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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

(2)

IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP (M) (8 Oct 71) DAJD-OTT

26 October 1971

SUBJECT: ~~Operational Reports~~ Lessons Learned, 504th MP Bn, 89th MP Gp, 16th MP Gp, 18th MP Bde, 720th MP Bn, 8th MP Gp, ~~Report Ending~~ 30 April 1971, RGSCS FOR 65 (R3) (U) (4-8)

"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U. S. C., SECTION 793 AND 794. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW."

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Operational rpt. for period ending 30 Apr 71.

1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAJD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

As Section 1 of the report is not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, it has been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

- Incl
1. DAJD-711072
 2. DAJD-711145
 3. DAJD-711177
 4. DAJD-711211
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2

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AVEGF-KG

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 504th Military Police
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RGS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

2. (U) Lesson Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations,
and Recommendations:

a. Personnel:

(1) OJT Personnel:

(a) Observation: Personnel being accepted to OJT for MOS 95B are not being screened carefully enough in all cases.

(b) Evaluation: Most of the personnel selected for OJT as MOS 95B have proven to be very acceptable, however, some do not meet the minimum standards established by CONARC schools and 4th AIT Brigade for MOS 95B, this results in substandard individuals entering the Military Police Corps. While these substandard personnel are able to perform their duties in lower pay grades, they are not capable of competing at the higher grade levels. This not only creates hardships on the Military Police Corps but also a hardship for the soldiers who find themselves not equipped to compete with their contemporaries.

(c) Recommendations: That the same prerequisites required to attend MP training at 4th AIT Brigade also be used when selecting personnel for on the job training and that no personnel be accepted without a prior screening of his personnel records. The common discrepancy noted was a low GT score.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) Convoy Wrecker Support:

DAFD-OTT
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Incl 1

AVBGF-KG

13 May 1971

4

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 504th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(a) Observations: Units supporting Lam Son 719 moved through MR 1 without adequate wrecker support. Military Police units were called upon numerous times to provide security for disabled vehicles and to escort recovery vehicles.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of adequate wrecker service creates unnecessary security and escort commitments for the military police. This also created unnecessary risk to vehicle operators and military policemen traveling on QL 1 during the hours of darkness.

(c) Recommendation: Wrecker service should be coordinated during the planning stage of convoy movements.

(2) On Post Protection for Sentry Dogs and Handlers Against Mortar/Rocket Attacks:

(a) Observation: Currently there are no provisions made for protection of sentry dogs and handlers against indirect fire attacks.

(b) Evaluation: Because of the type installations which require sentry dog protection, they are also high priority type targets for enemy rocket and mortar fire. No provisions are presently in effect which require the using unit of sentry dog patrols to provide the handler and dog a place of security during indirect fire attacks.

(c) Recommendations: That the requirement for construction of a protective position for sentry dog teams be included in the sentry dog survey.

(3) Military Police and Confrontations:

(a) Observation: Military Police Investigative patrols are often put in untendable positions at the scene of incidents which result in confrontations with the local populace.

(b) Evaluation: Investigation of the accident, protection of US property and personnel falls under the responsibilities of the military police. It is at the same time the responsibility of the Vietnamese government to safe guard US personnel during incidents which develop into confrontations. It has only been through the efforts of the local District Chiefs that these confrontations have reached satisfactory solutions.

(c) Recommendations: Military police should investigate an incident as quickly as possible and at the first indication of a

5
AVBGF-KG

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 504th Military Police
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

confrontation, notify appropriate US Advisory personnel and their counterparts.

e. Training: None

f. Logistics:

(1) Direct Support Maintenance of Military Police Units:

(a) Observation: Direct support maintenance units are not responsive enough to provide adequate maintenance to operating military police units.

(b) Evaluation: The down time for 1/4 ton vehicles, AN/VRC 46 radios and V-100s turned in for higher echelon maintenance was prohibitive. Consequently units were hesitant to turn any items to DS maintenance facility and in order to continue to meet commitments were forced to "scrounge" and borrow the necessary parts.

(c) Recommendations: That an inquiry be made to ascertain the availability of parts to determine if more effective direct support maintenance can be obtained for the military police units.

d. Organization:

(1) MTOE Change: (Operations Sergeant)

(a) Observation: There is no provision in a military police company for an operations sergeant.

(b) Evaluation: Military police companies often have several diverse missions within a company. Each section may have certain personnel in charge but a central individual is needed to monitor all company operations from the company headquarters. Practically all military companies have taken one outstanding squad leader and put him in the job as operations sergeant.

(c) Recommendation: A position of operations sergeant in grade E-7 be added to military police company MTOE's.

(2) MTOE Change: (Motor Maintenance Section)

(a) Observation: Present MTOE (MTOE 19-500 EP518) authorizes Sentry Dog Companies to requisition thirty (30) vehicles, yet calls for maintenance support to be provided by another unit.

AVBGF-KG

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 504th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(b) Evaluation: The 595th Military Police Company (SD) has two detachments attached for logistical support from the units they are supporting. The company headquarters is not authorized by TO&E maintenance personnel to support their requirements.

(c) Recommendation: That PLL be authorized for unit vehicles and that the following slots be incorporated into the TO&E of sentry dog units:

- 1 Motor Sergeant E-5 (1)
- 2 Mechanics E-4 (3)
- 3 PLL Clerk E-4 (1)

g. Force Developments: None

h. Communications:

(1) Power Supply for Base Stations:

(a) Observation: No provision is made for the power supply to operate radios in police stations.

(b) Evaluation: Current MTOE's for military police companies do not provide for power supplies to operate radios (AN/VRC 46 or AN/VRC 49) at MP stations. This necessitates borrowing, hand receipting, etc., from other units or support facilities.

(c) Recommendation: Power supplies be made an integral part of MP company equipment.

(2) Non-Availability of Commercial Communications Equipment:

(a) Observation: While the motorola 220 series radio had improved communications, their non-availability is a problem. It has been found that these radios operate at optimum capacity when used for one 6 hour shift and then returned for recharging.

(b) Evaluation: One unit has 21 radios assigned (595th MP Co (SD)) for 18 posts. This means that radios must be utilized on a 12 hour basis with only 12 hours allowed for recharging. This also causes increased wear on the radios and necessitates more frequent turn in for repair. The lack of back up communications and non-availability of radios from brigade often means sentry dog teams

7
AVBGF-KG

13 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 504th Military Police
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

must be posted with no communications available. As sentry dog teams are usually deployed in the most isolated areas of a facility his job becomes increasingly hazardous without communications.

(c) Recommendation: That the motorola 220 series or its equivalent be incorporated into the sentry dog company TO & E on the basis of one per dog team and allow one radio per every dog team be drawn as excess for use as back up for those radios in the shop for repair. In addition guidance should be given on the expected working life of the radio and its components so that timely replacement and P.M. can be performed, further recommend that base stations be provided at a ratio one for every installation facility in which sentry dog teams are located.

h. Material: None

i. Other: None


~~2 Incl~~

~~1. Organization Chart~~

~~2. Unit Location Overlay~~
Inclosures withdrawn

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - Commander-in-chief, USARPAC,
ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
- 3 - Commanding General, USARV,
ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375
- 5 - Commanding Officer, 16th Military . . .
Group, ATTN: AVBGF-B, APO 96349
- 2 - File


RUSSELL E. PARMENTER
LTC, MPC
Commanding

9

AV SUP-3 (13 May 1971) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 504th Military Police
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFCR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 16TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP, APO 96349 26 May 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The 504th Military Police Battalion's ORLL for the semi-annual
reporting period ending 30 April 1971 is submitted.

2. (U) The inclosed report has been reviewed and is considered
adequate. The following comments refer to referenced sections of the
report:

a. Reference para 1c (5): Authorized figures for civilian
personnel should read as follows--

Augmentation TDA	34
Program Six Civilianization	9
Total	43

Current authorization documents which affected this reporting period
were not received by this headquarters until 17 May; therefore, the
unit could not report the correct authorized figures. Current
authorization documents have been forwarded to this unit.

b. Reference para 1d: Operations and activities should have
been reported in chronological order as required in AR 525-15. Unit
has been notified.

c. Reference para 2: Sub-paragraphs e and f precede sub-paragraph
d. This is apparently a composition error made in final typing. Unit
has been notified.

d. Reference para 2a: Concur, however, this headquarters has no
control over these standards.

e. Reference para 2c (1): Concur. Consideration must be given
to vehicle recovery in the planning stages of any convoy move.

f. Reference para 2c (2): Concur. Recommend that this
consideration be incorporated into a revised 16th LP Brigade Supplement
to AR 190-12.

6

AVJEF-B (13 May 71) 1st Ind 26 May 1971

10-

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, 504th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

g. Reference para 2c (3): Concur. It is an unfortunate fact that even relatively minor incidents can lend themselves to developing into confrontations. Proper and speedy investigation, with appropriate advisory and claims officer assistance, may minimize confrontations. It is particularly important at this juncture of the Vietnamese Conflict to take whatever proper actions are necessary so that US-Vietnamese relations are not damaged.

h. Reference para 2d (1): Concur. Such recommended position(s) could be incorporated as a part of annual MTO&E revisions.

i. Reference para 2d (2): Concur. The preceeding comment applies.

j. Reference para 2f: Concur. Emphasis has been placed on the poor service being received in the maintenance and repair part area, especially electronics. A representative from ECCI, USARV, was in the Da Nang area in March researching the causes for the poor receipt of electronics repair parts at DSU's. USARV is presently aware of the V-100 repair parts problem and is in the process of obtaining an adequate supply of repair parts. It is suggested that units make regular liaison visits to supply and maintenance supporting units and utilize the Commander's Critical Items List (USARV Regulation 700-39) when problems arise in obtaining specific repair parts.

k. Reference para 2h (1): Concur. Non-vehicular mounted radio systems require a stable power source. Efforts to obtain these power supplies by means of 180 day loan should be followed up in annual MTO&E revisions.

l. Reference para 2h (2): Concur, although it is not believed that commercial equipment can be incorporated into MTO&E's. Motorola radios are presently leased and distributed by 18th MP Brigade on a hand receipt basis.

David J. Anderson
DAVID J. ANDERSON
LTC, MPC
Commanding

CF: CO, 504th MP Bn

11
AVEGC-P (13 May 71) 2d Ind: 15 June 1971
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 504th Military
Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFCR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO,
APO 96375

1. Comments on Significant Activities:

a. Page 2, para 1c(7):

(a) As of 1 November 1970

	<u>AUTH</u>		
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
29	2	930	961

(b) As of 30 April 1971

	<u>AUTH</u>		
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
31	2	910	943

b. Page 11, para 1g: The 5th Military Police Detachment was activated by USARPAC General Order 94 effective 8 March 1971 and was assigned to the 16th Military Police Group for further attachment to the 504th Military Police Battalion by 18th Military Police Brigade General Order 100, dated 24 March 1971. Activated under MTOE 19-500GP501, P51071, the detachment has an authorized strength of 2 officers and 9 enlisted men.

2. Comments on Lessons Learned:

a. Page 12, para 2a(1), Non-concur: Statistical analysis comparing the respective GT scores of two classes of March graduates of the Brigade OJT military police training program with a like number of randomly-chosen school-trained military police replacements indicated that the GT scores of those OJT personnel sent to the 16th Military Police Group were significantly higher than the scores of school-trained replacement personnel. While the replacement sample average GT score was 110.5, the Brigade selected OJT military policeman's GT score averaged 122.5. Mathematically this difference would result from chance less than one time out of a thousand. In general, non-military police-school-trained personnel were selected for the Brigade OJT program only after careful records-screening and personal interviews and in general possessed above average qualifications with respect to the minimum criteria as specified in DA Pam 350-10 for attendance at military police ALT. Personnel whose assignment to the Brigade was directed by HQ, USARV as a result of Keystone Robin actions may, in some instances, not meet desired prerequisites, however, the Brigade had no choice but to attempt to train and utilize such personnel.

b. Page 13, para 2c(2), Non-concur: Provisions for protective structures are provided for in paragraph 1-2, K (5), page 1-1, Responsibilities, USARV Supplement 1 to AR 190-12, dated 30 Nov 70.

AVBGC-P

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 504th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

12

c. Page 14, para 2d(1), Concur: TOE 19-77G includes an operations sergeant position in the company headquarters. Upon completion of the USARPAC MTOE Update, consideration will be given toward reorganizing all Brigade military police companies currently organized under TOE 19-37G.


d. Page 14, para 2d(2), Non-concur: The capabilities statement of MTOE 19-500EP518 for the 595th Military Police Company specifies that the unit must be furnished supply, mess, and organizational maintenance services. Under the sentry dog concept, the company headquarters operates merely as an administrative headquarters due to the normal dispersion of organic sentry dog detachments. For example, the 595th Military Police Company (SD) maintains security support at three geographic locations. It would be impractical for the company headquarters to attempt to provide organizational maintenance support to include the stockade of PLL for detachments located as far away as seventy-five miles. Under the recent USARPAC MTOE Update, one mechanic space was added to the sentry dog company MTOE under the authorization criteria of AR 570-2. However due to the aforementioned dispersion of sentry dog detachments (one company operates from seven geographical locations) spaces for a motor sergeant and prescribed load list clerk positions were not deemed feasible.

e. Page 15, para 2h(1), Concur: Subordinate Brigade units may request additional communications equipment for inclusion on MTOE/MTDA on an as-required basis.

f. Page 15, para 2h(2), Concur: However the Motorola 220 series radios are not standard items of equipment. The presently on-hand radios of this type are leased by Purchase Request and Commitment, DA Form 14-115. Preceding comment applies.

3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


FRANK L. BURNS
MAJ, MPC
Adjutant

CF:
CO, 16th MP Gp
CO, 504th MP Bn

13

AVHDO-DO (13 May 71) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 504th Military Police
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 7 AUG 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 504th Military Police Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters with the exception of page 14, paragraph 2d(2). The MTOE update document for the 595th MP Company submitted to Headquarters USARPAC on 21 April 1971 included one wheel vehicle mechanic, E4, MOS 62B20 to supplement the maintenance capability of the unit providing maintenance support. If unit's mission requires additional maintenance support, one more wheel vehicle mechanic could be authorized based on criteria prescribed in AR 570-2. Unit has been notified of procedure required to change a MTOE document. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

2. Additional comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "MTOE change: (Operations Sergeant)," page 14, paragraph 2d(1). Concur. Unit has been notified of procedure required to change a TOE/MTOE document. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Direct Support Maintenance of Military Police Units," page 14, paragraph 2f(1) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2j. Concur. 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2j summarizes action taken by this Headquarters to solve the problem. No separate action is required of USARPAC or DA. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


F. L. HONSOWITZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
504th MP Bn
18th MP Bde


14
GPOP-FD (13 May 71) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 504th
Military Police Battalion, Period Ending
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 13 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVBGE-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 89th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

2. Lesson Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:a. Personnel:

(1) Observations: An inordinate number of R&R allocations had to be returned to Hq., 18th MP Bde. during this reporting period.

(2) Evaluation: Since the inception of the fourteen (14) day CONUS leave program, fewer servicemen have been taking advantage of R&R. This casual relationship should be taken into consideration in future allocation for R&R flights.

(3) Recommendation: That Hq., 18th MP Bde. consult with Hq., USARV and reduce the number of allocations forwarded to this command.

(4) Command Action: No corrective action can be initiated at this level of command.

b. Intelligence: NONEc. Operations:

(1) Observation: Increased emphasis on drug suppression has resulted in the formation of drug suppression teams. These teams are composed of military policemen dressed in "old" clothing who operate covertly in conventional vehicles not identified as military police. With their VN police and ARVN MP counterpart, efforts are directed toward reducing the supply of drugs by attempting to make purchases from VN sellers and subsequently apprehending the seller and seizing his supply of illegal drugs. Additionally, U.S. military personnel observed attempting the purchase of drugs at suspected locations are apprehended, searched, and processed through MP Stations.

(2) Evaluation: Military Policemen assigned to drug suppression duty are necessarily placed in dangerous situations. The Vietnamese sellers with whom they come into contact are naturally hostile to any action which will place them in jeopardy or reduce their income. U.S. Military Personnel are keenly aware of the serious penalties which may result from the possession or use of narcotics and have used force to resist or avoid apprehension.

(3) Recommendation: That personnel assigned to drug suppression activities in Vietnam be authorized to carry a concealed weapon (.38 Caliber Pistol) for self protection and use when appropriate, to effect apprehensions.

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16

AVDGE-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 89th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (12) (U)

(4) Command Action: Authority has been received from 18th MP Bde. for drug suppression team members operating in MR 3 and 4 to carry concealed weapons.

d. Organization: NONE

e. Training: NONE

f. Logistics:

(1) a. Observation: It was observed that during the redeployment of the 300th MP Company to MR 1, the lack of contingency plans relating to equipment, caused unnecessary delay and confusion.

b. Evaluation: On 29 January 1971, the 300th MP Company stationed at Di An was alerted for redeployment. The unit had previously turned in much of its TOE equipment - tents, mess equipment etc. - as unneeded. Required equipment had to be placed on "special requisition" or receipted from other units.

c. Recommendation: More strict control and closer supervision should be placed on requests for turn in of "unneeded" TOE equipment. In Vietnam, units should maintain equipment and property plan for its use.

d. Command Action: More emphasis is being placed by commanders on those requests to delete TOE equipment. The justification for deletion of unneeded equipment has been expanded to include the need for equipment in the event the unit is deployed to the field.

Lessons Learned:

(2) a. Observation: The 89th MP Group has and is continuing to have problems requesting and procuring repair parts for the XM-706 Commando Car (V-100).

b. Evaluation: On 4 November 1970, all units were requested by 18th MP Brigade to submit a list of requisitions by Federal Stock Number, Nomenclature, Date of Requisition, Priority, Outstanding Requisition Number, for Repair Parts for the XM-706 Commando Car (V-100). Higher headquarters was concerned and needed these lists in order to exercise command influence in establishing a smoother flow of parts requisitioned. Some of the items that were hard to get were: V-100 tires, clutches, engines, speedometer cables, wheel cylinders, starters, distributors, spark plugs, V belts, headlights, steering knuckle boots, hand brakes, oil filters and oil gauges. They were also having trouble with the M-73 machine guns, malfunctioning. This problem in the last five (5) months

2

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AVBGE-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 89th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (13) (U)

has been alleviated by the new M-73 E1 machine gun. Throttle cables continue to be difficult to obtain and batteries which are a direct exchange item, now take from one (1) week to one and a half (1½) weeks to obtain.

c. Recommendation: That command take appropriate action to insure that repair parts for V-100 Commando Cars are available.

d. Command Action: Command has initiated surveys and inspections whereby shortages and problem areas can be identified before an emergency situation exists. The early identification of problem areas has increased the efficiency of our units to program their needs.

3. Communications:

(1) a. Observation: The radio repairman (31B) assigned to the companies are not being fully utilized.

b. Evaluation. The radio repairman need certain tools and components to properly perform their task. The unavailability of modules for the RT 524, and RR 442 result in items being constantly turned into repair facilities, making the repairman little more than an errand boy. With modules available, he could take positive steps to decrease present deadline rates.

c. Recommendation: The supply channels should be utilized by placing requests for various functional parts. Command interest in same should be brought to bear. Such concentrated effort may produce results.

d. A meeting was held by the Group Signal Officer for all Battalion Signal Officers, in regards to maintenance and preventive maintenance of communications equipment. Classes were held on operators maintenance to prevent unnecessary down time of communications equipment. Modules for organizational repair of the Radio Sets AN/VRC-49/VRC will remain on the unit PLL; however, statistics show no modules are being received. A new density list of COMEL equipment has been submitted to support maintenance, thus enabling the support maintenance activity to stock the necessary float to reduce down time on COMEL equipment. Command letter, dated 7 March 71, subject: Radio Maintenance Support, to the 29th General Support Group stated the lack of COMEL repair parts. Emphasis was placed on the unavailability of modules for the radio repairman at lower levels.

(2) a. Observation: The NESTOR system is not being utilized.

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18

AVBGE-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 89th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS OSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

b. Evaluation: Properly installing and operating a NESTOR system requires effort disproportional to its value in daily operation. Although possibly valuable in an emergency, widespread operation would be difficult due to unfamiliarity with the equipment and inadequate maintenance support. This results in no one using the system.

c. Recommendation: Eliminate the NESTOR system except in command nets.

d. Command Action: No corrective action can be taken at this level of command.

h. Material: NONE

i. Others: NONE


GEORGE F. PROUDFOOT
Colonel, MPC
Commanding

4

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19
AVBGC-O (14 May 71) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 89th Military
Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFDR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade, APO 96491

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Comments on Significant Activities:

a. Page 2, para 1c(5) Civilian Personnel: Authorized figures should read:

	<u>Authorized</u>
(a) Program Six Civilianization	24
(b) Augmentation MTDA P5WFPE9902	982
(c) Total	1006

b. Page 3, para 1c(7) Strengths: should read:

(a) As of 1 Nov 70: Authorized:

OFF	WO	EM	TOTAL
103	9	2354	2466

(b) As of 30 Apr 71: Authorized

OFF	WO	EM	TOTAL
88	7	2020	2115


c. Page 7, para 1e(6) Should read: The 300th MP Co was deployed to MR1 in support of operation Lam Son 719 on 29 January 1971, and was attached to the 504th MP Bn for all purposes. On 24 April 1971, the 300th MP Co was attached, per GO 1294, HQ, USARV, dtd 19 Apr 71, to the 23rd Infantry Division for all purposes.

d. Page 7, para 1e(10) Should read: On 12 Feb 71, the 284th MP Co was relieved from attached to the 89th MP Gp per GO 50, HQ, 18th MP Bde, dtd 12 Feb 71. Unit remained attached to the 95th MP Bn for logistical and maintenance support. Operational control prior to 12 February was and remains with the 18th MP Bde.

e. Page 9, para 1g(8) Should read: The S4 section, 18th MP Bde notified 89th MP Gp that New Korea Enterprises had been awarded the contract for the rebuild of PBR engines. This information was erroneous. The Shu Han Company ~~had been awarded the contract.~~

2. Comments on Lessons Learned: Page 12, para 2f(1): Concur.
3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



FRANK L. BURNS
MAJ, MPC
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

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- 1- CO, 89TH MP GP
- 1- File

21
AVHDO-DO (14 May 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 89th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 8 JUL 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558


1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 89th Military Police Group and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters with the exception of paragraph 2g(2): Nonconcur. The commander is responsible for the number and types of radio nets within his command. He should recommend greater use of secure (NESTOR) equipment and train his personnel accordingly. A USARV command msg, dtd 200740Z Mar 71, subject: Utilization of Tactical Secure Voice (TSV), stressed to commanders, at all levels, to work in close coordination with supporting Radio Research Units (RR Units) to identify and eliminate those factors which inhibit optimum use of their TSV assets.

2. Additional comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Personnel," page 11, paragraph 2a: Corrective action has been taken by the 18th MP Bde. Allocations received by a unit are based, in part, on a quarterly R&R requirements report (RCS: MACJ1-09) (R-2) submitted by USARV major and subordinate commands receiving out-of-country R&R allocations direct from this Headquarters. The 18th MP Bde requests and receives allocations for its subordinate units, including the 89th MP Group. During the period Jan - May 71, the 18th MP Bde requested 1458 R&R allocations; they received 1405 and used 80.3%. During this period the 18th MP Bde submitted a revised request which was 15% less than the original number required. This request was taken into consideration in allocation of quotas to the 18th MP Bde. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

b. Reference item concerning "Lessons Learned," page 12, paragraph 2f(2): Concur. These repair parts are on requisition from CONUS. Follow-up action will be taken to insure that requisitions remain valid.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


GEDDES F. MACLAREN

CPT. INF.

Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:
89th MP Gp
18th MP Bde

THIS DOCUMENT IS UNCLASSIFIED

22

GPOP-FD (14 May 71) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ, 89th
Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 18 AUG 71

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

23

AVBGF-B

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military
Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

2. (U) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

- a. Personnel: None
- b. Intelligence: None
- c. Operations: None
- d. Organization: None
- e. Training: None
- f. Logistics: None
- g. Communications:

(1) General Subject Area: Capabilities and Limitations of the AN/PRC 74B
AM Radio.

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Incl 3

AVEGF-B

15 May 1971

24

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: That the AN/PRC 74B single sideband AM radio can provide good communications and be an effective back-up system to the RTT.

(b) EVALUATION:

1. The quality of communications established with this equipment was greatly enhanced when personnel with a signal background operated the radio. This evaluation was made over a period of sixty (60) days when the system was used, under field conditions, in support of Operation Lam Son 719 in Quang Tri Province.

2. The radio had a tendency to drift off frequency, thus necessitating frequent clarification by the operator.

3. The AN/GRA 50 antenna did not necessarily have to be oriented "broadside" to other stations. In fact, the set often worked better when the antenna was not oriented "broadside". There appears to be no pattern in antenna orientation, and the "trial and error" method had to be used to consistently receive the best signal.

4. The radio worked best between the hours of 0800 to 2400. After 2400 hours, the signal-to-noise ratio decreases to the point where around 0200 hours, communications with this radio are impossible. The distance between stations did not alter this pattern.

5. As untrained operators often find the background noise in this system objectionable (there is no squelch circuit), it is best to establish and stick to a regular schedule of transmission hours.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That units establish a communications training program to include training on the AN/PRC 74B AM radio. Since the radio is not limited to "line of sight" transmission like the familiar AN/VRC 46 FM radio, situations may arise in the future where units will have to depend on this piece of equipment as experienced during Operation Lam Son 719.

2. That the AN/PRC 74B AM radio be used to freely pass administrative traffic and help relieve the load on the radio teletype. This would also augment the unreliable existing dial telephone system.

(2) General Subject Area: Communications Security

25

AVBGF-B

15 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: During the course of Operation Lam Son 719 in Quang Tri Province, classified information on convoy movements and volume was required to be passed routinely over non-secure FM nets.

(b) EVALUATION: Circe Code encryption devices are used to encrypt numbers and can be used to code grid co-ordinates, volume of convoy traffic and a wide variety of other messages involving the transmission of numbers. Using military police units were not familiar with this device and training sessions were necessary in order to satisfactorily implement this system. The transmission of classified information in the clear over non-secure radio nets enables the enemy to obtain valuable order of battle and intelligence information, particularly under tactical conditions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the use of the Circe Code encryption device be incorporated into unit and school training programs.

h. Materiel: None

i. Other: None

~~1 Incl~~

~~Organizational Chart~~

Inclosure withdrawn

David J. Anderson.
DAVID J. ANDERSON
LTC, MPC
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - CINC, USARPAC, ATTN: GPDP-DT, APO San Francisco 96558
- 3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO In Country 96375
- 5 - CG, 18th MP Brigade, ATTN: AVBGC-O, APO San Francisco 96491

13

27

AVBGC-P (15 May 71) 1st Ind 15 June 1971
 SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military
 Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65(R3)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE, APO 96491

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Comments on Significant Activities:

- a. Page 3, paragraph 1c(5), Civilian Personnel, should read:

Authorized

(a) Program Six Civilianization	36
(b) Augmentation TDA P5WFPE9902	127
(c) TOTAL	163

- b. Page 3, paragraph 1c(7), Strengths, should read:

- (a) As of 1 November 1970:

Authorized

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
82	6	2063	2151

- (b) As of 30 April 1971:

Authorized

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
84	6	2006	2096

c. Page 12, paragraph 1i(1): M73E1 Machine Guns are being obtained by units of the 16th MP Gp. Six guns were recently released from Long Binh Depot for shipment to the 630th MP Co, Cam Ranh Bay. More weapons will be released as requisitions are forwarded.

d. Page 13, paragraph 1i(2): The direct exchange of clothing and boots in the Da Nang area is improving. Shortages occurred due to support of Dewey Canyon II.

AVBGC-P

28

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65(R3)

e. Page 13, paragraph 1i(3): Repair parts for AN/VRC-46 radios are now on hand in the Da Nang area. In addition a direct exchange program is in effect and units in the DaNang area are experiencing an extremely low dead line rate on AN/VRC-46 radios.

f. Page 13, paragraph 1i(4)(a): Units have been provided with the FSN for the tire demounter and instructed to requisition it. In addition, lubrication instructions for a tire demounter constructed and utilized by elements of the 101st Airborne Division have been provided to all 18th MP Bde units.


g. Page 14, paragraph 1i(4)(b): Repair parts for V-100 Commando Cars continue to be a problem. Maintenance personnel from USARV DCSLOG are aware of this problem and are working to alleviate the situation.

h. Page 14, paragraph 1i(5): USARV is expecting to receive a quantity of new M51A2 $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks in the very near future. Present indications are that Military Police units will receive a portion of these new assets on a priority basis.

2. Comments on Lessons Learned: Page 14, paragraph 2g(1): Concur: The AN/GRC 50 antenna does not work best in Vietnam on a broadside orientation to other stations. This antenna seems to produce maximum performance when operated on a point North-South plain orientation. This observation holds true for both the Northern and Southern regions of the country. This pattern seems to relate directly to the position of this land area on the globe.

3. Battle correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

FOR: S1 COMMANDER:



FRANK L. BURNS
MAJ, MPC
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

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29

AVHDO-DO (15 May 71) 2nd Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 16th Military
Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 ; 0 JUL 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 16th Military
Police Group and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


GEDDIE T. MACLAREN
CPT. INF.
Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:
16th MP Gp
18th MP Bde

30
GPOP-FD (15 May 71) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ, 16th Military
Police Group, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 AUG 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. Mah

M. L. MAH
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR - 65 (R3) (U)

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) OBSERVATION: A careful review of minutes submitted by the human relations councils of subordinate units revealed that there was considerable variety in the make-up, approach and overall organizational value among the various councils.

(2) EVALUATION: Some had served to decrease tensions and broaden awareness while others had become merely clearing-houses for routine service gripes, performed to satisfy the requirement but not the spirit of MACV Directive 600-12.

(3) COMMANDER'S ACTION: In an effort to revitalize the program, a human relations workshop will be conducted during the period 15-16 May. The purpose of the workshop will be to distribute human relations training materials; to discuss training techniques; to exchange pertinent information; and to generate new ideas and proposals for improving human relations throughout the command. Participants will include an officer and enlisted representative from each group, battalion and stockade as well as other local headquarters to include the "Pioneer House", the Drug Rehabilitation Center organized by the Third Region Assistance Command.

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Incl 4

b. Intelligence. Control of Classified Material

(1) OBSERVATIONS: A 100% inventory of SECRET documents was conducted on 2 February 1971. During this inventory one page of a SECRET document was found to be missing. A formal investigation revealed that the page was most probably never included in the basic document.

(2) EVALUATION: Unaccountability of the missing page appeared to have been due to the fact that individuals handling and logging the document had not counted the pages carefully.

(3) CORRECTIVE ACTION:

(a) The pages of all documents received by the intelligence section are counted by two individuals and a receipt given to the courier. The document is then logged in and the individual logging the document is required to initial the remarks column of the DA Form 455. A second individual then checks the DA Form 455 against the document and initials the remarks column.

(b) Pages of documents being temporarily or permanently receipted are counted by two individuals before being released. Upon return of documents two individuals must count the pages of the document before giving a receipt. Temporary receipts are all maintained until such a time as a 100% inventory is made or until return of a permanent receipt.

c. Operations.

(1) Patrol Dog Employment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Patrol dog teams can perform not only the security function of the sentry dog team but also, because of the patrol dog's greater tolerance of distractions, can be worked in more varied situations in which the sentry dog would be ineffective.

(b) EVALUATION: On 28 Oct 70 the Brigade received two patrol dog teams for employment and evaluation. The thrust of the employment/evaluation plan developed by Brigade was to test the capabilities of the patrol dog team and to compare these capabilities with those of the sentry dog team. During the evaluation period, the patrol dog teams worked perimeter posts, the least and most suitable for sentry dog employment, building security, area posts, and performed point control and vehicle patrolling. The evaluation showed the patrol dog to be more versatile, controllable, and more highly trained than the sentry dog. The patrol dog team can work an ideal

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sentry dog post as well as the sentry dog team and is more effective when employed on a sentry dog post which is marginal because of such distractions as personnel and vehicular movement. Although the patrol dog alerts on distractions, as does the sentry dog, he does not alert as strongly because his aggressiveness is controlled. The patrol dog is more easily called off his alert than is the sentry dog and does not, therefore, tire himself and his handler during the duty tour as does the sentry dog when he repeatedly alerts. Additionally, the patrol dog, again because he will not attack unless commanded to do so by his handler or unless provoked, proved his versatility when compared to the sentry dog because he can be worked among people in crowds, on regular patrolling duties, and at checkpoints without concern that he will attack some innocent bystander. The patrol dog teams were also committed in support of FSA 26-1 during part of Operation Lam Son 719 and were evaluated under combat conditions. During this phase the teams worked nightly patrolling an ASP, with one dog being worked for each of two six hour shifts and the handlers working the full twelve hour shift. One handler worked the dog while the other acted as a security or "shotgun" guard for the team in case of enemy contact. Because of the patrol dog's tolerance to personnel other than his handler, it was learned that someone unknown to the dog, e. g. an infantryman, can also perform the security guard duty. It was found advisable for the security guard to carry a spotlight to check particularly dark areas, such as the inside of barns, encountered during patrol. The patrol dog team is not adversely affected when the spotlight is used just to the rear of the team so the light does not shine in the eyes of the team. The sentry dog would be ineffective in this environment for several reasons. The constant noise of not only enemy rocket and mortar fire but also of friendly artillery fire would cause the sentry dog to constantly alert and exhaust himself. The patrol dog adjusts more easily to this noise and soon learns to disregard it, therefore remaining effective while on patrol. Under combat conditions there are no permanent kennels in which to keep the dog when he is not being worked under the control of the handler. This factor presents a definite safety hazard for any friendly personnel in the area should the sentry dog escape from a portable or fixed expedient kennel because he will attack anyone other than his handler without provocation. The patrol dog will not attack unless provoked or commanded to do so, and, therefore, would present no danger to innocent personnel in the area should he escape from his kennel. The use of a security guard to provide additional and immediate firepower in case of enemy contact would not be possible with a sentry dog team which, because of the dog's distrust of anyone but his handler and his being trained to attack strangers, would have to work alone and at a distance from other personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That expansion of the patrol dog program within the Army be considered not as a replacement for, but as an adjunct to the present sentry dog program. Many permanent or semi-permanent facilities can be secured by the sentry dog team and do not require the additional abilities of the patrol dog. However, the abilities of the patrol dog team to effectively patrol marginal areas and to be worked directly in contact with other personnel make the patrol dog team a definite additional asset of the overall law enforcement program.

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34

(3) The Administrative Turn-in of Authorized Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: The authority to turn-in unneeded equipment or the cancellation of requisitions for equipment considered non-essential for the performance of the unit mission in the current area of operations can create problems when the unit is required to relocate on short notice to an area where the turned-in equipment is needed.

(b) EVALUATION: In the preparations for the rapid relocation of the 300th MP Company from Di An to Quang Tri in support of Dewey Canyon II, in late January 1971, it became readily apparent that certain critical equipment items required for support operations in MR1 had been administratively turned-in. At the time of turn-in, items such as immersion heaters, field ranges, cutlery, tableware, folding tables, and cook sets were not considered essential to the performance of the unit mission, and were in fact deemed required should the unit relocate. A major premise at the time of turn-in allowed the presupposed accessibility of turned-in equipment. However, the retrievability of equipment under the imposed time constraints involved in the 300th MP Company's move (approximately 36 hours from time of notification to time of move) was not expressly addressed. Certain required equipment items, therefore, had to be sent to the new location after the relocation had been accomplished.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That unit movement planners consider the implicit potentiality of a rapid relocation of a line unit when staffing the administrative actions for the turn-in of unit's "non-essential" equipment.

d. Organization.

(1) Inclusion of sufficient administrative overhead personnel in the Organization/activation of units.

(a) OBSERVATION: Frequently, planners involved in the activation and initial organization of MTOE units fail to incorporate sufficient administrative/overhead personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: During the TAADS MTOE update performed by Brigade units during February - April 1971, a preponderance of updated MTOEs submitted to Brigade for review incorporated additional overhead personnel positions. This phenomenon was particularly prevalent in cellular MTOE units which, in many cases, are either satellited (attached) on adjacent organic Brigade units or operate autonomously from several locations. A typical example of a unit MTOE without sufficient overhead personnel is the sentry dog company MTOE which formerly included no vehicular mechanic and no cook although the provisions of AR 570-2 would certainly allow their recognition. In addition, no dog trainer, no communications chief and no chief veterinary animal specialist were formerly recognized as requirements although the need has perpetually existed for each. Virtually all headquarters detachments evidenced valid demands for cooks, mechanics, and additional clerical positions. The belated cognizance of these administrative requirements could

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possibly be correlated with troop withdrawals and increased administrative work loads commensurate with a concomitant amelioration of administrative standards. In general, the updated MTOEs sent to USARV for subordinate Brigade units included the additional overhead required, provided sufficient justification had been presented.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That force planners at all levels recognize the administrative overhead requirements of potential units and structure activation MTOEs according to a practicably-established administrative criterion. Regulations provide basic guidelines, however, accurate estimates must consider actual situational demands.

(2) Basis of replacement of military cooks and kitchen helpers with local national direct hire personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: The basis of replacement of military mess personnel by local national direct hire personnel on a one-for-one basis is not adequate.

(b) EVALUATION: In the past, local national direct hire cook and kitchen helper personnel have been substituted for military personnel on a one-for-one basis. While military mess hall personnel are employed on a 12-hour per day, seven day per week basis in RVN, civilian direct hire personnel are employed on an 8-hour, six-day work week basis. Prior to the initiation of USARV Major Subordinate Commands receiving individual monetary budgets, units were not directly concerned with, or affected by overtime limitations. Rather, primary emphasis was placed on operating with personnel space ceilings, hence, a preponderance of LNDH mess hall personnel were allowed to work two - four hours of overtime per day. With the budget reductions, overtime cuts became the focal point for expenditure curtailments. In shifting to six-day, eight-hour/day work weeks for LNDH personnel, Brigade mess halls experienced manpower shortages. Presently, to offset these manpower deficiencies, it has become necessary to channel additional military personnel, coupled with civilian hire personnel paid from non-appropriated funds into mess halls.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That manpower staffers make an express allowance for additional local national direct hire personnel when replacing military cooks and kitchen helpers in mess halls.

(3) Contingency plans for short-notice unit relocations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Combat support and combat service support military police units, even though situated in a static location and performing quasi-permanent discipline, law, and order functions, need to prepare and maintain explicit contingency plans for rapid relocation.

(b) EVALUATION: Again, recent experience involving the near-immediate cessation of present duties by the 300th MP Company due to a required rapid unit relocation and commensurate assumption of a new mission illustrated the need for all military police units (and certainly all combat support/combat service support units) to maintain accurate and current

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5

contingency plans involving the relinquishment of former missions and operational commitments as well as standing operating procedures pertaining to the move itself. The performance of a fixed standard unit mission in a relatively stable, established locale, in spite of the fluidity required in a combat zone, gives rise to the propensity for certain units to feel a false degree of permanency. With the relocation of the 300th MP Company from Di An to Quang Tri in January 1971, the 720th MP Battalion responded to take over former 300th Military Police stations and patrol responsibilities. Certainly, this transition would have been effected more easily had express contingency plans been enacted. Detailed plans for the rapid move of the 300th MP Company from Di An to the departure airfields as well as plans for the storage and safeguarding of excess personal and U.S. government property could have expedited the move.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Unit planners should appraise themselves and their commanders of the exigencies involved in the immediate detailed requirements of a unit relocation concerning both the turnover of former missions and the relocation itself.

(4) Authorization for the XM706 Armored Car.

(a) OBSERVATION: The number of XM706's authorized for the 18th Military Police Brigade is insufficient to accomplish all missions requiring use of that vehicle and the manner of authorization does not allow the flexibility necessary to meet rapidly changing support requirements.

(b) EVALUATION: In July 1967 the first six XM706 Armored Cars to be utilized by US units in RVN were allocated to the 18th Military Police Brigade for informal evaluation. At the end of the evaluation period (January 1968) the Brigade, having found the vehicles satisfactory, requested an additional sixty-six be issued for use by Brigade units. After the introduction of large numbers of these vehicles into RVN, the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) conducted an exhaustive study of the XM706 in military police operations (Final Report-XM706 Armored Car in Military Police Operations, ACTIV Project No. ACG-70F). The ACTIV study recommended that each MP company under the area support concept be authorized twelve XM706 Armored Cars or thirty-six per battalion. While the total number of vehicles would prove sufficient, the method of allocation could be improved upon. Experience has shown that not all companies have a legitimate need for twelve XM706 Armored Cars. Examples are the 716th MP Bn, which has no convoy escort mission, but which is required to have the XM706 on hand for reaction force purposes. The 95th MP Bn is engaged almost entirely in the Discipline, Law and Order mission and has almost no need for the XM706. Company B, 720th MP Bn which operates in MR4 has a normal requirement for only six XM706's. The 93rd MP Bn, in Northern MR2, operates over a road net with one of the highest ambush rates in RVN but is only able to escort a portion of the convoys moving in the area due to lack of resources. Eventually four XM706 Armored Cars were authorized by TCE to each MP Company operating under the area support concept. The 18th MP Bde, in order to meet changing support requirements has found it necessary to continuously reallocate XM706 resources. Each adjustment

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of these resources had to be accompanied by documentation of lateral transfers, hand receipt documents, establishment of suspense systems for equipment on loan and requests to maintain equipment on hand above TOE authorization. The present authorization of four XM706's per company is excess to the needs of only a few companies and far short of the total needed for the Brigade-wide mission. Both the recommended Basis of Issue and the current authorization, obviously lack the flexibility required in Vietnam and indicate the need for a more flexible method of assigning resources.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A unit, so structured as to allow for the rapid adjustment of resources, not require a large overhead and, to the greatest extent possible, maintain unit integrity is needed. The XM706 should not be authorized as a basic part of the TOE of MP Battalions in RVN. All XM706 resources should come from a single unit and should be controlled at the MP group or brigade level. This should be a single unit of company size as opposed to several smaller units of detachment or platoon size. The unit should be organized along the lines of the 19-37 TOE company, e.g. four squads per platoon, but should be authorized, as necessary, more than three platoons. Squads should consist of four three-man crews for the XM706. These squads should be further broken down into two teams and be capable, for short periods of time, of operating separately. The squad should not however, be divided for long periods of time. A figure of four XM706's per squad is selected because of the normal manner of employment. Two escort vehicles are sufficient for small convoys of up to 14-16 vehicles. In convoys of two serials, four escort vehicles are necessary and so on. This type structure would allow for elements to be attached from the smallest working and organizational level up to a platoon sized element or larger. Since elements would be separated from the headquarters they would be dependent for rations, quarters and administration on the MP Battalion they are supporting, no mess section would be required. Only the maintenance section would need to be enlarged since supported units could not be expected to perform maintenance on more than a few vehicles above the normal TOE authorization. The maintenance section should be large enough to allow for one mechanic to accompany each squad when attached to the MP Battalions. Likewise one field radio mechanic should be authorized per platoon.

a. Training. None

f. Logistics. Repair parts for the XM706 Armored Car.

(1) OBSERVATION: There continues to be a shortage of repair parts for the XM706 Armored Car in RVN which adversely affects mission accomplishment.

(2) EVALUATION: Liaison with direct support units indicates that they have approximately thirty percent fill on their ASL. This shortage is reflected in the unit PLL's which are likewise at approximately at thirty percent fill. The relatively low density of this vehicle in Vietnam, coupled with their dispersion, has resulted in insufficient demands being placed on any one DSU to support ASL stockage.

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38

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Designate one DSU to maintain an ASL for all XM706 Armored Cars belonging to US Forces in RVN. All requisitions for PLL and DS repair parts would be processed by a single DSU thus having the effect of increasing the number of demands.

g. Communications. None

h. Materiel. None

i. Other. None

~~4 Incl~~

~~85~~

Inclosures withdrawn

W. K. Wittwer
W. K. WITTWER
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

2- CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO SF 96558

5- CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375

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8

AVHDO-DO (20 May 71) 1st Ind
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 18th Military
 Police Brigade, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS: CSFOR - 65
 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 27 JUL 1971

TO: ✓ Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
 APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
 Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade and concurs with the exception of page 24, paragraph 2f. Disposition of the vehicles in MR 1, MR 2, and MR 3 would create lengthy lines of communications for some customer units to a key DSU and would negate the concept of a single source for Class IX supply. Consideration is being given to including sufficient depot stocks on the LBN and DNG ASLs under Code P to support unit PLLs. As demands are captured, the items qualifying for stockage will be added to the supporting DSU ASL. This procedure would position stocks within a reasonable distance from the owning units and their supporting DSUs and would be in consonance with the current effort to reduce mission essential stockage and budgetary limitations. If facts are developed that warrant immediate additional stockage in depth, items may be added to the supporting DSU ASLs under Code P. Coordination with ICCV is in progress. No action is required by USARPAC or DA.

2. Additional comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Patrol Dog Employment," page 19, paragraph 2c(1): Concur. This program has been closely monitored by this Headquarters and appropriate correspondence with study has been submitted to United States Army Pacific (GPPM-S) and to TPMG under separate covers. This Headquarters will pursue the employment of patrol dogs to further bolster the overall military dog program. The use of patrol dogs as an adjunct to the sentry dog program should prove very beneficial. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended at this time.

b. Reference item concerning "Authorization for the XM706 Armored Car," page 23, paragraph 2d(4). The recommendation to control all XM706 Armored Cars at the MP group or brigade level has merit. Recommend unit submit a recommended TOE change through command channels to CG, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command IAW paragraph 2-10, AR 310-31.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

For 
 GEDDES F. MACLAREN
 CPT. INF.
 Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:
 18th MP Bde

40
GPOP-FD (20 May 71) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 18th Military
Police Brigade, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

AVBGE-HC

12 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 720th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

2. (C) Lessons Learned, Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

a. Personnel:

(1) Assignment of officers and key NCO's. . .

(a) Observation: No or little advance information concerning officer and NCO assignments to the Battalion is received. Some officers are assigned to the Battalion who have only a few months remaining on their tour, while others are transferred to another RVN assignment after only a few months in the Battalion.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of projections concerning officer and key NCO replacements preclude effective personnel management and intelligent assignment within the Battalion. There is entirely too much personnel turbulence.

(c) Recommendation: That field grade, captain and Senior NCO assignment forecasts be provided to Battalion a minimum of 60 days prior to the individuals arrival. That all key jobs be retained by the individual for his complete tour.

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42

AVBGE-HC

12 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 720th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(d) Command Action: The Battalion assignment policy has been changed to retain personnel in key assignments. Requests for advance notification and projection of incoming personnel have been made to higher headquarters.

(2) Motivation of Enlisted Men

(a) Observation: The young soldiers are extremely motivated to doing their jobs properly and are intelligent enough to recognize when they are not getting adequate guidance or support. This is particularly heart-warming in view of the many anti-war and anti-military sentiments they are exposed to.

(b) Evaluation: Not applicable

(c) Recommendation: Units establish adequate, reasonable and specific policies, and insure through the chain of command that they are understood. Also that squad leaders keep their men informed of the current situation.

(d) Command Action: A continuing effort to insure that our soldiers are kept informed through the chain of command. An increased emphasis has been placed on the training of junior NCO's.

b. Intelligence:

(1) Inadequate Intelligence Recording

(a) Observation: The need for improved intelligence gathering and recording techniques is manifest particularly concerning drug traffic. Records are extremely important due to the rapid turnover of personnel.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of adequate records pertaining to drug sources, establishments and operations require the expenditure of considerable resources to develop and investigate leads. The intelligence that is obtained should be recorded and retained for future use.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend an increase in covert intelligence operations concerning drug traffic, improvement of exchange of information with US/Vietnamese Police and intelligence agencies and the development of adequate police intelligence files for each area of operation.

(d) Command Action: Liaison has been established with the Police Advisors and National Police at province level to exchange information related to narcotic and drug traffic. Files reflecting the identity of both US personnel and Vietnamese Nationals, are being maintained at this headquarters when such identities are ascertained. The Vietnamese law enforcement agencies have been encouraged to maintain similar files.

CONFIDENTIAL

2

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AVBGE-HC

12 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 720th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

c. Operations:

(1) Military Police Support:

(a) Observation: As tactical units are deactivated the responsibility for discipline, law and order within the units former area of operations is absorbed by the Military Police Battalion with area responsibility.

(b) Evaluation: During the period of force reduction, it is essential to continuously evaluate the requirement for military police support, and adjust resources as necessary. This is particularly true when a US tactical unit with organic military police support leaves an area. Within MR III the requirement for military police support from the Battalion has actually increased although there has been a significant decrease in troop strength.

(c) Recommendation: That requirements for military police support be continually reviewed. Future plans for deactivation of tactical units should provide for the retention of their military police spaces within USARV.

(d) Command Action: The requirements for Military Police support are continuously reviewed, and the required adjustments are made.

(2) Traffic Accidents and Drugs

(a) Observation: Traffic accidents and offenses and drug abuse are two of the major police problems.

(b) Evaluation: Effective police action is compounded by the wide spread area of responsibility (over 31,00 square miles) and the dispersal of company size units through the area. Engineer units working on road construction throughout the area have a high traffic offense rate and are frequent drug violators. There is a definite need for more command emphasis in these areas. Too often the military police are looked upon to do a job which is the commanders responsibility.

(c) Recommendation: That commanders be reminded of their responsibility in maintaining discipline, law and order within their units.

(d) Command Action: Military police have been directed to concentrate their activities in those areas where traffic accidents and drug abuse are prevalent. Liaison with TRAC and letters to senior commanders to keep them informed of problem areas and the need for command emphasis.

(3) Lack of Effective Coordination

(a) Observation: With the departure of US tactical units, security of the area and responsibility to sweep the roads for mines prior to convoys using the road has been turned over to ARVN.

(b) Evaluation: There has been considerable delay in roads being

3 CONFIDENTIAL

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44

AVBGE-HC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 720th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

cleared of mines and too often the job was inadequately done with resultant injuries and vehicle damage.

(c) Recommendation: That the assistance of the MACV Advisory Teams be obtained to insure more timely and effective ARVN operations in those areas.

(d) Command Action: Supported commands have been requested to maintain closer liaison with the agencies responsible for clearing the highways and to return the convoys to their points of origin if road security requirements are not met.

(4) V-100 Commando Car:

(a) Observation: The V-100's have been the workhorse in our convoy escort operations and have proven their value. There has been considerable problems with the M-73 weapons system, primarily frequent jamming. Recent procurement of the M-73E1 should improve the situation. As an interim measure, 50 caliber machine guns have been mounted on A-frames as a back-up for this weapons system.

(b) Evaluation: Jamming of the M-73 is attributed in part to the distance (24 inches) of the weapon from the ammunition feeding can, and the 90 degree angle from which the ammunition is fed into the weapon. The ready cans located approximately 6 inches from the receiver do not hold sufficient ammunition. The dual firing capabilities of the M-73 makes it a desirable weapon. Due to the unreliability of the M-73, M-60 machine guns have been mounted on assigned armored vehicles. Weapons organic to the armored vehicles of this command are test fired on a monthly basis and data pertaining to malfunctions is recorded and is submitted to maintenance.

(c) Recommendation: That provisions be made to provide adequate equipment for all operating units in Vietnam.

(d) Command Action: Assistance was requested and obtained from Ordnance Technical Support Personnel, who are currently trying to design a MWO to alleviate this problem.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics:

(1) Nonavailability of replacement vehicles and repair parts.

(a) Observation: The situation concerning the availability of replacement vehicles, particularly 1/4 ton trucks and repair parts, especially for V-100's is tragic. The poor equipment we are required to work with at

4

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AVBGE-HC

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 720th Military Police
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

12 May 1971

times when requirements are increasing is inexcusable.

(b) Evaluation: Inquiry in support and command channels has many explanations for this problem to include the priority to AFWH on equipment from stand down units and repair parts shortage due to PLL and ASL problems, however the fact remains that the American soldier is being required to do the job with inadequate equipment.

(c) Recommendation: That provisions be made to provide adequate equipment for all operating units in Vietnam.

(d) Command Action: Numerous liaison visits to support and maintenance activities to resolve the problem. Procurement of some equipment via lateral transfer. A command letter outlining some of the problems encountered in obtaining parts for the V-100 Commando Car and the high deadline rate is being forwarded through command channels to the Commanding General, US Army, Saigon Support Command.

g. Communications:

(1) Shortage of Communications Equipment:

(a) Observation: The shortage of communication equipment is compounded by the age of the radios and the length of time it takes to get radios back from maintenance.

(b) Evaluation: The basic reason for which radios are deadline, is worn out modules which are not issued to supported units, necessitating the radios being placed in support maintenance for periods ranging from 5-90 days awaiting modules and other repair parts.

(c) Recommendation: That maintenance procedures be developed which will allow prompt repair and return of the communications equipment to the using unit.

(d) Command Action: Closer coordination has been established with 5th LEM Co, 91st CS Bn and 29th GS Gp to expedite the return of radios. Increased command emphasis is being placed on rapid turn-in of radios from the organization to DS Maintenance.

h. Material: None

i. Other: None

~~2 INCL~~

~~as~~

Inclosures withdrawn

Albert A. Ackerman

ALBERT A. ACKERMAN

LTC, APC

Commanding

5

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47

AVBGC-C (12 May 71) 1st Ind
 SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 720th
 Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS-
 CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 89TH MILITARY POLICE GROUP, APO 96491

22 May 1971

SEE DISTRIBUTION:

1. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate as clarified below.

2. Comments on Lessons Learned:

a. Page 14, para a(c): Concur with recommendation, however it is not possible to control advance notification of Officers and Senior NCO's at this level. Further, the changing situation many times precludes retaining personnel in one job for a complete tour.

b. Page 15, para a(2): Concur with recommendations. This can best be accomplished at the company and Battalion level.


c. Page 15, para b(c): Concur with recommendation. Drug suppression teams established at this headquarters maintains close liaison with CID and Vietnamese police authorities in an effort to develop drug "intelligence." All operating PMOs can contribute to the over all effort. Area PMs have been directed to increase efforts in their areas.

d. Page 16, para c (1) (c) Concur: MP support requirements are continually reviewed. During this reporting period several adjustments have been made to mission requirements. This review will continue in the future.

e. Page 16, para c(2) (c) and c(3) (c): Concur with recommendation.

f. Page 17, para c(4) (c): Concur with recommendation.

g. Page 17, para f and g: Concur with recommendations.


 GEORGE F. PROUDFOOT
 Colonel, MPC
 Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2- DA, ATTN: ACSFOR
- 2- CG, 18th MP Bde. ATTN: AVBGC-O
- 1- CO, 720th MP Bn.
- 1- File

48

AVBGC-0 (12 May 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 720th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-5 (R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade, APO 96491

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DC, APO 96375

1. Comments on Significant Activities:

a. Page 3, para 1c(5) Should read:

<u>Civilian Personnel:</u>	<u>Authorized</u>
(a) Program Six Civilianization	7
(b) Augmentation TDA P5WFPE9903	28
(c) Total	35

b. Page 3, para 1c(7) Should read:

(a) As of the first day of the first month of the reporting period:

<u>Authorized</u>			
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
27	2	762	791

(b) As of the last day of the last month of the reporting period:

<u>Authorized</u>			
<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
27	2	741	770

c. Page 9, para 1e(10): Add: The recent reduction of the number of handlers used in non-handler positions and a projected increase in input from the Ukinawa Sentry Dog School will enable the Can Tho commitment to be filled in the near future. Should projected input in handlers fail to increase as expected, the detachment will still be opened by using resources currently committed to posts of a lower priority than those at Can Tho Army Airfield. The recent updating of the sentry dog utilization priority list will better enable the commitment of the resources which are available to the posts which are the most critical. This will be accomplished by the withdrawal of teams committed to posts of lower priority.

d. Page 10, para 1e(12): The Patrol Dog Evaluation was conducted under the auspices of this headquarters and pursuant to a plan developed totally by this headquarters. This plan not only outlined the test under

49

AVDGC-0


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 720th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

which the teams were to be employed and evaluated but also specified in detail what evaluation criteria would be used to draw conclusions. The patrol dog evaluation results have already been commented on in the Brigade ORLL and need no further amplification. Additionally, the conclusions drawn in the 720th ORLL are too strong. The evaluation was based on the testing of only two patrol dog teams and the results of their performance, albeit outstanding, should not be generalized into the broad recommendation that patrol dogs be substituted Army-wide for sentry dogs. There are many isolated posts throughout the world which call for dog-team patrolling but which do not require the skill level of the patrol dog team and would be ideally manned by sentry dog teams. This was the position taken by the Brigade in its evaluation report which was sent to USARV. A copy of the same report was also sent for information to UTPEG.

2. Comments on Lessons Learned: Page 16, para 2c(1), Concur: Under the area military police support concept, all support requirements are continually analyzed and reviewed. Prior to a military police unit's stand-down, coordination is effected by the respective Brigade unit providing area support to ascertain potential requirements for Brigade military police support. In addition, based on the command appraisal of the new support requirements, personnel adjustments may be made at any/all organizational levels to augment Brigade support to the affected areas.

3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



FRANK L. BURNS
MAJ, MPC
Adjutant

CF:
CO, 89th MP Gp
CO, 720th MP Bn

AVHDO-DO (12 May 71) 3d Ind

50

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 720th Military Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 8 JUL 1971


TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 720th Military Police Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Additional comment follows:

Reference item concerning "Nonavailability of replacement vehicles and repair parts," page 17, paragraph 2f(1) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2g: Concur. The shortage and mechanical condition of USARV's 1/4-Ton fleet has been a problem for some time. A request of 942 each M151A2 1/4-Tons from TACOM has been approved for release to USARV and shipments have started to Vietnam. A recent reconciliation of back orders was conducted by ICCV and the new vehicles will be used to fill US shortages. This Headquarters is in receipt of the study submitted by 18th MP Bde, and action will be taken to fill as many shortages as possible. With respect to repair parts, combined effort between USARV and ICCV is being made to correct the shortage. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


GEDDES E. MACLAREN

CPT. INF.

Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:
720th MP Bn
18th MP Bde

51

GPOP-FD (12 May 71) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 720th Military
Police Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 AUG 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. Mah

M. L. MAH
2LT, AGC
Asst AG

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AVRGM-00

19 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, (8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 30 April 1971, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (P3)

2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations:

- a. Personnel: None.
- b. Intelligence: None.
- c. Operations:

(1) Observation: During the reporting period heroin continued to be readily available to United States personnel throughout Vietnam.

(a) Evaluation: Heroin is being supplied to members of United States Armed Forces by Vietnamese civilians in large quantities at a very low price. The heroin is 92 - 97 percent pure and is generally sold in screw and snap-on-top vials of .2 gram and .3 gram size. There does not seem to be any profit motive involved as the price and purity have remained constant. It is therefore believed that a concerted effort is being made to undermine morale and mission effectiveness of United States Forces. The drug is being administered by smoking, mixed either with marijuana or tobacco, inhalation or snorting directly into the nasal passages, or injection. Heroin is openly sold outside nearly every United States installation for \$3 - 5 per vial. Efforts to reduce the use of heroin by enforcement and education have met with very limited success.

(b) Recommendation: That diplomatic and political efforts be expanded by the United States Government to suppress the source of heroin.

(c) Command Action: The above has been discussed with persons in the highest level of Vietnamese Government, through diplomatic channels, and their assurances received that action would be taken.

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54

AVEGMA-00

19 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, (8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 30 April 1971, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R3))

(2) Observation: The 8th Military Police Group (CI) continues to take over Criminal Investigation Division missions of redeploying units.

(a) Evaluation: The absorption of responsibilities of redeploying units, with organic Criminal Investigation Division resources, has presented some problems in regards to the completion of pending Reports of Investigation and the disposition of evidence. These problem areas are manifested more on those occasions when a lack of continuity between the Criminal Investigation Division units exists due to the changeover occurring on the effective date of redeployment.

(b) Recommendation: Experience with two redeploying units in the past six months indicates the most efficient means of assuming the Criminal Investigation Division responsibilities is as follows:

1 An experienced, senior Warrant Officer from the controlling detachment should be attached to the redeploying unit to act as Officer In Charge of their Criminal Investigation Division element at least two months prior to the redeployment date.

2 Thirty days prior to the redeployment date all cases opened by the redeploying unit should be assigned case numbers from the controlling office.

3 Operational control of all Criminal Investigation Division assets of the redeploying unit should pass to the controlling office a minimum of ten days prior to the redeployment date.

4 Evidence should be transferred to the controlling office on the redeployment date.

(c) Command Action: The procedure outlined above has been included in the Standard Operating Procedure and concerned personnel informed as required.

(3) Observation: On 24 February 1971 this unit was directed to expand the capability of the Crime Laboratory to examine and identify hard narcotics.

(a) Evaluation: During March and April 1971 necessary

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55
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AVBCM-CO

19 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, (8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 30 April 1971, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R3)

Army Authorization Documents System documentation, equipment requisitions and work orders were submitted to expand the Crime Laboratory. Through the cooperation of Provost Marshal, United States Army Pacific, four enlisted chemists were trained at the 515th Military Police Crime Laboratory, Camp Zama, Japan in the procedures of examining and identifying hard narcotics, specifically heroin. Upon completion of this training it was planned that they would analyze suspected heroin, utilizing the facilities of the 9th Medical Laboratory at Long Binh until our Crime Laboratory was completed. Due to a breakdown of the 9th Medical Laboratory's equipment, the four chemists were returned to the 515th Crime Laboratory on a Temporary Duty basis to run Republic of Vietnam cases. They will remain there until either the 9th Medical Laboratory becomes operational again or our own laboratory is completed.

(b) Recommendations: That efforts continue to complete the expansion of the Crime Laboratory and the four enlisted chemists remain in Japan until facilities are available in the Republic of Vietnam.

(c) Command Action: Progress of the Crime Laboratory is being closely monitored, and the Temporary Duty of the chemists has been extended.

(4) Observation: Money conversions of departing personnel from the Republic of Vietnam takes place several hours in advance of the aircraft departure time.

(a) Evaluation: The conversion of Military Payment Certificates to United States Federal Reserve Notes takes place during processing at the Replacement Battalions. As a result, the delay in time subsequent to the money conversions and departure of the aircraft allows sufficient time for individuals to engage in illegal transactions.

(b) Recommendation: That adequate money conversion facilities or sterile areas be established at air terminals processing United States Armed Forces personnel departing from the Republic of Vietnam.

(c) Command Action: Letter was forwarded to higher

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56

AVBGM-CO

19 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, (8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 30 April 1971, Reports Control Symbol CCFOR-65 (R3).

headquarters recommending that the problem of Permanent Change of Station flights to Continental United States be moved from Tan Son Nhut Civilian Terminal to Camp Alpha, the present Rest and Recuperation processing center.

d. Organization:

Observation: The 8th Military Police Group (CI) was directed to establish a Joint Narcotics Investigation Detachment in November 1970. Personnel manpower spaces and equipment were not initially allocated, and it was necessary to provide assets from existing resources, while the required justification was submitted to higher headquarters. Establishment of an organization from current resources, with a restricted mission, has reduced the capability to provide general criminal investigation support within the area of responsibility.

(1) Evaluation: The Army Authorization Documents System, which is currently used to establish new units or change those already in existence, is cumbersome, inflexible, and does not lend itself to a rapidly changing situation.

(2) Recommendation: That The Army Authorization Documents System be amended to provide the flexibility needed to respond to the rapidly changing needs of commanders in the field.

(3) Command Action: The necessary approval from Department of the Army has not yet been received, and manning of this high priority mission unit continues to be from element resources. To insure continuity of operations it was necessary to request assignment of additional criminal investigators to this command pending formal approval of The Army Authorization Document. The assignment of these additional criminal investigators has been approved.

e. Training: None.

f. Logistics: None.

g. Communications: None.

4
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57

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AVBCM-CG

19 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, (8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 30 April 1971, Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65 (R3)

h. Material: None

i. Other: None.

~~Inclosure~~~~Organizational Chart~~

Inclosure withdrawn

WILBUR D. GETZ

COL, MPC

Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - CINC, USARPAC, ATTN: GPDP-DT
- 3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO-DO
- 4 - CG, 18th MP Bde, ATTN: AVBGC-O
- 1 - File

5
CONFIDENTIAL

59

AVBGC-0 (19 May 71) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

DA, Headquarters, 18th Military Police Brigade, APO 96491

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Comments on Significant Activities:

a. Page 2, para 1b(2): Lines 1 through 5 should read: A 142-man Military Police Customs Unit was activated provisionally by 18th Military Police Brigade General Order 388, dated 28 November 1970 and documented on Augmentation MTDA P5WFPE9903 to HHD, 18th Military Police Brigade submitted to USARV on 13 November 1970.

b. Page 2, para 1b(3): Add: Four assistant chemical analysts, E7, 95D30, were added to MTOE 19-500EP507, P50171 for HHD, 8th Military Police Group (CI) and submitted as part of the required detailed MTOE update to USARV on 9 March 1971. Equipment requirements for the analysis of hard narcotics were documented in Augmentation MTDA P5WFPE9904 for HHD, 18th Military Police Brigade and submitted to USARV on 17 March 1971.

c. Page 4, para 1c(7)(b) As of 30 April 1971, should read:

	OFF	WO	EM	TOTAL
Authorized:	8	80	72	160*

* There were no approved MTOE/MTDA actions during the reporting period affecting the 8th Military Police Group (CI).

2. Comments on Lessons Learned: Page 10, para 10d(1): Nonconcur: Upon establishment of the Narcotics Investigation Detachment (NIA), four warrant officer criminal investigators were transferred to the 8th Military Police Group (CI) from MACV. Additionally, seven personnel spaces were furnished by MACV and four personnel spaces were furnished by this headquarters to support the force structure change required by the MTDA for the NID. Paragraph 2-52, AR 310-49 provides certain flexibility in that emergency requests may be electronically transmitted to DA if deemed appropriate. It must be recognized that even with an emergency request, the time lags inherent in the requisitioning cycle attenuate the possibility of the immediate assignment of highly-skilled criminal investigators even to fill an urgent request.


AVBGC-0

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Military Police Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

60

3. Basic correspondence has been reviewed and is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



FRANK L. BURNS
MAJ, MPC
Adjutant

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- 2- DA, ACSFOR, Washington DC 20310
- 1- CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375
- 1- CO, 8th MP Gp (CI)
- 1- File

61

AVHDO-DO (19 May 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, (8th Military Police
Group (Criminal Investigation), Period Ending 30 April 1971,
Reports Control Symbol CSPOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 31 JUL 71

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 8th Military Police Group and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters with the exception of page 9, paragraph 2c(4): Nonconcur. The need for a more adequate customs facility is recognized. However, moving the TSN Civilian Terminal Processing Facilities to Camp Alpha would have a negative impact on current plans for Camp Alpha, which at present has a heavy workload with the recent establishment of a Leave Control Center. No action is recommended by USARPAC or DA.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


F.L. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
8th MP Gp
18th MP Bde

8

62

GPOP-FD (19 May 71) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ, 8th Military
Police Group (Criminal Investigation)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs with subject ORLL with the following
comment:

Reference, 2d Indorsement: COMUSMACV 140955Z Aug 71,
subject: Intensified Customs Inspection within DOD,
directed that all actions connected with the processing of
outbound military and DOD sponsored civilians departing RVN
on military, MAC charter and charter leave aircraft be trans-
ferred from the International Terminal at TSN to Camp Alpha.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

9

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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