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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

AGDA-A (M) (5 Apr 71) FOR OT UT 704203

13 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: FOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

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31 October 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army Support
Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65
(R2) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO San
Francisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO San
Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities:

a. ACofS, Personnel and Administration

(1) In August 1970, Special Troops were authorized to hire Vietnamese bus drivers for the Transportation Motor Pool. Ten Vietnamese were hired, and after an intensive six week training program, they were qualified as bus drivers. This action enabled the TMP to establish a comprehensive bus system without regard to company duties affecting the schedule. The routes commence at 0600 hours and work in two shifts until 2200 hours. The routes have been timed to coincide with each other enabling the TMP to be utilized as a bus terminal.

(2) Base Post Office Operations: On 1 October 1970, the 39th Base Post Office initiated Operation Reindeer. This marked the beginning of the Christmas mailing period. The 39th BPO received an augmentation of personnel and equipment to cope with the increasing volume of mail. Mail Movements: See Inclosure 1.

(3) Information Office:

(a) Hometown News Releases dispatched:

Editorial 257

Pictorial 183

(b) News Releases dispatched:

With Photos 63

Without Photos 8

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(c) Photo Assignments: 120

(d) Radio Programs: 13 programs of 15 minutes each were aired over AFVN-AM
Dong Ba Thin.

(e) Television Programs: 4 programs were aired over AFVN-TV, Nha Trang.

(4) Personnel Management: A continued decrease in Command strength is
evidenced by the figures listed below. Efforts are geared toward replacing key
personnel losses.

	AUGUST		SEPTEMBER		OCTOBER	
	AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG
OFF	414	341	414	365	410	369
WO	122	116	122	102	122	108
EM	7378	7381	7345	7485	7271	7188
TOTAL	7914	7838	7881	7952	7803	7665

(5) Reenlistment: The Reenlistment Program has continued the outstanding
performance that was achieved in the first half of the year. USARV Reenlistment
Incentive Awards Program was led by Cam Ranh Bay which achieved 81.4% of its
objective. The success achieved in this program is attributed to the excellent
support by unit commanders, our reenlistment personnel and strong command em-
phasis. A total of 179 persons reenlisted during this past quarter.

(6) Chaplain:

(a) Religious Activities: Chaplain activities in the Support Command
CRB have been extended into new and previously untouched areas. During the
summer, due to the shortage of Chaplains, we were unable to do more than main-
tain the regular service program. With the assignment of a full complement
of Chaplains we have extended our activities to holding field services and
other new arrangements such as having Chaplains ride with the convoys.

(b) Drug Amnesty Program: Chaplains have been active in the Drug
Amnesty Program and are seeking new ways to make the program more effective
through better counseling techniques.

(c) Missionary Activities and Civil Affairs: Morale and welfare have
been aided in a new program of involving local missionaries in religious
activities and in arranging tours of surrounding villages and towns.

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Civil affairs have been aided by involvement of Chaplain in coordinating some of the local projects.

- (7) Casualties: See Inclosure 2.
- (8) Promotions: See Inclosure 3.
- (9) Awards: See Inclosure 4.
- (10) Visitors: See Inclosure 5.
- (11) Congressional Inquiries: See Inclosure 6.

b. ACOB, Plans and Operations

(1) Improvement and Modernization of Vietnamese Military Forces:

(a) The number of ARVNization projects throughout the Support Command continued to rise during the reporting period.

1. On 1 September 1970, Small tugboat #177 was officially turned over to the Vietnamese. The tugboat was originally assigned to the 10th Transportation Battalion and was inspected and prepared for turnover by USAMRAV. The tugboat is currently in operation in the Saigon-San Tho area.

2. On 2 September 1970, 15 Vietnamese completed 30 days of training in helicopter maintenance. The training took place at Da Nang. The training was conducted by a US Army instructor. This training precedes the turnover of the equipment and mission responsibility which is expected to take place prior to 15 November 1970.

3. On 1 August 1970, the outport of Nha Trang was officially turned over to the Vietnamese. The US is transferring small tugboats to assist in the repair of barges and the resupplying of tankers. The cargo mission of the port has been switched to shallow draft. The US still assists in the areas of port documentation, Korean passenger processing and guard of the Vinson power ships.

4. Current Projects: Some of the projects currently undergoing coordination include:

a. Facility at the Nha Trang LSA - In April 1970, actions were initiated to turn over the POB facility of the Nha Trang LSA to the Vietnamese. The POB facility is the first designated to takeover the facility. The first phase of the turnover was the training of two Vietnamese officers and 100s from the 31st at POB. The objective of this training was to acquire

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the Vietnamese with US POL operating procedures as well as to prepare the facility for turnover. At this time, no formal agreement has been signed concerning the "how" or "when" the facility will be transferred, but a message is being prepared requesting instructions from MACV.

b. Mini-ports - On 7 September 1970, 15 Vietnamese from the 351st POL Depot (ARVN) completed 30 days of OJT for helicopter refuel operations at the Gia Nghia, Phan Thiet, Bao Loc, Dalat and Ban Me Thuot refuel points. A message was dispatched to USARV on the 10th of October 1970 requesting instructions on turning the refuel point over to the Vietnamese. USARV forwarded the message to MACV on 11 October 1970 and we are presently awaiting final implementing instructions.

c. Future Projects - Future projects under the Improvement and Modernization of the Vietnamese Military Forces Program include:

a. Small Tug #2107 - Small Tug #2107, currently located in Haoshuang, Taiwan, is scheduled to be transferred to the 5th AF in Nha Trang in the near future. Repair work has been completed on the tug. The vessel's return is pending the availability of a tow to bring it back to Cam Ranh Bay. The tug will be used by the Vietnamese for port operations at Nha Trang. Although no deep draft cargo vessels are planned to be used at Nha Trang, POL barges will require the tug's use.

b. Y-Tanker - The Y-Tanker of the 10th Transportation Battalion will eventually be turned over to the Vietnamese. A proposed LARV program has been approved to train a Vietnamese crew. At this time, a Vietnamese unit has not been identified to begin training or assume ownership of the vessel following a SWIFT transfer.

c. Yankee Ammo Area - All US ammunition operations in the Yankee Ammunition Area have been closed out. Concurrently, the Vietnamese are planning the construction of a large ammunition storage area near Dong Ha. The Yankee Ammo Area was offered the Vietnamese in lieu of the programmed construction of the new ASP or for use until the new ASP was constructed. The Vietnamese have notified us that they do not want the Yankee Ammo Area at all. Therefore, Yankee Ammo Area as an Improvement and Modernization project is now closed.

d. Duffel Bag - The Cam Ranh Bay Duffel Bag Facility is programmed for turnover to the Vietnamese. Since the first of the year, two Vietnamese captians have been working at the facility under Project BUDDY. At this time, we have approximately 50 Vietnamese receiving training, with a projected total of 125 by the end of the year. The facility is programmed to be ABVized by 30 September 1971.

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e. Project "HIT" (RF/PF Family Housing) - Following a recommendation by USARV to MACV that future issues of project HIT materials emanate from the Vietnamese supply points, an area at Nha Trang was proposed for the storage and issue of HIT materials. USARV informed us that the proposed area would have to be at Cam Ranh. A survey of the Army area at Cam Ranh Bay was made, but the USARV requirements could not be met. A reply was sent to USARV on 23 September 1970 informing them that an ideal area on South Beach, currently occupied by the Marine Maintenance Activity, could be made available if that activity is relocated from Cam Ranh Bay. At the present time, no reply has been received from USARV.

f. USAMMAV - The United States Army Marine Maintenance Activity-Vietnam has initiated a program to prepare the Vietnamese Army to support its own watercraft. The ARVN 306th General Support/Direct Support Group is the Vietnamese unit whose mission is most closely aligned to that of the USAMMAV. Twenty ARVN personnel from the 306th Group are presently participating in a BUDDY Training program at MMAV. Upon completion of this training, the Vietnamese will return to their unit to instruct additional Vietnamese. We are presently formulating plans to transfer MMAV equipment assets to the Vietnamese so that they may assume the entire marine maintenance mission when MMAV is inactivated.

(b) Vietnamese Training Status.

1. Total trained prior to 1 September 1970:

<u>NUMBER TRAINED</u>	<u>AREA OF TRAINING</u>
2	Repair & calibration of test equipment
2	Technical inspection of laundry units
3	Aluminum welding
5	POL handling and operations
4	Cadre for future POL classes
1	Radar repair
2	Carrier repair
1	Radio repair
2	Generator repair
9	Refrigerator repair
4	Marine maintenance and repair
3	LCM-8 maintenance
6	Winch operators

2. Current Training Program:

<u>NUMBER TRAINING</u>	<u>AREA OF TRAINING</u>
55	Life Raft
20	Marine Maintenance and Training

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3. Anticipated Future Training:

NUMBER TO BE TRAINED

3
2
70
unknown
unknown

AREA OF TRAINING

Seamen for LCUs
Oilers for Y-Tanker
Duffel Bag
Small Tug operations
Port Documentation

(2) Plans Division:

(a) Keystone - During the period, the command continued to experience a reduction in personnel under increment IV of Keystone Robin. The major unit involved in this drawdown was the 2nd Squadron of the 1st Cavalry.

(b) VAPP and Temporary Loans - During the reporting period, command letters and letters of instruction were published implementing USARV Reg 700-20, Temporary Loans and the Vietnam Asset Reconciliation Procedure.

1. Temporary loan of equipment requests were approved by USARV for temporary mission essential requirements. The items of loan were issued from depot stocks and renewals were guaranteed only by USARV after submission of MTOE/MTDA.

2. VAPP allowed the units of this command to report all excess items on hand in the unit without penalty. This allows the Inventory Control Center-Vietnam to accurately determine what assets are in-country and their location.

3. All the facets of this program have been utilized by the command and are a matter of command interest for staff visits.

(c) Realignment of Military Region II - Realignment planning for Military Region II proved to be a major part of the workload during this period. Lessons learned from this planning will be covered in the next quarterly report.

(d) OPLAN 70-70 - Annex G to USASUPCOM JPR OPLAN 70-70, Severe Weather Conditions, was published and provides guidance to a unit for the preparation for typhoon and other severe weather conditions.

(3) Manpower Management Division:

(a) MTOE/MTDA Actions: The Manpower Management Division processed 36 MTOE documents during the 1st Quarter FY 71. Twelve of these were sent to the Support Command from USARV for implementation. The following units were processed:

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155th Transportation Company

97th Transportation Company

HMC 50th General Support Group

128th Signal Company

129th Maintenance Supply Company

519th Personnel Service Company

7th-41st Corps - TDA

174th Ordnance Detachment

174th Ordnance Detachment

174th Ordnance Detachment - TDA

Twenty-five Initial Detailed MTOR were submitted to the USARPAC SAAC Data Bank.

(b) Unit Actions:

1. The 50th Transportation Group (Y) was inactivated and the carrier unit for the 1st Security Force.

2. The 174th Ordnance Detachment (Y) was inactivated and the carrier unit for the 1st Security Force.

3. The 50th Ordnance Detachment (Y) was inactivated and the carrier unit for the 1st Security Force.

4. The 26th Transportation, HMC was inactivated and the carrier unit for the 1st Security Force effective 13 August 1970.

(4) Security and Intelligence:

(a) Personnel Security Clearance Actions - During the reporting period, a total of 472 requests for personnel security actions were received and 359 clearances were granted or validated. At the close of the period, there were 28 actions pending.

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(b) Document Security - All classified documents in the 3d Division were reviewed for the purpose of regrading or destruction. This resulted in the formal destruction of 107 separate documents which were either obsolete or no longer needed.

(c) Security Inspections - Thirteen separate units were inspected in conjunction with the command's Annual General Inspection (AGI).

(d) War Trophy Registration - A total of 148 war trophies were submitted for intelligence value in accordance with USARV Reg 7-5.2 during the reporting period.

(e) Ground Defense -

1. A BPS (Balance Pressure System) sensor system was acquired and deployed along a ridge line running west of Ammunition Area Alpha and Target #1 & #2. Although operational, the system has not produced any confirmed activations.

2. An average of three reconnaissance patrols a week were conducted in the area of the Cam Ranh peninsula with no significant findings.

3. A Joint USARV/IFPV Sensor Survey was conducted to determine the feasibility of and most likely locations for the employment of a variety of sensor devices.

(f) Intelligence -

1. There were a total of twenty eight confirmed attacks in the Cam Ranh Special Sector during the period 1 October 1970. The majority of these attacks took place in the period 1 October to 15 October. Five of these were rocket/mortar attacks. The majority of these attacks were miscellaneous ambushes/sneakings. The majority of these attacks occurred between the 20th and 31st of the month during the period 1 October 1970. These attacks were independent rocket or mortar attacks and there was to be little if any coordination of significance.

2. The following is a chronological listing of enemy initiated incidents in the Cam Ranh Special Sector.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNIT INVOLVED</u>	<u>ATURE OF ACTION/INCIDENT</u>
011900H 1010	BF920110	ARVN RF	Small arms fire from VC
011700H 1010	PP020015	RCV	Small arms fire from VC

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<u>DTG</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNIT INVOLVED</u>	<u>NATURE OF ACTION/RESULTS</u>
071800H Aug	CP055259 CP055257 CP054265	Air Force	3 x 107mm rockets. None
052345H Aug	CP049319	22d Repl (PDO)	6 satchel charges. Minor damage.
120625H Aug	CP039257	Air Force	3 x rounds type unk. None
262200H Aug	BP910220	ARVN PF	Small arms/B-40. None
300226H Aug	CP069235	Air Force	3 x satchel charges. Moderate damage to Air Force POL farm.
300455H Aug	CP056277 CP060270	Air Force	2 x 107mm rockets. Minor damage to buildings.
021250H Sep	CP025255	542nd Sig Co	5 x 82mm mortars. 4 KIA (US)
110405H Sep	CP059171 CP061171 CP069179 CP069182 CP066188 CP069192	USASUPCOM-CRB	6 x 107mm rockets. 1 KIA (US) 3 KIA (US)
151930H Sep	CP006330	109th QM	Sniper fire, 1 round unk type. 1 KIA (US)
222200H Sep	CP049190	USASUPCOM-CRB	125mm B-40. None
231040H Sep	CP049190	USASUPCOM-CRB	External explosion Ammc Ship "Amerigo" Moderate hull damage.
250345H Sep	BP941219	ARVN PF	8 x B-40 rockets. 3 KIA (PF) 3 KIA (PF)
012130H Oct	BP931199	ARVN PF	Small arms. 1 KIA (PF), 2 1/wpn. 1 radio lost.
032719H Oct	BP931199	ARVN PF	Small arms. None

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<u>DTG</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>UNIT INVOLVED</u>	<u>NATURE OF ACTION/RESULTS</u>
032355H Oct	CP058140 CP062139 CP064143 CP066139 CP067138 CP068134 CP072138	USASUPCOM-CRB	7 x 107mm rockets. T5 POL. Jetty heavily damaged.
040605H Oct	CP053138 CP053139	USASUPCOM-CRB	2 x 107mm rockets. None.
300325H Oct	CP026296	Dong Ba Thin	10 x 82mm mortars. None.
311432H Oct	CP055162 CP053168 CP053172	USASUPCOM-CRB	3 x 107mm rockets. None.

3. Effect of Pyramiding Detainees in Breaking Viet Cong Infra-structure Organizations - At 232000H Oct 70, Harbor Defense at Cam Ranh Bay detained one Vietnamese male in a sampan southwest of the Cam Ranh Peninsula. His actions were very suspicious. Under interrogation, the individual admitted he was an AWOL ARVN soldier who had been working for the VC. He carried weapons, food and salt for the enemy as well as watched and made regular reports on shipping in Cam Ranh Harbor. By extensive exploitation of the detainee, local allied forces were able to develop a list of five additional VC or VC sympathizers. When a search of their homes was made, weapons and explosive charges were found. By application of the principle of pyramiding, a well organized VC sapper cell and VCI operation is being detected and eliminated in the Cam Ranh area.

4. At 300600H Oct 70, the Sui Hoa PF platoon located at CP003325 received one rallier named Pham-Van Cuong. He is believed to be an NVA enlisted-man from the K-98 or K-92 Sapper Battalion located in the Dong Bo Base area. Much of his initial story is inconsistent. He is thought to be of low intelligence and is being exploited by the S-2, Cam Ranh Special Sector.

(5) Operations Division:

(a) Duclap 43-70 - During the period 3-17 August 1970, the command provided logistical support to the 10th Aviation Battalion in support of Operation Duclap 43-70, which took place 60 km southwest of San Me Thuot.

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1. This operation involved the following tactical units in addition to elements of the 10th Ave Bn:

- a. 2nd Bn 45 Regiment (ARVN)
- b. 3rd Bn 45 Regiment (ARVN)
- c. 23rd ARVN Recon Co
- d. 2th ARVN Cav Sqdr (Armored)

2. The operation began with a combat assault by elements of the 45th Regiment into the AO. The 2th Cav moved overland into the AO.

3. Supply consumption for the first day include the following items supplied by this command.

- a. 42,000 gal JP4
- b. 21,000 rls A165 Ammunition
- c. 200 rls P47 Ammunition
- d. 120 rls M359 Ammunition

4. Total logistical support provided by the Support Command included the following:

- a. 20 S/T Ammunition
- b. 99,000 gal JP4

5. Results of the operation: 1 ARVN KIA, 1 ARVN WIA, 21 Enemy KIA
13 small arms captured, 3 persons detained.

(b) Dong Bo 12:

1. During the period 18-19 Sep 70, the command provided logistical support to the 10th Aviation Battalion in support of Dong Bo 12. This operation was conducted west of Cam Ranh Bay in the Dong Bo mountain range. It was a cordon and search operation performed by the 30th ROK Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 29th ROK Regiment.

2. Total logistical support provided by the command consisted of the following:

- a. 15 S/T ammunition
- b. 99,000 gal JP4

3. The majority of the support provided was during the initial insertion on 18 and 19 September and the extraction on the 28th. Due to the

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close proximity of the operation to the Cam Ranh area and the lack of POL storage facilities in the Aviation Battalion, the Support Command provided two 5,000 gal tankers for use by the Aviation Battalion as mobile storage refuel points. Additional tankers were utilized in a shuttle operation to insure that the point was full at all times. S&P trailers (12T semi-trailers) were provided for use as mobile rearm points. This assisted the aviation personnel in quick setting up and breaking down of the rearm/refuel points and saved considerable manpower.

4. Operation Dong Bo 12 was quite successful as numerous bunkers, huts, storage areas and small arms were captured and/or destroyed.

(c) Tuy Hoa Convoy

1. On 17 and 18 October 1970, a convoy was run from Cam Ranh to Tuy Hoa. This was the first convoy to this area by this command in more than one year. The purpose of this convoy was to transport the Headquarters of the 17th Aviation Group (Combat) which relocated to Tuy Hoa from Nha Trang. Another purpose was to test the feasibility of running resupply convoys to the Tuy Hoa area.

2. The convoy was extremely successful, and no problems were encountered. The success proved the feasibility of running such convoys when and if the need arises.

c. ACofS, Supply

(1) On the 27th of July, a directive from USARV arrived at this headquarters implementing Project ART (Accelerated Reduction of Tonnage). This project established FY 71 quarterly tonnage goals for the reduction of Class II and IV, Class VII and Class IX supplies at the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay. The first Quarter FY 71 goal required that Class II and IX be reduced to 57,000 short tons, the Depot attained 99.6% of the goal. Class VII was to be reduced to 11,000 short tons; 20.0% of this goal was attained. The assumption of the Qui Nhon vehicle park caused this shortfall.

(2) The ACofS, Supply assumed staff responsibility for retrograde in September, 1970. Retrograde is the movement off shore of Depot excess, Ammo and Reparables. In the month of September the goals established by USARV were 1900 S/T in Reparables, 200 S/T in Ammo, and 12,000 tires in Depot excess. Of these targets, only the 12,000 tires were missed. This was due to the late arrival of the Fringe programs from ICCV. (1st Quarter only)

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(3) Class II, IV and VII - The Cam Ranh Bay II, IV and VII DSU continued to exceed the command goal of 75% demand satisfaction. The DSU received 13,142 ASL requests and filled 10,923 for a 83.1% demand satisfaction. Demand accommodation attained was 90.4% for this quarter.

(4) The USASUPCOM-CRE Self-Service Supply Center continued to exceed the Command goal of 90% demand satisfaction. The Nha Trang store received 3,094 requests and filled 2,720 for a 87.9% demand satisfaction. Combined statistics for both stores show a demand satisfaction of 89.3% for the 1st Quarter. Zero balances were received from 14.4% average for the month of September to a combined figure of 17.8% during the month of October 1970.

(5) On 1 July 1970, a report was received by the 12 Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, to implement Project RFP (Paper Expenditure) as of 1 August 1970. This project is to identify, nominate, inventory and process high dollar value, high volume, and bulk items which may be excess. To date, 439 lines have been nominated for RFP. Eighty-three requisitions for 230 lines have been received. The total tonnage is 1,114.9 GWT, with a dollar value of \$11,732,416.

ACofS: Supply:

(1) The Command's Supply Control System (SCS) goal for fiscal year was established at 100% for all supply commands.

- () Supply Control System \$ 00,000.00
- () Supply Control System \$ 00,000.00
- (c) Supply Control System \$ 00,000.00
- d) Supply Control System \$ 00,000.00
- (-) Supply Control System \$ 00,000.00

The DA's 1st Air Force and 1st Air Force Inspection Team visited the 12 Army Depot, Cam Ranh Bay, on 1 October 1970. The purpose of the visit was to determine the effectiveness of the depot's operations and the problems experienced.

(3) In October, the USARV DCS, Comptroller notified the Cam Ranh Bay ACofS Comptroller that reimbursement to Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) was not being made by Military Construction, Army (MCA) for OMA financed stocks issued for MCA projects. Although there is no policy or guidance from USARV

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for recoupment of these funds, engineer units are required to report cost data for each project in process to the US Army Engineer Command-Vietnam. This should have been the basis for the transfer of funds from MCA to OMA. Since there was a severe reduction of USARV OMA funds for FY 71, reimbursement from MCA became significant. Subsequently, a representative from this office visited the 35th Engineer Group to review construction directives issued by USAECV for MCA projects. As a result \$226,250.00 has been identified for transfer from MCA to OMA. Information necessary for recoupment of the funds was forwarded to USARV. This office has implemented procedures to recoup the reimbursements due OMA from MCA in the future.

(4) Figures on the shipment of ammunition from Cam Ranh Bay to Qui Nhon by the break bulk and SLAM methods were furnished by the ACofS Transportation to Comptroller on 17 October 1970. Information for costs of unloading by both methods at Qui Nhon, including the backloading of empty trailers, were furnished by Transportation. These factors have been considered and merged with costs at Cam Ranh Bay to determine the actual costs for a short ton of ammunition handled to supply Qui Nhon ammunition needs. The cost analysis by the Comptroller has been completed and is now undergoing study.

e. ACofS, Ammunition

During the reporting period, ammunition received and shipped amounted to 62,449 STONS.

	<u>AMMUNITION</u>	<u>RECEIVED</u>	<u>SHIPPED</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
RECEIVED	10,000	10,000	10,000	20,000
ISSUES	10,000	10,000	10,000	20,000
LSA	1,000	1,000	1,000	2,000
DA NAVY	3,000	3,000	3,000	12,000
LONG BINH	900	100	100	1,000
QUI NHON	4,000	3,333	3,333	10,907
OTHERS	4,000	2,075	4,405	11,562

f. ACofS, Services

(1) Graves Registration GR - 120 in the Support Command processed 120 remains during the reporting period. This is a decrease of 62 from the previous reporting period.

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(2) Field Laundry: The field laundry processed 629,450 lbs during the quarter which is a decrease of 142,986 lbs from the previous quarter. This decrease was due to lost time which was a result of a burned out boiler, C-Day and yellow alerts. Contract laundry costs for the quarter was \$283,903.52. The cumulative cost for the period July through October 1970 was \$383,917.51. This is \$78,040.49 under the Command established goal.

(3) Storm Damage: On 28 October 1970, the Cam Ranh area was hit by Tropical Storm Louise. The full extent of the damage is not yet known; however, the initial estimate by the Installation coordinator put the damage at \$225,000. This occurred mainly in terms of damage to roadways, facilities and utilities. The majority of the destruction involved total or partial loss of roofs; however, six troop billets and twenty miscellaneous small structures were destroyed.

(4) On 3 October 1970, the T-5 FOL Jetty was heavily damaged by enemy action. Repair was made by the 497th Engr. Co. (PC). The Jetty was back in operation on 7 October 1970.

f. ACoFS, Maintenance

Keystone Asset Repair Program: The Keystone Asset Repair Program was originally contracted for a total of 4400 vehicles. This total was subsequently reduced to 3200 vehicles by USARV, based on in-country requirements. As a schedule of 612 vehicles through 3 October 1970, 446 items have been completed. An additional 446 items are on hand for completion which represents a backlog of 5 weeks. Another 319 items are awaiting parts. We anticipate generating some reparable assets from Keystone Robin Bravo; however, initial indications are that these will be insufficient to continue production at the required rate.

g. ACoFS, Transportation

(1) Project SLAM: Class V support to Qui Nhon was continued during the quarter utilizing the Sea-Land Ammunition Movement (SLAM) system. A total of 33 shipments were made moving 7021 S/T. Four of the shipments were made break-bulk due to time involved in returning trailers to this location. Total Class V support of Qui Nhon from Cam Ranh began on 1 September with the majority of this support to be provided by SLAM.

(2) MILVAN Pilot Program: Since the initiation of the MILVAN Pilot Program with the arrival of the Seatrain "Puerto Rico" on 28 June 1970, Cam Ranh Bay has received seven Seatrain vessels and has discharged 395 MILVAN containers. A total 179 fully stuffed MILVAN containers have been outloaded of which 86 were shipped to Okinawa on the USS "Comet". The average lift time (time involved in lifting the vessel to the chassis and locking it in place) is 5-8 minutes, with an average turnaround time (time from ship to marshalling yard and return) of 25 minutes.

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(a) The most recent concept involving MILVAN is the plan for ammunition containerization. This concept involves ammunition throughput from CONUS to the field Ammunition Supply Point (ASP). The first ammo containers are scheduled to arrive at Cam Ranh Bay in March 1971. The schedule projects two vessels every 15 days with 463 containers per vessel, which would represent approximately 14,800 S/T (approximately 75% of the monthly ammunition requirement at Cam Ranh Bay).

(b) The original MILVAN concept envisioned the conversion of four Moore McCormack Line vessels converted to container service; however, prior to the implementation of the project, Seatrain vessels were substituted. Seatrain vessels are capable of holding 140 containers, the remaining space being utilized by general cargo. The cost of MILVAN is determined by subtracting the total weight of the general cargo from the cost of the voyage; therefore, if there are four ports of call including two MILVAN ports, the additional time is included in the voyage cost. Seatrain vessels are on an extended time charter basis ranging from \$9,630 to \$10,480 per day depending upon the vessel. The total cost of MILVAN per voyage depends upon the length of the voyage from CONUS to Pacific ports and return. Seatrain vessels have visited Yang Tau and Sattahip in addition to Cam Ranh Bay, Newport and San Diego. Based on computations, the one way cost, CONUS to RVN, is estimated to be a maximum of \$1,020.00 per container and a minimum of \$705.00 per container depending upon the terms of the vessel charter.

(3) ARVNization of the Nha Trang Outport Operational responsibility for the Nha Trang Outport was transferred to the 5th ARVN Logistical Command on 1 August 1970. The USASUPCOM-CRB concept of operations was as follows:

(a) Shallow draft operations were transferred to the ARVN on 1 August 1970. A local agreement between the Commanding Officer, 5th ALC and the Commanding Officer, 124th Transportation Command was agreed upon, and approval of the joint MACV/RVNAF agreement was signed on 27 October 1970.

(b) All deep draft vessels with cargo consigned to the Nha Trang Outport were diverted to Cam Ranh Bay after 1 August. Cargo consigned to the ARVN is to be transhipped via lighterage to Nha Trang to be discharged by the 5th ALC.

(c) All US cargo consigned to Nha Trang will be transported via line haul convey after 1 August except for special request cargo which will be cleared through the 5th ALC Terminal Commander prior to shipment.

(d) The Alaska, Barge & Transport tug "Panther" was withdrawn on 1 August, and harbor tug service at Nha Trang became the responsibility of the 124th Transportation Command until ST 0107 is transferred to the ARVN. Transfer cannot be accomplished

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until the tug is returned from out of country maintenance in Taiwan. Upon return, the vessel will be tested and turned over to the 5th ALC for use in Nha Trang. The 5th ALC currently has personnel assigned to the 124th Trans Command in harbor craft training.

(e) The ROKA passenger operations remained at Nha Trang until 1 October 1970 when the mission was transferred to Cam Ranh Bay. This operation is further discussed below.

(f) ROKA Passenger Operations: The 124th Transportation Command has been tasked with the responsibility for embarkation/debarkation of ROKA personnel and the discharge/load of cargo on USNS troop ships arriving at Cam Ranh Bay. The troop ship mission was transferred to this location from Nha Trang on 1 October. Two vessels arrived during October with no major problems developing at the port.

(g) AVHization of Landing Crafts Utility (LCUs) and Liquid Cargo Vessel
Design 2014 (Y-Tanker)

(a) Currently three Landing Crafts Utility (LCUs) are in administrative storage due to a lack of crews. The AVHization program would allow these vessels to be released and would provide for reduced US strength and requirements for the remaining vessels.

(b) The Liquid Cargo Vessel, Design 2014 (Y-Tanker) has also been included in this program with the intention of eventually turning the vessel over to the Vietnamese Navy. This would allow for a RVNAF coastal ice capability.

(c) Vietnamese Army personnel will be trained initially as LCU seamen (MOS 61A10) and oilers (MOS 61C20). As the program developed, it could be phased to include training for Master/Mate (MOS 61P40) and Chief Engineer (MOS 61C40) for the more highly qualified personnel. Vietnamese Navy personnel will also be trained as seamen and oilers on the Y-Tanker. The program will be similar to that of the Army personnel. The following program has been approved and will be placed into effect when the students are available.

1. Phase I (All MOS)

Basic Orientation 7-10 days
1. Nautical terminology
2. Nomenclature
3. Safety

2. Phase II (MOS 61A10, 61C20 & 61C40)

On the job training 16 weeks

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3. Phase III (MOS 61B30 & 61C30)

On the job training-Length dependent on
individual ability

4. Phase IV (MOS 61B40 & 61C40)

On the job training-length dependent on
individual ability

(d) All training will be conducted on a "Buddy System" basis. Phase III and IV could require up to 20 weeks.

(e) A request for personnel to implement the training program was forwarded to USARV on 26 July and retransmitted on 10 August 1970.

(6) Transfer of Equipment to the Vietnamese: The ST 1978 was officially transferred to the Vietnamese during the month of September 1970. Observations regarding this transfer are noted in the Lessons-Learned section.

(7) Records established by the 124th Transportation Command:

1. 12 September 1970- Discharged from one Sealand vessel (Long Beach)
1,922 S/T in 24 hours.

(b) September 1970- Sealand Discharge in one month- 62,900 S/T*

(c) September 1970- Sealand Outload in one month- 50,234 S/T*

(d) September 1970- Sealand total handled in one month- 119,142 S/T*

(e) October 1970- Deep draft outload (excluding Sealand) in one month-
19,929 S/T.

* Figures include tonnage discharge/outloaded for tra shipment.

1. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Evaluation, Observations and Recommendations

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations

(1) Long Term Storage of Keystone Assets.

(a) Observation: A large portion of the Keystone generated assets received by the contractor and stored for an indefinite period of time, becomes inoperable. Also, assets received in an already inoperable condition receive further damage in many instances because of long-term storage.

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(b) Evaluation: Long periods of time in storage produce some deterioration of exposed equipment resulting in higher labor and replacement costs. Additionally, cannibalization is evident and both willful and careless damage often occurs while equipment is in storage and intransit. Another, and more direct result, is the deterioration of seals and brake systems. In some cases, entire brake systems require replacement.

(c) Recommendations: Keystone generated equipment should be processed as expeditiously as possible and work ordered from the closest available maintenance facility to minimize repair costs.

(?) Implementation of Keystone Drawdown.

(a) Observations: With the implementation of Keystone Robin USARV OPLAN 183-70, USASUPCOM-CRB was tasked to provide the facilities and administration needed for Keystone units to withdraw and turn in equipment in Cam Ranh Bay. The following are procedures found to be needed to insure rapid and orderly phasedown.

(b) Evaluation:

1. USASUPCOM-CRB OPORD 8-70 was published implementing USARV OPLAN 183-70 for Support Command units.

2. Immediate notification by headquarters of all units to bring drawdown under Keystone Bravo is required for expeditious planning and fulfillment of USARV OPLAN 183-70 requirements.

3. A planning and coordination conference should be held between all affected headquarters and units upon notification to begin the scheduling of drawdown, stand down dates, call-in dates and the requirements of each headquarters. Continuous and detailed coordination during the balance of the drawdown phase is necessary.

4. Submission of equipment inventories from affected units to the ACOFS Maintenance and to the 54th General Support Group (major subordinate command) should also be accomplished rapidly so that scheduling can be accomplished with a minimum disruption to normal operations.

5. Transportation requirements must be submitted early in the planning stage so that scheduling again can be accomplished with a minimum disruption to normal operations. Primary and alternate means of transportation must be considered.

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6. Host units for withdrawal must be assigned as soon as possible to allow for preparation of living and messing areas.

7. Units should be withdrawn in segments, i.e., company, battery, troop, with equipment to expedite processing.

8. SCRAM coding teams must be sent to each unit to pre-code all equipment. This smoothes out processing when the unit brings in equipment.

(c) Recommendations: In implementing Keystone drawdown, a careful study of, and where the situation allows adherence to, the aforementioned procedures will prove very helpful.

(3) MILVAN Pilot Program.

(a) Observations: It has been observed that poor stowage planning aboard Seatrain vessels has somewhat limited the efficiency of MILVAN handling operations.

(b) Evaluations: In many instances, containers were stowed in such a manner that containers consigned to other ports had to be restowed in order to backload Cam Ranh Bay containers without overstay. The Seatrain "Maryland" was completely discharged at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon before it could accept Cam Ranh Bay retrograde cargo. To preclude stowage problems a message requesting prestow planning for MILVAN was transmitted to MOTBA, Oakland, California.

1. Landing Gear construction: Extreme caution must be exercised in locking the landing legs of the MILVAN chassis after they have been lowered. When the legs are not fully extended, it is possible to push the locking pins in place and miss the receiver holes causing the legs to collapse and the van to fall forward. The landing gear is also less durable and more mechanically complicated than conventional military trailers. A program of equipment improvement recommendations is currently in progress to attempt to improve MILVAN equipment deficiencies.

2. Incompatibility with the M-52 Tractor: Only when the MILVANs are at a complete 90 degree angle to the tractor duals can the coupling be made without interfering with the landing legs. The higher center of gravity of the MILVAN when coupled often causes road instability which is extremely dangerous when operating on wet roadways and on mountain highways. Extensive driver training has been undertaken with emphasis on correct coupling procedures and proper operation, particularly on adverse roadways.

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3. The plan for Ammunition Containerization provides for the MILVAN containers to be in-country (RVN) for a maximum of 15 days. This is an insufficient amount of time in which to discharge, transship to the ASP, return to Cam Ranh Bay and to generate sufficient container-compatible retrograde cargo.

4. It has been observed that the projected schedule of arrivals for Seatrain has not been followed. During September 1970, the Seatrains "Puerto Rico" and "Carolina" were in port during the same period while none were scheduled to arrive in October. The Seatrain "Ohio" and the Seatrain "Maryland" are scheduled to be at Cam Ranh Bay on 13 November 1970. The inconsistent scheduling of Seatrain vessels prevents the maximum utilization of MILVAN containers for retrograde in that fully stuffed containers are not shipped. In addition, discharge time and congestion are increased when two Seatrains berth during the same period.

5. It has been found that Seatrain vessels are inefficient due to excessive in-port time of the vessels and double handling of containers caused by poor stow planning. All of the factors inflate cost and create an unbalanced picture in the efficiency of the MILVAN test program.

6. This command has recommended that MILVAN containers be tested for transport on the C5A aircraft. Approximately fourteen MILVAN containers can be loaded aboard an aircraft. The Air Force has indicated that Engineering tests must be performed to determine if MILVAN is compatible to air transport. If proven valid, flexibility of the Milvan containerized concept would be greatly increased.

7. Since MILVAN chassis are more compatible to commercial tractors, this command is considering the possibility of using commercial tractors for the MILVAN operation. There are currently 25 excess commercial tractors at Cam Ranh Bay that could be utilized for MILVAN.

(c) Recommendations: The use of Seatrain vessels is an inefficient and time consuming method of ocean transport and defeats the essential purpose and feature of containerized shipments: speed in discharge and clearance of the port. The costs of ocean transport are inflated and are not valid. If the MILVAN project is to be expanded, it is recommended that future container shipments be made via self-sustaining, container-compatible vessels. Every effort should be made to expedite engineering test of the MILVAN container and its adaptability to the C5A aircraft. Timely and evenly spaced vessel arrivals are an important key to the efficiency of the MILVAN program. To preclude time consuming congestion, and to aid the

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MILVAN retrograde program, it is recommended that consideration be given to improve the Seatrain schedule.

(4) Transfer of Equipment to the Vietnamese.

(a) Observations: The transfer of Small Tug 1978 to the Vietnamese was hampered by a lack of consolidated procedures for turn-over. This is evidenced by the fact that many of the items listed as required components for transfer are peculiar to the Vietnamese and are not in our supply system.

(b) Evaluations: These items are identified as requirements of TOE 10-930 which is an ARVN TOE. Additionally, turnover procedures are provided by the following references:

1. Letter, HQ MACV, MACJ464, 25 July 1970 (C), subject: Equipment Turnover Procedures, Tug Boats (U).

2. Letter, HQ MACV, MACJ464, 14 Feb 1970, subject: Equipment Turn-over Procedures- KEYSTONE BLUEJAY (FOUO), with change 1 dated 6 Mar 1970.

3. Letter, HQ MACV, MACJ464, 28 Mar 1970 (C), subject: Equipment Turnover Procedures Tug Boats (U).

4. Letter, HQ USARV, AVHGD-POO, 10 May 1970, subject: USARV Administrative and Logistical SOP for the Transfer of US Equipment Under the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program.

5. In addition to the previous, numerous messages have been transmitted containing further requirements.

(c) Recommendations: Recommend that a consolidated procedural guide be published outlining all requirements for equipment transfers to the Vietnamese.

c. Training: None.

d. Intelligence: None.

e. Logistics: None.

f. Organization: None

g. Other:

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(1) Interservice Support Agreement Inspections.


(a) Observations: Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) inspections were conducted 1 October 1970 by representatives of the ACoFS, Comptroller at the Class II, III and IV yards and DSU, 18th POL Platoon, 262nd Quartermaster Bn, and the 54th General Support Group at Nha Trang. A similar inspection was conducted at the Class IX yard, Consolidated Tech Supply, 69th Maintenance Bn and 54th General Support Group on the 14th and 15th of October 1970. The inspections revealed that in some cases, customers were not being billed as a result of general lack of knowledge by personnel of ISSA oriented activities of the ISSA program. Main problems centered around general ISSA procedures such as processing reimbursable issue documents correctly. The two activities had been inspected in 1969 with similar results. Original personnel rotated, successors were not taught the procedures and guidance documents were misplaced. During the inspection, however, personnel continue to be briefed by the inspectors, and a complete file of applicable ISSAs are furnished the activity.

(b) Evaluations: Personnel at the supply activities are not knowledgeable of ISSA listings, forms and publications concerned. The training of new personnel is inadequate and standing operating procedures are not comprehensive so that there are no concrete directions governing the ISSA program.

(c) Recommendation: Periodic inspections of supply facilities should be conducted at least every 60 days. Each activity must develop a standing operating procedure for ISSAs with careful references to applicable forms, publications and ISSA listings. Finally, new personnel must be thoroughly oriented and instructed in the ISSA procedures if the US Army is to be reimbursed. Since USARV's operating budget has been significantly reduced for fiscal 1971, the ISSA program has assumed added importance.

6 Incl
as

Incls 1 & 3 thru 6 w/d HQ DA


H.A. KISSINGER
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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AVHDO-DO (31 Oct 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army Support
Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970, RCS CSFOR-65

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 12 JAN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1970 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command Cam Ranh Bay.

2. Reference item concerning "Keystone Asset Repair Program," Section 1, page 15, paragraph f; concur. The number of wheeled vehicles scheduled to be repaired at CRB was reduced to 2400 on 3 November 1970 to reflect a further decrease in the anticipated in-country supply requirements. KEYSTONE Robin Bravo receipts at CRB have been insufficient to sustain production at the scheduled rate, and action has been taken to provide additional repairable assets by:

a. Job ordering from depot excess those 3/4-Ton Trucks which meet the ARVN mileage criteria.

b. Transferring a number of repairable KEYSTONE wheel vehicles from USASUPCOM-QNH to USASUPCOM-CRB.

No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



Clark W. Stevens Jr.
Captain AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
USASUPCOM-CRB

GPOP-DT (31 Oct 70) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Support Command
Cam Ranh Bay, for Period Ending 31 October 1970,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 FEB 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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CASUALTIES

1. 54th General Support Group

a. August 1970

(1) CROWN (Non-hostile death, prior to medical treatment) 1

b. September 1970

(1) REACH (Non-hostile death, after reaching medical facilities) 1

(2) CROWN (Non-hostile death, prior to medical treatment) 1

(3) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI) 1

c. October 1970

(1) ETHER (Killed in action) 1

(2) CROWN (Non-hostile death, prior to medical treatment) 3

(3) LOYAL (Non-hostile, VSI or SI) 1

(4) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI) 2

2. 124th Transportation Command

a. August 1970

(1) CROWN (Non-hostile death, prior to medical treatment) 1

(2) LOYAL (Non-hostile, VSI or SI) 1

(3) FRIAR Elect (Hostile, lightly wounded) 1

(4) FRIAR Non-elect (Hostile, lightly wounded) 1

b. September 1970

(1) CROWN (Non-hostile death, prior to medical treatment) 1

(2) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI) 3

c. October 1970

(1) FRIAR Non-elect (Hostile, lightly wounded) 4

(2) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI) 6

3. JSAMMAV

a. August 1970

(1) CROWN (Non-hostile death, prior to medical treatment) 2

b. September 1970

None

c. October 1970

None

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4. USAD-CRB

a. August 1970
None

b. September 1970

(1) ETHER (Killed in action)	1
(2) FRIAR Elect (Hostile, lightly wounded)	1
(3) FRIAR Non-elect (Hostile, lightly wounded)	3

c. October 1970
None

5. USASUPCOM-CRB

No casualty reports of any kind

6. H2. Special Troops

a. August 1970
None

b. September 1970
None

c. October 1970

(1) MISC (Non-hostile, not VSI or SI)	1
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~~Inclosure 2~~

UNCLASSIFIED

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AGDA-A (M) (5 Apr 71)

DAMO-ODU 704203

13 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans ATTN: DAMO-ODU within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl
as

Verne L. Bowers
VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND CAM RANH BAY
APO 96312

AVCA GO-H

31 October 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Hqs, US Army Support
Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DSI, APO San
Francisco 96375

Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO San
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TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations and Plans, Department
of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. WITHDRAWN

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CLASSIFIED BY: US ARMY SUPPORT
Command Cam Ranh Bay, 31 Oct 70
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR
INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1976

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31 October 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army
Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Evaluation, Observation and Recommendations:

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations

(1) Long Term Storage of Keystone Assets.

(a) Observation: A large portion of the Keystone generated assets received by the contractor and stored for an indefinite period of time, becomes inoperable. Also, assets received in an already inoperable condition receive further damage in many instances because of long-term storage.

18 (b) Evaluation: Long periods of time in storage produce some deterioration of exposed equipment resulting in higher labor and replacement costs. Additionally, cannibalization is evident and both willful and careless damage often occurs while equipment is in storage and intransit. Another, and more direct result is the deterioration of seals and brake systems. In some cases, entire brake systems require replacement.

(c) Recommendations: Keystone generated equipment should be processed as expeditiously as possible and work ordered from the closest available maintenance facility to minimize repair costs.

(2) Implementation of Keystone Drawdown.

(a) Observation: With the implementation of Keystone Robin USARV OPLAN 183-70. USASUPCOM-CRB was tasked to provide the facilities and administration needed for Keystone units to withdraw and turn in equipment in Cam Ranh Bay. The following are procedures found to be needed to insure rapid and orderly phasedown.

(b) Evaluation:

1. USASUPCOM-CRB OPORD 8-70 was published implementing USARV OPLAN 183-70 for Support Command units.

2. Immediate notification by headquarters of all units to bring drawdown under Keystone Bravo is required for expeditious planning and fulfillment of USARV OPLAN 183-70 requirements.

3. A planning and coordination conference should be held between all affected headquarters and units upon notification to begin the scheduling of drawdown, standdown dates, call-in dates and the requirements of each headquarters. Continuous and detailed coordination during the balance of the

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drawdown phase is necessary.

4. Submission of equipment densitites from affected units to the ACofS Maintenance and to the 54th General Support Group (major subordinate command) should also be accomplished rapidly so that scheduling can be accomplished with a minimum disruption to normal operations.

5. Transportation requirements must be submitted early in the planning stage so that scheduling again can be accomplished with a minimum disruption to normal operations. Primary and alternate means of transportation must be considered.

6. Host units for withdrawal must be assigned as soon as possible to allow for preparation of living and messing areas.

7. Units should be withdrawn in segments, ie., company, battery, troop, with equipment to expedite processing.

8. SCRAM coding teams must be sent to each unit to pre-code all equipment. This smoothes out processing when the unit brings in equipment.

(c) Recommendations: In implementing Keystone drawdown, a careful study of, and where the situation allows adherence to, the aforementioned procedures will prove very helpful.

(3) MILVAN Pilot Program.

(a) Observations: It has been observed that poor stowage planning aboard Seatrain vessels has somewhat limited the efficiency of MILVAN handling operations.

(b) Evaluations: In many instances, containers were stowed in such a manner that containers consigned to other ports had to be restowed in order to backload Cam Ranh Bay containers without overstay. The Seatrain "Maryland" was completely discharged at Cam Ranh Bay and Qui Nhon before it could accept Cam Ranh Bay retrograde cargo. To preclude stowage problems a message requesting prestow planning for MILVAN was transmitted to MOTBA, Oakland, California.

1. Landing Gear construction: Extreme caution must be exercised in locking the landing legs of the MILVAN chassis after they have been lowered. When the legs are not fully extended, it is possible to push the locking pins in place and miss the receiver holes causing the legs to collapse and the van to fall forward. The landing gear is also less durable and more mechanically complicated than conventional military trailers. A program of equipment improvement recommendations is currently in progress to attempt to improve MILVAN equipment deficiencies.

2. Incompatibility with the M-52 Tractor: Only when the MILVANs are at a complete 90 degree angle to the tractor duals can the coupling be made without interfering with the landing legs. The higher center of gravity of the MILVAN when coupled often causes road instability which is extremely dangerous when operating on wet roadways and on mountain highways. Extensive driver training has been undertaken with emphasis on correct coupling procedures and proper operation, particularly on adverse roadways.

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3. The plan for Ammunition Containerization provides for the MILVAN containers to be in-country (RVN) for a maximum of 15 days. This is an insufficient amount of time in which to discharge, transship to the ASP, return to Cam Ranh Bay and to generate sufficient container-compatible retrograde cargo.

4. It has been observed that the projected schedule of arrivals for Seatrain has not been followed. During September 1970, the Seatrains "Puerto Rico" and "Carolina" were in port during this same period while none were scheduled to arrive in October. The Seatrain "Ohio" and the Seatrain "Maryland" are scheduled to be at Cam Ranh Bay on 13 November 1970. The inconsistent scheduling of Seatrain vessels prevents the maximum utilization of MILVAN containers for retrograde in that fully stuffed containers are not shipped. In addition, discharge time and congestion are increased when two Seatrains berth during the same period.

5. It has been found that Seatrain vessels are inefficient due to excessive in-port time of the vessels and double handling of containers caused by poor stow planning. All of the factors inflate cost and create an unbalanced picture in the efficiency of the MILVAN test program.

6. This command has recommended that MILVAN containers be tested for transport on the C5A aircraft. Approximately fourteen MILVAN containers can be loaded aboard an aircraft. The Air Force has indicated that Engineering tests must be performed to determine if MILVAN is compatible to air transport. If proven valid, flexibility of the Milvan containerized concept would be greatly increased.

7. Since MILVAN chassis are more compatible to commercial tractors, this command is considering the possibility of using commercial tractors for the MILVAN operation. There are currently 25 excess commercial tractors at Cam Ranh Bay that could be utilized for MILVAN.

(c) Recommendations: The use of Seatrain vessels is an inefficient and time consuming method of ocean transport and defeats the essential purpose and feature of containerized shipments: speed in discharge and clearance of the port. The costs of ocean transport are inflated and are not valid. If the MILVAN project is to be expanded, it is recommended that future container shipments be made via self-sustaining, container-compatible vessels. Every effort should be made to expedite engineering test of the MILVAN container and its adaptability to the C5A aircraft. Timely and evenly spaced vessel arrivals are an important key to the efficiency of the MILVAN program. To preclude time consuming congestion, and to aid the

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MILVAN retrograde program, it is recommended that consideration be given to improve the Seatrain schedule.

(4) Transfer of Equipment to the Vietnamese.

(a) Observations: The transfer of Small Tug 1978 to the Vietnamese was hampered by a lack of consolidated procedures for turn-over. This is evidenced by the fact that many of the items listed as required components for transfer are peculiar to the Vietnamese and are not in our supply system.

(b) Evaluations: These items are identified as requirements of TOE 10-930 which is an ARVN TOE. Additionally, turnover procedures are provided by the following references:

1. Letter, HQ MACV, MACJ464, 25 July 1970 (C), subject: Equipment Turnover Procedures, Tug Boats (U).

2. Letter, HQ MACV, MACJ464, 14 Feb 1970, subject: Equipment Turn-over Procedures- KEYSTONE BLUEJAY (FOUO), with change 1 date 6 Mar 1970.

3. Letter, HQ MACV, MACJ464, 28 Mar 1970 (C), subject: Equipment Turnover Procedures Tug Boats (U).

4. Letter, HQ USARV, AVHGD-POO, 10 May 1970, subject: USARV Administrative and Logistical SOP for the Transfer of US Equipment Under the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program.

5. In addition to the previous, numerous messages have been transmitted containing further requirements.

(c) Recommendations: Recommend that a consolidated procedural guide be published outlining all requirements for equipment transfer to the Vietnamese.

c. Training: None.

d. Intelligence: None.

e. Logistics: None.

f. Organization: None

g. Other:

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
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters US Army
Support Command Cam Ranh Bay, Period Ending 31 October 1970

(1) Interservice Support Agreement Inspections.

(a) Observation: Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) inspections were conducted 1 October 1970 by representatives of the ACfS, Comptroller at the Class II, III and IV yards and DSU, 18th POL Platoon, 262nd Quartermaster Bn, and the 54th General Support Group at Nha Trang. A similar inspection was conducted at the Class IX yard, Consolidated Tech Supply, 69th Maintenance Bn and 54th General Support Group on the 14th and 15th of October 1970. The inspections revealed that in some cases, customers were not being billed as a result of general lack of knowledge by personnel of ISSA oriented activities of the ISSA program. Main problems centered around general ISSA procedures such as processing reimbursable issue documents correctly. The two activities had been inspected in 1969 with similar results. Original personnel rotated, successors were not taught the procedures and guidance documents were misplaced. During the inspection, however, personnel continue to be briefed by the inspectors, and a complete file of applicable ISSAs are furnished the activity.

(b) Evaluation: Personnel at the supply activities are not knowledgeable of ISSA listings, forms and publications concerned. The training of new personnel is inadequate and standing operating procedures are not comprehensive so that there are not concrete directions governing the ISSA program.

(c) Recommendation: Periodic inspections of supply facilities should be conducted at least every 60 days. Each activity must develop a standing operating procedure for ISSAs with careful references to applicable forms, publications and ISSA listings. Finally, new personnel must be thoroughly oriented and instructed in the ISSA procedures if the US Army is to be reimbursed. Since USARV's operating budget has been significantly reduced for fiscal 1971, the ISSA program has assumed added importance.


H.A. KISSINGER
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

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