

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD518241

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FROM:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors;
Administrative/Operational Use; MAY 1971. Other requests shall be referred to Assitant Chief of Staff for Force Development (Army), Washington, DC.

AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr 9 May 1975 ; AGO D/A ltr 9 May 1975

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

**THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.**

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

**APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE,
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.**

UNCLASSIFIED

AD_

518 241

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED

TO: UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: CONFIDENTIAL

AUTHORITY:

AGC, D/A

ntw.

9 May 75

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.



CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

②

DAAG-PAP (M) (5 Nov 71)

DAFD-OTT

19 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, US Army Spt Cmd, Da Nang, 79th Maint Bn; US Army Invt Con Cen, VN; US Army Depot, Da Nang; 71st Trans Bn for Period Ending 30 April 1971 (U)

AD 518241

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.
4. As Section 1 of the report is not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program it has been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Verne L. Bowers
 VERNE L. BOWERS
 Major General, USA
 The Adjutant General

D D C
 RECORDED
 200 6 104
 12

- 5 Incl
1. DAFD-OTT-711219
 2. DAFD-OTT-711035
 3. DAFD-OTT-711122
 4. DAFD-OTT 711229 and
 5. DAFD-OTT 711096

DISTRIBUTION:

- Commanding Generals**
 US Continental Army Command
 US Army Combat Developments Command
 US Army Materiel Command
- Commandants**
 US Army Quartermaster School
 US Army Transportation School

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U. S. C., SECTION 793 AND 794. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

Regraded unclassified when separated
 from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADJ NO. ---
 DDC FILE COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

3

AVCD-GO-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the U.S. Army Support
Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971. (RCS CSFOR-65 (R3))

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluations and Recommendations.

a. Personnel

(1) Awards:

(a) OBSERVATION: USASUPCOM, DNG's awards processing procedure in effect, at the beginning of LAMSON 719 did not respond rapidly enough to the increased volume of awards generated by the operation.

(b) EVALUATION: It became apparent that lead time for resupply requisitioning of decorations sets exceeded the duration of the operation and that subordinate units did not have enough clerical personnel to cope with administrative requirements.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Awards processing procedures were modified to meet the situation. Recommendations were accepted in handwriting in order to insure timely recognition of deserving individuals. A short feeder information

DAFD-OTT
711219
Incl 1

1
CONFIDENTIAL

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10**

CONFIDENTIAL

4

AVCD-GO-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the U.S. Army Support
Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971. (RCS CSFOR-65 (R3))

form was designated for impact awards and transferred to the normal form when time was available. A consistent decoration set requisitioning cycle permitted command action to have back orders filled.

(2) Control of Attached Personnel

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Difficulties were encountered in the identification, location and control of the 600 plus personnel attached to the 26th GSG during LAMSON 719. In addition, identification and control of personnel in attached units (over 1,200 personnel) from detachment to company size was difficult in that most personnel and units converged on Phu Bai and Quang Tri within a very short period of time.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The assignment of more processing teams at Phu Bai and Quang Tri would have been helpful in identifying and sorting out those personnel being attached to the 26th GSG for duty. Many individuals arrived with no orders, some carried personnel files, others arrived without the S-1 having been informed of their arrival. In some cases individuals were improperly assigned, as a result some individuals bound for USASUPCOM, DNG units initially reported to other organizations.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Personnel reception and processing teams should be available in the area of operation to identify and direct assignment of personnel. In addition, the teams would assist in identifying the location of personnel.

b. Intelligence: None.

c. Operations:

(1) LAMSON Planning

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The original planning group for operation LAMSON 719 proved to be too small and access to staff agencies possessing the required expertise for detailed planning of an operation of this magnitude was denied by the Limited Distribution (LIMDIS) restrictions.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Because of the LIMDIS requirement on all planning, the planning group was small with only a few selected individuals allowed access to it. Even 1st Area Logistical Command which was directly involved in the operation was not included in the planning. LIMDIS requirements proved totally unrealistic. They did not allow access to the necessary expertise on the staff, particularly in the areas of ammunition, POL and transportation. It was not possible to exchange information with logistical planners at HQ, USARV. Likewise, the major subordinate commanders and their staffs who were to execute the plan were not included.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

5

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCD-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971. (RCS CSFOR-65 (R3))

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In future operations of this type initial planning groups should be more versatile and large enough to include all required personnel on a need to know basis.

(2) Information Planning for LAMSON 719.

(a) OBSERVATION: Planning for Public Information/Command Information was not considered in the planning stage of LAMSON 719.

(b) EVALUATION: Preparation and coordination of an appropriate Information annex for operation LAMSON 719 was not effected because of exclusion from overall planning; hence, detailed and timely information guidance for the operation could not be disseminated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Overall planning for future operations of this magnitude should include Public Information/Command Information personnel.

d. Organization: Civilian Military Manpower Management

(1) OBSERVATION: Within USASUPCOM, DNG the separation of civilian and military manpower management made optimum utilization of all manpower resources difficult to achieve and required extreme and careful coordination between the staff agencies involved before a decision could be reached.

(2) EVALUATION: The manpower management function for military and civilian personnel must be in the same office. This office must be the one charged with the responsibility to manage TDA's, manpower authorizations and requirements.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: That the organization of all commands concerned retain all manpower functions together and in a staff element corresponding to G-3.

e. Training: None.

f. Logistics:

(1) Forecasting Requirements for Direct Exchange (DX) Items:

(a) OBSERVATION: The failure of DSU's to forecast repair parts requirements during the monsoon season resulted in the non-availability of many DX items.

(b) EVALUATION: Supply procedures (AR 735-36, AR 711-16) make provisions for commanders to requisition repair parts based on forecasts for future requirements such as climatic conditions and field exercises. Had these fore-

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCD-GO-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971. (RCS CSFOR-65 (R3))

casts been made, numerous days of Non-operational Rate Supply (NORS) down time could have been avoided during the monsoon seasons.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Forecasts of repair parts should be made and parts requisitioned prior to subsequent monsoon seasons. Forecasts should be based on data recorded during previous monsoon seasons and adjusted to reflect changes in densities.

(2) NCR 500 Operations:

(a) OBSERVATION: Poor transportation and communications between NCR 500 units and factory technical representatives at Headquarters, USARV has caused an increase in system down time. The non-availability of repairmen and repair parts has also hampered operations.

(b) EVALUATION: A school trained repairman has been assigned to this command and has partially alleviated the situation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To further alleviate this problem, it is suggested that a stock of the most frequently needed repair parts be stocked at the U.S. Army Depot, Da Nang, rather than having a centralized inventory at the Long Binh Depot.

(3) Shuttle Run Discipline:

(a) OBSERVATION: The lack of supervision over drivers assigned to local haul shuttle runs resulted in a decreased number of turnarounds during LAMSON 719.

(b) EVALUATION: When trucks are placed in a shuttle run between two points in the local area, it is imperative that a roadmaster or some supervisory element check performance of each vehicle periodically. The checks should be made at both origin and destination as well as along the route to be used between these points. The checks insure that the trucks are loaded and unloaded properly with minimum delay.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: When units are tasked to provide vehicles on a shuttle for high-priority cargo, they must also be tasked to provide a roadmaster or rover to check on their drivers at origin, along the route and at the final destination to insure efficient use of vehicles.

(4) ARVN C-Rations:

(a) OBSERVATION: The components of ARVN C-rations are packaged separately. Care must be taken when shipping these components to insure that an imbalance does not occur.

4

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

7
AVCD-GO-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971. (RCS CSFOR-65 (R3))

(b) EVALUATION: The three major components of ARVN combat rations are rice, a meat, fish or poultry item and fruit. Each component is packaged and palletized separately. When large quantities of rations are being moved, care must be taken to send a mix of the three components. Failure to take this precaution can result in an imbalance of the components and not sufficient stocks to constitute the required number of rations at the final destination.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To preclude imbalance problems with ARVN rations offered for shipment, close coordination with the ARVN Transportation and Quartermaster advisors is necessary. Documentation must be prepared and scrutinized carefully in order to avoid problems.

(5) Class VII Management at ICCV

(a) OBSERVATION: A large percentage of the requisitions for Class VII, ICCV controlled items were not received by ICCV or were received only after excessive delays in handling.

(b) EVALUATION: This problem caused extensive delay in units receiving equipment, as well as increasing work loads for DSU's. Problems appeared to be centered around two areas: (1) Requisitions are forwarded by mail to ICCV, which is slow and does not guarantee delivery. (2) The internal flow of documents at ICCV often takes in excess of one week from the date of arrival until receipt by the item manager.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A faster system of delivery to ICCV should be established. A daily courier system linking all DSU's with USASUPCOM, DNG and ICCV would solve the problem. The assignment of a Material Requests Expeditor Team authorized to represent DSU's would provide an element capable of conducting face to face coordination with item managers, consequently expediting material release.

(6) POL Engineer Support:

(a) OBSERVATION: An appreciable degree of engineer construction effort is required at the inception of an operation such as LAMSON 719 to permit construction of berms and access to unloading points at POL points. This support was extremely slow in coming.

(b) EVALUATION: It was quickly recognized that engineer support would not be forthcoming due to priorities given to QL-9 improvement between FSA 26-1 and FSA 26-2. Requests were submitted for organic bulldozer support, with drivers, for both FSA's. Receipts and utilization of these proved invaluable to the commanding officer of each FSA in that he could quickly accomplish his own construction after determination of priorities.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCD-GO-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971. (RCS CSFOR-65 (R3))

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Future operations of this type should include organic construction capability.

(7) Class VII Support to ARVN:

(a) OBSERVATION: During LAMSON 719, issue to ARVN was often slow and disorganized.

(b) EVALUATION: USASUPCOM, DNG was tasked with the responsibility to support ARVN with Class VII. Under normal procedure ARVN is not a customer of the US supply system. Any issue to ARVN must be approved by MACV J-4, USARV and released on an ICCV supply directive. In order to accomplish this the requirement was routed through MACV channels to J-4 who approved and forwarded it to USARV/ICCV. At the same time 1 ALC liaison officer passed the requirement on the U.S. system at 26th GSG. It was then forwarded through USASUPCOM, DNG to USARV and ICCV. Once the release was approved ICCV would relay the release telephonically to this headquarters who relayed to 26th GSG for issue. This procedure was slow.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Tighter controls and more responsive lines of communications should be established to provide a more responsive system.

(8) Multiple Chain of Command:

(a) OBSERVATION: As LAMSON 719 progressed and critical requirements developed there was a tendency for all major commands to forward supply requirements directly to USARV.

(b) EVALUATION: The USARV command structure is organized in such a manner that each division and separate brigade as well as XXIV Corps and USASUPCOM, DNG are authorized direct communications with USARV. This is the result of multiple chain of command; one for logistics, and one for tactical operations. A logistical support problem developed from this situation in that for any single requirement as many as three separate major headquarters can forward information to USARV. In most cases USARV received conflicting information resulting in confusion and delay.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Consideration should be given to establishing a procedure whereby logistic requirements are funneled through the senior tactical headquarters which in turn would maintain close coordination with the supporting logistical command.

(9) Closed Loop System:

(a) OBSERVATION: The Closed Loop system is not flexible enough to provide 100% support under all conditions and requirements.

CONFIDENTIAL

9

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCD-GO-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971. (RCS CSFOR-65 (R3))

(b) EVALUATION: Closed Loop assemblies are shipped into each military region in predetermined quantities. These quantities are based on demand data collected over several years, equipment densities, the quantity of un-serviceable assets retrograded, and the reduction of equipment densities. These procedures provide a sound basis for intensive management of critical assets. However, it does not provide the flexibility required to meet emergency situations such as LAMSON 719. It requires a minimum of two weeks to a month to obtain the approval to release and ship additional assets. During LAMSON 719, this was unacceptable. During the later stages of operations both the 1/5th Mechanized Infantry and 23d Infantry Division were experiencing critical increases in tracked vehicle deadline rates caused by the shortage of Closed Loop assets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A reserve pool of Closed Loop assets should be maintained for the purpose of providing backup support to routine Closed Loop inputs. This reserve would be maintained in-country as well as out of country.

(10) Class V:

(a) OBSERVATION: During LAMSON 719, IALC and USASUPCOM, DNG maintained separate ammunition pipelines, stockage schemes and resupply criteria.

(b) EVALUATION: Each system could have assisted the other under joint control for the success of the mission. Twice as many resupply sources would have been open to each party. Stockage would have been reasonable at each installation and meaningful priorities for resupply could have been set by a knowledge of both organizations needs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A joint logistical control center should have been established prior to D-Day, established the total requirement for LAMSON, and guided the execution of Class V supply support economically with a clearer understanding of the total mission and visibility of all the combined logistical system had to provide.

g. Communications: None.

h. Materiel:

(1) Use of Compressed Air:

(a) OBSERVATION: Construction equipment and MHE were operated for prolonged periods of time at higher than normal temperature.

(b) EVALUATION: Radiators on this equipment became clogged from dust and debris and very little attempt was made to eliminate this condition, often because water for such use was not available.

7

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

10

AVCD-GO-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971. (RCS CSFOR-65 (R3))

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An intensive supply effort should be made to provide complete BILI for equipment with compressed air systems. Vehicles could then be provided with air hoses and in the absence of water supply, compressed air could be used very effectively.

(2) Motion Picture Projectors:

(a) OBSERVATION: The Singer Graflex Model AS-25A (1) experienced considerable in-shop time during the reporting period.

(b) EVALUATION: This movie projector was mass purchased in CONUS without any support package. Maintenance units, therefore, have been at extreme disadvantage in providing timely repair response. The repair response time should improve, however, since schematics and parts lists have just recently been made available.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Before an item is fielded, it should be assured that a sufficient support maintenance package is available. Through this foresight and precaution, a problem as encountered with the Singer Graflex movie projector will be avoided in the future.

(3) Sensors:

(a) OBSERVATION: It was noted that an economical and simple means of monitoring chain link fences was needed. Multiple geophone strings connected to SID III or SHORT SHALO detectors were considered feasible. However, attaching geophones to chain link fencing with tape or wire led to many false activations due to the wind blowing against the fence. It was determined that spent trip flare brackets might be adapted to solve the problem.

(b) EVALUATION: It was discovered that four geophones could be wired in a series with MD-1 communications wire to form a geophone string which was then attached to chain link fencing using the trip flare brackets in which the geophone was inserted and screwed tight. The brackets were attached to the chain link fence by utilizing a small strip of metal (1"x3") which was fastened by metal screws.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Multiple geophone strings can be used with an economy of both labor and equipment where there is taunt chain link fencing. It is recommended that the geophone be attached using trip flare brackets and positioned upside down for maximum efficiency.

(4) Sensors:

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the vulnerability of the Class III area of FSA 26-1, personnel of the 3d Security Company determined that PSID sensors could

8

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL


AVCD-GC-MH

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971. (RCS CSFOR-65 (R3))

be utilized to increase the security of that area.

(b) **EVALUATION:** PSID's were utilized by implanting the geophone in the ground directly under 10,000 gallon fuel bladders. It was found that anyone touching the fuel bladder or walking adjacent to it would activate the geophone, sending a signal to the sensor monitoring site. Fuel bladders were numbered in order that the sensor monitor could determine which bladder was being tampered with. The only shortcoming noted of this technique occurred when dog patrols were initiated in the Class III area, as they at times activated the sensors.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** It is recommended that this technique be used in future operations of this nature. It is also recommended that dog patrols be kept away from the immediate area of the fuel bladders until there is a sensor activation. When a sensor activation occurs, the dog patrols should be sent immediately to confirm it. Employing sensors and dog patrols in this manner would result in the best utilization of both resources.



ARTHUR H. SWEENEY, Jr
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

"PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED".

13

AVHDO-DO (Undated) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the US Army Support
Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65
(R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375, 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-PD,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang and concurs except as indicated below:

a. Reference item concerning "NCR 500 Operations," page 19, paragraph 2f(2): Nonconcur. A stockage of frequently needed NCR 500 repair parts at the US Army Depot, Da Nang, is not necessary. NCR 500 units are currently able to maintain an adequate supply of repair parts in unit PLL. Establishment of an inventory point at Da Nang could not be justified due to the large number of NCR 500 repair parts which have a very low demand history.

b. Reference item concerning "Closed Loop System," page 21, paragraph 2f(9): Nonconcur. The Closed Loop Support Program is a totally integrated and controlled program in which DA-designated end items or components and assemblies are intensively managed through supply, retrograde, and overhaul to and from respective commands to maintain prescribed levels of readiness, and provide positive control. It is not intended to be the focal point upon which a short or long term tactical operation is to function. It provides a quantity of end items/components as maintenance float and depot stock for the total TOE/TDA in-country authorizations. The "reserve pool" consists of authorized depot stocks and any USARPAC asset in rebuild. This does provide flexibility to support short term operational requirements, such as LAMSON 719, because there usually is depot stock on hand at the time of need. The release of assets for LAMSON 719 was instantaneous when assets were available in-country. Otherwise, the items required had to be requested and shipped from within USARPAC or from CONUS. After the releases were made from either source, transportation means and priorities caused most of the time delay.

2. Additional comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "LAMSON Planning," page 17, paragraph 2c(1). Due to the extreme sensitivity of some planning activities, the size and composition of the initial planning groups must be severely restricted. Imposition of such restrictions is only made after a thorough

AVHDO-DO (Undated) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the US Army Support
Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSPOR-65
(R3) (U)

evaluation of the consequences and risks involved. These judgments are best left to the commander having overall responsibility for the operation. No action by this or higher headquarters is considered necessary. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Forecasting Requirements for DX items," page 18, paragraph 2f(1). DSU's when computing requirements for items of a seasonal nature should take into consideration the demands experienced during the same season the previous year. Authority for this type of requirement determination is granted by AR 711-16. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended.

c. Reference item concerning "Class VII Management at ICCV," page 20, paragraph 2f(5). Effective in June 1971 the ICCV has an enlisted courier on a daily route connecting the ICCV with the support commands and depots. All documentation and correspondence between these commands are eligible for this service. As to the time required for processing requisitions for Class VII items; the PEMA requisitioning system is almost completely manual due to the stringent controls required for issue of major items and the fact that all requisitions must be transmitted via mail or courier rather than by electronic means because of the exception data required (tabular authority and turn-in documentation). Compared to requisition processing for consumables the cycle for PEMA requisitions is, by necessity, much longer. However, steps have been taken which have reduced the in-house processing time to a week and to avoid the delay in mailing requisition to the depots.

d. Reference item concerning "Multiple Chain of Command," page 21, paragraph 2f(8). The multiple lines of communication caused many duplicative requirements during LAMSON 719. Even more serious was the multiplicity of requirements received for airfield construction materials. Requirements were received through USASUPCOM DNG, direct from XXIV Corps, and from USAEC. Requirements were never identical and it was frequently necessary to delay action on release of materiel due to delays experienced in determining what the real requirement was. It is recommended that in future operations of this type all commands adhere to the established logistical support chain, giving all requirements to the supporting Support Command.

e. Reference item concerning "Class V," page 22, paragraph 2f(10). Policy has been directed toward increasing mutual cooperation and coordination between USARV and ARVN Forces. This policy has formed the basis for the formation and development of the Single Ammunition Logistical System (SALS). The SALS provides for a single ammunition pipeline and for consolidation and transfer of stockage to the maximum extent possible. Therefore,

15

AVHDO-DO (Undated) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the US Army Support
Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65
(R3) (U)

this Headquarters fully concurs with USASUPCOM DNG's evaluation and re-commendation that increased effectiveness of support could have been achieved during the LAMSON 719 operation had Military Region 1 established a joint logistical center. In future operations, maximum consideration should be given during early planning for the establishment of a joint logistics center.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

CF:
USASUPCOM - DNG


F.L. HONSOWETZ
CIT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

16

GPOP-FD (undtd) 2d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, US Army Support
Command, Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 28 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

17

AVCS MT I (20 May 1971)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-lessons learned (79th Maintenance Battalion)
Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS AVCSFOR-65 (E3)

2. LESSONS LEARNED-COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS: Evaluations and Recommendations

a. Personnel:

(1)

(a) **Observation:** The 147th LEM Company is critically short of qualified radio repairmen with the 31E20 MOS in the grade of E-4 and E-5.

(b) **Evaluation:** By 15 June 1971, the 147th LEM Company will have only approximately 10% of the necessary personnel to perform the assigned mission. As a result it has become necessary to cross-train higher skilled personnel to perform radio repairs, specifically 26C and 31L MOS personnel. The influx of the 31E series is insufficient to adequately manage the additional workload of the Keystone and Thai missions of this company.

DAFD-OTT
Incl 2
711035

CONFIDENTIAL

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10**

CONFIDENTIAL

18

AVCS NT I (20 May 1971)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (79th Maintenance Battalion)
Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS AVCSFOR-65 (R3)

(c) Recommendation: That command emphasis be placed on this crucial problem area.

b. Intelligence-NONE

c. Operations

(1)

(a) Observation: The use of standard steam cleaning equipment was not adequate to handle the volume of vehicles required to be painted in the recent operations.

(b) Evaluation: The time required to clean a vehicle was cut in half by using a 100 cfm air compressor in conjunction with a peni-prime spreader and used to pressure clean the vehicles. This arrangement however, committed a critical piece of equipment. As it was only the pump that was used from the peni-prime spreader, we installed a salvaged pump and meter next to the air compressor and were able to get the same results without using the peni-prime spreader.

(c) Recommendations: Under similar circumstances, the Army should consider incorporating commercial water blasters into the TOE. A standard water blaster would ensure uniform washing techniques and MQI standards would be more easily attained.

(2)

(a) Observation: This unit received the mission to repair all beds turned into Keystone Operations. The individual handling of these beds was taking excessive time and the backlog was getting too large.

(b) Evaluation: A production line was established where the beds were placed on a rolling conveyor belt and as it passed from station to station a particular part could be replaced where necessary. The rollers were placed on an incline so the beds would be moved by gravity. Brakes were used to stop the bed where necessary. This arrangement greatly reduced the physical labor involved and made the entire operation more efficient.

(c) Recommendations: A unit commander when managing large quantities of like items should consider the feasibility of a production line type process.

d. Organization: See Inclosure #1 for Battalion organization

(1)

(a) Observation: Presently it is being planned to Vietnamize Long Binh CC&S Company, leaving only military slots in the critical areas of operation. Vietnamization will prove effective if close scrutiny is given to which slots are converted.

(b) Evaluation: Certain slots within this activity are critical due to accountability and technical knowledge. Placing qualified military personnel into these slots would prove beneficial to the Vietnamization program.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

19

CONFIDENTIAL

AVCS MT I (20 May 1971)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (79th Maintenance Battalion)
Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS AVCSFOR-65 (R3)

(c) Recommendation: Those critical technical slots be filled with qualified personnel, i.e. Warrant Officers. That an English speaking Vietnamese be located in each section to be responsible for the Vietnamese in that section, to make communication clearer and more concise.

e. Training-NONE

f. Logistics-NONE

g. Communication-NONE

h. Materiel:

(1)

(a) Observation: Water blasters are utilized to a great extent by the Long Binh CC&S Company, for the purpose of washing retrograde material. The blasters are not listed as items organic to this activity.

(b) Evaluation: Water blasters have become an integral part of this activity. They are used extensively in the washing of retrograde equipment.

(c) Recommendations: Incorporation of a standard military water blaster into the organizational property would ensure that MQI standards were met uniformly for all units. This would also make repair of equipment easier due to the accessibility of repair parts.

i. Other-NONE

1 Incl
as

Byard W. Rife
BYARD W. RIFE
LTC, OrdC
Commanding

3
CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED

21
CONFIDENTIAL

AVCS MH (20 May 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 79th Maintenance
Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65
(R3) (U)

HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO SF 971 000 0000 1971

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, AFSA: AVHDO-
DO, APC 96375

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310


1. (C) Reference paragraph 2a (1)(c), page 3. CONCUR. The shortage of 3LE personnel is recognized by this command and is widespread throughout USARV. The Department of the Army has been requested to assist in improving this situation. It should be noted that the figure of 10% for 15 June 1971 was projected by both the 147th LEM Company and the 79th Maintenance Battalion Adjutant on 30 April 1971. This projection was based on the assumption that no replacements for 3LE personnel would be sent to the 79th Maintenance Battalion. To preclude the 10% figure from actually occurring, this command has initiated the cross-training of personnel in the shop areas, solicited and begun training of local nationals from the Central Training Institute, as well as ensuring that 3LE assets will be assigned to the 79th Maintenance Battalion as they become available to this command.

2. (C) Reference paragraph 2c (1)(c) page 3. CONCUR. In addition, the water blaster should be considered for incorporation into the TOE of any DS or GS maintenance unit performing maintenance on wheel and track vehicles that operate under conditions of extreme mud.

3. (C) Reference paragraph 2d (1)(c), page 4. CONCUR. Technically competent warrant officers would be required to supervise a predominantly Vietnamese operation of Long Binh CC&S. The presence of English speaking local nationals would be essential for smooth operations and proper supervision.

4. (U) Lessons Learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



PAUL M. ROBERTSON
CPT, AGC
ASST AG

CF:
79th Maint Bn

4

CONFIDENTIAL

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED.

23

AVHDO-DO (20 May 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (79th Maintenance Battalion)
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 23 JUL 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GFCP-FO,
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 79th Maintenance Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Additional comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Personnel," page 1, paragraph 1a. Concur. This Headquarters continually reviews the status of all MOSC within USARV, and it is aware of the critical shortage of personnel in MOSC 31E20. DA is appraised monthly of this fact by the submission of a critical MOSC list by this Headquarters. This Headquarters endeavors to assign personnel equitably to all major commands within USARV. For assignment purposes the 79th Maintenance Battalion comes under the control of the 537th PSC (Support Command, Saigon). At the present time the 537th PSC is at 86.7% of authorized strength in MOSC 31E20. The USARV average is 78.6%. No action by USARPAC is recommended. Action by DA is required to insure timely fill of MOSC requirements. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Operations," page 3, paragraph 2c and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2 and item concerning "Materiel," page 4, paragraph 2h and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2. Concur with the recommendation that the Army should consider incorporating commercial water blasters into the TOE. This reinforces 1st Indorsement, AVHGC-DST, dtd 13 Dec 69, to ARMY CONCEPT TEAM IN VIETNAM final evaluation report on the suitability of the Water Blaster. This report was indorsed to CINCUSARPAC and recommended that Combat Developments Command examine the world-wide requirements for Water Blasters and, if appropriate, recommend pertinent TOE changes.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[Signature]
GEORGE P. MACLAREN
CPT, INF.
Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:
79th Maint Bn
USASUPCOM-SGN

24


GPOP-FD (20 May 71) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 79th
Maintenance Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 AUG 1971


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


I. M. CRAXI
CPT. AGC
ASST. MG

AVCS MI I (20 May 1971)
 SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (79th Maintenance Battalion)
 Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS AVCSFOR-65 (R3)



This report is the property of the Department of Defense and is loaned to you.

Operational Report of the United States Army Inventory Control Center,
VIETNAM for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations:

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations:

(1) Changes in Retrograde Instructions:

(a) Observation: During the period difficulties were experienced due to rapid changes in destination for retrograde assets. These changes are directed by USARPAC and received at the USAICCV in message format. Attempts are made, upon receipt of changes in destination, to stop assets in port and redirect shipment.

(b) Evaluation: The attempt to redirect shipments at port invariably results in confusion and does not block all assets from going to the improper destination. The major difficulty is the time factor required to inform all interested parties so as to stop those assets already booked for shipment. This entails cutting new Transportation Control Movement Documents (TCMDs) and changing the shipping data plate on each vehicle. Invariably some assets are loaded aboard ship during the time the change is being processed.

DAFD-OTT
711122
Incl 3

27

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that upon receipt of a change in destination, all assets at port be allowed to continue to the previous destination. Those in route to port can, however, be diverted.

(2) Project Orange Bakt (ZMO) Dry Battery Deliveries.

(a) Observation: A large percentage of dry battery requisitions experience either handling or shipping delays, resulting in the use of premium transportation in attempts to meet Requested Delivery Dates (RDD). Most of these deliveries are late even though premium transportation is used.

(b) Evaluation: Organizations responsible for handling and shipping RVN dry battery requisitions are not always aware or responsive to the requirements for expeditious processing and handling of dry battery requisitions in order that all RDD's are met. Any delay throughout the pipeline can result in critical battery shortages due to low stockage levels maintained in RVN. The USAICCV dry battery manager must monitor critical battery deliveries on a shipment-by-shipment basis in attempts to meet RDD's.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that the necessity for expeditious processing and handling of dry battery requisitions be re-emphasized at 2d Logistical Command, LCOPs and the NICP.

(3) Outstanding Fund Reservation List From CFMA:

(a) Observation: The USAICCV noted that the CFMA fund reservations for USAICCV transactions were increasing in a dollar value which was unrealistically greater than the estimated net obligations for requisitions for the same period.

(b) Evaluation: The USAICCV requested CFMA to furnish visibility of the requisitions making up the Outstanding Fund Reservation Report, USARPAC CSC, Run No. V108 CFMA. USAICCV managers reviewed those requisitions valued at \$100,000 or more first and later reviewed those requisitions valued between \$10,000 and \$100,000. The first review resulted in cancellation and purge actions reducing fund reservations by \$44.3 million and the second review reduced fund reservations by \$22.3 million.

c. Recommendation: It is recommended that USAICCV manager review of requisitions establishing fund reservations in CFMA be accomplished at least quarterly to enhance the value of the Outstanding Fund Reservation Report as a financial management tool.

(4) Project Keystone Assets In Depot Operating Assets:

(a) Observation: The USAICCV Financial Inventory Report (FIR), 31 December 1970, showed an unaccountable increase in the dollar value of FEMA Principal depot operating assets of approximately \$50,000,000.

(b) Evaluation: The FIR Report was closely reviewed and found to have FEMA Principal items with wrong or non-existing purpose/subpurpose codes included in the accountability of Operating Assets. Further investigation determined the source of these assets with wrong or non-existing purpose/subpurpose codes to be Project Keystone turn-ins. Project Keystone assets are not to be included in operating assets and are automatically excluded when the proper purpose/subpurpose code is applied. Further investigation showed the non-existing codes to have resulted from key punch errors and the wrong purpose/subpurpose code being applied to Project Keystone turn-ins by the Excess Operations Keystone section of the US Army Depot, Long Binh.

(c) Recommendation: The Financial Inventory Report (FIR) requires proper input to be a useful financial management tool. It is recommended that the importance of accurate input to the Financial Inventory Report be re-emphasized at all depots to enhance the reliability of the Financial Inventory Report as a useful management tool.

(5) Commander's Critical Items List and Project Keystone:

(a) Observation: The percent of in-country fills for Commander's Critical Items List (CCIL) requisitions has steadily declined from a February, 1971 fill of 56% to an April fill of 46%. FEMA Principal items showed a decline from 39% fill in February, 1971 to 19% fill in April, 1971.

(b) Evaluation: Reduction of CCIL requisition in-country fills reflects reduced in-country stockage of critical items and insufficient replenishment.

(c) Recommendation: Quick reaction to CCIL requirements can be achieved through the use of lateral transfers from stand-down units to active units before Project Keystone turn-in actions are undertaken. It is recommended that a procedure be developed to transfer items entering the Keystone Project to active units having critical requirements for the items.

(6) Operation Lam Son 719/Dewey Canyon II:

(a) Observation: The United States Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (USAICCV) participated in Operation Lam Son 719/Dewey Canyon II, providing intensified supply management support for the Operation during the period 10 January 1971 to 25 March 1971. The USAICCV identified requirements and obtained supplies required from in-country and off-shore

29
sources, directing shipment to the US Army Depot, Da Nang (USAD, DNG) and later in the period to Quang Tri Subdepot. During the period approximately \$46,000,000 worth of supplies were moved to support the Operation.

(b) Evaluation: The USAICCV has had great difficulty in confirming the overall cost of supplies furnished in support of Operation Lam Son 719/Dewey Canyon II. The USAICCV established an operations center which identified requirements and obtained the needed supplies. This center also maintained records of supply directives. The costing generated from the supply directives initiated by the USAICCV was compared with costs generated by in-country depots. Reconciliation was made with US Army Depots at Long Binh and Cam Ranh Bay. Complete reconciliation was not possible with the US Army Depot, Da Nang. Issues were made from the Da Nang Depot and from the Quang Tri Subdepot without consideration for gathering cost data either during or after the time the issues were made.

(c) Recommendation: Recommend that plans for future operations, such as, Operation Lam Son 719/Dewey Canyon II, consider the necessities of after-action costing of supplies furnished, both FEMA and stock fund, and contain procedures to follow which will make USAICCV and depot reconciliations possible.

(7) Distribution of Keystone Assets:

(a) Observation: Disposition of Keystone assets are predetermined by DA and USARPAC. Instructions are in the form of Major Item Distribution Instruction Sheet (MIDA sheets) which are distributed to Keystone processing activities, depots, and USAICCV. The MIDA sheets provide for specific quantities to be shipped to special commands and direct disposition of the remainder. The system is sound and workable. The Keystone Control Center distributes a weekly completion report to all concerned activities. Comparison of the Keystone Weekly Completion Reports with the Statement of Inventory Transaction Report reflects: that items which are directed for issue to ARVN were actually put in depot stocks; items which MIDA sheets directed be retained as depot stock were transferred to ARVN or retained in the Keystone account; and, documents showed transfer of Keystone items to depot stock but the stock was never physically moved from the Keystone activity to the depot warehouse.

(b) Evaluation: Keystone processing activities do not follow instructions on MIDA sheets with consistency. Many items scheduled for transfer to ARVN have been retained as depot stocks resulting in shortfall of ARVN issues and inflation of depot assets.

(c) Recommendation: It is recommended that an indoctrination and instruction program be established for personnel in the Keystone Project to assure that the directed actions are accomplished. Empower one element of the Keystone Project to have free access to all areas for spot checks, with the authority to make changes where needed to insure that proper disposition is made. Emphasis should be placed on tracking Keystone assets from input to receipt at ultimate destination.

- c. Training: None
- d. Intelligence: None
- e. Logistics: None
- f. Organization: None
- g. Other: None


 J. F. [unclear]
 Colonel, [unclear]
 Command [unclear]

31

AVHDO-DO (Undated) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of the United States Army
Inventory Control Center, Vietnam for Period Ending 30 April 1971
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 26 Jun 71

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, United States Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam and concurs with the exception of paragraph 2b(5). Currently, CCIL requirements are filled from depot stock or passed out-of-country for expedited supply action. CCIL furnishes the necessary management to insure critical items receive prompt and positive supply action. USARV critical items are projected for each Keystone increment and are in fact, returned to depot for issue against critical shortages throughout RVN. If a lateral transfer procedure was initiated, it would serve to decrease the responsiveness of the CCIL program by transferring items based on geographical location rather than urgency of need. In addition, transfers between units in different Military Regions would cause nonjudicious use of dwindling USARV transportation assets. Under current configuration the CCIL Branch, USAICCV, is not staffed to review the status down units' inventories to identify those assets to be transferred. The decline in fill of PEMA principal items as a result of CCIL is based on a higher priority for other in-country programs and due to the fact that a major portion of items received from Keystone require maintenance and are not suitable for issue against critical requirements under lateral transfer. Unit has been so advised.

2. Additional comment follows:

Reference item concerning "Changes in Retrograde Instructions," paragraph 2b(1): Concur. The USAICCV observation is valid as far as confusion and additional work is concerned. However, the cost of future transshipment of cargo should be considered. Recommend USARPAC evaluate each diversion on a case by case basis to insure minimal ultimate costs to the government.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


F. L. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furns
USAICCV

32

CPOP-FD (undtd) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of HQ US Army
Inventory Control Center, Vietnam, Period Ending
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 SEP 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. Mah

M. L. MAH
1LT, AGC
ASST AG

21 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (US Army Depot,
Da Nang) Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and
Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Lack of critical skills in Depot personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Individuals with the proper skills and adequate experience are not being assigned to the Depot in sufficient numbers. The overall skill level of Depot personnel must be increased.

(b) EVALUATION: This situation has developed because of the inexperience which is normally associated with both junior commissioned officers and NCO's and the absence of a CONUS training base. The situation is aggravated by the abbreviated one year tours at the Depot since there is not adequate time for personnel to become completely familiar with all aspects of their job. An excessive amount of time and effort is consumed in training, while too little time is available to realize the benefits from the training. The situation is most acute in the middle management level; i.e., junior officers and middle grade NCO's. In addition to the normal efforts to assign individuals in accordance with their MOS, special attention must be given to obtaining middle managers which have the expertise gained through formal training and the experience of repeated assignments in the logistics or supply field.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Several actions should be taken to enhance the quality of middle management level personnel at this Depot. Identification of those NCO positions on the TDA which require extensive experience in logistics and designation for inclusion in the Non-Commissioned Officer Logistics Program (NCOLP) should be completed. Subsequent identification of certain positions where the expertise and experience of a DA Civilian could be utilized without reducing the effectiveness of the military structure should follow. Finally, certain company grade officer positions require extensive experience in a particular field and the conversion of them to warrant officer positions is desirable. Care must be exercised to insure that the selected positions are compatible with warrant officer MOS's and do not require supervisory skills not normally expected of Warrant officers.

21 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (US Army Depot,
Da Nang) Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** Sixty-five NCO positions have been identified as requiring NCOLP's and a letter dated 9 Dec 70 has been sent to higher headquarters requesting that the positions be filled with NCOLP's. Twenty-six NCOLP's have been assigned in response to this action. Their logistics experience has significantly increased the overall quality of the middle management level. MPTDA action will be taken to insure continued recognition of this requirement. Seventeen DAC positions were added to the Depot staffing level on the draft MPTDA prepared in January 71. The USARPAC Manpower Utilization Survey Team recognized two additional positions during their survey. The reclama to the Manpower Survey recognized a total of twenty-two positions suitable for DAC's. Seven DAC's have been assigned to date and they have contributed significantly to increasing the experience level of the Depot. Thirteen company grade officer positions have been identified as suitable for filling by warrant officers. A Manpower Requirement Change (MRC) was submitted on 14 Apr 71 requesting the necessary substitution.

(2) Manpower Survey Team Impact on TDA

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The proposed TDA for the Depot which was submitted to DA in April 1970 did not provide enough properly qualified personnel to adequately staff the Depot for its current mission, especially in view of the close down of the Qui Nhon Depot and the assumption of a portion of that mission by this depot.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Upon notification in December that a Manpower Survey would be conducted in February 1971, a proposed MPTDA was developed and the Depot was reorganized into this structure. Workload data was collected during December and January. The Commander's Recommendation for personnel to the Survey Team based on the mission and the MPTDA were as follows with proposed contractor personnel included in the totals:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>DAC</u>	<u>LN</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
90	10	823	16	1243	0	2182

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** The Survey Team made the following recommendation:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>DAC</u>	<u>LN</u>	<u>CONTRACTOR</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
46	8	452	19	823	211	1559

This represented a considerable manpower reduction since the Survey Team would not recognize an undocumented mission or future workload. The full impact of the Qui Nhon Depot's closing had not yet been reflected in recorded workload data. The organizational structure of the proposed MPTDA was generally recognized as adequate with the

21 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (US Army Depot,
Da Nang) Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

exception of the Troop Command which was considered to be over staffed. Workload data in the Storage Division had not been maintained for sufficient duration, in proper quantity, or by each functional area which resulted in the entire Storage Division being surveyed on gross Depot workload statistics. This resulted in a loss of certain supervisory positions which are necessary to control each functional area because of mission and isolation from the Main Depot. A MRC has been submitted to correct this deficiency. Other recommendations and findings of the survey were that workload statistics be developed IAW DA Pamphlet 616-566 (Depot Staffing Guide), that R and U functions of the Depot Engineering Office be accomplished by the Support Command Facilities Engineer, and that immediate action be taken to fill the survey recommended positions by depot qualified personnel. Command action has been taken on all these recommendations.

b. Intelligence. None

c. Operations.

(1) Control of Throughput Shipments during Operation Lam Son 719 at the Sub-Depot.

(a) OBSERVATION: The accountability for Throughput cargo was not adequate.

(b) EVALUATION: This situation arose because Throughput drivers were not reporting to the Sub-Depot per instructions received at the port. Due to the considerable amount of confusion at the port of entry, many drivers did not understand that they were supposed to go to Quang Tri for additional documentation before carrying the cargo to its final destination. Consequently, accountability for some items was lost. The requirement to pass Throughput shipments through the Sub-Depot wasted transportation resources which were at a premium.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A representative of the Sub-Depot should be stationed at the port of entry to send Throughput shipments direct to their final destination. This representative would maintain a log of all such shipments so that accurate accountability would be maintained.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This system was implemented on 17 February when a member of the Logistical Office, 26th GS Group, was assigned to the port as the Sub-Depot's representative. That office had been charged with the initial responsibility of identifying Throughput shipments. This system worked exceptionally well upon implementation and should be employed in future operations of this nature.

(2) Security and Handling of Supplies and Equipment during Large Scale Movement Operations.

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (US Army Depot,
Da Nang) Period ending 30 April 1971 (US GSPOR-65 (R3))

(a) OBSERVATION: Some equipment and supplies were pilfered and damaged at and between the ramps and ports of debarkation and the Sub-Depot.

(b) EVALUATION: At the ramps and ports of debarkation, supplies and equipment accumulated faster than they could be moved. A degree of carelessness coupled with operator fatigue contributed to the damage suffered by the supplies and equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Intensive supervision at shipping/receiving points should be incorporated into the plan of execution for the operation. Each shipment should be documented with a TCMD at the point of origin and the cargo load should be verified against the TCMD when it reaches the Sub-Depot. Control procedures to account for all TCMD's should be developed. A sufficient number of personnel, with adequate supervision, should be made available to physically safeguard the items at the shipping/receiving points.

(3) Assistance to Units During Peak Periods.

(a) OBSERVATION: The establishment of the Sub-Depot to assist the 625th S&S Co was time consuming and resulted in some duplication of effort and delays in supplies reaching the FSA's.

(b) EVALUATION: From the beginning it was planned to turn the Sub-Depot over to the 625th S&S Co when routine supply activity was resumed. The creation of two sets of stock record cards was a duplication of effort. Many customers of the Sub-Depot were not familiar with depot operations. Consequently there was a learning period in which customers had to become familiar with depot procedures. During this period prompt shipment of items to the using units did not occur. Since customers were familiar with DSU operations and procedures, real savings in time and personnel would have been achieved had the existing DS unit been augmented by Depot personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: During similar operations, Depot resources should be utilized to augment existing DS units rather than establishing a separate Sub-Depot.

d. Organization.

(1) OBSERVATION: Early in this period inventory and location accuracy was discovered to be unsatisfactory and the Depot was not staffed to correct the situation. When the US Army Field Depot Da Nang assumed the added mission of operation of the Naval Supply Depot, the hasty transfer of control resulted in a vastly increased mission for Depot personnel. Immediately following takeover a massive input of stock occurred which was necessary to satisfy Army requirements.

21 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (US Army Depot,
Da Nang) Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

(2) **EVALUATION:** As late as January, the Depot found itself unable to achieve satisfactory levels of inventory and location accuracy. At that time, the Depot Availability Balance File (ABF) listed approximately 48,800 line items. There was ample evidence to indicate that the ABF quantity for any given item did not agree with the actual balance on hand in storage. It was estimated that there were at least 10,000 line items on hand in storage that were not reflected on the ABF. Although it was not possible to ascertain the exact degree of location accuracy, it did not exceed 69%. In the absence of accurate and reliable inventory and location data, it was virtually impossible to respond satisfactorily to customer requirements. Concurrently, this lack of accurate data hampered effective stock management and resulted in inventory, worth millions of dollars, not being readily available for issue.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** In response to these unsatisfactory conditions and anticipating no relief from manpower constraints, it was determined that the best course of action would be to place the inventory and location functions under contractor operation. The resulting contract, awarded to Philco-Ford Corporation on 25 February 1971, has proved most advantageous to the Depot in cost effectiveness and in the improvement of inventory and location accuracy. The contract required a 100% location survey by 30 April and a wall to wall inventory by 30 June 1970. The location survey was completed on time and the inventory is processing satisfactorily. The two Depot sections replaced by the contractor had cost \$20,129 per month. The contractor operation, costing \$13,860 per month, has resulted in a net savings of \$6,269 per month or \$25,076 over the four month period of contract. During March, the first month of contractor operations, the contractor was responsible for 36,900 transactions in addition to the 46,600 generated by the warehouses. Under military operation it had cost \$0.562 for each add and delete transaction. Each contractor generated transaction cost only \$0.376 resulting in a net savings of \$0.186 per transaction. In addition to cost savings, the Depot's inventory and location accuracy has improved substantially. In February, the last month of military operation, location accuracy peaked at 62%. Under contractor operation, location accuracy rose to 81% in March and to 93% in April.

(4) **COMMAND ACTION:** Location and inventory functions should be continued under contract and other depots should explore the feasibility of contracting these functions at their installations.

e. Training. None

f. Logistics

(1) **OBSERVATION:** A tremendous amount of excess stock resulted when the Army assumed control of the Navy Depot on 1 July 1970. This was a result of a change in mission due to troop reductions, especially the

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (US Army Depot,
Da Nang) Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

phase down of US Navy facilities in MR I, the different type of supply management systems employed by both services, and the fact that new construction in Vietnam was severely curtailed which left the Class IV yard and other construction materials storage areas in an excess stockage position.

(2) EVALUATION: In July 1970, the Navy turned over to the Army approximately 100,000 short tons (s/t) of supplies which were valued at \$32 million. The Army stock in the Field Depot, 57,000 s/t valued at \$10 million, resulting in a total Depot tonnage of 157,000 s/t valued at \$42 million. Stock on hand at the end of April 1971 is estimated at 183,000 s/t with a value of \$70 million. The increase in tonnage and dollar value is due to heavy supply support requirements for Operation Lam Son 719. Now that combat operations are being reduced, much of this on hand material will be excess in the near future. Aggressive action by ICCV and this Depot is required to reduce stock to a reasonable level. Significant progress has already been made in reducing the ASL from 45,000 lines in Jul 70 to 20,000 lines in April 71. Corresponding decreases in Fringe lines from 30,000 to 18,000 at the same time have been realized. The majority of these lines were retrograded out of country after 1 January 1971. The amount of excess disposed of prior to 1 December 1970 was very small since the Depot was still in the buildup phase and specific requirements to support combat units in MR I were indefinite. Beginning in December 1970 more attention was given to excess disposal by inter-depot shipment to support requirements at Cam Ranh Bay and Long Binh, through retrograde out of Vietnam, and shipment to PDO.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Several current programs are aimed at eliminating excess stock from this Depot. The first is the reduction of requisitioning objectives (RO). An ADP program has been developed which identifies items that have shown a decline in requirements attributable to changing missions and reduced combat intensity. Reduced RO's will prevent procurement and stockage of un-needed items. The second is the cancellation of un-needed items already due-in. The third is the nomination of apparent excesses in stock to ICCV for disposition instructions. To date, this Depot has nominated over 8 million dollars worth of stock under Project RIDE (Rapid Identification of Depot Excesses). An additional 36 million dollars worth of stock on the ADF has tentatively been identified as excess. Inventories are being conducted to confirm on-hand quantities prior to nominating them for disposition. This type of effort will be continuous over the next several months.

39


AVCD-AD-M

21 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (US Army Depot,
Da Nang) Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

(4) **COMMAND ACTION:** A significant problem exists in the nomination and disposition of excesses over which the Depot has no control. All items identified as Depot excess must be referred to Okinawa for PURA screening. The total time lag between nomination of excesses and receipt of disposition instructions is at least 45 days. It is imperative that the depot excesses be identified as rapidly as possible so that the PURA screening process can be initiated.

- g. Communications. None
- h. Materiel. None
- i. Other. None


JOHN E. MAIER
COL, GMC
Commanding

41

AVCD-GO-MH (21 May 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, US Army Depot, Period
Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Da Nang, APO 96349 24 JUN 1971

TO: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHIC-IG, APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by the US Army Depot, Da Nang for the period ending 30 April 1971 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Page 5, para 2a(1). Concur. No further comment required.

b. Page 6-7, para 2a(2). Concur. No further comment required.


c. Page 7, para 2c(1). Concur. A revised system utilizing subdepot personnel at the tranship point did prove very successful during LAMSON 718 and should be employed in future operations of this type.

d. Page 7-8, para 2c(2). Concur. The rapid buildup of critical supplies during the early phases of LAMSON 719 was greater than the documentation capability at transshipping sites. Additional assets will be required to handle any sizeable operations in the future.

e. Page 8, para 2c(3). Nonconcur. Augmenting direct support units is one method that could be used. It is a matter of relative size of support mission. In LAMSON 719, the amount of equipment involved and the number of troops being supported dictated that a mini-depot under a field grade officer be established. It proved to be a good method of assuring control of assets, particularly major items, and assured that the units for which the equipment was consigned actually received it.

f. Page 8-9, para 2d. Concur. No further comment required.

g. Page 9-11, para 2f. Concur. Continuing efforts are being made to reduce depot excess.



ARTHUR H. SWEENEY, JR.
Major General, USA
Commanding

42

AVHDO-DO (21 May 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, US Army Depot, Da Nang,
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 26 APR 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-PD
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned
for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, US Army Depot
Da Nang and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Col. ...
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL

Cy furn:
US Army Depot DNG
USANUPCOM-DNG

43

GPOP-FD (21 May 71) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, U.S. Army
Depot Da Nang, Period Ending 30 April 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 SEP 1971

TO: HQ DA (DAFD-ZA), WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. Mah

M. L. MAH
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 71st Transportation Battalion
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR (R3)

2. **Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations**

a. **Personnel:**

Effecting Economies and Efficiencies in Terminal Operations

(1) **OBSERVATION:** USAT Newport has a commercial orientation, that is, it operates in a stable logistical environment and it relies heavily upon local national contractors and direct hire employees from the greater Saigon metropolitan area. In such an environment there exists a complex array of "work rules" and "port practices" which have developed over time and which have become almost contractually binding upon the terminal operator.

(2) **EVALUATION:** Any managerial effort to effect economies and efficiencies in terminal operations must be made only after giving full weight to traditional, but informal "work rules" and "port practices". Precipitous actions, however logical and efficient, tend to be resisted as an intrusion on traditional practices. Managerial improvements can be made, but only after full and prior consultation with the affected personnel. Furthermore, such improvements must be gradual, otherwise they will meet with resistance and even work stoppages.

(3) **RECOMMENDATIONS:** All managerial decisions must give full consideration to their effects upon local national personnel and the unique rules and practices surrounding the employment of terminal operating personnel.

b. **Intelligence:** None

c. **Operations:**

(1) **Imbalance between MILVANS and MILVAN Chassis.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The comparatively heavy influx of MILVAN containers into USAT Newport has exceeded the number of MILVAN chassis available to the supporting highway unit.

(b) **EVALUATION:** When inbound MILVANS arrive, it is frequently necessary to separate loaded containers from their chassis in order to move the inbound MILVAN's from shipside. Consequently, the port must frequently handle each MILVAN container several times and devote critical storage space to demounted MILVAN's. The imbalance between MILVAN containers and chassis strains port resources in MHE and storage space, at the same time that it largely negates the throughput advantages of containerization.

45

AVCS TC XC CO

20 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 71st Transportation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR (R3)

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** The number of MILVAN chassis available to the supporting MILVAN highway unit should be increased to meet the anticipated input of MILVAN containers. Furthermore, some priority should be given to the outbound movement of loaded MILVAN's by the appropriate transportation management agency (e.g., MCC or TMA).

(2) **Work Stoppage Liability during Force Withdrawals**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The uninterrupted availability and operation of major water terminals is essential to the orderly phaseout of major US forces from the Republic of Vietnam.

(b) **EVALUATION:** The large reduction in US military terminal units has required that USAT Newport rely increasingly upon local civilian labor for sustained operation of the terminal. In the event of a labor strike, strike plans provide for operation of the port by a composite US military force which would be suitable to sustain operations for only short periods. Sustained, efficient operations during a prolonged strike will require a cohesive, trained, and equipped force which can only be provided by a full TOE unit.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Contingency plans at higher headquarters should provide for a TOE terminal service capability for possible employment in the event of a prolonged work stoppage at key USARV ports.

d. **Organization:**

Employment of TOE Units in Logistical Operations with an Industrial Orientation

(1) **OBSERVATION:** TOE terminal units are not organized and staffed to provide operational control and supervision over large terminals which operate in a stable environment.

(2) **EVALUATION:** TOE terminal units are best employed during a build-up phase when port facilities, equipment, and an indigenous labor force are not available or are inadequate to meet military requirements. TOE units should be converted to TDA organizations when conditions stabilize and the local economy can provide the essential resources. USAT Newport is presently operated by a reduced strength TOE battalion which lacks the organization in terms of equipment authorization, grade and MOS structure to do the best possible job of managing what is essentially an industrial operation.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION:** USAT Newport should be operated by a TDA military element specifically designed to meet the command and control and equipment requirements of the port. Action is being taken to effect this reorganization.


AVCS TC XC CO

20 May 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 71st Transportation Battalion, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR (R3)

- e. Trainings: None
- f. Logistic: None
- g. Communications: None
- h. Materiel: None
- i. Other: None

1 Incl
Org Chart




VINCENT P. McDONALD
LTC, TC
Commanding

47
AVCS TC CO (20 May 71) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 71st Transportation
Battalion (Tul), Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-3)

DA, HQ, 4th Transportation Command (Tul C), APO 96491, 25 May 1971

TO: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Saigon, ATTN: AVCS MH,
APO 96491

Lessons learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this
command.


JOHN R. LEARY
Colonel, TC
Commanding

AVGS MH (20 May 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 71st Transportation
Battalion (TML), Period Ending 30 April 1971, BCS CSFOR-
65 (R3)

HQ, US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO 96491 7 JUN 1971

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-
DO, APO 96375

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310


1. Reference paragraph 2. c. (1) (c), page 6. CONCUR. The problem addressed by the 71st Transportation Battalion is a recurring one. However, the shortage of chassis was alleviated by this command with the scheduled shipment of 50 additional chassis into Newport. It is expected that the nature of the MILVAN program will continue to have this inherent characteristic of imbalance of vans and chassis. The application of proper management techniques will keep the imbalance at minimum levels. Outbound movement of MILVAN receives the same priority as movement of all other cargo. There will be occasions when lack of available deep draft assets will thwart the 71st Transportation Battalion's desire to keep its port area cleared. Movement of MILVAN is closely controlled and supervised by the 3rd Transportation Center (MC).

2. Reference paragraph 2. c. (2) (b), page 6. CONCUR. Present contingency plans for a composite US force to operate the terminal at Newport will be unrealistic after overall troop strength reductions within the next twelve months. There is a distinct need for consideration of a plan whereby two TOE terminal service companies located in CONUS or some other offshore location can be quickly mobilized and inserted into the theater for operating the Newport terminal for protracted periods of time. These companies should be maintained at full strength and should be fully trained to perform their missions.

3. Reference paragraph 2. d. (3), page 6. CONCUR. Appropriate action will be taken by this command to effect proper modifications to the authorization document as it is submitted.

4. Lessons Learned, observations, and recommendations are concurred in by this command.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



PAUL M. ROBERTSON

5 CPT. AGC
ASST AG

CF:

71st Trans Bn

49
AVHDO-DO (20 May 71) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 71st Transportation Battalion,
Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

9 JUL 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-PD,
APO 96558


1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 71st Transportation Battalion and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Additional comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Imbalance between MILVANS and MILVAN Chassis," page 5, paragraph 2c(1) and 2nd Indorsement, paragraph 1: Concur. The relative low level of retrograde cargo available for shipment has caused an accumulation of MILVAN. Due to an excessive number of MILVAN currently on hand in the Newport/Long Binh area, actions are proceeding to return the containers to CONUS on an expedited basis. The Transportation Management Agency is placing emphasis on the booking of the containers. Fifty MILVAN chassis are being relocated from Qui Nhon to Saigon to bolster the number of MILVAN chassis available to the highway units supporting the 71st Transportation Battalion. The actions cited will relieve the imbalance of chassis to container. No action by USARPAC or DA is recommended. Unit has been so advised.

b. Reference item concerning "Work Stoppage Liability during Force Withdrawals," page 6, paragraph 2c(2) and 2nd Indorsement, paragraph 2: Concur. USARV ADMIN/LOG PLAN 94 (Work Stoppage at a US Operated Military Port Complex) requires that USASUPCOM, Saigon operate Newport with a composite force, in the event of a work stoppage by the local national work force. This Headquarters studied the cargo volume at Newport and agrees with USASUPCOM, Saigon that two additional Transportation Terminal Service Companies would be required to augment the composite US force during a prolonged work stoppage by local civilian labor. The availability of Terminal Service Companies from other Support Commands in-country was considered and is severely limited. A message has been transmitted to USARPAC and DA concerning the availability of Terminal Service Companies to deploy to the Republic of Vietnam if requested by USARV. This Headquarters will study the subject further, based on the USARPAC and DA reply. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


F.L. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.

6 Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
71st Trans Bn
USASUPCOM-SGN

50

GPOP-FD (20 May 71) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 71st Transportation Battalion,
period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army,
Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. Mah

M. L. MAH
2LT, AGC
ASST AG

Organizational Chart
71st Transportation Battalion Newport



8

Inc 1 *Attached for administration and logistics only

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

52

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, DAFD-OTT, Washington, D. C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL	
3. REPORT TITLE		2b. GROUP	
Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, US Army Spt Cmd, Da Nang, 79th Maint Bn, US Army Invt Con Cen, VN, US Army Depot, Da Nang, & 71st Trans Bn for Period Ending 30 April 1971 (U)		4	
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsuregency operations, 1 Nov 70 to 30 Apr 71			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CG, US Army Spt Cmd, Da Nang, CO's, 79th Maint Bn, US Army Invt Con Cen, VN, US Army Depot, Da Nang, & 71st Trans Bn			
6. REPORT DATE		7b. TOTAL NO OF PAGES	7c. NO OF REFS
May 1971			
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO		9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
b. PROJECT NO		711219 711229	
c. N/A		711035 711096	
d.		711122	
9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		DAFD-OTT, Washington, D. C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DD FORM 1473 NOV 66

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

(This page is unclassified)