

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD514723	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	unclassified
FROM:	confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO:	Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM:	Controlling DoD Organization: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Washington, DC 20310.,
AUTHORITY	
Adjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd 10 Sep 1975; Adjutant General's Office [Army] ltr dtd 10 Sep 1975	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA-A (M) (7 Apr 71) FOR OT UT 704176

15 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b. AR 525-15.
2. The information gained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl
as


VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals

US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Army Materiel Command

Commandants

US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Armor School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Field Artillery School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Institute for Military Assistance



**Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified inclosure.**

CONFIDENTIAL

AD514723

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army

Deputy Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Research and Development

Assistant Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Engineers

The Surgeon General

The Provost Marshal General

Commander In Chief, US Army, Europe

Commanding General, US Army, Alaska

Commander, US Army Forces Southern Command

Commandant of the Marine Corps

Defense Documentation Center

USAF Project RAND

Commanding Officers

US Army Limited War Laboratory

US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency

US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center

US Army Construction Engineering Research Laboratory

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

AVQB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn) for the period ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(4) Situation at the Beginning of the Period. The most significant contact during August occurred on 18 August, when a CSF operation from TIENT PHUOC raided a VC complex consisting of 27 structures approximately 17 kilometers Southwest of the camp. The contact, which resulted in 27 structures destroyed and seven VC killed, was believed to have involved an element of the 402nd VC Local Force Sapper Battalion. Enemy activity was at a low level throughout MR-2 during August as major elements of the R-3 Front remained out of contact. Intelligence continued to indicate that Special Forces camps within PLIKU Province had been targeted for an offensive to be conducted sometime during September. In addition to sporadic contacts around Camps DUC DO and PLEI ME, several caches were discovered within PLEI ME's TAOR, where the K-1 Battalion, 95th NVA Regiment, had been identified in contact. Additionally, intelligence indicated a southward movement of enemy units through Base Areas 702 & 701, as well as increased activity within Base Area 740. Enemy activity, which was light throughout MR-3 during the month of August, was centered along Highway 22, between TAY NINH City and the Cambodian border. Elements of the 95th NVA and 271st VC Regiments, 9th VC Division, as well as the 289th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, remained in western War Zone C, where they continued to direct activities against Allied operations. Intelligence continued to indicate that enemy units within sub-regions 1, 2, and 3 were continuing to experience difficulties in personnel replacements and resupply, thereby forcing them to downgrade a number of main force units to smaller guerrilla-type elements, as well as to disband and deactivate several units. Elsewhere in the MR, the enemy increased his infiltration attempts into KAU NGUYA Province, from the BA NGUYA Province, from the BA THU Base Area of Cambodia. With the exception of the period 29 to 31 August, during which hostilities were intensified, enemy activity in MR-4 during the month of August remained at a low level. By contrast, activity occurring in the 4th Special Tactical Zone maintained a constant low level. The enemy's brief period of increased attacks probably represented an attempt to disrupt the senatorial elections of 30 August. His efforts at the time were characterized by limited attacks-by-fire against lightly defended troop positions, provincial capitols, and district towns. Prior to this high point, the enemy was thought to have been primarily concerned with resupply activities, personnel recruitment, and the resecuring of his former Cambodian sanctuaries.

(5) Operations. The statistical data on operations conducted this quarter are shown in Inclosure 5. CIDG Camp Strike Forces (CSF) were engaged in squad, platoon and company size operations throughout their TAOR's to provide intelligence, hamper enemy movement, and to otherwise conduct offensive operations.

(6) Situation at the End of the Reporting Period. During October, the most significant contacts and intelligence activities involving Special Forces assets in MR 1 occurred within Camp THUONG DUC's TAOR. Attacks-by-fire plagued the camp during virtually the entire month, and four major contacts by Camp and Mobile Strike Force Operations resulted in 48 enemy killed. The only other significant contact in MR 1, an operation from Camp HONG SON killed 13 enemy. The contacts within THUONG DUC's TAOR were possibly with units of the 38th NVA Regiment, elements of which were reported to have been participating in the attacks-by-fire against

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVMP-C

SUMMARY: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(AFN) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RGS 00000-65 (02)

the camp. The attacks ceased during the last five days of the month, probably due to adverse weather conditions and the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy by CSF and MSF operations. October activity affecting Special Forces areas of interest within MR 2 was centered around Camp PLEI ME, where sporadic contacts with up to company-size enemy units occurred throughout the month. Late in October, the enemy initiated an offensive against military installations in southwestern PLAIKU Province, attacking USR Oasis, the Weight Davis engineer compound, and various ARVN and RF/PF positions. On 23 October, the K-394th NVA Artillery Battalion was identified in contact in the eastern portion of PLEI ME's TAOR. Intelligence continued to indicate an enemy buildup within Cambodia, north of Camp BU PRANG, and sporadic contacts occurred with unidentified enemy elements transporting supplies over a trail network in the northeastern portion of the area. Elsewhere within Special Forces areas of interest, activity remained at a low level. During October, enemy activity was at a low level throughout MR 3. There were no major enemy relocation except for the 17th NVA Regiment, 5th VC Division, which is believed to have redeployed north into Cambodia from an area eight kilometers southwest of Camp BU DOP. With the reported dispersal of the 1st NVA Regiment into small local force elements, there are presently no enemy units of regimental-size operating in the LONG AN Sub-Region. In TAY NINH province, a new sapper battalion, the 10th, was reportedly operating in Base Area 354 and north of TAY NINH City. Intelligence also indicated that the enemy has established a new infiltration route through central TAY NINH Province southward into Sub-Regions 1 and 5. Enemy activity in MR 4 remained at a low level during the month. The problem of personnel deficiencies was reported to be extensive among enemy units in northeastern MR 4. These shortages were said to have led to the disbanding of the 502nd VC Local Force Battalion in Base Area 470, as well as other enemy units in KINH HOA Province. Elsewhere, there was evidence of intended enemy movement from Cambodia into MR 4. Within Base Area 400, indications were received of troop movement by elements of the 1st NVA Regiment from NHI GIAI and NHI CAM to NHI COTO in the Seven Mountains region, possibly to avoid ARVN operations on the two northern mountains.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

b. (C) Intelligence

(1) Significant Section Activities

(a) Collection: During the reporting period the S2 Collection Branch approved a total of 23 revised Operational Plans and addenda. Thirteen Operational Plans were terminated. Further, a total of 297 coded informants were terminated and 15 prospective agents were coded. During the three month period a total of 1,633,763\$VN (\$13,845.45) from Cost Code 912 Funds was expended, resulting in the production of 2,598 intelligence reports (IRs). For the reporting period the cost per IR was \$5.33. Nine Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICRs) and four SICR management messages were processed. Also during the quarter the FY 71 2nd, 3rd, and 4th quarter budget estimates were reviewed and revised. The final stages of the termination of intelligence operations were completed at 16 Special Forces camps.

(b) Operations:

1 A previously produced special study portraying troop ethnic composition in each CIDG camp was up-dated in August, September and October. These revisions were of particular import in recording significant changes in troop strength brought about by the conversion of numerous CIDG camps.

2 During the reporting period 5th SF GP (Abn) Intelligence Bulletins 7-70 through 9-70 were prepared and disseminated to all subordinate elements. The bulletins contained information of a general intelligence value, such as enemy weapons, tactics, and possible courses of action. In addition, reviews of significant dates during applicable months were included in view of the fact that the enemy has on past occasions initiated offensive activity to coincide with and commemorate certain dates of political, religious or historical importance.

(c) Counterintelligence:

1 Counterintelligence (CI) inspection teams conducted two announced and seven unannounced CI inspections in addition to local records checks, personnel security interviews and subject interviews. Inspecting agents were requested by staff sections of Headquarters and subordinate elements of 5th SF GP (Abn) for assistance concerning security matters and aided in advising elements in the security of defense information during forthcoming camp conversion and phase-down of 5th SF GP (Abn). Agent personnel were also involved in the incident investigations which concerned the well being and safety of the personnel residing on SIOB.

2 The Security Administration Section in-processed 510 personnel during the period 13 July through 12 October 1970, and out-processed 949. Persons processed for Special Leave totaled 92. 154 background investigations and 12 national agency checks were initiated on personnel processing into 5th SF GP (Abn), while 92 persons were processed for cryptographic clearance.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)**

3 During the reporting period the polygraph section began organic support once again (on 14 September 1970). Since then the section has conducted 44 examinations concerning suspected Viet Cong activities and general security screening type examinations. In the first month of the resumption of the program, the examiner gave support to all four Military Regions.

4 The Special Operations Section increased the productivity of its intelligence nets through increased liaison and expansion of agents in the field. During the period July through October, twelve Viet Cong Infrastructure members and 22 Viet Cong were identified. Also, 27 raw information reports were disseminated to the intelligence community by 5th SF GP (Abn), 1st SF, Counterintelligence Branch.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(2) Military Region 1.

(a) In early August the estimated enemy troop strength in MR 1 was 56,500 personnel, of which 49,000 were combat troops. There were three confirmed enemy divisions, nine independent regiments, and 35 independent battalions held by Order of Battle to be operating within the MR. Although no troop strength figures were received during September or October, USARV Order of Battle, as of late October, carried three enemy divisions, 17 independent regiments, and 35 independent battalions as operating within or on the borders of MR 1.

(b) Enemy activity was generally at an extremely low level during August with little or no significant contacts reported from the majority of the CIDG camps. The most significant intelligence development was the indication that the 304th NVA Division, which had infiltrated into QUANG TRI Province during the months of June and July, had undergone a major reorganization prior to infiltration. PW's captured from the division's 9th and 66th NVA Regiments revealed that their units no longer maintained sapper companies which are normally subordinate to an infantry regiment. It is now believed that these sapper companies possibly formed the nucleus for the newly activated 29th Sapper Battalion. In QUANG NAM Province, elements of the 5th Mobile Strike Force (MSF) conducted operations in an area north of Camp THUONG DUC, where enemy activity remained at a low level and little significant intelligence was received. In QUANG TIN Province, on 14 August, a CSF operation from TIEN PHUOC discovered an unoccupied regimental-size complex six kilometers northeast of the camp. On 18 August, another camp operation from TIEN PHUOC raided a VC complex consisting of 27 structures, approximately 5 kilometers southwest of the camp, resulting in seven VC killed. On 25 August, following a contact with an estimated enemy platoon 15 kilometers south of TIEN PHUOC, a search of the contact area yielded a cache of equipment the type of which suggested the possibility that the site had been used as an ordnance facility. The contact, in which two VC were killed and four were captured, was believed to have involved an element of the 402d VC Local Force Sapper Battalion. In QUANG NGAI Province, information received from PW's, HOI CHANH's, and captured documents exposed indications of an impending offensive to be conducted by NVA, as well as VC Local and Main Force elements in the near future. A compilation of reports indicates that the enemy intended to complement his direct fire attacks against RF/PF outposts with indirect fire attacks against the more populated areas of QUANG NGAI City. During the month of September, enemy activity in MR 1 was generally at a low level with the exception of the AN HOA-THUONG DUC area. Enemy activity throughout the remainder of MR 1 consisted primarily of the movement of VC Local Force and Main Force elements toward the coastal lowlands. On 29 September at 1030 hours, Camp THUONG DUC and THUONG DUC District Headquarters received an indirect fire attack consisting of approximately 50 mortar, recoilless rifle and rocket rounds. Three civilians were killed, two were wounded, and one bunker was destroyed. During the weeks prior to the attack, several agent reports had indicated that elements of enemy units were deploying toward THUONG DUC. A HOI CHANH statement at THUONG DUC District Headquarters on 24 September revealed that the 38th NVA Regiment, VC Military Region 5, was in the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

area of the camp and would attack during the monsoon season. Further agent reports indicated particularly heavy enemy movement within four to five kilometers of the camp. In addition to the 38th NVA Regiment, the 577th NVA Rocket Battalion is believed to be involved at THUONG DUC. Present indications are that the attacks against the camp will continue during October, with the possibility of ground probes also being employed. Elsewhere in MR 1, Special Forces assets will probably continue to find enemy activity at a relatively low level. During the month of October, the most significant contacts and intelligence activities occurred within Camp THUONG DUC's TAOR. Continuing attacks-by-fire plagued the camp during virtually the entire month, and four major contacts by Camp and Mobile Strike Force operations resulted in 48 enemy killed. In the only other significant contact in MR 1, an operation from Camp NONG SON killed 13 enemy. The contacts within Camp THUONG DUC's TAOR were possibly with units of the 38th NVA Regiment, elements of which were reported to be participating in the attacks-by-fire on the camp. Information received from a PW who was captured on 15 October in THUONG DUC's TAOR revealed that the operational plan for the 38th Regiment is to maneuver the 490th Sapper Battalion and the 38th Regiment's 8th Battalion into an encirclement and attack of THUONG DUC during the 1970 monsoon season. Meanwhile, the 9th Battalion, 38th Regiment, is to fend off ARVN reinforcements with the aid of a 12.7mm antiaircraft machinegun company against Allied air support. The attacks-by-fire against Camp THUONG DUC ceased for the last five days of the month, probably due to adverse weather conditions and the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy by CSF and MSF operations. The lull is expected to continue as long as the adverse weather conditions prevail. Elsewhere in MR 1, there were no significant intelligence activities involving Special Forces assets.

(c) There were no new weapons or equipment introduced in MR 1 during the reporting period.

(d) By the end of the reporting period, all Special Forces "A" Detachment camps in MR 1 had been converted into the ARVN Ranger border surveillance system. Therefore, forecasts as to enemy activities involving Special Forces assets in MR 1 are not applicable.

(3) Military Region 2.

(a) In early August, the estimated enemy strength in MR 2 was 57,000 personnel, of which 39,900 were combat troops. During the reporting period, enemy initiated activity was centered in southwestern PLEIKU Province. Contacts occurred throughout the period within Camp PLEI ME's TAOR, and in late October the enemy initiated an offensive against military installations in that area. Elsewhere in MR 2, the enemy has been engaged primarily in supply procurement, as severe food and ammunition shortages have greatly hindered other activities during recent months. As of late October, estimated enemy strength was 57,000 personnel, of which 39,500 were combat troops.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(b) During the month of August, enemy activity ranged from a low to moderate level throughout MR 2. In KONTUM Province, enemy activity remained at a low level, with CSF operations reporting no significant contacts. However, intelligence received during the month continued to indicate that the enemy may be planning to conduct another major offensive in the DAK SEANG area prior to the end of the calendar year. Additionally, intelligence sources suggested the presence of a new NVA regiment west of DAK SEANG, which was reportedly equipped with armored vehicles and accompanied by Chinese advisors. An earlier report from the same area stated that a 1st NVA Regiment would coordinate with the 28th NVA Regiment to conduct offensive activity in the DAK SEANG area. Although the actual presence of such units remains unconfirmed, sensor activations indicated increased infiltration into the region during late July and early August. Activity increased slightly in Camp BEN HEI's TAOR during the month, as CSF operations sighted lights on several occasions and elements of the 4th MSF Battalion reported contacts with up to platoon-size enemy elements, as well as the discovery of several recently used bunker complexes. In PLEIKU Province, enemy activity continued at a moderate level as CSF operations from all four CIDG camps reported contacts up to company-size enemy units. Intelligence continued to suggest an upcoming offensive to be conducted within the province. However, resupply and transportation problems continued to hinder the enemy build-up, suggesting that the offensive might possibly be delayed. During late July, a PW captured nine kilometers northwest of Camp PLEI ME revealed that elements of the K-1 Battalion, 95B NVA Regiment, and the 631st NVA Artillery/Infantry Battalion were operating within PLEI ME's TAOR. On 8 August, an intelligence source reported that a 143d NVA Regiment with an estimated strength of 1,000 men was located 26 kilometers southwest of Camp PLEI MRONG, inside Base Area 702. Although Order of Battle does not carry a 143d NVA Regiment, other intelligence sources did indicate increased activity within the base area. Elsewhere in PLEIKU Province, an intelligence source reported that a 2d NVA Regiment, BKQ Division, was located five kilometers northeast of PLEI MRONG with the mission of attacking PLEIKU City during late August or early September. Although Order of Battle does not carry a 2d NVA Regiment in this area, other intelligence sources indicated that a battalion-size enemy unit was operating within the camp's TAOR. On 22 and 23 August, PW's captured 18 kilometers northwest of the camp revealed that the 1st Company, VC Region 5, was operating in the area. During late August, CSF operations from Camps DUC () and PLEI ME discovered a three-ton rice cache in the K-1 Battalion's normal area of operations. Throughout the month, enemy transportation elements travelling through PLEI ME's TAOR encountered CSF operations and other friendly units. An additional burden was placed on enemy resupply efforts by the requirements of enemy units operating deep inside Cambodia. PW's revealed that supplies were being carried from Base Area 702 to the BA KEV area of Cambodia. Enemy activity during the month was at a low level in the southern portion of MR 2. Intelligence received during the latter portion of the month suggested an increase in activity in Base Area 470. However, Order of Battle carried only elements of the 250th NVA Transportation Regiment as operating in the vicinity, and the actual presence of any new units remained unconfirmed. During September, enemy activity affecting

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. REF: USFOR 65 (R2)

Special Forces assets in MR 2 remained at a low level, with major units of the H-3 Front remaining out of contact. The only significant contacts in KONTUM Province occurred at Camp DAK PEK. On 12 September, the camp received three rounds of 60mm mortar fire and a ground probe by an estimated platoon-size enemy force. The camp received several other ground probes during the month, probably carried out by the 1st Company, K-10th NVA Battalion as well as two local force companies normally operating within DAK PEK's TAOR. Elsewhere in KONTUM Province, an intelligence source reported on 8 September that the 28th NVA Regiment was located 17 kilometers northeast of KONTUM City. During the following two weeks, elements of the 42nd NVA Regiment made numerous contacts approximately 15 kilometers north of the city. Order of Battle carries the 28th NVA Regiment in the Tri-Border region, although that unit has remained out of contact since the siege of DAK NGAN. In PLEIKU Province, intelligence continued to indicate that the enemy might initiate a large scale offensive against Special Forces border camps. Enemy activity in the province remained at a low level during the month, however. Sporadic contacts occurred within the TAORs of Camps PLEI ME and DUC CO, involving enemy units of up to company-size in the same general area where the F-1 Battalion, 95th NVA Regiment was identified in contact during late July. However, intelligence sources reported that the battalion had relocated to Cambodia, and it was later positively identified in that country during September. PW's captured on 10 September by K elements identified the H-15 Battalion as operating along Route 16 south of PLEIKU City. The PW's further stated that the unit would coordinate with the 108th VC Local Force Sapper Battalion to conduct operations west of Camp PLEI ME. Interrogation of a PW captured on 17 September, 12 kilometers northwest of Camp DUC CO, reported that the G-32 Local Force Company was operating in the area with the mission of Interdiction Highway 19 east of DUC CO. In addition, previously captured documents indicated that the G-31 Local Force Company was also in the same general vicinity. Elements of the 63rd ARVN Ranger Battalion made several contacts during late September approximately 100 kilometers northwest of the former Special Forces camp at PLEI HUNG, and intelligence indicated that the enemy unit involved was the C-2 Company, 1st Artillery Battalion. This unit is now functioning as a local force company under operational control of the 1st Artillery Group. Intelligence continued to indicate an enemy buildup within Base Area 702, and several sources reported that NVA units in that area were conducting operations within Cambodia. These units would reportedly return to South Vietnam in November, possibly to initiate an offensive in PLEIKU Province. Activity was at a low level in the southern portion of the MR, although intelligence indicated that the enemy was increasing his efforts to rebuild his supply caches within Base Area 700. Vehicle lights were observed within the TAORs of Camps NGAN HUNG and DUC CO, and intelligence sources reported up to regimental-size units within the DUC CO Base Area. Documents captured by Free World Forces on 23 September 50 kilometers east-northeast of DAK PEK, revealed that enemy local forces within DAK PEK Province were instructed to increase activity during the latter portion of September and during October. During October, enemy activity was at a moderate level within PLEIKU Province and around Camp DAK PEK in DUC Province, but remained at a low level elsewhere within Special Forces areas of interest. In

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RGS CDROR-65 (R2)

in PLAKU Province, major units of the enemy's B-3 front remained out of contact and continued resupply activities. Several contacts and incidents of anti-air fire were reported within Camp DAN KHANG's TAOR, possibly indicating elements of the 40th NVA Artillery Regiment were still present in the vicinity. Early in October, KONTUM City received eleven 122mm rocket rounds within seven days, and intelligence indicated that harassing attacks-by-fire would continue. Within PLAKU Province, activity was centered in Camp PLEI MEI TAOR, where our operations made frequent contacts with up to company-size enemy elements. Late in the month, the enemy initiated an offensive against military installations in the PLEI MEI area. Elements captured on 23 October by elements of the 47th ARVN Regiment revealed that elements of the K-39th NVA Artillery Battalion were operating within PLEI MEI's TAOR. On 30 and 31 October, attacks were conducted against Fire Support Base Oasis, Camp Wilson Davis, and ME Initial-Action in southwestern PLAKU Province. The large-scale sapper attack against FSB Oasis possibly indicates that the K-20th NVA Sapper Battalion has reinforced into PLAKU Province from Cambodia. The increased willingness to expend large quantities of ammunition indicated that the supply shortage which had hindered the enemy in this region had been alleviated. Intelligence sources had previously indicated that the enemy would return to PLAKU Province after the rainy season, and the identification of the K-39th NVA Artillery Battalion substantiates these reports. In the southern portion of ME 2, activity was centered approximately 13 kilometers north-northeast of Camp DAN KHANG, where the enemy has established a trail network extending from the Cambodian border into the interior of QUANG DUC Province. Captured rucksacks indicated that the enemy was transporting supplies from QUANG DUC Province into Base Area 740. The 251st NV Transportation Battalion was probably responsible for the contacts sustained by our operations in this vicinity. During November, the enemy is expected to continue resupply activities, while PLAKU Province may be the target of a limited offensive.

(c) No new enemy weapons or equipment were introduced into ME 2 during the reporting period.

(d) Recent intelligence has indicated a substantial enemy buildup in the vicinity of Base Area 740, with fighting positions prepared and supplies being transported into the region. Order of Battle presently carries only the 250th Transportation Regimental headquarters and the 251st Transportation Battalion in the vicinity. However, intelligence sources have reported that a substantial force is located in the area, with the intention of attacking Camp DAN KHANG at an undisclosed time. PLAKU Province is likely to be the center of enemy initiated activity in the near future, as enemy units previously operating within Cambodia have returned and are probably now in an offensive posture.

(5) Military Region 3.

(a) In early August, estimated enemy strength in MR 3 was 75,000 personnel, of which 33,000 were combat troops. Camp KONTUM received sporadic attacks-by-fire during the month, while an operation from Camp DAN KHANG engaged the enemy in the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

only major contact involving Special Forces assets. In September, enemy activity throughout the MR generally lessened, with the exception of a significant increase in Camp LOC NINH's TAOR. During October, the enemy continued to experience supply difficulties which resulted in a further decrease in his combat activities. By the end of October, enemy strength was estimated to be 74,000 personnel, of which 32,500 were combat troops. During August, the enemy in MR 3 operated with three confirmed divisions, eleven independent regiments, and 35 independent battalions. As of late October, the number of confirmed independent regiments had decreased to eight, while the number of independent battalions increased to 40.

(b) During August, enemy activity was light in both PHUOC LONG and BINH LONG Provinces. It was believed that the 5th VC Division Headquarters remained inside Cambodia, approximately 25 kilometers northwest of Camp BU DOP, while the division's 174th NVA Regiment was held to be located approximately eight kilometers southwest of BU DOP. Analysis of available intelligence indicated that the 5th Division had formed a new regiment, the 6th, composed of divisional cadre and newly infiltrated personnel. Although the 6th Regiment was carried as unlocated during the month, it was believed to be conducting training exercises inside Base Area 351. In TAY NINH Province, enemy activity for the second consecutive month was centered along Highway 22 in western War Zone C. On 1 August, a CSF operation from Camp TRANG SIT made contact with an estimated VC/NVA battalion in the vicinity of the TRAI BI Bridge, eleven kilometers southeast of Camp THIEN NGON. The contact, which resulted in 15 enemy killed, was probably with an element of the 271st VC Regiment, 9th VC Division. Intelligence indicated that the 209th NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division, and the 95C NVA Regiment, 9th VC Division, had remained north of THIEN NGON to conduct offensive activity against Allied operations in that area. Elsewhere, Camp KATUM received sporadic attacks-by-fire during August, and although the enemy unit responsible remained unidentified, it was believed to have been an element of the 96th NVA Artillery Regiment, 69th VC Artillery Command, which was located approximately ten kilometers northwest of the camp. In HAU NGHIA Province, enemy activity was again light, although intelligence reports indicated that the 269th VC Main Force and 128th VC Artillery Battalions, along with several unidentified units, began reinfiltrating into the province from the BA THU Base Area of Cambodia. Enemy units in Sub-Regions 1, 2 and 3 experienced severe difficulty in obtaining replacements and supplies throughout the month, forcing a number of elements to downgrade to local force companies. During September, enemy activity remained light in PHUOC LONG Province. The 174th NVA Regiment, 5th VC Division was believed to have remained in an area approximately eight kilometers southwest of Camp BU DOP, while the division's newly-formed 6th NVA Regiment was thought to be continuing its training activities within Base Area 351. The 5th Division headquarters remained out of contact in Cambodia, approximately 25 kilometers northwest of BU DOP. Enemy activity increased to a moderate level in BINH LONG Province, with Camp LOC NINH reporting numerous contacts with up to battalion-size enemy units in an area ten kilometers northeast of the camp. Numerous agent reports indicated that elements of two enemy regiments were located near LOC NINH, although the 275B Regiment, 5th VC Division was the only unit of that size identified in contact. Enemy activity in TAY NINH Province decreased from a moderate level in early September to a low level by the end of the month. The enemy in that province directed his efforts primarily at the interdiction of Highway 22. Elements of four enemy

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn.) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

regiments were believed to be involved along the highway at various times during the month. Although the 141st NVA Regiment, 7th NVA Division was not identified in the contacts, elements were reportedly involved in interdiction of rations for a six day period prior to redeployment back into Cambodia. The 7th NVA Division's 209th Regiment was believed to be located in the vicinity of KREK, Cambodia, while the 165th Regiment was thought to be located in the vicinity of MINOM, also in Cambodia. Elements of the 9th VC Division's 95C and 272nd Regiments were believed to have remained during September in an area west and south of the recently converted Special Forces camp at THIEN NGON, and reportedly retained the interdiction mission along Highway 22. The 9th Division headquarters was believed to be located west of Base Area 354, while its 272nd Regiment was thought to be in the vicinity of KOMPONG CHAM, Cambodia. In HAU NGHIA and LONG AN Provinces, enemy activity during the month was light, with only sporadic contacts and attacks-by-fire reported. Intelligence continued to indicate that many of the enemy units in the region were suffering from shortages of food, supplies and manpower. In an attempt to compensate for these shortages, VC Sub-Regions 2 and 3 reportedly combined to form the LONG AN Sub-Region. As part of this move, it was believed that several understrength enemy units were combined to bring their strength up to a reasonably combat effective level. During October, enemy activity was again light in PHUOC LONG and BINH LONG Provinces. The 6th NVA Regiment of the 5th VC Division remained out of contact, probably in Base Area 354. The 7th NVA Regiment, 5th VC Division, which was previously located in an area southwest of Camp BU DOP, was believed to have redeployed during the month deep into Cambodia. The 5th Division headquarters was believed to be located approximately 25 kilometers northwest of Camp BU DOP, while the division's 275th VC Regiment probably remained in an area approximately ten kilometers north east of Camp IOC NINH, BINH LONG Province. The D-368th VC Local Force Battalion was identified several times during the month, and at the end of the period was believed to be operating throughout the northern and central portions of BINH LONG Province. In TAY NINH Province, enemy activity varied from a light to a moderate level during October. Recently converted Camp KATUM reported a slight increase in enemy activity as compared to September, although no major incidents were reported with the exception of a 30-round attack-by-fire against a KATUM operation on 10 October. A PW as well as documents captured north of Tay Ninh City identified the 10th Sapper Battalion, Sapper High Command, which was the first positive identification of any such battalion operating within Tay Ninh Province. Intelligence indicated during October that the enemy has established a new infiltration route from Base Area 354 westward to HUI BA DEN, then south into VC Sub-Regions 1 and 5. The route was reportedly established in an effort to furnish enemy elements in those Sub-Regions with the men and supplies they are seriously lacking. During the coming month, enemy activity in MR 3 is expected to remain at its current level, with no major offensive incidents expected against Special Forces assets.

(c) No new enemy weapons or equipment were introduced into MR 3 during the reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(d) Enemy activity in MR 3 is expected to remain at a relatively low level during the coming period with no major enemy offensive activity expected near Camps BU DOP, TRANG SUP, and TONG LE CHON. Activity can be expected to consist of continued resupply missions and the re-establishment of former base areas.

(5) Military Region 4.

(a) In early August, enemy strength in MR 4 was estimated to have been 41,000 personnel, of which 33,600 were believed to have been combat troops. Although at the close of the previous period, the reinfiltration of troops was suspected, subsequent information tended to discredit the prospect of their return to MR 4 from Cambodia, despite the cessation of Allied cross-border operations. In view of the fact that recent intelligence has emphasized that the enemy is using guerrilla forces, in addition to main and local force units, to effect his anti-pacification policies, it is likely that the capabilities of larger units are being used inside Cambodia. Additional intelligence has suggested that units engaged in counteracting the government's pacification program have been somewhat debilitated by personnel losses, resulting from these activities. As a result, at the end of October, although the total enemy strength in MR 4 remained at approximately 41,000 men, the total number of combat troops was estimated to have been 32,700.

(b) With the exception of the period 29 - 31 August, during which hostilities were intensified, enemy activity during the month of August remained at a low level. By contrast, activity in the 4th Special Tactical Zone during the high point remained at a low level. The enemy's brief period of increased attacks probably represented an attempt to disrupt the senatorial elections of 30 August. His efforts were characterized by limited attacks-by-fire against lightly defended troop positions, provincial capitals, and district towns. Prior to this high point, the enemy was thought to have been primarily concerned with resupply activities, personnel recruitment, and troop movement. In the western portion of MR 4, reports had indicated the buildup of enemy troops on the western slopes of NUI GIAI. The reported movement of forces from NUI COTO, as well as the relocation to northwestern NUI GIAI of the 18B NVA Regimental Headquarters, suggested that that unit may have contributed the majority of forces to the troop concentration. Presently, elements of the 18B NVA Regiment are thought to have redeployed to NUI COTO, although, in addition to the reported movement of its 26 Battalion to an area 25 kilometers southeast of BA TIEN District Town, other information indicated that its 24 Battalion may have relocated to the Three Sisters region. During the month, there were two incidents in the Seven Mountains area involving 120mm mortars. Despite the reported destruction of two of these weapons, the subsequent impacting of a 120mm round at Camp BA XOI indicated that the enemy's capabilities may have been significantly increased in Base Area 400. In the northwestern portion of MR 4, reports reemphasized the possibility that the 295th VC Main Force Battalion was operating in central Base Area 704, in conjunction with local guerrilla units. Several reports also indicated that an estimated 200-man company of recruits was being trained in this region. Information suggested that units in the area were

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

ordered in early August to prepare for an offensive, possibly against selected targets in HONG NGU District, against which activities were reported to have been previously targeted. Elsewhere in MR 4, elements of the 504th VC Local Force Battalion, in conjunction with other guerrilla forces, were reportedly located in the Horseshoe area with the mission of harassing Navy PBR's patrolling the region, probably in an effort to keep the waterways open for resupply activities. In addition to the enemy's interest in the movement of troops and supplies into MR 4, evidence also revealed that he may have been interested in resecuring former Cambodian sanctuaries. The emphasis on such efforts may have resulted in the reported deployment of a Forward Command element of the enemy's Military Region II to the southwestern portion of Base Area 470. Allegedly, the Forward Command Post was given direct control over the 88th NVA Regiment, the DT1 and DT2 VC Main Force Regiments, and five provincial guerrilla units. It is possible that this delegation of authority was intended to permit the regional headquarters to devote more of its attention to Cambodian affairs. During September enemy activity consisted primarily of light attacks-by-fire against military outposts and troop installations, as well as taxation efforts, troop movements, and resupply operations. The level of activity remained relatively low throughout the month with the exception of limited highpoints on 23 and 28 September. Except for the deployment westward of an element of the 18B NVA Regiment to a position approximately 25 kilometers southeast of HA TIEN District Town, the disposition of major units in MR 4 remained relatively unchanged during the period. Within the Seven Mountains area where the remainder of the regiment was carried, ARVN forces on NUI CAM discovered a cache and contacted an unidentified enemy unit on 20 and 21 September, respectively. According to agent reports and captured documents, the enemy reverted to the use of primarily guerrilla tactics in his effort to counteract the GVN pacification program. Intelligence pertaining to directives allegedly levied on VC committees in districts adjacent to Base Area 704 indicated that COSVN had ordered guerrilla forces to consolidate their capabilities and cooperate with the VC infrastructure, particularly in regard to taxation activities. Elsewhere, a three-phased plan was said to have been initiated to combat the pacification program, to include propagandizing against the GVN, infiltrating People's Self Defense Force and Popular Force outposts, and employing main force tactics against the government's installations. The recipient of the orders, the VC BEN TRE Provincial Committee, was also reported to have been assigned the task of creating a new unit, the 516C VC Local Force Battalion. The battalion was reportedly to have been used--along with COSVN reinforcements--in an offensive scheduled for the end of October. Other information from the period may have disclosed influences affecting the enemy's renewed interest in primary tactics. Whereas various information referred to shortages of weapons and ammunition among enemy forces, a report from KIEN TUONG Province disclosed that ammunition and equipment had been confiscated from guerrilla forces and shipped to the SONG TRANG Region for distribution to units inside Cambodia. Other indications suggested that morale may have been low among enemy personnel, requiring the addition of NVA troops to several units and the movement elsewhere of men whose homes were near a unit's area

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn.)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

of operations, in order to deter desertions. The only section of MR 4 which appeared to have been less affected by shortages was the Seven Mountains region. During the month, several reports suggested that the enemy had deposited supplies in the NHA BANG Region and that a substantial enemy force may have gathered in Cambodia along the border of western CHAM PAO Province, with the intention of deploying either into Base Area 400 or into the U-MINH Forest. During the month of October, enemy activity in MR 4 remained at a low level, with an average of 2.6 incidents per day throughout the region. However, the majority of these incidents occurred in VC MR 3, and not within VC MR 2, which had a daily average of only 2.2 incidents within the three provinces of the 44th Special Tactical Zone. Enemy activity was characterized predominantly by anti-pacification attacks by force against outposts in the provinces of KIEN HOA, DINH TUONG and VINH BINH. According to a rallier, the enemy had almost completed the second of three phases of a plan outlined in COSVN Resolution 20, to defeat the GVN pacification program and instigate a country-wide uprising. However, in contrast to this report, other information suggested that recent hostilities may have been costly to the enemy. As a result of losses allegedly suffered in KIEN HOA Province, the enemy was said to have shifted the focal point, from which the projected uprising would spread, from there to DINH TUONG Province. In addition, the problem of personnel deficiencies was reported to have been extensive among units in northeastern MR 4. These deficiencies were said to have led to distributing personnel among district level forces and disbanding the 502d VC Local Force Battalion, located in northwestern Base Area 400, and units in KIEN HOA Province. Elsewhere, there was evidence of intended enemy movement from Cambodia into MR 4. Early in the month, a substantial enemy force was reported to have gathered along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border northeast of HA TIEN District Town, western VIEN GIANG Province, with plans to deploy to the U-MINH Forest. Later, on 27 October, there was a CSF contact, approximately 25 kilometers west of Camp VINH GIA, with an estimated two platoons, which may have been an element of the previously reported enemy force. Nearby, within Base Area 400, there were indications of troop movements by elements of the 153 GVN Regiment from NUI GIAI and NUI CAM to NUI COTO, possibly to avoid GVN operations on the two northern mountains. During the period, in addition to alleged resupply operations from the TRAM Forest to Base Area 400, several reports claimed that supplies had been moved to NUI TA BAC, in the north-central portion, of which there was a CSF contact with an estimated 50 enemy personnel on 13 October.

(c) There were no new weapons or equipment introduced in MR 4 during the reporting period.

(d) Although it is possible that the enemy will substantially increase his activity during the coming period, in accordance with his alleged plans to stage a general uprising in the near future, it is more likely that personnel deficiencies and ammunition shortages will preclude a significant rise in the level of hostilities. As a result of these shortages, the enemy units in northeastern MR 4 are reported to have been forced either to compensate for their shortages by purchasing ammunition through penetration agents or to disband and distribute their personnel among local guerrilla forces. Elsewhere in MR 4, a significant increase in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

activity may occur, when the deployment of an allegedly sizeable enemy force to the U-MINH Forest is completed. However, pending the arrival of these troops and others, which may be moving to other areas within the military region, it is unlikely that hostilities will be escalated beyond their current low level in L. 4.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVG. 3

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the period ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

c. (C) Operations.

(1) Military Region 1 (Co C)

During the reporting period, Company C assets conducted a total of 1880 operations which resulted in 233 enemy killed, 33 captured and 53 weapons captured.

(a) On 7 Aug, at 1130 hrs, 15 kms SW of TIEN PHUOC, a company sized CSF operation from the Camp initiated contact with a VC Base Camp. Seven VC were killed, four VC, three AK-47s, one M-79 and miscellaneous documents were captured.

(b) On 19 Sep, 10 kms NE of Camp BA TO, a company sized CSF operation from Camp initiated contact with six VC. Enemy broke contact withdrew W. Res: three VC KIA and two AK-47s CIA.

(c) On 18 Oct at 1140 hours, three kms S of Camp THUONG DUC, two companies from the 1st MSF and one company from Camp were fired on by an estimated VC/NVA company. Enemy broke contact S. Twenty VC/NVA were killed, one 75mm RR, one B-40 Rocket Launcher and one Chicom radio were captured. One LLDB and one MSF member were killed and six CSF were wounded.

(d) On 22 Oct at 0518 hours, three kms SE of Camp THUONG DUC, two Cos from the 1st MSF and one company of CSF from Camp were attacked in their night location by an estimated VC/NVA company. Enemy broke contact and withdrew SE. 20 VC/NVA were killed, four AK-47s and one B-40 RL were captured. Five CSF were killed, 13 CSF and three MSF were wounded. Two M-16s, one M-79 and miscellaneous web-gear were lost.

(2) Military Region 2 (Co B)

During the reporting period, Company B assets conducted a total of 5,117 operations which resulted in 35 enemy killed, 17 enemy captured and 24 weapons captured.

(a) On 23 August at 1200 hrs, a platoon size CSF operation from Camp PLEI ME, PLEIKU Province, initiated contact with five VC seven kms NW of Camp. Res: One VC KIA, three VC CIA, one M-1 Carbine, 2,000 lbs rice CIA.

(b) On 15 Sep, an ambush from a company CSF operation from Camp BU PRANG, QUANG DUC Province, ambushed four VC/NVA 14 kmw NE of Camp. Res: Four VC/NVA KIA, two AK-47s, and four rucksacks full of corn CIA.

(c) On 14 Oct, a platoon CSF operation from Camp BU PRANG, QUANG DUC Province, initiated contact with an NVA platoon 13 kms NNE of the camp. Res: Seven NVA KIA, four AK-47s, CIA.

(3) Military Region 3 (Co A)

During the reporting period, Company A assets conducted a total of 2,335 operations which resulted in 51 enemy killed and 12 weapons captured.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the period ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(a) On 1 Aug, a CSF company operation from Camp TRANG SUP, TAY NINH Province, made contact with an estimated enemy Bn, 11 kms SE of Camp THIEN NHON. Results: 15 enemy killed, five AK-47s, one B-40 RL, seven Bangalore torpedoes, 36 Chicom grenades, one 122mm rocket and other assorted equipment and ammunition captured in action. Six CSF WIA.

(b) On 10 Sep, a CSF company from Camp LOC NINH, BINH LONG Province, initiated contact with an estimated three enemy companies seven kms NE of Camp. Res: 10 VC KIA. One CIDG WIA.

(c) On 10 Oct, a CSF company from Camp KATUM, TAY NINH Province, received 30 rounds of 60mm mortar and small arms fire in their RON position 13 kms NE of Camp. Res: One CIDG KIA.

(4) Military Region 4 (Co D)

During the reporting period, Company D assets conducted a total of 3,321 operations which resulted in 55 enemy killed, one enemy captured, and 26 weapons captured.

(a) In Aug, there were no significant contacts or incidents reported. Those skirmishes that did occur were sporadic and of short duration. Contacts and incidents dropped to an all time low. Camps TO CHAU and THANH TRI converted to ARVN Ranger at the end of the month.

(b) In September, minor contacts and incidents increased, but none were of great significance. The major contacts occurred on the water ways and were initiated against the airboat sections. Camps TUYEN NHON and CAI CAI converted to ARVN Ranger at the end of September.

(c) During October, contacts and incidents continued to increase. The most significant contact was made by Camp VINH GIA in an operation across the border approximately 26 kms W of the camp. Though the number of operations and contacts doesn't compare to the previous quarters results, by the end of October Co D had six fewer camps than in the previous quarter. Camps THUONG THOI and PHU THANH THON converted to ARVN Ranger at the end of October.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for Period Ending 31 October 1970. (S OAFOR 65 12)

d. (C) Plans and Organization

(1) CIDG Camp Conversion to ARVN Ranger

(a) On 26 Jun 70, 5th SF Gp (Abn) received a message granting authorization to publish a plan for the phaseout of the CIDG program and the phasedown of USASF. This was to be accomplished during the period 1 Jun 70 to 31 Mar 71. On 30 Jun 70, OPRD 3-70 (CCCIDG) the conversion of the CIDG to ARVN Ranger and subsequent phasedown of USASF was published. This order authorized and directed the phasedown of CIDG by requiring conversion of 38 "A" camps to ARVN Ranger during the period 1 Jun 70 to 31 Dec 70. Under this plan USASF strength in support of the CIDG program is to be reduced to zero by 31 Mar 71.

(b) Listed below are the camps that converted during Aug, Sep, and Oct 70.

NR	CAMP	CONV DAY	RANGER STRENGTH 31 DEC	ASSIGNED CONV DAY	REMOVED CONV DAY
1	Ha Thanh	31 Aug	455	457	415
1	Tra Bong	31 Aug	455	512	486
2	Polei Kleng	31 Aug	455	403	403
2	Plei Krong	31 Aug	455	443	443
3	Tra Cu	31 Aug	455	402	374
3	Ben Soi	31 Aug	455	431	386
4	To Chau	31 Aug	455	379	379
4	Thanh Tri	31 Aug	455	334	315
TOTAL PHASE 1					3,161
1	Mai Loc	Closed Aug			
1	Hinh Long	30 Sep	455	500	386
1	Ba To	30 Sep	455	510	400
1	Gia Vuc	30 Sep	455	460	460
2	Tieu Atar	30 Sep	455	414	414
2	Trang Phuoc	30 Sep	455	399	399
3	Thien Ngan	30 Sep	455	375	333
3	Loc Minh	30 Sep	455	371	358
4	Tuyen Nhon	30 Sep	455	302	300
4	Cai Cai	30 Sep	455	398	398
TOTAL PHASE 2					3,448

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVOB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-05 (R2)

MR	CAMP	CONV DAY	RANGER AUTH BY TOR	ASSIGNED CONV DAY	RECRUITED/ CONVERTED
1	Tien Phouc	31 Oct	455	470	408
1	Nong Sen	31 Oct	455	381	362
2	Plei Djerang	31 Oct	455	479	478
2	Plei Mo	31 Oct	455	476	454
2	Duc Co	31 Oct	455	467	457
3	Duc Hus	31 Oct	455	283	253
3	Katum	31 Oct	455	369	369
4	Binh Thanh Thon	31 Oct	455	332	332
4	Thi ()	31 Oct	455	286	286
TOTAL PHASE 3					3,409

(2) USASF Space Reductions: On 11 Oct 70 MACV sent a (Keystone Robin) message to 5th Group requiring 5th Group to support Phase V redeployment. In support of Phase V redeployment (Keystone Robin), 5th SF Gp (Abn) was tasked with reducing USASF strength by 550 places to an authorized strength of 1,971.

(3) MR 1 (Company C) Current Plans/Concepts

(a) Due to the location of Mai Loc and its low recruiting potential, it was decided by JGS and the MR 1 CG to close camp Mai Loc and transfer the CIDG to another location. Mai Loc, (A-101) was officially closed on 27 Aug 70 and the A Detachment was inactivated.

(b) During the reporting period five "A" Detachments were inactivated as their CIDG camps were converted to ARVN Ranger. These detachments were: A-102, A-104, A-105, A-106, A-107.

(c) Due to the tactical situation at camp Theung Duc, the conversion of this camp to ARVN Ranger was postponed until 31 Oct 70.

(4) MR 2 (Company B) Current Plans/Concepts

(a) Company B continues with conversion to ARVN Ranger as outlined in 5th SF Gp (Abn) OPORD 3-70 and Company B OPORD 10-70.

(b) During the reporting period six "A" Detachments were inactivated as their camps converted to ARVN Ranger. These detachments were: A-241, A-231, A-233, A-251, A-253, and A-255. Also, detachment A-201, which advised the 1st MSF Bn, was deactivated during this period.

(5) MR 3 (Company A) Current Plans/Concepts

(a) Continued emphasis is being placed on conducting platoon sized operations, with a company on standby for reinforcement. Platoon sized operations are able to cover a larger area and have been more effective than company size operations as a counter-measure to enemy infiltration.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 3th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for Period Ending 31 October 1970. RUS CSFOR-65 (R2)

Past efforts to increase the use of intelligence have been beneficial; this will continue to be a point of particular emphasis. During this reporting period the VNSF have almost completely assumed the responsibility of requesting and directing all air support. Requests for preplanned airstrikes and assault helicopter companies are strictly a VNSF function with the USASF acting only in an advisory capacity.

(b) As in the past, this headquarters continues to plan and direct combat operations of subordinate B Detachments in support of MR objectives. B Detachments, in conjunction with their VNSF counterparts, continue to assist the A Detachments in the conduct of offensive operations. This has decreased in recent months as the A Detachments continue to accept more of these responsibilities. Of particular note is the role that the VNSF commanders are playing in the conversion of A teams to ARVN Rangers; VNSF commanders are solving many of the problems of conversion at the A Detachment level with logistical and administrative support from the higher detachments.

(c) This headquarters has followed and will continue to follow the assigned missions outlined in the Combined Campaign Plan 1970. At this time we are planning more platoon size operations composed of only VNSF and CIDG to prepare them for the turnover of responsibility and equipment. Also, more combined operations are being planned with ARVN in an effort to maintain complete coverage of assigned TAOR's.

(6) MR 4 (Company D) Current Plans/Concepts:

(a) During this reporting period the phasedown/conversion program has gone as planned, and in some cases ahead of schedule.

(b) The following is a listing by date, location and camp designation of the disposition of units under C 4's control:

- 1 31 Aug - Three KKK companies from Ba Xoai (A-421) were converted to RF/PF; Chau Doc Province.
- 2 05 Sep - Thanh Tri (A-414) converted to 67th Border Surveillance Ranger Bn.
- 3 05 Sep - To Chau (A-442) converted to 66th Border Surveillance Ranger Bn.
- 4 23 Sep - Thuong Thoi (A-432) camp transferred to Kien Phong Province.
- 5 02 Oct - Tuyen Nhon (A-415) converted to 75th Border Surveillance Ranger Bn.
- 6 02 Oct - Cai Cai (A-431) converted to 76th Border Surveillance Ranger Bn.
- 7 15 Oct - Moc Hoa (A-402) camp transferred to Kien Tuong Province.

(c) The following FOB's were turned over during this reporting period:

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

- 1 18 Aug - Thuong Thoi (A-432) FOB Cau Muong turned over to Kien Phong Sector.
- 2 26 Aug - Tuyen Nhon (A-415) FOB Da Bien turned over to Kien Tuong Sector.
- 3 27 Aug - To Chau (A-442) FOB Tra Pho turned over to Kien Giang Sector.
- 4 23 Sep - Thuong Thoi (A-432) FOB Bien Dinh turned over to Kien Phong Sector.
- 5 30 Sep - Ba Xoi (A-421) FOB Chung Co (No. 21) and FOB Le Hoac (No. 23) were turned over to Chau Doc Sector.

(7) Detachment B-55

(a) Due to the projected phasedown of the 5th Mobile Strike Force, the recruiting program for CIDG has been halted.

(b) In light of the impending phasedown of Detachment B-55 and the 5th MSFC, minimal replacements of USASF personnel lost to DEROS in the first two months of the reporting period have been effected. As a result of the curtailment of operations as phaseout nears, current losses in USASF strength are not being replaced. Det B-55 will continue to operate under its existing TOE structure with the remaining personnel performing additional duties as required.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (ABN) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

e. (C) TRAINING:

(1) Combat Orientation Course:

(a) The Combat Orientation Course for 5th SF GP (ABN) replacement personnel again altered its Program of Instruction to keep newly assigned personnel abreast of the ever changing missions of the 5th SF GP (ABN), 1st SF. A special country briefing has been added to the initial orientation. This briefing is designed to enlighten all newly assigned non-Special Forces personnel of the mission of Special Forces in conjunction with the vast area of responsibility of 5th SF GP (ABN), 1st SF. This briefing also serves to update SF personnel returning to 5th SF GP for the 2nd and 3rd tours. The M-60 machinegun has also been added to the COC curriculum as this weapon is now being utilized at several detachments and within the SFOB defensive perimeter. A class on the Geneva Convention and Law of Land Warfare has been included to meet USARV and Army wide requirements.

(b) During the reporting period, the COC trained 29 officers and 163 enlisted men.

(c) The following is a breakdown of students for classes 3-71 through 11-71:

<u>COC CLASSES</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>COMP</u>
3-71	19 July-26 July 70	32
4-71	26 July-4 Aug 70	15
5-71	9 Aug-16 Aug 70	16
6-71	16 Aug-23 Aug 70	11
7-71	23 Aug-30 Aug 70	21
8-71	30 Aug-5 Sep 70	26
9-71	13 Sep-19 Sep 70	19
10-71	20 Sep-26 Sep 70	12
11-71	25 Oct-31 Oct 70	10

(2) MACV Recondo School:

(a) The mission of the MACV Recondo School is to train selected personnel from US/FWMAF and ARVN units in specialized techniques and skills necessary to conduct successful long range reconnaissance operations in Vietnam.

(b) During the reporting period the MACV Recondo School trained 241 students from US, FWMAF, and ARVN units. The following is a breakdown of students by unit:

23
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ENTR</u>	<u>DROPPED</u>	<u>GRADUATED</u>	<u>CERT OF ATTENDANCE</u>
1ST Mar Div	4		2	
101st Abn Div	48	11	37	
IFFV (75th Inf)				
173d Abn Bde	54	17	37	
5th SF GP (ABN)				
Americal Div	36	6	30	
1st Cav Div (ABN)	25	2	23	
199th Inf Bde	3	1	2	
25th Inf Div	30	7	23	
IIFFV (151st Inf)				
ROMA	35	3	32	
Royal Thai Army	30	0	30	
MACV Adv Teams	1	0	1	
4th Inf Div	22	5	17	
1/5th Inf (Mech)	9	4	5	1
9th Inf Div	5	1	4	
USAF				
ARVN	58	13	45	
550th CIDG	2	0	2	

(3) Company A:

(a) During the first part of the reporting period the CIDG Training Center at Trang Sup provided basic and refresher training to 79 CIDG recruits. Although no formal artillery tng is now given to the CIDG due to conversion, the CIDG receive refresher training on-site. As a result, there are now two 105mm howitzers with school trained CIDG at all the border camps in MR-3. Due to conversion of most of the camps, personnel at Company A are conducting comprehensive OJT programs under the guidance of 5th SF GP and MSF to train the CIDG for their ongoing mission.

(b) Because of a shortage of recruits at the camps, only 85 CIDG received Basic Infantry Training during this period. The instructors devoted more time to

34
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

weapons familiarization, maintenance, platoon and squad tactics with special emphasis on ambush techniques and immediate reaction drills to coincide with their ongoing mission during conversion.

(c) During the latter part of the reporting period all formal training at Company A and subordinate detachments was discontinued due to upcoming conversion of the camps in MR-3. However, OJT continues at all levels, with particular emphasis being placed on marksmanship, small unit tactics and preventive medicine.

(4) Company B:

(a) Throughout the camps USASF and VNSF conducted continued refresher training weekly. Training consisted of the following type subjects:

- 1 Basic Combat Training Refresher
- 2 Small Unit Tactics and Crew Drill
- 3 Map Reading and Navigation
- 4 Field Fortification
- 5 Care and Use of Radios
- 6 105 Howitzers and 106mm Crew Drill and Firing
- 7 Care and Use of Individual and Crew Served Weapons

(b) Due to the relatively large turnover of personnel, training must be conducted constantly in all subjects. On the job training is conducted to improve skills of all personnel and to familiarize them with areas other than their specialties. US artillery units provided training for the CIDG crews at Bu Prang, Duc Lap, Polat Kleng, Dak Seang, and Ben Het. Instruction was aimed at improving the proficiency of the crew.

(c) Camps are required to conduct Camp Strike Force Refresher Training weekly on basic subjects to improve the CIDG soldiers operational efficiency. Thus far the weekly training program has proved very successful.

(5) Company C:

(a) USASF training for US personnel during the reporting period continued to emphasize mandatory requirements.

(b) VNSF: Company C conducted the following courses during the reporting period:

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</u>	<u>GRADUATION DATE</u>
Auto Mechanics Course	35	19 Sep 70
Refrigeration Course	6	7 Sep 70
Maintenance Course	16	7 Sep 70
Refrigeration Course	14	20 Oct 70

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVQB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. PCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(e) CIDG: In light with the phasedown of the CIDG program, Company C conducted the following courses:

<u>COURSE</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</u>	<u>GRADUATION DATE</u>
Auto Mechanic's Course	35	26 Sep 70
Generator Repair and Auto Mechanic's Course	21	20 Oct 70

(1) During the first part of the reporting period the Company C Training Center at Ba T. conducted Camp Strike Force Refresher Training for 105 CIDG from Camp Gia Vuc. Also, 208 CIDG recruits underwent Basic Combat Training at their "A" camp sites. This training was conducted by VNSF cadre and they make the decision as to when a recruit is ready to be released from training and transferred to an operational status.

(2) There are no plans to continue refresher training for the CIDG Forces. MR-1 will initiate a Ranger Training Program for CIDG troops as each camp converts. A training center has been established at Hoa Cam (Da Nang). In light with this new program, 384 CIDG Camp Strike Force personnel underwent Ranger Training at the Hoa Cam National Training Center. They were from Camps Minh Long, Tra Bong, and Gia Vuc.

(3) A four week Artillery Refresher Program was conducted at Camp Ha Thanh. This instruction was presented by MR-1 ARVN Artillery and included crew drill, FO, and FDC procedures.

(4) During the last portion of the reporting period the MR-1 CIDG Training Center at Ba T. officially closed its training facilities due to camp conversions.

(6) Company D:

(a) USASF: Due to personnel shortages inherent in a period of phasedown/conversion there was no USASF cross training conducted during the reporting period.

(b) VNSF: Company D conducted a food preparation school at Can Tho for 7 VNSF personnel. Four VNSF completed a preventive medicine course given at Can Tho. Also, nine VNSF personnel completed a 14 week preventive maintenance course given in Nha Trang.

(c) CIDG: Throughout the camps USASF and VNSF conducted training for the CIDG personnel in the following courses:

<u>COURSES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</u>	<u>GRADUATION DATE</u>
Logistics Course	22	26 Sep 70
Mass/Cook Course	8	26 Sep 70
Logistics Course (Can Tho)	23	6 Oct 70

CONFIDENTIAL 26

CONFIDENTIAL

AVQB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

<u>COURSES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</u>	<u>GRADUATION DATE</u>
Heavy Truck Driver's Course	12	6 Oct 70
Medical Course (Can Tho)	12	17 Nov 70
Medical Course (Long Xuyen)	9	30 Nov 70

(5) The Airboat Company at Cao Lanh (A-404) is presently conducting a seven day course on Airboat operation and tactical employment for Republic of Korea Marine Corps (2 Officers and 5 NCOs).

(6) During the reporting period 294 Mobile Strike Force recruits underwent a six week Basic Combat Training course at Dong Ba Thin Special Forces Training Center.

(7) Detachment B-51 (Dong Ba Thin):

(a) During this quarter emphasis was placed on the quality of instruction by more use of training aids, lesson plans, and demonstration teams. Classes were monitored by USASF personnel and taught by VNSF committee.

(b) At the end of each week a Weekly Monitor Report was prepared for the Commander of the VNSF Training Center; S-3, 5th SFOA; and G-3 VNSF High Command.

(c) Projects for improvement have been implemented and a current analysis of training at Dong Ba Thin is underway to determine lesson plans and FOLs for future missions of the training center.

(d) Diagrams for the enlargement of the VNSF Training areas, and firing range have been submitted to the VNSF High Command. At the present time, renovation and improvement of the VNSF Training Center camp defenses is continuing using CSF personnel, with advise and support by VNSF and USASF personnel.

(e) Courses graduated or in progress during the reporting period:

<u>COURSES</u>	<u>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</u>	<u>GRADUATION DATE</u>
VNSF Basic Airborne Course	92	20 Jul 70
Combat Reconnaissance Course	100	27 Jul 70
7th Tae Kwon-Do (Karate)	21	17 Sep 70
VNSF Radio Operator	10	7 Dec 70
Ord Combat Interpreter's Course	18	18 Aug 70
CIDG Leadership Course	56	25 Aug 70
1st Mobile Strike Force Refresher Tng	294	18 Aug 70
15th VNSF Basic Airborne Course	9	13 Oct 70
VNSF Officer and NCO Basic	70	30 Nov 70

27

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(8) Detachment B55 (5th Mobile Strike Force):

(a) USASF: USASF personnel have been exempted from mandatory training subjects due to operational commitments. Classes on F.O. procedures, physical security and alert procedures were given to keep the individual members of this Command abreast of new developments.

(b) VNSF: Formal VNSF training has not been observed at this time. Co-operation on a daily basis with US counterparts and instructing classes in basic military subjects to CIDG personnel constitute a program of on-the-job training.

(c) CIDG personnel training: Due to operational commitments of the 5th MSFC, refresher and on-the-job training were the primary programs in effect during the first half of the reporting period. During the second half of the reporting period, the majority of formal training for the 5th MSFC CIDG personnel was presented in the Nha Trang area to include Hon Tre Island, the Dong Ho area and the ARVN NCO Academy. The great variety of training areas is a result of the lack of central training area available to the 5th MSFC. The 5th MSFC is scheduled to deactivate during the next reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGS-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for Period Ending 31 October 1970. RGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

g. (C) Combat Developments: Combat developments section has recently received a new item from the Land Warfare Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland. This new item is the "hand Grip" designed for the M-79 40mm Grenade Launcher and enables the weapon to be employed in the hand-held, waist or shoulder fired method. The item weighs only 1.12 pounds, and is made from an aluminum alloy. Various elements of the 5th SF GP (Abn) will test this piece of equipment.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn.) for the Period Ending 31 August 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

2. (U) Aviation:

(1) Army Aviation Support: Army aircraft have provided good support during the reporting period. Company C in Danang received, at the beginning of the reporting period, two UH-1s but was reduced to one on 1 September 1970 due to the conversion of the CTDG to ARVN Ranger. Company B in Pleiku continues to receive two UH-1s. Company A in Bien Hoa receives four UH-1s of which two are dedicated to Long Hai Training Detachment daily. Company D at Can Tho continues to receive two UH-1s. All of these aircraft are absolutely necessary for effective command and control, and light resupply.

(2) Tactical Airlift Support: The airlift support has remained highly satisfactory during the reporting period. The C-7A dedicated aircraft resources remain a major asset to the logistical requirements of 5th Special Forces Group units.

(3) Tactical Air Support: The USAF has 5 F4Cs at Pleiku and 9 F4Cs located at Ban Me Thuot East attached to Company B. All other "C" Detachments receive F4C support from Sector F4Cs operating out of their associated provinces. Immediate TAC AIR has been outstanding. Preplanned airstrike support has generally been outstanding.

(4) Military Region 1 (Co C):

(a) Army Aviation Support: Primary support by Army Aviation during the reporting period was provided by the 282nd AHC. These helicopters were used to the maximum permissible extent. Crews averaged approximately 7-8 flying hours daily, and the maximum ACL was carried on almost all missions. In spite of the frequency of quarterly and intermediate maintenance and inspection requirements, these two aircraft were available to this unit almost constantly. This is an improvement over the last reporting period as well as the crews themselves deserve recognition for their outstanding support.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: During the reporting period over 1000 troops were moved by special mission airlift request on C-130, C-123 and C-7A aircraft.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: As in the last quarter, all requests for tactical fighter support was initially submitted to VNAF through G-3, WRL. Approximately 20% of all airstrikes were flown by VNAF.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Atr) for the Period Ending 31 August 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(5) Military Region 2 (Co B):

(a) Army Aviation Support: Helicopter support for this period was generally good, although poor weather was a problem. The grounding of the CH-47 "Super C", and the removal of all CH-54s from MR-2 has posed a serious problem as there is now no heavy lift helicopter in MR-2. Any heavy lift requirement has to be accomplished by CH-54s from Long Binh.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: This support was excellent throughout the reporting period.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: This support was outstanding throughout the reporting period.

(6) Military Region 3 (Co A):

(a) Army Aviation Support: Aviation support during this reporting period remained at four UH-1D model aircraft. Supporting the "C" Detachment are two UH-1D model aircraft utilized for resupply and a CAC. I/MC continues to receive two UH-1D model aircraft on a dedicated basis.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: Throughout this reporting period, this headquarters received one dedicated C-7A aircraft daily. All C-123 and C-130 aircraft requirements continue to be requested on a mission type basis.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support: Preplanned airstrikes requests continued to decrease appreciably during the reporting period due to the number of camps being converted to ARVN Ranger.

(7) Military Region 4 (Co D):

(a) Army Aviation Support: Company D continues to receive 2 UH-1s on a dedicated basis.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support: Tactical Airlift Support is controlled by 44th Special Tactical Zone.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn) for the Period ending 31 October 1970. MCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

h. (C) Logistics

(1) Supply:

(a) The average number of personnel supported during the period 1 August to 31 October 1970 was:

USASF	-	2,566
CSF & MSF		13,460

(b) During the reporting period, significant quantities of equipment in excess of the operational needs of the 5th Special Forces Group were identified and reported in accordance with Department of the Army Guidance. Equipment declared uneconomically repairable was turned in through property disposal channels.

(2) Maintenance: Omitted.

(3) Movements: Cargo moved from the LSC in short tons, during the reporting period was:

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>
Airland	736.2	448.7	393.4
Airdrop	14.0	0.0	0.0
Road Convoy	24.2	4.6	0.0
Sealift	0.0	0.0	51.1

(4) Services: During the reporting period, the Group Maintenance Facility began the LLDB Senior Non-Commissioned Officers' Maintenance Course. The course is 12 weeks in length, and the objective is to train VNSF NCOs in the operation, maintenance, and repair of equipment assigned to their units.

(5) During the reporting period fourteen 2½ ton trucks, one hundred and forty-one HT-1 radios, and approximately 91 airboats were reported to MACV/USARV as excess to the 5th Special Forces Group. The vehicles and radios are to be turned in to the U.S. Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay. To date, fifteen airboats are to be transferred to the 3rd Marine Assault Group, Da Nang, twenty each to the Americal Division and six each to the 101st Airmobile Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVOB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period ending 31 October 1970. RCE CSFOR-65 (R2)

(6) Military Region I: (Company C)

(a) Supply:

1 This FSP now supports 1,281 CSF, 218 MSP, and 201 U. S. personnel for a total of 1,700 troops. Supply emphasis has been on insuring camps are at, but not over, their basic loads of all classes of supply prior to conversion.

2 Due to recent directives from the Group S-4, the previous overages of rice stockage at the FSP have dwindled to a more workable inventory. Six thousand eight hundred bags were transferred to 11th Quartermaster Battalion (ARVN) during September and October and one thousand eight hundred of the next four thousand bags due in will be trans-shipped to Vung-Tau, near Saigon, for use by MACV CORDS. PIR supply has been adequate with the possibility of a small excess after the end of October, when all the camps have converted. This excess will be laterally transferred to Command and Control Detachment North, also located in Da Nang. Canned mackerel supply has been critically short during several periods, but generally it has been more available than in the past. POL supply has been adequate, as has the resupply of ammo. All requests from Company C, to the Logistical Support Center at the SFOB have been cancelled to cut the flow of supplies to the FSP in anticipation of conversion of Company C on 30 November 1970. Only mission essential items have been requisitioned from 1st Logistical Depot in Da Nang since September.

3 The Naval Support Activity has completely turned over to the Army, leaving all Logistical support in Da Nang to 1st Logistical Command.

4 Detachment B-11 in Chu Lai has, for all practical purposes, closed, with only four personnel remaining to hold the compound until final disposition is made of the real estate.

5 Camp Mai Loc was ordered closed by the end of August and all personnel, supplies, and equipment was returned to Da Nang by convoy, taking a total of four truck convoys. Personnel were reassigned throughout the company, and equipment was serviced and returned to stock.

6 All five southern camps have converted successfully, Ha Thanh and Tra Bong on 31 August and Qia Vuc, Ba To, and Minh Long on 30 September with the conversion of the last three southern camps completed, the liaison detachment in Quang Ngai also closed on 2 October. With only one camp, Thuong Duc, remaining to support, primary emphasis has been placed on preparing backload shipments for the SFOB in Nha Trang.

7 Thuong Duc has, again, come under siege, starting on 29 September, making resupply requirement a little tougher for that camp. Due to outstanding air support from XIIIV Corps aviation and the Marine Air Wing, aerial resupply by OH-53 has been accomplished in an outstanding manner. Due to the siege, however, the conversion of Thuong Duc has been delayed at least one week. This should place no particular burden on conversion of the C detachment on 30 November.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVOB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn) for the Period ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(b) Maintenance:

1 Vehicle deadline rate rose to 15 pct., with the primary problem area still being the evacuating of vehicles, particularly 2½ ton trucks, from the A Detachments. A total of twenty-six vehicles were converted to the ARVN Rangers, helping the deadline rate somewhat by reducing the total number of vehicles on hand. MHE deadline rate dropped slightly to 3.6 pct. Generator deadline rate dropped slightly to 19 pct., primary reasons are that a total of twenty-four generators, 1.5 KW to 10 KW, were transferred to the ARVN Rangers.

2 Appliance deadline rate rose to 6.2 percent.

(c) Cargo Movements:

1 The following tonnages were moved by the mode as indicated during the reporting period:

AIRLAND	-	1,093.40
AIRDROP	-	30.17
CONVOY	-	116.25
SEALIFT	-	<u>67.90</u>
TOTAL	-	1,307.72

2 Aircraft availability slacked off beginning in October, due to the fact that the FSP only had three camps remaining to support. Only one of the three has a fixed wing airstrip, so the dedicated C7A was cut to three days a week. This has been sufficient to move all required supplies to Tien Phuoc. Nong Son and Thuong Duc have been resupplied by cargo helicopters.

(d) Services:

1 The FSP Maintenance Facility completed the fifth and final automotive and generator maintenance course for CIDG from all camps. In practically all cases, the CIDG trained in these courses agreed to convert to Rangers, hence, their new abilities will help the overall Ranger Program to be more successful.

2 The FSP Rigger Section continues to conduct courses in sling load operations for personnel from ARVN units as well as LLDB. To date, six courses have been conducted, with a total of 753 graduates from 26 different ARVN units.

3 The Maintenance Facility conducted an 8 week course in refrigeration maintenance and operation for eight LLDB. The purpose of the course was to familiarize the trainees with the operation and repair of refrigerators, freezers, fans, and air conditioners. The course ended on 10 October.

(e) Facility Improvements: Only facility improvements undertaken during the reporting period were repair and utilities of existing structures and roads on the compound.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVQB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (RZ)

(7) Military Region II: (Company B)

(a) Supply: The initial part of the reporting period, Company B FSP provided logistical support for ten "A" detachments and two "B" detachments. The most significant event of the three months was conversion of seven "A" detachments to ARVN Rangers. Conversion proceeded smoothly, all items on the ARVN Ranger TO&E and TA were laterally transferred to the Vietnamese Ranger Camp Commanders and all excess was backloaded to Pleiku. The emphasis was placed upon backloading during the reporting period but despite this, there was no difficulty providing the remaining "A" detachments with logistical support. Support was accomplished by maximum utilization of all available aircraft and truck convoys to Kontum, Duc Co, Plei Mrong, Nha Trang and Qui Nhon.

(b) Maintenance: Scheduled maintenance of all vehicles and equipment assigned or attached to Company B has failed to produce the high standards of preventive maintenance desired by this unit. From an overall 10% deadline during the month of July, a daily spot check was initiated on equipment and vehicles assigned or attached to Company B, and this has proven its worth. In the month of August 1970 the deadline rate was 6%, September it was 4% and in the month of October it was 3%. Overall maintenance of generators inspected during liaison visits on all "A" sites was found poor, with 35% of the equipment on site faulty or deadlined. A program of training indigenous personnel was initiated. During the three month program, eight indigenous personnel were trained on site and twelve indigenous personnel were trained in the Maintenance Facility. It was found a refresher course for generator operators is needed on all "A" sites at least once every six weeks.

(c) Air Movement: During September, the Air Movement Section lost one dedicated C7A aircraft. The difficulty presented was swiftly overcome by making use of all opportune aircraft. The following is a monthly total of cargo moved during the reporting period.

August	Airland	-	1,570,860
	Airdrop	-	0
	Convoy	-	377,199
September	Airland	-	1,462,434
	Airdrop	-	0
	Convoy	-	801,727
October	Airland	-	1,217,353
	Airdrop	-	0
	Convoy	-	365,200

(d) Services: The FSP supports "A" detachments in Class I through V. Class III logistical support comes from 88th S&S Bn, 1st Logistical Command. Technical representatives from this location can, on request, go to an "A" detachment and give immediate and on the spot support.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVQB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the period ending 31 October 1970. RCL USFOR-65 (R.)

(e) Logistical support from ISC has greatly decreased due to impending close out. Problems in obtaining supplies have been greatly reduced by judiciously scanning all "A" and "B" detachment requisitions and filling only those mission essential requisitions.

(f) The goal of Company B FSP remains to close out this support point by 31 January 1971 without lessening logistical support for "A" and "B" detachments. Timely backloading is essential if Company B is going to meet the conversion date.

(g) Support from the LSC, 1st Logistical Command and 2nd Logistical Command has been excellent.

(h) Military Region III: (Company A)

(a) Supply:

1 The FSP at Company A supported an average of 215 U. S. personnel assigned and attached to the 5th Special Forces Group, 015 CIDG in the LHTD, and an average of 2,500 deployed throughout the Military Region.

2 The LHTD has continued to run special operations in the Military Region which has required particular logistical support from Company A FSP. This support has caused a critical low in our class II supplies.

3 All classes of Supplies have been requisitioned from ISC on an as-needed basis. Therefore, all stockage levels, due to phasedown, have been below that of normal operating strength.

4 During this quarterly reporting period, the FSP at Company A spent \$1,241.08 on local procurement of supplies and maintenance of equipment. Repair of items such as refrigerators, air conditioners, freezers, and water pumps has been a major expenditure. The volume of repair and highly specialized tasks which are occasionally necessary for these items requires a portion of the maintenance to be done outside the FSP.

5 Expendable items not available through normal supply channels require a major expenditure, comprising about 25% of the monthly total. These items are generally of good quality and quantity.

(b) Maintenance:

1 The CIDG rehabilitation program continues. Presently one man is being trained in the area of vehicle maintenance. Two men are learning generator and MHE repair, and two men are learning air conditioning and refrigeration repair. All trainees are showing excellent progress at present.

2 New or rebuilt $\frac{1}{4}$ ton engines, transmissions and differentials are still not available through supply channels. The same holds true with $\frac{3}{4}$ ton engines. At present we are utilizing used parts and rebuild kits to keep our $\frac{1}{4}$ ton deadline as low as possible. Vehicles requisitioned from ISC have yet to be received. This places a heavy burden on the automotive section as conversion requirements must be met.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS USFOR-65 (R2)

2 All B detachments were visited and PLL were reviewed and updated.

4 Deadline vehicles are increasing in number as skilled mechanics pursue better jobs and replacements are hard to find. Direct exchanging of vehicles has also become a problem as conversion has almost exhausted the normal stockage and the rebuilding of vehicles is time consuming.

5 Due to non-availability of fuel injection pumps and magnetic amplifiers for Libby 10KW generators, it was necessary to backload them to LSC for disposal or turn in for PDO.

6 Since gaining the services of a qualified weapons tech rep, the repair production aspect has been improved considerably.

(c) Air Movements:

1 During the reporting period a total of 2,392 short tons of cargo and 6,813 passengers were transported by air movements section of Company A FSP. A total of 741 short tons of cargo were transported via convoy. There were 1,651 short tons shipped by air in the following categories: 12 short tons by C-130, 19 short ton by C-123; 698 short ton by dedicated C7A aircraft; 922 short ton by rotary wing aircraft.

2 There were no tactical emergency or combat essential missions requested during this period. No significant problems were encountered by the air movements section.

(d) Services:

1 During the last reporting period the R&U facility at Company A performed routine maintenance at all detachment levels.

2 C detachment electricians are currently in the process of rewiring the CIDG hospital.

3 Two 20 foot water towers, complete with plumbing, were installed by C detachment carpenters and plumbers.

4 Due to phasedown there has been no significant projects planned for the future.

(9) Military Region IV: (Company D)

(a) Supply: During this reporting period the S-4 Section supported the following number of personnel.

USASF	-	220
CSF	-	1,898
MSF	-	443

On 30 September, A-414, Thanh Tri and A-431, Cai Cai, were converted to ARVN Rangers. Logistical support was terminated to Seafloat during this period.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVQB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period ending 31 October 1970. RCL CSFQ1-65 (R2)

(b) Maintenance:

1 Due to phase down no courses were conducted during this period.

2 Deadline equipment by type:

	August	September
Vehicles	5%	3%
MHE	5%	0
Generators	10%	3%
Air Conditioners	10%	7%
Water Pumps	8%	0
Outboard motors	5%	0
Airboats	3%	3%

(c) Movements: The following tonnage of supplies were moved during this reporting period:

Airland	-	2,366 tons
Airdrop	-	0
Convoy	-	123
Backload	-	212
Total tonnage	-	2,701 tons

(d) Services: Local Class III support is provided by the 228 S&S Company. Their support is outstanding. They always meet our demands. Local Ammunition (Class V) support is provided by the 54th Ammo Base Depot (ARVN). During this period we have received excellent support other than 50 caliber API which we requisition from LSC. LSC continues to provide outstanding support. Due to phase out; no planned improvements to our facilities will be done.

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. (U) Engineer.

(1) Engineer Section.

(a) The Engineer Section provided materials and technical assistance for the completion of twelve major 906 funded projects during this quarter. These projects included construction of the following: 15' x 45' addition to CIDG school; joint TOC/Commo Bunker; 10 8' x 8' fighting bunkers; 20' x 48' TOC; 15' x 100' building for dependent housing; POL storage areas.

(b) In addition to the above projects, funds were provided to purchase materials for self-help projects such as burn out latrines, repair of dependent housing and the capping of bunkers.

(c) Some projects were expedited by having materials pre-cut in Bien Hoa and then shipped to job site for assembly.

(2) Repair and Utilities (R&U).

(a) The R&U Section continued to provide maintenance and general installation in support of electrical, plumbing, and refrigeration requirements.

(b) R&U warehouse stockage levels have remained at an adequate level.

(c) Tech Reps have made several field trips to A and B detachment in support of their requests, particularly in the areas of refrigeration and electrical wiring.

(3) Construction and Rehabilitation.

(a) Military Region II

(1) A-253: KB TEAM #4 was deployed to Camp Duc Co on 14 September 1970. Work on three living-fighting bunkers was completed, and ammunition bunker constructed and the TOC capped with concrete. A camp drainage system was installed and all work was completed 13 October 1970.

(2) Det B-23: Construction of all facilities at A-233, Trang Phuc has been completed with the assistance of KB TEAM #4. All construction at A-236, Bu Prang is complete. KB TEAM #1 was deployed to A-239, Duc Lap to complete an underground dispensary and a number of living-fighting bunkers.

(3) Det B-24: The construction of the TOC at A-242, Dak Pek is 97% complete as of 31 October, with only the plumbing work remaining. The dispensary at Dak Pek is 90% complete as of the same date. KB TEAM #4 was deployed to A-245, Dak Seang on 20 October 1970 with the mission of repair and rehabilitation of the airstrip. As of 31 October 1970 the project is 65% complete and all holes

AVQB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Afm) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (a2)

(b) Well Drilling Operations: A well was completed at Plei Ljereng and one also at Dak Pek. Well operations at Bu Prang were unsuccessful and a well team is currently at Dak Seang.

(c) Budgeting and Funding: Omitted.

(d) Post Engineers: Omitted.

(e) Miscellaneous: Omitted.

(4) Military Region IV

(a) There were six (6) projects completed during this reporting period; B-43 project #906-1103, extension of defensive wire, A-413 project #906-A-413-2, berm construction, A-414 project #906-A-414-1 dependent houses, project #906-A-414-3 bunker construction, A-421 project #906-421-3 capping of bunkers and team house, A-431 project #906-A-431-4 halipad. There are three (3) projects under instruction at the present time at Company B; Detachments A-404 project #906-A-404-3 defensive bunkers, A-413 project #906-A-413-3 line bunkers, A-421 project #906-A-421-3 ammo bunker. These projects are scheduled to be completed before camp conversion date.

(b) Well Drilling Operations: N/A

(c) Budgeting and Funding: N/A

(d) Post Engineers: Staff Engineers are preparing the backlog of excess equipment, repair and utilities items to Logistical Support Command, Nha Trang.

(e) Miscellaneous: N/A

AVGB-8D

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Aka) for the period ending 31 October 1970 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

J. (U) Political Warfare (POLWAR)

(1) General: Almost all of the S5 efforts have been tuned to effecting a smooth transition of the CIDG to the Ranger program, RF or STD. To date there have been few problems in implementing the program. It appears as though there is at least surface cooperation between the former A-camps, converting A-camps and the district and province officials.

(2) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS): The PSYOPS role has been an internal affair aimed at converting the CIDG to other programs. The individual soldiers' families and friends have been deluged with information concerning rank assimilation and the numerous benefits accorded the man who joins ARVN Ranger, RF or STD. Most of the enemy oriented PSYOPS has been turned over to the VNSF with the USASF personnel monitoring the program.

(3) Motivation and Indoctrination (M&I): M&I teams have been sent to various camps, especially in MR 2 due to proximity. This is a culmination of several months of performing for the camps in support of the conversion program. It is felt by VNSF that M&I after this period would be ineffective since the remaining camps have already made their decisions and M&I teams will not convince those few who refuse to convert.

(4) Civic Action (CA): The S5 Section has been coordinating with the Khanh Hoa Province Committee (on S5 activities) in order to establish priorities for local CA projects. Two Nha Trang school additions have been the main focus during the reporting period. This is in addition to food and equipment for a Catholic boys school and leprosarium. In the field, the most important areas have been the animal husbandry projects. These have, in most cases, been successful and are considered to be the most lasting results from 5th SF Gp CA programs in the hinterland. The ARVN Rangers are taking over these programs in nearly all areas. Those that remain out of Rangers hands will go to such organizations as the Christian Relief Service at Company B.

(5) Military Region 1 (Co C):

(a) Psychological Operations: During the reporting period, 92 missions accounted for the 7,108,000 air dropped leaflets. Leaflet requests are handled exclusively by the VNSF S5.

(b) Motivation and Indoctrination: M&I classes were held throughout the reporting period. During the latter portion of the period, the local VN gave classes. It is believed that this greatly aided in obtaining an 85% - 90% Ranger conversion.

(c) Civic Action: Food assistance to typhoon victims has been the current CA highlight this reporting period. The farm projects and the training of indigenous personnel in agricultural methods so that the projects will continue appears to be quite successful.

AVOIR-2D

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Aba) for the period ending 31 October 1970 MCE CSFGR-65 (R2)

(6) Military Region 2 (Co B):

(a) Psychological Operations: The PSYOPS efforts have been internal. The idea was to direct the local population to the district and province agencies as USASF goes through a phasedown.

(b) Motivation and Indoctrination: An intensive MAI program, augmented by the Company B POLWAR team has thwarted an expected high AWOL rate due to conversion. The AWOL rate has been held at a monthly par or below as a result of the MAI efforts.

(c) Civic Action: During the months of August and September some 300 refugees at Plei Djereng and roughly 200 at Duc Co were assisted in relocating to the villages adjacent their respective camps. Company B supplied food to those people and provided a liaison with Pleiku Province for a teacher and school for each refugee camp. In both cases, due to the efforts of Company B, the refugees have become an integrated part of their communities. On 15 October a similar relocation project began at Bu Prang with about 500 people. The project continues.

(7) Military Region 3 (Co A):

(a) Psychological Operations:

1 The use of the POLWAR team with MEDCARS has proven to be effective in creating the image of an interested GVN.

2 Feedback from VN channels indicates that a substantial proportion of requested leaflet/loudspeaker missions are being flown by the 30th PSYOPS Bn despite recent cuts in US assistance and air assets.

(b) Motivation and Indoctrination: In MR 3 MAI teams have also proven effective by explaining in detail what the CIDG could expect in the form of personal gain from conversion. Also, the USASF CA/PO is advised against presenting any of the MAI material.

(c) Civic Action: Animal husbandry projects seem to have the most durability because of the foresight of a number of CIDG in their respective camps. At all converting camps, an attempt has been made to turn over existing animal husbandry assets to those who display the most likely aptitude to continue the projects.

(8) Military Region 4 (Co D):

(a) Psychological Operations: A total of 5.5 million leaflets have been disseminated. Air loudspeaker broadcasts have been aided by Navy Beach Jumpers. The themes have included Chieu Hoi, Land Reform, GVN programs and explanation of Free World Forces presence in VN. Implementation of VF PSYOPS started on 30 September. PSYOPS has decreased steadily with the advent of conversion.

AVGB-RD

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Aka) for the period ending 31 October 1970 RCS CSFGR-65 (R2)

(b) Motivation and Indoctrination: M&I is felt to be less than effective in this area since the POLWAR teams have given substantially less than total commitment to the program. The other usual methods of informing the CIDG of conversion have been used such as lectures and films.

(c) Civic Action: As conversion proceeds, this program is being turned over to the VN. The Navy Beach Jumpers have proven to be a welcomed ally in CA projects. Night MEDCAPS, begun during this reporting period, are meeting with a great deal of success as it provides medical and civic action attention to those individuals working the fields during the day visits.

AVOB-C
SUBJECT

Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn)
for the Period Ending 31 Oct 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

k. (U) Personnel.

(1) Promotions: A total of 169 promotions for enlisted men and 100 for officers were effected by this headquarters.

(2) Strength: Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and at the close of the period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period: 1 Aug 70

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AOB</u>
Authorized:	597	24	2419	3040
Assigned:	511	23	2370	2904

(b) Close of Period: 31 Oct 70

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AOB</u>
Authorized:	449	28	1929	2396
Assigned:	421	13	1738	2172

(c) Strengths for MRs:

As of 1 Aug 70

As of 31 Oct 70

MR I (Co C)

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
Authorized:	63	184	29	67
Assigned:	47	147	29	93

MR II (Co B)

Authorized:	94	299	73	201
Assigned:	72	242	56	151

As of 1 Aug 70

As of 31 Oct 70

MR III (Co A)

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>EM</u>
Authorized:	99	279	54	143
Assigned:	74	236	41	117

AVG 10

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 Oct 1970. RGS CSFOR-65 (12)

MR IV (Co D)

Authorized:	80	240	58	136
Assigned:	56	206	30	93

(3) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) Judicial Punishments:

THIS QUARTER

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>Total</u>
General Court-Martial	0	0	0	0
Special Court-Martial	3	0	0	3
Summary Court-Martial	0	0	0	0

LAST QUARTER

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total</u>
General Court-Martial	0	1	0	1
Special Court-Martial	0	0	1	1
Summary Court-Martial	0	0	0	0

(b) Non-Judicial Punishments:

THIS QUARTER

	<u>August</u>	<u>September</u>	<u>October</u>	<u>Total</u>
Article 15, UCMJ	37	19	16	72

LAST QUARTER

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total</u>
Article 15, UCMJ	22	24	14	60

(c) Legal Assistance: Legal Assistance was rendered to 229 clients, an increase of 9 from the past quarter.

(d) Morale and Personnel Services. The following R&R allocations were received by the 5th SF GP (Abn) for the last quarter.

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report .. Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 Oct 1970. RGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

<u>SITE</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>
TOKYO	25	25	0
BANGKOK	18	27	50
TAIPEI	16	16	18
SYDNEY	50	50	60
HAWAII	100	75	55
HONGKONG	15	15	40
TOTALS	224	208	223

(5) Reenlistment: The following are the 5th SF GP (Abn) Reenlistment Statistics for the last quarter.

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>DA OBJ</u>	<u>RA1</u>	<u>AUS</u>	<u>RAC</u>	<u>USAR/NG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>%</u>
AUGUST	24	2	0	24	0	26	108.0%
SEPTEMBER	24	3	2	23	0	28	116.6%
OCTOBER	22	5	0	18	0	23	104.6%
TOTALS:	70	10	2	65	0	77	110.0%

(a) Twenty-one extensions of ETS were completed during report periods.

(b) The monthly reenlistment objective is based on reenlisting 1% of our total assigned strength, regardless of category.

(6) Postal. The following statistics represent number of certified, insured and registered pieces of mail handled by SPOB.

<u>INSURED MAIL</u>		<u>REGISTERED MAIL</u>		<u>CERTIFIED MAIL</u>	
		<u>IN</u>	<u>OUT</u>		
AUG	162	AUG	196	AUG	20
SEP	234	SEP	180	SEP	14
OCT	198	OCT	126	OCT	14
TOTAL	594		502		50

AVQB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special
Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 Oct
1970. MOS OSFOR-65 (R2)

(7) Awards and Decorations:

(a) The total number of decorations awarded to 5th SF GP (Abn)
personnel for the period ending 31 October 1970.

<u>AWARD</u>	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>
MH	0	0	0
DSC	1	2	0
DFC	2	1	0
SS	36	29	16
JM	6	3	2
SM	0	4	4
BS-V	8	101	49
BS	570	357	382
AM-V	4	22	15
AM	147	78	73
ACM-V	0	44	19
ACM	<u>111</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>47</u>
TOTAL	885	841	607
CIB	92	59	37
OMB	12	8	8
PH	53	47	24

(b) Awards of the Bronze Star and below are approved by 5th SF GP
(Abn). Silver Star to Distinguished Service Cross are approved by USARV.

(8) Special Servi

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 Oct 1970. ROS OSFOR-65 (R2)

(a) General. The Craft Shop and photo lab was transferred from Camp McDermott and officially opened at SFOB on 15 Oct 70.

(b) Library. Attendance in the library was 511 for Aug, 493 for Sep and 488 for Oct 1970.

(9) Religious Activities.

Services Conducted 230

Attendance 4775

Group Parish Activities

Invocation/Benedictions

Hospital Visits	50	Conducted	4
Counseling	618	Attendance	230
Interviews	2345	Staff Meetings	176
Communion Services	177	Camps Visited	155
C/A Payops Activities	16	Camps Visited	113
Memorial Services	7		
Attendance	369		

(10) Civilian Personnel.

General. The civilian personnel office continues to monitor promotions, hiring and other personnel actions closely. The phase down of civilian personnel is in effect and at present the strength of the units still operational during the months indicated are reflected below:

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>
HHC	548	546	524
Co A	387	397	274
Co B	422	418	371
Co C	326	281	207
Co D	347	347	251

AVGB-0

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Special
Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 Oct
1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>
Co E	13	13	12
B-36			*83
B-51	51	47	45
B-55	80	80	82
JOOD	~~211~~	~~215~~	~~212~~
TOTAL	2318	2274	1990

*Part of Co A till 1 Oct 70.

(11) Miscellaneous: The following are miscellaneous activities programs conducted by 5th SF GP (Abn) during the last quarter. CIDG Strength and Accounting. CIDG Strength for Aug was 17,309 and Sep was 13,591. As of 31 Oct the CIDG Strength was 9,479. Strength figures will be lowered monthly in conjunction with camp conversion..

(12) Safety.

(a) General. Safety newsletters and command letters on safety continue to be published.

(b) Injuries and deaths by accidents.

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>
Injuries	4	2	2
Deaths	0	0	0

AVGB-SU

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

1. (U) Medical

(1) USASF Medical Care. The capability for provision of unit level medical care to USASF was expanded at SFOB dispensary by adding X-ray, electrocardiogram, audiometry and bacteriologic culture/identification facilities, in order to reduce traffic to Cam Ranh Bay since the closure of the 8th Field Hospital. USARV hospital medical support to USASF throughout the Republic has remained excellent.

(2) CIDG Medical Care.

(a) CIDG and VNSF medical procedures in the reporting and treating of Venereal Disease, Leprosy, Tuberculosis, and Plague have been Vietnamized by adopting the Ministry of Health programs for these diseases. The adoption of these programs will prepare Vietnamese medics, remaining on site after conversion of CIDG Camps, to obtain care in those disease areas for the military and civilian personnel living in and around these remote camps.

(b) Dossiers (the equivalent of annotated certification by the 5th Group) on individual CIDG nurses, medics and technicians, containing their medical training and capabilities, are being delivered by local medics and doctors to each Province Medical Chief prior to conversion. These dossiers will enable the individual to gain employment commensurate with his or her capabilities, in most cases within the same district, for those CIDG personnel unable to be converted to ARVN. The employment of some of these individuals in the GVN Rural Health Program will allow their skills to be used locally to benefit the health of troop dependents living near the remote camps.

(c) In order to implement Vietnamization, USASF advisors have assisted their VNSF counterparts in adopting the ARVN immunization program for CIDG personnel.

(3) Preventive Medicine. CIDG Malaria remains markedly below the 1969 rate for this quarter, and shows also the seasonal variational decline seen at this time in 1969. This lower rate is attributed to persistent and effective command advisory emphasis calling for VNSF command action at all levels to require CIDG troops to take prophylactic anti-malaria medication and observe other malaria precautions. USASF malaria remains markedly below the rate for this quarter in 1969.

AVQB-SU

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(4) Medical Supply. In the past, preventive medicine supplies within 5th Special Forces have been critical items in short supply. In an effort to increase the responsiveness of the logistical support to demands for these often critical items, the responsibility for PM supplies was transferred to Medical Supply channels. This has improved order-ship time, reduced the number of out items, and improved the overall Group sanitation effectiveness.

(5) Training. Assistance was begun, and is continuing, to the VMSF in updating their training programs for medics in order to meet new operational requirements.

(6) MEDCAPS. During the reporting period there were 275 MEDCAPS conducted at 42 locations throughout the Republic of Vietnam. A total of 61,513 patients were treated.

AVGB-S

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

m. (U) Signal.

(1) Operations:

(a) During this reporting period all means of communications organic to the command continued to operate at a high level of efficiency with no major problems encountered.

(b) Headquarters 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF is continuing to review the nature and volume of all electronically transmitted traffic. Much of the traffic is handled by courier, allowing a move closer to the communication austerity goal set forth by COMUSMACV.

(c) In conjunction with the present communication austerity program all subordinate units of the 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF, are requesting that teletype circuits be deleted when the traffic volume is low and other means are available. Additionally, shared frequencies have been turned in.

(2) Training:

(a) In an effort to further upgrade the proficiency of the Special Forces communicator, all C Detachments are utilizing Morse Code to pass a portion of their daily traffic.

(b) During this reporting period increased emphasis has been placed upon safeguarding of defense information using AR 380-5. The purpose of classes held were to refresh each individual with the regulations governing safeguarding of defense information. The classes emphasized proper handling, classification/downgrading and storage of classified defense information and materials.

(c) Continued strong emphasis is being placed upon all companies of the 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF to eliminate all transmission security violations within the Military Regions. This is being accomplished by close coordination with the 101st RRU units in the Military Regions, and all means of communications are being monitored by the Radio Research Detachments.

(3) New Concepts/Equipment:

(a) During this reporting period the new high gain FM frequency antenna AS-223/GRC was tested by companies C and D. These tests proved that this highly directional antenna effectively doubled the transmitting range of FM radio sets while using either the secure or non-secure mode of operation.

(b) It was found that the AS-223/GRC antenna is light weight and can be installed in a matter of minutes. It is recommended that this antenna be procured through the Army supply channels, and held in supply stock for issue to Special Forces units.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVTB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 70. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (U) Personnel: None

b. (C) Intelligence:

(1) (C) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) Missions. (Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION: Preflight checks by intelligence personnel often indicate that the necessary APD equipment is in proper operable condition, when in fact the equipment fails to operate during the actual conduct of the mission.

(b) EVALUATION: Post-flight checks often indicate that, although the equipment failed during the mission, it was in operable condition. A subsequent examination of the helicopter often indicates a faulty circuit in the internal electrical system of the craft.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When using non-organic air support or an air crew unfamiliar with APD missions, the UH-1 electrical system must be pre-flight inspected and any problems brought to the attention of the crew chief.

(2) (C) Polygraph Utilization. (HQ S2)

(a) OBSERVATION: Incident investigations and investigations concerning Viet Cong activities are greatly enhanced by the use of the polygraph only when proper investigative techniques have been used prior to the support of the polygraph.

(b) EVALUATION: The polygraph is most often misused due to the lack of a prior investigation. Proper prior investigation by trained personnel will alleviate many of the problems encountered in the course of an investigation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The polygraph should be used only as a tool of investigation and only as the last step in an investigation. Further, case files should be instituted and maintained so that when polygraph support is needed, the polygraph examiner can read into the case for enlightenment as to how he should approach the actual polygraph examination. In essence, assigned counterintelligence agents or other investigators should bear the brunt of the burden in an investigation, and the polygraph examiner requested as a last resort when all else has failed.

c. (C) Operations: Waterborne Operations (Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION: Waterborne, especially airboat operations, prove extremely effective in covering CTMC TAORs when the monsoon season causes the water level to rise.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVGB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the period ending 31 October 70. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(b) **EVALUATION:** The utilization of airboats is particularly effective because of their speed, maneuverability, fire power, and extensive area coverage capabilities. Sampans and other waterborne craft can also greatly increase the offensive coverage of a TAOR. It must be stressed, however, that waterborne operations are greatly enhanced by air assets, i.e. helicopter gunships, FACs and C and C ships.

(c) **RECOMMENDATIONS:** That when forces are employed in areas traditionally inundated during monsoon seasons, waterborne operations, utilizing air support, be strongly considered for planning purposes.

d. (U) Organization: None

e. (U) Training: MOI Training for Indigenous Instructors (HQ S3)

(1) **OBSERVATION:** Indigenous instructors, at times, have not been able to effectively train CIDG, because of a lack of awareness of principles and methods of instruction.

(2) **EVALUATION:** Much training in actual subject matter has been given to the indigenous instructor, but MOI is not stressed enough. No matter how an instructor grasps the subject matter, his presentation will inevitably lose its effectiveness if he does not have a good awareness of the principles on instruction.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** That increased and continual emphasis be placed on providing MOI training to Instructor personnel.

f. (U) Logistics: None

g. (U) Communications: None

h. (U) Material: None

i. (U) Political Warfare

(1) Distribution of PSYOPS leaflets (Co D)

(a) **OBSERVATION:** It has been observed that when PSYOPS leaflets are disseminated in a hamlet, the other hamlet residents do not leave their homes to gather the leaflets. The children of the hamlet do, however gather the leaflets and take them to the elders.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Children are a good means for distributing PSYOPS leaflets among all residents of a hamlet. The children bring the leaflets to their elders who have stayed in their homes or who have remained to work their fields.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** PSYOPS leaflets should be distributed to the children as well as the hamlet elders.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVOB-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 70. RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

(2) S5 Personnel working in off-limits areas

(HQ S5)

(a) OBSERVATION: S5 personnel at every command level are the commander's contact with the local people.

(b) EVALUATION: S5 personnel are often hampered in the performance of their duties by commanders who will not allow them to mingle with the people. S5s are supposed to be able to advise the commanders as to the desires of the people for civil action projects. S5s are supposed to develop themes for PSYOPS campaigns directed towards the people and the enemy. S5s are supposed to be able to judge the economic and political situation within the command's area of interest. Shortsightedness on the part of many make this part of the S5's job impossible because he is not allowed to participate freely with the people in off limits areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That S5 personnel not be restricted by off limits areas in the performance of their duties.

j. (U) Medical:

(1) Preventive Medicine Supplies

(HQ Surg)

(a) OBSERVATION: All job-oriented supplies have been ordered through medical channels by end-users except preventive medicine (PM) items, causing some confusion in delivery of PM items to medical end-users.

(b) EVALUATION: Delivery of PM supplies through non-medical supply channels to end-user medical personnel has been slow because of the vast overall number of items supervised by non-medical supply personnel. Transfer of PM supplies to medical supply channels within 5th Special Forces Group has markedly improved order-ship time and reduced the number of due-out items, and improved Group Sanitation effectiveness.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That transfer of item management responsibility for PM equipment and supplies to medical supply channels be considered at all levels within the Army, particularly by operationally deployed units.

(2) Chlorination of Bulk Water Supplies

(HQ Surg)

(a) OBSERVATION: Bulk water supplies at fixed installations are most effectively chlorinated by means of in-line hypochlorinators.

(b) EVALUATION: At fixed Special Forces installations in RVN, several methods of chlorination of bulk water supplies have been utilized. Bulk chlorination at intervals using the slurry method has resulted in periods of inadequate chlorine residual when large volumes of water are consumed. Use of an Erdalator has the disadvantage of the extremely high initial cost (\$30,000)

AVIR-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn) for the period ending 31 October 1970. RCR C-PCR-65 (R2)

lack of repair parts and repairmen, and necessity for an operator. Use of in-line hypochlorinators involves low cost of installation, no operator cost, constant chlorination and little repair workload. Hypochlorinators are not in regular supply channels, must be purchased outside the US Army, and delivery time is exceptionally long.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the use of in-line hypochlorinators be considered for use at fixed installations, by all overseas US Army and other military branches, very early in the development of each installation, in preference to bulk slurry chlorination or use of Erdalators. To be effective, this requires stock levels of hypochlorinators already available in military supply channels, advance planning and wide knowledge of hypochlorinators.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Harvey G. Patterson, Maj, FA
For HARVEY G. PATTERSON
LTC, Infantry
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - SACSA, OJS, Washington D.C. 20310
- 1 - DCS for Mil Opns (ATTN: JA-SO) DA, Wash, D.C. 20310
- 2 - CG, CONARC, Ft Monroe, VA. 22101
- 1 - CINCPAC (ATTN: J3 Special Operations) APO 96558
- 1 - CINCSARPAC (ATTN: GPOP-O SF OFF) APO 96558
- 1 - CG, USARYIS, APO 96331
- 6 - CG, USARV (ATTN: AVHQC-DST) APO 96375
- 1 - CG, USARV, ATTN: MH APO 96375
- 1 - CG 2d Log Cmd (ATTN: CISO) APO 95248
- 6 - CG JFPCENMA, Ft Bragg, N.C. 28307
- 1 - Institute for Strategic and Stability Operations, CDC, Ft Bragg N.C. 28307
- 1 - USA Intel Sch, ATTN: AHBO-DL, Fort Holabird, Md., 21219
- 1 - Comdt, USAWC, ATTN: Library Off, Carlisle Barracks, Pa, 17013
- 1 - Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, ATTN: DFI, Department of the Army, Wash. D.C. 20310
- 1 - Station Commander, USASPD ACSI DA, Rm 2A197 2 Annex 1, NSA Op Bldg, Ft Meade, Maryland 20755
- 1 - Comdt, USACAS Ft Gordon, Ga., 30905
- 1 - Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Wash, DC 20310
- 1 - Library, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, ATTN: DJCASO, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

AVON-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CSFOR-6C (R2)

- 1 - I CTZ CORDS, APO 96349
- 1 - II CTZ CORDS, APO 96350
- 1 - III CTZ CORDS, APO 96227
- 1 - IV CTZ CORDS, APO 96215
- 1 - CO, 1st SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 97131
- 1 - CO, 6th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF, Fort Bragg, N.C. 28307
- 1 - CO, 7th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF, Fort Bragg, N.C. 28307
- 1 - CO, 8th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 09337
- 1 - CO, 10th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF, Ft Devens Mass. 01133
- 1 - CO, Special Forces Det (Abn), Europe APO NY 09050
- 1 - 46th SF Co. 1st SF, APO 96291
- 1 - JCCD, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96243
- 1 - Ea HQ, 5th SF Gp (Abn) Principal and Special Staff Office
- 1 - Co A, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96227
- 1 - Co B, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96318
- 1 - Co C, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96337
- 1 - Co D, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96215
- 1 - Ea Sep R-Det, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF APO 96240

INCLOSURES:

1. Organizational Chart	61
~~2. List of Commanders and key personnel~~	
3. Troop Disposition Lists	62
4. Military Region Maps	65
5. Operational Statistics	69
~~6. Weapons Briefing~~	
~~7. Green Beret Magazines (August, September, and October 1970 issues included in Copies 1 thru 20)~~	
~~8. Table of Contents~~	

Incl 2, 6, 7 and 8 wd, HQDA

AVHDD-DO (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RCS CAPOM-65 (R2)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

30 DEC 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-DT, APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn).

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Distribution of PSYOP Leaflets," page 54, paragraph 2i(1). Dissemination of propaganda should be accomplished by all available means emphasizing the most effective means when possible. The Face to Face aspect of placing leaflets in the hands of children for distribution to their parents encourages the children to participate in the propaganda effort, and will probably produce favorable residual attitudes if the leaflet message does not offend the target audience. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "S-5 Personnel Working in Off-Limits Areas," page 55, paragraph 2i(2). The mission of the S5 generally is to gain the support of the local populace through use of PSYOP and Civic Action/Community Development Programs. To achieve this objective the S5 must be free to work with Local National Officials. This authority can not be considered as license for indiscriminate visitations to off-limits areas in an unofficial capacity. Should appearance of US personnel in off-limits areas become too frequent an impression of official approval for such areas will be erroneously assumed by other US personnel and the Vietnamese populace in general thus voiding the original purpose of the off-limits designation. Recommend CO 5SFCA, 1SF in conjunction with local military and civilian law enforcement officials develop a special pass for personnel required to work in off-limits areas. Unit has been so advised.


c. Reference item concerning "Preventive Medicine Supplies," page 55, paragraph 2j(1): nonconcur. The so called preventive medicine supplies and equipment are items of common usage by the Corps of Engineers, Chemical Corps and Medical Department. Worldwide, the vast majority of these items are utilized primarily by the Corps of Engineers in their insect and rodent control programs. It would be neither efficient nor expedient for the smaller user to manage these items on a world wide basis. The herbicides and related equipment are utilized primarily by the Chemical Corps. The relatively minor usage of these items by the Medical Department again does not warrant transfer of these items to the medical supply system. Unit has been so advised.

AVHDO-DO (15 Nov 70) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn) for the Period Ending 31 October 1970. RGS CSFOR-65 (R2)

d. Reference item concerning "Chlorination of Bulk Water Supplies," page 55, paragraph 2j(2): nonconcur. The determination of the best method to treat water is based on the quality of the water to be treated. In some areas because of unacceptably high content of solids the solid materials must be removed. In these areas an Erdalator must be used. In-line chlorinators have proven effective but are subject to malfunctions and down time. For this reason in many areas where this method is used it is highly recommended that a full time operator be assigned to preclude the system from becoming non-potable as a result of equipment failures. Historically, several outbreaks of disease have been traced to non-potable water from non-attended in-line chlorinator systems wherein the chlorination equipment had become inoperable while the system continued to produce non-chlorinated water. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
5th SFGA

GPOP-DT (15 Nov 70) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Special Forces Group
(Abn), for Period Ending 31 October 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)


HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 FEB 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters concurs in subject report with the following
comments:

Reference paragraph 2j(2), page 55: Concur. Due to the inherent problem of non-potable water being introduced into a water system by a malfunctioning in-line chlorination system, this type system would not be considered to be effective unless trained operator/maintenance personnel were available for constant monitoring of the system while it is in operation. In cases where chlorination only is required to produce potable water (as opposed to removal of suspended solids as is done in the Erdiator process), the in-line chlorination systems appear to be an effective, low-cost process. Studies should be made to determine the degree to which in-line chlorination systems could be used effectively were they introduced universally into the inventory.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES AFO 96210



GROUP 4
 DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 Years
 DIR 5200.10

Incl 1 to 5th SF Gp (Abn) ORLL for the
 Period Ending 31 October 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

MR-1

DET	LOCATION	COORD	DATE OPENED	NR CSF	NR PF	NR MSF	MISSIONS	ETHNIC GROUPS
C-1	DAMANG	BT07527193	SEP 62	90			C & C	VN
1st MSF	DAMANG	BT07527193	FEB 66					
A-109	THUONG DUC	Z011175321	APR 66	124		177	M S P	VN/MONT
			TOTAL	514		177		

MR-2

A-204	KONTUM	AR77358916	NOV 67	60		567	M S P	VN/MONT
B-23	BAN MS THUOT	AQ79100294	NOV 64	60			C & C	MONT
A-236	BU PRANG	YU68105087	OCT 67	389			CSF/BS	MONT/CAMB
A-239	DUC LAP	YU48895610	NOV 66	380			CSF/BS	MONT/CAMB/VN
B-24	KONTUM	AR77358916	JAN 66	59			C & C	VN/MONT
A-212	DAK PEK	YB94956835	NOV 62	133			CSF/BS	MONT
A-214	BEN HET	YB86522555	MAY 68	521			CSF/BS	MONT/VN
A-215	DAK SEANG	YB89631052	JUL 66	342			CSF/BS	VN/MONT
			TOTAL	2270		567		

62

MR-3

C-3	HIEN HOA	YT00901270	NOV 66	99			C & C	CAMB
B-32	TAY NINH	IT20455987	DEC 67	90			CSF/BS	VN/MONT/CAMB/CHI
A-301	TRANG SUP	IT16505550	FEB 63	510			CSF/TC	VN/CAMB
B-33	HON QUAN	IT75768732	MAR 68	60			C & C	VN/CAMB/MONT
A-334	TONG LE CHON	IT62228103	MAY 67	355			CSF/BS	VN/MONT
A-341	BU DOP	XU97452900	NOV 62	304		500	CSF/BS	VN/CAMB
B-36*	LONG HAI	YS43805153	SEP 67			500	MSF	VN/CAMB/MONT
			TOTAL	1118		500		

*LONG HAI carried as separate Detachment

MR-4

C-4	CAN THO	WS84301160	MAR 63	80			C & C	VN/CAMB/CHI
B-41	XOC HOA	IS03009097	FEB 65	12			C & C	VN/CAMB
B-43	CHI LANG	WS03856435	DEC 69	119			C & C	VN/CAMB/CHI
A-402	CHI LANG	IS02859010	OCT 70	29		391	M S P	VN/CAMB/CHI
A-404	CAO LANH	WS69365597	FEB 67	15		169	M S P	VN/CAMB/CHI

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL


MR-1 (CONT)

TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

<u>DET</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COORD</u>	<u>DATE OPENED</u>	<u>NR CSF</u>	<u>NR RF</u>	<u>NR PF</u>	<u>NR MSF</u>	<u>MISSIONS</u>	<u>ETHNIC GROUPS</u>
A-413	BINH THUAN THON	VT86110325	MAY 65	328				CSF/BS	VN/CAMB
A-432	CHI LANG	VS31519566	OCT 70	450				CSF/BS	VN/CAMB/MONT
A-421	BA XOMI	VS95596272	JAN 66	457				CSF/BS	VN/CAMB
A-119	VIN GIA	VS76206090	AUG 64	573				CSF/BS	VN/CAMB
TOTAL				2093					
									560

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL




DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DCD DIR 5200.10

Incl 4 to 5th SF GP ORLL for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1970

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

Military Region 2




CONFIDENTIAL

Military Region 3



CONFIDENTIAL

Military Region 4



67
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1. (C) Missions:	MR-1	MR-2	MR-3	MR-4	RF/PF	TOTAL
a. Squad	910	3581	1499	1193	446	7183
b. Platoon	736	1488	722	1685	20	4651
c. Company or Larger	154	48	114	443	16	775
2. (C) Contacts:						
a. Frd initiated	79	60	31	9		7
b. VC initiated	27	32	34	38	1	1
c. Incidents	102	37	62	11		212
3. (C) Confirmed enemy losses:						
a. KIA	233	35	51	55		374
b. Cptr	33	17		1		51
c. Quarterly Comparison of Confirmed Enemy Losses Country-Wide:						

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>CPTR</u>
FEB-APR 69	2095	147
MAY-JUL 69	1466	85
AUG-OCT 69	1133	128
NOV-JAN 70	1304	106
FEB-APR 70	1587	131
MAY-JUL 70	763	84
AUG-OCT 70	374	51

4. (C) USASF Losses:	<u>MR-1</u>	<u>MR-2</u>	<u>MR-3</u>	<u>MR-4</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. KIA			1	2	3
b. WIA	2	1	2	5	10
c. MIA					0

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl 5 to 5th SF GP ORLL for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

STATISTICAL DATA (CONT)

d. Quarterly comparison of USASF casualties country-wide:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
FEB-APR 69	19	141	3	163
MAY-JUL 69	18	86	2	106
AUG-OCT 69	7	58	1	66
NOV-JAN 70	12	77		89
FEB-APR 70	11	120	1	132
MAY-JUL 70	4	60		64
AUG-OCT 70	3	10		13

5. (C) VNSF Losses:	<u>MR-1</u>	<u>MR-2</u>	<u>MR-3</u>	<u>MR-4</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. KIA	2			2	4
b. WIA			8	1	9
c. MIA					0

d. Quarterly comparison of VNSF casualties country-wide:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
FEB-APR 69	23	99	3	125
MAY-JUL 69	5	31	1	37
AUG-OCT 69	2	26		28
NOV-JAN 70	8	23		31
FEB-APR 70	14	22		36
MAY-JUL 70	2	12		14
AUG-OCT 70	4	9		13

6. (C) CIDG Losses:	<u>MR-1</u>	<u>MR-2</u>	<u>MR-3</u>	<u>MR-4</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. KIA	11	10	8	16	45
b. WIA	84	38	44	44	210
c. MIA					

d. Quarterly comparison of CIDG casualties country-wide:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
FEB-APR 69	283	1618	50	1951
MAY-JUL 69	292	1370	27	1689
AUG-OCT 69	213	984	53	1250
NOV-JAN 70	199	1047	6	1252
FEB-APR 70	267	1007	2	1276
MAY-JUL 70	106	~~564~~	3	673
AUG-OCT 70	45	210		255

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

STATISTICAL DATA (CONT)

7. (C) RF/PF Losses:

MR-1 ONLY

- a. KIA Ø
- b. WIA 3
- c. MIA Ø

d. Quarterly comparison of RF/PF Casualties country-wide:

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
FEB-APR 69	6	4	1	11
MAY-JUL 69	3	3	2	8
AUG-OCT 69	4	5		9
NOV-JAN 70	1	8		9
FEB-APR 70	9	5		14
MAY-JUL 70	2	9		11
AUG-OCT 70		3		3

8. (C) Weapons:	<u>MR-1</u>	<u>MR-2</u>	<u>MR-3</u>	<u>MR-4</u>	<u>RF/PF</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
a. Friendly Wpns Lost	7	2	2	9		20
b. Wpns Cptr	53	24	12	26		115

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
HQ DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL
		2b. GROUP
		3
3. REPORT TITLE		
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations 1 Aug to 31 Oct 70.		
5. AUTHOR (Last name, middle initial, first name)		
CO, 5th Special Forces Group, 1st Special Forces		
6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
15 November 1970	74	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
	704176	
8b. PROJECT NO.		
N/A		
c.	9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be associated with this report)	
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A	DA, OACSFOR, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT		

CONFIDENTIAL

DD FORM 1473

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification