape broadcasts have proven successful. Hoi Chanh should be periodically and systematically interviewed by PSYOP personnel to secure exploitable material and selected Hoi Chanh should be returned to their hamlets to counter enemy propaganda themes. Cooperation with District level PSYOP personnel is necessary to insure the program takes advantage of the specific local situation.

(e) Hoi Chanh have revealed significant exploitable PSYOP information during follow-up interrogation which was not revealed in their initial interrogation interview. The fact that Hoi Chanh have withheld valuable PSYOP information during initial processing can be attributed to a combination of several factors. During these first hours of detainment the Hoi Chanh is very apprehensive. Fear often leads him to relate only what he expects will please his captors. He often hesitates to relate everyday information which may have no immediate

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value but is of extreme importance to the long range PSIOP effort. Later, when he has experienced good treatment, the individual will normally become more receptive to visitors and to the idea of returning to his local hamlet, even if it requires him to make a propaganda speech. Such interviews have resulted in names of VC and/or sympathizers and their known relatives. On subsequent visits to the Hoi Chanh's hamlet these relatives have been visited and encouraged to induce their family members to rally. Initial Hoi Chanh interviews should be followed by additional interviews within a month of rallying.

(f) During the reporting period, 423 Hoi Chanh returned to the GVN. Although the Brigade was credited with very few of this total, we were directly responsible for the basic decision of these Hoi Chanh to rally through military operations, psychological operations and civic action projects.

**Summary of Propaganda and Psychological Operations: 1 Apr 70 - 30 Aug 70**

LOUDSPEAKER			LEAFLETS		
MISSION	HOURS	TARGETS	NUMBER	TARGETS	QRs
AIR	78	805	6,100,550	493	239
GROUND	615	983	1,290,650	950	65

**(2) Techniques for Determining and Satisfying Grievances and/or Aspirations**

(a) In order to determine the needs and aspirations of the people, constant coordination has been maintained with local officials. This coordination is obtained by constant personal liaison with officials at both Province and District levels. Efforts have been made to strengthen local officials so they are more informed spokesmen for the people's needs and aspirations.

(b) When the particular needs of the people in an area are established, then efforts can be made to insure that civic action projects fulfill these needs.

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## 3. (C) US Military Forces

### a. General

During the period 27 March to 15 September, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division participated in operation Toan Thang IV, which was initiated on 1 Nov 69. The period has been characterized by sizeable expansion of the Brigade's TAOI and changes in task organization. As a result, the Brigade has operated in an expanded TAOI with fewer maneuver battalions, while simultaneously preparing for redeployment and inactivation. With the exception of the Brigade's operations in Cambodia in early May, enemy activity has remained at a low level with both Main Force and NVA units avoiding decisive engagement. During the months of March through September 1970, the Brigade accounted for 692 enemy killed, 49 prisoners of war, 16 Ho Chi Canhs, and 253 weapons captured or destroyed.

### b. Maneuver Battalions

There are four maneuver battalions organic to 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division: 2-47 Inf (M), 2-60 Inf, 5-60 Inf, and 6-31 Inf. Since 28 February, however there have never been more than three maneuver battalions under operational control of the Brigade. During the Cambodian operation, for 34 days, the Brigade's organic maneuver strength consisted of only one battalion and a Ranger company to cover all of Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces. A dispositional summary of the Brigade's organic maneuver battalions showing periods of OPCON to other units is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OPCON TO</u>	<u>DATES</u>
2-47 Inf (M)	Whon Trach District Chief	18 - 27 Apr
	1st Cav Div (AMGL)	27 Apr - 12 May
	25th Inf Div	12 May - 21 Jun
	USARV (For Inactivation)	15 Sep - 22 Sep
2-60 Inf	25th Inf Div	22 May - 22 Sep
	USARV (For Inactivation)	22 Sep - 12 Oct
5-60 Inf	25th Inf Div	2 May - 31 May
	1st Cav Div	1 Jun - 26 Jun
	25th Inf Div	2 - 21 Aug
	USARV (For Inactivation)	8 Sep - 12 Oct
6-31 Inf	25th Inf Div	28 Feb - 18 Apr, 1-4 May
	USARV (For Inactivation)	8 Sep - 12 Oct

\*Direct Support, with OPCON continuing to the Brigade.

### c. The Brigade Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI)

The TAOI assigned to the Brigade has been expanded from approximately two-thirds of Long An Province on 27 March to a peak of about 2400 square kilometers in three provinces by 25 July. On 4 May in the initial period of Cambodian operations, the Brigade's TAOI was expanded to include all of Hau Nghia Province south of Highway 1. On 22 June, Whon Trach District of Bien Hoa Province was added to

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the Brigade TAOI with the return of 2-47 Inf (M) to Brigade control. By 25 July the AO of 2-47 Inf (M) had been further expanded to include Mbon Trach and parts of Duc Tu and Long Thanh Districts.

d. The Cambodian Sanctuary Operation (Toan Thang 500)

The highlight of combat activity during the period came with a six day thrust into the "Parrot's Beak" region of eastern Cambodia in which the Brigade accounted for 159 enemy killed, 16 Hoi Chanh, 18 Prisoners of War, 126 individual weapons, 47 crew-served weapons, 28 tons of ammunition, and 4 tons of rice against US losses of 7 KIA and 29 WIA. The action was initiated on 7 May with the Brigade opening FSB Seminole at Ba Thu and conducting airmobile operations with 6-31 Inf in conjunction with 4 CIDG companies from Duc Hue and Tra Cu and 2 RF companies from Bao Trai. Two contacts on 7 May involving Companies A, B, and D of 6-31 Inf supported by USAF, C/2-4 Arty, and helicopter gunships from D/3-4 Cav and 145th Avn Bn resulted in 19 enemy killed and 14 captured without friendly losses. On 8 May, A, B, and D Companies of 6-31 Inf conducted an airmobile raid on the city of Chantrea and immediately encountered fierce resistance on every side of the city. Attempts by all three companies to enter the city were repulsed repeatedly until the afternoon of 9 May, when all effective enemy resistance ceased after 36 hours of continuous bombardment by artillery, gunships, and tactical air strikes. On the afternoon of 10 May, two additional battles flared involving Companies C and D of 6-31 Inf in separate 4-hour firefights. In one of the battles, Company D was pinned down in the village of Ph Thoat under heavy enemy small arms and mortar fire. After 24 hours of aerial bombardment by gunships and USAF tactical airstrikes, the town was taken by Companies A and D on the afternoon of 11 May. Action continued on the morning of 12 May for a brief period as Company A engaged an enemy platoon in an hour long firefight northwest of Ba Thu. All elements of the Brigade were withdrawn to Vietnam on the afternoon of 12 May leaving the enemy's base at Ba Thu a smoldering ruin and his units scattered and demoralized.

e. Types of Brigade Combat Operations

The principle types of operations conducted by the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division were the night ambush, the daylight airmobile, riverine ambush and patrol, and daylight ground reconnaissance. A variety of diverse ambush assets supported such operations to include air cushion vehicles (ACV), engineer assault rafts and boats, scout and tracker dogs, chemical sniffer and tactical CS flights, assault helicopters, gunships, tactical air, artillery, air cavalry, and Navy riverine craft. Approximately 65% of all Brigade operations were conducted at night. Training of Vietnamese territorial forces through combined operations has been an area of particular emphasis involving units from squad to company strength. Results of the program, particularly on airmobile operations, are gratifying in that GVN forces now airmobile regularly and with a high level of proficiency. While no innovations nor special tactical doctrine has been advanced by the Brigade to add to existent, well established tactical doctrine, a combination of widely diverse assets from mechanized, to airmobile, to riverine have been blended into a combination which capitalizes on the versatility of the separate infantry brigade to cover the largest possible operational area with a relatively small force.

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### f. Booby Traps

The single most successful enemy action against the Brigade has been the employment of booby traps. A variety of techniques are used by Brigade units to breach booby-trapped areas, although all are extremely time consuming and none are fully effective. Extensive artillery preparations, tactical air strikes, and paths blasted by Bangalore torpedoes have provided the most effective means of reducing small, well-defined minefields and booby-trapped areas. Such techniques have sharply reduced Brigade casualties and have denuded enemy base areas and cache sites of their protective screen. This has been an area of continuing concern. Methods of clearing booby-trapped areas must be developed which are practical and can be used by the infantry in Vietnam.

### g. Redeployment and Inactivation Process

On 1 July, the Brigade was alerted for redeployment and inactivation. Planning began immediately for an orderly, phased withdrawal. The number of combined operations with Vietnamese territorial forces was sharply increased to facilitate the assumption of a broader role by the Government of Vietnam forces in TAOI. Schedules for the standdown of units and turnover or elimination of bases were carefully prepared and implemented. The Brigade's standdown site at Di An was prepared and processing and turn in centers were established for personnel and equipment. On 1 September, 5-60 Inf began its standdown at Di An; followed by 6-31 Inf on 8 September; 2-47 Inf (M) on 15 September; and 2-60 Inf on 22 September. Supporting artillery batteries stood down concurrently with supported maneuver battalions and smaller support units were inactivated as requirements for their support ceased. Each of the flag bearing units is represented in a 100-man Honor Guard Detachment that returns to Fort Lewis on 12 October for inactivation. After completing 45 months of continuous combat in Vietnam, the colors of the proud "Old Reliables" are to be retired.

### h. Artillery Support

(1) From 27 March to 15 September the 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery continued its mission of direct support of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division in Long An, Hau Nghia, and Bien Hoa Provinces. The battalion operated with four organic firing batteries. At various times during this period the Brigade had support from the 5th Battalion, 8th Artillery and 1st Battalion, 27th Artillery. A statistical breakdown of the battalion is included as Tab B.

(2) On 27 March 1970, Battery D continued to support the 6th Battalion, 31 Infantry at FSB Gettysburg in the "Plain of Reeds" in which the howitzers were emplaced on "Paddy Platforms". FSB Gettysburg was closed on 26 May 1970.

(3) Battery C continued to support the 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry from FSB Chickamauga (Doan Ket) in the "Plain of Reeds". The location was astride known NVA infiltration routes from Ba Thu, Cambodia, into the southern portions of the III Corps Military Region. The howitzers were placed on "Paddy Platforms" because the majority of the area was inundated at high tides. The FSB at Doan Ket was kept open for twenty-five days and was closed on 21 March 1970.

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(4) From 1 April through 10 April the battalion participated in a Zapper Team operation. The Zapper Team was composed of two M42 Dusters from the 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery and two 155mm (SP) howitzers, one M577 Command Truck and one M548 Ammunition Carrier from the 1st Battalion, 27th Field Artillery. The team was organized in response to the need for medium artillery on specific targets. The concept was to move within direct fire range of known and suspected enemy locations and saturate the area. The intent was to destroy all bunkers and boobytraps in the area and clear the heavy nippa palm, thereby making the area accessible to ground troops. It was also intended to deny the enemy further use of these areas as base camps and hiding places. The Dusters were used to clear the woodline immediately forward of and flanking the firing position. During the ten days of the operation the Zapper Team worked in several areas in Rach Kien and Binh Phuoc Districts.

(5) From 1 May to 10 May 1970 Battery B supported the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry in its OPCON mission to the 1st Cav Div; from 10 May to 31 May 1970 Battery B supported the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry in its OPCON mission to the 25th Infantry Division.

(6) On 7 May 1970 Battery C at FSB Chamberlain airmobiled three howitzers to FSB Seminole (XT 275028) with an initial security force from the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry. Battery C supported operations of the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry in Cambodia until FSB Seminole was closed 12 May 1970.

(7) Battery A supported the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry in Cambodia in its OPCON mission to the 1st Air Cavalry Division at FSB Shakey (TU 210518) from 1 June 1970 to 26 June 1970.

(8) On 26 June Battery C airmobiled three howitzers from FSB Chamberlain to FSB Shiloh with initial security provided by the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry. Battery C supported operations of the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry and the Air Cushioned Vehicles until 29 June when FSB Shiloh was closed.

(9) On 7 July 1970 Battery B moved by land to Long Thanh District. Battery B supported the 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry throughout the Long Thanh and Nhon Trach Districts.

(10) Battery C placed three howitzers on river barges and used them to support operations up and down the Van Co Tay and Van Co Dong Rivers and the Industrial Canal from 8 July to 7 August 1970.

#### 1. Engineer Support

(1) The most significant program assigned to the organic Engineer Company was the Long An Secondary Road Program. This program, combined with joint conduct of combat operations has contributed significantly to Vietnamisation in Long An. The Long An Secondary Road Program was implemented in conjunction with activation of RF/PF forces which moved into the countryside as the road construction progressed. In Long An, a total of 190 Km of roads were constructed. Road construction for the 1970 dry season was complete when the Brigade incorporated Hau Nghia Province and Nhon Trach District into its TAOI.

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(2) The Brigade was able to commit a large portion of its organic engineer resources to the road program because of the unique terrain features of the AO. Because helicopters can be landed almost anywhere throughout the AO, it was possible to provide combat engineer support on a mission basis. The only exceptions to this occurred when a Brigade element was operating in Cambodia and in Nhon Trach District, where engineer platoons were collocated with battalion command posts. Normally one ready reaction squad was maintained at Tan An Airfield, with an engineer platoon readily available.

(3) Boat operations were introduced in early June. A boat platoon was organized consisting of an officer and an NCO, plus 15 EM. The boats were used in two principal ways: for insertions and for ambushes. In the insertion operations, the boats were used primarily as transport. In the boat ambushes, the boats were an integral part of the ambush, with the boat-mounted machine gun providing additional fire power. The latter operation was quite successful. The ambushes were normally conducted with an element of the Brigade's ranger company, plus the engineer gunner and pilot. On occasions the boats were used to respond to intelligence targets. The overall effect of boat operations was to increase the mobility of the Brigade, and to prevent access to better quality targets.

#### j. Signal Support

(1) Quality and reliability of all communications systems, VHF, FM radio, and switchboard service were emphasized during the reporting period. Systems were constantly re-engineered to provide maximum efficiency; relay sites were installed when required and a new signal complex was constructed to house signal facilities in order to upgrade the communications systems. The result of this command emphasis was readily recognizable, as operations personnel efficiently and effectively controlled the Brigade through a period when its assets were taxed to the utmost.

(2) In conjunction with the interest in communication systems, the command continued to emphasize the upgrading of Communication Security (COMSEC) within the Brigade until a high level of usage and quality was attained. The excellent response of brigade communications personnel in implementing the NESTOR Utilization Plan has decreased the enemy's communications intercept capabilities while enhancing the operation and capability of brigade radio nets.

(3) During the Cambodian operations the communications capabilities of the Brigade were taxed to the maximum. Extended Tactical Command Posts necessitated the installation of numerous retransmission sites. Due to the full commitment of communications assets, helicopter support was required almost daily to provide repair parts and maintenance personnel to keep the equipment operational. During the entire period, communications personnel throughout the Brigade performed in an exceptional and professional manner to maintain the vital mission essential communications links.

#### k. Training

(1) During the period continued emphasis was placed on replacement training, battalion training, and in-country specialized training. All battalion and specialized training ceased as the battalions commenced standdown for redeployment and subsequent inactivation.

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(2) Replacement training was conducted by "Go Devil Academy", the Brigade replacement facility, and consisted of five days of orientation and training in skills necessary to prepare the individual for combat. The training was oriented to delta operations and included such subjects as patrolling, booby traps, water safety and survival, river crossing techniques, and demolition training. Replacement training continued at "Go Devil Academy" until mid-July; by that time replacements to the Brigade were not in sufficient quantity to warrant maintaining a replacement training center.

(3) Battalion refresher training was conducted by all subordinate battalions of this command on a continuous basis. In addition to mandatory subjects, certain special interest subjects were taught. These subjects included airborne operations, night ambush techniques, communications security, and weapons familiarization, seroing and maintenance. On the return of all units from Cambodia in late June, each battalion conducted an intensive refresher training program. Weapons training, safety, and small unit leadership training were stressed. Training was also conducted to give practical experience to replacement personnel who had been trained in a non-combat MOS.

(4) Each month the Brigade received allocations to send selected individuals to schools for in-country specialized and advanced training. Much of the specialized training was conducted at Cu Chi by the 25th Infantry Division "Tropic Lightning Academy". These advanced courses included Advanced Combat Marksmanship (Sniper), Generator Operator, Generator Operator Supervisor, Mess Management, Explosives and Demolitions, Helicopter Load Preparation, and Combat Leadership. In addition, personnel were sent to the Southeast Asia Signal School at Long Binh for technical instruction on radar and signal communications, and for audio-visual courses. Qualified personnel also attended the 5th Special Forces RECONDO School at Nha Trang.

**1. Research and Development**

The Brigade Research and Development program was focused on items of the Expedite Non-Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment (ENSURE), Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), Land Warfare Laboratory (LWL), and Vietnam Laboratory Assistance Program Army (VLAPA) programs. Major projects included the Air Cushion Vehicle (ACV), the XM706 Commando Car, the XM4 Firing Platform and the Belly Armor Kit for the M113A1. On notification of the Brigade redeployment and inactivation, coordination was effected with USARV for disposition instructions for all R&D equipment. During the redeployment phase all equipment was turned in for subsequent retrograde action or in-country transfer.

**m. Logistics**

(1) Logistics support activities during the past six months were extremely widespread and varied. Numerous battalion moves prior to, during and after the Cambodian campaign necessitated many changes in support arrangements. Although this situation created a myriad of minor problems and coordination requirements, no major problems resulted and no unit went without the supplies vital to their mission.

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(2) During the period of March/April, the 6-31 Inf and 5-60 Inf phased out of two established minor bases, Cam Gims and Bach Kien, and transferred them to GVN forces. The 6-31 Inf moved to Hau Nghia on 15 March and became dependent upon the 25th Inf Div for logistical support less Class II and VII. Logistical support of their FSB Gettysburg required an average of 2 CH-47 resupply sorties daily. The 2-47 Inf (Mech) moved to Nhon Trach on 13 April and established a rear at Bearcat. Very shortly thereafter they moved to the 1st Cav Div and moved their trains to Tay Ninh. In order to insure adequate maintenance support a 15-man Maintenance Contact Team was placed in direct support of the battalion and moved with them. This proved to be a workable technique and was used successfully for subsequent unit operations.

(3) Throughout May and June the Brigade continued moving units to support the Cambodian campaign. Each of the Brigade battalions were involved. The 2-47 Inf (Mech) entered Cambodia with the 1st Cav Div and later operated with both the 1st and 2nd brigades of the 25th Infantry Division. Their trains supported them from Tay Ninh, Katum and Thien Nhon. The 5-60 Inf moved to FSB Jamie on 2 May and their trains subsequently moved to FSB Shakey's Hill in Cambodia, became OPCOM to the 1st Cav Div, and reestablished their trains at Song Be. On 26 June, they returned to the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Division. The 6-31 Inf continued to operate in the Parrot's Beak of Cambodia. To support those operations their supply pipeline was shifted from Ben Lac to FSB Chamberlain. All supplies were trucked to FSB Chamberlain and airlifted from there to FSB Seminole (just south of Ba Thu, Cambodia) in order to conserve aviation blade time, because of the critical shortage of CH-47 assets, it became necessary to resupply FSB Gettysburg by LCM-8 boats. Two boats from the 1099th Trans Co supported this operation during May. The 2-60 Inf moved from Tan Tru to FSB Hilltop, inside Cambodia, on 22 May, their trains were established at Katum.

(4) In July, the S4 and 30, 99th CSSpt Bn began concentrating their efforts on planning for the redeployment of the Brigade. The phasing out of units from base camps in Long An and Hau Nghia to the standdown location at Di An required careful detailed planning and extensive coordination to provide for continued support of all units. The equipment processing locations opened on 20 July and all units began turning in their excesses and unused MTOE equipment. On 28 July the Brigade Supply Officer moved to Di An to begin establishing that facility. The entire operation, to include preparation of facilities, provision of post, camp, and station property, messing, coordination of laundry and shower facilities, was undertaken and accomplished in an outstanding manner by the support battalion.

(5) Redeployment preparations continued during August and certain support elements were moved to Di An as that facility was expanded. The AG and Finance set up the personnel processing area while the Replacement Detachment on "Go Devil Academy" assumed the job of setting up areas for unit occupation. All units intensified their turn in of excess and unneeded equipment.

(6) On 1 September the first units began their standdown and equipment turn ins. No significant problems were encountered during redeployment activities.

**CONFIDENTIAL****n. Maintenance of Unit Strength**

(1) During the months of March through May a well-balanced rate of personnel turn-over was maintained. The effects of attrition were nullified by an excellent replacement program. Brigade strength averaged 104.9% for the period from 31 March to 31 May.

(2) From June through August strength of the Brigade began to decline steadily. During this period HQ USARV initiated plans to withdraw the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division from the Republic of Vietnam. As a result of this decision fewer replacements were allotted to the Brigade. By the end of July replacements stopped completely. By 31 August Brigade strength had fallen to 92.4% of authorized strength. On 1 September redeployment began.

(3) All units remained completely operational during the period of greatest loss. This was accomplished by timely and efficient reassignment within the Brigade. Another major factor which aided the Brigade at this time was the voluntary extension of tours by many key personnel.

**o. Organization**

The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division remained under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division until 22 September, when the last maneuver battalion commenced standdown. At that time operational control of the Brigade reverted to USARV. At the time of redeployment and standdown the following units were assigned to the Brigade:

HHC, 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division  
 2d Battalion, 47th Infantry (Mechanized)  
 2d Battalion, 60th Infantry (OPCON 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div)  
 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry  
 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry  
 2d Battalion, 4th Field Artillery  
 E Company, 75th Infantry (Ranger)  
 39th Cavalry Platoon (Air Cushion Vehicle)  
 45th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)  
 65th Infantry Platoon (Combat Tracker)  
 19th Military History Detachment  
 19th Public Information Detachment  
 39th Chemical Detachment  
 493d Military Intelligence Detachment  
 99th CS Support Battalion  
 56th Signal Company  
 571st Engineer Company  
 483d Military Police Platoon  
 276th Field Artillery Detachment


2 TABS

A - Enemy Unit Locations  
 B - Artillery Statistical Summary

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


TAB A

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Enemy Unit Locations  
 Hau Nghia Province  
 Scale: 1:250,000  
 Sheet No. MC-48-7

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TAB A

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**ARTILLERY STATISTICAL SUMMARY**  
**27 March 1970 to 31 August 1970**

**1. Targets**

<b>a. 2-4 FA: Bunkers and Military Structures Destroyed</b>	<b>40</b>
<b>Confirmed Body Count</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Secondary Explosions</b>	<b>236</b>
<b>b. 5-42 FA: Bunkers and Military Structures Destroyed</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Confirmed Body Count</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Secondary Explosions</b>	<b>52</b>

**2. Displacements to 31 August**

<b>BTRY</b>	<b>DATE</b>	<b># OF TUBES</b>	<b>DISPLACED TO</b>
<b>A</b>	<b>21 Apr</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Binh Phuoc</b>
	<b>29 Apr</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Ben Lac</b>
	<b>5 May</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Tan Tra</b>
	<b>1 Jun</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>FSB Shaky</b>
	<b>27 Jun</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>Binh Phuoc</b>
	<b>8 Jul</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Thu Thua</b>
	<b>4 Aug</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Binh Phuoc</b>
	<b>9 Aug</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>Tan An Airfield</b>
	<b>12 Aug</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>Tan An Airfield</b>
	<b>22 Aug</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>IS464650</b>
	<b>24 Aug</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Binh Phuoc</b>
	<b>27 Aug</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Tan An Airfield</b>
	<b>28 Aug</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>Binh Phuoc</b>
<b>B</b>	<b>19 Apr</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>Phuoc Lai</b>
	<b>1 May</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>Thien Ngoc</b>

TAB - B

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<b>DATE</b>	<b># OF TOURS</b>	<b>DISPLACED TO</b>
<b>B</b>		
1 Jun	6	Ca Chi
2 Jun	6	Binh Phuoc
27 Jun	6	Tan Tru
7 Jul	6	Long Thanh
13 Jul	3	FSB Julie
23 Aug	3	FSB Julie
<b>C</b>		
4 May	3	FSB Jackson
4 May	3	FSB Chamberlain
7 May	3	FSB Seminole
12 May	3	FSB Chamberlain
16 Jun	2	IT490003 and return to FSB Chamberlain
25 Jun	3	FSB Chamberlain
26 Jun	3	FSB Shiloh
29 Jun	3	FSB Chamberlain
7 Jul	3	Tan Tru
8 Jul	3	Bon Lee
9 Jul	3	IS557805 (Barges)
11 Jul	3	IS563651 (Barges)
12 Jul	3	FSB Chickamauga (Barges)
14 Jul	3	IS337845 (Barges)
24 Jul	3	Tan An (Barges)
25 Jul	3	Bon Lee (Barges)
27 Jul	3	IT411151 (Barges)

TAB - B (cont'd)

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BTX	DATE	# OF TURNS	DISPLACED TO
C	1 Aug	3	XB550006 (Barges)
	7 Aug	3	Tan Tru (Barges off loaded at Ban Luc)
	8 Aug	3	Ban Luc
	14 Aug	3	Tan Tru
	19 Aug	6	FSB Chamberlain
	25 Aug	3	XB569935 and return to FSB Chamberlain
	26 Aug	2	XB615455 then to Sugar Mill
	26 Aug	4	Sugar Mill
	28 Aug	6	FSB Chamberlain
	D	18 Apr	3
29 Apr		3	FSB Gettysburg
5 May		3	Ban Luc
25 Jun		3	Tan Tru
8 Jul		3	FSB Chamberlain
9 Jul		2	XB570936 and return to FSB Chamberlain
27 Jul		3	XB411151 and return to FSB Chamberlain
8 Aug		3	FSB Chamberlain
9 Aug		6	XB521049
14 Aug		3	Ban Luc
19 Aug	3	Ban Luc	

TAB - B (cont'd)

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## II.(C) Evaluation of RF/PF in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces

1. During my tenure as Commanding officer of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division there has been a marked increase in the overall proficiency and combat effectiveness of the RF/PF forces in Long An and Hau Nghia Province. Long An currently employs 54 RF Companies and 209 PF Platoons; Hau Nghia has 33 RF Companies and 77 PF Platoons. Advisor estimates indicate that about one-third are outstanding and compare favorably with most US units. Another one-third are considered satisfactory, but require additional training; and one-third are considered marginal combat ready.
2. By 28 February, Can Giouc and Can Duoc Districts were "Vietnamized" and virtually no US operations were subsequently conducted in these districts. No significant deterioration of the pacification and development status was noted within these districts. The military security posture of both districts has been encouraging and indicates GVN willingness and capability to continue improvement in security of the area.
3. To assist the Vietnamization in our TAOI the Brigade conducted daily combined operations with RF/PF forces. During the last six months approximately 25% of all Brigade operations have been in the combined mode. During the last six months 35% of Brigade airmobile assets were allocated to GVN forces. In March, April, and May a portion of these allocations were in the conduct of combined airmobile operations. In the last three months, because of their demonstrated proficiency, all have been turned over directly to province for sole-user operations.
4. In addition to the training received through combined ground and airmobile operations, GVN forces also received periodic training in specialized skills from the Brigade "Go Devil" Academy cadre, as well as from maneuver battalion personnel. Also, in both provinces, the RF/PF forces are continuing to conduct "in place" training under supervision of MAT advisors.
5. The conduct of combined operations, allocation of airmobile assets, and individual training have led to significant and tangible improvements. Long An territorial forces have mastered the airmobile method of operation; Hau Nghia has much work left to be done in this area. GVN forces have assumed a more aggressive posture and now conduct extended operations. RF/PF units now conduct platoon and smaller sized operations, a practice untested in this area until late in 1969.
6. An important, yet unknown, factor in the assessment of military stability in Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces is the continued availability of an ARVN Regiment in each of the two provinces. Operations by ARVN forces in Cambodia limit the capability of retaining one regiment in each of the two provinces.
7. I feel, the effect of our efforts have been greatest in Long An, where there has been a longstanding coordinated effort. The outstanding advances in Long An during the past year, and particularly within the last six months, can be attributed in large part to Colonel Tu, the Province Chief; he has enjoyed centralized control over all forces, to include ARVN, operating in the Province; he is a strong, forceful leader and is singularly responsible for most of the military successes. In contrast Hau Nghia is in essence controlled by the 25th

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ARVN Division Commander even to the extent of directing the employment of territorial forces. The relative ineffectiveness of the forces in Hau Nghia, when compared with those in Long An, may be due primarily to this command arrangement.

8. In summary, I feel that the territorial forces in both provinces have conducted increasingly more effective operations, both night and day, against all elements of the Communist forces. The increased effectiveness of these operations, the gradual decline in enemy strength in both military and VC infrastructure, the growth in RF/FF forces in both areas indicate that GVN forces will fair well in coming months, given that there will not be a major reinforcing effort by the VC/NVA.

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## III. (C) Section III - Appraisal of GVN Effort in TAOI

1. The following is my personal assessment of the current situation in the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division's area of operation. While this Brigade is generally more knowledgeable of the overall situation in Long An Province, we have in the last several months become increasingly aware of the state of affairs in Hau Nghia and southwestern Bien Hoa Province.

2. I have observed combined operations with all three regiments of the 25th ARVN Division. Across the board this force has demonstrated gains in professional maturity, aggressiveness and confidence, due in large measure to their successful Cambodian and cross border operations. Elements of the Division are aggressive in contacting the enemy in response to intelligence. In the past six months divisional units have shown increased proficiency in the conduct of night ambush patrols and airmobile operations. Each regiment has an established area of operations (AO) but, when air assets are available, conducts airmobile operations both within and outside these AOs. A typical example is the use of floating boundaries by the 50th Regiment to conduct extensive operations not only in western and southern Long An Province, but also in the IV Military Region. Greater improvements appear to have been achieved in Long An than in Hau Nghia. This is attributed to the dynamic leadership of Colonel Tu, Long An Province Chief, and the fact that he controls the operations of all GVN forces in Long An, including the 50th ARVN Regiment. ARVN Artillery units have progressed from a need for technical and logistical assistance to a present need for only logistical assistance; they can support combat operations, independent of US help; are able to move, shoot, and communicate quickly, accurately and effectively. GVN Ground Forces now display complete confidence in their own artillery support; six months ago these ground elements relied almost totally on US Artillery support. Although each province has its share of both outstanding and mediocre territorial forces, these forces generally show gains in combat effectiveness and in the ability to accomplish their assigned mission. Continuing progress is being made in those areas where Vietnamization has been completed, such as the eastern part of Long An Province in spite of US troop withdrawals. A typical progress indicator is reflected in the inability of this Brigade to get AO clearances when territorial forces have the same intelligence picture. Such AO denial by all types of GVN forces operating in Long An can be expected in all attempts to respond to a specific intelligence target. In Hau Nghia Province AO denial by ARVN commanders can not be anticipated in all cases and such disapproval by territorial forces occurs infrequently. In Nhom Trach District of Bien Hoa Province this degree of competence and aggressiveness on the part of territorial forces is just beginning to manifest itself. I have observed CIDG closely only during operations in Cambodia. From my point of view, CIDG operations there were the highlight of their operational life in this area (Hau Nghia). In Cambodia they worked in close coordination and cooperation with a major US unit which gave them a psychological uplift and greater drive. Their effectiveness in Vietnam operations continues to be marginal. Although they have a long way to go in training and operational experience, PSDF operations are beginning to show positive effectiveness and results. Satisfactory leadership is their key deficiency.

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3. Long An in the last four months has gone from 15 V hamlets to no V hamlets. Steady progress has been made in all areas toward economic development, political stability and security, notwithstanding a hamlet regression from time to time. GVN officials have become more cooperative and assertive in targeting on common objectives required to upgrade security, economic development and GVN control of hamlets and villages. Operations in Cambodia have made it possible for pacification and development efforts to move forward at a faster pace than anticipated several months ago.

4. By virtue of personnel selection procedures and individual training and experience, I feel that the quality of senior officers, majors and above, in the advisory role is uniformly of a high order. The quality of the advisory effort benefits accordingly. Company grade officers are mostly of a high quality and are motivated to accomplish the advisory mission. However, a critical shortcoming continues to be grade and branch substitutions to an excessive degree.

5. The most critical problem with respect to Vietnamization continues to be leadership, particularly at the district and province level. In this Brigade's TAOI, Colonel Tu is most outstanding among both military and civilian leaders. If I were allowed to make only one change in VN leadership in III MR, I would make Colonel Tu the CG, 25th ARVN Division. Administrative and logistical support of personnel, weapons, and equipment continues to plague GVN forces and will adversely impact on Vietnamization efforts. Hesitancy and unwillingness of ARVN and territorial forces continues to inhibit the achievement of unity of effort. This latter attitude is prevalent throughout the Brigade's Area of Interest, particularly in Hau Nghia. On withdrawal of US forces from Hau Nghia this may become a major obstacle to future success if not overcome by GVN officials.

6. Although some portion of the populace may remain indifferent toward any form of central government, I see interest in elections as evidence that the greatest percentage of the people are morally committed to a government of their own choosing in a free South Vietnam.

7. From the military point of view, I have felt that our key strength has been that of maintaining simple, long-term missions. To the accomplishment of these missions, organization and techniques of operations are then adjusted in accordance with the changing situation and nature of the war. In order of priority, I see our principal military mission as being: 1) support of pacification, 2) upgrading of GVN forces, and 3) elimination of enemy forces. Objectives and goals should be analyzed to insure that they will make a positive contribution to one or more of these missions and that their result will merit the resources that will be consumed. The nature of the war is vastly different from what it was 8-12 months ago. At this time I see the greatest long term benefit accruing to the elimination of VCI, como liaison and local force units, by the maintenance of heavy pressure day and night, by both US and territorial forces. I sense that we are relying too heavily on territorial forces to accomplish this mission in both Long An and Hau Nghia, particularly in the latter.

8. From the enemy's view, our Cambodian cross border operations were a total disaster in their short-term effect. The long-run effect will depend on the success of Vietnamization and the stability of the GVN. Specifically, throughout this Brigade's area of interest, the enemy is short of equipment, medicine, ammunition, and all supply items. He cannot mount a sustained highpoint war offensive. He is receiving few, if any, replacements. He has no safe areas to which he can return for medical treatment, convalescence, training or rest. The enemy must avoid contact and move in small size forces. GVN and US forces continue to maintain pressure day and night in further elimination of VC/NVA and VCI, plus gaining relative increases in Hoi Chanh. ARVN, operating on its own, is building confidence in its ability to operate alone. When ARVN forces return to Vietnam they will be able to, and will have the will, to protect their homeland in the absence of US forces.

9. In summary, I see giant strides having been made toward success of allied efforts in South Vietnam. Cross border operations in Cambodia, or our play in the enemy's backyard as General Abrams phrased it, "have made a monumental contribution".

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