Organizing and Managing Unconventional War in Laos, 1962-1970

Abstract

This report describes and assesses the U.S. role in Laos from 1962, when the Geneva Accords went formally into effect, to 1970, when the quiet war in Laos intensified and changed its character. The emphasis in on organizational and managerial problems, especially given the constraints imposed by the Geneva Accords. This is also a case study presenting a broader examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the United States Government in dealing with counterinsurgency.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1972
Accession Number
AD0523767

Entities

People

  • Douglas S. Blaufarb

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Aircrafts
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Department Of State
  • Employment
  • Geography
  • Government Procurement
  • Governments
  • Interagency Coordination
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • National Governments
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Southeast Asia
  • United States
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Defense Acquisition Program Management
  • Library and Information Science/ Studies, Southeast Asia Studies, Bibliography of Vietnam and Lao Studies.
  • Strategic Security Studies