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AUTHORITY

AGG D/A ltr 23 Jan 1976; AGG D/A ltr 23 Jan 1976

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AGC, D/A Hr, 23 Jan. 76

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



IN REPLY REFER TO

26 May 1972

DAAG-PAP-A(M) (8 May 72) DAFD-OTT

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, HQ, 17th Aviation Group
(Combat); 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry for Period Ending
31 Oct 71, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

AD 520897

1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.
4. As Section 1 of subject reports are not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, they have been omitted.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

2 Incl

1. DAFD-OTT (712164)
2. DAFD-OTT (712016)

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AVBAV-C

15 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

SECTION II - LESSONS LEARNED

A. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY:

1. Sapper Attacks:

a. Observation: It has been observed that sapper attacks are preceded by detailed reconnaissance to include identifying anti-intrusion devices and determining the extent of protective wire. This may take place anywhere from 3 to 7 days prior to the attack.

b. Evaluation: Sapper attacks are well planned and rehearsed prior to an attack. Sapper attacks usually take place between 2400 hours and 0200 hours.

c. Recommendations:

(1) All security guard personnel must be continuously alert to prevent the enemy from capitalizing on the element of surprise.

(2) Once the enemy has started his attack by fire and executes his movements, maximum firepower from all friendly organic and supporting weapons must be immediately employed.

(3) Set patterns must be avoided to prevent the enemy from capitalizing on set routines.

(4) Reaction forces and Tactical Air must be capable of responding instantly.

(5) Once an attack is imminent, all personnel not involved in the defense of the installation must take protective cover.

(6) An alternate means of communication must be available.

(7) Perimeter wiring should be buried to prevent the enemy from breaking the circuit by some mechanical means.

2. Continued Enemy Use of Old Base Areas:

a. Observation: VC/NVA forces are frequently utilizing partially destroyed bunkers in old and abandoned base camps.

b. Evaluation: It has been noted that VC/NVA forces utilize old and abandoned base areas to eliminate detection from the air.

c. Recommendation: Continual close surveillance by aerial observers and ground forces should be placed on old, partially destroyed bunker complexes. Any indications of renewed use of these bunkers should warrant

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1971, **RCS CSFOR-65**
(R3)(U)

reaction by air, artillery or ground elements. When possible, actions should be taken to completely destroy all structures that can be of any use to the enemy.

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15 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

B. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

1. Operations:

a. Minefield Records:

(1) Observation: Incompleteness and inaccuracy of minefield records hampered the minefield clearing operation tremendously.

(2) Evaluation: Due to the incompleteness and inaccuracy of minefield records which were used to clear the Phu Hiep Area Minefield, it was difficult to locate and identify mines in the area.

(3) Recommendation: A detailed study of minefield records should be made prior to initiating clearing operations. This is of particular importance when minefield records are inaccurate and incomplete. Additionally, efforts should be made to seek the assistance and guidance of EOD personnel. An accurate and complete record of the minefield layout should be maintained at all times. This record should include all the different types of anti-personnel mines that were used.

b. Minerollers:

(1) Observation: It was observed that using a tank mineroller in sandy soil hampered and prevented the rollers from establishing proper contact with the clearing of minefield.

(2) Evaluation: Tank minerollers proved to be ineffective when operating in sandy soil.

(3) Recommendation: Sheepsfoot rollers are highly recommended to be used for clearing minefield in sandy soil. Sheepsfoot rollers were proven to be very effective.

c. Minefield Clearing Around Vietnamese Hamlets:

(1) Observation: Minefields located around Vietnamese hamlets were very difficult to clear, because the people residing in the hamlets were in close proximity of clearing operations.

(2) Evaluation: Without keeping Vietnamese personnel at a safe distance, it hampers the mine clearing operation tremendously.

(3) Recommendation: When clearing minefields which form a protective perimeter around Vietnamese hamlets, the people residing in the hamlets should be told why the minefield is being removed and warned of the danger of being in close proximity of clearing operations. In addition, local police or hamlet officials should be available during clearing operations

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to assist in keeping personnel at a safe distance.

d. 201st Avn Co (Corps):

(1) Observation: Many Army Aviators are not familiar with ICAO flight plans.

(2) Evaluation: The ICAO blank forms are maintained in the operations and flight planning rooms at most airfields with a complete FLIP planning manual.

(3) Recommendations: When an aviator, especially U-21 pilots receive their initial in-country orientation, more emphasis should be placed on proper planning and filing of ICAO plans. This briefing be conducted by the unit instrument examiner during his orientation briefing.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

C. SIGNAL.

1. Observation: During a medevac mission in the vicinity of An Son, RVN the primary and alternate medevac frequencies were jammed.

2. Evaluation: The jamming was very effective and forced the aircraft to conduct the mission without ground radio contact. Medevac, search and rescue, and artillery/flight following frequencies for all military regions in RVN are listed in the UNCLASSIFIED REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM FREQUENCY publication. Search and rescue and medevac frequencies can be easily jammed. Artillery warnings include location of fire, direction and range, time period, and occasionally impact coordinates. These frequencies are rarely jammed because of the valuable information the enemy can gather.

3. Recommendation: The Republic of Vietnam Frequency Publication should be classified confidential and controlled in the same manner as SOI's. Tactical secure voice (TSV) equipment should be an integral part of each FM radio.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

D. SAFETY.

1. LOH Pilot Training:

a. Observation: Five accidents have involved LOH aircraft performing a low level reconnaissance mission. Three of these accidents involved pilots literally flying into trees. Results were all aircraft lost and one fatality.

b. Evaluation: Low level flight over heavily vegetated terrain is a requirement for the accomplishment of the air cav mission. Because of the hazards involved only the most thoroughly trained aviators should be placed on missions of this type. In the three cases above the pilots had less than one hundred hours each, all were released for missions after their transitions. A review of operational procedures guides and all appropriate regulations show no minimum hour level requirement for LOH pilots to perform low level reconnaissance missions.

c. Recommendation: The feasibility of establishing a training program for LOH pilots in air cavalry units should be considered. The object of such a program would be to ensure that the LOH pilots are well qualified prior to the performance of air cavalry missions.

2. Weather Accidents:

a. Observation: This organization has experienced two major accidents which involved weather as a major cause factor. Results, 1 AH-1G destroyed with 2 fatalities, 1 CH-47 mission with 1 fatality and 4 MIA.

b. Evaluation: One involved a flight of two AH-1Gs on an administrative flight after dark. When IMO conditions were encountered one pilot elected to climb and by reference to his instruments he executed a successful instrument approach at his home base. The other aircraft tried to maintain VMC in IMC weather and was located several days later, crashed on the side of a mountain. The other accident involved a CH-47B which failed to make a position report and has not been located as of this date. Debris has washed up along the coast line so it is assumed that the aircraft crashed into the water.

c. Recommendation: There is no emphasis on maintaining instrument proficiency by higher commands. There should be a dynamic program initiated to upgrade the instrument qualifications of all army aviators, a standard instrument ticket should be the minimum and a pilot should be required to meet annual and semi-annual instrument minimums. Perhaps by upgrading the quality of the instrument program and applying more command emphasis there might be a substantial decrease in IMC oriented accidents.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

E. LOGISTICS.

1. Refuel/Rearm Point:

a. Observation: Battalions and Squadrons of the Group are required, through necessity, to organize their own refuel/rearm points at the various base camps. The concept of "hot" or rapid refueling was found to be essential to mission requirements.

b. Evaluation: Organic tanker refueling is unacceptable, due to the extensive turn around time required at each refueling stop. Most of the equipment now in operation at the refuel sites has been handed down from departing support elements and other USARV assets to the respective aviation units using the sites. This equipment is old and difficult to maintain. Repair parts and major end-items are in very short supply. The majority of the replacement parts for this equipment has to be special ordered from CONUS.

c. Recommendation: The ideal situation for operating and maintaining refuel/rearm points in support of tactical operations would be for a support element to be attached at the aviation battalion/squadron level. This element should be organized with personnel and equipment capable of operating one or more full scale (6-12 points) refuel sites and the associated rearm points.

2. Supplies and Repair Parts:

a. Observation: As operational commitments are phased down, supply channels are slowing down. Expendable and non-expendable common items are still required to maintain an effective operating force.

b. Evaluation: Self Service Supplies and Class II and IV items needed by the remaining operational units have become increasingly difficult to obtain through supply channels. Vehicular repair/replacement parts are scarce. Normal requisitioning channels are slow at best and numerous vehicles must be carried on a deadline status due to the lack of parts. High priority requests, which should normally take from 5 to 7 days to be filled, are experiencing delays of from 30 to 90 days. Reconciliations are often difficult to accomplish, due to the phasedown of support facilities. Barrier materials necessary for perimeter defense are very difficult to obtain in the quantities required. During the retrograde operation, the troop density has increased in base areas, and perimeter defense has become increasingly important.

c. Recommendation: It is imperative that these materials remain available in order to adequately protect our forces as they phase down. The supply system must remain functional until all units have inactivated or redeployed.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

3. Excess Equipment:

a. Observation: The turn-in of excess equipment by Keystone and Non-Keystone units has not met with the success desired.

b. Evaluation: The requirement for documentation has been a deterrent to property recovery.

c. Recommendation: It is recommended that excess property, not on the unit property books and excess to the unit's requirement (e.g. found on post), be recovered under an amnesty, no-questions-asked, turn in facility where no documentation is required. This type of program would recover a larger quantity of property, which otherwise would be abandoned, buried, or destroyed because of the added burden of preparing and documenting the property for turn in.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lesson Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

F. DRUG SUPPRESSION AND REHABILITATION CENTER.

1. Complaints from patients:

a. Observation: Patients complained of feeling like convicts because of the security measures maintained throughout the program. Meals were even brought into the facility since there was no kitchen.

The staff decided to try issuing limited passes for those patients in the second phase.

b. Evaluation: It was decided to send the patients to the mess hall for most of their meals under the control of a staff supervisor. This method required a minimum of one staff member per three patients for positive control. There were incidents of drugs being introduced into the center.

The patients were put on their honor and allowed to leave the facility in groups of three. This did not work because the good intentions of the patients soon gave in to the luring merchandise of the heroin pushers in the area.

c. Recommendation: Staff must maintain positive control over the patients throughout their day. With the right people the staff can make the patients accept this supervision with few or no complaints.

2. Feedback on Graduates:

a. Observation: Lack of feedback on the graduates from unit commanders.

b. Evaluation: With feeder information the center could get a better idea of the success of the program. These reports could also be combined with the statistics and information in compiling to help answer such questions as what kind of soldier turns to drugs instead of professional help for his problems, and what types of counselling are best for the various characters and personalities of those who enter the program.

c. Recommendation: All unit commanders must make it a point to submit a feeder report on graduates to help this program to succeed and improve.

3. In-unit follow-up of ex-patients:

a. Observation: There can be only limited success in influencing the attitude of patients in a two-week stay at the center. Effective rehabilitation is a continuing process. The staff recommended designation

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15 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS GSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

of in-center training of selected volunteer counselors from line units, who would return to their units after the training, and fulfill the requirement for local counselling capabilities. As of 31 October, 29 such counsellors had been trained at the center.

b. Evaluation: There was some delay in effecting this portion of the program, in that there was a reluctance on the part of NCOs and junior officers to volunteer for this position. As drug education activities increased, and attitudes toward rehabilitation efforts changed, the program began to take effect and now is firmly established throughout MR 2. It has also been adopted as a part of the USARV program.

c. Recommendation: All commanders should actively support their unit counselor in his efforts by insuring he is relieved from as many other additional duties as unit strength will allow. Unit commanders should also monitor each counselor's activities to insure proper conduct of rehabilitation efforts within the unit.

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AVBAGC (15 Nov 71) 1st Ind

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
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation
Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65
(R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO San Francisco 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APTN: AVHDO-DO,
APO San Francisco 96375

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned
for the period ending 31 October 1971 and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


MATTHEW SANGER
1LT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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17 FEB 1972

AVHDO-DO (15 Nov 71) 2nd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned of Headquarters, 17th Aviation Group (Combat) for the period ending 31 Oct 71 and considers it an adequate reflection of the unit's activities during the period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



F. L. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
17th Avn Gp
1st Avn Bde

15
GPOP-FD (15 Nov 71) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ, 17th
Aviation Group (Cbt), Period Ending 31 October 1971,
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 MAR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in the subject ORLL with the following comment:

Reference Section II, para D2, page 6. USARPAC is and has been in complete agreement with this recommendation and has on several occasions queried HQ USARV concerning the reestablishment of annual night and instrument proficiency flying requirements in RVN. HQ USARV has requested delay in initiation of such a program because of operational and facility limitations, increased flying hours and resultant maintenance support required, and recommends beginning FY 73 as earliest date for implementation. During Mar 72 DA directed a worldwide instrument capability upgrading effective immediately. In addition USARPAC has taken action to direct the reestablishment of annual night and instrument proficiency flying requirements for aviators assigned SEA effective 1 July 1972.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. MAR
M. L. MAR
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

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AVBAWY

17 November 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 31 Oct 71, and Troop C, 3d Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, RCS CSFOR (R3) (U)

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A. Personnel:

(1) Personnel Shortage and MOS Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: The 7/1st ACS continued to accomplish all assigned missions even though there was only an average personnel fill of approximately 80% during the past six months. Of the 80%, only 60% were in the proper MOS and grade.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to operating with an acute shortage of trained personnel, almost all tasks took longer to accomplish, especially in the areas of aircraft and vehicle maintenance. Very close supervision was necessary to insure aircraft were mission ready and air worthy. It was imperative that many personnel be utilized in an MOS other than the one in which they were trained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To promote proper utilization of personnel and to further the efforts of a Modern Volunteer Army, it is strongly recommended that personnel be assigned in the proper MOS and to units in which there exists a vacancy for that MOS. Aviation units require many special and technical MOSs and in-unit, OJT type training is neither practical nor possible in many instances. It is further recommended, that units which are engaged in daily combat operations, not be allowed to fall below minimum prescribed readiness standards in regard to personnel assigned and MOS Training.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: A vigorous on-the-job training program was conducted by units within the 7/1st ACS and secondary MOSs were awarded when possible. Many personnel with 11 series MOSs were cross trained as aircraft mechanics and clerks, since the infantry platoons within the individual Troops are not utilized on Combat operations.

(2) Lack of Personnel in MOS 67Y, AH-1G Crewchief

(a) OBSERVATION: At the present time, there are no slots authorized for AH-1G Crewchiefs in the MTO&E for an Air Cavalry Squadron.

(b) EVALUATION: Not having 67Y MOSs authorized by MTO&E, but having AH-1G aircraft authorized and on hand is a difficult situation. Maintaining the AH-1G is more complicated than maintaining UH-1H or OH-6A type aircraft. Without school trained crewchiefs, the magnitude of the problem of keeping the AH-1G flyable is more than doubled. Without the ability to show authorization, replacements are difficult to obtain.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: AH-1G Cobra Crewchiefs be authorized by MTO&E, because they are necessary if nine AH-1G aircraft are to be maintained in a flyable condition.

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(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** A letter requesting AH-1G crewchiefs be authorized by MTO&E was drafted and forwarded through channels during the month of April 1971.

B. Intelligence: None.

C. Operations:

(1) ARVN Security of Pick-Up Zones.

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Pick-up zones supposedly secure by ARVN standards are not necessarily free of hostile fire.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Even though a considerable number of ARVN troops may have been inserted into a particular area during a given day, the PZ's have, on occasion, been found quite insecure upon extraction. It has been noted, that in many cases, even with adequate time available, ARVN troops failed to clear likely enemy positions in and around the PZ. The results have been, that on several occasions, the lift sections have taken fire from these locations, particularly during the latter phases of the extraction.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** It is recommended that all air mission commanders never consider a PZ as secure until the scouts have conducted a thorough reconnaissance of the area prior to the extraction of ground troops. This recommendation excludes established base camp and built up areas.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** PZ reconnaissance is now SOP within the 7/1st ACS.

(2) Utilization of Air Cavalry Assets:

(a) **OBSERVATION:** As the reduction of Air Assets in MR IV continues, more and more evidence becomes available of Air Cavalry packages conducting missions normally assigned to assault companies.

(b) **EVALUATION:** An air cavalry package should be utilized on operations where a number of troops must be inserted but not just for the actual movement of a large number of troops. As soon as landing zones are cleared for insertions, the air cavalry package should perform screening, blocking, and/or reconnaissance type missions. Not only does this concept permit the most efficient utilization of air assets, but it also enables a smaller ground force to accomplish their mission more quickly and effectively.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** It is strongly recommended that using units review and screen mission requirements and put more emphasis on placing the correct type mission with the most applicable air assets, i.e., Air Cavalry Package, VNAF Package, or Assault Helicopter Company.

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(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** As a result of the air cavalry troops being utilized in various roles, air mission commanders were instructed to thoroughly brief the ground unit commander on the troop's capabilities and limitations. Additionally, all aviators were given detailed instruction as to the wide variety of roles expected of an air cavalry troop.

(3) **Deterioration of the AH-1G Swashplate.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** During the past three months, five AH1G swashplates have been replaced. All five were replaced prior to the time before overhaul (TBO). Two were due to material failure and the others due to lack of lubrication.

(b) **EVAJ/JATION:** Material defects cannot always be foreseen, but in many cases, they may be prevented by the submission of an Equipment Improvement Recommendation (EIR). The lack of lubrication is obviously caused by improper maintenance supervision and lack of knowledge in performing the lubrication.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** It is recommended that all maintenance personnel become aware of the importance of submitting EIR's to correct material defects. It is further recommended that all AH-1G crewchiefs be taught and supervised in the proper way to lubricate the AH-1G swashplate.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** An EIR, control number H-22700, was submitted on the AH-1G swashplate during the reporting period. Additionally, all supervisory personnel have been instructed to closely monitor the lubrication of the AH-1G swashplate during the reporting period. Additionally, all supervisory personnel have been instructed to closely monitor the lubrication of the AH-1G swashplate to ensure that it is performed in the proper manner. Finally, classes have been presented to all AH-1G crewchiefs on the proper method in lubricating the AH-1G swashplate.

D. **Organization:** None.

E. **Training:**

(1) **Training of VNAF Pilots.**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** During the past six months, the 7/1st ACS has had numerous VNAF helicopter pilots assigned to the Squadron for training purposes. The training program called for 3 months or 180 hours per pilot. A few had flown as many as 200 hours since completing flight school, while several others had not flown any since flight school.

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(b) The VNAF pilots assigned to this Squadron were very beneficial to our efforts during a period when we were extremely short of U.S. Pilots. VNAF pilots were taught many procedures not commonly observed by VNAF Pilots on Combat operations, and aviation safety procedures were stressed. Better understanding between the U.S. and Vietnamese was also promoted since the VNAF pilots were required to live in the U.S. troop billets. Due to the training required of U.S. replacement pilots, it was almost impossible to fly more than 2 VNAF each day, depending upon the mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that no more than eight VNAF pilots be assigned to this Squadron for training at any given time. This will ensure that no more than two VNAF are assigned to any given troop.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: When possible, each individual VNAF trainee was required to fly daily combat missions beside more experienced U.S. Pilots. Instructor Pilots were directed to fly with each VNAF pilot at every opportunity and concentrate on those areas of training where weaknesses continued to exist. Additionally, a requirement to limit the number of assigned VNAF trainees is currently being coordinated through Vietnamese command channels.

(2) In-Country Training of AH-1G Pilots.

(a) OBSERVATION: Newly arrived AH-1G pilots are given a check-ride in the backseat of the Cobra immediately upon assignment to this unit although he will not normally occupy this position again for at least a 90-day period.

(b) EVALUATION: The AH-1G transition school only allots three hours of training in the front seat of the Cobra. An aviator who has only recently received an AH-1G transition is far from proficient in the aircraft upon his arrival in this unit. With a different location of the flight controls and an apparent difference in aircraft attitude, in the front seat as compared to the back, it is doubtful if the pilot could accomplish a safe landing in an emergency situation if the Aircraft Commander in the backseat became incapacitated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that all newly arrived AH-1G aviators be given a standardization ride in the duty he will perform immediately upon assignment to this unit.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: All troop Weapons Platoon Leaders have been instructed to insure that newly assigned AH-1G pilots receive an initial and a 90-day standardization checkride in the duty they will perform.

F. Logistics: None

G. Communications: None

H. Material: None.

I. Other: None

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FRANCIS B. MARTIN
LTC, AR, Commanding

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15 DEC 1971

AVBAGC (17 Nov 71) 1st Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the 7th Squadron
1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1971, and Troop
C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, RCS CSFOR (R3) (U).

DA, Headquarters, 1st Aviation Brigade, APO San Francisco 96384

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO,
APO San Francisco 96375

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned
for the period ending 31 October 1971 and concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



MATTHEW SANGER
1LT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

AVHDO-DO (17 Nov 71) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending 31 October 1971, and Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, RCS CSFOR (R3). (U)

JAN 13 1972

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD, APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 7th Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Lawrence E. Honsowetz
L. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
1st Avn Bde
7/1st Air Cav

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GPOP-FD (17 Nov 71) 3d Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 7th
Squadron, 1st Air Cavalry, Period Ending
31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 15 FEB 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs with the subject ORLL report as indorsed with the following comment: Reference paragraph 2a(2), page 1.: By MTOE 17-095TP501, P50172, as implemented by USARPAC GO 606, 22 Oct 71, amended by USARPAC Go 79, 28 Jan 72, this squadron is authorized the following:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Number</u>
E7	67Y40	3
E6	67Y40	3
E5	67Y2F	27
E5	67Y20	6
E4	67Y20	12
Total		51

A prior MTOE authorized:

<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Number</u>
E7	67Y	3
E6	67Y	3
E5	67Y	12
E4	67Y	12

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

M. L. Mah
M. L. MAH
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

Cy furn:
CG USARV

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