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AUTHORITY

AGO DA ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980; AGO DA ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**



IN REPLY REFER TO

DAAG-PAP-A(M) (12 May 72) DAFD-OTT

26 May 1972

SUBJECT: Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Hqs, 108th Artillery Group;  
8th Battalion, 4th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1971 (U)

AD 520920

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1. Section 2 of reports, subject as above, are forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with para 4b, AR 525-15.
2. The information contained in these reports is provided to insure that lessons learned during current operations are used to the benefit of future operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.
3. Information of actions initiated as a result of your evaluation should be forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: DAFD-OTT, within 90 days of receipt of this letter.
4. As Section 1 of subject reports are not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program, they have been omitted.

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
ROBERT E. LYNCH  
Colonel, AGC  
Acting The Adjutant General

2 Incl

1. DAFD-OTT 712012
2. DAFD-OTT 712007

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-VID-0  
SUBJECT: CRL of 108th Artillery Group

15 November 1971

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) M-36 Chronograph

(a) Observation: During the reporting period the chronograph was inoperative and awaiting parts approximately 52% of the time.

(b) Evaluation: The M-36 Chronograph proved to be an extremely fragile piece of equipment. A slight jar in transit or missile blast would knock it out of adjustment making it inoperative and requiring organizational maintenance.

(c) Recommendation: That the M-36 Chronograph be constructed to withstand transportation over rough roads and the shock of firing.

(2) Fire Support Coordination

(a) Observation: During Operation Lam Son 810 additional FSO's had to be obtained from XXIV Corps Artillery and assigned battalions to provide adequate liaison with the maneuver elements.

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.VIID.C  
SUBJECT: ORLL of 108th Artillery Group

5 November 1971

(b) Evaluation: Insufficient liaison often effects a mismanagement of artillery assets, requests for fires are not properly expedited, and current information is not always available.

(c) Recommendation: That the liaison element at Group level be increased, giving it more flexibility in any given situation.

(d) Observation: Initially, artillery fires had been unnecessarily checked due to air strikes.

(e) Evaluation: Once a joint fire support team, consisting of artillery, naval gun fire, Aerial Field Artillery, and Air Force representatives was established, problems of this nature were eliminated and all elements could be brought to bear on a target simultaneously with devastating results.

(f) Recommendation: That a joint fire support element be established prior to any operation to insure proper coordination of assets.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics: None

g. Communications:

(1) Radio Teletype

(a) Observation: During Operation Lam Son 810, the 108th Artillery Group established a forward CP at Quang Tri. Radio Teletype communication continued to be relied upon heavily to obtain timely transmissions of hard copy traffic.

(b) Evaluation: Maintenance problems, and difficulty in obtaining replacement parts, in particular the Modem MD-522, greatly hampered teletype operation.

(c) Recommendation: A direct exchange program, and a greater number of float items should be at support units to preclude long periods of downtime due to the lack of replacement components.

(2) Telephonic

(a) Observation: During the operation 108th Artillery Group installed AN/GRC-163 systems in order to communicate telephonically with 8th Battalion,

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AVIID-C  
SUBJECT: ORLL of 108th Artillery Group

15 November 1971

4th Artillery located at Dong Ha and 1st Battalion, 39th Artillery at FSB Nancy.

(b) Evaluation: In congested areas frequency problems are prevalent. Initially, frequencies are good but interference develops after a short time. A maintenance problem also exists on the 163 system as our direct support unit does not have the capability to repair the Multiplexer AN/TCC-70.

(c) Recommendation: That AN/GRC-163 be inspected by the Electronics Command to correct possible deficiencies present in the system. In the future all direct support units should have the capability of either field repair of the AN/TCC-70 or a direct exchange program.

h. Materiel

(1) 10S Binocular Eye Piece and Eye Piece Cover

(a) Observation: After several months of use the eye piece cover deteriorated leaving the eye piece exposed. After a period of exposure the right eye piece became so scratched vision was reduced 90%.

(b) Evaluation: The eye piece cover is not capable of withstanding the external forces exerted upon them by the observer and the weather, resulting in erosion of the eye piece due to the elements, i.e., wind, sand, and rain.

(c) Recommendation: Eye piece covers be made of a more durable materiel and a removable plastic or glass lens be adapted to protect the eye piece. This would allow the observer to replace a scratched lens on the site without costly support assistance.

(2) AN/TPS 25 Surveillance Radar

(a) Observation: When operating the AN/TPS 25 on LZ Co Pung at an elevation of 5300 feet, numerous maintenance problems were caused when heavy fog and clouds were inhaled by the blower motors and shorted out the electrical equipment.

(b) Evaluation: The AN/TPS 25 is an old piece of equipment and the filters over the intake parts were not sufficient to absorb moisture.

(c) Recommendation: Filtering devices should be developed which may be substituted for current filters in areas with a high moisture content in the air.

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AVIID-C

15 November 1971

SUBJECT: ORLI of 109th Artillery Group

(3) Azimuth Release Lock

(a) Observation: To obtain optimum coverage over the extensive sectors of observation, continuous observation is required.

(b) Evaluation: During this reporting period there has been a relatively high number of sightings as a result of continuous observation. Observers complained of cramped hands and fingers as a result of holding the azimuth release lever down for these extended periods.

(c) Recommendation: The azimuth release lever be modified to allow free traverse without requiring the observer to manually restrain the lever.

(4) AN/GRC-163

(a) Observation: Major problems were encountered with the AN/GRC-163, in particular with the RT-524.

(b) Evaluation: The RT-524 will continually overheat if it is not rotated on a 12 hour basis and proper ventilation does not exist. It is extremely difficult to prevent the RT-524 from overheating in hot weather, thus hampering the effectiveness of the system.

(c) Recommendation: A larger capacity blower system should be developed to insure proper ventilation of the RT-524 when used as part of the AN/GRC-163.

i. Evaluation of New Equipment

(1) AN/MPQ-34

(a) Observation: The AN/MPQ-34 Surveillance Radar has been utilized on a test basis in Northern MR L

(b) Evaluation: The site preparation is a major problem due to the size of the system. The radar is strictly a ground surveillance set and cannot be expected to adjust fire in its present configuration. Movement of the AN/MPQ-34 requires assets not organic to the field artillery, thus creating coordination and logistical problems not encountered with other radars currently being used.

(c) Recommendation: That these factors be taken into consideration prior to adopting the AN/MPQ-34 into the Army equipment system.

WALLACE E. NICKEL  
COL, FA  
COMMANDING

7  
AVII-ATC (17 Nov 71) 1st Ind

17 NOV 1971


SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned of the 108th Artillery Group  
for the period ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps Artillery, APO San Francisco 96345

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, ATTN: AVII-GCT, APO San Francisco  
96349

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached Operational Report Lessons Learned for the 108th Artillery Group and concurs with the report with the following comments and changes.
2. (U) Change paragraph 2h(3) "Azimuth Release Lock" to "Azimuth Release Lock for the Integrated Observation System."
3. (C) Reference paragraph 2i(1). Before this equipment is considered for adoption by the US Army it is recommended that: (1) The radar be considerably reduced in size and weight and be given increased modility and (2) an additional mode for the adjustment of artillery should be added to the equipment's capabilities.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROBERT S. RILEY  
LTC, FA  
Adjutant

8

AVII-000 (15 Nov 71) 2d Ind

SUBJ: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 108th Artillery  
Group for the period ending 31 October 1971, RGS CSFOR-65  
(R3) (U)

DA, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, APO 96349 11 JAN 1972

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 108th Artillery Group and concurs with the report as submitted.

*Julian W. Bradshaw*  
JULIAN W. BRADSHAW  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

9

AVHDO-DO (15 Nov 71) 3rd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned of the 108th Artillery Group  
for the Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 4 MA

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,  
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for  
the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 108th Artillery Group  
and considers it an adequate reflection of the unit's activities during  
the period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
D. A. KEENAN  
Captain, AGC  
Asst AG

Cy furn:  
108th Arty Gp  
XXIV Corps

10

GPOP-FD (15 Nov 71) 4th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 108th  
Artillery Group, Period Ending 31 October 1971,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 30 MAR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*M. L. Man*

M. L. MAN  
1LT, A7C  
Asst AG

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AVIIDD- CO

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery.

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2. Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

A. (U) Personnel:

(1) Observation: At certain times there appeared to be a tremendous influx of NCO's and a stop in the flow of lower grade FM's. At other times the situation was reversed.

(2) Evaluation: The monthly report of needed personnel is forwarded to HQ USARV for action. Personnel by grade and MOS are then programmed for and assigned to this unit to fill those slots. Personnel have been lost to intermediate headquarters for other duties and no replacement arrived at the ultimate unit of assignment. No further check was made to insure that the assigned person reaches the unit.

(3) Recommendation: More stringent controls should be placed on replacements to preclude their being taken from the reassignment stream. If necessary, HQ USARV should assign a person directly to a battalion sized unit.

B. (C) Intelligence:

(1) Observation: Targets provided by "Usually Reliable Sources" proved to be a valuable source of targeting; however, a great deal of time was lost in getting such targets fired.

(2) Evaluation: Whenever a target of any nature was located, the grid had to be submitted for clearance. Valuable time was thus lost prior to firing.

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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned (cont'd)

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(3) Recommendation: "Usually Reliable Source" (URS) targets should be passed on a quick fire channel with expedited clearances to insure prompt firing. Personnel working with clearances at all levels should be instructed as to the nature and credibility of such targets, and of the need for rapid processing.

C. (C) Operations:

(1) Observation: Close coordination between air and artillery is vital in close combat and prevents the wasting of assets. During the siege of Fire Support Base Fuller, artillery assets were wasted.

(2) Evaluation: During the siege of FSB Fuller there was a lack of fire power coordination. Artillery was check fired within a 5 kilometer radius of FSB Fuller so that aircraft could maneuver about freely. Due to the lack of an FCL and a tendency to utilize only aircraft for fire support, any contribution the artillery might have made in the defence of FSB Fuller was completely neutralized. The 8" firecracker projectile could have been very effectively employed against enemy forces with a greater killing effect than the ordnance of the aircraft for which it was checkfired.

(3) Recommendation: Fire coordination lines should be developed for all fire support bases and incorporated into each overall defence plan. All higher headquarters and supporting units should be aware of the predetermined FCL's in effect for each area. The FCL's can be adjusted as the individual situation develops to permit simultaneous employment of artillery, aircraft, and any other fire support capabilities.

D. (U) Organization:

(1) Observation: Current TO&E authorizes 112 EM and 6 officers per firing battery. This is not sufficient to operate all sections on a continuous 24 hour a day basis.

(2) Evaluation: The TO&E authorizes 4 enlisted personnel in the FDC for manual operations. Two of these are chart operators and two are computers. If the check chart and check computer system are used, these 4 persons are the minimum necessary to man one shift, and to operate indefinitely, two alternating shifts are required.

(3) Recommendation: The TO&E be changed to reflect the additional 4 persons needed in the FDC for continuous operation.

E. (U) Training: None.

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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned (cont'd)

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## F. (C) Logistics:

## (1) Fork lift requirements:

(a) Observation: Battery ammunition sections experienced great difficulty in manually transporting and handling the large amounts of heavy artillery ammunition required for sustained high rates of expenditures.

(b) Evaluation: Heavy artillery ammunition is shipped to ASP's and issued in palletized loads. Fork lifts are utilized to load and unload this ammunition at the ASP. This battalion had available to it, two fork lifts which were used to the best possible advantage to move this palletized ammo. These fork lifts proved themselves invaluable and expedited resupply operations.

(c) Recommendation: Each firing battery and the battalion ammunition section be issued a fork lift as one of their basic vehicles.

## (2) Engineer Support:

(a) Observation: During several operations in which this battalion participated, firing elements displaced to field positions and were shortly thereafter attacked by indirect fire weapons. In addition, building of berms and bunkers for protection of equipment, ammunition, and personnel were dependent upon the availability of engineer support which was minimal.

(b) Evaluation: Storage of exposed ammunition on the ground presents a great hazard to artillery units when subjected to indirect fire attacks. Immediate construction of bunkers was often delayed due to the lack of engineer support and/or the length of time necessary to fabricate by manual means structures of the size necessary to protect heavy artillery ammunition.

(c) Recommendation: A heavy artillery battalion be provided immediate engineer support with bulldozer for use in constructing, improving, and maintaining field positions.

## (3) Heavy Recovery Vehicle:

(a) Observation: This battalion on many of its field operations suffered from the lack of a suitable recovery vehicle.

(b) Evaluation: To return guns to an operational status rapidly, an adequate tracked vehicle retriever is needed. Frequently, this battalion had to request its Direct Support Unit for assistance in the form of its M88. In addition, the M578 uses the same carriage as the M107 and the M110 and suffers from the same problems, as discussed later in this ORLL.

(c) Recommendation: A heavy artillery battalion be issued an M88 tracked recovery vehicle instead of the M578.

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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned (cont'd)

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(4) Barrier Material:

(a) Observation: This battalion, operating in a mobile environment, redployed frequently on artillery raids and field operations.

(b) Evaluation: Due to the short advanced notice given, it is often difficult to have enough barrier material, i.e. sandbags, culvert, perforated steel planking, wooden beams, and membrane available for rapid deployment to a field location.

(c) Recommendation: Enough barrier material should be maintained by the Battalion S-4 to sustain two field positions simultaneously. As a minimum the following items should be maintained:

- 20,000 sandbags
- 200 sheets PSP
- 120 pieces 5' diameter culvert
- 60 6"X6"X12' wooden beams
- 60 55 gallon drums w/top cut off
- 30 14'X14' pieces membrane

G. (C) Communications:

(1) Observation: In most cases, communications equipment and procedures proved satisfactory. However, frequency override and duplication caused many problems.

(2) Evaluation: When working in a communications environment shared by units of two other allied nations, plus three other branches of service, an accurate centralized system needs to be devised for allocating frequencies to using units. When dealing with classified frequencies and when using Signal Operating Instructions that change daily or monthly, problems are bound to exist.

(3) Recommendation: A more centralized control of frequency allocations should be established. Quick reaction channels should be established to provide quick frequency changes when problems do occur.

H. (C) Material and Maintenance:

(1) Contact Teams:

(a) Observations: The remoteness of the fire support bases creates a problem of response time and distance for the supply of repair parts and the inspection and evaluation of equipment shortcomings and failures by Direct Support Units.

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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned (cont'd)

(b) **Evaluation:** In many cases the availability of DSU personnel at fire support bases would enhance trouble shooting and provide a quick solution to problems. If these individuals had a readily available PLL of DSU parts, a great deal of down-time could be avoided.

(c) **Recommendation:** A contact team be located at each heavy artillery position and be provided with an adequate supply of DS repair parts.

(2) M110 and M107:

(a) **Observation:** Maintenance requirements for heavy artillery are great, but even when proper maintenance schedules and procedures are adhered to, certain problems continually reoccur.

(b) **Evaluation:** On the M107 and M110, the cooling system suffers from clutter design in that many items seem to have been installed with no prior planning. The fan-tower assembly has a restricted space for exhausting. Due to the dusty conditions in Viet Nam, the fan-tower, in drawing in cooling air, draws air which is contaminated or impregnated with dust, oil and/or water saturated particles through the radiator. This dust adheres to the surface of the cooling tubing and vanes and eventually dries and cokes its surface. As time passes, surface dust builds and restricts the normal passage of air and causes overheating problems.

The rear wheel hub assemblies have experienced repeated shearing of the lugs. The lugs which attached the rear road wheel are not designed for the amount of shear force developed in this component. This unit experienced failures of this type on its weapons on nearly every move it has made. The lug itself appears to be an aluminum alloy, when it should be of a material with a greater capacity to prevent shearing or of a different design to provide additional lugs on the road wheel.

Vibration of the tracks causes bolts to loosen and eventually shear at the counter balance bracket, engine mounting plate, transfer case, power take off for the auxiliary drive, and the elevating/traversing assemblies. A possible corrective action would be to lace these particular bolts.

The spade cylinder, hoses, and fitting assembly have the most repeated failures. This item seems to be the weakest component of the entire hydraulic system. Fittings have been a source of continual failures when the spade is raised to be locked in the traveling position. Insufficient clearance between the spade cylinder and the fitting causes broken fittings.

Many components are located in positions which are extremely difficult to reach when making repairs or replacing assemblies. Several of these components are the voltage regulator, rectifier, and accumulator.

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SUBJECT: Lessons Learned (cont'd)

(c) Recommendation: The large number of problems encountered in maintaining the M107 and M110 indicates that a major redesign of a self-propelled carriage for this gun should be initiated to provide a more reliable carriage assembly.

## I. (U) Medical:

## (1) Safety:

(a) Observation: Even though only one death in the battalion can be attributed to an accident, the large number of accidents that took place caused a greater amount of lost duty hours than any other single cause.

(b) Evaluation: Although injuries were caused by many sources, the majority were incident to the handling of heavy artillery projectiles, and working around the guns themselves.

(c) Recommendations: Possible suggestions for improvements are:

1. Non-skid gun walk surfaces and boot soles.
2. Improved methods of noise protection and hearing conservation.
3. Issuing of safety toed boots to cannonners.
4. Thorough familiarization of artillerymen in Advanced Individual Training with proper methods of handling and lifting heavy artillery projectiles.

## (2) Malaria Prevention:

(a) Observation: Even though this battalion had only 2 cases of malaria, further effort in this area is needed.

(b) Evaluation: Investigation shows that a great majority of lower grade enlisted personnel do not take the chemoprophylactic agent due to real or imagined gastric intestinal side effects.

(c) Recommendation: All incoming personnel should receive a briefing on the importance and safety of taking anti-malarial agents at unit level, and continuing emphasis should be placed on this subject by supervisory personnel. In addition, frequent unit-wide urinalysis tests for anti-malarials should be conducted.

## (3) General Sanitation:

(a) Observations: At all fire base locations, insect and rodent vector control problems are great.

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AVIIDD-CO

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned (cont'd)

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(b) Evaluation: The large amounts of waste and refuse generated from inadequate methods of food storage create such problems.

(c) Recommendations: Measures which might aid in all of these areas are:

1. Development of rapid chemical treatment methods for human waste allowing sanitary disposal.

2. Dissemination of methods and materials for efficient incineration of burnable refuse. An example would be portable incinerators.

3. Development of new techniques of waste disposal suited to the military. One suggestion is the use of compactors for refuse and wrapping in degradable materials for sanitary handling prior to burying.

4. Use of packaging materials for food stuffs that serve as secure and sanitary storage containers to replace the cardboard boxes, burlap and polythylene bags presently used.

5. Greater availability of Preventative Medicine teams and facilities to work with and provide advice to unit personnel on a routine and frequent basis.

6. More thorough advice and briefing to personnel in basic training on methods of personal hygiene and public health.

7. Provide modern equipment and efficient methods to Quarter Master laundry facilities to allow more thorough and rapid laundry service.

*Richard E. Sugg*

RICHARD E. SUGG  
MPC, FA  
Commanding

Distribution:

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
AVIID-XO (12 Nov '71) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th  
Battalion, 4th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-  
65 (R2) (U)

Headquarters, 108th Artillery Group APO SF 96308 17 Nov 71

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps Artillery APO SF 96349

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the attached Operational  
Report - Lessons Learned (ORLL) for 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



RONALD R. BASKIN  
LTC, FA  
Executive Officer

AVII-ATC (17 Nov 71) 2nd: Ind

17 NOV 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned of the 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery for the period ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

DA, HQ, XXIV Corps Artillery, APO San Francisco 96349

TO: Commanding General, XXIV Corps, ATTN: AVII-GCT, APO San Francisco 96349

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the attached Operational Report Lessons Learned for the 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery and concurs with the report with the exception of paragraph 2 below.

2. (C) Nonconcur with recommendation in paragraph 2G(3), concerning a centralized control of frequency allocations. A centralized control of frequency allocation does exist in Military Region 1. MACV allocates all frequencies for Military Region 1 through XXIV Corps (Signal) for further allocation to using units. These are provided in MACV's Frequency Authorization Report and XXIV Corps (Signal) Frequency Plan. Alternate frequencies are provided in SOI's for any given net to provide a quick change when a frequency problem arises. XXIV Corps' Standard Signal Instructions (SSI) direct the frequency user to report all interference problems through their next higher command to the frequency manager, XXIV Corps.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

ROBERT S. RILEY  
LTC, FA  
Adjutant

2/

AVII-GCO (12 Nov 71) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters 8th Battalion,  
4th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)  
(U)

DA, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, APO 96349 11 JAN 1972

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters 8th Battalion, 4th Artillery and concurs with the report except as indicated in paragraph 2 below.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Personnel" page 1, paragraph 2A: Nonconcur. Normally personnel taken from the reassignment stream are for operational requirements. To have HQ, USARV assign personnel directly to a battalion sized unit would deprive the commanders of groups, separate brigades, and divisions of a command prerogative - that of assigning personnel where they can most influence the successful completion of the unit mission. Also without automatic data processing equipment at battalion level to facilitate strength accountability, HQ, USARV will not know the local personnel situation as well as the commanders mentioned above.

b. Reference item concerning "Communications," page 3, paragraph 2G: Nonconcur. In MRL, MACV has assigned primary responsibility for frequency management to XXIV Corps. Due to the large demand on FM frequencies, MRL has been divided into three areas. Frequencies are then assigned one time per area. The number of frequencies allocated to each major unit is based upon an evaluation of the unit's requirements. Frequencies assigned major units are changed as necessary to meet new requirements. Each major unit (SOI publishing unit, i.e. division, separate brigade, group, etc.) is responsible to provide for daily, weekly, or monthly frequency changes and to respond to problems requiring immediate frequency changes. The 108th Arty Gp, senior headquarters to the 8th Bn, 4th Arty, was assigned responsibilities of a SOI publishing unit. The channel for allocating frequencies and responding to new requirements was both short and effective when properly utilized, within the limitation of frequencies available. The 108th Arty Gp ORLL made no comment on frequency management.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JULIAN W. BRADSHAW  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

AVHDO-DO (12 Nov 71) 4th Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 8th Battalion,  
4th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October 1971, RCS CS FOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 2 FEB 1972

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,  
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for  
the period ending 31 October 1971 from Headquarters, 8th Battalion, 4th  
Artillery and considers it an adequate reflection of the unit's operations  
during the period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
F.L. HONSOWETZ  
CPT. AGC.  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
XXIV Corps  
8/4th Arty

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GPOP-FD (12 Nov 71) 5th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, HQ 8th  
Battalion, 4th Artillery, Period Ending 31 October  
1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 8 MAR 1972

TO: HQDA (DAFD-ZA) WASH DC 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

*M. L. Mah*

M. L. MAH  
1LT, AGG  
Asst AG

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