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AGC D/A ltr dtd 25 Jun 1975; AGC D/A ltr dtd 25 Jun 1975	

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (28 Feb 72)

DAFD-OTT-712033

11 13 Mar 72

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, ~~Period Ending 31 October 1971, AGO CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)~~

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1. The attached report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in this report is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl
as

VERNE L. BOWERS
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

THRU: Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOF-PD
AFO 96558

TO Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities.

a. COMLAND.

(1) Commanders.

CG, USARV	
1 May 1971 - 31 October 1971	GEN Creighton W. Abrams
DCG, USARV	
1 May 1971 - 31 October 1971	LTG William J. McCaffrey
CG, USARENGRCOMDV	
1 May 1971 - 5 August 1971	MG Charles C. Noble
6 August 1971 - 31 October 1971	MG Robert P. Young
CO, USAFEDCOMV	
1 May 1971 - 30 June 1971	COL Philip J. Noel, Jr.
1 July 1971 - 31 October 1971	COL Richard H. Ross

(2) Distinguished Visitors Summary. During the reporting period distinguished visitors to this headquarters were:

NAME/DATE

POSITION

Honorable Barry J. Shillito
2 May 1971

Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L)

DAFD-OTT
712033

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Mr. Sidney Cox 4 May 1971	Assistant, Fiscal Assistant Secretary US Treasury Department
Mr. John E. Ingersoll 5 May 1971	Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
General William B. Rosson 10 - 17 May 1971	CINCUSARPAC
Chaplain (COL) (P) Aloysius J. McElwee 11 - 16 May 1971	Dep Chief of Chaplains (Designate)
MG William A. Enemark 16 - 21 May 1971	The Inspector General, DA
MG Livingston H. Taylor 17 - 20 May 1971	Chief, MAAG, Republic of China
EG Harold H. Dunwoody 18 - 19 May 1971	CG (Designate), 1st Bde, 5th Infantry Division (Mech)
EG Thai Sychhin 19 May 1971	FAMK, Director of Health Services
Mr. Carl Arena (GS-16E) 20 - 24 May 1971	Chairman, Food Service Executives Association
Rear Admiral Charles L. Waite 29 May 1971	CINCPAC Surgeon
MG Vu Ngoc Hoan 1 June 1971	Surgeon General, Armed Forces Republic of Vietnam
Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burnett 1 June 1971	Commander in Chief, Far East Command, Singapore
Rep Frank M. Clark (D-PA) Rep Philip E. Ruppe (R-MICH) 2 June 1971	Members, House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and Public Works
EG Slade Nash USAF 5 - 6 June 1971	Vice Director, Defense Special Projects Group
MG Joseph W. Pazdirtz 7 - 9 June 1971	Special Assistant to COMUSFK

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EC James B. Adamson 10 June 1971	CG (Designate) US Army Forces, HRR2
COL(P) Alfred B. Hale 15 - 19 June 1971	DCSPER, USARPAC
Mr. Ivan W. Jennings, (GS-17) 20 - 24 June 1971	Deputy Chief, US Army Audit Agency
MG John R. Deane, Jr. 28 June 1971	Director, Defense Communications Planning Group
MG John J. Hayes MG Jack C. Fuson 6 - 9 July 1971	CG, 2d Logistical Command
EG(P) Ralph J. Richards, Jr. 8 17 July 1971	Assistant Comptroller for Finance & Compt Information Systems, DCA, DA
LTC M. F. Brogan 10 July 1971	Chief of the General Staff Australian Army
Dr. Jerome H. Jaffe (Code 2) 11 July 1971	Special Consultant to the President on Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
MG Cheng, Hsueh-Suey 11 - 17 July 1971	DCSLOG, Ministry of National Defense, ROK
Rep George E. Danielson (D-CAL) 12 - 13 July 1971	Member, House Veterans Affairs Committee
MG George Sarnet, Jr. 17 July 1971	Deputy Chief, OCFD, DA
MG Phillip B. Davidson, Jr. 22 July 1971	ACofS, Intelligence, DA
Dr. Robert B. Forney, (GS-18E) 3 - 6 August 1971	World Renowned Toxicologist
MG Donnelly P. Bolton 4 - 10 August 1971	Director Operations/Army Staff Vietnamization Director, ODCSOPS
Mr. Leslie R. Sears, Jr. 6 - 10 August 1971	Director of Operation and Maintenance Army Appropriation
EC Robert J. Koch 6 - 7 August 1971	CG (Designate), XXIV Corps Artillery

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MG Verne L. Bowers
7 - 8 August 1971

The Adjutant General, USA

BG Maxwell Steel
9 August 1971

Command Surgeon, Military Airlift Command

Rep Paul Rogers
14 August 1971

Chairman of the Subcommittees on Public Health and Environment of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce

MG R. J. H. Webb
17 August 1971

New Zealand Chief of General Staff (Chief of New Zealand Defense Staff, Designate)

LTG Kriangsak Chomanan
17 August 1971

Dep Chief of Staff, Supreme Command HQ (Forward), Royal Thai Forces

Senator Robert J. Dole (R-KAN)
20 August 1971

Republican National Chairman

Rep Don Edwards (D-CAL)
21 - 23 August 1971

Member of Committee on Judiciary

Mr. Park Rinard
22 August 1971

Administrative Aide to Senator Hughs and Staff Member of the Subcommittee on Drug Abuse in the Armed Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee

Mr. David Abshire (Code 3)
24 August 1971

Assistant Secretary of State For Congressional Relations

Rep Benjamin B. Blackburn
26 August 1971

Member, House Committee on Banking and Currency

Mr. John Selwyn Gummer
27 August 1971

Conservative Member of Parliament, Great Britain

Dr. Richard S. Wilbur
3 September 1971

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment

RAFM Lawrence Heyworth, Jr.
7 September 1971

DCofS, Military Assistance, Logistics and Administration, CINCPAC

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Mr. Nelson Gross
8 September 1971

Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State
and Coordinator for International
Narcotics Matters

Air Vice-Marshal N. M. Maynard
8 - 11 September 1971

Commander, British Far East Air Force

MG G. F. T. Richardson
13 September 1971

QM General, Australian Army

EG William H. Best
13 September 1971

Commander of the USAF Air Weather
Service

Francis Xavier Nguyen Van Thuan
15 September 1971

Bishop of Nha Trang

IEC Joseph M. Heiser, Jr.
17 - 19 September 1971

DCSLOG, DA

MG James J. Gibbons
20 - 21 September 1971

DEPCOMUSMACTHAI

MG Thip Pholpoke
22 September 1971

Assistant Surgeon General, Royal
Thai Army

Mr. Max Stettner
22 September 1971

Assistant Director, Defense Division
GAO

EG John A. Wickham
24 September 1971

Deputy Chief of Staff, Economic
Affairs, MACV (Designate)

OFF William B. Rosson
21 - 28 September 1971

CINCUSARPAC

Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse
2 October 1971

1 Douglas K. Kinsey
(Federal Executive Level 5)
- 3 October 1971

Commissioner, Property Management and
Disposal Service, GSA

RADM Wentworth
6 October 1971

Commander, Military Sealift Command,
Far East

Dr. William J. Reiss
8 October 1971

Executive Secretary, Division of Service
to Military Personnel, Lutheran Council
in the USA

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

EG Frank E. Blazey
8 October 1971

Deputy Commanding General, DRAC
(Designate)

MG Carl W. Hughes
14 - 19 October 1971

Chief Surgeon, DA

Mr. Leonard Sullivan
18 October 1971

Deputy Director, SEA R&D

MG George S. Prugh
16 - 21 October 1971

The Judge Advocate General, DA

Mr. Herbert Allen
20 October 1971

Staff Consultant to Sen Bensten
(D-TEXAS)

MG Charles J. Denholm
25 October 1971

CG, Army Security Agency

Mr. Paul K. Hesselbarth (GS-16)
28 October 1971

Assistant Director for Contact and
Foreign Affairs, Veterans Administration

h. PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.

(1) CofS Army's Letter on Leadership. On 7 April 1971, the CofS of the Army published a letter to the officers and HCOs of the Army on the subject of leadership. As a result of a query to the major subordinate commands on reactions to this letter, the following information was received:

(a) Initial impressions of how the letter was accepted:

1. Generally with interest and enthusiasm;
2. Some concern over lack of support by military justice system;
3. Some concern over application and effect of MVA concept on peacetime Army;
4. Tone of cautious optimism by some.

(b) An evaluation of impact this special attention to leadership had on commands:

1. Trend towards improved performance and better functioning of chain of command;

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1971, ACS CSFOR-65 (R3)

2. Enthusiasm about movement to pre-Vietnam Disciplinary and performance standards;

3. Focusing of attention on junior leaders, both officer and NCO;

4. Acknowledgement of high-level Army concern over discipline and leadership;

5. Permeation of personal responsibility and responsiveness by each member in the chain of command;

6. Renewed emphasis on leadership;

7. Revitalization of concept of chain of command.

(c) Status of actions initiated in conjunction with guidance provided by GSA:

and energetic use 1. Accelerating the administration of military justice of 212 eliminations;

2. Showing of film "Building a Better Army;"

3. Group discussions and conferences;

4. Bolstering the use of chain of command;

command; 5. Classes on leadership, discipline, and chain of

6. Distribution of letter to all new officers and NCOs;

7. Initiation of quality-personnel retention program;

8. Establishment of enlisted advisory councils;

9. Re-emphasis of commander's open-door policy;

10. Establishment of NCO leadership refresher course;

11. Establishment of awareness teams;

12. Establishment of junior officer orientation program;

13. Human relations workshops.

(d) Communications to improve understanding and acceptance of the letter:

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SUBJECT: Operational Support-Besser, Director of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS USFOR-65 (R2)

1. Return promotion and reduction authority to battalion level;
2. Stress the peacetime role of Army leaders.
3. Emphasize the need for leaders to be knowledgeable in contemporary problems;
4. Reinforce the outstanding record of officers and NCOs in last decade;
5. Stress key concepts of the letter; i.e., "enhanced" professionalism, attract and retain "good" men, produce a "better" Army with "increased" capabilities;
6. Improve the image of the Army mission;
7. Interlock concepts of authority and responsibility;
8. Establish leadership courses.

(2) Drug Abuse Counteroffensive.

(a) On 17 June 1971, President Nixon announced that the military effort in the drug program, as part of the national effort, would include the identification of heroin users in Vietnam. The purpose of the program is to provide the heroin user with medical assistance to overcome his need for the drug and to have every individual return to CONUS in a drug-free condition. To accomplish this effort, USARV maintains a high visibility on drug users. Once an individual has been identified, either involuntarily through urinalysis screening or voluntarily through the exemption program, his rehabilitation will be monitored until he leaves the command. An individual remaining in Vietnam will be monitored through positive rehabilitation assistance directed by his unit commander. A humane and compassionate approach to the drug user who exhibits a sincere desire to stop using drugs is the essence of the exemption program. It should, however, remain clear that the United States Army, Vietnam does not condone drug abuse. If a man chooses the exemption path to rehabilitation, he has a chance to cure himself. If he fails, he will be placed in the Drug Treatment Center (DTC). Recidivists will be sent to the DTG or Drug Abuser Holding Center (DAHC) and will be subject to appropriate administrative and disciplinary actions.

(b) To accomplish the requirements as delineated in (a), USARV has initiated several urinalysis programs. Initially the programs were designed to "tighten the net" on personnel departing SVN in an effort to prevent drug users from returning to CONUS before they could be detoxified and medically treated. This effort proved successful and the scope of the

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

urinalysis and treatment program has been expanded to include testing of entire units on an unannounced basis and retesting of personnel who have been previously identified as drug users.

(c) The initial phase of testing began on 18 June 1971, on personnel departing this command for reassignment. On 7 July 1971, testing was begun on elements of the first unit preparing for rotation back to CONUS. During the period 13 - 18 July, a 2 percent random survey was conducted. This sampling provided usage rates for the various regions and units throughout the command. On 22 July 1971, the testing of individuals enroute to CONUS on specialleave and those applying for foreign service tour extension began.

(d) Since the beginning of the program staff members and security personnel associated with the various components of the program have been checked on a frequent, recurring basis.

(e) On 1 August 1971, testing for amphetamines and barbiturates began. Testing of all personnel going on 14-day CONUS leave and all TDY personnel (in-country for 30 days or more) started on 15 August 1971. Unannounced unit testing began on 25 August 1971.

(f) During the months of September through November, the following categories were or will be added to the testing system:

1. Testing of all R&R and leave personnel (15 Sep 71);
2. Twice-a-week testing of Rehabilitation Center Staff (20 Sep 71);
3. Recnlistees (1 Oct 71);
4. Follow-up testing of previously identified users (15 Oct 71);
5. Testing of confined and apprehended drug offenders (15 Nov 71),

(g) Personnel identified as drug users while processing for reassignment outside of RVN are no longer permitted to depart the command through normal transportation channels. Since 10 August 1971, all patients departing the command, even though completely detoxified, are returned to CONUS by Medical Air Evacuation. This procedure was adopted for several reasons, the overriding one being a desire to keep patients in medical channels for more adequate follow-up.

(h) A moderate morale problem existed for a short while with detoxified personnel awaiting onward movement to CONUS hospitals.

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Initially, personnel were often delayed in departing the command because of either nonreceipt of CONUS bed sites or insufficient aircraft space. This problem was resolved by reporting patients to JHRO immediately upon arrival at the Drug Treatment Center and increasing the number of scheduled flights from 10 to 23 per week. Additional aircraft will be made available at any time movement of 20 or more patients is required.

(i) On 24 September 1971, a secure drug abuse holding center, with 134-bed capacity, was placed in operation at Long Binh. This facility is necessary to treat recalcitrant and recidivist drug abusers.

(j) On 2 October 1971, the Drug Treatment Center at Cam Ranh Bay increased its bed capacity from 150 - 250. This increased the total drug treatment center patient capability to 550. This increase in capability was in anticipation of the influx of patients identified in unit testing.

(k) On 20 October 1971, an additional urine testing laboratory was placed in operation at Da Nang. This facility is needed to conduct the testing of personnel departing RVN from Da Nang which becomes an out-processing activity beginning 1 Nov 1971. The other testing laboratories are operating at Camp Alpha, Long Binh and Cam Ranh Bay.

(3) USARV Drug Rehabilitation Center. On 6 October 1971, at HQ, USARV, a conference was held to orient area commanders, rehabilitation center commanders, physicians, and enlisted counselors in the standardized rehabilitation program. MEDCOM professional consultants contributed to this day-long conference as speakers and instructors in the area of medicine, laboratory, research, professional therapy and social work. The area of major emphasis was the development, training, and effective utilization of unit/base counselors; to provide necessary follow-up support to individuals after completion of two week rehabilitation at a center.

(a) Visit by Civilian Drug Specialists. This command was visited by six civilian drug specialists, representing Dr. Jaffe, Special Consultant to the President on Dangerous Drugs, to compare civilian and military rehabilitation programs and offer advice and assistance. The team presented interesting viewpoints concerning the rehabilitation program. This command was impressed by the deep sense of commitment which members of the team displayed toward the drug problem in Vietnam. The team's recognition of existing potential within the Army structure for the provision of effective rehabilitation programs and personnel was very encouraging. Members of the staff at the Long Binh Treatment Center felt that the team presented helpful observations and recommendations. The team's presence assisted the staff to objectively reevaluate their own attitudes concerning their roles in the early phase of rehabilitation.

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(b) Medical Records, Reports, and Regulating.

1. Significant activity of the Medical Records, Reports, and Regulating Division of Plans and Operations included involvement with planning and implementation of the Aeromedical Evacuation portion of the USARV Drug Abuse Counteroffensive. The initial conceptual guidance was given in June 1971, which outlined the concept of aeromedical evacuation of only drug addicts, whereas those in the category of "drug user" would be released from the detoxification centers in Vietnam and returned to CONUS via normal DEROS flights (the terms "addict" and "drug user" were those used at the time). Some difficulty was experienced in coordination of out-of-country evacuation of the drug addicts with the off-short flight schedule which was in effect just prior to the start of the Drug Abuse Counteroffensive. Additional difficulty was experienced in receiving CONUS hospital destinations from Armed Services Regulating Office (ASMRO), Washington, D. C., in time to move drug abuse patients out-of-country through the aeromedical evacuation system. On 1 July 1971, a decision was made by USAF CofS to evacuate detoxified drug abuse patients (addicts) in the normal MAC aeromedical evacuation system (C141) instead of the earlier proposed charter flights. This decision was made primarily because the numbers of identified addicts was far below initial estimates. The first major change in policy in aeromedical evacuation of drug abuse patients came in early August just subsequent to the visit by BG Maxwell Steel, Command Surgeon, Military Airlift Command to RVN. BG Steel directed that all patients dispositioned from the Drug Treatment Centers in the DEROS category be evacuated from RVN via the routine aeromedical evacuation system. Concurrently, the commercial companies flying the DEROS charter flights established the policy that drug abuse patients identified in the user category would not be allowed aboard these charter flights. A PACOM Aeromedical Scheduling Conference was held at Hickman, AFB, Hawaii, 10 - 11 August 1971. The primary purpose of this conference was to design the most appropriate intra- and inter-theater aeromedical evacuation flight schedule based upon projections of the number of drug abuse patients entering the system (Figure 1). The final schedule increased the number of C141 missions out of RVN from 10 to 23 per week. Patient classification shifted from allowing the physician in the Drug Treatment Center to classify either "litter" or "ambulatory" to the policy that all patients would be classed as litter, sedated, and restrained. In early September 1971, the policy was liberalized once again, allowing the attending physician the prerogative of classifying each drug abuse patient on the merits of each individual patient. The practice of obtaining a destination CONUS hospital as soon as possible after entry into the Drug Treatment Center was adopted in order to prevent delays in patient evacuation. Patients are moved on ASMRO Cite Number, thereby permitting movement during a seven-day period. In order to expedite the regulating process and to reduce errors in spelling of patient regulating data, a message system was implemented


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to transmit this data from the Drug Treatment Centers through the 68th Medical Group, and HQ USAMEDCOMV and PACOMJPRO (SEA) in Saigon. Conversely, HQ USAMEDCOMV, 68th Medical Group, and the Drug Treatment Centers were added as addressees on the daily ASHRO message which transmits the destination CONUS hospital.

2. The start of the Drug Abuse Counteroffensive had a dramatic impact on treatment as well as aeromedical evacuation resources.

3. The existing systems were used extensively whenever possible. The implementation of the message system for reporting patients for movement of PACOMJPRO (SEA) aided in reducing errors previously caused by misinterpretation when telephonic communications were utilized. Additionally many man-hours were saved by utilizing the message system.

(c) Nursing Activities.

1. In June, the 6th Convalescent Center was redesignated as the Drug Treatment Center, Cam Ranh Bay. The original staff was supplemented by additional ANC staff to accomplish this change in mission.

2. In July, a new facility, the Long Binh Drug Treatment Center, was opened on Long Binh Post and staffed with five ANC personnel, (MOS 3448), from other in-country facilities. In September, the staff was increased to nine ANC members.

3. In September, the Long Binh Drug Abuse Holding Center was opened. This facility includes a staff of four ANC members.

4. In October 1971, a total of 29 ANCs were assigned full-time duty with some type of drug treatment facility. This staff does not include two neuropsychiatric nurses, assigned to Keystone Oriole teams at the 95th Evacuation Hospital and 24th Evacuation Hospital, who are involved in support of the drug treatment program. The staff of 29 nurses has been provided from in-country resources.

(k) Dental Activities. The most significant activities performed by the 932nd Dental Professional Service and its subordinate dental detachments were:

(a) Continued area dental support to USARV and FMARF personnel.

(b) Participation in the troop and unit drawdown, consolidation of dental support effort, and rearrangement of areas of responsibility.

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(c) Reduction in number of dental detachments from seven to five and dental officers' strength from 159 to 127.

(d) Areas of responsibility were enlarged for four of the remaining detachments, and major elements of one detachment were moved to provide increased support for a consolidated concentration of troops in the Da Nang area. The headquarters of another detachment initiated movement to improve the command's posture for further troop reductions.

(e) Closing or transfer to the ARVN of seven compounds having dental clinics resulted in considerable loss of clinical space. Reductions in supported troop strength in other areas such as Qui Nhon resulted in further reduction of clinical space which resulted in the turn-in of excess equipment and the closing of dental operating rooms. The total result was a considerable shortage of clinical space in which the remaining dental personnel could work. This shortage of clinical space was overcome in some areas by reutilization of various and sundry SEA huts, quonsets, and other buildings. Some diversion of dental manpower from the primary mission was required to accomplish these facility improvements.

(f) Two detachments were reorganized under the new dental TOE 8-670 on 1 September 1971.

(5) Preventive Medicine - Military Quarantine Inspection Program.

The Military Quarantine Inspection (MQI) Program started with personnel from the 20th and 172nd Preventive Medicine Units has shown further expansion during this report period, primarily in respect to port facilities covered and number of personnel required to provide adequate staffing. A total of four port facilities are now served on a continuing basis with an additional four loading facilities covered intermittently wherever they are in operation. Operations are such that the MQI team must be able to stand by on a 24-hour basis at those facilities which ship retrograde cargo on a regular basis. At the end of the report period 30 out of the 163 preventive medicine personnel of the two units were assigned exclusively to the MQI program. Using data available for the first four months of this report period to arrive at a six-months' workload, 614 vessels will have been cleared and 286,178 long tons of material will have been inspected by the four MQI teams during this period. It is apparent that the workload associated with retrograde cargo will increase with accelerated drawdown and will require reassignment of more personnel to the MQI program. It is also apparent that the proportionate amount of work associated with intermittent loading at some of the less active facilities is considerably greater than at active port facilities. There have been several reasons for the considerably greater amount of cargo found unsatisfactory on first and even on subsequent inspections at facilities

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used on an intermittent basis. Personnel at these facilities charged with preparation of the cargo for inspection are rarely well versed in the inspection requirements which they will have to meet and how this must be achieved. Equipment and material needed to prepare the cargo are either not immediately available or of a makeshift type which invariably leads to delays in preparation of the cargo and ultimate loading, as well as repeated inspections by the MQI team. Consequently, it is considered advisable to restrict the loading of retrograde cargo only to permanent port facilities, staffed as they are with experienced personnel and equipped with the necessary facilities to prepare retrograde cargo in accordance with military quarantine requirements.

(6) Special Category R&R and 7-Day Leave (7&7) Program. On 1 October 1971, the final phase of planned improvements to leave and R&R policy was implemented with the starting of the Special Category R&R and 7-day Leave (7&7). Under this program, service members may combine R&R to Hawaii with seven days leave. Onward travel to CONUS at their own expense is authorized. The program provides government transportation between Vietnam and Hawaii and offers a 14-day period at Hawaii or in CONUS at the individual's choice.

(7) Returned Prisoner of War. On 8 October 1971, SSG John E. Sexton was released by enemy forces and returned to U.S. control. He had been a prisoner of war since August 1969. SSG Sexton was admitted to the 24th Evacuation Hospital at Long Binh, where his condition was declared fair with a good prognosis. On 10 October, SSG Sexton was interviewed and photographed by USARV and USAMEDCOMV personnel. Additional data are provided in the lessons learned portion of this report.

(8) Vung Tau R&R Program. The Vung Tau R&R site has been operating since February 1971. This facility, located on the US beach at Vung Tau, has provided overnight and day-use R&R support to members of units and organized groups from Military Regions III and IV. Since February, the facility has served an average of 8,000 overnight and 12,000 day-use participants each month. Billeting (tentage) and messing facilities are operated by the R&R center staff and by the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division.

(9) Standdown of Tactical Unit CID Activities.

(a) During the reporting period the 173rd Airborne Brigade and 1/5th Mech Infantry Brigade stood down; the former redeploying to Fort Campbell, Kentucky and the latter being deactivated. Based on previous stand-down experience gained in conjunction with the 25th Infantry Division stand-down and others, new procedures for transfer of criminal investigative responsibilities were formulated.

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(b) Experience previously gained had surfaced two major problems. The first had been the failure of departing units to complete the majority of their open investigations prior to departure. This resulted in a disproportionate number of incomplete investigations being left to the Detachment of the 8th Military Police Group (CI) which had been tasked to assume investigative jurisdiction and responsibility. The ensuing backlog of investigations had prevented their being expeditiously completed and caused additional administrative handling and further delay. The second problem had been the 8th MP Group Detachment's unfamiliarity with the areas of operation vacated by departing units, lessening their effectiveness in assuming the mission. New procedures adopted in subsequent standdowns precluded the reoccurrence of these problems, as indicated below.

1. Upon notification of standdown or redeployment the 8th MP Group (CI) Detachment dispatched an evaluation team to the departing unit's CID Section. The team collected information on the number of investigations pending, average number of cases opened per month, case load per investigator, evidence on hand, and the number of investigators meeting keystone redeployment criteria.

2. The information developed was provided to the 8th MP Group (CI) operations section and the USARV Provost Marshal, Criminal Investigations Branch. The data available were analyzed and a target date for assumption of mission was proposed by message to the Commanding General of the departing unit. Upon receipt of command approval, investigators from the mission-assuming detachment were dispatched to the departing unit. These investigators began investigating all cases opened on or after the agreed-upon assumption date using 8th Group case numbers. Tactical unit investigators were assigned no new cases and were therefore able to concentrate on closing cases previously opened. During this period evidence was decreased to the lowest possible level.

(10) Employment of Marijuana Detector Dogs.

(a) On 6 May 1971, six marijuana detector dogs arrived in-country and were assigned to the Joint Customs Group. After a period of acclimation and retraining, the dogs were employed in aerial ports, hold-baggage shipment points, post offices, and unit areas. Currently, nine dogs are employed and have been moderately successful from the point of view of number of positive alerts made. In terms of deterrent effect, the dogs have been highly successful; although, objective analysis of this effect is difficult. It has been determined that the dogs are most effective when:

1. The temperature is cool;
2. Noise at the search scene is kept to a minimum;

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3. There is a minimum of distraction at the search scene, such as other animals, people or moving objects;

4. The rapport development between dog and handler during training is maintained at a high level;

5. The dog is not allowed to become a pet, but is treated as an equal partner on a team with an important mission.

(b) The number of positive alerts resulting in seizures have been limited. However, the capability of the dogs has in part been verified by the number of "dead-scent" alerts recorded. A dead-scent alert is one in which the dog alerts on places which formerly contained marijuana. Evidence of such ability has been developed during retraining exercises (marijuana is placed in a container and then removed; the dog alerts on the container even though no marijuana is present.). Further evidence of "false positives" have occurred in unit searches when a dog has alerted on an individual who was subsequently found not to be in possession. However, further search revealed that the individual's foot locker or wall locker at one time contained marijuana, indicating that the individual previously had marijuana on his person.

(c) Efforts to disguise the scent have no effect on the dogs' ability. In several instances dogs have alerted to marijuana mixed with talcum powder or sprinkled with perfume.

(d) The deterrent effect of the dogs has been illustrated on numerous occasions. The most significant evidence attesting to this fact has occurred during unit searches. The number of possession cases detected normally has been limited, but the amount of marijuana found discarded in trash cans or simply thrown on the ground verifies that the individual soldier believes the dog can live up to his reputation.

(11) Transfer of Waterborne Security Mission to Vietnamese Navy.

(a) During the reporting period the responsibility for waterborne security was assumed by the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) at Qui Nhon, Saigon/Newport, Cogido/Bien Hoa, Cat Lai and Vung Tau. To aid them in assumption of this responsibility, all US Army Patrol Boat River (PBR) assets were scheduled to be turned over to them. In order to insure a smooth transfer, the following measures were initiated:

1. Through coordination between NAVFORV and USARV, the following procedures were implemented prior to turnover of Army PBR assets; all boats were brought to a combat operational status by their US Army crews; and all boats were subsequently, scheduled for overhauling and

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and refitting at four Navy Logistical Support Bases (LSB) located at Da Nang, Na Bhe, Ben Luc, and Binh Thuy. The major problem incurred during this phase was that of obtaining repair parts to complete the overhaul and refitting. As of 15 October 1971, three PBR's were still in LSB's awaiting arrival of repair parts. After the boats were overhauled, a joint inventory was held with VNN and US Army representatives. Upon completion of the inventory, the PBR's were turned over to the Vietnamese Navy, who concurrently assumed the waterborne security mission at the various locations.

2. During the period between the overhaul and joint inventory, training was conducted. This training consisted of conducting the harbor security mission with a combined crew of both Vietnamese and US Army personnel, thereby allowing the Vietnamese to learn techniques employed by US Army personnel on a first-hand basis. The standard operating procedures (SOP) for each of the five patrol areas were given to the US Navy to be translated and distributed to the VNN crews.

3. A formal ceremony was held at each of the port facilities where the US Army had had responsibility for waterborne security. This ceremony signaled the official assumption of the security mission by the VNN.

(b) The procedure for the turnover of the waterborne security mission and US Army PBR assets as outlined above was very effective, except for the previously mentioned difficulty experienced in getting the overhauls completed due to the shortage of repair parts.

(12) Provost Marshal Activities.

(a) Crimes of Violence and Against Property.

During the period 26 March to 25 September 1971, there was no significant (10 percent or greater) change in the number of complaints or founded offenses for crimes such as murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary and housebreaking, larceny (\$50 or over), and auto theft, even though the US Army strength decreased approximately 8 percent from the period ending Fiscal Year 1971. This trend is attributed to an increase in the number of crimes which gain material benefit (robbery, larceny, burglary and housebreaking) by other than Army personnel. This trend is substantiated by the approximately 58 percent increase in the number of identified offenders in the category "Other Than Army Personnel" (NOTE: The number of identified Army offenders decreased by approximately 9 percent during this period).

(b) Use, possession, sale or trafficking of drugs.

The Provost Marshal activities concerning drug abuse were primarily directed against the sale and trafficking of drugs, especially

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narcotics, in active covert criminal investigative efforts; and in identifying the user through overt military police activities by thorough searches at gates to installations, facilities and in the routine search of criminal offenders. In conjunction with the positive command functions, the Provost Marshal activities have served to reduce the incidence of drug abuse and to increase the number of apprehensions of persons for the sale or trafficking in narcotics. With the active military police and CID investigative effort, through the formation of Drug Suppression Teams and the combined Joint Narcotic Investigative Detachment, the number of founded cases for the sale and/or trafficking of narcotics rose by approximately 69 percent. (It is further noted that the number of persons identified in the sale and/or trafficking of narcotics increased by approximately 73 percent during this period.) As a measure of the command's and the Provost Marshal's effort to reduce the use of drugs, it is noted that approximately 21 percent fewer people have been identified as offenders for use and/or possession of narcotics, dangerous drugs or marijuana. Current command and Provost Marshal activities will result in a continued reduction of drug abuse.

c. INTELLIGENCE.

(1) Significant Enemy Activities.

(a) Enemy-initiated activity throughout the period 1 May to 31 October was generally low; however, each MR experienced a moderate increase of enemy activity at least once during the period.

(b) Attacks by fire were conducted throughout the MR and Fire Support Base (FSB) 5, Kontum Province, was subjected to a ground attack. The enemy force, probably the 66th NVA Regiment, 3-3 Front, suffered 139 KIA in the attack. The enemy also stepped up the ground activity in Binh Dinh Province. In MR 1 an attack by fire on Da Nang destroyed 400,000 gallons of fuel. The afternoon of 21 May, FSB C2 was struck by 11 122mm rockets, killing 29 and wounding 33 US soldiers. Allied land clearing operations in the Boi-Boi Woods-Trapezoid area of MR 3 encountered stiff enemy opposition. On 25 May elements of the 11th ACR, providing security for the operations, were attacked by elements of the 101st NVA Regiment and suffered one US killed and 18 US wounded. The remainder of the country experienced only a low level of activity at this time.

(c) In June enemy forces south of the DMZ applied heavy pressure against FSB's Sarge and Fuller. On 23 June the enemy force overran Fuller, which was not recaptured until 25 June. Heavy fighting continued through the remainder of the month and into early July. The

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enemy force, probably the 27th NVA Regiment, suffered in excess of 500 casualties during the period and has conducted no major operations since. Swimmer sappers sank the USS American Hawk in Qui Nhon Harbor on the 15th of June. Elsewhere, enemy activity remained at a low level.

(d) Enemy efforts throughout the country were at a low level during July. However, enemy sappers did sink two ammunition barges and damaged a third in Qui Nhon Harbor on 25 July.

(e) The enemy again applied heavy pressure on FSB Sarge during August. The enemy conducted the heaviest attacks by fire of the year during this period. On 23 August the 2d Squadron, 11th Cav and the 3d Battalion, 2d ARVN Infantry, west of FSB 02 were hit by approximately 1,000 rounds of mixed mortar fire and a coordinated ground attack. The enemy force, probably the 52nd NVA Regiment, repeatedly attacked FSBs along the DMZ during the month and finally withdrew, probably to North Vietnam, after sustaining over 650 KIA in the attacks. August was also marked by an increased enemy effort countrywide to influence the lower house elections. The week prior to the elections saw an increase in terrorist incidents and enemy propaganda efforts attempting to get individuals sympathetic to the VC cause elected to the lower house. On 17 August swimmer sappers sank the USS Green Bay in Qui Nhon Harbor. On 25 August enemy sappers penetrated the Cam Ranh Bay tri-service ammunition dump and destroyed approximately 6,000 tons of ammunition. On election day, 29 August, enemy-initiated activities were light, with the majority occurring in MR 2. Approximately 79 percent of the registered voters turned out for the elections. August also marked the return of the 3d NVA Regiment, 2nd NVA Division to their old area of operation in the Qui Son Valley.

(f) ARVN Forces launched a multi-battalion operation in northwestern Quang Tri Province during the first week of September and encountered almost no enemy resistance. Early in September the emphasis of enemy efforts shifted to the Delta. Heavy fighting erupted in the U Minh Forest on 4 September and lasted for three weeks. The period from 4 to 24 September was the longest period of sustained contact by enemy forces in MR 4 since the ARVN U Minh operations began in December 1970. During this period the 183 NVA, 95A NVA, and D-1 VC Regiments suffered approximately 600 KIA. The heavy enemy losses in this fighting probably delayed for several months enemy plans for a dry season campaign in the Delta. In MR 3 the 101st NVA Regiment ambushed the S1 of the Tri Tam District southeast of Tri Tam City. Two RF platoons reacted and were ambushed enroute to the scene. Friendly losses were 29 killed, including the District Chief, District Police Chief and the District Senior Advisor. September also was marked by countrywide attempts by the enemy to disrupt the presidential election and discredit the government. On 25 September

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swimmer sappers sank two ammunition barges in Qui Nhon Harbor. On 26 September elements of the 5th VC and 7th NVA Divisions commenced a series of coordinated attacks against ARVN forces in northwest Tay Ninh Province and along QL 22 to Krek, Cambodia. These attacks continued into October.

(g) The night of 2 - 3 October, the eve of the Presidential election, was marked by 76 attacks by fire countrywide, the heaviest volley this year. Enemy efforts had no serious affect on the election, as approximately 88 percent of the registered voters turned out and President Thieu received more than 90 percent of the votes cast.

(h) On October 13, enemy forces released SSG John Sexton, Jr., after two years of captivity. SSG Sexton was the first PW released by the VC/NVA in over two years. Enemy activity through the remainder of the month was limited to economy-of-force attacks.

(2) Significant Intelligence Operations/Activities.

(a) The following were published by I&S Division during the reporting period:

1. NVA POL Pipelines in Laos (16 May 1971)
2. Study of the Se Bang Hieng Waterway (6 June 1971)
3. Use of Enemy Water Mines in RVN (27 June 1971)
4. Comments on the Enemy Sapper Threat (6 July 1971)
5. Study on VC Action Arrow Teams (18 July 1971)
6. Study on Recent Infiltration into MR 3 (1 August 1971)
7. NVA Conscription System (5 September 1971)
8. Combat Intelligence Lessons (1 October 1971)

(b) Monthly intelligence briefings were conducted for all newly arrived personnel assigned to Headquarters, USARV. In addition, intelligence briefings were given to visiting dignitaries.

(c) A weekly intelligence conference was held each Friday at 1330 hours. Participants were representatives from local commands and from the general and special staff sections of Headquarters, USARV. The agenda included summaries of significant operations and enemy activity.

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(d) The Current Analysis Special Intelligence (CASI) Section provided all-source intelligence which was presented daily in the form of a Commander's Briefing Book to the Command Group and designated USARV staff members.

(e) The USARV Intelligence and Security Division Daily Intelligence Review (DIR) and Weekly Intelligence Review (WIR) were published throughout the reported period.

d. PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING.

(1) Artillery Expenditures.

(a) USARV continued to manage ammunition expenditures through the application of management operating rates.

(b) Artillery expenditure levels shown below indicate that intensified artillery management was practiced by commanders at all levels.

May	\$293,107
June	\$334,185
July	\$255,949
August	\$247,454
September	\$200,839
October	\$129,113

(c) The drawdown of units as well as the application of management tools is indicated by the steady reduction in artillery expenditures.

(2) War Dogs. During the semi-annual reporting period the USARV Dog Training Detachment trained a total of 61 handlers and 61 dogs in eight classes. The detachment has a total of 95 dogs on hand, and 130 are assigned to combat units. A total of 112 dogs were transferred to CONUS. Current distribution of war dogs in RVN is as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>SCOUT DOGS</u>	<u>MINE/TUNNEL DOGS</u>	<u>TRACKER DOGS</u>	<u>MARIJUANA DOGS</u>
101st Abn Div	28	6	0	0
3d Bde, 1st Cav	19	4	3	0
23d Inf Div	27	14	4	1

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Army Training Det	$\frac{25}{169}$	$\frac{20}{44}$	$\frac{2}{9}$	$\frac{2}{3}$
TOTALS				

(3) Training.

(a) The USARV Sniper Program begins to phase down as units stand down. During the reporting period 60 kills were credited to USARV units. One hundred and sixty-five snipers were trained during the period.

(b) In compliance with the Army Chief of Staff's new policy on training, announced in June 1971, USARV established new training guidance to decentralize training management to the battalion and separate company level. Military justice and in-country replacement training continues to be supervised from USARV.

(c) The USARV Individual Training Group (UITG) continues to train Cambodian Infantry. During the period, twenty additional battalions were trained, and the program met its objective of 30 battalions by 1 October 1971. The training site at Chi Lang was moved to Phuoc Tuy and began the training of one battalion during this period. Seven battalions are presently in training at Long Hai and Dong Ba Thin. Logistic support continues to be provided by USARV.

(4) Command Vietnamization. The RVNAF OJT program, part of Command Vietnamization, began to decrease during the period as more US units stand down. A total of 8,936 RVNAF personnel have been trained during the period; 32,545, during this calendar year; and 71,293, since the program's inception in October 1969.

(5) Installation Defense Evaluations. During this reporting period two installations and all port facilities were evaluated in Military Regions 1, 2 and 3. Port security has improved considerably during the past two months.

e. Logistics.

(1) Property Disposal. The US Army Property Disposal Agency Vietnam (USAFDAV) trends for the period April 1971 through September 1971 are reflected in the following operations statistics for that period:

(a) Items (acquisition value):

Average Inventory	\$32,448,560
Total Disposition	59,438,733
Total Utilization	18,377,732
Total Generations	38,657,603

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(b) The item inventory on hand at the beginning of April 1971 was \$40,187,603, and the inventory on hand at the end of September 1971 is the result of the CO, USAPDAV's emphasis on improving Property Disposal Holding Area (PDHA) records, utilization of items, and increasing the frequency of sales.

(c) Scrap (STON)

Average Inventory	226,592.2
Total Generations	79,250.9
Total Dispositions	76,215.1
Total Adjustments	-100,410.9

(d) The scrap inventory on hand at the beginning of April 1971 was 255,779.6 STON, on hand at the end of September 1971 was 139,069.3 STON. The September 1971 total consisted of 14.43 percent non-ferrous metallic scrap, 80.44 percent ferrous scrap, and 5.13 percent other scrap. These percentages are typical for the period considered. The 120,410.9 STON adjustment is the result of a 42,450.9 STON bare ground adjustment in September 1971 at the Qui Nhon PDHA, a bare ground adjustment of 70,211.4 STON at Da Nang in August 1971, and the remainder was upgraded from scrap to items.

(e) During the six-month period the total disposition of items exceeded item generations by 20,781,125 (item disposals were 153 percent of item generations). In the same period the total disposition of scrap was 1,044.3 STON (23.7 percent of scrap generations). The number of usable items sales conducted during the six-month report period increased over the previous six-month period by 23 percent and is expected to increase more as anticipated additional generations of usable items are realized.

(f) Scrap sales have been hindered during the report period by local political obstacles, one case was the item contractor at Chu Lai being denied an export license, causing three empty ships to be turned away from the Chu Lai Port. In another instance a municipal land tax was imposed on contractor scrap storage areas at Can Ranh Bay during June. This resulted in denial of transportation movement permits for Vietnamese scrap contractors for a period in excess of 30 days. Security problems at the staging yard of Da Nang's largest scrap contractor caused a stoppage of scrap removals there until a suitable storage site was arranged by this Agency.

(2) Items Inventory Utilization. Utilization of items from the Items Inventory (PDA) for the six-month period are as follows:

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<u>Element</u>	<u>Acquisition Value Items Issued</u>
US Forces	\$7,409,183
RVNAF & ROK	5,937,965
MAFET	
Cambodia	1,160,380
China	2,263,113
Korea	343,939
Philippines	243,206
Thailand	605,040
Other Federal Agencies	5,057,399

(3) Proceeds. Total proceeds (FPA) for the period reported are shown as follows:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Total Proceeds</u>
April	\$619,230
May	411,542
June	500,999
July	561,109
August	577,498
September	841,666

(4) Class V Issue Experience. During this six-month period the total Class V issues for USARV were 212.7 thousand S/T compared with 248.2 thousand S/T for the previous six-months. This represents a total decrease of 35.5 thousand S/T over the period or an average monthly decrease of 6 thousand S/T.

(5) Class V Stockpile Posture. The balance on hand for Class V stocks at the beginning of this period was 115.0 thousand S/T. During the period this balance on hand decreased by 42.4 thousand S/T to 72.6 thousand S/T at the end of the period.

(6) Vietnamization of ASP's. During the period the turnover of Area #4 at the Long Binh Ammunition Supply Depot to ARVN was completed in May 1971. The ASP at Duc Pho was closed in June, and the ASP at LZ English was closed in August. In September the ASP at Quang Tri was turned over to the ARVN. The remainder of the ASP at Chu Lai is being prepared for transfer to ARVN by 1 November 1971.

(7) Single Ammunition Logistical System. At the August Ammunition Rate Conference at USARVAC, efforts were continued to develop common ammunition supply rates for USARV and ARVN. The monthly meetings of the

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Joint Ammunition Review Board were also continued. A total of over 50,000 S/T of ammunition have been transferred from ARVN to USARV or USARV to ARVN since these meetings were begun in late 1970.

(8) USARV Participation in the USARPAC 3S ADPE upgrade program. During May, DCSLOG and DCSMIS conducted an extensive review of USARV's scheduled participation in the USARPAC 3S upgrade program. As the program was originally developed, each 3S processing site in USARV was to receive 3d generation ADPE (RCA Spectra 70) to replace various models of 2d and 3d generation ADPE. Third generation ADPE was scheduled for installation at the Aviation Materiel Management Center (AMMC), the US Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam (USAICCV), and the Army depots at Da Nang and Saigon. Considering long-range plans for USARV, as well as potential cost savings, the DCSMIS recommended elimination of upgraded ADPE from the Army depots. This proposal would eliminate large-scale computer capabilities from the Army depots and would, in turn, require a major change in the modus operandi of the USARV general supply system, since the Army depots would be unable to perform supply-management-related functions. Based on a study of the changes required, and the potential effects on the level of logistical support to USARV, the DCSLOG recommended adoption of the DCSMIS proposal, and approved the concept of centralizing all supply functions at the USAICCV. In June, USARV presented this concept to USARPAC and received approval. As a result of these actions RCA Spectra 70 ADPE will be installed at the AMMC and USAICCV only, during November and December 1971 respectively, and fully centralized supply management will be implemented at USAICCV on 1 December 1971. From that date Army depots will perform storage-related functions only.

(9) Conversion of USARV General Supply System to Central Stock Control Procedures. After receiving USARPAC approval of the concept of fully centralized supply management, the DCSLOG formed an Ad Hoc committee to prepare a detailed implementation plan and to write a comprehensive letter of instructions to all concerned. The Ad Hoc committee was composed of representatives from DCSMIS, DCSLOG and USAICCV. On 25 August the approved LOI, containing the detailed implementation plan, was published and distributed to the USARV staff and all subordinate commands. The Ad Hoc committee continues to monitor and supervise execution of the conversion plan.

(10) Cargo Discharged and Handled in RVN Ports (STON).

Month	Discharged	Handled
April	382,831	575,331
May	422,695	627,291
June	319,496	496,927
Quarter Total	1,124,022	1,699,549

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July	357,566	569,708
August	366,249	499,650
September	<u>314,883</u>	<u>494,798</u>
Quarter Total	978,698	1,564,156

(11) Sea-Land Container Service (000 STON).

Month	Total Cargo Shipped into RVN	Total Sea-Land Shipped into RVN	% Sea-Land of Total
April	224.1	34.5	15.5
May	289.1	58.9	20.2
June	<u>202.5</u>	<u>46.9</u>	<u>23.1</u>
Quarter Total	715.7	139.9	19.6
July	217.7	58.2	26.7
August	164.2	33.5	20.3
September	<u>176.4</u>	<u>26.6</u>	<u>15.1</u>
Quarter Total	558.3	118.3	21.2

(a) The total amount of cargo shipped into RVN deep-draft ports during 1st Quarter FY 72 dropped 22.0 percent (157,400 STON) from the previous quarter. The total amount of inbound Sea-Land cargo dropped 15.3 percent (21,600 STON). However, Sea-Land's percentage of total tonnage discharged in RVN increased from 19.6 percent in 4th Quarter FY 71 to 21.2 percent for 1st Quarter FY 72. A comparison of total tonnage handled during these periods indicates a 9.4 percent reduction of inbound tonnage, with a corresponding increase in retrograde and intra-RVN shipments. During 4th Quarter FY 71, 45.1 percent of all cargo handled was inbound tonnage. Performance for 1st Quarter FY 72 indicates 35.1 percent of total tonnage handled was inbound cargo.

(b) As a result of an influx of inbound ammunition during the period 20 September 1971 to mid November, intensified management of all ammunition systems within RVN is being accomplished to reduce the days of ships' delay and wait to the absolute minimum. Currently, the MACV Ships Priority and Destination Board (SPDB) is meeting three times weekly at MACV J48 to monitor and direct shipping. The SPDB, which is comprised of MACV, component services, RVNAF and USMCV, directs rerouting and diversions from areas of congestion to areas where capability exists to discharge cargo if feasible. Lighterage has been repositioned to satisfy requirements at areas of greatest impact. Original estimates of ships

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waiting or in "hold" status has been reduced from 135 to 40 days during the October - November time frame. Efforts are being made to further reduce vessel demurrage.

(12) Roll on/Roll off (Ro/Ro) Service (Number of Trailers)

<u>Month</u>	<u>Received</u>	<u>Shipped</u>	<u>On Hand</u>
April	401	270	699
May	413	177	915
June	123	375	603
Quarter Total	937	822	
July	94	337	360
August	720	477	603
September	487	625	950*
Quarter Total	1,301	1,439	

*Report Submitted by USASUPCOM-DNG, Increased on hand

Trailers received during 1st Quarter FY 72 increased 38.85 percent over last quarter. The number of Ro/Ro trailers shipped increased 75.06 percent over last quarter and the number on hand at the end of the reporting period decreased 14.25 percent. The number of trailers shipped out of country will decrease during the next quarter as phasedown operations continue.

(13) Motor Transport Tonnage (STON).

<u>Month</u>	<u>Port & Beach</u>	<u>Local</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Total</u>
April	299,261	242,384	350,570	892,215
May	296,127	158,299	207,495	661,921
June	197,957	189,960	130,086	518,003
July	185,905	144,175	138,761	468,841
August	156,472	97,587	85,216	340,275
September	145,088	133,992	79,416	358,496

(14) Rail Movement (STON).

<u>Month</u>	<u>US Military Sponsored Cargo</u>	<u>Passengers</u>
April	36,605	174,521
May	40,605	168,743
June	32,169	173,318
July	29,919	181,572
August	30,526	179,781
September	38,780	181,234

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(15) NAC Channel Airlift Utilization. USARV continued to exceed its seat utilization goal of 95 percent for all months of the reporting period. The following data includes all NAC Channel traffic from RVN to South destinations.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Seats Allocated</u>	<u>Pass Moved</u>	<u>% Utilization</u>
April	25,200	27,702	108
May	16,175	17,307	110
June	14,565	15,910	109
July	20,683	21,499	104
August	20,405	21,299	105
September	17,004	18,697	105

(16) Inter-Service Support Agreements.

(a) Based on the requirements of AR 700-39 and the current USARPAC Supplement, an annual review of renegotiable agreements was required of all ISSA's. As part of the annual review the agreements must be renegotiated and placed on the new DD Form 1144, providing more detailed information on support, date, and cost breakout. During the report period over 300 agreements have entered the renegotiation process. The annual review and renegotiation requirements has provided USARV with a more current and reliable record of support being rendered and received.

(b) A program was initiated in May to consolidate as many ISSA's as possible during the annual review and renegotiation process. As a result of the many consolidations made, USARV has been able to reduce the number of ISSA's in effect for support rendered to a more manageable number.

(c) In May a seven-category number system of workload priority and accountability was established to handle the heavy workload (in excess of 300 agreements requiring action). This priority system has proven invaluable in scheduling workload and in seeing that support is being provided in a timely manner.

(d) Since USARV is the predominant element in RVN it is the largest of the supplying activities providing interservice and inter-agency support. The support being provided includes all classes of supply and covers the entire spectrum of logistical services, from maintenance of equipment to provisions for laundry, messing, and billeting support. USARV is presently the supplying activity on 251 ISSA/IASA's while being the recipient of support on 38 ISSA/IASA's. The ISSA/IASA support provided by USARV is as follows:

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<u>Supporting Activity</u>	<u>Number of Agreements</u>
U.S. Air Force	33
U.S. Navy	49
U.S. Marines	15
U.S. Coast Guard	6
Other DOD Agencies	33
Non-DOD, US Government	23
DOD Contractors	92

(e) The impact of the Inter-service/Inter-agency Support Program upon USARV assets is reflected in the estimated dollar value of support being rendered. USARV presently provides an estimated \$196,750,166 of support yearly, while receiving an estimated \$2,213,002 of support. About 25 percent of the USARV-provided support is nonreimbursable, in accordance with JCS policy which requires that logistical services (to include supplies consumed in the performance thereof) be provided on a nonreimbursable basis.

(17) Graves Registration. The Joint Central Graves Registration Office was established at US Army Mortuary, Tan Son Nhut, in May 1971. The mission of this office is to collect and maintain data on all KIA's (body not recovered) and mission personnel to support the search and recovery effort of all US remains in Southeast Asia.

(18) Food Service. The Subsistence Operations Review Board, Department of the Army has requested that a combat organization be chosen in RVN to test a special 20-day cyclic menu. The menu will consist of food items desired by the unit's personnel. The 6th Bn, 27th Artillery, has been selected to conduct a 90-day test of the menu.

(19) Laundry. The USARV FY 72 budget included funds for contract laundry operations. The contracts are used to supplement US Army field laundries. Their use is comparable in cost to field laundries and saves U.S. military spaces. There are presently 20 of these contracts in effect in RVN.

f. COMMAND MANAGEMENT.

(1) Management Information Systems.

(a) USARPAC Standard Supply System (3G) Upgrade. RCA Spectra 70 ADPS is scheduled to be delivered to USAFPC and USAICCV on 25 November 1971 and 10 December 1971, respectively. A total of 54 programmer/analysts were given training within USARV by RCA systems personnel. Twenty military personnel are currently undergoing operator and scheduler training in USARPAC. Local national operators and schedulers will be trained after the ADPS arrives in USARV. Command-unique programs

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at USAAMMC have been converted to RCA Spectra 70 at USARPAC. Command-unique programs at USAICCV are in the process of being converted.

(b) ADPE Retrograde. Shipment of one RCA 501 computer system to CONUS was completed, and one RCA 301 system will be shipped 30 November 1971. One IBM 7010/1460 computer system was shipped from Cam Ranh Bay. Twelve NCR 500 systems have been returned to the vendor, and an additional 58 pieces of PCM have been retrograded to CONUS.

(c) Cost Savings During the Period. A continuing review of ADPE utilization during the drawdown and discontinuance of leased ADPE from the USARV inventory has reflected a rental and maintenance cost savings of approximately \$82,400 per month.

g. INSPECTOR GENERAL.

(1) Complaint Investigation. During the period there were 1,972 complaints registered with Inspectors General within USARV. This was a decrease from 2,156 during the preceding six-month period. The ratio of justified and unjustified complaints increased from 26 percent justified and 74 unjustified during the preceding six-month period to 37 percent justified and 63 percent unjustified during the last period. This increase in percentage of justified complaints is attributed in part to the success of recent efforts to revitalize the Inspector General System. There is a tendency for newly assigned, school-trained IG's to seek out problem areas and to be more understanding of the complainant's problem. Personnel turbulence resulting from the reduction in troop strength and drawdown of forces was also an important factor. Complaints pertaining to transfer/reassignment and assignment/utilization comprised the two highest categories of soldier dissatisfaction and showed a gradual upward trend throughout the period.

(2) Inspections. HQ USARV conducted 53 Annual General Inspections and two Inspector General visits during the period. Areas most often found to be unsatisfactory or deficient were: Incomplete safety SOP's; inadequate fire prevention measures; funds records not maintained in accordance with regulations; and lack of command and staff supervision of funds; ammunition not secured; inadequate maintenance of personnel records (records missing or not complete); improper orientation to newly assigned personnel; inadequate maintenance of individual clothing and equipment records; and inadequate maintenance of filing systems.

h. INFORMATION. None.

i. CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS. None.

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1. COMMAND HISTORY.

(1) Organization.

(a) The 24th Military History Detachment - 173rd Airborne Brigade was inactivated during Increment Eight Redeployment.

(b) Increment Eight also witnessed the elimination of the position of Executive Officer and Medical Historian from the Office of the Command Historian on 1 July 1971. Medical history responsibilities were transferred to the USARV Surgeon's Office.

(2) Visitors. During the reporting period, Mr. Charles Von Luttichau, Historian, Current History Branch, Office of the Chief of Military History, visited RVN from 2-3 June 1971. Mr. Von Luttichau met with several MHDs and had fruitful discussions with the COMUSMACV and other senior American officers in RVN and Cambodia. Dr. Kenneth R. Deacon, Historian for the Office, Chief of Engineers, visited RVN beginning 5 October 1971. Dr. Deacon travelled to numerous engineer units in order to gain firsthand knowledge of engineer activities in Vietnam.

(3) Orientation Program. During July 1971, the Command Historian initiated a comprehensive orientation program for newly assigned MHD commanders. During these briefings conducted by the Command Historian and experienced MHD commanders at Long Binh, new MHD officers were instructed in interview techniques, records management and historical properties procedures.

k. AVIATION: None.

1. ENGINEER.

(1) Significant Activities. The United States Army Engineer Command, Vietnam (USARENGRCONV) provides command and control of all non-divisional engineer activities in USARV. USARENGRCONV field command units are organized as follows: the 34th Engineer Group (Binh Thuy), the 35th Engineer Group (Cam Ranh Bay), the 45th Engineer Group (Da Nang), and the 159th Engineer Group (Long Binh). During the reporting period, the majority of USARENGRCONV's efforts were expended in engineer operational support and lines of communication (LOC) construction.

(2) Construction Operations.

(a) LOC Program. During the period, a total of 261 km of the USARV LOC Program was completed. US troops completed 132 km; ARVN engineers completed 42 km; and the contractors completed 87 km. Additionally, both the contractors and troops devoted considerable effort to

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repairing; routes for turnover to the Director General of Highways (DGOH).
Completed roads turned over to DGOH during the period include:

MR	ROUTE	km	CONSTRUCTING UNIT
2	QL-11 (Br 27 - Jct 21B)	6	577th Engr Bn (Const)
2	QL-20 (Br 18 - Br 15)	10	815th Engr Bn (Const)
2	QL-1 (Binh Thanh - Sang Cau)	22	OICC
2	QL-1 (Song Sau - Tuy An)	28	OICC
2	Tha Trang Streets	5	OICC
3	QL-20 (QL-1-II/III MR)	25	169th Engr Bn (Const)
3	QL-15 (Bear Cat - Vung Tau)	43	OICC
4	QL-4 (Thanh Hoa - Soc Trang)	29	OICC

(b) USARV LOC Construction Summary:

	US TROOP	CONTRACTOR	ARVN	TOTAL
Total km Programmed	1391	1149	598	3138
Total km Paved	2178	834	96	2208
Total km Remaining	113	315	502	930
Total km Deferred/Unassigned				547

(c) Facilities Engineering.

1. Disposal of Excess Facilities. The transfer of excess facilities to RVNAF is being accomplished in accordance with AR 405-90 and MACV Directive 735-3. During the period 1 May 1971 to 31 October 1971, there were 64 transfer actions completed. The initial acquisition value of these transferred facilities was approximately \$33 million. This brings the total of transfer actions to RVNAF as of 31 October 1971 to 153, which represents an initial acquisition value of approximately \$127 million. Disposition of facilities is normally done by transfer action to RVNAF; however, in some cases disposition is by abandonment. During this period, civilian contractors have been awarded contracts to purchase excess facilities. The sale of excess facilities has permitted installation commanders to dispose of unneeded buildings while at the same time retaining the real estate. In addition, the government will realize a monetary return for these facilities. Critical items are being controlled and removed before disposition of facilities is made.

2. RVNAF and Vietnamese Civilian OJT Program. Some transfer actions to RVNAF have included Power Plants. The lack of facilities engineering skills required to continue to operations of these power plants required Headquarters, USARV, to implement an OJT program for RVNAF

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personnel and for Vietnamese civilians. This OJT program is executed by contract and is conducted at the transfer site where the power plant will remain. The initial phase of the OJT program has been well received and rated satisfactory.

3. Termination of Leases. The continuing program of reducing the number of leased facilities in RVN has resulted in a considerable cost reduction during the period 1 May thru 31 October 1971, as listed below. Headquarters, USARV, with assistance from MACV, has placed continuing command emphasis on terminating leases. During the period 1 May thru 31 October 1971, 62 leases were terminated, with a total annual rental value of \$1,815,024.46. This has lowered the annual rental value for leased facilities in RVN to \$8,368,182.58 and it has decreased to 218 the number of leases in the inventory. During the next few months, additional leases are scheduled for termination. This will add to the savings thus far effected.

MR	LEASES TERMINATED 1 May - 31 Oct 71	Amount
MR 1	6	\$ 38,644.07
MR 2	5	65,110.81
MR 3	39	153,138.64
MR 4	12	1,558,130.94
	62	\$1,815,024.46

(d) RVNAF Improvement and Modernization. Joint training affiliation has continued at three industrial sites between US and RVNAF engineers. Operation of the industrial sites has been taken over by the RVNAF and Weigt-Davis, Ban He Thout, and Hui Le. RVNAF operation of the industrial sites has so far proved to be satisfactory, with great effort being made by the RVNAF engineers to become technically proficient. There are now six RVNAF engineer battalions at work on LOC's. The 61st ARVN Engineer Battalion moved from the mission on QL-1 and assumed the mission of the 577th Engineer Battalion (US) to complete a section of QL-20 near Da Lat. The 65th is continuing work on QL-14 from junction 431 to Dao Thong. The 71st is continuing construction on QL-4 from Soc Trang to Bac Lieu. The 73rd is preparing to begin construction on IML-8A. The 52nd is continuing construction of QL-1 from Cia Ray to the 2/3 MR border. A total of 958 RVNAF and VN civilian personnel have completed some form of facilities training since 30 April 1971. Subjective rating standards show that qualitative evaluation of training furnished the Vietnamese has been favorable. The Vietnamese recently moved a step forward by announcing the completion of training for the 7th Cambodian Engineer Battalion at a graduation ceremony held on 29 October 1971.

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(c) Force Structure Changes.

1. During the reporting period two Force Structure Actions involving engineer units were finalized by Department of the Army and USARPAC General Orders as follows:

a. Inactivation of the 18th and 20th Engineer Brigades and the 937th Engineer Group effective 20 September 1971.

b. Inactivation of the 93rd Engineer Battalion (Const) effective 31 July 1971.

2. Redeployment.

a. The following engineer unit redeployments were conducted as part of the Increment VIII and IX troop withdrawals during the period July to 31 October 1971:

14th Engineer Battalion (Cbt)

20th Engineer Battalion (Cbt)

34th Engineer Battalion (Const)

864th Engineer Battalion (Const)

153rd Engineer Detachment (FF)

b. Additionally, the following number of engineer units were inactivated as a part of the Increment VIII and IX troop reductions during the period 1 July to 31 October 1971:

15th Engineer Company (LE)

104th Engineer Company (DT)

509th Engineer Company (PB)

630th Engineer Company (LE)

26th Engineer Detachment (PI)

38th Engineer Detachment (WD)

156th Engineer Detachment (WD)

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306th Engineer Detachment (FT)

510th Engineer Detachment (Util)

579th Engineer Detachment (Ter)

614th Engineer Detachment (PL)

c. During the reporting period other units within the Engineer Command were involved in partial drawdown which contributed to Keystone Oriole redeployment quotas. The combination of unit redeployments, inactivations and drawdowns resulted in a total authorized space reduction of 4,915 during the period.

(f) Mapping and Intelligence.

1. The 227th Engineer Detachment (TL) continued to perform the five major functions of its mission as follows:

a. Provide staff support and planning in topographic matters to USARV and USARENGRCONTV;

b. Maintain operational control over the 66th Engineer Company (T) (C), the 579th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) and Hydrographic Survey Team #1;

c. Coordinate the activities of in-country topographic agencies, which include the National Geographic Directorate and the 1st Engineer Topographic Group (ARVN);

d. Coordinate in-country topographic activities with out-of-country agencies, United States Army Topographic Command and USARPAC;

e. Continued to maintain flood prediction data and issue twice-weekly flood forecasting message for the Mekong Delta during period 7 August until 29 October 1971.

2. The 579th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) provided assistance in the location of construction material and used its file references in answering questions concerning terrain data. The unit was deactivated on 15 October 1971. This was the last remaining terrain detachment in the Republic of Vietnam. Hydrographic Survey Team #1 was reduced to one officer during the month of October. Plans are being finalized for the turn-over of hydro-survey equipment to the units Vietnamese counterpart.

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3. Vietnamese topographic agencies are primarily engaged in printing all in-country maps used by the Vietnamese armed forces. They have developed the capability to provide mapping support to their own units. This has been primarily accomplished with the guidance of the 227th and MACV J/54.

a. COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS. None.

a. MILITARY JUSTICE AND LEGAL AFFAIRS. None.

2. (C) LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. PERSONNEL.

(1) Accurate DEROS Loss Reports.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the reporting period lack of accurate reporting of DEROS losses by subordinate commands continued to hamper efforts to regulate command strength.

(b) EVALUATION: Accurate DEROS loss data is vital to accurate strength forecasting and for programing transportation requirements. During the first half of the year, reports from the field fluctuated widely from month to month and made strength forecasting extremely difficult. In June 1971 a by-name reporting system was implemented which required commands to provide a by-name listing of DEROS personnel for the month following the report month. This approach was refined in July by furnishing the subordinate commands with computer-prepared PTF rosters for validation. Some improvements have been noted in the accuracy of the reports in August, September, and October; however, the impact of Keystone Oriole (KSO) curtailments still cause fluctuations since it is difficult to determine the exact date of departure of KSO personnel from a standdown unit until the last minute.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That subordinate commands take necessary action to identify KSO losses by day before the beginning of an increment or as near after it begins as possible.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None Required.

(2) Shortage of Psychiatric Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: Fully trained psychiatric personnel are in short supply in Vietnam; large numbers are needed to support the Drug Counteroffensive effectively.

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(b) EVALUATION: Paramedical personnel have been observed during operation of rehabilitation Centers and it is noted that they generally perform in a very creditable and acceptable manner.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Numerous persons with backgrounds in areas such as teaching, social service, psychology, and corrections work are being identified and effectively used in positions not requiring a fully certified psychiatrist.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

(3) Replacement Personnel for TDY Personnel of the Drug Abuse Program.

(a) OBSERVATION: The departure of the personnel TDY in support of the Drug Abuse Program and the arrival of their replacements was a serious problem in the operation of the program.

(b) EVALUATION: The arrival of replacements was not according to schedule, and that only 141 out of 176 have arrived. This in turn caused the involuntary extension of the majority of the TDY personnel. The lack of specific departure dates and the lack of information available caused personal problems and lowering of morale among the TDY personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken to insure that future replacements arrive as scheduled. That TDY personnel sent to RVN in the future be oriented not to expect the return to their home station on a specific date but that availability of replacements will have a major effect on their actual departure dates.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Surgeon's Office, USARV, and AG USARV, were in constant contact with CTSG, DA and EPD, GPO, DA, concerning status of replacements. Procedures were established to identify each replacement upon arrival in RVN and to speed his in-country processing and arrival to his unit. All available incoming personnel in selected MOS's were assigned to the units identified with the Drug Abuse Program. Command-wide screening of personnel in-country was conducted to determine personnel available to be placed in the program in OJT status.

(4) Enlisted shortages in the Drug Program.

(a) OBSERVATION: Critical shortages exist within the units associated with the Drug Abuse Program.

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(b) EVALUATION: Because of the rapid implementation of the Drug Abuse Program all available in-country resources were channeled into the program. Generated requirements rapidly overcame available resources. TDY personnel from COMUS were initially utilized to operate the program as well as in-country resources. The TDY personnel have been replaced by PCS personnel to a large extent. Emergency requisitions were submitted to obtain the rest of the required personnel. The full complement of personnel required to operate this program is not expected to arrive until the late November/early December time frame.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That emergency requisitions for the Drug Abuse Program personnel be filled as soon as possible.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The following additional actions were taken by the USARV Surgeon to alleviate the critical shortages in selected MOS's listed:

1. MOS 92B: A USARV command-wide screening of all personnel with a chemistry/medical-technology background was accomplished. Nineteen personnel were selected for assignment for duty in MOS 92B at the urine testing laboratories. Twelve of these personnel have arrived, and the rest should arrive NLT the end of the month. Utilization was made of nonlaboratory personnel in the urine collection stations in order to release 92B personnel for duty in the urine testing laboratory. Utilization of branch immaterial personnel in the unit sweep teams has relieved 92B personnel for duty in the urine testing laboratories.

2. MOS 91G: Personnel who have civilian training in this field are being identified from standdown units for possible utilization in this MOS in the drug treatment centers and the drug rehabilitation centers.

(5) Impact of the Urinalysis and Testing Program on Replacement Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: The majority of the drug testing programs utilize the replacement battalions as a sampling location, since they are the choke point for the various classes of individuals to be tested (i.e., DEMOS, R&R, Leave, 727). Any additional time for facilities required for the test usually results in the requirement being placed on the replacement activity concerned.

(b) EVALUATION: Additional processing requirements placed on the replacement battalions require additional personnel and facilities. Any increase in a particular urinalysis program usually results in a

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request for more personnel or facilities in the replacement battalions. Of utmost importance, however, is the effect the urinalysis programs have on the ability of the replacement battalions to ship people, particularly in the case of DEROS personnel. In order to achieve a high degree of aircraft utilization, reporting times to replacement battalions have had to be increased. Reporting times are now specified as not sooner than 4 days prior to DEROS and not later than 3 days prior to DEROS.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That any future program of this nature be carefully considered as to its impact on the replacement battalion personnel and facilities.

(d) **COMBINED ACTION:** None Required.

b. **INTELLIGENCE.**

(1) **Weather Forecasting.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The amount of weather information normally available in the areas of operation in Vietnam does not permit the detailed and accurate analysis of forecasting desired in support of tactical operations. This deficiency is greatly reduced by routine, reliable reports on existing weather conditions from relatively few strategic points within the AO. The reports from Army surveillance aircraft are especially valuable. FAC reports in the early morning hours are very useful, as are Pathfinder reports from the ground.

(b) **EVALUATION:** If Army and Air Force elements engaged in field operations can be directed to take simple weather observations at regular intervals without degrading their ability to carry out their primary duties, they can provide weather information that will immensely improve weather forecasts for the AO. Pilot reports from low-flying aircraft in the AO are most valuable, but great benefit can be gained from observation made by combat control teams (Army and Air Force), Army control tower personnel, rangers, and long-range patrols.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That designation of Army elements to take simple weather observations during field operations be made a part of the operations plan or order. The frequency with which they report, and the channels through which they report, should be specified. The number of hands through which the information must pass should be kept to an absolute minimum. Where possible, the weather information should be given directly to the supporting AUS weather unit. All of these units should be appropriately equipped with FM radios to make this possible.

(d) **COMBINED ACTION:** None Required.

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c. OPERATIONS.(1) Double Ambush.

(a) OBSERVATION: An ARVN District S-1 was returning to his District Headquarters by jeep from an inspection of the rebuilding of fortifications around a damaged outpost when he was ambushed. The ARVN troops at the outpost, upon hearing the firing from the ambush nearby, notified the local Sub-Sector Headquarters by telephone. The District Chief immediately organized a reaction force consisting of an RF and a PF platoon, accompanied by key US and ARVN district personnel. The reaction force departed on foot for the site of the initial ambush. Upon reaching the site they were immediately attacked by mortar fire and the District Chief and two US Army Advisors were killed. The Province Chief upon hearing of the second ambush requested additional forces to include ground elements, armed helicopters, artillery fire and tactical air support. The Province Chief also flew over the ambush area and directed armed helicopter strikes on suspected enemy locations. In addition, US helicopters moved another RF platoon into the vicinity. During the sweep of the area following the armed helicopter attack and supporting fires, sporadic contacts were made with enemy in the vicinity. The cumulative results were 27 KIA; 25 MIA; one MIA; 35 WPMS, two FRC-25 radios, one ambulance and five 1/4 ton trucks damaged or destroyed. Enemy losses were 33 KIA and seven WPMS destroyed.

(b) EVALUATION: Available intelligence should have been collected and evaluated prior to dispatch of the reaction force. If exigencies dictated immediate deployment, the force should have proceeded with extreme caution and in coordination with supporting arms such as reconnaissance helicopters and gunships. Higher headquarters should have been notified and all available support should have been requested and coordinated in advance so as to avoid piecemeal commitment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Commanders and US Advisors to RVN Forces take action as outlined in the above evaluation to prevent a recurrence.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: Headquarters, USARV has published the above in Battlefield Reports - "Tips for Commanders."

d. ORGANIZATION. None.e. LOGISTICS.(1) Retrograde of ADPE.**CONFIDENTIAL**

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(a) **OBSERVATION:** A significant amount of ADPE in USARV was returned to the vendor or released for reutilization by other governmental agencies during Increment VI, VII, VIII and IX drawdowns. Leased equipment returned to the vendor has a required delivery date 60 days following date ADPE was discontinued from rental. These required delivery dates are not being met due to shipping delays in COMUS.

(b) **EVALUATION:**

1. Following packing and crating by respective facilities at Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Long Binh, leased ADPE is returned to COMUS via air transportation. Guidance for packing, crating and shipping is furnished by this Headquarters.

2. Procedures established by this Headquarters to insure timely shipment are adequate.

3. Following departure from terminals in RVN, it is not possible for this Headquarters to ensure timely arrival at destinations in COMUS. Only after-the-fact tracer action can be initiated by MACV TMA.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** A central facility should be established in COMUS to expedite COMUS shipments to vendors to avoid incurring reinstatement of rental due to late delivery.

(d) **CORRELATED ACTION:** None required.

(2) **Drug Counteroffensive.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Some unit supply problems were encountered in the drug treatment centers due to a shortage of experienced supply personnel. Unit supply rooms are constantly deluged with high-priority requirements to get urgently needed materiel to support an operation already underway. This consistent demand for immediate action has made it difficult to organize and set definite supply procedures.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Through the diligent efforts of assigned supply personnel the sections are improving, and there are no immediate major problems.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** In future attempts to open treatment facilities, it is suggested that a staff of highly qualified medical supply personnel be assigned to the facility. The people could use their experience and knowledge in coping with initial problems encountered in beginning a new activity. After establishing requirements, procedures, and

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controls, these individuals could be replaced by less experienced personnel with the capability of carrying on the established operations.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** The USAFEDCONV Drug Operations Center is coordinating with ACOF3, Personnel and Administration and ACOF3, Supply, Maintenance and Services, HQ, MEDCONV, to establish procedures whereby experienced supply personnel could initially be assigned to newly established drug related facilities.

(3) Preservation of Nonperishable Subsistences.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Required Class 9 inspections of nonperishable subsistences (AR 40-656) should not be made at Class I supply points in Vietnam.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Normally all nonperishable subsistence is inspected every 90 days. This requires removal of the protective covering and a detailed inspection. It has been found in Vietnam where many Class I points are outside, uncovered, and items cannot be repacked, that removal of the protective covering (i.e., breaking open a pallet or carton) and subsequent exposure to sun and rain leads to an increased deterioration. This is not true where subsistence can remain covered until used.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That protective covering not be removed from nonperishable subsistence for the sake of routine cyclic inspections when it cannot be repacked or protected.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** USARV Reg 700-41 states that nonperishable subsistence will not be routinely inspected at Class I points, but rather force-issued after it has been on hand 90 days. This does not preclude regular cyclic inspections at depots prior to issue to the Class I points.

(4) Surveillance of Perishable Subsistence.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Guidance is lacking in the area of surveillance of perishable subsistence.

(b) **EVALUATION:** AR 40-656 goes into great detail on methods, frequencies, and requirements concerning inspection of nonperishable subsistence. Here in Vietnam, at the end of a long supply chain, we find many, if not more, problems with perishable items. Guidance on performance of cyclic inspections is lacking.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** AR 40-656 be expanded to cover perishable subsistence.

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(c) COMMAND ACTION: UTARY Suppl 1 to AR 40-656 is being staffed to offer interim guidance.

f. COMMUNICATIONS: None.

g. HAZARD: None.

(1) Portable Dental Clinic.

(a) OBSERVATION: The most glaring deficiency in the dental unit TOE is a lack of suitable, portable, clinical space in which to perform dental treatment.

(b) EVALUATION: Currently TOE-authorized tentage is totally inadequate shelter for the protection of dental operating personnel, sophisticated modern dental equipment, and patients. A clean, dust-free, controlled-environment type of portable dental clinic is necessary for the use of modern dental equipment and provision of modern dental treatment. A thorough study of shelters available in the Army supply system reveals that a very adequate shelter is available in the form of the M313 semi-trailer expandable van, FSN 2300-772-5273. A truck-mounted version of this shelter (MPS1) is now in use as a dental clinic in RVN and is an outstanding shelter for dental clinic space. The 1,000 miles per year accumulated by this vehicle mitigates against use of the truck-mounted version and favors the use of the van mounted M313. This van was originally designed for use as a portable operating room and is now (since the development of M313) used extensively by calibration and maintenance units who also require a clean, dust-free, controlled environment in which to protect equipment and operating personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Change 2 to TOE 8-670 should include 13 M313 vans in lieu of tentage. Vehicle allocation should be changed to provide four 5-ton diesel tractors to move the three teams in echelon, one 2 1/2-ton truck w/w to carry POL and other supplies and pull the water trailer, one 3/4-ton truck per team for supply and personnel transport, and one 1/4-ton truck per team for messenger and other administrative purposes. Each van would require conventional field dental equipment supported by a 10 kw turbo alternator or generator and an air compressor providing 100 cubic feet per minute of oil-and-water-free air at 100psi.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

(2) Portable Precast Revetments and Bunkers.

(a) OBSERVATION: Portable precast revetments were instituted by this Headquarters in June 1971. Several precast revetments were produced

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for use as protection for aircraft and critical facilities throughout RVN. This Headquarters designed and tested the structures. Tests proved the revetments could withstand the effects of a 122mm rocket detonated at 15 feet. Recently, a precast concrete bunker has been developed to provide a relocatable perimeter bunker using readily available materials. The bunker is designed similarly to the revetment and withstood the same tests. The four 8' x 8' x 6" walls are identical, with an open window 1 1/2' x 5' in the upper half. The rear wall is rotated so that the window opening serves as a doorway. The 10-foot-square floor slab is also precast. The walls are held in place by 4-inch angle iron bolted to the slab edges. The roof, prefabricated from lumber, is designed to provide protection only from the weather. The bunker can be assembled in 4 hours utilizing a wrecker or crane.

(b) EVALUATION: Long Binh Post is presently utilizing these bunkers on the defensive perimeter and on 36' observation towers. It is believed that these bunkers are more economical and require less time to construct than other designs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Continue to test concrete bunkers for usability in the tactical situation.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: None required.

h. OTHER.

(1) Tropical Canine Peneytonemia (TCP) Control.

(a) OBSERVATION: Tetracycline when employed early in the syndrome offers control.

(b) EVALUATION: Tetracycline, depending on the time given, offers control of TCP. If given early enough it can prevent serious clinical complications. The best method to identify suspects for TCP is the monthly white blood count. Any animal with a white blood count of 7,000 or less is considered a "suspect."

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Continue TCP white blood count screening on all military dogs in the TCP area on a monthly basis. Treat all suspects prior to clinical signs with 14 days of oral Tetracycline at a daily rate of 50 mg/lb body weight in divided dosages. Dogs with a rapidly falling white blood count should be treated prior to reaching 7,000.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: USAFEDCOMV Reg 40-2 outlines the procedures recommended in (c). It is too early to make any statistical evaluation of this action.

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(2) Drug Counteroffensive.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Abrupt policy changes involving patients, when coupled with the personality makeup of the drug abuser, lead to unnecessary and potentially dangerous confrontations between staff and patients. A humane and medical approach has been found preferable to a rigid disciplinary approach in the treatment of drug patients. Stringent punitive measures and the employment of military police should be used only when necessary and then under supervision of the medical staff. It has been found that the minimum use of medications in heroin withdrawal is advantageous. It has been our experience that many drug abusers, experiencing withdrawal symptoms, will abuse any medication given. Maximum attention must be directed to security in the pharmacy. If needles, syringes, and medications are at all possible to obtain, some drug abusers will obtain them. Treatment centers have experienced outbreaks of smoking valium and injecting chloralhydrate intravenously. Structured daily patient activities are essential, primarily to help eliminate boredom, hostility, and poor morale. Staff/patient activities are encouraged. It is sometimes felt that the patients' rehabilitation is hindered by their knowledge that days spent in a treatment center are "bad time." This knowledge has an adverse affect on morale, even though the patients are aware that no punitive action against them is contemplated.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Accessibility of all staff members to patients reduces tensions.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Policy changes affecting patients should be minimized and widely published. Use of minimum medication, compatible with good medical practice, in heroin withdrawal cases. A social-work officer or psychiatrist should be readily available to supervise the social-work specialists and/or psychiatric specialists. Because of frequently observed "needle dependency," attempts should be made to minimize the use of parenteral medications, except initially in the case of severe gastrointestinal symptoms with amosis which must be controlled before oral medications can be used. Campagine (10 mg IM) has worked successfully in controlling this problem. In treating large numbers of drug patients, easy access to loyal council for the patients should be fostered.

(d) **CONCLUDED ACTION:** Accessibility of staff to patients is being emphasized in USAFEDCOMV treatment facilities. Policy changes are well publicized. Social workers, psychiatrists, and legal counsel are made available to the patients as much as possible within availability of these personnel.

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(3) Returned Prisoner of War Processing.

(a) OBSERVATION: It was noted during the processing of SSG Sexton that aeromedical evacuation responsibilities were divided among several staff agencies; that responsibilities of the Military Police in regard to protection of repatriated P.O.W.'s were unclear; that DA was intervening and requesting information which should be provided by Medical Command; and that news restrictions concerning repatriated P.O.W.'s were excessive.

(b) EVALUATION: Aeromedical evacuation was made more difficult and confusing than expected due to the following: Fragmented responsibilities; conflicting actions and instructions resulting in confusion of MP duties in regard to protection of repatriated P.O.W.'s; DA's request for patient diagnostic data jumped channels from MRO direct to the hospital; and unnecessary news restrictions led to antagonism and spread of rumors and conjecture.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that all aeromedical evacuation be coordinated by one USAHEDCOMV office; that the responsibilities of the Military Police be clarified; that DA request information through JERO channels; and that restrictions on news releases concerning prisoners of war be relaxed.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The after-action report is being prepared by this Headquarters at this time.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



L.E. SCHWEITER
MG US Army
Chief of Staff

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Vietnam, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 25 JAN 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-2A) WASH DC 20310

Concur with subject ORLL except for paragraph 2a(1)(c).
DOD Regulation 4500.32-R, MILSTAMP, provides adequate procedures to ensure timely delivery to consignee. If breakdown has occurred in the system, this should be reported through appropriate command and technical transportation channels.

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