UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD594137

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: unclassified

FROM: secret

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

FROM:

Distribution: Controlled: all requests to Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Attn: TIO. Washington, D. C. 20301.

AUTHORITY

DARPA ltr, 20 Nov 2001; DARPA ltr, 20 Nov 2001

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AD594137

UNANNOUNCED

October 1970

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

Strategic Studies Center
SSC-TN-7358-2
Revised Technical Note

COMMUNIST CHINA AND CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR WEAPONS - INPUT SUBSTUDIES A THROUGH J (U)

In addition to security requirements which apply to this document and must be met, it may be further distributed by the holder only with specific prior approval of ARPA/TIO.

Wash DC 20301
NO TAB

Prepared for:

Defense Supply Service
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C.

Under Sponsorship of:

Advanced Research Projects Agency
Washington, D.C.

Contract DAHC15-68-C-0377
SRI Project MU-7358

This note is a working paper presenting the record of research in progress. The methodology, views and conclusions contained herein are preliminary. Accordingly, this document does not constitute an official report of Stanford Research Institute and therefore may be altered, expanded or withdrawn at any time.

SRI-O-1000

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Approved for Review Distribution
R. B. Foster
Director, Strategic Studies Center

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS EXCEPT [illegible]

"THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECS. 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW."

DDC
RECEIVED
DEC 16 1970
D

SRI
STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Menlo Park, California 94025 · U.S.A.

ASTIA Cont. No. 6292

TECHNICAL REPORT

A Technical Report is a document of Stanford Research Institute that presents results of work directed toward specific research objectives. The report is a comprehensive treatment of the objectives, scope, methodology, data, analyses, and conclusions, and presents the background, practical significance, and technical information required for a complete and full understanding of the research activity. Technical Reports are reviewed and approved by a division executive director or higher official of the Institute.

RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

A Research Memorandum is a document of Stanford Research Institute that presents the results of work in progress. The purpose of the Research Memorandum is to invite comment on research in progress. It is a comprehensive treatment of a single research area or of a facet of a research area within a larger field of study. The Memorandum presents the background, objectives, scope, summary, and conclusions, as well as method and approach, in a condensed form. The report is reviewed and approved by a department director or higher official of the Institute.

TECHNICAL NOTE

A Technical Note is a working paper that presents the results of research related to a single phase or factor of a research problem. The purpose of the Technical Note is to instigate discussion and criticism. It presents the concepts, findings, and/or conclusions of the author. The report is reviewed by a project leader or higher official of the Institute.

October 1970

This document consists of 453 pages.

Copy No [redacted] of [redacted] copies.

Strategic Studies Center
SSC-TN-7358-2
Revised Technical Note

COMMUNIST CHINA AND CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR WEAPONS - INPUT SUBSTUDIES A THROUGH J (U)

Authors

M. Earle
T. Koujakian
R. Lawrence (Consultant)
H. Rood
D. Marks Lt. Col. USAF
J. Ryan
S. Brown
D. Benson
S. Stone
W. Lee

Prepared for:

Defense Supply Service
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C.



Under Sponsorship of:

Advanced Research Projects Agency
Washington, D.C.

Contract DAHC15-68-C-0377
SRI Project MU-7358

This note is a working paper presenting the record of research in progress. The methodology, views and conclusions contained herein are preliminary. Accordingly, this document does not constitute an official report of Stanford Research Institute and therefore may be altered, expanded or withdrawn at any time.

SRI-0-1000

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Approved for Review Distribution
R. B. Foster
Director, Strategic Studies Center

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS EXCEPT: NONE

FOREWORD

This volume presents a series of substudies drafted as inputs to the preparation of the final report on the study of Communist China and clandestine nuclear weapons. Because of subject material overlap, length, and in some instances minor inconsistencies among substudies, the decision was made not to publish the material contained in this volume up to the Institute's publication standards, i.e., in the normal final report format. It seemed desirable, however, to distribute the substudies along with the final report, given the extensive treatment of issues central to answering the projects key questions. Several cautionary notes are in order: first, there are inconsistencies as mentioned above; second, since the material is input to the final report, the position of the study group as presented in the final report may be different than presented on the subject in the substudies; and, third, publication as an SRI technical note means that the author may revise or withdraw the paper as he so chooses at a later date. Thus, the reader is encouraged to ensure that new material has not been prepared before quoting data contained herein.

R. B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COMMUNIST CHINA AND CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR WEAPONS - INPUT SUBSTUDIES

INPUT SUBSTUDY A	An Assessment of CPR CNA Requirements By: H. Rood
INPUT SUBSTUDY B	Communist China Contemporary Outlook and Military Strategy By: T. Koujakian
INPUT SUBSTUDY C	A Taxonomy of CNW Applications By: H. Rood
INPUT SUBSTUDY D	Alternative 1985 World Environments By: R. Lawrence
INPUT SUBSTUDY E	Alternative 1985 Chinas By: T. Koujakian
INPUT SUBSTUDY F	Projections of CPR GNP and Output End-Use Allocations By: M. Earle
INPUT SUBSTUDY G	Postulated CPR Strategic Force Postures By: M. Earle, D. Benson
INPUT SUBSTUDY H	Representative Scenarios Using CNA By: M. Earle, S. Stone, H. Rood, D Marks
INPUT SUBSTUDY I	CNA Vulnerability Planning Data By: J. Ryan, S. Brown
INPUT SUBSTUDY J	Survey of China Experts on Selected Topics By: T. Koujakian, S. Stone
INPUT SUBSTUDY K	CNA Technical Considerations By: E. Kinderman, R. Rodden, P. Dolan, T. Logothetti

Input Substudy A

AN ASSESSMENT OF CPR CNA REQUIREMENTS

By: H. Rood

Input Subsidy A

AN ASSESSMENT OF CPR CNA REQUIREMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	INTRODUCTION	A-1
I	HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE	A-3
II	CHINESE GOALS, STRATEGY AND THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THEM	A-9

INTRODUCTION

Accepting the uncertainty inherent in the consideration of such a form of attack, one may still conclude that CNA is both conceivable and technically feasible and therefore can be considered a palpable threat. It is not even possible to predict that Chinese nuclear technology would necessarily develop the means for such a mode of attack or even to demonstrate that Chinese policy and strategy would naturally evolve a requirement for means to launch CNA. Since CNA is both conceivable and feasible, however, it helps to review some of China's historical experience, Chinese objectives and the means available to achieve them, and the threats that China may perceive and the likely responses to those threats. By so doing one may consider whether CNA could be a useful option, and suggest from what strategic and other considerations a requirement for it might emerge.

Given the circumstances under which CNA might be employed ; the purposes for which it could be employed ; some of the effects it might have ; and, suggested how Chinese policy and strategy might find such an option appropriate, one will not be able thereby to conclude that CNA will be used by China, but only that such a threat cannot be ruled out.

Whether the requirement for the capability to launch CNA manifests itself in the fruits of technology or gives rise to those fruits, the requirement, should it emerge, will have come out of the confluence of events and circumstances that comprise Chinese history and that shape

Chinese response to the world around her. Tradition, historical experience, nationalist and revolutionary zeal, the definition of strategic objectives, internal circumstances and conditions, and, the shape of external resistance to Chinese policy all may contain the foundation and impetus for launching an unconventional attack.

It is useful therefore to recall facets of Chinese history and experience that convey some notion of what drives Chinese policy and why, in the implementation of that policy, the Chinese might pursue strategies and courses of action that would render CNA an attractive option.

I HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A review of some aspects of Chinese history illuminates some of the roots of Chinese hostility toward the outside world. For it is within that hostility, hardened perhaps by idealogical zealousness, that such an eccentric form of attack might be conceived.

The Chinese response to the world has been shaped by the depth, variety and length of her history and by the impact of foreigners on that history. Western curiosity about China, particularly during the time Europe was coming out the the Middle Ages, provided the beginning of a continuing series of contacts between China and the West.[1] Western ideology, the most prominent manifestation of which today, is Marxism-Leninism, entered China as early as the Second Century, B.C. with Buddhism; Mazdeism from Persia in the Seventh Century; Muslimism in the Tenth Century; and the Judeo-Christian ideology starting with Judaism in the First Century, A.D., followed by Nestorian, Manichaean, Roman and Greek Christianities between the Seventh and Fourteenth Centuries.[2]

Chinese acceptance of foreign influence came in part from a cosmopolitan outlook fostered by the diversity of kindgoms and peoples, who, at various times, had been tributary to the Chines Emperor, and by the impact and absorption of foreign conquerors like the Mongols and Manchus who themselves became Chinese. It is perhaps this very cosmopolitanism which most propelled the Chinese to patronize the "barbarians" of the West and to resist Western technology. The conflict between Chinese

---

[1] See for example, Leonardo Olscki, Marco Polo's Asia (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1960) and his Precursors of Marco Polo, as well.

[2] "Foreign Religions in Central Asia and China up to the 14th Century," in Albert Herrmann, An Historical Atlas of China , (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1966), p. 37.

tradition and the acceptance of Western technical enquiry and development is no better illustrated than by the fact that mathematical development which had lagged in China after the 13th Century was revived by the work of Jesuit scholars who, among other things, translated Euclid into Chinese in 1607. Under the first four Manchu Emperors, the Imperial Board of Astronomy was almost continuously entrusted to Jesuits, while mechanical technology introduced from the West remained a subject of curiosity but not of development until the late 19th Century.[1]

The use of gunpowder provides an excellent illustration of the disparity of outlook between China and the West. Brought from China by European travellers, it remained for the Chinese virtually a toy, a curiosity and a religious appurtenance. In the West, its introduction spurred chemical and metallurgical development and a means to organize and apply national power in the international community. Finally, in the hands of numerically inferior Europeans, gunpowder provided the tool for imposing Western technology and administrative techniques on the great Chinese Empire. Thus a Chinese toy in the hands of Europeans propelled China into the modern world.

The inherent conservatism of the Chinese civil administration and the firm traditionalism of the Emperors rested to a great extent on the notion that the Chinese Empire was the center of the universe and that other peoples were properly only tributaries of the Empire. It was the Emperor's role to promote the Chinese model amongst the barbarians not through force but by example: the barbarians would look at China, learn from China and emulate China.

---

[1] Clocks, organs, telescopes and eyeglasses were much admired by the Chinese, but only eyeglasses were imitated by Chinese technicians. See Ssu-Yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923, (New York: Atheneum, Press, 1967), p.16.

The aloofness of the Celestial Kingdom toward outsiders is perhaps best illustrated in the edict of Chi'en-lung to King Goerge III of England in 1793:

> "You, O King, are so inclined toward our civilization that you have sent a special envoy across the seas to bring to our Court you memorial of congratulations on the occasion of my birthday and to present your native products as an expression of your thoughtfulness. On perusing your memorial, so simply worded and sincerely conceived, I am impressed by your genuine respectfulness...
>
> As the request made in your memorial, O King, to send one of your nationals to stay at the Celestial Court to take care of your country's trade with China, this is not in harmony with the state system of our dynasty and will definitely not be permitted. Traditionally people of the European nations who wished to render some service under the Celestial Court have been permitted to come to the capital. But after their arrival they are obliged to wear Chinese court costumes, are placed in a certain residence, and are never allowed to return to their own countries. This is the established rule...
>
> Moreover, the territory under the control of the Celestial Court is very large and wide. There are well-established regulations governing tributary envoys from the outer states to Peking...
>
> The Celestial Court has pacified and possessed the territory within the four seas. Its sole aim is to do its utmost to achieve good government and to manage political affairs, attaching no value to strange jewels and precious objects...
>
> As a matter of fact, the virtue and prestige of the Celestial Dynasty having spread far and wide, the kings of the myriad nations come by land and sea with all sorts of precious things...
>
> We have never set much store on strange or ingenious objects, nor do we need any more of your country's manufactures..."[1]

---

[1] An Imperial Edict to the King of England, op. cit., p. 19.

Balanced against the resistance to foreign innovation in technology or adminstration was the drive among some Chinese to institute reforms that would have permitted China to modernize itself. That this drive toward reform was abetted and even encouraged by foreigners only increased the resistance to it on the part of successive Chinese Emperors. The impulse to reform was, however, strengthened by the decisive defeats the Chinese suffered at the hands of Europeans and most of all by the defeat of China at the hands of Japan in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.[1]

More than anything else, it appears to have been the impotence and humiliation of China which promoted the conditions leading to revolution and disintegration. China presents then, a complete contrast to Japan in respect to Western influence. Like the Chinese, the Japanese could not consider the foreigners to be in any respect their equals, but at the same time, Western efforts to trade with Japan were only rebuffed up to the point where it became clear that either trade would be accepted willingly or it would be insisted upon by powers who had the means to impose their will. The dramatic and rapid modernization and industrialization of Japan following the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate, left Japan completely free to exploit the technology of the West while expanding its influence into China and the rest of Asia. Unlike China, Western influence permitted Japan to become a power in the Far East rather than the subject of territorial and commercial exploitation. The ultimate humiliation to China then was its defeat in 1895 by a power but newly westernized, a power who would continue to exploit and beset China until the end of the second World War.

The Chinese outlook on the world has been shaped therefore, in part by notions of Chinese cultural superiority, of China as the center of civilization and of the universe, notions that contributed to the xenophobia expressed in the 19th Century uprisings and which were reinforced by the humiliation of China because of Chinese impotence. Present

---

[1] See for example the writings of Timothy Richard, Hsi-to, The Warning Bell from the West(1895); Wang Tao, Hsueh Fu-cheng and others who preached reform. Teng and Fairbanks, China's Response to the West, pp. 131-174.

Chinese hostility toward the western powers particularly the growing Chinese nationalism are in part, then, a product of Chinese historical experience and in part an outgrowth of Chinese drives to become a great power under the influence of a Chinese-developed version of Marxist-Leninism. It may not be coincidental that recent Chinese historical scholarship has tended to refuse to have China's attainments traced back to western enterprise:

> "An extreme example is to be found in the angry diatribes of Li Ya-nung who sees in such theories willful attempts to belittle China...
>
> But to more sedate scholars also, the idea that an innovation such as the art of casting bronze might have come from some center in western Asia is clearly repugnant. Even the hypothesis that a minor thing such as the form of the 'willow leaf' sword of the Chou could be of foreign origin is abhorent."[1]

It seems clear that the Chinese view of the world has been heavily colored by the following:

- China's continuous existence as a kingdom, empire or nation since long before the Christian era which has promoted strong convictions about the evident superiority of Chinese culture as a model for emulation by the lesser nations and peoples of the world;
- Chinese notions of superiority have promoted resistance to foreign ideas and pronounced tendencies toward xenophobia;
- Chinese impotence in the face of Western power and technology; China's lack of capacity to exercise control over its own territory in the face of internal divisions and foreign intrusion; its defeat at the hands of the westernized Japanese have all contributed to a strong sense of victimization at the hands of the industrially advanced nations.

---

[1] A. F. P. Hulsewe, "Chinese Communist Treatment of the Origins and the Foundations of the Chinese Empire," The China Quarterly, No. 23, July-September 1965, pp. 78-105.

The roots of Chinese hostility toward the outside world and particularly toward the West are deep and strong. They have been reinforced by Chinese nationalism and revolutionary zeal; and, the hostility is directed not only toward the Western powers but toward those peoples in Asia, who, in resisting Chinese influence have seemed to become the agents of that influence.

II CHINESE GOALS, STRATEGY AND THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE THEM

Chinese hostility, derived in part from a sense of victimization because of past Chinese impotence, is reinforced by the nature of China's internal problems as well as by the means chosen to solve the problems. Chinese vulnerability to the past was based on the difficulty of establishing administrative and political control over the variety of peoples who, at various times, have been included within the Chinese Empire.

Two fundamental difficulties continue to face China: to unify the races and peoples that presently comprise China in order to extend common administration and government throughout China; and, to come to terms with the world outside of China so that external influence may not divide China as it has seemed to have done in the past. Marxist-Leninism has been the device that has emerged with which to solve both problems.

Maoism, the present form of Marxist-Leninism in China, is perceived as the means to resolve the inherent conflict between the drive for a centralized empire with a unified people and the harsh realities of a quasi-federal anomoly split by competing local, provincial and ethnic minorities that seem willfully to resist unification. The success of the Soviet Union in assimilating the vast conglomerate of ethnic and linguistic groups through the device of common sets of political and ideological beliefs imposed by the elite cadres of Marxist-Leninism, must seem a compelling example of the effectiveness of ideology in fostering national unification. If the population of China could not become at once Chinese, it could become, at once, Socialist if it were subjected to the proper teaching and discipline. Thus for China, "the Confucian hierarchy of scholar-gentry headed by the Emperor" has been replaced by the "militarized peasantry" of Mao Tse-tung.[1]

---

[1] W.A.C.Adie, "China's Foreign Policy II, The Developed World," The World Today, Volume 24, No. 6, June 1968, pp. 257-268.

The extension of the techniques used to effect Chinese unification to the problem of bringing the world to terms with China then seems to follow logically.

The defeat of Japanese forces in China, was attributed to the struggle of the United Front of peasants, workers, soldiers, intellectuals and businessmen, in which the critical ingredient for success was the role of the selected communist cadres working underground until they could accumulate the necessary strength to defeat the enemy, and the reliance placed on the peasants as "the most numerous ally of the proletariat," and "the main force in the War of Resistance."[1]

Reliance on the peasants in the war against Japan, and in the Civil War as well, fostered the tradition of the peoples' war based on rural areas in which the populous countryside was used to isolate the cities from one another and to emcompass the defeat of the enemy forces based on the cities. Those same notions seem to be perceived as applying with equal validity in China's struggles against the imperialist powers, for they as "the cities of the world" are surrounded by the rural areas, the "Third World."

Chinese communist claims to special purity and orthodoxy, contained in the Marxist-Leninism preached by Mao, have strong foundations, therefore, in Chinese tradition, where China is the model for emulation:

> "The Chinese revolution provides a successful lesson for making a thoroughgoing national-democratic revolution under the leadership of the proleteriat; it likewise provides a successful lesson for the timely transition from the national-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution under the leadership of the proletariat."[2]

---

[1] Lin Piao, Long Live the Victory of the People's War, (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1966), pp.17-22.

[2] Ibid., p. 52.

> "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war is not only a product of the Chinese revolution, but has also the characteristics of our epoch. The new experience gained in the people's revolutionary struggles in various countries since World War II had provided continuous evidence that Mao Tse-tung's thought is a common asset of the revolutionary people of the whole world. This is the great international significance of the thought of Mao Tse-tung."[1]

In short, in modern times, China presents an example for the emulation of the world just as the Celestial Empire once did in the past. Just as the Emperor was once the preeminent leader among the host of lesser and more barbaric potentates, so today, Mao Tse-tung is preeminent in the new revolutionary world, for "Chairman Mao commands the highest prestige in the nation and the whole world and he is the most outstanding and greatest figure."[2]

In the eyes of the Chinese regime then, the simple truths of Mao Tse-tung are seen as the inspiration of liberation movements everywhere. Thus in South Yemen, the southern Yemeni people "kindled once again the revolutionary flames of armed struggle in the Radfan...Inspired by the vigorous national liberation movement in Asia and Africa and from their own practice of struggle in the past century or more, the southern Yemini people have come to understand the brilliant thesis of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the great leader of the revolutionary people of the world, that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.'"

---

1 Ibid., p. 52-53.

2 "Lin Piao's Address at the Englarged Meeting of the CCP Central Committee, May 18, 1966," Issues and Studies, Volume VI, No. 5, February 1970, pp. 81-92.

"Chairman Mao has taught us: 'People of the world, be courageous, dare to fight, defy difficulties and advance wave upon wave. Then the whole world will belong to the people, Monsters of all kinds shall be destroyed.'"[1]

To effect the socialist transformation of the masses of the world is to force the world to come to terms with China. Thus will be carried out not only the traditional Chinese obligation of a mission civilatrice but with it enhances China's power and influence in the world by making China the leader of the weaker peoples against the Great Powers, with whom China has a multitude of scores to settle.

Marxist-Leninism, as preached by Mao, is therefore the cement with which to unify and strengthen China and the basis of Chinese attempts to dominate the Third World to form an alliance that will progressively destroy the Great Powers. That which disrupts the world situation, that which contributes to inherent instabilities throughout the work redounds to Chinese advantage for it promotes the conditions required for the socialist transformation while dissipating the resources and power that might otherwise be used against China.

Centralization within China, increasing industrialization, purification of doctrine and honing down of the cadres of socialism go forward to strengthen China internally, in order to make her a force in the world, simultaneously with the pursuit of strategies and policies abroad intended to create the objective conditions of revolution to isolate and weaken the other powers and open the world for further extension of Chinese interests and influence.

---

1 "NCNA Correspondent Hails South Yemen Republic," Peking NCNA International Service in English 0935 GMT 1 Dec 76 B, Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report, 4 December 1967 (FB 234/67), pp. BBB9-11.

So long as China remains at all unified, changes in modes of leadership may be reflected in the style and conduct of Chinese affairs, but seem unlikely to do more than modify present policies somewhere along the spectrum between the pragmatic and the dogmatic.[1] While a pragmatic leadership might confine Chinese advances to those commensurate with Chinese industrial and technical capabilities and appropriate to the Chinese internal situation, avoiding, as far as possible, direct Chinese involvement with any of the major powers, a more doctrinaire leadership, less flexible, more dogmatic and impatient, might well risk any confrontation that seemed consistent with ideology and which promised progress toward Chinese and socialist objectives. On the one hand is a strategy of patient attrition aimed at the preservation of China and the gradual accomplishment of Chinese aims, or on the other, a policy aimed at dramatic accomplishment even at the hazard of China. Internally, the same kind of alternatives seem to be present, lying between a concentration on the industrial and economic strengthening of China at the expense of ideological consistency and purity or concentration on the evolution of the party machinery and doctrine even at the expense of slowing Chinese industrial and economic advancement. The particular combination of pragmatism and idealism present at any one time will color the perception of the world to Chinese eyes, while the strength of the faith in the inevitability of the triumph of the revolution and the view of the Chinese role in that revolution will shape the nature and extent of the Chinese involvement in revolutionary and liberation movements abroad.

Two characteristics seem, up to now, to have dominated the notion of revolution inside China and seem to have influenced the shape of the Cultural Revolution, (1) the encouragement of self-help on the part of the masses to effect the revolution; and, (2) the conviction that conflict is beneficial, indeed intrinsic to the evolution of the masses into the proper state of mind for the socialist transformation.[2]

---

[1] See Input Substudy B.

[2] See for example, "Secret Documents Yield Insights on Mao," New York Times, March 1, 1970.

The popular mass movements or peoples' liberation movements in emulation of the Chinese model are fostered not merely by Chinese inspiration but by such assistance as will make self-help effective in overcoming the forces opposing liberation, serves Chinese foreign policy by tying down or dissipating the forces of reaction across the world so that they may not be mobilized effectively against China itself. Dissipation of the forces of reaction in fruitless efforts to contain widespread liberation movements buys time for China to become a great power at the same time that it weakens those powers who might otherwise make war on China. Promotion of dissent and disunity abroad weakens China's opponents by setting them one against the other leaving China free to pursue its own goals. China as a relatively weak power has little to lose, since:

> "Dialectical and historical materialism teaches us that what is important primarily is not that which at the given moment seems durable and yet is already beginning to die away, but that which is arising and developing, even though at the moment it may not appear to be durable, for only that which is arising and developing is invincible. . . .
>
> "Why can the apparently weak new-born forces always triumph over the decadent forces which appear so powerful? The reason is that truth is on their side, while the reactionary classes are always divorced from the masses and set themselves against the masses."[1]

There is no particular reason, technical or otherwise, that the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government should lack a reasonably clear picture of the nature of events and the conditions in the world outside of China, for they have the same access to the world's sources of news and to the flow of information as other countries of comparable size and resources. Yet it appears that the Chinese view of the world tends to be shaped more by the internal demands of ideology than by the inherent characteristics of events and conditions in the outside world. That which is observed to happen abroad, then, is seen

---

[1] Lin Piao, op. cit., p. 47.

through the prism of Marxist-Leninist ideology as it exists in China and the Chinese impact on world events is interpreted in terms of the proletarian revolution shaded heavily by notions of the inevitability of that revolution.[1]

Chinese interpretation of events is not comparable to a French, German, British or American interpretation of events, but a positive effort to force events to conform to Chinese views. Thus science and technology are not simply something to be used to fulfill Chinese needs but are to be made to conform to Chinese requirements and indeed to the Chinese. It is not a mere absurdity then, when one reads, "Mao Tse-tung's thinking is not only the best weapon for reforming society and remolding people's ideas, but also the best guidance for revealing the secrets of science and technology."[2] It is, instead, a willful effort to revolutionize science and technology to make it a Chinese instrument rather than one borrowed from the West and adapted to Chinese needs. When the Chinese assert "We must sweep away the prestige of so-called specialists and authorities who try to overwhelm us with foreign books and sterotypes... We must tear down the bourgeois flag and hoist the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought in the field of science and technology,"[3] it is an effort to assert Chinese independence and self-reliance.

---

[1] Evidence for this point of view is presented in "Ts'an-k'ao Hsiao-hsi (Reference Information): How Well Informed are Chinese Officials about the Outside World," by Henry G. Schwarz in The China Quarterly, No. 27, July-September, 1966, pp. 54-83: Thus Reuters, Agence France Presse, and TASS have officers in Peking; four Communist newspapers in Hong Kong subscribe to Associated Press. Content analysis of Reference Information provide to party functionaries, government and army officials, contained references to dispatches by United Press International, Kyodo of Japan, Press Trust of India, Deusche-Presse-Agentur, the Central News Agency of Nationalist China, and Antara of Indonesia. In addition, New China News Agency in Peking monitors "over forty stations of thirty foreign new services, totalling about 300,000 words and 281 hours daily."

[2] Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), 24 June 1966.

[3] New China News Agency, 9 June 1966.

> "The Policy of Self-reliance requires that in the cause of building socialism a country must independently develop its economy, national defense, science and technology, culture and education, and other undertakings according to its concrete situation and its own manpower, material resources and fund supply...a country must not depend upon any other country and become a satellite of another country."[1]

Thus, while it may be inferred that China will rely on measures that are both old and new and that "all possible approaches to achieve national goals," will be adopted, but that both the "old and the new" will be, in fact, Chinese.[2]

Whether Chinese goals are to foster revolution in order to bring down the great powers of the world in order to leave China dominant or to promote the proletarian revolution in order to foster the inevitable triumph of Marxism-Leninism with China as the principal proponent remains obscure. It is clear either goal is served by liberation movements abroad, and by any conflicts that may occur among the other great powers. So long as China is itself too weak to confront the other great powers militarily without risking certain defeat, the setting of one great power against the other and the weakening of the industrialized nations of the world by persistent internal assaults and peripheral wars of liberation leaves China free to develop its own strength and military capability in preparation for the final struggle against the forces of reaction and revisionism, when those forces are no longer capable of overcoming China and its allies in Asia, Latin America and Africa. That which weakens China's enemies and the enemies of true socialism strengthens China and brings closer the day of fulfillment, whether that fulfillment is a purely Chinese one, a socialist one or both.

---

[1] Ching-chi Yen-chiu (Economic Research), 1965, No. 7 (20 July 1965), translated in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service, Publication No. 34,015 (1966).

[2] Leo A. Orleans, "Research and Development in Communist China," Science, Vol. 157, No. 3787, pp. 392-400.

The coming of the revolution to China has not dissipated Chinese hostility toward the West but has seemed to exacerbate it. At the same time, the identification of Chinese goals with those of the socialist revolution, while fostering Chinese unity, has reinforced the traditional notion of China as the purveyor of a superior culture and the model for the less well-developed to follow. The chiliastic nature of Chinese communist ideology with its dogmatic assumption of a single truth and an inevitable triumph lends to Chinese policy the strength of a messianic drive.

While the vehicle for the achievement of Chinese internal and external goals is fueled by revolutionary ideology, the operational strategy is at once deliberate, conservative and opportunistic. It is possible to discern two aspects of that strategy, the one aimed at the problem of territorial unification and the strengthening of China as a nation; and the other, aimed at establishing Chinese influence in and about those areas from which the principal threats to China may arise. The way in which Chinese military power has been employed and the areas into which Chinese assistance has been extended seem to indicate the nature and objectives of Chinese strategy.

The principal Chinese military actions outside of China proper since the close of the Civil War in 1949, have been against Tibet, which has been occupied and is being sinified against India in support of Chinese claims to Indian-occupied territory; in North Korea, presumably in response to the threat posed by the operations of United Nations forces during the Korean War; against Formosa in support of claims to that territory; and against Soviet forces on the Ussuri River and on the frontiers of Sinkiang. Whether Chinese intervention in the Korean War was dictated by territorial interests, concern about a possible attack on Chinese territory, or because of the distress of a sister Socialist Republic remains unclear. It could easily have been all three. On the whole, the use of Chinese military power has been conservative and limited to areas to which Chinese ground forces have immediate access.

It seems clear, that in part at least Chinese strategy may be shaped by a strong inclination to feel that imposition of unfair treaties during the time of Chinese impotence in the 19th century deprived China of territory that was by rights hers. This seems implied in the book A Brief History of Modern China, published in 1954. Territories included were those held tributary by China until their loss under the Manchu Empire from 1727 onwards: areas comprising the present Soviet Republics Kirgiz; Tadzhik; part of Kazakh S.S.R.; and territory as far west as Lake Balkhash; the Ladakh area northeast of Jammu-Kashmir and the Pamirs; Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim; the territory northeast of Manchuria to the Sea of Okhotosk; the Soviet Maritime provinces from the Amur to the coast of the Sea of Japan; the Island of Sakhalin; the Mongolian Peoples Republic; and, according to some sources, Assam and the N.E.F.A., Nagaland, Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Thailand, North and South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and North and South Korea.[1]

Chinese interest in the territory on its periphery is to claim that which once belonged to China and of which China was deprived during the period of her weakness. The restoration of that territory to China would be the mark of China's return to the status of a great power but also it is a critical factor in the administrative and governmental centralization

---

[1] See "And Now China Claims All These Too," India News, Volume 11, No. 20, p.1; "La Chine rapelle ses revindications sur 90,000 km^2 de territoire Indien," Le Monde, 26-27 September 1965, p. 4; W.A. Douglas Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands (New York: Van Nostrand, 1965); Alistair Lamb, The China-India Border (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962); and, for the extent of the Manchu Dynasty's holdings during its greatest expansion, see "The Manchu Empire and the European Powers," in Albert Hermann, An Historical Atlas of China (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), p. 51. It included Burma, most of Assam, Tibet, Korea, most of what is presently Soviet territory from Bukhara west to Sakhalin, as well as Annam (North Vietnam). See also, "Manifestations a Pekin en l'Honneur des etudiants Expulses d'U.R.S.S.: Un Vice-Ministre demande la restitution a la China des 'territoires perdus'". . . Le Monde, 8 November 1966, p. 2.

of China itself. For in order to hold frontier populations within the Chinese orbit, it is essential to exercise dominant influence over those territories across the Chinese frontiers. Thus recent reports of a Free Turkestan Movement, aimed at the liberation of the Chinese territory of Sinkiang and based within Soviet territory, makes comprehensible, Chinese interest in those Soviet territories wherein such threats against China may arise. The Chinese capacity to govern China depends on its being able to counter those ethnic forces that have traditionally fragmented China.[1]

The Chinese imperial tradition, the reassertion of Chinese control over those territories that have once been Chinese, the necessity to control border territories to prevent fragmentation of the Republic, and the imperatives of Marxist-Leninism with its high priority on proselytization all tend to reinforce one another because each are essential to the restoration of Chinese influence in the world, to the defense of Chinese territory and to the prospering in China and the world at large of the Chinese version of Marxism-Leninism.

In order for Chinese policy to succeed and for Chinese Marxism-Leninism to prevail in China, it is essential to prevent the formation of strong states or firm alliances on the Chinese frontier that can become the base for encouraging dissident movements, ethnic or political, within China itself. Where strong states exist on the Chinese frontiers

---

[1] "Move to Liberate Sinkiang," San Francisco Chronicle, March 10, 1970, p. 9; see also, "Early Han Frontier Policy Aimed to Prevent Defection of Chinese Leaders Along the Border," and, "Purpose of Frontier Statecraft to Hold Frontier Populations Within the Chinese Orbit," in Owen Lattimore's Inner Asian Frontiers of China, pp. 477-482; "China Says Russia Invading Sinkiang," Washington Star, June 11, 1969, p. 1. On Mongolia, for example, see "China Urges Mongolia to Revolt Against Soviet," Los Angeles Times, March 21,1969, p.23; "Moscow Eagle Eye on Mongolia," May 21, 1969, p. 4; and "Russia Embraced: Peking's Fury Over Outer Mongolia," San Francisco Chronicle, May 22, 1969, p. 18.

they must be weakened and fragmented by promoting dissident movements in those states in order to destroy the government's capacity to defend the state and to control the territory of the state. In order to break up those alliances that can become the means of opposing Chinese policy or that may become the centers of power around which to organize resistance to China, the allies must be split and those countries closest to China isolated from any assistance that they might otherwise receive. The promotion of popular movements against the governments of the states on the periphery of China not only fit the requirements of Marxist-Leninism for people's revolution but also provide a method of warfare that dissipates the strength of the state under assault by forcing it to engage in internal warfare, while permitting China to escape the consequence of its policies because it is not Chinese troops who are attacking the states in question, and such support as China does render is in a form that does not seem to call down retaliation on China itself. Those states that are under this kind of assault are too weak to make war on China, while those states who might be strong enough to attempt to call China to account are bemused by the purposeful ambiguity in China's role in supporting the dissidents within their frontier.

There emerges then a portrait of Chinese military policy and strategy that conveys the notion of a relatively weak power, China, operating in the interstices of the nuclear strategies of the Soviet Union and the United States to erode their positions by exploiting the weaknesses and inherent instabilities of those countries that might otherwise be the allies of the Great Powers. The Soviet Union is disarmed by the fact that China is ruled by a Marxist political party which is pursuing a goal common to such Communist parties: the promotion of the socialist revolution. Thus the Soviet Union and China, despite their rivalries with one another, can cooperate in a place like Vietnam since the long-range ideological goals appear to be those of Communism and the Soviet Union cannot appear to be remiss in supporting pursuit of such goals in Vietnam, if it wishes, in the future, to have any influence in that country. At the same time, countries like the United States and

India, with strong commitments to democratic forms of government find it difficult or are reluctant to associate indigenous liberation movements with Chinese imperialism, since popular movements and dissent within a state are consistent with the traditional notions of a democratic society.

Chinese behavior toward India is particularly instructive as an illustration of the operation of Chinese strategy. India, following its independence, pursued a policy of non-alignment and when the Communists prevailed in China, a policy of friendship with China, itself a professed anti-colonialist power. Despite its participation and local defeat in the Korean War, China occupied Tibet, a country whose security had traditionally been a concern of those who ruled India. India, militarily weak, neutralist and in an effort to foster good relations with China, accepted the Chinese occupation of Tibet and its incorperation into Chinese territory. From Tibet, Chinese forces and influences begin working on the border kingdoms of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, also territories traditionally associated with the security of India. Once established in Tibet, China began a series of border forays to re-establish its claims over territories within the borders of India. India, beset with its own internal problems and with its own conflict with Pakistan continued to court Chinese good-will by dampening as far as possible any response to Chinese activities on the Indian frontier. Not until there was a direct and open challenge to Indian authority in the Aksai Chin in northern Ladakh and actual large-scale attacks across the Indian frontier in N.E.F.A. and Assam as well as in Ladakh, did India begin to oppose with any determination, Chinese assaults on India territory. China meanwhile aligned itself with Pakistan. India's military weakness and internal instability, rendered it incapable of a vigorous anti-China policy, because in any Indian-Pakistan war, China is in the position to seize Assam and by moving through Sikkim from Tibet, to cut the principal road and rail routes by which Indian reinforcements would have to move in order to defend Assam. Thereafter, China, in order to avoid forcing India into a military alliance with the Soviet Union or the West, promoted

the weakening of Indian administration in the border areas in Assam, the N.E.F.A., Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura, by supporting dissident border tribesmen with guerrilla training and equipment; and, at the same time extended considerable military assistance to Pakistan, so that despite the strengthening of Indian military forces after the Chinese attacks in 1962, Indian forces remain tied down to guard against Pakistan in Kashmir the Rann of Kutch, and West Bengal; to deal with the dissident tribesmen in the border areas; and, to deal with internal crises, fomented in part by Moslem-Hindu friction and in part by radical political parties some of which receive their inspiration from China and the Soviet Union.[1] At the same time, China has not hesitated to use its own growing military power to remind India of its relative impotence.[2]

The combination of obvious local military superiority in conventional forces and the possession of a very modest nuclear force has permitted China to develop strategic advantages through support of dissident movements, pressure on border areas, and a ubiquitous program of road building that is careless of international frontiers. This strategy has

[1] See for example, "Green and Red Revolutions: A New Brand of Communist is at Large in India's Rural Areas. His slogan is "China's Mao is our Chairman, China's path our path." Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LXVII, No. 12, March 19, 1970. "India Seizes 500 as Peking Agents: Reds Arrested to Forestall 'Revolutionary Action'," New York Times, December 31, 1964, p. 4; "After Party Victory: Indian Red Leader Gives Mao Support," Los Angeles Times, February 23, 1967, p. 31.

[2] See for example, "China Threatens India with Use of Air Power," Los Angeles Times, September 14, 1967, p. 5; "Civil Defense," (A report of the institution of Air Raid Drills in New Delhi) San Jose Mercury, August 22, 1967, p. 48; "Red China Threatens Air Action in Border Area," Japan Times, September 15, 1967, p. 1; and, "India Won't Sign A-Ban Treaty, Official Says: New Delhi Fears Lack of Firm Guarantee Against Possible Nuclear Strike By China," Los Angeles Times, February 9, 1968, p. 22; "China Vows to Aid Pakistan in War: Liu Promises 'Unswerving' Support as visit ends," New York Times, April 1, 1966, p. 24; "President of China Greeted by 50,000 on Pakistan Visit," New York Times, March 27, 1966, p. 2; "Chinesische Truppenmassierung an der indischen Grenze," Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 14 December, 1968, p. 7; and, "Tibet: Jet Airfield Construction," a report of construction of a Chinese jet airfield at Shigatse, Tibet, about an hour's flying time from the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan. A report is included, also, of a military road running from Lhasa through Kodari to a point just outside Katmandu, Nepal, Military Review, Volume L, No. 4, April, 1970, p. 108.

applied generally to areas within easy reach of the Chinese frontier largely protected by an apparent fear of Chinese anger if the programs are too vigorously opposed by military force.[1]

---

[1]The shape of Chinese road and border strategy may be seen in F.P. Hoeber, H.W. Kood, Y. L. Wu, and E. Beckler, Boundary Conditions of the Sino-Indian Conflict, SRI Technical Report, June 1963;

Chinese actions may be seen in "Chinese Intrusion Across Sikkim Border," India News; Nov. 26, 1965, p. 1; "Chinese Road Building Continues Near Sikkim, Ibid. Nov. 11, 1966, p. 5; "India Protests to Pakistan and China Against Illegal Road Construction in North Kashmir," Ibid., July 11, 1969, p. 1; "Burma: The New Ledo Road," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. LXVI, No. 48, Nov. 27, 1969, pp. 460-1; A report of 5,000 Chinese People's Liberation Army troops road-building in Northern Burma and of clashes between Burmese and Chinese forces; "India Warns China on Kashmir Route," The Washington Post, June 27, 1969 p. A20; and, "Military Experts Worried: China's Road Nearly Done in Laos," The Evening Star, Washington, D.C., June 19, 1969, p. A6.

The support of dissidents may be seen in "Chinese Arm Naga Rebels," Bangkok World, June 10, 1968, p. 4; "New Indian Border Threat," San Francisco Chronicle, June 20, 1968, p.10; "Four Years to Wipe out Reds," Bangkok World, August 12, 1968, p. 4; "In Towns, Red Flags Go Up Over Night: Troops Step up the Hunt," The Straits Times (Singapore), June 21, 1968, p.1; "Red Terrorists in Border Battle," Bangkok World, August 16, 1968, p.1; "Army Chief Praises Alert on Borneo Border," The Straits Times, June 6. 1968, p. 7; "Thailand: Fighting For Pattani," Far Eastern Economic Review, Volume LXVI, No. 42, October 16, 1969, p. 155; and, "Burma: Peking or Yunnan," Ibid., No. 46, pp. 346-7; "Malay Communists Believed Recruiting in South Thailand," Washington Star, 8 October, 1968, p.9; "Red China Helps Malaysian Rebels," New York Times, January 14, 1966, p.4; "Peking Hails Rebels on Thailand 'Front,'" New York Times, January 16, 1966, p. 36.

See also, "China-Trained Naga 'General' Arrested," India News, March 28, 1969, p. 4; "Mao Takes to the Hills, Far Eastern Economic Review, Volume LXII, No. 11, October 31, 1968, pp. 240ff; "Troops Rout the Nagas in Fierce Jungle Battle," The Straits Times, June 10, 1968, p. 13; "China Reports Burma Revolt," San Jose Mercury, July 10, 1967, p. 2; "Sinkiang-Gilgit Link Road India's Protest," India News, May 24, 1968, p. 6; "On Sikkim-Tibet Border: Indians Exchange Fire With Maoists," The Japan Times, September 12, 1967, p. 1. See also, Los Angeles Times, October 4, 1966, p. 2; "India Protested to Communist China Against Intrusion by Chinese Troops Into the Himalayan Kingdom of Bhutan It Was Announced Today;" "Red China to Help Nepal," Los Angeles Times, March 16, 1967, p. 4; "Red China Shadow: Bhutan Girds Against Possible Invasion," Palo Alto Times, June 1, 1967, p. 44.

In areas beyond the reach of Chinese military power, that is, those areas of the world where the Chinese are as yet incapable of using their ground forces as a threat with which to back Chinese supported insurgency, the Chinese have attempted to develop contacts through extension of economic and technical assistance and by supplying arms and training for nationalists and other groups whose activities may contribute to the general instability. Thus Chinese agents have been reported in Africa and direct Chinese economic and other assistance have been granted in Tanzania and elsewhere.[1]

At the same time the Chinese have shown more than passing interest in affairs in the Middle East and Europe where Chinese interests can be seen to be dictated in part by rivalry with the Soviet Union over leadership

---

[1] "Peking's Game in Africa," India News, 8 February 1963, p. 2; Leon M.S. Slawecki, "The Two China's in Africa," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 398-409 (January 1963); "China Interferes in Kenya's Internal Affairs," (Report from Kenya Newspaper) India News, July 7, 1967, p. 6; "Chinese Envoy in Nairobi Ordered to Quit," India News, July 14, 1967, p.1; "TanZam Railway: No Ants Yet," The Economist, Volume 233, No. 6582, p. 79; "Red China Expands in Tanzania," San Francisco Chronicle and Examiner, Nov. 30, 1969, Section D, Page 3: a report of Chinese training of "liberation front units", and the training of Tanzanian People's Defense Force and naval units by Chinese personnel. See Also, "China: A Revolution for Export," Mizan (London), Volume 9, No. 2, March/April 1967, pp. 80-86; "Le Gouvernement de Pekin Se Heurte a une mefiance accrue des dirigeants d'Afrique noire," Le Monde, 4 March 1966, p. 5; "Red China Railway," Bangkok World, June 17, 1968, p. 4; "Communist China will build a railway from Guinea to Mali, it was announced Wednesday."

of the Moslem world and in part as the possible foundation for a forward strategy on the part of China.[1]

---

[1] Francois Joyaux, "La Politique Chinoise au Moyen Orient," Orient (Paris), No. 40, 4e Trimestre, 1966, pp. 25-44; "Israeli Hears of Chinese Aid to Syria," New York Times, Nov. 17, 1965; "Peking overtures Find Friendly Ear in Syria," Los Angeles Times, November 26, 1965, p. 15; "Effects of Soviet-China Rivalry Seen in the Mid-East," Los Angeles Times, December 26, 1966, p. 7; "Pro-China Party May be Started in Syria," Los Angeles Times, February 23, 1968, p. 16. See also, W.A.C. Adie, "China's Foreign Policy: 1. The Third World," The World Today, Vol. 24, No. 3, March 1968, pp. 111-120, and, Adie, "China's Middle East Strategy," The World Today, Volume 23, No. 8, August 1967, pp. 317-326. "Departing Peking Ambassador Linked to Cairo Plot," Christian Science Monitor, December 22, 1968, p. 4; "Anti-Soviet Bid: Peking Moves into Middle East," San Francisco Sunday Chronicle, July 19, 1964, p. 10; "Chinese Held Countering the Russians in Algeria," New York Times, November 1, 1964, p. 14; "Peking's Plot in the Mideast," San Francisco Chronicle, June 23, 1967, p. 1; "Pakistan's Role as Broker," India News, Vol. IV, No. 16, August 6, 1965, p. 5: Marshall Chen Yi proposed to the Turkish Government through Turkish journalists: "On your return to Turkey kindly inform the Turkish Government that if it desires to send commercial and cultural delegations to China, the People's Republic of China is prepared to welcome the delegations coming from the Turkish Government. All of these can be organized with the help and guidance of Pakistan, a close friend of both countries," He further declared that Pakistan could play a leading role in the establishment of relations between Turkey and China. The report was abstracted from a story in the Turkish newspaper KIM, Istanbul, April 1, 1965; and "Red China Welcome for Arab Leader," San Francisco Sunday Chronicle and Examiner, March 22, 1970, p. 16; "Israel Links Arab Terrorism in Jordan to Communist China: Say Captured Al-Fatah Leader was Trained by Chinese..." Los Angeles Times, March 23, 1968, p. 7; "Peking Seeks to Cash in on Soviet-Arab Tension in Mideast," The Christian Science Monitor, May 16, 1969, p. 15. On Europe see, among others, "China and Albanian Bid for Yugoslavia," Christian Science Monitor, December 1, 1969, p. 7; "Foires et Salons: Success de l'exposition technique Francaise a Changhai," Le Monde, 16 Nov. 1966, p. 20; "Exposition Technique Francaise a Changhai," Le Monde, 1 November 1966, p. 21; "China and Austria Sign Big Contract on Steel-Mill Unit," New York Times, December 20, 1965, p. 59; "Broad Base Seen in China Project: Many European Concerns May Help Build Mill," New York Times, March 20, 1966, P. 18; "Swiss Oust 2 Chinese on Spying Charges," New York Times, 25 March 1966, p. 2; "Red Chinese Granted Albania Bases, Yugoslav Sources Say," Los Angeles Times, December 2, 1968, p. 1; "Mao Oriented Swedes Set Up Own Red Party," Los Angeles Times, January 12, 1969, p. 1, sect. B; "Bonn Footnote: West German-Chinese Red Trade Sidelights Sino-Soviet Friction," Christian Science Monitor, March 20, 1969, p. 1; "Split with Moscow: Europe's Reds Swinging to Mao," San Francisco Chronicle, September 15, 1967, p. 18; and, "Russia, in Unique Move, Briefs Bonn on Clash with China," Los Angeles Times, March 12,1969, p. 1; "Albania's Coastal Gun Build-up (With Chinese assistance)," San Francisco Chronicle, October 14, 1968, p. 48.

Chinese strategy, the application of Chinese power to the accomplishment of Chinese goals, demonstrates a number of facets:

1. The direct application of Chinese military power is presently reserved for re-occupation of Chinese-claimed areas such as Tibet and to render more effective certain claims to disrupted territories, as on the Indian frontier; in the trans-Ussuri area; and, in Western Sinkiang. Also it is used to meet immediate threats to Chinese territory as in Fukien Province opposite Formosa; and, as in Chinese intervention in the Korean War.

2. The indirect application of Chinese power through proxy nations such as North Vietnam and Pakistan, where assistance is granted to bolster indigenous military strength and where Chinese personnel, as in North Vietnam, perform some logistical and defensive tasks.

3. The indirect application of military power through the support of indigenous insurgent forces whose personnel are trained in China or by Chinese personnel and who are supplied with Chinese equipment with which to wage guerrilla warfare, as in Thailand, Burma, Malaya Laos, Burma and the Indian frontier areas.

4. The threat of the use of Chinese military power to dampen resistance to Chinese-supported insurgents by providing sanctuaries for guerrillas; to cover Chinese road-building activities in areas where China is seeking a strategically advantageous position, such as Ladakh, Northern Burma, Laos and Thailand; to limit military response to Chinese incursions across international frontiers--as in India and the trans-Ussuri territory; and, to defend areas not under Chinese control but where governments exist whose policies serve Chinese interests, such as North Vietnam and Pakistan.

5. The furnishing of foreign aid, technical, economic and military, and propaganda support for areas where Chinese sympathy and support may exploit local anti-Western sentiment and promote Nationalist, pro-Communist or even pro-Peking sentiment.

6. The development of pro-Peking communist parties or pro-Peking factions in existing Communist parties in countries abroad as a means of competing with the Soviet Union and of influencing external policies within those countries.[1]

---

[1] See "Peiping Supported Formation of the Leftist Japanese Communist Party," Issues and Studies, Vol. VI, No. 5, February 1970, pp. 4-5. See also, "Mao Bids Japan's Reds Help Fight Revisionism," New York Times, Nov. 26, 1961, p. 5; K. N. Ramachandran, "Peking and Indian Communism Since 1965," Current Scene: Developments in Mainland China, Volume VIII, No. 6, March 15, 1970.

Chinese strategy is pervasive, the use of military forces in that strategy has been conservative but the use of other means of accomplishing strategic ends has been common: military alliance as with Pakistan, logistical and material support as with North Vietnam, the sponsorship and support of insurgents and guerrillas, economic and technical assistance, and exploitation of ideological differences. There appears to be no significant inconsistency between Chinese strategy and the precepts of war as taught by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao:

1. War is the continuation of politics.
2. War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes, or political groups.
3. The object of war is the preservation of oneself and the destruction of the enemy.
4. The enemy fights his own way and we fight our own way.
5. Starting from a strategically inferior and passive position, one can deprive the enemy of local superiority, thus destroying the enemy locally, and accumulate the results of these partial local destructions of the enemy into major strategic victories.
6. The three stages of war: the strategic defensive within which tactical offensives are waged; the strategic stalemate when one makes the enemy yield his strategic initiative; and the strategic offensive, when having finally snatched the strategic initiative, one totally defeats the enemy.

The present stage of Chinese strategy would seem to be the "strategic stalemate," in which China is conserving its strength while attempting to put its enemies into a strategically inferior position.[1]

Constraints on Chinese Strategy

Chinese foreign policy and national strategy operate under a number of handicaps at present. The drive for doctrinal purification within China, for example, if successful will render China a formidable industrial and military power which when equipped with a sizeable strategic nuclear force will place it in the ranks of the superpowers. Yet the process of doctrinal purification and internal unification conflicts with the orderly

[1] The details of Communist Chinese military strategy are given in Input Substudy B.

and rapid expansion of Chinese industrial capabilities because of the disruptions inherent in party and other organizations as they come under the surveillance and discipline essential to party and doctrinal purification.

While industrialization is an essential component of modernization and fundamental to construction of a powerful nation, the ideological and administrative unification of China is essential to permit China to employ its power within the international community and to accomplish the ideological and strategic goals it seems to wish to attain.

A major constraint on China, at the present time, is the gap between its ambitions and the material means with which to realize them. The material means must be attained from an economy that has to absorb the cost of industrialization; the demands for sustenance of a burgeoning population; and, the development and exploitation of resources within China.[1]

A further constraint on Chinese strategy derives from China's geographical position which renders it vulnerable to those great powers whose interests in Asia may come into conflict with Chinese interests.

The long coastline that provides easy access to China by nations with strong naval forces is a major strategic weakness, further exacerbated by the fact that the chain of islands stretching from the Kuriles, the Japanese home islands, Okinawa, Formosa, and the islands of Malaysia, extending from the Philippines to the Indonesia group, southward to Australia, are all under foreign control and provide potential bases for naval, air and other military operations against China as well as for operations against Chinese naval forces breaking out to the Pacific or into the Indian Ocean. China's long coastline, because of the resources

---

[1] See Input Substudy F.

required for its defense, enhances the vulnerability of China's frontiers with the Soviet Union which are extremely extensive and because of their location, chiefly in remote areas, make defense difficult and the switching of reserves from the coast to the inner frontier a lengthy operation. Not only are the inner Mongolian and Sinkiang frontiers at the end of tenuous lines of communication within China, but also the population on the Chinese side of the frontier often has ethnic or linguistic ties with the population across the frontier and therefore provides fruitful soil for sentiments hostile to China and friendly to the peoples living within Soviet territory. The frontier of North China, that area known loosely as Manchuria, is bounded by Soviet territory on the north, to the east and on the south by North Korea. The Trans-Siberian Railway along the Amur River north of Manchuria constitutes a strategic artery from which Soviet forces may debouch into North China, while the Soviet naval base at Vladivostok, as well as bases in the Kuriles and Kamchatka provide centers from which Soviet naval strength may be deployed against China. The pivotal position of North Korea lies in the possibility that in any conflict between China and Russia, North Korea may aggrandize itself at the expense of China, while if it were to support China against the Soviet Union, it could expect no reward save increased Chinese control. To the westward, Manchuria is bounded by Inner Mongolia, which in turn is bounded by the Mongolian People's Republic, an ally of the Soviet Union. Detachment of any or all of Inner Mongolia opens up, not only the western flank of Manchuria but also the headwaters of the principal rivers of Central China and would move China's frontier southward into Central China. The long frontier of Sinkiang with the Soviet Union in the northeast, north and west leaves that territory vulnerable to Soviet encroachments at the same time that the frontiers themselves remain remote from the center of Chinese power and population. The Indo-Chinese peninsula with its long tradition of European and more recently American influence constitutes a disorganized zone where, if events move against Chinese interests,

a further threat to Chinese territory may be mounted. The growth of Indian industrial potential and the ease with which India could become a nuclear power renders India a threat because of the possible support India might grant to Burma should that country suffer Chinese assault, while the possibility that India and the Soviet Union might become allied in opposition to China poses a threat to Tibet and also a threat to any Chinese attempt to exercise direct influence in the Middle East across the land routes from Tibet, through Pakistan and Persia. Yet a strong position in the Middle East, based on an alliance of Moslem states, or direct Chinese presence in the Middle East is imperative as a counterpoise to the Soviet threat in the Far East. The chief Chinese strategic disability that emerges from all of this is a weak capability to influence events in the other centers of power in the world. The Soviet Union and the United States both comprise the principal strategic threats to China, and yet the bases of power of both countries are remote from China. The Soviet Union, aside from being a strong nuclear power, is also a strong naval and land power capable of using land, sea, air and nuclear power against China while relatively invulnerable to the chiefly ground-based military power of China. In the same way, the United States, a strong nuclear and naval power, is located across a wide ocean and is, therefore, also invulnerable to Chinese land-power.

In order to counter the threat posed by the United States, China must erode the U.S. position in Asia so that Asian countries may not be used as bases of military, naval and air operations against the Chinese homeland. That means not only that the United States must be disengaged from the mainland of Asia but must be excluded as well from the islands stretching from Japan southward to Australia. In order to deny use of the islands to the United States, regimes must be established in those islands that are hostile to the United States, friendly to China or neutral between the two.

In order to counter the threat by the Soviet Union, China must command the territory now ruled by the Soviet Union in the area from Kamchatka around to the Pamirs, so that Soviet land-power would have to cross vast areas in order to reach the heartland of China. At the same time, China must attempt to command the allegiance of or otherwise control those islands off the coast of Asia from which the Soviet Union could project its seapower against Chinese coasts.

In present terms then, the principal strategic threats against China may be seen as follows:

1. Fractionation of the Chinese Communist Parties leading to the development of a pro-Soviet faction, civil war and eventual Soviet intervention.
2. Fragmentation of China into provincial size territories ruled by local commissars or war-lords prepared to dispute Peking's control.
3. Spontaneous detachment of border territories to become autonomous entities or parts of neighboring nations.
4. Detachment of territories by subversion or foreign-supported insurgency.
5. Guerrilla or commando attacks on border or coastal territories.
6. Naval bombardment, air or missile attack on coastal, industrial or strategic targets.
7. Combined arms attacks to detach portions of Chinese territory.
8. General war or general nuclear war.

The threat of fragmentation, fractionation of the Communist Party in China, spontaneous detachment of border territories and detachment of territories by subversion may all be dealt with internally by China. The indoctrination of the population of China, the purification of party doctrine and cadres to eliminate or correct potential dissidents, the strengthening of security forces and peoples' militia are within Chinese capabilities. The extension of Chinese influence into non-Soviet territories, beyond the boundaries of China through patronization of guerilla and other nationalist movements and the eventual extension of Chinese

Communist doctrine into such areas seems within Chinese capabilities and may be undertaken at a minimum risk of military response by other great powers.

India may be rendered incapable of a vigorous military response against China by the threat of Chinese military power; the threat of Chinese-Pakistan cooperation in the event of hostilities; and by playing on India's susceptibility to internal instability arising from Moslem-Hindu friction, ethnic, linguistic, provincial and class differences, and the social impact of industrialization, urbanization, food shortages and a multiplying population. Indian intervention in support of Burma, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal is rendered difficult by geography, while the active wooing of the latter three countries by China promotes their alienation from India, while degrading India's capacity to defend itself against low-order Chinese incursions across India's northern frontiers.

There seems little question of China's capability to extend its influence into those areas across its frontiers where support of insurgents, building of roads and even the entry of Chinese forces can be effected without more than nominal opposition from the United States or the Soviet Union. In remote and thinly populated areas, the Chinese army may go wherever it can build roads and develop supply bases. The capacity of the Chinese Army to operate in remote areas of the Chinese Republic has been well demonstrated in the occupation and Sinification of Tibet and in the border engagements with India.

But China has been attempting to develop influence in areas remote from where the Chinese army can effectively operate. The Chinese capacity to conduct military operations further afield is, however, strictly limited by the size of the Chinese fleet, air force and merchant marine. It seems clear from the profile of the Chinese fleet that it is more appropriate to coastal and off-shore operations in defense of the maritime approaches to China than to the support of sustained military operation at any great distance from China.

That is not to rule out long-range submarine operations conducted by around 20-odd Soviet W-Class submarines that could be based overseas either in countries friendly to China or in remote oceanic areas where they would be serviced by depot ships.[1]

Chinese merchant carrying capacity is at present too small to support vigorous overseas operations in the face of determined opposition. There are 239 ocean-going vessels of 765,545 tons gross. In 1966, for example, China had only 180 merchant ships of 1,000 gross tons or larger, compared to the Soviet Union's 1,343 ships of 1,000 gross tons or larger. The Chinese navy has only one troop transport of 1,873 tons and five cargo ships of 1,000 tons or less; and five oilers or petrol tankers, originally designed as yard oilers. China might extort the use of Portuguese ships by bringing pressure on Macao; Portugal has about ninety-three vessels of 1,000 gross tons or larger, of which 53 are freighters and twenty-five are mixed passenger-freighters. Albania, an apparently firm Chinese ally, has about 11 vessels of 36,550 tons gross.[2]

Pakistan, which has received considerable material assistance from China, has a merchant fleet comprised of 64 vessels engaged in trade between West and East Pakistan, in the Haj service carrying pilgrims from Pakistan to Jedda on the route to Mecca, and in general oceanic trade between Pakistan and Africa, Europe, Japan, China, the Philippines as well as the Western Hemisphere.[3]

---

[1] Thus, the Chinese Fleet comprises about 33 diesel submarines, 4 destroyers, 17 frigates and escort craft, 24 submarine chasers, and 380 fast torpedo/missile/gunboats. See Jane's Fighting Ships 1969-70, (London: Jane's Yearbooks, 1969), pp. 59-64 and, Weyers Flottentaschenbuch, 1968, (Munchen : J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1968), pp. 26-7.

[2] Current statistics on Chinese and Albanian merchant carrying capacity is in Jane's Fighting Ships 1969-70, p.1 and 59; and in A Statistical Analysis of the World's Merchant Fleets, U. S. Department of Commerce, December 1967 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) p. 76 and pp. 130-1. Naval auxiliary statistics are in Jane's and Weyers Flottentaschenbuch XLIX. Jahrgang 1968, pp. 26-7 and p. 110.

[3] "Sea-Borne Links," Interim Report Series, Volume XI, No. 2 (Washington, D.C Embassy of Pakistan), February 1970.

China has the capability of acquiring by purchase or construction more merchant shipping and it may well be that they will do so.[1] But the present small size of their merchant carrying capacity and the short-range capability of their Navy constitutes a severe handicap to use of maritime power for extending Chinese influence abroad. A further handicap is the long turn-around-time for Chinese ships moving between Chinese ports and those areas where China has manifested a vigorous interest in influencing events. Thus from Kuang-Chou (Canton) to Mozambique, Tanzania is 5,598 miles, for a turn-around-time of as much as 50 days.[2]

China has the potential to develop a large merchant marine and a considerable fleet, she has not been able to yet or at least has not chosen to do so. Therefore, Chinese capacity to support trans-oceanic operations is limited by the size of the Chinese fleet and merchant marine. Sustained military operations of any significance would only be possible for the Chinese after a considerable accumulation of supplies and forces, carried on over an extended period of time. While such a buildup might be possible where it did not blatantly challenge other powers, it would depend on a friendly host prepared to acquiesce in Chinese policy. Otherwise, China must depend for its influence on supporting indigenous movements supplied with infantry arms and capable of chiefly guerrilla operations against forces as lightly armed as themselves. The smuggling of arms and supplies into areas where insurgent groups are operating can be effected easily in ordinary circumstances and while arms and supplies may be passed to such groups through countries friendly to China, China lacks the naval capability to protect such shipments against even a modest naval challenge, if the latter is mounted at any distance from the coasts of China.

---

[1] "Red China Builds 18,800 ton Ship," Japan Times, January 10, 1968, p. 8.

[2] Distances Between Ports, 1965, H.O. Publication No. 151 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965). This considers that a speed of less than fifteen knots is maintained.

The Chinese armed forces are, at present, ill-equipped for sustained operations against a determined enemy at any considerable distance from the territory of China. China's comparative military weakness constitutes a constraint on Chinese foreign policy, yet it has not prevented China from attempting to exercise its influence in areas remote from China.

It appears that Chinese objectives and strategy will continue to intrude Chinese policy in areas where the United States has commitments or other interests. A review of Chinese objectives and of U. S. capabilities to interfere with the accomplishment of those objectives lends some perspective to the kinds of requirements that may well emerge in Chinese planning:

Chinese Objectives:

1. Restoration to China of those territories considered by tradition to be Chinese. Examples of such territory include Tibet, which has already been restored; Formosa whose security is a concern of the United States; Outer Mongolia, presently an ally of the Soviet Union; and those territories on the periphery of China that at times have been under Chinese suzerainity.
2. The removal of U. S. influence from Asia.
3. The establishment of Chinese influence and perhaps hegemony over Asia.
4. The assumption of the leadership of the Third World and of the international communist movement.

U.S. Capabilities:

1. U.S. strategic nuclear power much of which is located at great distance from China and is therefore relatively invulnerable to any present Chinese military capability while remaining available for employment directly against the Chinese homeland.
2. American naval and air power which is capable of deployment against the Chinese coast at the pleasure of the United States with the implication that such power may be backed by the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
3. The high degree of strategic mobility of American general purpose forces and their availability for operations on the periphery of China while Chinese general purpose forces lack any capability to operate on the periphery of or directly against the United States.

4. Access to land bases on the periphery of China that makes possible the economical deployment of U.S. general purpose forces to lend credibility to commitments of U.S. to its allies in the Far East thus strengthening the resistance of those allies to Chinese or Chinese supported encroachments.

5. The presence or potential to be present of U.S. forces in areas over which China might wish to exercise hegemony; and which provides some basis for countries on the periphery of China to resist low-level Chinese incursions through third parties or indigenous insurgents while presenting China with the possibility of war with the United States should Chinese policy go beyond the support of proxy or insurgency operations.

6. U.S. capability to influence events on the periphery of China and elsewhere through economic and technical assistance to governments and peoples the support of which strengthens their will to resist Chinese influence and incursions.

Chinese Requirements:

In order to counter U.S. capabilities and to accomplish Chinese goals, the following requirements seem to emerge:

The means to effect the following:

1. Reduction and eventual removal of U.S. influence from Asia in order to deprive the U. S. of bases from which to deploy general purpose and tactical nuclear forces against China.

   a. By discrediting U.S. commitment to its allies in Asia.

   b. By making the stationing of U.S. forces on the territory of Asian nations to appear to be more disruptive and dangerous than the threat from China.

   c. By weakening the U.S. capacity to respond to Chinese gambits in Asia.

   d. By depriving those governments on the periphery of China of economic and other forms of assistance that might otherwise strengthen their stability and their will to resist low-level or other incursions.

2. Reduction of U.S. capabilities to strike China with strategic nuclear weapons.

3. The increase of Chinese capabilities to inflict damage directly on the United States.

4. Gain influence over events in the United States to render them favorable to China.

5. Influence over diplomatic events in a fashion that would prevent the United States from deploying its full military power against China.

While it cannot be supposed that Chinese policy-makers, having arrived at such a list of requirements, would instantly leap to the concept of CNA, it is possible to suggest that CNA could provide the means for meeting some of the requirements that have been listed. Some ways in which CNA might be used to serve such requirements suggest themselves:

There is basis for suggesting that a Chinese requirement for CNA is not improbable. The following factors and circumstances appear to favor the emergence of such a requirement:

1. Chinese hostility to the West, founded in historical experience; ideological commitment; and, the conflicts between U.S. and Chinese policy.
2. The drive for restoration of territories lost to China in the past.
3. The close association between ideology and Chinese policy and strategy where ideology is both the vehicle and the rationalization for success of policy and strategy.
4. Manifestations of Chinese interest and influence outside the immediate periphery of China tied as they are to the strong missionizing characteristics of Chinese ideology.
5. The willingness of China to challenge the other powers and even to risk war in the process of implementing its policies, despite China's relative military weakness.
6. The strong guerrilla flavor in Chinese military doctrine and that application of that doctrine through the extension of military and economic aid.
7. The apparent determination of China to replace the influence of the U.S. and its allies in areas contiguous to China.
8. The seemingly intransigent nature of the Chinese quarrel with both the Soviet Union and China.

9. The present constraints on Chinese military power:

   a. Lack of a significant strategic nuclear capability.

   b. Lack of a considerable means to use and support general purpose forces away from China.

   c. Economic constraints on the development of full-scale strategic nuclear forces and strategically mobile general purpose forces.

10. The nature of the threats the United States is capable of mounting against China while remaining relatively immune from similar threats from China.

Reduction and removal of U.S. influence from Asia:

1. Discredit U.S. commitments to its allies in Asia.

2. Make the stationing of U.S. forces in the territory of Asian countries appear to be more disruptive and dangerous than the threat from China.

3. Deprive those governments on the periphery of China of access to economic and other forms of assistance from the United States in order to weaken their will and strength to resist low-level incursions or internal disruptions.

4. Weaken the resolve and the capacity of the United States to intervene on behalf of nations beset by Chinese or Chinese supported gambits.

Reduction of U.S. capability to strike China with strategic nuclear weapons:

1. Erode the will of the U.S. to use strategic nuclear weapons against China.

2. Operate below the threshold where U.S. would be willing to use nuclear weapons.

3. Link U.S. nuclear strike on China with a Soviet counter-strike.

4. Cripple or destroy elements of U.S. strategic nuclear offensive forces.

Increase China's capacity to inflict damage directly on the United States

1. Develop strategic nuclear offensive forces.

2. Develop means to counter U.S. strategic nuclear defenses.

Gain influence over events in the United States to render them favorable to China.

1. Build political groups who favor China and Chinese goals.

2. Acquire the capability to exacerbate internal dissent, disorder and civil disruption.

Gain influence over significant diplomatic events to prevent U.S. deploying forces against China.

1. Catalyze War
2. Counter-balance Soviet nuclear power against that of the U.S. to permit Chinese policy to operate in the interstices of the balance.

CONCLUSIONS

The goals of China as a nation and China as a leading communist power may at times coincide, but it is not always possible to disentangle that which is motivated by a strong ideological commitment and that which derives from the efforts to come of age as a great and influential power in the world. Even amongst the Chinese, it must not always seem clear whether Chinese policy aims at promoting the welfare of China and the Chinese people or at making China the instrument for the accomplishment of the goals of international communism. Clearly the two must at times overlap when that which benefits China furthers communism, yet, it is not certain that the furtherance of communism may not at times call for the sacrifice of the interests of China and its people; or at least that long-range Chinese and communist goals may not call for short-term sacrifices that in their magnitude may transcend that which is customarily considered to fall within the definition of sacrifice made in the national interest. The capacity of totalitarian regimes to compel sacrifice that other forms of government would consider intolerable has been demonstrated in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union. The Nazi goal of racial purification and conviction about the inferiority of Slavic, Jewish and other subject peoples that led to the execution of millions of people in concentration camps, deprived the Third Reich of manpower and services, the utilization of which might have promoted a German victory in World War II. The Soviet sacrifice of six or seven million people in order to reorganize Soviet agriculture--not so that it would become more productive, necessarily, but so that it would fit the precepts of socialism as defined by the party apparatus; and the widespread purge of Soviet party and military figures between 1936 and 1938, which seriously demoralized the Soviet

Army while depriving Russia, during a time of international crises, of the services of thousands of experienced officers and administrators. Such sacrifices in the interest of revolutionary zeal or doctrinal purity may be a predictable characteristic of totalitarian regimes. The Cultural Revolution and the operations of the Red Guards in China seem to have been therefore, a manifestation of Chinese totalitarianism. It does seem clear that China exposed itself to grave risks of civil war; laid itself open to mischance in its foreign relations; and, suffered economic and industrial setbacks, which, however transient, were costly in terms of the development of Chinese power and compelled sacrifice on the part of the Chinese people. Therefore, it is not improper to suggest that the present regime in China is capable of taking military and strategic risks beyond those usually considered feasible in the study of strategy. The prudence that has come to be expected of the great nuclear powers may not be a characteristic of China, a weak power attempting to become strong. Mao Tse-tung is reported to have said to Prime Minister Nehru of India, that China alone of the nations of the world could well afford to suffer two or three hundred million casualties and so had the least reason to fear a nuclear war.[1]

It must be considered then that Chinese strategy may be based less on the consideration of risks than on the consideration of gain. China has already demonstrated the willingness to risk the development of a strategic nuclear force under the threat of preemptive attack by the Soviet Union and even to provoke border incidents against a nation whose military power is much greater than its own. Having little to lose, save population and time, and seemingly with the clear conviction of doctrinal and cultural superiority over its enemies, reinforced by some notion of

---

[1] "Mao Tse-tung, he said, had remarked when they were talking together in Peking that China alone of the nations of the world could well afford to suffer two or three hundred million casualties and so had the least reason to fear a nuclear war," in "China has Least Reason to Fear a Nuclear War, Mao Told Ne[illegible]," India News, January 22, 1965, p.1.

the inevitable triumph of Chinese socialism, China progresses toward the status of a great power. The devices and strategies it will use to achieve its goals will depend more on Chinese conceptions of how progress ought to be made than on conventional notions of the behavior of nations in the international community.

Input Substudy B

COMMUNIST CHINA CONTEMPORARY WORLD OUTLOOK AND MILITARY STRATEGY

By: T. Koujakian

Input Substudy B

COMMUNIST CHINA CONTEMPORARY WORLD OUTLOOK AND MILITARY STRATEGY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	INTRODUCTION	B-1
I	THE COMMUNIST CHINESE CONTEMPORARY WORLD OUTLOOK	B-2
II	THE COMMUNIST CHINESE CONTEMPORARY AND TRADITIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY	B-16
III	THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CNA	B-29
IV	CONCLUSIONS	B-31

INTRODUCTION

This Substudy explores a CNA's (Clandestine Nuclear Attack) compatibility with Communist Chinese ideology and military strategy; the sources of Communist China's world outlook, Communist China's conception of the world and of its role in it, the sources of Communist Chinese military strategy and that strategy itself are surveyed separately in the next few pages for such a purpose. The discussion of the question of compatibility follows immediately; it should be noted that due to the nature of that question, the answers (particularly with regard to the compatibility of CNA with Communist Chinese ideology) are more subjective than objective.

I THE COMMUNIST CHINESE CONTEMPORARY WORLD OUTLOOK

A. The Sources of Communist China's Contemporary World Outlook

The Communist Chinese contemporary world outlook is the product of the combination of China's past, China's experience with the West, China's experience as a republic, and Communist Chinese experience with Marxism-Leninism.[1] It is quite difficult--if not outright impossible--to trace the specific influence of each of the four elements on the Communist Chinese contemporary outlook. However, it might be useful to summarize the characteristics of traditional China and the lessons drawn by the Communist Chinese from China's experience with the West, with republicanism and from their own experience with Marxism-Leninism.

The outstanding characteristic of traditional China was its feeling of cultural superiority: the Chinese regarded their empire as the center of the universe and their society as the ideal model for socio-political organization.[2] The preservation of the model was the emperor's responsibility; the masses, too, were charged with the responsibility of preserving the model and reserved the right to rebel in case the emperor neglected his responsibility and deviated from the rules prescribed by the model; i.e., in case the emperor lost the "mandate of Heaven."[3]

---

[1] See, for example, Benjamin I. Schwartz, Communism in China: Ideology in Flux, (Harvard Univ. Press, 1968,) Chapter 10.

[2] See, for example, John King Fairbank, The United States and China, (The Viking Press, 1967,) p. 116; also C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, (Oxford University Press, 1969,) p. 21.

[3] See, for example, Arthur F. Wright, ed., The Confucian Persuasion, (Stanford University Press), p. 16.

The emperor had yet another responsibility: the universal promotion of the Chinese model. This was to be realized not through the forceful imposition of the model by the Chinese on the various "barbarian" groups, but rather through the force of the model's example as applied in China: the barbarians would look at China (the model), learn from China (undergo a cultural transformation), and emulate China. In other words, the members of the various "barbarian" groups would, on their own initiative, culturally transform themselves and reorganize their societies in the Chinese image.[1]

Another characteristic of traditional China was the projection of China's domestic experience onto the international level: the principles governing the relations among the various members of a Chinese family did not only serve as the basis of the Chinese social system but also as the basis of the traditional Chinese system of international relations--the tributary system.[2]

Finally, primarily due to the Chinese feeling of superiority, traditional China lived in self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world.[3] The Chinese refused to consider "barbarian" ideas and inventions or to incorporate them into their socio-economic-political system.[4]

The forceful opening of China by the West in the middle of the 19th century submerged some of these characteristics. The Western nations (and later Japan) embittered, mistreated, and exploited China: they shattered the Chinese empire and created havoc in China itself. These

---

[1] See, for example, Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations, 1858-1880, (Cambridge, 1960,) pp. 7-8.

[2] See, for example, Hsu, op. cit., p. 4; also Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, The China Reader: Imperial China, (Vintage Books, 1967,) p. 101.

[3] Schurmann and Schell, op. cit., p. 105.

[4] See, for example, Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 20.

submerged characteristics of traditional Chinese society began to gradually emerge with the establishment of the People's Republic of China (1949)--albeit in modified forms and with different contents due to China's experience with the West, republicanism and Marxism-Leninism.

The Communist Chinese leadership believes in the superiority of its ideology and culture, (i.e., Marxism-Leninism-Maoism) not only to non-Marxist ideologies and cultures but also to the ideologies and cultures of the other socialist states.[1] Maintaining that this is the age of national liberation and socialist revolution,[2] the Communist Chinese consider their country as the center of world revolution[3] and their revolutionary model as the ideal model for the national liberation movements and socialist revolutions of the African, Asian and Latin American masses.[4]

The Communist Chinese feel obligated to promote revolution and their revolutionary model.[5] While promoting their model, however, the Communist Chinese insist that revolutionary conditions must exist before the model can be applied to a situation with any hopes of success, they also emphasize that revolutionaries have to be self-reliant.[6]

---

[1] Hence, one of the reasons for the Sino-Soviet dispute.

[2] As Mao put it: "Yes, we are advocates of the omnipotence of a revolutionary war; that is good, not bad, it is Marxist," in "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace--Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (5)," Peking Review, November 22, 1963, p. 11.

[3] C. P. Fitzgerald, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

[4] See, for example, Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War;" and A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (First Vintage Edition, 1960), pp. 66 and 69.

[5] See Footnote 2 above.

[6] Lin Piao, op. cit.

Projecting their own domestic experience onto the international level, the Communist Chinese insist that the entire socialist camp, in its struggle against the imperialist camp, should adopt the Communist Chinese revolutionary model of encircling the world "cities" from the world "countryside."[1]

Finally, one can make a strong argument that the isolation of Communist China is as much self-imposed as it is the consequence of the American containment policy.

Some of the important lessons that the Communist Chinese have drawn from China's experience with the West and republicanism and from their own experience with Marxism-Leninism are:

1) The Chinese already knew that power and not cultural superiority is the final arbiter of disputes between the "civilized" Chinese empire and the "barbarians." What the Chinese have learned is that some "barbarians," i.e., the Westerners, are just not willing to respect nor submit to Chinese cultural superiority; cultural superiority does not necessarily mean military superiority. Mr. Fitzgerald summarizes this point in the following way:

> "The Chinese have come to believe through their experiences in the past century that in international relations respect is only gained by inspiring fear. A dangerous doctrine, but one which the West was at great pains to teach to China throughout the past 150 years."[2]

2) Economic development, industrialization and the application of scientific discoveries toward military ends are an important source of

---

[1] Lin Piao, op. cit.

[2] Fitzgerald, op. cit., p. 71.

power. In this respect, Communist China--though culturally and ideologically superior to the rest of the world--cannot afford to (and should never) ignore nor reject the economic and industrial experience, the scientific discoveries and militarily-significant technological innovations of the rest of the world: Communist China cannot afford to (and should not) live in total isolation as in the past.

The masses, too, are an important source of national power, and the concept of nationalism or "common destiny" is an effective means of motivating the masses.

3) A nation or a revolutionary movement must never lose sight of its interests and objectives and must rely primarily on its own resources to safeguard its interests and to realize its objectives.

4) It is possible for a weak force to defeat a strong force by exploiting the latter's vulnerabilities while strengthening one's self in preparation for the final and decisive blow. The weak force's attempt to defeat the strong force requires a long period of time during which the weak force must never give up in hopelessness but persist patiently and relentlessly until it becomes stronger than its opponent. In this respect, the politico/psychological aspect of the struggle is as important as the military one.[1]

5) Since the strong force (regardless of how weak it gradually becomes) will never submit peacefully to the weak force (which will gradually grow quite strong) but always put up a fight, the weak force must always expect the enemy to launch a war at any time. The weak force must be on the alert, prepared and ready to accept the opponent's challenge, and, if the time is ripe, to deal the opponent the decisive blow or the coup de grâce. However, unless the strong force imposes a war upon the weak force and until and unless the weak force has grown stronger than the strong force, the weak force should avoid a direct and overt confrontation with the strong opponent and attempt to get along with it while

[1] See Barnett, op. cit., pp. 75-76

weakening it and strengthening oneself.

Combining the traditional Chinese characteristics (which, as has been argued continue to persist in contemporary Communist China) with the lessons that the Communist Chinese have drawn from China's experience with the West and republicanism, and looking at the combination through a Marxist-Leninist looking-glass, it is possible to conclude:

It looks as though the Communist Chinese leaders are attempting to restore the traditional Chinese empire in its new version. This new version substitutes Confucianism with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism; it also avoids the shortcomings of its predecessor and incorporates the lessons learned in the last one hundred and twenty or so years. In short, the new Chinese empire is equipped to meet the "western" standards of an empire while preserving its "easternness". Its leaders hope it will succeed where the traditional empire failed; they hope it will sustain the pressures of (if not actually challenge and defeat) its competitors (which naturally view the resurgence of the Chinese empire as a threat and attempt to curb or eliminate it before it becomes unmanageable).

The Communist Chinese contemporary world outlook reflects this drive to restore the traditional Chinese empire in its newer version while ensuring that this new version succeed where the previous one has failed: in resisting the pressures of the Western empires, in surviving in a hostile environment.

B. The Communist Chinese Contemporary World Outlook

The central theme of the Communist Chinese contemporary world outlook is the proletarianization[1] of the peoples of the world. Central to

[1] Proletarianization is the spread of communism--literally, the transformation of an individual into a proletariat--to make an individual think and act like a proletariat. For an excellent analysis of the Communist Chinese Weltanschauung, see Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (New Enlarged edition), pp. 38-45 and 526-531; and Schwartz, op. cit., Chapter 10; Barnett, op. cit., pp. 70-77; and Richard Lowenthal, "Soviet and Chinese Communist World Views," in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., Soviet and Chinese Communism Similarities and Differences (Washington Univ. Press: First paperback edition, 1967), pp. 371-404.

the theme of proletarianization is the concept of struggle: the struggle to destroy capitalism-imperialism (which will naturally resist the process of proletarianization and try to subvert it to the very end) and the struggle of the socialist or progressive forces among themselves not to forget their goal[1] nor to be lulled by the "sugar-coated bullets"[2] of capitalism-imperialism.[3] As the Communist Chinese put it in October 1963:

> In the last analysis, the national question in the contemporary world is one of class struggle and anti-imperialist struggle.[4]

Specifically, the Communist Chinese leaders believe that the world is divided into two camps: the imperialist camp and the socialist (or progressive) camp.

The imperialist camp consists of the capitalist-imperialist governments (representing the ruling classes) of North America and Western Europe and of their lackeys, i.e., the pro-imperialist governments (representing the ruling classes) of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The camp is led by the United States of America.[5]

---

[1] i.e., destroying capitalism-imperialism and spreading communism.

[2] e.g., talks of detente, genuine peace and disarmament that are intended to lull the socialist forces.

[3] If the general line of the international communist movement, said Peking, "is one-sidedly reduced to 'peaceful coexistence,' 'peaceful competition' and 'peaceful transition,' this is...to discard the historical mission of proletarian world revolution, and to depart from the revolutionary teachings of Marxism-Leninism," see "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement--the Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963--June 14, 1963," Peking Review, June 21, 1963. "If too much stress is laid on the possibility of peaceful transition, and especially on the possibility of seizing state power by winning a majority in parliament," said the Chinese in 1963, reiterating their views of November 10, 1957, "it is liable to weaken the revolutionary will of the proletariat, the working people and the Communist Party and disarm them ideologically," see "The Origin and Development Between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves--Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.," Appendix I, Peking Review," September 13, 1963, p. 21.

[4] "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism--Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (4)," by the Editorial Department of People's Daily and Red Flag, October 21, 1963. Text in Peking Review, October 25, 1963, p. 13.

[5] "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism, etc. ...," op. cit.

The socialist camp consists of the progressive forces of history. These forces are divided into three groups whose ultimate goal is the total and thorough destruction of capitalism-imperialism (and their lackeys) and the realization of the ideal communist society, i.e., proletarianization of the peoples of the world.[1]

First, there are the socialist countries wherein the masses (led by the proletariat and its vanguard, the indigenous communist parties) have already eliminated the class enemies, i.e., the capitalist-imperialist bourgeoisie, and are in power. The tasks of these countries are twofold: internally, to wage a relentless struggle against the remnants of the defeated bourgeoisie and their offspring (the "new class") to destroy them completely while advancing on the road leading to the communist society; externally, to play an active and leading role in the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle aimed at the complete and thorough destruction of capitalism-imperialism.[2]

Second, there are the masses of the nations ruled by capitalist-imperialist governments. These masses are exploited and oppressed by their governments; led by the indigenous proletariat and its vanguard, the indigenous communist parties, these masses are preparing for a socialist revolution to wrest power from their oppressors in the fashion of the Russian October Revolution (1917).[3]

Third, there are the masses of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Their tasks are twofold: to stage a national-democratic revolution to overthrow "imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic-capitalism" in the fashion of the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and of the War of Resistance Against Japan (1937-1945); having first (through a united front of all indigenous forces) eliminated foreign imperialism, the indigenous lackeys of foreign imperialists (bureaucratic-capitalism) and the big landlords (feudalism), the masses of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and then stage a socialist revolution in the fashion of the Chinese Communist Revolution (1927-1937 and 1945-1949) aimed at the liquidation of the indigenous bourgeoisie and at the establishment of the socialist state.[4]

---

[1] Ibid.
[2] See "A Proposal Concerning the General Line, etc....," op. cit.
[3] See Lin Piao, op. cit.
[4] See "A Proposal Concerning the General Line, etc. ...," op. cit.

Needless to say, both national-democratic and socialist revolutions are led by the indigenous proletariat and its vanguard, the indigenous Communist parties.[1]

The Communist Chinese maintain that the socialist and imperialist camps are engaged in a life-and-death struggle whose inevitable outcome will be the victory of the socialist camp and the total, thorough, and complete destruction of capitalism-imperialism and their lackeys.

Asserting that the conditions in the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle today are similar to the conditions prevalent in China during the first half of the twentieth century, the Communist Chinese insist that the socialist camp adopt the strategy of a people's war against the capitalist-imperialist foes.[2]

According to such a strategy, North America and Western Europe are the "cities of the world"--the strongholds of the imperialist camp where socialist revolutions are being held back due to the strength of capitalism-imperialism. Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the "rural areas of the world" "which are now being subjected to aggression and enslavement on a serious scale by the imperialists"[3] and where the imperialists are weakest.

The strategy of the socialist camp should therefore concentrate on the "encirclement of cities by the rural areas": on the defeat of the imperialists in the "rural areas of the world" first and in the "cities" last.

"In a sense, therefore, the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the people"(of Asia, Africa, and Latin America)"who constitute the

---

[1] Ibid., also Lin Piao, op. cit.

[2] Lin Piao, op. cit.

[3] Lin Piao, op. cit., p. 48.

overwhelming majority of the world's population."[1] And "The socialist countries should regard it as their international duty to support the people's revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."[2]

The Chinese Communists maintain that it will take a very long time for the socialist imperialist struggle to end, for the socialist camp to totally and thoroughly defeat imperialism. But they believe that due to the success of the various national liberation movements in the "rural areas of the world" and to the accomplishments of the socialist countries in the fields of armaments, science and technology, economic growth, modernization, industrialization and political education, the socialist or progressive camp is growing stronger while the imperialist camp is growing weaker every day.[3] However, the Chinese maintain that regardless of how strong the progressive camp grows and how weak the imperialist camp becomes, and no matter how inevitable the victory of socialism over capitalism-imperialism is, the imperialists will never admit their weakness nor give up peacefully. The capitalist-imperialists will always resort to violence to hold on desperately to their last vestiges of power.

---

[1] "A Proposal Concerning the General Line etc. ...," op cit., and Lin Piao, op. cit., p. 49.

[2] This concept of supporting the people's revolutionary struggle remains ambiguous, but it is known to include the training of revolutionaries and providing small arms, cash and propaganda literature to such "revolutionary groups as el-Fatah. The Chinese maintain that national liberation movements and socialist revolutions cannot be imported from abroad; revolutionary conditions have to be present in a country before any revolution can succeed. The Chinese also maintain that revolutions must be led by indigenous leaders and that revolutionaries must be self-reliant in their struggles. In other words, the el-Fatah or the Black Panthers cannot and should not expect China to intervene militarily (or go to war) on their behalf against Israel and the United States respectively to realize the al-Fatah and Black Panther goals. All that these revolutionaries can expect from the socialist countries is "sympathy and active support."

[3] Lin Piao, op. cit., p. 49.

That is why, the Chinese Communists argue, there will be soil for wars as long as imperialism remains. Only after the capitalist-imperialist governments have been violently, thoroughly, and completely smashed by the progressive camp can the world rest assured that there will be no more wars.

The map which appears on the next page was originally published by the People's Daily (26 September 1968), it is an indication of the Communist Chinese leadership's conviction that the forces of history are progressing or developing in the way the Communist Chinese leadership (and specifically, Mao Tse-tung) predicted they would.

While the progressive camp is gradually destroying the capitalist-imperialists and their lackeys, the socialist governments, the Communist Chinese maintain, must go on coexisting with the capitalist-imperialist governments. The communist Chinese principle of international relations is the following:

1. Socialist countries must coexist peacefully with the capitalist-imperialists governments,[1] do business with them and try to prevent a world war.[2]

While coexisting peacefully with the capitalist-imperialists, the socialist countries should always continue their "tit-for-tat" struggle against capitalism-imperialism, weaken imperialism in every possible way and be ready and prepared for a third world war should the capitalist-imperialists decide to launch one.[3] Socialist countries must also unite with the masses of the nations governed by capitalist-imperialists and

---

[1] "Peaceful coexistence" is not a foreign policy strategy but a foreign policy tactics.

[2] The Communist Chinese maintain: "The menace of war by the imperialist camp still exists...But the forces thwarting the danger of war and preventing a third world war are rapidly developing...A new world war can be prevented provided the communist parties of the world keep on uniting and strengthening all the forces of peace and democracy that can be united," "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace etc. ...," Peking Review, November 22, 1963, p. 10. The Communist Chinese argue, however, that the possibility of a third war will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists.

[3] "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace etc. ...," op. cit.

UNCLASSIFIED



1. The Albanian people led by the great Marxist-Leninist Comrade Enver Hoxha are unfolding a revolutionization movement of profound significance for socialist revolution and have won one great victory after another. The heroic, valiant Albanian people are closely rallied around the Albanian Party of Labour. With pick in one hand and rifle in the other, they are safeguarding and building their socialist motherland. This great beacon of socialism in Europe is shining in ever greater splendour.

2. The ranks of the Marxist-Leninists in many West European countries are growing.

The imperialist bloc is speeding to disintegration. United States imperialism's domination over Western Europe has weakened. Devaluation of sterling has thrown the capitalist monetary system into unprecedented confusion. The political and economic crises of the United States and West European capitalist countries have worsened. Since May the great storm of workers' and students' revolutionary struggle has swept France. In some other West European countries revolutionary mass movements followed in rapid succession.

3. An excellent situation exists in the Palestinian people's armed struggle to liberate their homeland in Israeli-occupied areas the Palestinian guerrillas struck repeated blows at the enemy. In the past year over 5,000 Israeli aggressor troops were killed or wounded.

4. The flames of the African people's armed struggle are raging fiercer. Armed struggle of the peoples of Congo (K), Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and Zimbabwe against imperialism, colonialism and their lackeys are growing in depth and winning new victories.

5. The Soviet revisionist renegade clique has brought about all-round capitalist restoration at home and is pushing a policy of capitulation and betrayal abroad. Acting as United States imperialism's accomplice and stepping up collaboration with it to redivide the world, it has degenerated into social-imperialism. Its sudden invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia in August has further exposed its vicious social imperialist features and has been denounced and opposed by the world's revolutionary people. Modern revisionism headed by Soviet revisionism is crumbling. Each day is harder for it.

6. The South Yemeni people's armed struggle against British colonial rule has triumphed. The People's Republic of Southern Yemen was established on November 30, 1967. An imperialist plot for armed subversion was smashed.

7. Integrating Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, with the practice of the Burmese revolution, the Communist Party of Burma has successfully waged twenty years of revolutionary armed struggle. At present revolutionary bases and guerrilla zones cover 67 per cent of the country's area.

8. Since early 1967 when revolutionary Indian Communists mobilized the Naxalbari peasants to launch armed struggle, the flames of the Indian peasants' revolutionary armed struggle has spread rapidly. The revolutionary Indian Communists are leading the broad masses of peasants in heroic armed struggle to seize land. Up to early 1968 'Naxalbari-type' peasant movements had erupted in fifty areas in eight states and regions under direct central control.

14. The Communist Party of Thailand, integrating Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, with the practice of the Thai revolution, is leading the Thai people in revolutionary armed struggle. After three years of guerrilla warfare the Thai people's armed forces are now active in thirty of the country's seventy-one provinces.

15. Led by the Communist Party of Malaya, the Malayan people's armed forces have persisted in protracted struggle and their ranks are growing.

16. There has been a new development of the protracted armed struggle in which the Philippine people have persevered.

17. Led by the Communist Party of Indonesia, revolutionary Indonesian people have launched armed struggle against the fascist military régime in vast rural areas of the main islands of Kalimantan, Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi and are building revolutionary bases in some areas.


...ique clique has brought about all-...home and is pushing a policy of ...ed. Acting as United States im...ling up collaboration with it to in...grated into social-imperialism. Its ... of Czechoslovakia in August has ...-imperialist features and has been ...orld's revolutionary people. Modern ...isionism is crumbling. Each day is
9. Initiated and led by our great leader Chairman Mao himself, the great proletarian cultural revolution has won decisive victory throughout China. Closely following Chairman Mao's great strategic plan, China's revolutionary people are forging ahead to seize all-round victory ! Revolutionary people of the world hail the splendid victory of China's becoming more consolidated and powerful.
The world has entered the era where Mao Tse-tung's thought is the great banner. The great, invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung is being spread throughout the world and has become the most powerful ideological weapon of the world's revolutionary people.
60°
120°
180°
120°
60°
18. The Johnson Administration ... and abroad. It has suffered severe ... against Vietnam. The political and ... further sharpened. The broad mass ... United States are daily awakening. T... struggle against tyranny have blaze... Afro-American struggle is now intr... ment. On April 16, our great le... 'Statement in Support of the A... Violent Repression', Afro-America... the world warmly acclaim Chairm... solved to launch a sustained and v... States imperialism, the common en...
19. The flames of revolution are ... perialism's 'backyard'. The Latin Am... against United States imperialism ... develop. The struggle of the Lat... tyranny and persecution is steadily e...
13. The Japanese people's anti-United States patriotic struggle is steadily mounting. The ranks of the genuine Marxist Leninist left are growing rapidly in the struggle against the United States-Japanese reactionaries, Soviet revisionism and Japanese revisionism.
12. The New Zealand Communist Party and the Communist Party of Australia (M. L), holding high the revolutionary banner of Marxism-Leninism, have made new contributions to the struggle against imperialism and revisionism.
armed
...ia, revolutionary ... against the fascist ...nds of Kalimantan, ...evolutionary bases
10. Brilliant victories won by the Vietnamese people in their arduous and resolute war against United States imperialism have contributed to the anti-United States struggle of the peoples.
11. The Laotian patriotic armed forces and people have liberated two-thirds of the country. In seven months of dry season fighting, from last winter to this spring, they won a brilliant victory in wiping out over 16,000 enemies.

世 界 大 好 形





*TRANSLATION: MAP OF THE EXCELLENT WOR

Source: The Chinese version of the Map of the appears in Arthur Huck, The Security of China Press, New York, 1970, for the Institute for S p. 8, as reproduced from the People's Daily, 2

In the English version, the map is an adaptati Desk Outline Map, World, No. 7079, published b Chicago. The English commentary is a translat comments on the People's Daily map. The trans Arthur Huck, The Security of China, pp. 9-11.

Figu

世 界 大 好 形 势 图*



*TRANSLATION: MAP OF THE EXCELLENT WORLD SITUATION

Source: The Chinese version of the Map of the Excellent World Situation appears in Arthur Huck, The Security of China (Columbia University Press, New York, 1970, for the Institute for Strategic Studies, London) p. 8, as reproduced from the People's Daily, 26 September 1968.

In the English version, the map is an adaptation of the Cartocraft Desk Outline Map, World, No. 7079, published by Denoyer-Geppert Co., Chicago. The English commentary is a translation of the Chinese comments on the People's Daily map. The translation is found in Arthur Huck, The Security of China, pp. 9-11.

Figure B-1 A "MAP OF THE EXCELLENT WORLD SITUATION" PUBLISHED IN A CHINESE NEWSPAPER (U)

assist these people. The Chinese argue that necessary compromises and agreements between a socialist country and a capitalist-imperialist government do not require the masses governed by the capitalist-imperialist government to make concessions at home:

> Peaceful coexistence designates a relationship between countries with different social systems...It should never be extended to apply to the relations between oppressed and oppressor nations, between oppressed and oppressor countries or between oppressed and oppressor classes and never be described as the main content of the transition from capitalism to socialism, still less should it be asserted that peaceful coexistence is mankind's road to socialism.[1]

2. Socialist countries must strive for peaceful coexistence on the basis of the Five Principles with countries having different social systems and oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war[2] of the capitalist-imperialists.

C. China's Roles in Its World Outlook

The roles which Communist China assigns itself in its world outlook are the following: First, the Chinese consider themselves the leader of the socialist camp by default. The Communist Chinese maintain that since the Soviets have failed to perform the tasks of the leadership of the socialist camp properly (fostering capitalism at home and refusing to contribute to the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle) and since the Soviets have refused to assume the responsibilities which such a position of leadership entails, the Soviets have automatically lost the mandate of Marx--their legitimacy as leaders of the socialist camp.

---

[1] "A Proposal Concerning the General Line etc. ...," op. cit.

[2] Ibid.; the Five Principles are: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and equality and mutual benefit.

The mantle of leadership, the Communist Chinese maintain, has thus fallen upon the shoulders of the Communist party of China (and its chief, Mao Tse-tung) which has not only maintained its relentless struggle against capitalism and imperialism (at home and abroad) but has even intensified it.

Second, the Chinese regard their experience with economic development, industrialization and modernization as the model which all underdeveloped countries should imitate. This, too, has its ideological fallout. The economic development, modernization and industrialization of the countries of the socialist camp can only strengthen the camp vis-a-vis the imperialists and their lackeys.

Third, the Communist Chinese regard their experience against Chiang Kai-shek and Japan as the model which all masses and nation-states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America should adopt for their nationalist-democratic and socialist revolutions.[1] The Communist Chinese, as has been seen, also regard their experience against Chiang and Japan as the model which the socialist camp should adopt in its anti-imperialist struggle.

---

[1] Due to politico-military considerations, to geographic contiguity, to ideological commitment and to traditional patterns of international relations with East and South Asia, the Chinese feel they should encourage the masses of East and Southeast Asia to put into practice the Chinese model and liberate themselves from imperialism and its indigenous lackeys.

II THE COMMUNIST CHINESE CONTEMPORARY AND TRADITIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The persistence of Chinese tradition is not only evident in the Communist Chinese contemporary world outlook but also in contemporary Communist Chinese military thinking and strategy. As such, one is well-advised to preface a discussion of contemporary Communist Chinese military strategy with a brief analysis of traditional Chinese military thinking and strategy.

A. Traditional Chinese Strategy: Sun Tzu, Wu Ch'i and Ssu Jang Chu

1. The constant elements of the art of war are: the morale of the troops and morale and stability on the home front (national unity); the terrain and weather conditions; the quality of military leadership and quantity and quality of the armed forces and equipment; and the organization and control in the armed forces and supply lines.[1]

2. The military principles are:

a. Man (and not weapons) is the decisive factor in war;

b. The enemy should be subdued without fighting and with the least amount of damage to life and property. As such, the best way to defeat the enemy is to disrupt his strategy (or plan); the second best way is to disrupt his alliances (and communications). The next best way is to

---

[1] A commander should be aware of these constant factors not only as they apply to him but also as they apply to his enemy: know yourself as well as the enemy.

attack his army, and the least desirable way to defeat one's enemy is to attack (besiege) his city(ies); and,

c. A commander should not repeat his former strategy.

3. The strategic offensive doctrines are:[1]

a. Before attacking the enemy's forces or cities, (1) confuse and deceive the enemy's commander(s); (2) break the enemy armed forces' will and capacity to fight by sabotaging the armed forces' morale, equipment, organization, supply lines and reserves;[2] and (3) break the enemy people's will and capacity to resist by creating confusion and dissension among the population and civilian leadership.[3]

b. When attacking the enemy's forces or cities, (1) one should reserve the strategic initiative; (2) one should reserve the strategic surprise (move swiftly and secretly); (3) one should strike when the enemy is unprepared and at his enemy's weakest point; (4) one should force the enemy to spread out his forces (or force him to tie his forces in several places on several fronts simultaneously) and concentrate one's forces on the enemy's weakest units. The point is to overwhelm the enemy;[4] (5) use the cheng ("normal, direct") force to distract the enemy and the ch'i ("extraordinary, indirect") force to deal the enemy the crippling blow (meaning that the "distractive effects are necessary to ensure that

---

[1] It should be noted that due to its conception of the world and to its geographical location, China never crossed the high seas to fight a major war in the British or French tradition; as such, the classical essays do not delve into naval strategies.

[2] Such sabotage activities are carried out by one's spies in the enemy camp.

[3] Such activities are carried out by one's spies in the enemy's city(ies).

[4] However, an advantage of men and/or weapons is not a guarantee to victory; the other elements (such as terrain and weather) must also be advantageous to one's self. In other words, a commander should attack or strike only when the entire situation assures victory.

decisive blows may be struck where the enemy is unprepared...);[1] and (6) leave the enemy an escape route, for a desperate enemy will fight to death, but when the enemy pretends to escape do not give chase.

4. The strategic defensive doctrines are:

a. Since the line separating strategic offense and strategic defense is fluid (meaning that an army may attack for defensive purposes or retreat for offensive purposes), the majority of the strategic offensive doctrines hold true for strategic defense.

b. As to the defense of a city (or a specific area), the military guidelines offered by the traditional Chinese military thinkers are not very specific. The city may wish to remain besieged, in which case the commander of the city's forces has to (1) make the city invulnerable to the enemy's spies (who seek to break the city forces' and population's will and capacity to resist) and close all escape routes so that his soldiers and people have no choice but to fight to death; (2) prevent the besiegers from disrupting his strategy and communications with the outside world;[2] (3) conceal his defenses "as under the ninefold earth" and deceive the enemy into attacking the city prematurely.

c. Should the city decide to break the siege, the strategic doctrines of offense may prove effective.

---

[1] In Sun Tzu the Art of War, Samuel Griffith says that the effects of cheng and ch'i forces, "are mutually reproductive. We may define the cheng element as fixing and the ch'i as flanking or encircling, or, again, as the force(s) of distraction and the force(s) of decision. Their blows are correlated," p. 43.

[2] The city's communications with the outside world are important for the city commander. He may wish to break the enemy's siege of his city by asking his allies to attack the enemy's rear or the enemy's city and thus relieve the siege of the city.

5. The tactical doctrines of offense and defense are (more or less) one and the same;[1] and as the reader will notice, many of these doctrines are repetitions of the strategic doctrines:

a. Reserve the tactical initiative; and,

b. Before attacking, break the enemy's will and capacity to fight and confuse his commanders;

c. Strike when and where the enemy is exhausted and unprepared (or when and where the enemy does not expect you to strike); when striking the enemy at any one point, defeat his forces at that point (the idea is to be stronger than the enemy at any one particular point); but do not engage the enemy's elite troops;

d. Constantly frustrate and harass the enemy on the battlefield; when he is resting, force him to move, and when he is well fed, try to starve him;

e. Use your cheng force to distract the enemy and your ch'i force to deal the decisive blow;

f. Wherever you are, rely on the population of the area (and not your home base) for provisions; and,

g. Do not press a desperate enemy to fight, for he will fight to the death; be sure your enemy has an escape route, but when the enemy pretends to escape, do not chase him.

6. Some observations on traditional Chinese military strategy:

As it was earlier stated, the traditional Chinese military thinkers preferred to defeat the enemy without fighting and treated war as a last means of subduing the enemy. Once in war, the traditional Chinese military thinkers (and their strategic and tactical doctrines) aimed to defeat the enemy with the least amount of damage to life and property and in the

---

[1] The line separating tactical offense and defense is very fluid.

shortest possible length of time.[1] As such, they advised China's rulers against protracted war and based their doctrines on mobility, "deception, the creation of false appearances to mystify and delude the enemy, the indirect approach, ready adaptability to the enemy situation, flexible and coordinated maneuver of separate combat elements, and speedy concentration against points of weakness."[2]

B. Modern Chinese Strategy: Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao

1. Definition of war:

a. "'War is the continuation of politics.' In this sense war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times there has never been a war that did not have a political character."[3]

b. "War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes, or political groups, and all the laws of war are applied by warring nations, states, classes or political groups for the purpose of achieving victory for themselves."[4]

2. The object of war is the "preservation of oneself and the destruction of the enemy."[5] The constant elements of war are of two kinds: objective elements (natural, economic, political and military conditions of both sides) and the subjective element (each side's ability to direct war). There are six problems of strategy in war; they involve "giving proper consideration" (a) "to the relation between the enemy and ourselves;" (b) "to the relation between various campaigns or between various

---

[1] China's traditional military thinkers were also aware that, generally speaking, war drained the ruler's treasury and caused prices and taxes to rise.

[2] Griffith, op. cit., p. 9.

[3] Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), Vol. II, p. 152.

[4] Mao, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 190.

[5] Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 185-186.

operational stages;" (c) "to those parts which have a bearing on (are decisive for) the situation as a whole;" (d) "to the special features contained in the general situation;" (e) "to the relation between the front and the rear;" and (f) "to the distinction as well as the connection between losses and replacements, between fighting and resisting..."[1]

3. Protracted war

a. Why protracted war?

(1) In the case of the Revolutionary War,[2] because (a) China "is a vast, semi-colonial country which is unevenly developed politically and economically;" (b) the enemy is "big and powerful;" (c) the Red Army is "small and weak;" and (d) the war is an agrarian revolution, and it is led by the Communist Party of China. Now given (a) and (d), one concludes that "it is possible for the Chinese Red Army to grow and defeat its enemy;" and given (b) and (c), one concludes that "it is impossible for the Chinese Red Army to grow very rapidly or defeat its enemy quickly."[3]

(2) In the case of the War of Resistance,[4] because (a) the enemy is a strong and advanced country, has a capacity to wage war but is deficient in manpower and natural resources; (b) the enemy has the "meagre support" of other fascist-imperialist states; (c) China is a weak, semi-colonial and semi-feudal country but has a vast territory, plenty of resources, a large population, plenty of soldiers and is led by progressive forces, i.e., the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Red Army; (d) China has "abundant international support;" and (e) the Chinese population detests the foreign invaders and fully supports the Chinese forces. Now, given the above conditions, it is possible to conclude that the Chinese army

---

[1] Ibid., Vol. I, p. 199.

[2] The Civil War between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists.

[3] Mao, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 199.

[4] The war between Japan and China, 1931-1945.

will grow and eventually defeat Japan, but the army cannot grow rapidly and Japan cannot be defeated quickly. One can also conclude that time is on China's side and that it is to Japan's benefit to conclude the war quickly while it is in China's interest and benefit to prolong the war as much as possible. As such, Japan will be waging a war of quick decision, while China will be waging a protracted war (which is spelled in the battlefield as battles and campaigns of quick decision). The Chinese Communist military strategists maintain that after Japan is defeated in many battles and campaigns, Japan's war of strategic quick decision will have to change into protracted war; i.e., Japan is bound to fight the war in China on China's terms.

b. Strategic principles of a protracted war:

(1) Strategically despise the enemy but tactically respect him; in other words, strategically pit one against ten, i.e., the weak against the strong, but tactically pit ten against one;

(2) When in war with a strong enemy,[1] retreat to the countryside and establish base areas there, unite with and rely on the peasants to defeat the enemy in the countryside first,[2] and then encircle and defeat the enemy's cities (which are his strongholds) from the countryside. The principle involved here is that starting from a strategically inferior and passive position, one can deprive the enemy of local superiority, thus destroy the enemy locally and "accumulate the results of these partial local destructions of the enemy into major strategic victories and so achieve the final political aim of expelling the enemy..."[3] The basic

---

[1] Assuming that the war is being fought in one's own country, in this case China.

[2] Since when one is retreating the enemy will be pursuing and occupying as much territory as possible, the enemy will become overextended; this and other reasons, such as the peasants' hostility to the enemy, will make the enemy very weak particularly in the countryside which is far away from the cities or the enemy strongholds.

[3] Mao, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 157.

principles of such a war are "to use the tactical offensive within the strategic defensive, to fight campaigns and battles of quick decision within a strategically protracted war and to fight campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines."[1] As such, three stages are distinguishable in this kind of a war: (a) the strategic defensive, when one conserves one's strength and awaits an opportunity to defeat the enemy; (b) the strategic stalemate[2] when one makes the enemy relinquish the strategic initiative and puts the enemy in a strategically inferior position; and (c) the strategic offensive, when having finally snatched the strategic initiative, one totally defeats the enemy;

(3) Rely on the masses for all kinds of purposes: espionage, sabotage, covering of operations and other military purposes;

(4) The enemy fights his own way, and we fight our own way. There are no ethics in war, and "There can never be too much deception in war."[3]

(5) Man (and not weapons) is the decisive factor in war.

c. The strategic doctrines of a protracted war include (1) reserve the strategic initiative and the strategic surprise[4] (move swiftly and secretly); (2) force the enemy to spread out his forces and engage and destroy these forces one by one (beginning with the weakest and most

---

[1] Mao, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 157.

[2] In the Revolutionary War, the second stage is known as the "strategic counter-offensive"; in the War of Resistance, the "strategic counter-offensive" is the title given to the third stage, while the second stage is entitled "strategic stalemate." To avoid confusion, the second stage of both wars will be called the "strategic stalemate," and the third stage of both wars will be entitled as the "strategic offensive" in this paper.

[3] Mao, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 165.

[4] Needless to say, in the first stage of the war, i.e., the strategic defensive, it is the enemy who has an advantage in the fields of strategic initiative and surprise.

isolated units first); (3) don't strike on all fronts (or strike with one fist not two); concentrate superior force against the enemy; (4) avoid decisive battles; (5) maintain extensive battlefields (or fluid battle fronts); and (6) coordinate the activities of your regular and irregular (guerilla) forces; distract and wear down the enemy to ensure the success of your decisive blow to the enemy.[1]

d. The Chinese Communists identify three types of warfare: mobile, guerilla and positional. In the strategic defensive stage, mobile warfare is primary, while guerilla and positional warfare are supplementary. In the strategic stalemate stage, guerilla warfare is primary while mobile warfare is supplementary. In the strategic offensive stage, mobile warfare is primary, while positional and guerilla warfare are supplementary. Taking the entire war as a whole, it is mobile warfare that determines the outcome of the war.[2]

---

[1] It should be noted that as far as the strategic doctrines are concerned the line separating defensive from offensive operations is fluid.

[2] "Mobile warfare is the form in which regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operation," (see, Mao, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 171). The Chinese Communists defined their type of regular warfare as "Regular only in its concentration of forces for mobile warfare and in a certain degree of centralization and planning in command and organization; in other respects it retained a guerilla character and, as regular warfare, was on a low level with the regular warfare of foreign armies, or in some ways, even with that of the Kuomintang Army. Thus, in a sense, this type of regular warfare was only guerilla warfare raised to a higher level." (Ibid., p. 227.) During the period of strategic offensive in the War of Resistance, says Mao, "We can assume that, given up-to-date equipment, a great change will take place in the Army and its operations. Our Army will then attain a high degree of centralization and organization, and its operations will lose much of their guerilla character and attain a high degree of regularity; what is now on a low level will then be raised to a higher level, and the Chinese type of regular warfare will then change into the general type." It should be noted that when the Japanese began their all-out war with China in 1937, the Chinese Revolutionary War was in its second stage. The

e. The basic principle underlying the tactical doctrines[1] of the Chinese Communists is "quick decision offensive warfare on exterior lines."[2] Only the tactical doctrines of guerilla and mobile warfare will be discussed here; the Chinese Communists do not lay any stress on positional warfare. These tactical doctrines are primarily aimed at "wiping out the enemy's effective strength" and not at "holding or seizing a city or a place."

The tactical doctrines of mobile warfare are: reserve the initiative (flexibility in dispersal and concentration and shifts in position); avoid passive defense[3] (move away if you can't hold on to a place or base); do not fight a battle unprepared and do not fight a battle you are not sure of winning; if you can't win, move away; avoid battles of attrition in which you lose more than the enemy does or in which you break even; in a battle or campaign where the enemy forces are superior, divide the enemy's forces (force them to spread out) and engage and defeat each of the sections one by one by concentrating a superior force on the enemy's weakest and most isolated units first, and his stronger units later; as to enemy cities, take the weakly defended cities first, then the moderately defended cities and take the strongly defended cities last; and "Replenish our strength with all arms and most of the personnel captured from the enemy."[4]

---

third stage of the Revolutionary War went into operation in 1945-1946 after Japan was defeated, and by that time, the Chinese Red Army had substantially "regularized" itself.

[1] The lines separating offensive and defensive operations is fluid.

[2] Mao, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 167.

[3] In modern strategy (and also in traditional strategy) offense and defense are a function of the preservation (or loss) of initiative, strategically and tactically. Defense is associated with a loss of initiative; passive defense refers to not only a loss of the initiative but the refusal (or failure) to regain the lost initiative.

[4] Mao, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 162.

The tactical doctrines of guerilla warfare are similar to the tactical doctrines of mobile warfare.

The tactical doctrines of guerilla warfare are best summarized by Lin Piao in the following way:

> The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.[1]

C. Similarities and Differences Between Traditional and Modern Chinese Strategy

There is no question that the modern Chinese strategic and tactical doctrines are a continuation of their traditional counterparts, with a few modifications. Both modern and traditional doctrines emphasize the following points:

1. The indirect approach to defeating one's enemey:

a. Strike the enemy where and when he does not expect you to strike;

b. Break (or weaken) the enemy forces' will and capacity to fight through inside-enemy-camp fifth column operations;

c. Break (or weaken) the enemy people's will to resist (also through fifth column operations inside the enemy cities) while at the same time try to win the enemy people over to your side. There would seem to be a contradiction at first glance between these two objectives; however, if the enemy population's will is broken through fifth column operations of clandestine nature and of unidentified origins (which would enhance the fear and insecurity of the enemy people), the enemy people might be persuaded to respond favorably to one's appeals for winning these people over.

---

[1] Ibid., Vol. I, p.124.

It should be noted that outside of the Korean War and the Sino-Indian war, the Chinese have never fought a war against an enemy on foreign soil or enemy territory:

2. The coordination between the activities of one's regular and guerilla forces;

3. The deception of the enemy and "the creation of false appearance to mystify and delude the enemy;"

4. The decisive role of man (over weapons) in war, maintenance of the initiative, mobility in war, knowing the enemy, fluidity of battlelines and fluidity of the line separating offense from defense.

The differences between the two sets of doctrines (or the modifications) concern the following two points:

--The Ideological Element

Whereas the traditional Chinese strategists would have been satisfied with just breaking the will of the enemy people to resist and merely neutralizing these people (in the sense that: you won't resist us, you won't fight with us but you won't fight against us), the modern Chinese strategists also insist on proletarianizing the masses--convincing the enemy people that they should side with the Chinese against the common enemy: the capitalist-imperialists.

--The Duration of War

The traditional Chinese military strategists opposed a protracted war on the principle that such a war would drain the resources of the state. The modern Chinese strategists support a protracted war, because, given the nature of their economy, military technology and enemy, the Chinese have no other choice. The modern Chinese strategy is a weak man's strategy in which the weak side is trying to defeat the strong opponent by accumulating a number of local victories and, given correct leadership, hoping to combine these local victories into strategic superiority and the ultimate defeat of the (by-now) weakened enemy. As Lin Piao put it:

> The history of the people's war in China and other countries provide conclusive evidence that the growth of the people's revolutionary forces from weak and small beginnings into strong and large forces is a universal law of development of class struggle, a universal law of development of people's war.[1]

The international significance of this law of development is that many tactical victories by the progressive forces of history against the imperialists in the "rural areas" of the world, i.e., the imperialists' weak spots, will add up to a strategic victory and the ultimate defeat of the imperialists. In other words, once the progressive forces of history defeat the imperialists in many battles and campaigns in the "rural areas" of the world, the progressive forces can then accumulate the results of these local victories and turn them into strategic superiority; the next logical step, of course, would be to engage the "cities" of the world and defeat them.

---

[1]Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 46.

III THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CNA

While it is impossible to prove that CNA is compatible with Communist Chinese ideology, it is also incorrect to state that it is not compatible; the truth lies somewhere between these two extreme positions and may be summed up thus: CNA is not incompatible with Communist China's ideology--an ideology which exhorts the masses of the world to despise the so-called "capitalist-imperialists," believes in the inevitability and the necessity of the total and thorough destruction of the enemy, and legitimizes struggle, i.e., domestic violence and the resort to force on the international level as a means of realizing one's objectives.

A clandestine nuclear attack is particularly attractive to the Communist Chinese given the nature of their military thinking and strategy: clandestine nuclear explosives are useful--if not ideal--for striking one's enemy how, when, and where the enemy does not expect a strike, for breaking the enemy forces' will and capacity to fight by creating chaos through fifth column operations, for weakening the enemy people's will to resist by creating chaos through fifth column operations and for deceiving the enemy.

Theoretically, the combination of Communist China's contemporary world outlook and military strategy should be able to accommodate CNA for the purposes of:

1. Providing the Chinese forces local (tactical) superiority against better equipped American (or pro-American) forces during a U.S.-China war in Asia.

2. Creating political turmoil and aggravating U.S. relations with its East and Southeast Asian allies (on whose territories the U.S. has

stationed nuclear weapons) by setting off near (or in) those American nuclear facilities or bases a clandestine nuclear explosion. A nuclear explosion occurring on board of a visiting American aircraft carrier or a submarine would also serve this purpose of forcing the U.S. out of Asia.

3. Threatening an American ally in East or Southeast Asia to comply with Chinese demands or suffer the consequences of a clandestine nuclear explosion on its soil.

4. Preventing the U.S. from executing its commitments to an East or Southeast Asian ally in distress by exploding (or threatening to explode) a clandestine nuclear weapon in the U.S. or on the soil of an ally.

5. Weakening the American forces' will and capacity to fight and the American people's will to resist by generating through a clandestine nuclear explosion fear, insecurity, chaos, scepticism and distrust on the part of the American forces and people toward the American government and military.

6. Assisting militant American groups accomplish their objective of disrupting the social, economic, political, and cultural life of the United States.

7. Exploding a clandestine nuclear weapon to create a distraction inside the U.S. to ensure the success of the Communist Chinese decisive blow against the U.S.

To the above list, one may add the use of clandestine nuclear weapons as a supplement to the Communist Chinese minimum-deterrent vis-a-vis the U.S.

The fact that CNA is not incompatible with Communist Chinese ideology and military thinking and strategy does not mean that the Chinese will use it willy-nilly anytime and anywhere. CNA, when and if used, will constitute only one move in a series of moves aimed at the realization of one (or more) specific Communist Chinese objective(s).

IV CONCLUSIONS

The Communist Chinese contemporary world outlook reflects Communist China's desire and attempt to restore the traditional Chinese empire in its new version. This new version substitutes Confucianism with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism; it also avoids the shortcomings of its predecessor and incorporates the lessons learned during the last one hundred and twenty or so years.

While attempting to restore the traditional empire, the Communist Chinese must proceed with the implementation of their plans very slowly and cautiously; they must not appear so aggressive and threatening as to provoke their opponents into a deadly preventive strike against Communist China. In other words, starting from a very weak position, Communist China seeks to assert itself as a superpower; in so doing, however, Communist China must not provoke the already established superpowers into eliminating, once and for all, the growing power and influence of China before it realizes its objective of great power status. Both Communist China's contemporary world outlook (with its emphasis on struggle) and Communist Chinese military thinking (with its emphasis on the indirect approach) are fitted for such a purpose.

Besides attempting to assert itself as a superpower while preserving its sovereignty and political and territorial integrity, Communist China also seeks to establish its hegemony in Asia, to become accepted as the leader of the world Communist movement, to spread Communism, and to incorporate all those territories claimed as Chinese into Communist Chinese society. Communist China's domestic objectives include economic development, industrialization, modernization, maintenance of Communist

rule in China, integration of the various non-Chinese nationalities into Chinese society, and the imposition of a common ideology on the Chinese population.

Notwithstanding Communist China's ambitious foreign policy goals, it is fair to state that domestic and not foreign affairs will preoccupy the Communist Chinese leadership presently and in the future.

Input Substudy C

A TAXONOMY OF CNA APPLICATIONS

By: W. Rood

Input Substudy C

A TAXONOMY OF CNA APPLICATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	INTRODUCTION	C-1
I	TO ACHIEVE A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE APPROPRIATE TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS	C-4
II	TO INFLUENCE DIPLOMATIC EVENTS IN SUCH A FASHION AS TO DEPRIVE THE UNITED STATES OF COURSES OF ACTION WHICH, IF FOLLOWED WOULD INTERFERE WITH CHINESE POLICY	C-6
III	AS A WEAPON TO INFLUENCE U.S. DOMESTIC EVENTS	C-9
IV	AS A WEAPON TO ACHIEVE MILITARY OR NON-MILITARY OBJECTIVES ACCORDING TO THE PRECEPTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE	C-11
V	AS A WEAPON TO INFLICT PUNISHMENT OR EXACT REVENGE	C-13
VI	CONCLUSION	C-14

INTRODUCTION

While it is demonstrable that China has the technical capability to mount a clandestine nuclear attack, it is not possible to predict whether or not they will do so. It is clear however that the employment of nuclear weapons in clandestine forms of attack against the United States could inflict considerable damage and might significantly impair U.S. freedom of action to respond appropriately to threats to the national interest. To suggest that the threat of CNA could be sufficiently palpable to warrant consideration, it must be demonstrated that such a form of attack might contribute to the accomplishment of Chinese objectives and that it might be consistent with the Chinese strategic situation.

While the wanton or irrational use of clandestine attack may not be ruled out, the costliness of nuclear weapons in time and material, and the administrative difficulties in employing them clandestinely seem to make it unlikely that clandestine nuclear attack would be planned outside the framework of a coherent strategy to the success of which CNA would be expected to contribute. The purposes to which CNA might be put would seem most likely to be those that were consistent with Chinese requirements and the Chinese assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the United States.

Since Chinese policy-making and strategic planning remain obscure, it is difficult to suggest by what route the development of a capability for CNA could emerge. One may infer, however, for purposes of analysis, that Chinese strategic considerations could give rise to a requirement for something like CNA, or that the conception of CNA could emerge in the process of research and development on nuclear weapons.

It is to the latter case that one may look for the most illuminating instances of uses for CNA. The Chinese nuclear weapon technologist,

having visualized the possibility of developing a reliable portable nuclear device would be likely, with his knowledge of the effects of nuclear weapons, to be able to suggest a number of applications for weapons that could be delivered by other than conventional means. The great destructiveness of nuclear weapons make their use desirable against targets the destruction of which would grant a strategic or political advantage to China. The possibilities of clandestine deployment of such weapons is appealing to a country that has, at present, a limited capability for deploying more conventional means for delivering nuclear weapons.

What applications then, might a Chinese nuclear technologist visualize for nuclear weapons that could be deployed clandestinely? A Chinese technologist confronted with the formidable problem of American capabilities vis-a-vis China, the demands of Chinese policy, and the relative strategic weakness of China outside of Asia, might conceive the following menu of applications for CNA:

I. To achieve a strategic objective appropriate to the use of nuclear weapons.

II. To influence diplomatic events in such a fashion as to rob the United States of courses of action which if followed, would interfere with Chinese policy.

III. To influence domestic events in the United States in order to alter U.S. policy or to destroy American resolve.

IV. To promote the achievement of military or non-military objectives through the use of CNA as part of the tactics of guerrilla warfare.

One additional application suggests itself, one that is unlikely to be included in any menu presented by the Chinese technologist. To include it would smack of defeatism, yet were nuclear weapons to have been clandestinely deployed into the United States and were some of them to remain available for use, it must be considered plausible that they might also be used:

V. To inflict punishment or to exact revenge following a major Chinese reverse or defeat by the United States.

Having arrived at what appears to be a reasonable selection of applications , it is possible to suggest some purposes for which CNA

might be used within the category of each application. Elucidation of the various applications also provides the basis for development of a set of scenarios that help to establish the perspective within which CNA may be viewed. The scenarios provide the basis for raising those questions, the answers to which convey some notion of the shape that a CNA threat would have to take in order to be consistent with Chinese purposes.

I TO ACHIEVE A STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE APPROPRIATE TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A nuclear device so configured that it may be deployed clandestinely and detonated at will may be conceived of as a surrogate stragegic weapon either to be employed in numbers or singly in a clandestine nuclear attack or in conjunction with other forms of strategic nuclear attack.

Degradation of Strategic Offensive/Defensive Forces: The purposes that might be served include the degradation of Strategic Offensive or Defensive forces either through direct attack or by granting the Chinese a secure second strike, with which to respond to a U.S. first strike, or as a means of maintaining minimum deterrence in order to interrupt the development of a U.S. first-strike.

Precursor Strikes: Clandestine nuclear attacks aimed at reducing the overall U.S. strategic strike force and as a prelude to ICBM, SLBM or other form of strategic strike so that together the attacks would degrade the U.S. capability to retaliate against China with strategic nuclear forces.

Penetration Attack: CNA aimed at U.S. strategic defensive forces in order to reduce their capability to give early warning, intercept and destroy incoming weapons. Such an attack might be aimed at control centers,command organization, early warning systems, target acquisition capabilities, or defensive weapons. The purpose would be to weaken U.S. strategic defense forces to reduce their capability to respond to an attack.

Pre-emptive, Damage-limiting Attack: CNA used by itself in order to disarm U.S. strategic strike forces or so reduce their effectiveness that the effect would be to limit damage to Chinese targets to some tolerable limit.

Secure Second-Strike: The clandestine deployment and siting of nuclear devices in order that they may always constitute a secure-second strike which since the weapons would be sited on or near their proposed targets, they would not fall victim to a U.S. nuclear strike on China.

Deterrence: A major use that could be conceived for CNA would be to use its threat where conveyed openly or implicitly to deter the United States from following a strategic course of action leading to the infliction of a defeat on Chinese policy or frustration of a Chinese course of action. For example, if the initiation by the United States of military operations in defense of an ally on the periphery of China carried with it the implication of one or more nuclear detonations within the United States the consequence would be to face the United States with the alternative of accepting the risk while continuing to assist the ally; accepting the risk with the added risk of triggering general nuclear war, if the United States decided to retaliate, were the clandestine device detonated; or, foregoing the option of helping the ally. The mere acceptance of the possibility that the Chinese could launch a CNA whether or not they could or would, would constitute a deterrence, especially if China were prepared to exploit, propagandistically, the dangers of nuclear war implicit in U.S. assistance to an ally. While such a threat might not prevent the United States from assisting an ally, it would place the United States in the position of having to consider whether the assistance to the ally was vital enough to risk the initiation of nuclear war.

Urban Industrial Damage: It is possible to conceive of CNA as a means to inflict massive urban-industrial damage to degrade the overall capability of the United States to wage a major war abroad. Were the Chinese to conceive that a vital interest were so much at stake in a war with the United States, that a general U.S. nuclear strike on China became an acceptable risk, then urban-industrial damage to the United States effected by CNA would be a reasonable course of action to damage U.S. capability to sustain a war.

II TO INFLUENCE DIPLOMATIC EVENTS IN SUCH A FASHION AS TO DEPRIVE THE UNITED STATES OF COURSES OF ACTION WHICH, IF FOLLOWED WOULD INTERFERE WITH CHINESE POLICY

A. Blackmail

This purpose could be served by so organizing a clandestine nuclear attack on the United States or one of its allies, that the choice was to make concessions or suffer the consequences of one or more nuclear detonations whose location would remain secret until the detonations were effected. If the concessions were made the location of the devices would remain secret from the United States so that the threat could be renewed. Or, an ally of the United States might be approached by China or her proxies with the threat of CNA to be carried out if the United States were informed and with the concession to be that the ally dissolve its ties with the United States. Key members of Congress and the President might be approached by agents acting for the Chinese, but with the principals left unspecified, with the demand that certain concessions be made in order to prevent the detonation of a clandestinely placed device in an American city. Since it need not be revealed that the weapon was Chinese if the concession did not seem definitely to be related to China, the risk to China could remain low while the dilemma for the United States would be that of any victim of a blackmailer.

B. Bargaining

The use of CNA for this purpose would include the actual trading of information about the location of clandestine nuclear weapons in the United States. Under this kind of situation, the concessions demanded might be vital to China's realization of some of its goals while less vital to the national interest of the United States. For example, when the Soviet Union emplaced nuclear weapons in Cuba, it was considered a major threat to the United States, but not an immediate provocation to war. The bargain struck by the Soviet Union in which the United States achieved the removal

of the missiles, was a tacit agreement on the part of the United States to grant Cuba immunity from U.S. attack while, at the same time acknowledging, also by implication, the right of the Soviet Union to station forces in Cuba. Since such bargaining could be carried on in the glare of publicity in the United States and against the background of the prospect of general nuclear war, U.S. concessions to gain removal of the weapons would appear a rational alternative to nuclear war.

C. Catalytic War

So long as the anonymity of the origin of CNA could be preserved, its use to catalyze a war between the United States and the Soviet Union might be considered appropriate. The conditions necessary to accomplish such a purpose would be a severe, extended and obvious crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union in which the threat of outbreak of nuclear war would be apparent. The delicate and explosive nature of the crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time of the revelation of the Soviet missiles in Cuba provides an example of a situation where catalytic war might seem appropriate. It is difficult to see how war between the United States and the Soviet Union could have been easily prevented had a nuclear detonation taken place within the United States or even within the Soviet Union. If a nuclear detonation in the United States were to take place under similar circumstances and were it to be accompanied by a widely held view that the culprit was Russia, the impulse to war, in the United States might be irresistible. Whether or not it was irresistible, the possibility that the Soviet Union might believe it was, would certainly raise the inclination of the Soviet Union to be prepared for war, if not to consider launching a first-strike.

Catalyzing war between the United States and the Soviet Union would serve Chinese purposes by freeing China from concern with a Soviet attack on China at the same time, that U.S. forces would be so involved in war or the possiblity of war with the Soviet Union

that China might be expected to consider that it had virtually a free hand in the Far East.

A variant of this purpose for the use of CNA is the degradation of U.S. strategic forces to such an extent that strategic retaliation against China after a clear CNA attack on U.S. nuclear capability would expose the United States to a Soviet first-strike capable of destroying the U.S. retaliatory capability or so degrading it that both the Soviet Union and China would have a free hand to develop their own strategic purposes.

D. Political Embarrassment

The purpose would be to force a course of action on the United States as a consequence of the apparent irresponsibility of the American government or of U.S. forces in handling nuclear weapons. CNA under this purpose would be launched under circumstances that would be meant to lead to the conclusion that it was a U.S. weapon that had detonated accidentally or because of carelessness. Thus the detonation of a weapon alongside of a U.S. Minuteman silo, at a Polaris submarine base, or on a U.S. strategic air base or air or missile defense site would be aimed at raising a public outcry against the positioning of such a weapon within the United States or in an allied country for fear of repetition of the accident. Detonation of a clandestinely emplaced weapon under appropriate circumstances at a U.S. military installation overseas might effectively eliminate the continued stationing of U.S. forces in the country where the base was located or even sever a military alliance. At the same time, such a use of CNA would call attention to the danger of having U.S. forces on one's territory, for even if it were established eventually that the weapon had been clandestinely placed and detonated to discredit the United States, the dangers of having U.S. forces in one's country would have been made manifest. The possibility of proving the alien origin of the weapon to the satisfaction of those already suspicious of nuclear weapons and of the U.S., even if concrete evidence were forthcoming, would remain problematical.

III AS A WEAPON TO INFLUENCE U. S. DOMESTIC EVENTS

A. Erosion of U.S. Resolution

The purpose of CNA under this category of use, would be to bring home to the American people the dangers of nuclear war in such a fashion that courses of action upon which the United States might be embarked would be abandoned because of public outrage. So long as the origin of the attack could remain anonymous or at least ambiguous, the detonation of one or more nuclear weapons in the United States might be made to seem the consequence of whatever courses of action were being followed by the United States rather than as the consequence of an overtly hostile act by China. Under the rationale often displayed in regard to U.S. campus disorders, it is the response by the police to the use of force by the students that leads to violence rather than the initial violence itself. Or in the present Cambodian situation, it is the U.S. and South Vietnamese response to the situation that is fraught with violence and not the violation of Cambodian neutrality by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese that led to the violence. Use of CNA for this purpose then, if accompanied by the right tone of public utterance would emphasize the danger to the United States of responding to threats to its national interest abroad, because that response might constitute provocation for nuclear war against the United States.

B. Victory Abroad Achieved by Exacerbating Domestic Revolt in the United States

The use of CNA for this purpose would be shaped in such a fashion to give the impression that dissident U.S. military personnel had employed nuclear weapons to discredit the United States government; that irresponsible members of the government had detonated a nuclear weapon in order to suppress dissent in the United States, or provoke nuclear war with a foreign power; or that a militant group was waging war against the United States government by using nuclear weapons for sabotage or to evoke terror. The

concept would be to implant the notion that the CNA was American in origin in order to preoccupy the government and the United States with the civil disorders that might be expected to ensue. Fabrication of evidence that a dissident or militant group were about to or had used a nuclear device to terrorize the government or to otherwise cripple the United States would force a pre-occupation with domestic events that would mitigate against the use of U.S. forces abroad by tying down the decision-making mechanism in the government as well as U.S. forces in the United States to run down the culprits and explore for further clandestine nuclear weapons.

IV AS A WEAPON TO ACHIEVE MILITARY OR NON-MILITARY OBJECTIVES ACCORDING TO THE PRECEPTS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

A. Social and Political Disruption

The detonation of one or more clandestinely installed devices in the United States designed to provoke the greatest possible social disorganization through the destruction of communications, vital services and transportation with the threat that other such weapons might at any time be detonated would have the purpose of disrupting the U.S. capability to react to events abroad at the same time that the clandestine nature of the weapons, ambiguity about their origin and purpose, would minimize the threat of retaliation while promoting confusion and demands for action on the part of the government. Re-establishment of order and restoration of services would present a post-attack situation in the United States without providing a substantial foreign target against which to retaliate. While U.S. strategic forces might remain intact, the capacity of the United States to deploy general purpose forces would be eroded by the demand that such forces be put to the task of restoration in the United States.

B. Sabotage of Industry and Communications

CNA employed for this purpose would have substantially the same kind of disruptive effect as CNA employed for Social and Political Disruption. It would have the additiona impact of disrupting the productive capacity of the United States in order to erode the capacity of the United States to supply and equip its forces overseas or to undertake mobilization at home. At the same time, the threat, implied or explicit, of further CNA would force the deployment of forces within the United States for security, to restore order and to undertake post-attack recovery. Again, were the attacker to remain anonymous his identity ambiguous, a condition intrinsic to escaping retaliation, the catharsis of retaliation would be denied the United States while the attacker would be in a position to enjoy the advantage granted by U.S. internal distraction.

C. Support of Insurgency Within the United States

While this purpose is the most precarious in terms of reliability, since it would require the dedicated enthusiasm of a militant group prepared to take risks and perhaps even sympathetic to China or its ideology, the payoff would be enormous if even a single nuclear attack could be attributed to the work of militants who after the attack would be fully prepared to claim credit for the attack. Social, political and industrial disruption would be one of the by-products to erode U.S. military capabilities, while the distraction of the government and population compelled to move against the militants under the threat of further nuclear attacks would open opportunities to the Chinese to pursue courses of action to which the United States otherwise would be prepared to respond.

V AS A WEAPON TO INFLICT PUNISHMENT OR EXACT REVENGE

This purpose seems the least rational and is therefore the most dangerous and, as noted above, not logically presented by a Chinese technologist because of its defeatist implications. However, the motives for use of a CNA can be seen to fit within the framework of a number of strategic approaches by a country with whose policy the policy of the United States is in fundamental conflict. The rationale for use as part of an overall strategy can lead to some conclusions about the utility of CNA in gaining strategic or other advantage. The apparently mindless impulse to inflict punishment after a United States victory in a war or some similar success that has left China relatively helpless or caused the overthrow of the present regime in China has its parallel in the notions of Adolph Hitler in his final days. It was his will that Germany go down in flames since it had been a weak vessel that had broken under his will to carry the war to its extreme. It appears clear that had Hitler the means of inflicting major damage on any of the Allied powers in the last days of the war, such an action would have been consistent with his frustration as well as his approach to the waging of war. It is not beyond reason therefore to consider the possibility that a totalitarian regime in China might, in its death throes, derive some satisfaction from inflicting significant damage on the United States homeland, despite the fact that such an attack would have no particular military value to China. Were the administrative and command problems inherent in the deployment of a nuclear device or devices into the United States to have been solved by the Chinese technologists and were the weapon not to have been used earlier, it would remain available for use in the final act of China's defeat, to carry with it the promise of at least revenge if not strategic advantage.

VI CONCLUSION

Review of the purposes to which CNA might be put provides a means for suggesting the kinds of targets that might be attacked; the factors that would favor such targets being chosen; and, the factors that would render successful attacks difficult. A summary review for each of the generic applications is presented in Table G-1. If one has some notion of the kinds of targets the destruction of which would serve the strategic purposes falling within the various applications of CNA, some estimate of the vulnerability of the United States to CNA can be made while a review of the factors that favor use of CNA, and those that render successful use difficult, provide a basis for suggesting the circumstances under which CNA would be most likely to be used, and perhaps some measures that might be taken to reduce the Chinese inclination to employ a clandestine mode of attack.

CNA is a method of strategic attack based chiefly on the element of surprise. Its effect, if employed by China, would be to influence events abroad in a fashion favorable to China. Such a method of attack, used alone, or in conjunction with other means of strategic attack, might be conceived as a means to further Chinese policy; to achieve advantages not otherwise within the capability of China to achieve; or to prevent the pursuit of courses of action by the United States that would be unfavorable to China. Once CNA were to become a Chinese option, it need not be supposed that it would be ruled out once China possessed significant capabilities in the more conventional forms of nuclear attack. For while, in the beginning, CNA might be conceived as a strategic stopgap to cover shortcomings in other strategic capabilities, the merit of surprise attack and the quality of ambiguity of clandestine employment of nuclear weapons would still commend CNA as a useful option.

CNA need not accomplish the purpose suggested here in order to inflict severe damage on the United States and its population or to interfere significantly with the U.S. capability to carry out national

policy. The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor did not defeat the United States nor prevent the ultimate defeat of Japan. The attack accomplished the strategic purpose for which it was intended by destroying a major portion of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The United States was robbed, albeit temporarily, of important strategic options that raised the price the United States had to pay in order to defeat Japan. The casualties and damage that were inflicted at Pearl Harbor crippled the United States capability to defend the Philippines and strengthen the Allied naval defense of the Malay Barrier. There is a lesson in the Japanese experience that may not be ignored in considering possible use of CNA. The Japanese strategic conception of the Pearl Harbor attack was above reproach. Its success is unquestioned, yet the assumptions that underlay the strategic concept were incorrect. Major Japanese successes early in the Pacific War did not, as might have been expected, weaken American resolve to carry the war to a successful conclusion nor provide sufficient strategic leeway for the Japanese to stave off eventual total defeat. It seems perfectly plausible, that China, beginning from certain misapprehensions about the nature of U.S. resolve and U.S. capabilities and vulnerabilities, might well evolve a valid and successful strategy for employment of CNA while pursuing an over-all strategy that is so defective that its anticipation by the United States would be inconceivable. In short, the development of countermeasures for CNA may be appropriate even if the U.S. conception of Chinese strategy does not seem to make the threat of its use a reasonable one in American eyes.

Table C-1

APPLICATIONS OF CSA

	Targets	Factors Favoring Use	Factors Rendering Success Difficult
1 [illegible]		Centralization of U.S. Command and Control System.	Dispersal of U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces.
[illegible]	Command Centers; ICBM sites, Polaris; SAC bases.	Delicacy of U.S.-Soviet Strategic Balance.	Existence of back-up systems for SCF, SDF and Early Warning System.
		Obvious reluctance of U.S. to employ nuclear weapons (as in Vietnam and Korea).	Mobility of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Forces.
		Remoteness of strategic weapons sites from population centers.	Weakness of Chinese Strategic Nuclear Forces.
2 [illegible]	Command Centers; early warning system, air defense and missile defense sites.	Fragility of Early Warning System.	Lack of capability to use Chinese General Purpose Forces directly against U.S.
[illegible]	ICBM; Polaris; SAC bases; special weapons storage sites.		
[illegible]	Command centers; ICBM, Polaris, SAC; urban centers, military bases, industrial sites.	Lack of U.S. preparation in Civil Defense.	Lack of credibility of CSA.
		U.S. statements about the operations of deterrence.	
[illegible]	Major urban areas, transportation centers; commercial centers, industrial areas.	Vulnerability of urban-industrial areas to nuclear damage.	Balance of Strategic Nuclear and Tactical Nuclear Forces in favor of the United States.
		Concentration of commerce, industrial organizations and transportation in a number of large centers.	
[illegible]		Easy access to likely targets.	Unpredictability of U.S. Reaction.

Table C-1 (contd)

APPLICATIONS OF CNA

Application	Targets	Factors Favoring Use	Factors Rendering Success Difficult
II. To Influence Diplomatic Events	[illegible] Governmental or other administrative centers; cities or industrial centers.	Ambiguity about source of attack. Threat invoked by notion of use of nuclear weapons. Difficulty of locating hidden weapons	Linkage of U.S. strategic weapons to any form of nuclear attack on the United States. Incredibility of such a threat without a demonstration. Separation of powers within the Federal Government
[illegible] Overseas or U.S. military bases or nuclear installations	Past losses or accidents involving nuclear weapons. Persistence of propaganda theme abroad about dangers of having U.S. nuclear weapons on a nation's territory.		
[illegible] Typical strategic nuclear targets.	Balance of U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear balance	Policy of nuclear-pause; arrangements similar to hot-line.	

Application	Targets	Factors Favoring Use	Factors Rendering Success Difficult
III. To Influence U.S. Domestic Events	Urban-industrial centers; military installations; prominent localities such as Disneyland, athletic events, or other public assemblages. Public figures.	Reputation of some dissident groups for violence against the United States; myths of military-industrial influence; and experience abroad with military coup d'etat. U.S. tradition of isolationism Linkage of U.S. policies abroad with violence at home. Ambiguity about origin of CNA	Unpredictability of U.S. reaction; atmosphere of desperation in U.S. may lower U.S. restraint in operations abroad. Sentiment may associate dissidents at home with enemies abroad.

UNCLASSIFIED

Table C-1 (contd)

APPLICATIONS OF CSA

Application	Purpose	Targets	Factors Favoring Use	Factors Rendering Success Difficult
IV. As a Guerrilla Weapon	1. To [illegible] attacks [illegible] communication centers, [illegible] and popu- [illegible] 2. [illegible] attacks by [illegible] weapons 3. To [illegible] and trial and [illegible] capabilities 1. [illegible] to deal with [illegible] and [illegible] 2. [illegible] military capability.	Communication centers; governmental centers. Industrial, logistical and military targets. Nuclear weapons and other special weapons storage sites.	Myths about the ubiquity of guerrillas and the difficulty of conducting counter-insurgency operations. Complexity of administrative, communication and transportation systems. Interdependence of various areas of the country on one another. Lack of well-established emergency procedures, for civil defense and post-attack recovery. Ambiguity about origins of attack. Lack of well-planned psychological warfare counter-measures.	Uncertainty of U.S. response. Difficulty of tying down U.S. strategic response by internal disruption. Freedom of action possible under state of emergency and disinclination to restraint when the state is threatened.
V. Exact Revenge or Inflict Punishment	Deprive U.S. of [illegible] of the fruits of victory	Random, probably cities	Detonation constitutes success.	Renders post-attack negotiations difficult.

Input Substudy D

ALTERNATIVE 1985 WORLD ENVIRONMENTS

By: Robert M. Lawrence

Input Substudy D

ALTERNATIVE 1985 WORLD ENVIRONMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION D-1

I ALTERNATIVE WORLD ENVIRONMENTS D-2

Figure D-1 Attack in Progress or Imminent
Figure D-2 Containment
Figure D-3 Latent Containment or Attack
Figure D-4 Cooperation
Figure D-5 Expansion
Figure D-6 The World of Opportunity as Seen by Peking
Figure D-7 The Threatening World as Seen by Peking
Figure D-8 Bounds of the World 1961-1985

II ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE WORLDS D-11

III OBSERVATIONS ON CNA PRONE WORLD POWER ALIGNMENTS D-20

INTRODUCTION

This substudy identifies alternative world environments for 1985 to establish a framework for evaluating the conditions under which the Chinese might use clandestine nuclear weapons as a function of the relationships among major powers and power blocks. Thus the material contained in this substudy is essentially an input into the assessment of CPR CNA requirements (Input Substudy A) and a framework for assessing the sensitivity of the representative situations described in Input Substudy H. Following the identification of the major alternative world environments, their major components are assessed and observations made concerning CNA-prone world power environments.

I ALTERNATIVE WORLD ENVIRONMENTS

Figure D-1 through D-5 present the major alternative world environments identified for the China clandestine nuclear attack study. The five major elements of the world environment bearing on China policies from the point of view of a Chinese defense planner are: the Soviet Union, the United States, Europe, the Middle East and a grouping called Asia, Africa and Latin America. The figures depict a homogeneous configuration, that is each major component is perceived as being essentially equal weight relative to Chinese interests or concerns. Figures D-6 and D-7 attempt to amend this approach by adjusting the even-sided pentagon to depict how the view from Peking in the year 1985 appears in the world of opportunities and the threatening world respectively. Using the five environments with their 5 facets, a large number of "Chinese-world environment relationships can be constructed which are heterogeneous in complexion, i.e., representations of "credible" real worlds. From such an exercise the final section of this appendix, observations on CNA-prone world power relationships was drafted.

An alternative method for describing the evolution of the world environment has been developed by R. F. Rhyne in Contingent U.S. Patterns 1970-2000, published in December 1969 by Johnson Research Associates, Santa Barbara, California. The summary figure of that study is included as Figure D-8. That figure provides a frame of reference for understanding the different paths which political relationships might follow from 1970 through the year 1985. Not only are the kinds of alternatives that might be achieved by the year 1985 indicated but the uncertainties associated with predicting the actual evolution are made explicitly clear by such a conical chart.

Figure D-1

ALTERNATIVE WORLD ENVIRONMENT #1.
"Attack in progress or imminent"

In the homogeneous configuration the real or imagined threat perceived by Peking from the five world facets is that of attack upon China, or her ruling elite



Figure D-2

ALTERNATIVE WORLD ENVIRONMENT # II.
"Containment"

In the homogeneous configuration the real or imagined situation perceived by Peking relative the five world facets is one of containment.



Figure D -3

ALTERNATIVE WORLD ENVIRONMENT # III.
"Latent Containment or Attack"

In the homogeneous configuration the real or imagined situation perceived by Peking is one in which all five world facets possess a full range of nuclear, conventional, and guerilla forces, but Peking sees no threat.



Figure D-1

ALTERNATIVE WORLD ENVIRONMENT # IV.
"Cooperation"

In the hetrogeneous configuration the Chinese have worked out a mutually beneficial relationship with one of the world facets.



Figure D-5

ALTERNATIVE WORLD ENVIRONMENT # V.
"Expansion"

In the hetrogeneous configuration the Chinese have adopted guerilla, conventional, and nuclear force in attacks upon one of the five world facets.



Figure D-6

THE WORLD OF OPPORTUNITY AS SEEN BY PEKING



Figure D-7
THE THREATENING WORLD AS SEEN BY PEKING



How the threatening world looks to Peking, the even-sided pentagon is actually skewed in this way. See ALTERNATIVE WORLD ENVIRONMENTS #'s I and II, possibly III.

Figure D-8

BOUNDS ON THE WORLD 1964-1985
(Three Important Variants)



Source: E. F. Rhyne, Contingent United States Futures, 1970-2000, Appendix 3, p.2, December, 1969. Johnson Research Associates, Santa Barbara, California.

II ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPONENTS OF ALTERNATIVE WORLDS

A. The American Component

There are a number of situations involving an interface between the Chinese and the United States where CNA use might look attractive to the former nation. Several are highly "CNA prone."

The most "CNA prone" situation would be one in which the current low-profile "Nixon Doctrine" is rejected by the United States and in its place is adopted some variant of a "roll back" strategy. Thus the United States, alone or in concert with other nations, would directly threaten the integrity of China, or of the ruling elites within Chinese society. Depending upon the perception by Peking of the nearness to attack, CNA could be either a high priority strategy, or in fact an employed action. Such U.S. actions as invasion of China, aerial attacks upon China, massing of troops immediately outside Chinese territory, outfitting Nationalist Chinese for an invasion, or giving substantial assistance to dissident elements within China, would probably satisfy the boundary conditions for the Chinese to threaten, or use CNA.

Another situation in which the Chinese might view CNA as being unusually attractive, would be one in which the domestic American turmoil were judged in Peking to be suggestive that the U.S. was in a "terminal" condition. Such perception could either be reflective of the actual situation, or a misperception, it would not matter regarding Chinese use of CNA. The point of CNA use in this situation would be to push the revolution over the brink to success, render assistance to hard pressed revolutionaries, or create panic and confusion and so assist the revolutionary movement. It

should be noted here however, that the Chinese have indicated they will be reluctant to jeopardize China to assist revolutionary movements in other lands. And given the nuclear strength of the U.S, the Chinese may eschew CNA to help the revolution out of fear of a "last-ditch" American response.

A third situation in which CNA might be considered by the Chinese against the U.S, would be in the event the "Nixon Doctrine" continues and the U.S, leaves Asia physically, but maintains support of and an interest in, allied regimes. In such a situation Chinese expansionism could become bogged down with opposition by American allies. Thus the Chinese might need to sever U.S, support for those nations stopping Chinese thrusts outward. CNA threats might be useful for the purpose. The U.S, might support its allies with transfer of tactical nuclear weapons, or with the threat to use strategic weapons directly against China, in either event CNA might be a counterweight. Because of the danger of massive strikes by the U.S, in protecting its allies, it is doubtful if the Chinese would challenge U.S, supported nations until they have built substantial stocks of regular strategic nuclear weapons, to which CNA would only be an adjunct.

A fourth category of interface between China and the United States calling for consideration of CNA by the Chinese would be if the United States adopted a hard-line containment policy. This would involve the stationing of substantial numbers of U.S, troops and correlative support forces upon the Chinese borders to prevent the expansion of either Chinese territorial possessions, or political-economic influence. Should the Chinese seek to break out of such containment CNA might prove a means to deter U.S, strategic attacks, and or use of tactical nuclears on the battleground, or of removing U.S, forces, on pain of CNA use. Again, because of the magnitude of U.S, nuclear retaliatory response it is not likely the Chinese will challenge U.S hard-line containment policy unless they have first built considerable regular strategic forces, to which CNA would only be an addition

A fifth situation in which CNA might be used would involve complete American withdrawal from Asia, with no lingering ties of any sort. In this situation the Chinese might seek to expand outward rapidly and would "cover" the possibility the U.S. would suddenly reassert itself into Asia by relying upon CNA to act as a deterrent to U.S. action. However, again, because of the might of U.S. retaliatory power it is not likely that the Chinese will entertain confrontations with the U.S. that they initiate unless they have developed strong regular strategic forces.

Several variables must be noted as they pertain to any use by China of CNA against the U.S.:

(a) US reduction of nuclear forces via the SALT talks route would place the US (assuming continued Chinese nuclear production) nearer Chinese nuclear levels, and hence make a confrontation for dearly sought Chinese goals more likely.

(b) US deployment of ABM will heighten the attractiveness of CNA to the extent that the Chinese seek or fear a confrontation with the U.S., and to the extent that ABM blocks delivery of nuclear attack upon the U.S.

(c) As Chinese regular nuclear power grows, and is not countered by American defensive actions, CNA becomes less attractive because of its inherent disadvantages (unless catalytic war is desired).

B. The Soviet Component

Four general categories of relationships between China and the Soviet Union present possibilities for CNA use by Peking. The first would involve a Soviet Union which is heavily involved in a confrontation with the U.S., the S.U. could be either hostile toward China or participating in improved relations with China. In either event use of CNA might trigger an exchange between the two superpowers with China becoming the beneficiary of such a war. A variant would be war between the U.S. and the S.U. with China using CNA threat to forestall any secondary attacks upon China by the U.S. (or for that matter by the S.U.).

A second type of relationship possibly producing CNA use would be one in which the relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States are improving. CNA might be used in the hopes of provoking distrust on the part of the two superpowers who would suspect each other of the detonation if the Chinese were sufficiently clever about it.

A third type of CNA use, and the one which is most "CNA prone" in the category of Chinese-SU relationships, is when the SU and US are making common cause against China. At that time, when the Chinese see their nation or their elite structure endangered by such SU-US cooperation the use of CNA against either or both Superpowers, or its threatened use, becomes quite likely.

A fourth type of CNA use by the Chinese, in terms of the Soviet component, would be in the situation where the internal developments in the Soviet Union led Peking to believe that revolution was imminent. Under these conditions the Chinese leaders might use CNA in the Soviet Union to assist dissident elements, spark revolution by inducing confusion and lack of faith in the government, and might seek to prevent U.S. intervention in behalf of the Soviets by using the CNA threat as a deterrent.

C. The Asian/African/Latin American Component

Two general types of situations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America could provide the incentive to the Chinese to use CNA. Although neither are particularly likely to result in actual CNA use, the one most likely would be the following: social progress is stalled, frustrations build up, and the Chinese version of modernization is much in demand; the Chinese supply assistance in return for the exercise of substantial influence in the affairs of the recipient nations. In such circumstances intervention by the United States, either acting singly or in concert with others, could cause the Chinese to seek to deter such meddling with "their" revolution by threatening or using CNA. This kind of CNA use runs counter to expressed Chinese statements on the kind of relationship which revolutionary groups should expect from Peking. That expectation may include arms and other forms of supplies, tactical and strategic doctrine, but in the final analysis Chinese troops will not be sent and the revolutionaries must win with their own people (a kind of precurser to the "Nixon Doctrine"). If the Chinese stick to this relationship then it is unlikely they will risk nuclear encounters with the United States in order to "save" a revolution in another land. It should be noted however that as Chinese regular nuclear forces grow one might, from a nearing parity position, "suggest" to the U.S. that the latter ought to stay clear of intervention in guerrilla revolutions. Trends in the U.S. suggest America may go beyond the "Nixon Doctrine" in eschewing involvement in such situations regardless of the acquisition of Chinese nuclear forces.

The opposite situation, i.e., one in which the developing lands are making the kind of social progress which precludes turning to Maoist solutions, could offer some incentive for CNA use. The most likely case in

this not-very-likely category of events, is that the Chinese would seek to disrupt growing relationships between the developing lands and the United States by detonating a CNA weapon. Or, the Chinese could consider warning the United States to reduce its ties with the developing nations by threatening CNA use. Again, as is so often the case in our analysis, it does not seem likely the Chinese would risk nuclear confrontation with the United States for such goals as those mentioned above.

A variant on the theme expressed in the preceding sentence would be the amalgamation of the developing nations into an anti-Chinese alliance led by the United States. Should such a grouping appear to have as its purpose the destruction of China, or of the elite within China, CNA use would become quite possible. The point would be to erode the anti-Chinese alliance by threatening the United States to force America to cease its alliance-prompting activities.

Another variant on the same theme would be where the Asian neighbors of China, possibly with some other developing lands joining in, would present constraints upon Chinese expansionism. Even if the United States were a part of such an alliance, not an instigator of it, the use of CNA against America would not seem particularly high because the more immediate roadblocks to Chinese expansion would be her neighbors. If the Asian neighbors of China, largely on their own, seek to prevent Chinese expansionism, CNA use against the U.S. is not a high priority for the Chinese. They would need to save whatever force they had acquired for some tough customers such as the Soviet Union, and possibly a Japan armed with nuclear weapons, and an India similarly equipped.

D. The European Component

Several possible developments in Europe might prove tempting to Chinese exploitation using CNA. The first of these would be a situation in which the United States and Soviet Union are in European serious confrontation, and neither superpower had the ambition or power to become very deeply involved in another part of the world. Under such circumstances the Chinese could feel that their encroachment upon United States controlled, or allied, areas could be safeguarded if a CNA capability existed. CNA use in the context of American and Soviet confrontation would be less likely should the U.S. deem it important to meet treaty commitments beyond Europe in spite of being heavily engaged with the Soviet Union. In this case the Chinese run a much higher risk of nuclear confrontation with the U.S. than if the Americans were largely viewing the world as unimportant save for their primary struggle with the Soviet Union.

A much different form of development which could elevate CNA use to an acceptable option for the Chinese would involve rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, one suspects, also in that context, the lessening of tension between East and West Europe. Should the Chinese view such lessening of hostility between the two superpowers as highly dangerous then CNA might be used to induce a breakdown of increasingly good relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. A variant of this situation would be a new "Congress of Vienna" (possible SALT) wherein the superpowers and their European allies decide that China was a threat to world peace and stability. In the face of such hostility, particularly if the verbalization were implimented in terms of military economic political action, the Chinese might seek to forestall hostile action by resorting to a threat to respond with CNA.

A third general kind of development which might lead to the use of CNA by the Chinese would be the growth of a Europe such as to challenge the United States and possibly the Soviet Union. In these circumstances the United States might be so preoccupied with competition from a strong, aggressive, united Europe that she was forced to neglect other areas. In such a situation the Chinese might feel they could benefit from the American involvement in a serious confrontation with the Europeans by extending their influence under cover of CNA threat. Their hope would be that the Americans would be so involved with the Europeans as to be unwilling to risk CNA in order to preserve some secondary area from falling under Chinese domination. As in the first paragraph Chinese CNA use during U.S. difficulties with a united Europe would be much less if it appeared the Americans would continue to meet treaty commitments in spite of her troubles across the Atlantic.

E. The Middle East Component

There is one basic configuration of Middle East relationships, and several variations thereto, which would possibly be inviting to the Chinese in terms of attempting to extend their influence, or even hegemony, to that area of the globe. This would be when the Arab relationship to Israel (for whatever reasons) is such that the Arabs would request assistance from China running from civilian aid to military equipment, advisers, and ultimately, regular Chinese military forces. A similar situation would be one in which the Arabs did not initiate a request for aid, but instead were receptive to a Chinese initiated offer of help. Should the U.S. oppose such Chinese assistance, either alone, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, or with other nations, the Chinese might have occasion to resort to CNA as a means to pursue their penetration of the Middle East, while deterring American intervention. While CNA could be considered in such circumstances it must be noted that the risk of a nuclear confrontation with the United States, over such a minimal matter to the Chinese as extension of influence 5,000 miles to the west makes CNA appear unlikely.

Developments in the Middle East could involve use of a Chinese CNA in a somewhat different form. Should the Arabs wish to forestall U.S. intervention in behalf of Israel they could conceivably obtain CNA weapons from the Chinese to use as a deterrent to U.S. action. The price charged by the Chinese for supplying such weapons would probably involve some sort of concessions to Chinese expansionism. The probability of the Chinese supplying CNA weapons for Arab use probably depends heavily upon the Chinese belief that the Arab s could threaten to use, or actually use, the weapons without the U.S. determining their source.

III OBSERVATION ON CNA PRONE WORLD POWER ALIGNMENTS

Five basic configurations, and a number of modifications within each, account for the vast majority of conceivable situations in which CNA use by the Chinese against the United States is more, rather than less, likely. Fortunately from the point of view of American strategic planners each general category of CNA-prone configuration is characterized by clearly observable patterns of interactions on the part of either or both the Chinese and the United States, or in some instances the interactions between China, America, and other states or political movements. Therefore U.S. strategic planners can be generally aware of the movement in world trends toward or away from CNA-prone relationships, and can, being so warned, either reverse U.S. actions so that movement is away from CNA-prone circumstances; or, alternatively, the planners can eschew reversing trends toward CNA potential use points and can instead prepare to deter CNA attack, defend against it if deterrence fails, or initiate an assertive disarming strike against China.

While broad trends toward or away from CNA-prone situations can be observed, and correlative action taken by the U.S. on the basis of such observations, a weakness in preparing for CNA possibilities must be mentioned. This is that precise prediction of the likelihood of CNA use in terms of percentage points (i.e., there is a 92% chance of CNA use in a given circumstance) is not realistic.

A. Protection of Chinese Integrity or That of the Ruling Elite from American Assault

CNA prone situations wherein use of such weapons is highest would be when the Chinese believed the chances are high that the U.S. is preparing to seriously harm China, destroy Chinese society, or remove the ruling elite , or when American action directed at those ends had begun. In the case of the former, Chinese use of CNA would probably be in terms of threats to deter the feared U.S. action, or demonstration attacks to add substance to their threats to deter , or possibly first strike disarming attacks to degrade U.S. strategic forces prior to their anticipated use against China. Should the U.S. move against China in terms of invasion, support of a Nationalist Chinese attack, support of anti-regime groups within China, or assertive disarmanent attack CNA would likely be used to cripple U.S. strategic forces, communicate China's intention to defend herself in every possible way. Should U.S. attacks, or U.S. backed attacks continue, CNA would be used as part of inter-war, war-termination bargaining efforts to obtain the best resolution of the situation from Peking's viewpoint.

B. Sino/American Confrontation in Asia Resulting from Chinese Expansion

In this general type of situation the Chinese could consider CNA as a means to compensate for a deficiency in their regular nuclear forces, or to augment such forces, during a period of high intensity confrontation with the U.S. resulting from Chinese efforts to move outward from their existing borders plus American efforts to block such expansionism. Two possible employment strategies for CNA, derivative from this general type of situation exist. In case of U.S. efforts to halt the Chinese expansionism at the point of aggression, i.e., on the Asian mainland, CNA (or CNA plus regular strategic forces) could be used to threaten unacceptable cost to American Pacific bases and CONUS unless the U.S. withdrew its opposition to Chinese action. CNA could be used in a demonstration attack to lend weight to the Chinese threat in these circumstances. CNA could be used to cripple U.S. strategic forces in an effort to deprive America of the support strategic forces could give to U.S. opposition to Chinese expansion at the point of aggression. Alternatively, if the U.S. eschewed land war in Asia as a means to contain Chinese expansionism, but resorted to threats of massive retaliation to constrain Chinese action, CNA could be used as a counter to negate the U.S. threats, or a demonstration use could be made to drive the point home that U.S. massive retaliation would result in Chinese retaliation. In this circumstance CNA might be used to cripple U.S. strategic forces and so degrade American ability to resort to massive retaliation.

In the case of collective containment of Chinese aggression, by either land war in Asia or the threat of massive retaliation, CNA use against the U.S. would be related to the extent that the U.S. was the central force in the anti-Chinese alliance structure. If by removing

American participation, the alliance could be made to crumble then CNA utility would be greatly increased, if the U.S. were not the "kingpin" then CNA use against the U.S. would be less likely.

C. Aid and Abet the Objective Conditions of Revolution re: the United States

A number of events could coalesce to suggest to Peking that (1), the "peasants and workers" in the U.S. are in full-blown revolution and that (2) the "countryside" (i.e., Asia, Latin America, Africa) is in a pro-Chinese peasant revolution. Given this perception by the Chinese, Peking could feel that exploitive capitalism in general, in the U.S. in particular were in a "terminal" condition. CNA use could then be viewed as a means to push capitalism over the brink into the ashcan of history. It should be noted that CNA use in the above described circumstances is mitigated against by several factors. It runs counter to Maoist doctrine which holds that while China supports guerilla wars, in the final analysis the revolution must be borne on the backs of the indigenous peoples. Further, if history had progressed to the point of capitalism being terminal, then one might expect capitalism to reach its demise unaided. On the other side, however, one could argue if he were Chinese that CNA in a terminal situation would be useful to eviscerate U.S. strategic nuclear forces which might be employed against the source of peasant revolution in a spasm reaction during America's death throes.

D. Catalytic Opportunities

Two types of catalytic situations may evolve. In a condition where the Soviet Union and the United States are involved in high intensity confrontation (possibly in Europe) (Middle East) CNA might be considered for use as the spark to ignite thermonuclear conflagration between the two super-powers. The objective would be for the US/SU to reduce themselves below the then existing power of China. In this type of situation the use of clandestine weapons would seem enhanced if China also possessed some regular strategic nuclear forces. This would be desirable from Peking's point of view for such forces would help guarantee that China would not be struck as part of the general superpower exchanges, at least not purposefully. Possession of such regular strategic forces would also mean that in some sense China "would inherit the earth" in the aftermath of massive US/SU thermonuclear strikes.

A converse situation which could be CNA prone would be one in which cooperation between the SU and US is developing along lines which are, or appear to the Chinese to be, anti-Chinese in tone and direction. The purpose of CNA catalytic use in this kind of circumstance would be to create sufficient distrust in the evolving relationships that they fail.

E. Preservation of Non-contiguous Insurgent Movements from U.S. Attack

In circumstances wherein peasant insurgent movements which seem to be developing successfully are endangered by direct or indirect U. S. action, CNA in various modes might be threatened or demonstrated to force cessation of U.S. activity. However, in view of Maoist doctrine regarding revolutionary help to be expected from Peking, it is not very likely that the Chinese would endanger their revolution to assist another one, particularly if the one needing assistance is far removed from the borders of China.

Four Overlays: SALT and ABM, Chinese Acquisition of Strategic Forces, and Nuclear Proliferation in Asia.

1. Each of the general situation configurations analyzed above as being CNA-prone, would be sensitive to SALT imposed limits upon U.S. strategic forces. The sensitivity would vary in terms of the dimensions of the limitations. But the sensitivity would be a constant factor in the sense that U. S. forces available for utilization against China would be reduced (including both offensive and defensive forces). The exception would be SALT-induced accommodation with the SU of an anti-Chinese character wherein decreased forces would result, but they could all be retargeted against China. This would be a form of the cooperative situation discussed in D. above.

2. Each of the general situations analyzed above would be sensitive to U.S. ABM deployment in several ways. The greater the deployment of U.S. ABM the less dependable would be Chinese regular strategic forces comprised of missiles, hence the requirement to augment such forces with CNA capability. Secondarily, the greater the deployment of U.S. ABM the greater the temptation to use CNA in a first strike mode to cripple ABM C^2 and that of U.S. offensive systems protected by ABM, should China contemplate action to which U.S. strategic weapons use might be a response.

3. CNA is sensitive to the growth of Chinese regular strategic weapons in the sense that a weak force would need to be augmented by CNA, and a moderate force much less so. Conversely, if China possessed a moderate strategic force she might feel freer in using CNA, or at least in placing CNA about, for discovery would be less likely to lead to punitive strikes due to the presence of Chinese regular retaliatory forces.

4. The proliferation of nuclear weapons about the borders of China, i.e., in India and Japan, possibly later in Australia will probably have the effect of forever stilling real aspirations of Chinese hegemony beyond the unimportant states and semi-states of Southeast Asia In this sense CNA use will be sensitive to such proliferation because most of the circumstances generating CNA requirements will then be removed.

Input Substudy E

ALTERNATIVE 1985 CHINAS

By: T. Koujakian

Input Substudy E

ALTERNATIVE 1985 CHINAS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	INTRODUCTION	E-1
I	CHINESE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND ALTERNATIVE PATTERNS OF LEADERSHIP	E-2
II	THE CHINAS OF THE 1980s	E-33
III	IMPLICATIONS FOR CNA	E-37
IV	CONCLUSION	E-39

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is fourfold: First, in light of the preceding discussion of the sources of Communist China's contemporary world outlook and of China's role in such a world, to extract Communist China's national objectives; to discuss the various types of leadership groups that could likely succeed Mao Tse-tung; third, to explore the question of whether the realization of China's national objectives would be affected (if at all) by each of the various types of leadership groups under consideration; finally to note the sensitivity (if any) of a CNA to each of the various leadership types which are posited as likely to succeed Mao Tse-tung.

I CHINESE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND ALTERNATIVE PATTERNS OF LEADERSHIP

A. Basic Assumptions

The discussion of the Chinese national objectives and the alternative patterns of leadership is predicated on the following assumptions:

1. China will remain a Communist state, and its future leaders, irrespective of their type and nature, will unquestionably remain dedicated Communists. In this respect, Communist China's contemporary world outlook will not be sensitive to changes in the Communist Chinese leadership. As it will soon be noted, the five types of Chinese leadership groups under consideration here differ not so much in terms of the priority each group attaches to each of China's several national objectives as in terms of how and how soon (or the strategies through which) these objectives should be realized;

2. Communist China will remain unified;

3. China will remain self-reliant regardless of the type and nature of the leadership that succeeds Mao Tse-tung. The principle of self-reliance doesn't exclude Chinese collaboration with the Soviet Union or Japan, for example; rather, what it means is that Communist China will continue to rely mainly on its own self, i.e., resources, manpower and brains, for the realization of its national objectives, both domestic and foreign;

4. Barring the possibility of a Soviet or American violation of Chinese sovereignty and political and territorial integrity, domestic and not international affairs will continue to preoccupy future Communist Chinese leaders. As to international affairs, it is doubtful that the bulk of Chinese attention and energy will be concentrated on Sino-American relations.

B. Communist China's National Objectives[1]

1. Domestic

a. Economic development, industrialization, modernization;

b. Maintenance of communist rule in China;

c. Integration (or assimilation) of the various non-Chinese nationalities into Chinese society;

d. Imposition of a common social ideology on the Chinese population which would involve not only the restructuring of society, but also the substitution of the traditional and/or heretic social values with Maoism.

2. Foreign

a. To achieve world recognition as a great power;

b. To preserve the sovereignty and territorial and political integrity of China;

c. To establish Communist Chinese hegemony in Asia;[2]

---

[1]For a discussion of China's national objectives, see, Harold Hinton. Communist China in World Politics (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), pp. 3-22, and 107-121; Devere E. Pentony, China, the Emerging Red Giant (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), Section II; A. Doak Barnett, op. cit., Chapter 1, and pp. 13, 15, 21, 23, 33, 65-66, and 77-80; Vidya Prakash Dutt, China and the World, (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 29-33, 36-38, 43, 48-50, 62-64, 71-73, 85-87, 191-194; Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: Praeger,1966), pp. 8-13; and the various expert testimonies in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China," March 8, 10, 16, 18, 21, 28, 30, 1966.

[2]Currently, the U.S. remains the main obstacle to the realization of this Chinese objective (the Soviet Union and Japan are potential obstacles). China will have to remove the American military, political and economic presence from Asia (beginning with the Far East and Southeast Asia) before extending its own hegemony. While removing the U.S. presence, China will see to it that the political, military and economic vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal is filled by China and not the Soviet Union or Japan. The removal of the American presence from Asia (particularly from the Far East and Southeast Asia) involves not only the weakening of the American will and capacity to remain in Asia for the purposes of containing China (or resisting direct or indirect extension of Chinese hegemony), but also the weakening of the will of the indigenous U.S. allies to continue hosting the U.S. (militarily, politically, and economically) and the weakening of the will and capacity of these nations to resist Chinese influence and hegemony.

d. To become accepted as the leader of the world Communist movement;

e. To spread Communism;

f. To incorporate all those territories claimed as Chinese into the Communist Chinese society - particularly the island of Taiwan.

Of course, these national objectives cannot be accomplished overnight, and some of these objectives may never be realized. Furthermore, while the accomplishment of some of these objectives, e.g., objective d_n would not require any enormous amounts of manpower, or capital, the realization of some of the other objectives may be costly; for example, objective b. has already cost the Chinese approximately three billion dollars and the invaluable services of a team of highly skilled men in terms of nuclear development.

Some of the Chinese national objectives are complementary; the realization of one (or more) of the Chinese objectives may speed up the realization of one (or more) of the other objectives. For example, the establishment of Chinese hegemony in Asia will necessarily contribute to the spread of communism and to the recognition of China as a great world power.

However, other objectives are in conflict. One set of conflicting objectives is the reclamation of alienated Chinese territory vs. the preservation of Chinese sovereignty and territorial and political integrity. Another conflict involves the imposition of a common ideology on the one hand, and economic development, modernization, industrialization and political and administrative centralization on the other.

A great portion of the conflict between the imposition of a common ideology vs. economic development, modernization, industrialization and centralization is due to the rate, magnitude and intensity of the process of proletarianizing (e.g., the Great Leap Forward), and to the Chinese leaderships's (i.e., Mao Tse-tung's) insistence on and the demand of impeccable ideological purity from the Chinese people, institutions and society as a whole, e.g., the Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution (GPCR). For example, an inevitable by-product of economic development and industrialization is the swelling of the ranks of bureaucrats and technocrats who tend to become interested more in their professions than in political work or continuous criticism-transformation campaigns. Such a development, argues Mao Tse-tung, hinders the process of proletarianization and must be eliminated. Unfortunately, however, this continuous elimination process, as the GPCR has demonstrated, is inimical to industrialization and economic development.

Whether in the post-Mao era this conflict between ideology on the one hand, and economic development, industrialization, modernization and centralization on the other hand, will be allowed to continue to plague Communist China or be resolved (and if it will, then how) depends upon the type and nature of the leadership that will step into the Chairman's shoes.

C. Alternative Patterns of Leadership

1. Types of Leadership Groups (for a summary, see Table E-1)

This paper posits five types of leadership groups that likely succeed Mao Tse-tung: pragmatic-violent; pragmatic-peaceful; doctrinaire-violent; doctrinaire-peaceful; and a combination of pragmatic and doctrinaire, violent and peaceful.

A pragmatic leadership is realistic, practical, flexible and accomplishment-oriented; it realizes and appreciates the internal limitations and external constraints on China's ability and capacity to accomplish the various Chinese national objectives. As such, a pragmatic leadership attempts to realize its objectives piecemeal. A doctrinaire leadership is idealistic, dogmatic, inflexible and value-oriented; it disparages the internal limitations and external constraints on China's ability and capacity to realize the various Chinese national objectives or hopes to overcome them by uttering an ideological maxim or two. A doctrinaire leadership attempts to accomplish its objectives in great bounds and leaps.

The category peaceful vs. violent is concerned only with the external behaviour (or foreign policy strategies) of the various types

Table E-1

ALTERNATIVE PATTERNS OF LEADERSHIP: COMMUNIST CHINA

PRAGMATIC-VIOLENT	PRAGMATIC-PEACEFUL	DOCTRINAIRE-VIOLENT	DOCTRINAIRE-PEACEFUL	COMBINATION
• Realistic and accomplishment oriented;	• Realistic and accomplishment oriented;	• Idealistic and value-oriented;	• Idealistic and value-oriented;	
• Practical and flexible;	• Practical and flexible;	• Dogmatic and inflexible;	• Dogmatic and inflexible;	
• Realizes and appreciates internal limitations and external constraints on its ability and capacity to accomplish its objectives;	• Realizes and appreciates internal limitations and external constraints on its ability and capacity to accomplish its objectives;	• Disparages internal limitations and external constraints on its ability and capacity to realize objectives;	• Disparages internal limitations and external constraints on its ability and capacity to realize objectives;	
• Realizes objectives piecemeal;	• Realizes objectives piecemeal;	• Attempts to realize its objectives in great bounds and leaps;	• Realizes objectives in great bounds and leaps;	
• Prefers to do things its own self rather than rely on third parties or proxies;	• Prefers to rely on third parties or proxies to realize objectives;	• Prefers to do things on its own self and not rely on third parties or proxies;	• Prefers to rely on third parties or proxies to realize objectives;	
• Prefers to realize its objectives through the direct application of its power;	• Prefers to use indirect and covert and political and military power and influence to bring about those conditions under which China can realize its objectives peacefully;	• Prefers to realize objectives through the direct application of its power;	• Prefers to use indirect and covert political and military power and influence to bring about those conditions under which China can realize its objectives peacefully;	
• Projects the image of being aggressive, pushy and jumpy.	• Projects image of being prudent restrained and cautious.	• Projects image of being aggressive, pushy and jumpy.	• Projects the image of being prudent, restrained and cautious.	

of leadership. A violent leadership prefers to do things themselves and not rely on third parties or proxies; it also prefers to realize China's national objectives through the direct application of Chinese power toward such an end. As such, a violent leadership is willing to resort to force the world's recognition as a great power, to establish Chinese hegemony in Asia, to gain the position of leadership of the international communist movement, to spread communism and to regain control over the alienated Chinese lands so long as the resort to force doesn't endanger the sovereignty and political and territorial integrity of Communist China. A violent leadership projects the image of being aggressive, pushy, jumpy, and in a hurry to establish directly and on its own China's place in the sun. A peaceful leadership prefers to rely on third parties or proxies to realize its objectives; its main characteristic is its desire to realize China's objectives through indirect and covert political-diplomatic maneuvering, to bring about or create those conditions under which China will be able to accomplish its objectives without the resort to force. In other words, a peaceful leadership prefers not to impose itself and China on the world in a forthright manner but to have the nations of the world (on their own initiative, so to speak) call upon China to assume its place in the sun.

It should be quite strongly emphasized that irrespective of its type the post-Mao Communist Chinese regime will consist of a coalition government wherein the pragmatic will share power with the doctrinaire, and the violent with the peaceful, each lobbying for its own point of view. Therefore, when discussing a specific leadership type (particularly in terms of its strategy), e.g., pragmatic-violent, this substudy is not referring to a united and cohesive regime wherein each and every participant is pragmatic and violent, but rather to a coalition government wherein the pragmatic-violent members constitute a majority.

2. Priority of Objectives

The maintenance of Communist rule on the Chinese mainland and the preservation of Communist China's sovereignty and territorial and political integrity will head the priority list of any Communist

Chinese leadership.

Economic development, industrialization modernization, integration, imposition of a common ideology, recognition of China as a great world power, Asian hegemony, the reclamation of alienated Chinese territory and the spread of Communism, will also rank high on the priority list of any Communist Chinese leadership. However, the resolution (or intensification) of the conflict between ideology and economic development (industrialization, modernization, etc.) will be decided by the type and nature of the post-Mao Communist Chinese leadership.

Also dependent upon the type and nature of the post-Mao Communist Chinese leadership is the future position of the leadership of the International Communist Movement on the priority list.

3. Alternative Strategies

There are various means and combinations of means, i.e., strategies, through which Communist China would hope to realize its national objectives given the various possible future leadership types.

Table E-2

STRATEGY OF THE PRAGMATIC-VIOLENT LEADERSHIP TYPE

(1) Domestic

(a) Economic Development, Industrialization, Modernization

- Emphasis on technical expertise (as against "redness");
- Willingness to accept the consequences of economic development, modernization and industrialization in terms of growth in the ranks of bureaucrats and technocrats. In other words, the leadership is concerned, first and foremost, with the conformity of the infrastructure to ideology (given the economic conditions of China) and with rapid economic development on such a basis; in this respect, debacles such as the Great Leap Forward (GLF) are avoided;
- Emphasis on agriculture as the basis of the economy but the objective is the establishment of a strong heavy industry base in Communist China; capital formation through forced savings;
- Reliance on material incentives (including the promotion of the private agricultural sector) to increase production;
- Promotion of birth control measures;
- Expansion of foreign trade; import of foreign technology;
- Restoration of complete party authority and exclusion of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from the economical-industrial sector; limited reliance on PLA assistance during the harvesting period.

(b) Maintenance of Communist Rule

This would involve the elimination of all actual or potential challenges to the Communist regime through the use of force:

Table E-2 (Contd)

STRATEGY OF THE PRAGMATIC-VIOLENT LEADERSHIP TYPE

all dissenting elements or sectors of Chinese society will be forcefully castigated.

(c) Integration

- Relocation of population, sinification;
- Arrangement of a working-together relationship allowing local political autonomy and a degree of cultural freedom in return for voluntary ideological conformity and total political allegiance to Peking. This arrangement is backed by force. In short, the primary concern of the leadership is to immunize the nationalities to non-Chinese political influence on the one hand, and to "sinify" and proletarianize them, on the other hand, without alienating them to the point where these people become susceptible to non-Chinese influence.

(d) Imposition of a Common Social Ideology

- No demands of "impeccable" ideological purity from Chinese population and institutions;
- The process of bringing the super-structure into conformity with ideology is not allowed to disrupt the process of economic development, modernization or industrialization as long as these structurally conform with ideology;
- Re-invigoration of the Communist Party of China (CPC);
- Promotion of routine and orderly ideological purification campaigns, e.g., criticism - transformation sessions, through the machinery of the CPC; little or no likelihood for massive ideological campaigns in the fashion and magnitude of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR);

Table E-2 (Contd)

STRATEGY OF THE PRAGMATIC-VIOLENT LEADERSHIP TYPE

- Use of Mao Tse-Tung's name and thoughts for purposes of legitimacy and appeal to the masses during indoctrination campaigns.

(2) Foreign

(a) Recognition as a World Power

- Maintenance of a large, strong and modern conventional army (includes navy and air force) to enable China influence events beyond China's immediate borders;
- the deployment of a nuclear arsenal capable of deterring the United States (U.S.) and the Soviet Union (SU);
- the discriminate direct military challenge and defiance of the U.S. and the SU, i.e., the successful humiliation of the superpowers at times and places of China's own choosing (i.e., without endangering China's sovereignty and political and territorial integrity);
- the direct political challenge of the U.S. and the SU;
- the securing China's frontiers through the establishment, promotion and/or maintenance of friendly and/or subservice neighboring governments (use of force if necessary but without endangering Chinese sovereignty);
- the enhancement of China's prestige through technological, economic and industrial accomplishments;
- the creation of China's formal global or regional alliance system(s) with other socialist or pro-socialist states;
- the political isolation of the two superpowers by capitalizing on the mistakes and failures of the two superpowers, and on the fears and grievances of the poor and anti-status quo nations and by uniting with the dissatisfied allies of

Table E-2 (Contd)

STRATEGY OF THE PRAGMATIC-VIOLENT LEADERSHIP TYPE

the big two;

- the spread of Chinese influence by conquest, by uniting with the poor nations and the dissatisfied allies of the superpowers, by instigating wars of national liberation which are dependent on Peking for arms and cash, and by promoting pro-Peking Communist parties; all this without endangering China's sovereignty and territorial and political integrity though not necessarily concerned with the alienation of "bourgeois" or nationalist regimes.

(b) Preservation of the Sovereignty and Political and Territorial Integrity of China

- as far as the U.S. non-nuclear threat is concerned, the leadership pursues three sets of policies: one aimed at convincing the U.S. that China cannot be defeated in an Asian land war because, among other Chinese advantages, of the strength of the PLA; another aimed at preparing to fight the U.S. on China's periphery (and not on the mainland) and engaging U.S. forces without waiting for the U.S. to invade or bomb China proper (U.S. invasion of North Korea or North Vietnam would trigger Chinese intervention); another aimed at the gradual erosion of U.S. influence in East and Southeast Asia through a series of national liberation movements and other military-political moves;

Table E-2 (Contd)

STRATEGY OF THE PRAGMATIC-VIOLENT LEADERSHIP TYPE

- the neutralization of the U.S. strategic nuclear threat would involve the deployment of a minimum-deterrent force with a guaranteed capacity to destroy five to ten major U.S. cities or the national entity of three to five U.S. allies; the ability to keep the U.S. off-balance and uncertain by playing the U.S. and the SU against one another. To a lesser extent a pragmatic-violent type of leadership also attempts to convince the U.S. that China cannot be defeated in a nuclear war and to pressure the U.S. (through the U.S. allies and non-committed nations) to avoid a confrontation with China;
- as far as the Soviet non-nuclear threat is concerned. A pragmatic leadership attempt to successfully integrate the various non-Chinese nationalities of the border regions into the Chinese society, to convince the Soviets that a

Table E-2 (Contd)

STRATEGY OF THE PRAGMATIC-VIOLENT LEADERSHIP TYPE

Soviet conventional offensive cannot remain limited but will lead to a protracted war, to modernize the PLA, and to play on Soviet fears of a two-front war;

- the neutralization of the Soviet nuclear threat involves the deployment of a minimum-deterrent force with a guaranteed capacity to destroy ten to fifteen major Soviet cities (particularly Moscow and Leningrad) or a good portion (20-30) of Soviet industrial capacity or a good portion of the Soviet strategic forces enough to tip the Soviet-American strategic balance in America's favor, the ability to convince the Soviets that a nuclear attack on China can only be the prelude to a protracted war between China and the USSR, the ability to play the U.S. and West Germany against the Soviet Union, and the ability to aggravate existing conflicts involving the SU (but not China) so as to divert Soviet attention away from the Chinese front.

(c) Leadership of the International Communist Movement

The pursuit of this objective is mainly a function of Sino-Soviet relations. A pragmatic-violent Communist Chinese leadership which is hostile to the Soviet Union would pursue this goal (of becoming the leader of the international Communist movement) mainly to defy, aggravate and isolate the SU. A leadership which is interested in (or is) cooperating with the SU would use the threat to pursue this goal as a bargaining point.

A leadership hostile to the Soviet Union pursues this goal also as a means of promoting the recognition of China as

Table E-2 (Contd)

STRATEGY OF THE PRAGMATIC-VIOLENT LEADERSHIP TYPE

a world power and expanding Chinese influence.

(d) The Spread of Communism

A pragmatic-violent leadership pursues the goal of spreading Communist not just for its own sake, but as a vehicle for expanding Chinese influence (particularly in Asia) and eroding the enemy's power (in general). As far as China's Asian neighbors are concerned, a pragmatic-violent type of leadership is willing to resort to force in order to spread Communism as long as such an action does not endanger China's sovereignty and political and territorial integrity and does not undermine the realization of the other Chinese objectives. This type of leadership is also willing to bring direct political pressure to bear on its neighbors and to supply revolutionaries arms and cash in the name of spreading Communism but without endangering China's sovereignty and indiscriminately undermining the realization of China's other objectives; the leadership, however, does not necessarily mind alienating friendly or neutral "bourgeois" or nationalist regimes;

Where Peking is unable to bring direct military or political pressure to bear upon a situation, Peking resorts to the promotion of indigenous Communist parties or national liberation movement loyal to Peking and to the supply of arms and cash to revolutionaries.

(e) Hegemony in Area

By undermining U.S. alliance system through:

- the promotion of and active support to subservient indigenous Communist parties or independent leftist groups in the countries allied with the U.S. for the purpose of fostering

Table E-2 (Contd)

STRATEGY OF THE PRAGMATIC-VIOLENT LEADERSHIP TYPE

political turmoil specifically aimed at aggravating America's relations with its allies;

- the use of overt (or covert) military and political pressure on the U.S. allies on China's periphery: promoting internal political instability in these countries; threatening these countries with military sanctions should they fail to comply with China's term (without endangering China's sovereignty); attacking an American ally and daring the U.S. to come to its aid (particularly if the U.S. is preoccupied in Latin American or in Europe); sabotaging U.S. technical, economic and military aid programs in East and Southeast Asia; and sabotaging U.S. bases in these regions;

Saturating U.S. capacity to meet its commitments through:

- the promotion of national liberation movements simultaneously or in succession to aggravate and confuse the U.S.;
- the provocation of a Soviet-American confrontation (in the Middle East, for example);
- the aggravation of U.S. domestic problems.

By imposing China's will upon the Asian nations following the erosion of U.S. influence in the area through military conquest and direct political pressure.

(f) Reclamation of Alienated Chinese Territory - In This Case Taiwan, Quemoy, Matsu and Pescadores:

- the invasion of the island following U.S. withdrawal from the area or following the weakening of U.S. - Taiwan alliance;

Table E-2 (Contd)

STRATEGY OF THE PRAGMATIC-VIOLENT LEADERSHIP TYPE

- the creation of an appropriate excuse for China to invade these islands;
- the conclusion of a Taiwan-China agreement as a stepping stone to total take-over of these islands.

Table E-3

PRAGMATIC-PEACEFUL

(1) Domestic

There is no significant difference between a pragmatic-violent and a pragmatic-peaceful leadership on domestic strategy.

(2) Foreign

(a) Recognition as a World Power.

Similar to the strategy of a pragmatic-violent leadership with the following exceptions:

- the maintenance of a large and strong army (reluctant to spend much on modernization: marginal modernization) which is not necessarily capable of enabling China to influence events beyond China's periphery;
- the reluctance to discriminately but directly challenge and defy the superpowers militarily; rather a pragmatic-peaceful type of leadership resort to the superpowers as well as to the indirect and covert military and political challenge and defiance of the two superpowers (i.e., by proxy);
- reluctance to apply direct military pressure on neighbors; a pragmatic-peaceful type leadership resorts to indirect military (nat'l liberation movements) and political (subversion) pressure to have her way with her neighbors.

(b) Preservation of Sovereignty and Political and Territorial Integrity of China

- as far as the U.S. non-nuclear threat is concerned, this involves the simultaneous pursuit of three sets of policies; one, to convince the U.S. that it cannot defeat China in a land war in Asia because, among other Chinese advantages, of the strength of the PLA;

Table E-3 (Contd)

PRAGMATIC-PEACEFUL

- second, to pressure the U.S. through U.S. allies and non-committed nations) to seek a detente and not a confrontation with China; third, to weaken U.S. freedom of action or military-political maneuverability in East and Southeast Asia through a set of indirect and covert political and military maneuvers aimed at aggravating U.S. relations with its allies in these areas and at pressuring the East and Southeast Asian actions to force the U.S. out of these areas; simultaneously, the pragmatic-peaceful type of leadership prepares to fight the U.S. on China's periphery (North Vietnam or North Korea); but this option of fighting the U.S. on China's periphery is reserved as China's last resort;
- as far as the U.S. nuclear threat is concerned, this involves the deployment of a minimum-deterrent force with a guaranteed capacity to destroy five to ten major U.S. cities or the national entity of three to five U.S. allies; simultaneously, the pragmatic-peaceful Communist Chinese leadership attempts to convince the U.S. that China cannot be defeated in a nuclear war but will emerge victorious encourages the U.S. allies and non-committed nations to pressure the U.S. into seeking a detente and not a confrontation with China; the conclusion "no-first-use" or "free zone" agreements may also be seriously pursued;
- as far as the Soviet non-nuclear threat is concerned, a pragmatic-peaceful leadership attempts to successfully integrate the various non-Chinese nationalities of the border regions into Chinese society, emphasizes the

Table E-3 (Contd)

PRAGMATIC-PEACEFUL

point that a Soviet violation of Chinese sovereignty and integrity will result in a protracted war which will tie down large number of Soviet troops thereby weakening the Soviet Union's European Front, encourages the Soviet allies, the U.S. and the rest of the world to pressure the SU into seeking a detente with China rather than confrontation;

- the neutralization of the Soviet nuclear threat to China involves the deployment of a minimum deterrent capable of destroying ten to fifteen major Soviet cities (especially Moscow and Leningrad) or a good portion (20-30% of Soviet industrial capacity or Soviet strategic forces enough to tip the U.S. -SU strategic balance in America's favor; the ability nuclear war (that a nuclear war will boil down to a people's war wherein the Chinese people will completely destroy the Soviet forces); and the ability to set the U.S. and Germany against the SU and to aggravate existing conflicts involving the SU (but not China) to divert SU's attention away from China; the conclusion of a "no-first-use" agreement with the SU may be seriously pursued.

(c) Leadership of the Communist World

Same as pragmatic-violent leadership.

(d) The Spread of Communism

Same as a pragmatic-violent leadership with the following exceptions;

- the reluctance to resort to force or direct political pressure; indirect and covert political and military pressure preferred, e.g., promotion of indigenous pro-

Table E-3 (Contd)

PRAGMATIC-PEACEFUL

Peking Communist parties and national liberation movements.

- the reluctance to deliberately alienate friendly "bourgeois" or nationalist regimes.

(e) Asian Hegomony

By undermining U.S. alliance system through:

- the promotion of subservient Communist parties or leftist groups in the countries allied with the U.S. to aggravate U.S. relations with these allies;
- the befriending of U.S. Asian allies through economic assistance plans, friendship treaties, and the settlement of China's outstanding territorial claims with its neighbors;
- the indirect and covert political pressure on U.S. allies;

By saturating the U.S. capacity to meet its commitments through:

- the promotion of national liberation movements;
- the provocation of a U.S. -SU confrontation in Europe or the Middle East;
- the aggravation of U.S. domestic problems;

By appealing to the American and Asian people to the effect that

- the people of the world should be left alone to decide their own fate;
- security arrangements are dangerous, unreliable and unnecessary;
- China has no aggressive designs;
- pro-US governments are corrupt;
- Asian national liberation movements are just wars.

Table E-3 (Contd)

PRAGMATIC-PEACEFUL

(f) Reclamation of Alienated Chinese Territories

- the conclusion of a Communist China-Taiwan merger agreement;
- the conclusion of a package deal with the U.S. wherein the U.S. commits itself to withdraw its forces from Taiwan in return for a Chinese guarantee that China will not invade Taiwan but will work out an agreement to peacefully incorporate Taiwan and the other islands into Communist Chinese society.

Table E-4

DOCTRINAIRE-VIOLENT

(1) Domestic

(a) Economic Development, Industrialization, Modernization

- emphasis on political work rather than expertise;
- refusal to accept the consequences of economic development, industrialization and modernization in terms of the growth in the ranks of technocrats and bureaucrats and of the ossification of the bureaucracy. In other words, the leadership is concerned, first and foremost with the conformity of the superstructure to ideology rather than economic development per se;
- emphasis on agriculture as the basis of the economy but the objective is the establishment of a solid heavy industry base in China; capital formation through forces savings;
- willingness to undertake programs in the fashion of the GLF but much less ambitious than GLF;
- reliance on normative measures rather than material incentives to motivate masses;
- promotion of birth control measures;
- restricted expansion of foreign trade; import of foreign technology though not experts;
- Cadres - PLA - masses in charge of agricultural and industrial management; authority of party is partially and continuously undermined to preclude the rise of a "new class" of bureaucrats and technocrats.

(b) Maintenance of Communist Role

(Same as pragmatic-violent)

Table E-4 (Contd)

DOCTRINAIRE-VIOLENT

(c) Integration

- relocation of population; sinification;
- immunization of the border region people to non-Chinese influence through indoctrination; unwillingness to grant these people more local autonomy or cultural freedom than is granted to any other locality anywhere else in China;
- willingness to resort to force to keep these people in line;

(d) Imposition of a Common Social Ideology

- concerned with the strict conformity of the infra- and super-structures to ideology;
- demand of "impeccable" ideological punity from Chinese people and institutions;
- carry out cyclical or periodic purges and mini-GPCR; continuous indoctrination (criticism-transformation) movements; no slowdown in rate, magnitude or intensity of proletarianization process;
- restore party authority but not totally; PLA and masses share authority of and act as watchdogs on party;
- attempt to keep Mao thoughts alive and Mao's influence strong;

(2) Foreign

(a) Recognition as a World Power

- the maintenance of a large and strong (not necessarily modern in the western sense) PLA to enable China influence events beyond China's immediate frontiers;
- the deployment of a nuclear arsenal capable of deterring the SU and the U.S.;

Table E-4 (Contd)

DOCTRINAIRE-VIOLENT

- the indiscriminate direct political and military challenge of the two super-powers;
- the securing of China's frontiers through the promotion or establishment of friendly or subservient governments (use force if necessary but without endangering China's sovereignty and political and territorial integrity);
- the enhancement of China's prestige through economic, industrial and technological accomplishments with the emphasis placed on the contribution of "Communist" to these accomplishments;
- the creation of China's formal global and regional alliance system(s) with socialist or pro-socialist countries;
- the isolation of the U.S. and the SU by capitalizing on their mistakes, failures and shortcomings and on the fears and grievances of the poor and anti-status quo nations and by uniting with their dissatisfied allies;
- the spread of Chinese influence or Communism by conquest, by uniting with the poor and dissatisfied nations, by instigating mass of national liberation and socialist revolutions, and by promoting from Peking Communist parties; all this without endangering China's sovereignty and political and territorial integrity but not necessarily concerned with the alienation of "bourgeois" or nationalist regimes.

(b) Preservation of Chinese Sovereignty and Territorial and Political Integrity

Same strategy as that of a pragmatic-violent leadership with one noted distinction: a doctrinaire - pragmatic type of

Table E-4 (Contd)

DOCTRINAIRE-VIOLENT

leadership emphasizes quite strongly the ideological aspect of a Sino-Soviet or Sino-American conventional or nuclear confrontation - explaining the conflict in ideological terms and calling upon all Communist parties and socialist states to unit behind China (as a test of their international proletarianism) to defeat imperialism or social imperialism once and for all.

(c) Leadership of the Communist Camp

This goal is pursued for its own sake and involves

- the defamation of the Soviet leadership through accusations and demonstrations that the Soviets have neglected their task of leadership and deviated from the Marxism-Leninism;
- the promotion of the idea that Peking has the model or the correct strategy for the success of the national liberation movements and the success of the entire Communist struggle against the imperialist camp;
- the attempt to obtain the allegiance of the world Communist parties (particularly those of Asia, Africa and Latin America) by championing revolution, encouraging the various revolutionary groups to adopt the Chinese model, promoting the establishment of Communist parties loyal to Peking, promoting the domination of the national liberation movements by Communist parties loyal to Peking, and providing training, moral and material support to revolutionaries everywhere.

(d) Spread of Communism

As a means of spreading Chinese influence and also Communism per se through:

Table E-4 (Contd)

DOCTRINAIRE-VIOLENT

- military conquest (without endangering China's sovereignty and territorial and political integrity but not necessarily caring about the alienation of "bourgeois" or nationalist regimes nor about the undermining of some of China's other objectives);
- direct political pressures (on the above terms also) brought to bear on neighboring countries or countries within reach;
- establishment and promotion of Communist parties around the world, domination of national liberation movements by pro-Peking Communist parties, and supply of arms and cash as well as the Chinese revolutionary model to revolutionaries everywhere;

(e) Hegemony of Asia

Same as pragmatic-violent leadership but explanation of conflict or policies couched in ideological jargon.

(f) Reclamation of Alienated Chinese Territories

Same as pragmatic-violent leadership.

Table E-5

DOCTRINAIRE-PEACEFUL

(1) Domestic

There is no significant difference between a doctrinaire-violent and doctrinaire-peaceful leadership on domestic strategy.

(2) Foreign

(a) Recognition as a World Power

- the maintenance of a large and strong conventional (not necessarily modern) army;
- the deployment of a nuclear arsenal capable of deterring the U.S. and the SU;
- the political and ideological challenge and defiance of the U.S. and the SU, i.e., the humiliation of the two superpowers;
- the securing of China's frontiers through the indrect promotion of subservient governments;
- the enhancement of China's prestige through technological economic and industrial accomplishments emphasizing the contribution of ideology to these accomplishments;
- the creation of China's own regional or global informal or formal alliance system;
- the political isolation of the U.S. and the SU by capitalizing on their failures and mistakes and on the fears and grievances of the poor and dissatisfied nations; and by provoking a Soviet American confrontation and by creating tensions in or breaking up the American and Soviet alliance systems. All this with emphasis on ideology;
- the spread of Chinese political, ideological and economic influence by uniting with the poor and dissatisfied nations of the world, by indirectly instigating national liberation movements, i.e.,

Table E-5 (Contd)

DOCTRINAIRE-PEACEFUL

providing moral and limited material support to the resolutionaries by promoting pro-Peking Communist parties and by creating China's own alliance system.

(b) Preservation of China's Sovereignty and Territorial and political integrity.

Same as pragmatic-peaceful leadership.

(c) The leadership of the Communist Camp.

This objective is pursued for its own sake and would involve:

- the defamation of the Soviet leadership through accusations and demonstration that the Soviets have neglected the task of leadership and deviated from true Marxism-Leninism;
- the promotion of the idea that Peking has the right model for the vistory of the national liberation movements and of the entire Communist camp;
- the attempt to obtain the allegiance of various Communist countries (especially in Latin America, Africa and Asia) by championing revolution, to encourage the various revolutionaries to adopt the Chinese model, to promote the establishment of pro-Peking Communist countries, and to provide training, moral and limited material support to the revolutionaries.

(d) Spread of Communism

As a means of spreading Chinese influence and also Communism per se:

- indirect political pressure on neighboring governments;
- establishment and promotion of indigenous Communist parties;
- the Communist subversion and domination of national liberation movement;

Table E-5 (Contd)

DOCTRINAIRE-PEACEFUL

- supply of arms and cash to revolutionaries most everywhere in an indirect and covert fashion.

(e) Hegemony of Asia

Same as pragmatic-peaceful leadership but explanation of conflict and policies couched in ideological jargon.

(f) Reclamation of Alienated Chinese Territories

- merger with Taiwan as a stepping stone to eventual total Communist Chinese domination of the islands,
- no package deal with the U.S.

Table E-6

COMBINATION: PRAGMATIC-DOCTRINAIRE
VIOLENT-PEACEFUL

(1) Domestic

(a) Economic Development Industrialization, Modernization

- emphasis both on expertise and redress;
- unwilling to accept the consequences of economic development, modernization and industrialization in terms of growth in the ranks of technocrats and bureaucrats;
- emphasis on agriculture as the foundation of the economy with the objective of establishing a strong heavy industry base for China;
- minimum reliance on material incentives;
- promotion of birth control measures;
- selected expansion of foreign trade, i.e., in terms of trading partners or fields of trade; import of foreign technology;
- partial restoration of party authority and partial reliance on PLA.

(b) Maintenance of Communist Rule

(Same as others)

(c) Integration

- relocation of population; sinification;
- practical, working-together arrangements as well as Communization backed by force.

(d) Imposition of a Common Ideology

- concerned with the strict conformity of the infra- and super-structures to ideology;
- demand "impeccable" ideological purity from Chinese society and population; the realization of this goal is

Table E-6 (Contd)

COMBINATION: PRAGMATIC-DOCTRINAIRE
VIOLENT-PEACEFUL

not allowed to completely destroy China's economy but may be allowed to cause some severe temporary disruptions;

- carry-out cyclical or periodic purges and mini-GPCR, continuous indoctrination campaigns; but these measures need not necessarily be allowed to involve each and every sector of society: selected purges and indoctrination;
- partial restoration of party authority; PLA and masses act as watchdog on party.

(2) Foreign

The foreign strategy of this type of leadership will be a combination of the foreign strategies of the first four types. A pragmatic-doctrinaire, peaceful-violent leadership will deploy a nuclear arsenal and maintain a strong and modern army; it will be inclined to resort to direct and overt as well as indirect and covert means to realize its foreign objectives — emphasizing the one or the other depending upon the situation and circumstances.

II THE CHINAS OF THE 1980s

The preceding discussion of the alternative strategies may have wrongly (and certainly unintentionally) conveyed the impression that the five strategies (and the implementation of each) are static; on the contrary, they are dynamic.

First, there is always the question of the allocation of resources: which parts of the strategy ought to be implemented first or faster than the other parts? Any leadership type will have to cope with this problem: how much money ought to be spent on the promotion of birth control as against the construction of fertilizer plants? Or technical education as against material incentives? Or the development of nuclear as against conventional weapons? As parts of a strategy are implemented, e.g., China deploys her minimum deterrent, one may expect shifts of focus in resource allocation, e.g., concentration on fertilizer plants or on the modernization of the conventional armed forces.

Second, as parts of a strategy are implemented and produce certain results (advances or reverses), these results will affect (positively or negatively) the process of implementing the other parts of the strategy, i.e., those parts that are still in the process of implementation. For example, fast economic growth will enable the Chinese to provide greater material assistance to national liberation movements. The deployment of a Chinese minimum-deterrent force vis-a-vis the U.S. may weaken or strengthen the ties between the U.S. and America's Asian allies; either way, such a development will have some bearing on China's plans for Asian hegemony and the Chinese will have to take that into consideration.

Third, one must also refer to Mao's old age and the possibility of his death in the near future. Mao's death is likely to cause some disruption in certain sectors of the incumbent Chinese (economic, industrial, political, etc.) strategy. Assuming that the current division in the Communist Party of China will persist well into the future, it is also likely that an interim period of intra-leadership power struggle will follow Mao's death; this will further disrupt the implementation of the incumbent strategy and retard the implementation of a

new strategy until a new leadership group emerges. It was earlier stated that irrespective of its type, this post-Mao Chinese leadership will comprise a coalition of various forces wherein one faction will constitute a majority. Although the majority will have its way, it cannot and will not remain impervious to the opinions of the minority forces which will be lobbying for their views. As such, the majority will have to struggle with and at times placate the minority in order to remain in the majority; this intra-leadership struggle will undoubtedly affect the implementation . . the strategy of the major leadership faction.

Fourth, the implementation of a strategy will also be affected by the strength and determination of one's enemy(ies), i.e., the balance of world forces. This is why it was previously noted that some of China's objectives, e.g., hegemony in Asia or leadership of the Communist movement or the reclamation of all alienated Chinese territories, may never be fully realized.

Fifth, there are problems which any type of leadership will have to take into account in the process of implementing a strategy: population, "interplay between central and regional authority", weather and other factors (e.g., infestation) that are likely to affect agricultural output, a certain degree of constant bureaucratic inefficiency, and the implications of foreign policy conflicts on the realization of a country's domestic and foreign objectives. All these are problems likely to contribute to the dynamism of each of the alternative strategies, problems likely to hinder the implementation of each of the alternative strategies. Other such problems concern foreign policy conflicts -- mainly, China's efforts to catch up with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in relative terms of strategic capability, and war (at a time and place not of China's choosing).[1]

Taking into account the above five remarks concerning the dynamism

---

[1] But one of our basic assumptions is that Communist China will not engage in a war with either the United States or the Soviet Union.

of the implementation of each of the five strategies. Table B-7 projects Communist China's internal and external developments for each leadership type for the period of 1980-1985 assuming that the type under discussion inherits the mantle of leadership of Communist China in the period 1970-1975. For example, supposing that a doctrinaire-violent type of leadership assumes power in China sometime during the five-year period 1970-1975, Table B-7 provides the reader with a summary description of domestic and foreign policy developments in Communist China as these have evolved by the period 1980-1985 under the leadership of such a type.

UNCLASSIFIED

Table E-7

ALTERNATIVE CHINAS - 1980

Pragmatic - Violent Leadership	Pragmatic - Peaceful Leadership	Doctrinaire - Violent Leadership	Doctrinaire - Peaceful Leadership	Combination
• Impressive (4-5%) rate of economic growth; 1.5-2.0% population growth	• Impressive (4-5%) rate of economic growth; 1.5-2.0% population growth	• Poor (2-3%) rate of economic growth; 1.5-2.0% population growth	• Poor (2-3%) rate of economic growth; 1.5-2.0% population growth	• Periodic economic growth offset by periodic slumps; average (3-4%) growth rate overall
• Party manages economy, party-army supervise economy	• Party manages economy, party-army supervise economy	• Party and army manage and supervise economy	• Party and army manage and supervise economy	• Party-army management and supervision of economy
• Foundation for ambitious heavy industry program ready for take-off	• Foundation for ambitious heavy industry program ready for take-off	• Foundation for ambitious heavy industry program not ready	• Foundation for ambitious heavy industry program not ready	• Foundation for ambitious heavy industry program not laid down
• Party authority restored as fully as possible	• Party authority restored as fully as possible	• Party authority only partially restored	• Party authority only partially restored	• Local party authority partially purposefully undermined by Peking
• Party is source of central and local leadership legitimacy and main channel for upward social mobility	• Party is source of central and local leadership legitimacy and main channel for upward social mobility	• Party army-masses are source of leadership legitimacy; army is also main channel for upward social mobility	• Party army-masses are source of leadership legitimacy; army is also main channel for upward social mobility	• Party army--masses are source of leadership legitimacy; army as well as party serve as main channel for upward social mobility
• Ideology routinized	• Ideology is routinized	• Permanent revolution	• Permanent revolution	• Permanent revolution: at times in low and at other times in high gear
• Politically stable society	• Politically stable society	• Leadership (Peking) - generated political instability	• Leadership (Peking) - generated political instability	• Leadership (Peking) - generated periodic political instability
• Intra-leadership conflict or power struggle confined to party channels	• Intra-leadership conflict and power struggle confined to party channels	• Intra-leadership conflict or power struggle not confined to party channels but may by-pass these channels	• Intra-leadership conflict or power struggle not confined to party channels but may by-pass these channels	• Intra-leadership conflict or power struggle not confined to party channels
• Party control over government but army given greater voice in party	• Party control over government but army given greater voice in party	• Party and army equally control government	• Party and army equally control government	• Party-army equally control government
• May separate party leadership from government leadership	• May separate party leadership from government leadership			
• Conventional forces greatly modernized	• Conventional forces marginally modernized	• Conventional forces marginally modernized	• Conventional forces marginally modernized	• Marginal modernization of conventional forces
• Emphasis on conventional war	• Emphasis on both conventional and people's war	• Emphasis on people's war	• Emphasis on people's war	• Emphasis on people's war
• Nuclear weapons not accepted as decisive factor in war nor as focus of Chinese military strategy	• Nuclear weapons not accepted as decisive factor in war nor as focus of Chinese military strategy	• Role of nuclear weapons in war and strategy downgraded	• Role of nuclear weapons in war and strategy downgraded	• Role of nuclear weapons in war and strategy downgraded
• Erosion of party control over army; emphasis on professionalism	• Some erosion of party control over army; a growing tendency toward professionalism	• Intensive ideological indoctrination of army	• Intensive ideological indoctrination of army	• Intensive indoctrination of armed forces
• End to self-imposed isolation	• End to self-imposed isolation	• Continued self-imposed isolation	• Greater involvement in international activities	• Periodic end to self-imposed isolation and periodic self-isolation
• Partial improvement of China's political-military position	• Great improvement of China's political position	• China's political-military position not significantly improved	• China's political position improved	• Periodic improvement of China's political-military position offset by periodic undermining of such a position
• China still competing for leadership of world communist movement	• China still competing for leadership of world communist movement	• China still competing for leadership of world communist movement	• China still competing for leadership of world communist movement	• China still competing for leadership of world communist movement
• China recognized as a great world power	• China recognized as more than a great regional power though not as a great world power	• China recognized as a great regional power	• China recognized as a great regional power	• China recognized as a great regional power
• Taiwan and other Nationalist-controlled islands remain in Nationalist hands	• May reach agreement with U.S. or Nationalists over Taiwan	• China unable to incorporate alienated territories	• China unable to incorporate alienated territories	• Taiwan and other Nationalist-controlled islands remain in Nationalist hands

UNCLASSIFIED

III IMPLICATIONS FOR CNA

The question of sensitivity is not whether a leadership group will or will not resort to CNA because of the compatibility or incompatibility of the attack with a particular leadership's ideology and strategy. It was concluded in Input Substudy A that CNA is not incompatible with Communist Chinese ideology and strategic thinking; here it should be noted that such is the case irrespective of the type and nature of the specific leadership group in power. Rather, the question is what particular circumstance[1] or set of circumstances as perceived by the leadership group in power would lead to the use of CNA; this question of "perception" leads us back to the type and nature of the leadership in power. To sum up:

1) No single leadership is more CNA-prone than the other groups, with the exception of a super-Maoist type.[2]

2) The timing of CNA, when and if the attack comes, will be sensitive to the type and nature of the Communist Chinese leadership in power, just as any other decision in Peking, Tokyo or Washington, D. C., is sensitive to the type and nature of the leader (or group of leaders) who happens to be responsible, at the time for making decisions of such significance and magnitude.

3) As long as China continues to remain preoccupied with domestic and not internal affairs and as long as China continues to remain militarily weak (in relative terms, i.e., as long as China remains on the strategic defensive) it is the external circumstances and

---

[1] e.g., balance of power between US, USSR/CPR and strategic threat to China

[2] Such a leadership group will be characterized by its total and blind loyalty to ideology, total blindness to reality, and rejection of reason and rationality. This type of leadership will be obliged to push the wheels of history and challenge the U.S. (and all of China's past and present enemies -- and even friends --) to a showdown. The probability of the emergence of such a leadership, however, is extremely low; even if such a type of leadership does emerge, it will not last very long.

the leadership's perception of these circumstances that will influence that leadership's use of CNA. Three such circumstances would be: an immediate U.S. strategic (missiles, not land forces) attack on China, the Chinese embarkment on a course involving unacceptable risk and a fair certainty of failure, and the weakening of U.S. power to the point where the Chinese feel the time is ripe to snatch the strategic initiative from the United States and go on the strategic offensive.

4) Once the Chinese do take to the strategic offensive, then (and only then) would the external circumstances[4] influence on the use of CNA decrease in importance and the leadership's nature and type's influence on the use of CNA become dominant.

IV CONCLUSION

Communist China's progress in the realization of its various domestic and foreign objectives in the years to come will partially depend on the type and nature of the present and future leadership groups in Peking. For the future, four specific types of leadership groups were identified as likely to succeed Mao Tse-tung: pragmatic-violent, pragmatic-peaceful, doctrinaire-violent and doctrinaire-peaceful. However, it is the contention of this substudy that irrespective of its specific type, the post-Mao Communist Chinese regime will consist of a coalition government wherein the pragmatic will share power with the doctrinaire, and the violent, with the peaceful -- each lobbying for its own point of view. Therefore, when a specific leadership type, e.g., pragmatic-violent, is being discussed (particularly in terms of its strategy,) the reference is not to a united and cohesive regime wherein each and every participant is, for example, pragmatic and violent, rather the reference is to a coalition government wherein, to stick to our example, the pragmatic-violent members constitute a majority.

Finally, it was also concluded that with the exception of a super-Maoist leadership type, no Communist Chinese leadership type is more CNA-prone than others.

Input Substudy F

PROJECTIONS OF CPR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND OUTPUT END-USE ALLOCATIONS

By: M. Mark Earle

Input Substudy F

PROJECTIONS OF CPR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND OUTPUT END-USE ALLOCATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	INTRODUCTION	F-1
I	ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND NEAR TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS	F-2
II	ALTERNATIVE 1970-1990 PROJECTIONS OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT	F-5
III	ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS	F-21

INTRODUCTION

One hypothesis regarding the deployment of clandestine nuclear weapons is that the CPR would opt for such devices because of their inability to develop and operationally deploy other strategic delivery systems, such as ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. To a large extent the test of the hypothesis lies in an assessment of their economic potential to support advanced military programs, although adequate rates of growth of military technology and manufacturing expertise are also important. While GNP is not a perfect measure of the CPRs or U.S. economic capability, it is the standard basis for assessment of economic potential.

The fundamental problem in evaluating the economic potential of Communist China, hence her ability to produce advanced weapon systems is the near total lack of economic statistical data upon which econometric growth models can be based. An earlier study provided a framework for exploring alternative growth patterns for the CPR; the methodology of that study (referred to in this Input Substudy as RM-58) employs a simplified Harrod-Domar model, requiring only investment targets (expressed as a rate of aggregate savings) and an assumed marginal-output-to-capital ratio.[1]

Following a summary of current economic conditions, five projections of GNP and streams of output end-uses are presented to permit evaluation of the economic feasibility of force postures such as those postulated in Input Substudy G.

---

[1] M. Earle, et al., Projections of Communist China GNP and Output End-Use Allocations (SSC-RM-5205-58), Stanford Research Institute, June 1969, UNCLASSIFIED. See Chapter III of that report for a complete description of the Harrod-Domar approach and model.

I ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND NEAR TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS

The results of China's economic development programs the past two decades have been mixed. The success of the first Five-Year Plan (1952-1957) was impressive. Progress was evident in many sectors, particularly heavy industry and transportation. Agriculture was a problem area. The Great Leap Forward (GLF), conceived to increase heavy industry output and to solve concurrently the problem of rural unemployment and underemployment, was a well documented failure. GNP declined, according to Liu, from 113 billion yuan in 1958 to 97 in 1961. In 1961, the economy began its recovery and by 1965 industrial output levels were slightly higher than those of 1958. Moderate growth continued until the Cultural Revolution began in 1966.

Based on fragmentary evidence, the following observations can be made regarding the economic impact of the Cultural Revolution:

- Damage to the economy was probably less for the Cultural Revolution than was experienced in the GLF.
- The machine building industry was set back at least two years in the civilian sector and one and a half years in the defense sector.
- The industries that suffered the most declines were transportation, coal and steel.
- Foreign trade declined in 1967 to a level 7 percent below 1966 for imports and 15 percent below for exports.

The decline in the economy could have been much worse had the 1966-67 harvest not been so favorable. (The opposite was true in the GLF where bad planning and management problems were compounded by a significant decline in agriculture output.)

The near term growth potential of the economy is extremely difficult to determine, given the lack of economic indicators regarding the current state of the economy. Near term growth, however, probably depends on the following:

- Adequate expansion of the infra-structure necessary to support an expanding economy;
- Impact of the anti-technology and materialism doctrines on the incentives of the plant managers and workers;
- Success of the rural reform program announced by Mao in his directive of May 7, 1966. The program is aimed at increasing tool and fertilizer output in small local plants by financing the increased output directly by the communes and brigades. The ultimate objective of the program is the transfer of some skilled and educated people from cities to rural areas, reflecting Mao's concern that the rural/urban distinction be reduced;
- Resolution of the trade paradox. The need to import specific capital items to supplement existing capital stock is evident, yet the self-reliance concept of Mao's encourages reduced imports;[1]
- Impact on the quality of education of key scientific and management personnel of the new non-material incentives;
- Impact on economic development objectives of the patterns of leadership which might emerge after Mao;
- Success in controlling the population growth rate; growth during the last several years has been on the order of 1.8 percent per year, an intolerable level when your population exceeds 700 million;

[1] Many economists believe the self-reliance approach may have a greater long-run multiplier effect on development than an aggressive import strategy because it forces the indigenous population to acquire skills that are useful beyond the application of the specific capital item.

- And, finally, the ability of the central government to control regional leaders to ensure that the maximum return is realized for a given investment program.

To cover a range of possible results given the above, a set of five projections are presented in the next section.

II ALTERNATIVE 1970-1990 PROJECTIONS OF AGGREGATE OUTPUT

A. Values Selected for Growth Model Variables

As noted earlier, in addition to a base year GNP, a Harrod-Domar model requires only estimates of investment rates and marginal-output-to-capital ratios to project GNP over time. As in RM-58, the projections of this section are based on target rates of investment which are assumed (with one exception) constant for the 20-year period. Historical ChiCom savings rates are summarized in Table F-1. Although a reasonable average appears to be in the 20 to 25 percent of GNP range based on data in Table F-1, an extensive study by Chenery and Strout of economic development in underdeveloped countries found the normal range to be 9 to 16 percent with a median of 12 percent. With the exception of the low growth projections, the values used in this substudy tend to be lower than the historical data, but above the Chenery results, i.e., 18-20 percent. Such rates are generally compatible with the announced current targets. Use of such rates, however, causes inordinately low MOCR estimates as is noted in the following discussion.

Chenery and Strout found a MOCR quartile range from 0.21 (lower) to 0.36 (upper) for the five-year sample they analyzed. As noted in RM-58, use of 0.36 seems very high, since such levels have been enjoyed only by countries like Taiwan and Israel who have received significant external aid, an unlikely possibility for China. Yet, the 0.21 figure does not appear to enable the development of the requisite infrastructure. Moreover, the stream of investments of Table F-1 with reasonable MOCRs would have resulted in GNP growth in excess of that observed (see Table F-2),

Table F-1

ESTIMATES OF CHICOM SAVINGS RATES
(Percent of GNP)

Year	Su*	Hollister†	Liu‡	Ishikawa
1950	--	13.0	--	--
1951	--	17.9	--	--
1952	19.2	20.8	--	19.7
1953	21.1	21.6	--	22.1
1954	25.1	21.1	--	22.7
1955	25.7	20.7	--	21.6
1956	26.2	18.8	--	21.1
1957	25.8	22.6	--	23.7
1958	27.0	33.3	21.9	--
1959	33.8	33.2	19.2	--
1960	13.7	--	17.8	--
1961	21.1	--	16.9	--
1962	32.8	--	16.7	--
1963	--	--	17.0	--
1964	--	--	17.1	--
1965	--	--	18.0	--
1953-57 Average	25.1	21.0	--	23.0
1958-62 Average	31.7	--	18.5	--

Source: Earle, op. cit., p. 62.

* Y. L. Su, F. P. Hoeber, and W. W. Rockwell, The Economic Potential of Communist China, Volume I, Table 51, p. 298 and Volume 3, Table 67, p. 12a.

† William J. Hollister, "Trends in Capital Formation in Communist China," An Economic Profile of Mainland China, Volume I, Table 1, p. 125.

‡ Liu and Yeh, pp. 96-110.

Source: Ishikawa, National Income and Capital Formation in Mainland China, op. cit., Table 1-17, p. 90.

Table F-2

CHICOM GNP ESTIMATES, 1957-1965
(Billions of 1952 Yuan)

Year	Liu*	Wu†
1957	100.0	100.0
1958	113.1	110.7
1959	109.6	119.1
1960	100.7	120.7
1961	96.8	82.1
1962	98.7	109.0
1963	103.0	--
1964	109.4	130.0
1965	115.5	133.5

Source: Earle, op. cit., p. 56.

* Liu, Table No. 1, p. 50. Figures in the column have been adjusted upward by a depreciation factor of 5.0 percent, to convert NNP to GNP.

† 1957-62 figures from Y. L. Wu, The Economy of Communist China - An Introduction, Preger Dunlow, Publishers Press, 1965, p. 91; 1964 and 1965 figures from an unpublished study by Y. L. Wu, September, 1968.

even when the disruptive periods of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution are normalized. Thus, as a means to obtain reasonable GNP growth rates some abnormally low MOCRs were used, given that the investment rate was selected as 18-20 percent.[1]

Base year GNP (1969) was an update of the 1965 base year of RM-58. Essentially, a subjective judgment was made, based on the qualitative reports of the disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution, that a net growth of 2 percent was the probable upper limit for the period 1965-1969.

B. Values Selected for the Allocation of Output End-Use

By definition all output is divided into personal consumption, government, investment, and for the CPR, unidentified. The end-use sectors will be discussed in reverse order.

Normally, the output of an economy is divided into consumption and investment with consumption displayed by public (government) and private (personal) categories. However, when estimates were made of the values of the end-use categories it was found that their sum was less than GNP developed by other estimating and analytical techniques. To make the end-use allocations add to GNP, the difference between GNP and consumption plus investment is called unidentified. Some portion of the unidentified is government, some is personal consumption but, if the RM-58 model is used and the investment and MOCR figures are claimed to be net, then unidentified does not include any investment.

The investment allocation in all projections is that set by the planner and used in the projection model to derive the GNP growth estimates.

Government is subdivided into three categories, general, military and military foreign aid. These categories represent a slight regrouping from RM-58. In that study a separate estimate, called "special military," was made by Y. L. Wu of China's basic military R&D program.

---

[1] This is a departure from the approach of RM-85 where the investment rates were held down and higher MOCR estimates used. The net effect on GNP growth is the same whichever approach is taken.

Personal consumption is estimated using the concept of minimum maintenance income developed by Y. L. Wu and F. P. Hoeber.[1] Essentially, a subsistence level per capita consumption is estimated and that figure multiplied by the population level to derive total personal consumption. Thus, the population growth rates are directly related to the amount of output allocated by the model to personal consumption.

C. Alternative Projections of GNP and Output End-Use

A general description is given of the rationale for the five projections and the structural and end-use allocation factors explicitly listed.

[1] See Earle, op. cit.

Table F-3

GNP AND END-USE ALLOCATIONS, PROJECTION A

General Description: Low GNP growth. Per capita consumption held constant; small increase in the allocation to the government sector. Moderate gross investment but average MOCR very low reflecting periodic recessions. Population growth rate reduced to 1.5% yr. from the current limit of about 2%.

Values for GNP Growth model parameters:

Marginal Output - Capital ratio (MOCR): .154

Savings ratio: .13

GNP Growth rate: 2.0%

Projections	Projection Factor	1969	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Population (millions of persons)	1.5% increase yr	771	783	843	908	978	1054
GNP (billions of 1952 yuan)		133.7	136.4	150.0	166.3	183.6	202.7
End-use Allocations:							
1. Personal Consumption (billion yuan per capita current value)	constant	71.1	72.5	78.1	84.	90.6	97.6
2. Government		13.2	13.5	14.5	15.2	16.7	19.2
a. General	0.5% yr.	(6.5)	(6.5)	(7.5)	(6.9)	(7.1)	(7.3)
b. Military	0.5% yr.	(9.7)	(9.7)	(10.0)	(10.3)	(10.6)	(10.9)
c. Foreign Military Aid	constant	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)
3. Investment	14.0% GNP	20.1	17.7	19.6	21.6	23.9	26.4
4. Underutilized	18.2% GNP	24.0	25.5	29.5	31.1	31.3	37.9
5. Growth in Allocable Output	residual	0	3.5	5.7	11.3	19.1	21.6
Alternative PAO							
Underutilized Sector Constant at 1969 level	constant	24.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
Alternative Potential Allocable Output	residual	0	3.5	10.5	17.4	24.4	34.5



Figure F-1 PROJECTION A - POTENTIAL ALLOCABLE OUTPUT*

Table F-4

GNP AND END-USE ALLOCATIONS, PROJECTION B

General Description: Moderate GNP Growth. Per capita consumption increases slightly overtime; marginal increases in the allocation to government end-uses. Investment rate averages near 20% and MOCR achieved about average. Population growth rate reduced to 1.5% yr. from the current rate of about 2%.

Values for GNP growth model parameters:

Marginal output - Capital ratio (MOCR): .350

Savings ratio: .18

GNP Growth rate: 1.5%

Projections	Projection Factor	1969	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Population (billions of persons)	1.5% increase/yr	771	783	843	908	978	1051
GNP (billions of 1952 yuan)		139.7	139.7	174.1	217.0	270.4	337.0
End-use Allocations:							
1. Personal Consumption (92.0 yuan per capita initial value)	1.0% yr						
Real		71.1	73.2	82.7	93.3	105.1	118.1
Adjusted*		- -	71.2	- -	- -	- -	- -
2. Government		17.-	17.1	18.2	19.1	20.1	21.1
a. General	1.0% yr	(6.5)	(6.6)	(6.9)	(7.3)	(7.7)	(8.1)
b. Military	1.0% yr	(9.7)	(9.8)	(10.3)	(10.8)	(11.4)	(12.0)
c. Foreign Military Aid	0.5% yr	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)
3. Investment	18.0% GNP	20.1	21.1	31.3	39.1	48.7	60.7
4. Undistributed	18.7% GNP	25.0	25.-	27.9	41.1	41.3	37.9
5. Potential Allocable Output	Residual						
Real*		0	-1.5	12.4	31.4	62.2	99.2
Adjusted*		0	0	12.4	31.4	62.2	99.2
Alternative PAO							
Undistributed Sector Constant at 1969 level	constant	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
Alternative Potential Allocable Output	residual	0	-1.0	30.9	40.5	71.5	112.1

* If the PAO is a positive given the above projection factors, the amount necessary to raise PAO to zero is taken from personal consumption.



Figure F-2 PROJECTION B - POTENTIAL ALLOCABLE OUTPUT*

Table F-5

GNP AND END-USE ALLOCATIONS, PROJECTION C

General Description: Moderate GNP growth, variant. Per capital consumption allowed to increase 2% per year while moderate increases are also programmed to all governmental sectors, although military end-uses are emphasized. An investment rate of 20% is maintained (the announced target) but due to periodic recessions the MOCR achieved only average about .23. Population grows unchecked at 2%/yr.

Values for GNP growth model parameters:

Marginal output - Capital ratio (MOCR): .225
Savings ratio: .20
GNP Growth rate: 4.5%

Projections	Projection Factor	1969	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Population (billions of persons)	2.0% increase /yr	771	786	868	958	1058	1168
GNP (billions of 1969 yuan)		153.7	159.7	174.1	217.0	270.1	337.0
End-Use Allocations:							
1. Personal Consumption (96.6 yuan per capita initial value)	2.0%/yr						
Real*		71.1	73.2	90.0	108.2	129.3	153.6
Adjusted*		- -	68.5	89.9	- -	- -	- -
2. Government		17.2	17.6	19.9	22.5	25.4	28.8
a. General	2.0% yr	(6.5)	(6.6)	(7.3)	(8.1)	(8.9)	(9.8)
b. Military	3.0% yr	(9.7)	(10.0)	(11.6)	(13.4)	(15.5)	(18.0)
c. Foreign Military Aid	1.0% yr	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)
3. Investment	20.0% GNP	30.1	31.9	34.8	43.4	54.1	67.4
4. Unidentified	18.7% GNP	35.0	36.5	39.5	51.1	34.3	37.0
a. Potential Allocable Output	residual						
Real*		0	-5.5	-0.1	11.8	27.3	49.3
Adjusted*		0	0	0	11.8	27.3	49.3
Alternative PAO Utilization Sector Constant at 1969 level	constant	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
Alternative Potential Allocable Output	residual	0	-5.0	1.1	17.9	36.6	67.2

* If the PAO is negative given the above projection factors, the amount necessary to raise PAO to zero is taken from personal consumption.



Figure F-3 PROJECTION C - POTENTIAL ALLOCABLE OUTPUT*

Table F-6

GNP AND END-USE ALLOCATIONS, PROJECTION D

General Description: high GNP growth. Per capita consumption grows at an annual rate (1.5%) slightly less than population which grows unchecked at 2.0%/yr. A moderate increase in the allocation of output to government is programmed. The significant difference between Projection D and those of B and C is that a high MOCR is achieved which results, given the assumed 18% annual rate of investment, in a high rate of GNP growth, 6%/yr.

Values for GNP growth model parameters:

Marginal output - capital ratio (MOCR): .333

Savings ratio: .18

GNP growth rate: 6.0%

Projections	Projection Factor	1969	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
Population (millions of persons)	2.0% increase/yr	771	786	868	958	1058	1168
GNP (billions of 1952 yuan)		103.7	111.7	189.7	253.9	339.8	454.7
End-Use Allocations:							
1. Personal Consumption (1.5% increase per capita in real value)	15%/yr						
Real*		71.4	73.9	87.9	101.4	124.2	147.7
Adjusted*		- -	74.5	- -	- -	- -	- -
2. Government		17.2	17.5	19.2	21.1	23.1	25.4
a. General	2.0%/yr	(8.5)	(8.6)	(9.3)	(9.9)	(8.9)	(9.8)
b. Military	7.0%/yr	(8.7)	(8.9)	(10.9)	(12.0)	(13.2)	(14.6)
c. Foreign Military Aid	0.5%/yr	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)
3. Investment	18.0%/GNP	20.1	21.3	31.3	39.1	48.7	60.7
4. Intermediate	18.7%/GNP	25.0	26.1	29.5	31.1	34.3	37.9
5. Potential Allocable Output	to total						
Real*		0	-0.3	-1.8	4.2	107.5	183.0
Adjusted*		0	0	-1.8	4.2	107.5	183.0
Alternative PAO Reduction Sector							
Constant at 1969 level	constant	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
Alternative Potential Allocable Output	residual	0	0.3	26.3	41.3	118.8	195.0

* If real PAO is negative, given the assumed projection factors, the amount necessary to raise PAO to zero is taken from personal consumption.



Figure F-4 PROJECTION D - POTENTIAL ALLOCABLE OUTPUT*

* Potential Allocable Output (PAO) = the difference between GNP and the assumed level of aggregate output allocated to personal consumption, investment, government and unidentified. The PAO could, therefore, be available for allocation to support advanced military programs as outlined in the study.

Table F-7

GNP AND END-USE ALLOCATIONS, PROJECTION E

General Description: low to moderate graduated growth. Projection E assumes that Mao dies in the mid-70's. Prior to his death a moderate GNP growth rate had been achieved; during the period following his death the political consolidation results in a low net growth in aggregate output. From 1980-85 an increased rate of growth in GNP is achieved followed by a "solid" growth period based on better planning and execution. The factors for each period are listed in the table; the selection of 1975 as the point in time when Mao dies is arbitrary.

Values for GNP growth model parameters:	1970-75	1976-80	1981-85	1986-90
Marginal output - Capital ratio (MOCR):	.233	.154	.233	.250
Savings ratio	.15	.13	.15	.18
GNP Growth rate:	3.5%	2.0%	3.5%	4.5%

Projections	Projection Factors				1969	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990
	1970-75	1976-80	1981-85	1986-90						
Population (millions of persons)	1.8% /yr	2.0% /yr	1.8% /yr	1.5% /yr	771	785	858	947	1035	1115
GNP (billions of 1952 yuan)					133.7	138.4	164.4	181.5	215.6	268.7
End-Use Allocations:										
1. Personal Consumption (92.6 yuan per capita initial value)	1.0%	2.0%	constant 1980 value							
Real*					71.4	73.4	84.2	107.3	117.3	126.3
Adjusted*					- -	- -	- -	103.2	- -	- -
2. Government					17.2	17.3	19.0	20.8	23.8	25.9
a. General	1.0%	1.0%	1.5%	1.5%	(6.5)	(6.6)	(7.1)	(7.5)	(8.1)	(8.7)
b. Military	2.0%	1.0%	2.0%	2.0%	(9.7)	(9.9)	(10.9)	(13.3)	(14.7)	(16.2)
c. Foreign Military Aid		constant 0.5%			(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)
3. Investment	15% GNP	13% GNP	15% GNP	18% GNP	20.1	20.8	24.7	23.6	32.3	48.4
4. Unidentified	18.7%	18.7%	18.7%	18.7%	25.0	25.9	30.7	33.9	40.3	50.2
5. Potential Allocable Output		residual								
Real*					0	0.8	5.8	-4.1	1.9	17.9
Adjusted*					0	0.8	5.8	0	1.9	17.9
Alternative PAO										
Unidentified Sector Constant at 1969 level		constant			25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
Alternative Potential Allocable Output		residual			0	1.7	11.5	4.8	17.2	43.1

* If the PAO is negative given the assumed projection factors, the amount necessary to raise PAO to zero is taken from personal consumption.



*Potential Allocable Output (PAO) is the difference between GNP and the assumed level of all non-defense budget allocations, private consumption, investment, government and international costs. The PAO would then be available for allocation to support expanded military programs as outlined in Projection A.

Figure F-5 PROJECTION E - POTENTIAL ALLOCABLE OUTPUT*



Figure F-6 GNP AND END-USE PROJECTION E

III ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS

After extensive analysis of the economic potential of Communist China to support advanced military programs, RM-58 concluded that "the construction of a set of GNP estimates and output end-use allocations such as those set forth . . . is little more than an exercise in reasonable thinking. Data on actual parameters are non-existent. The impact of political activities in Mainland China is abrupt and apparently repetitive."[1] The same conclusion applies to this input substudy. A Harrod-Domar approach is, however, useful for exploring the sensitivity of possible streams of GNP to major changes in the structural variables of the growth model.

Figure F-7 presents GNP estimates for Communist China for the period 1952-1990. The 1952-1965 data is based on an average of Wu and Liu estimates. The extrapolation from 1965-1969 is a subjective update of Stanford Research Institute's 1965 GNP estimate, based on fragmentary reports of the impact of the Cultural Revolution on that economy. During that period even less than the normal sparse data was available upon which GNP estimates could be derived. For the period 1969-1990 three estimates are present. A high growth case (Projection D) provides the upper boundary and a low growth case (Projection A) reflects a GNP growth rate of 2 percent per year. Also plotted on the figure is the GNP estimate for Projection E which assumed a moderate growth until after a postulated leadership reconsolidation following Mao's death.

The general test of economic feasibility used in this study is the absolute size of potential allocable output, i.e., that resource stream available to support the postulated military programs presented in Input Substudy E. An assessment of the adequacy of the potential allocable output streams is included as part of Input Substudy E.

---

[1] Earle, op. cit., p 115.



Figure F-7
COMMUNIST CHINA GNP ESTIMATES, 1952-1990*

DATA SOURCES:
(1) 1952-1965
Average of Wu and Liu estimates
Wu estimates:
1952-1965: Y. L. Wu, R. F. Hudson, M. M. Rockwell, The Economic Potential of Communist China, Volume I: Growth to 1970, SRI, 1965, p. 130.
1966: Their unpublished study by Y. L. Wu for SRI, September 1966.
Liu estimates:
1952-1957: T. C. Liu and K. C. Yeh, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965, p. 91. 1958-1965: U. S. Exp. Doc., p. 50; data for these years have been increased by a 4 percent depreciation factor to convert NNP to GNP.
(2) 1966-1969: Update of 1965 data as done in 1965 in this study.
(3) 1970-1990: Projections Y. L. and T. Liu's Subtrends.

In some of the projections because of the assumed values of the factors, the potential allocable output turned out to be negative, for example in Projection B the year 1970. In all such instances the potential allocable output was adjusted to zero and personal consumption adjusted downward by the appropriate amount.

The unidentified sector, calculated to be 18.7 percent of GNP in the base year 1969, is handled two ways in the projections. First, it is held constant at 18.7 percent of GNP — thus as GNP grows, unidentified also grows. An alternative PAO stream is generated by holding unidentified constant at the 1969 level of 25 billion yuan. In all instances the latter increases the size of the time stream of potential allocable output.

Analysis of economic feasibility using the above approach provides, as noted above, an ability to understand the reasonableness of certain claimants on aggregate resources. It should be noted, however, that if the priority of a program is high enough (for example, China's nuclear and missile R&D programs) the money will be expended for the program even at the cost of a greater GNP growth or satisfaction of even "minimum" programs requirements of other output claimants.

Input Substudy G

POSTULATED CPR STRATEGIC FORCE POSTURES

By: M. Earle, D. Benson, W. Lee

Input Substudy G

POSTULATED CPR STRATEGIC FORCE POSTURES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	INTRODUCTION	G-1
I	ALTERNATIVE CPR MILITARY STRATEGIES	G-2
II	FORCE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS	G-6
III	TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH AND WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAM STATUS	G-8
IV	POSTULATED FORCE POSTURES	G-21
V	WEAPON SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS	G-34

INTRODUCTION[1]

The purpose of this substudy is to present data on four postulated CPR strategic force postures. These postures provide baseline projections of forces which might be purchased over time to support possible ChiCom military strategies. From the analysis of alternative postures such as presented in this paper, one can begin to assess the possible utility to CPR force planners of clandestine nuclear weapons.

[1] Force data for this substudy was drawn in large part from SSC-TN-5205-105 Input to SPAR-69 China Threat Data (U) (Secret Restricted Data), by W. T. Lee, M. Earle, D. Benson and P. A. Nimmons. The intelligence cut-off date for this substudy was January 1970.

[redacted]

I ALTERNATIVE CPR MILITARY STRATEGIES (U)

[redacted] Given the national objective discussed in Substudy E, two military strategies can be defined as a basis for developing alternative future strategic force postures. These strategies have in common the direct and indirect support of revolutionary wars and the attainment of at least some kind of strategic nuclear offensive force to deter the United States and perhaps even the USSR. Within each strategy, specific options remain concerning the timing of the development and deployment of specific weapon systems. Thus, for each pattern, the CPR planners may decide to achieve an early military capability or to delay such expenditures to realize a greater political/military potential a decade or so later.

[redacted] The ChiCom alternatives are:

[redacted] a. A "limited global strategy" that places primary emphasis on building a nuclear strategic offensive force for deterring the United States and possibly the USSR and non-Communist nations in Asia.

[redacted] b. A "Eurasian emphasis strategy" consisting of two basic variants:

- The buildup of strategic offensive forces such as MRBMs, SLCMs, and bombers designed primarily for use in Asia, including the gradual modernization of air defense and at least part of the ground forces, supplemented by forces permitting a very limited second-strike capability against the United States or the USSR.
- Military policies which would give priority to air defense and the complete modernization of the ground force, with only token SOF directed against either the CONUS or Asian nations.

[redacted] 1. The following sequence would be consistent with giving priority to the theater nuclear force objective:

[redacted] a. The immediate objective would be to gain the prestige of a nuclear power. This has already been largely achieved by the testing

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] of three fission devices, one of which probably was delivered by a ballistic missile and by the testing of four thermonuclear devices.

[redacted] b. In the early 1970s the ChiComs probably would deploy a medium and light bomber, MRBM/IRBM and perhaps an SLCM force designed to threaten Asian nations, thus reducing the efficacy of U.S. nuclear guarantees, and holding those nations hostage for U.S. actions in Asia. Part of the force would be targeted against the USSR. An increased theater target capability could be attained in the mid-to-late 1970s through the deployment of an IRBM with approximately a 2000 nmi range.

[redacted] c. Also in the early-to-mid 1970s, however, the ChiComs would deploy a very small ICBM force intended to threaten the United States with the destruction of a few cities. The ICBMs might be supplemented by a few SLBMs, but this is considered doubtful if the decision is made to channel resources and technology toward a significant theater attack capability.

[redacted] 2. While this appears to be one logical sequence of evolving ChiCom objectives, there is also an alternative set of time-phased objectives in which the ChiComs seek a deterrent force against the United States as early as possible at the expense of the MRBM/IRBM force threatening their Asian neighbors.[1] If direct threats to the United States and the USSR are given first priority, then the Chinese objectives might evolve in the following manner:

[redacted] a. Make public claims to membership in the strategic nuclear club on the basis of the nuclear tests already conducted and by the orbiting of a satellite in early 1970.

[redacted] b. Deploy a small number of ICBM launchers as soon as possible in order to lend credence to claims of deterring the United States and negotiating U.S. nuclear guarantees.[2]

---

[1] [redacted] This does not mean, however, that the MRBM/IRBM force might not be deployed in limited numbers.

[2] [redacted] As a variant, the deployment of an operational ICBM system might be delayed until their solid propellant technology is sufficiently advanced.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] c. Develop an I/MRBM system and initially deploy it against the USSR for similar reasons; use both the ICBM and I/MRBM capabilities to buttress the ChiCom claims to leadership of national Communist parties throughout the world.

[redacted] d. Delay the I/MRBM force targeted against other Asian neighbors and U.S. bases until the mid-1970s.

[redacted] 3. Regardless of the ChiCom choice of these general alternatives, they very likely will engage in a modest national space program to lend credibility to their claims of accomplishments and to enhance the political utility of the forces they may deploy.

[redacted] 4. If the ChiComs are to realize their long-term objectives, they must acquire a nuclear force capable of deterring both the United States and the USSR from using nuclear weapons, for two principal reasons:

[redacted] First, Sino-Soviet relations already have deteriorated to a point where the Chinese leaders cannot depend on the USSR to invoke its nuclear deterrent in China's behalf. Indeed, unless a political rapprochement is achieved, a prudent ChiCom planner probably would rate the risk of a nuclear confrontation with the USSR on a par with the risk of such a crisis with the United States.

[redacted] Second, without a capability to threaten CONUS, ChiCom threats of nuclear attacks on its Asian neighbors probably would not be credible, and hence the Chinese would not be able effectively to discredit U.S. nuclear guarantees. While a considerable part of the USSR is within 1000 nmi MRBM range of likely ChiCom deployment areas, Moscow and the bulk of Soviet industry and population requires much longer range IRBM delivery vehicles.

[redacted] In order to serve effectively as a deterrent against a U.S. (or USSR) nuclear strike, the Chinese nuclear force would need a second-strike capability against U.S. and USSR cities. Even without second-strike capability, it could still be a deterrent against U.S. or USSR escalation at lower levels. At no time in the forseeable future can China be expected to have a nuclear force anywhere near the size or

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] capability of those of the two superpowers. Thus, China cannot hope to achieve a capability to destroy the protected strategic nuclear forces of either of the two major powers.

[redacted] However, even a second-strike force of quite uncertain reliability could be very useful for China. By making it likely that some portion of its force might survive a first strike, China could threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries which the United States has guaranteed against nuclear attack, suggesting that the United States would be deterred from retaliation. A second-strike capability would have similar strategic utility against the USSR.

[redacted] Additionally, such a second-strike capability could be used to deter certain U.S. actions in the Asian theater--or USSR actions in the border regions; e.g., the use of tactical nuclear weapons to repel an overwhelming conventional attack by Chinese forces. This could be done either by threatening nuclear escalation, or, in the event of a counter-force strike by one of the superpowers, by threatening the destruction of several of their cities with China's residual capability.

[redacted] If the Chinese leaders take a "twenty-year look," their best strategy would be to invest heavily in selected basic industries--metallurgy, chemicals and plastics; electronics; technical education; and, basic military research during the coming decade in order to create a strong base for future expansion of their military effort. However, they would then have to be satisfied with a relatively small and unsophisticated strategic force until 1980-85. If, on the other hand, the Chinese attempt to build a modern strategic force rapidly during the next ten years, this would have to be at the further expense of civilian consumption, expansion of their industrial base, and rate of growth of their technological progress. If they tie up most of their scientists, technicians, and most technically advanced capital stock in large-scale development programs over the next ten years, then their ability to expand and to modernize their forces in the second decade would be severely limited.[1]

---

[1] [redacted] This effect on economic growth is referred to as the scissors effect.

[redacted]

[redacted]

II FORCE DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS (U)

[redacted] A. The ChiComs must satisfy a number of prerequisite conditions if their leaders are to aggressively pursue any of the strategies outlined above. At a minimum the following conditions will have to be met:

[redacted] 1. Maintenance of effective political control over Mainland China.

[redacted] 2. Achievement of a rate of growth in GNP sufficient to provide an adequate level of consumption of the growing population and the maximum rate of saving for investment in the industrial base and for support of military programs.[1]

[redacted] 3. Generation of adequate foreign exchange for overseas purchases for consumption, and military and industrial development.

[redacted] 4. Development of a broad, diversified base and extensive applied competence in advanced technologies, including all the skills, facilities, and industrial infrastructure required for a nuclear force.

[redacted] 5. Modernization of the ground and tactical air armies and their air defenses, at least to the degree necessary to provide defense of Mainland China and some capability to cope with potential escalation of the "revolutionary" war that they support around the Asian littoral.

[redacted] B. If the United States continues its policy of containing the CPR and if friction with the USSR continues to grow (or even remains

---

[1](U) Ideally, the level of consumption would be maintained at the per capita subsistence "minimum maintenance" level. However, in the short-run, dips below even that level are possible. Further, as will be shown later, the resources available for the military are sensitive to the defined per capita subsistence level which is used to calculate the percent of GNP allocated to personal consumption.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

at present levels), then a military force adequate to support China's most ambitious national objectives would require a mix of intercontinental strategic offensive systems, modern theater forces composed of nuclear and conventional elements, and at least some air defense for Mainland China. To acquire such a force mix would be extremely costly, and the CPR would have to overcome serious economic and technical limitations. It is unlikely that these can be eliminated during the next two decades. Therefore, the CPR will be faced with difficult decisions regarding the allocation of the military budget and national resources between conventional theater forces, air defense, and the nuclear forces, particularly during the first decade. Finding the resources for such national prestige activities as a space program will compound the CPR's problem.

[redacted] C. The technology consideration for force posture development are discussed in the next section.

[redacted]

III TECHNOLOGICAL GROWTH AND WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAM STATUS (U)

A. External Aid (U)

[redacted] The relatively rapid progress of CPR strategic missile and nuclear weapons programs today can probably be explained primarily by three factors:

[redacted] a. The CPR received significant assistance in ballistic missile and nuclear technology from the USSR prior to 1961, made extensive use of voluminous information either published in the United States or Western Europe in open-source literature, and benefited from the fact that a number of their scientists and engineers were trained in Western Europe and the USSR.

[redacted] b. The CPR have given top priority to these military research and development efforts and have developed a organizational structure which ensures that the missile and nuclear programs receive first call on all the human and material resources, internal and external, available to the regime.

[redacted] c. The atomic energy and ballistic missile development organizations are, or were, headed by very capable and dedicated individuals and the establishment was free of political interference at least until the Cultural Revolution in late 1966.

[redacted] Soviet assistance during 1957-1960, with some deliveries of hardware (probably extending to 1962) as a minimum fulfillment of pre-existing contracts, apparently included the following elements:

[redacted] a. Provision of a limited number of missiles and ground support equipment for liquid propellant SRBM systems including possibly the SS-1a SCUNNER, SS-1b SCUD, SS-2 SIBLING, SS-3 SHYSTER, and perhaps even plans for the SS-4 SANDAL MRBM; similar hardware and equipment items for

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the SA-2 guideline surface-to-air defensive missile system; missiles and some support equipment for the SSC-2 SAMLET and SS-N-2 STYX surface-to-surface short range naval cruise missile systems and perhaps the SSC-2a SALISH ground-launched short-range cruise missile may also have been included.

[redacted] b. Assistance in the design and construction of a test range intended to develop and train crews on ballistic missile systems through the 1000 nmi range, MRBM class.

[redacted] c. Provision of designs and probably some of the necessary equipment and instrumentation for liquid propellant test facilities adequate for developing propulsion systems for ballistic missiles ranging from short-range tactical models through MRBMs.

[redacted] d. Assistance in the design and tooling of missile production facilities--the extent of this assistance is less certain than the previously listed items.

[redacted] e. Some degree of assistance with the construction of one G-class diesel-powered ballistic missile launching submarine and in construction of one or more classes of fast short-range Soviet-designed cruise missile launching patrol boats of the OSA and KOMAR classes.

[redacted] f. Assistance in the design and construction of W and R-class diesel-powered attack submarines.

[redacted] Although the Soviet withdrawal of technical and hardware assistance in 1960 seems to have slowed the Chinese advanced weapons programs considerably, it by no means reduced the priority of the effort as far as the ChiComs were concerned. By about 1966 the ChiComs seemed to have recovered from the worst effects of the withdrawal and probably were at about the point in weapon development they would have reached in about 1962 if the break had not occurred. Hence, the apparent effect of the ICBM firings will probably be launched on a southwesterly azimuth with impact points somewhere in the Indian Ocean, although Pacific Ocean points cannot be ruled out at this time.

[redacted]

[redacted]

B. ICBM Development Program (U)

[redacted] Briefly reconstructing the major milestones as shown in Fig. G-1, it is noted that Soviet assistance in the design and construction of the test range probably began about the time the 1957 agreement on the extension of technical assistance in advanced weaponry was signed. The first hardware deliveries of liquid fuel ballistic missiles ranging from the SS-1 through possibly the SS-3 or SS-4 probably occurred in the 1958 to 1960 period. Initial firings of the Soviet-supplied hardware at the test range probably took place in the 1959-1960 period. Soviet assistance on the static test and propulsion development facilities for ballistic missiles very likely occurred sometime in 1959-1960, or just before the Soviet withdrawal.

[redacted] Working backward from the ICBM milestone shown in Fig. G-1 and assuming that the first ICBM test booster will consist of clustered MRBM propulsion units, it can be inferred that construction of a production facility capable of producing SRBM/MRBMs, and eventually clustering these boosters into a larger vehicle, must have started no later than about mid-1960. This facility probably was based upon Soviet designs and may have been equipped to a large extent by the USSR since it is not very likely that the ChiComs have been able to produce, or import from the West, all of the specialized tooling and instrumentation required to develop and to produce liquid fuel boosters for missiles of this size. However, by some time in 1965-1966 the Chinese probably were producing prototype MRBMs, or at least their equivalent in terms of propulsion systems and tankage, at the rate of one or two vehicles per month. The preponderance of opinion leans toward storable liquid propulsion technology as being readily available for the first generation ChiCom MRBM and the ICBM. The postulated second generation ICBM could be either a more advanced storable liquid or a solid propellant system.

[redacted] Given the Chinese launch of a space booster in early 1970, its development probably can be traced back to 1962 when test firings of a first stage consisting of clustered MRBM propulsion units may have begun at the Peiping development facility. Based upon this milestone, the

[redacted]



Figure G-1 [redacted] MILESTONES OF CHICOM BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT--HIGH TO MEDIUM CONFIDENCE MILESTONES (U)

[redacted]

launch facility at the SCTMTC probably began construction in 1965-66 and presumably was completed by the end of 1967 in view of the publicized ChiCom official forecasts of an ICBM/space vehicle launch in 1967.

[redacted] Since the initial operational Chinese thermonuclear weapon probably will weigh on the order of 4000 to 6000 lbs, and since the first ICBM probably will be a large and cumbersome vehicle in the tradition of the Soviet SS-6, any ChiCom ICBM force deployed in the early to mid-1970s probably will consist of soft above-ground launch sites. Plausible characteristics for the first ChiCom ICBM/space booster based on the above development data are as follows:

Table G-1 [redacted]

PLAUSIBLE FIRST GENERATION ICBM CHARACTERISTICS (U)

Configuration	2-stage
Propellant	Storable Liquid (Kerosine Amine)
Dimensions	Diameter: 8-12 feet Length: 100-120 feet
Gross Liftoff Weight	400,000-600,000 lbs
Range (Nominal)	5000-6000 nmi
CEP	3-5 nmi
Payload Weight	6000-10,000 lbs
Yield	2.0-4.0 MT
Deployment Mode	Soft above-ground launchers, rail served
IOC	1972-1974

C. I/MRBM Development Program (U)

[redacted] Since most observers estimate that the CPR had achieved the technical capability to deploy MRBMs sometime in 1967, test firings of Chinese-produced missiles of this type (600-1000 nmi range) can be assumed to have begun as early as 1965.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Plausible characteristics for the first generation ChiCom MRBM based on intelligence community estimates are as follows:

Table G-2 [redacted]

PLAUSIBLE FIRST GENERATION MRBM CHARACTERISTICS (U)

Configuration	Single Stage
Propellant	Storable Liquid (Kerosine/Amine)
Dimensions	Length: 70 feet Diameter: 5 feet
Gross Liftoff Weight	100,000 lbs
Range	600-1000 nmi
Guidance	Radio Inertial
CEP	2.0-3.0 nmi
Payload Weight	~3000 lbs
Yield	0.05 MT
Deployment Mode	Road transportable to soft above-ground sites
IOC	1969-1971

[redacted] The reasons for the apparent delay in MRBM deployment are unknown, and could range from an overestimation of their technical capability, to the diversion of needed resources in support of an early ICBM program, to the effects of the Cultural Revolution. In any event, the next ten years will almost certainly see some level of Chinese Communist deployment of I/MRBMs even if in the near term they concentrate their resources on developing and producing ICBMs targeted against the United States. There is also the possibility that MRBM deployment is being delayed until the ChiComs develop an IRBM capable of reaching targets in the Western USSR.

[redacted] However, it may still be assumed with some confidence that, if the ChiComs follow the time-phased sequence of national objectives outlined in Substudy E, they will probably seek an early SRBM/MRBM nuclear

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

threat capability against their Asian neighbors to dilute the effectiveness of U.S. guarantees and perhaps hold these nations as hostages. Most of the potential military and urban/industrial targets on the Asian periphery can be reached by MRBMs located some distance from the China Coast. It should be noted that the ChiComs have launched a missile to MRBM ranges with a nuclear warhead (CHIC-4 test).

[redacted] The first generation ChiCom MRBM will most likely be a storable liquid propellant system similar to the Soviet SS-3.

[redacted] A possible spinoff from the MRBM test and development program is the short range (100-300 nmi) tactical missile. However, such a system will probably have to wait until the late 1970s when warhead capability will exist for smaller payload missiles.

D. Considerations Affecting the ChiCom SLBM Development Program (U)

[redacted] The principal rationale for postulating a Chinese Communist SLBM program in the future is to ensure some degree of survivability of their strategic deterrent force in the face of overwhelming U.S. SOF capabilities.[1] Even if the Chinese Communists deploy their ICBM and MRBM launchers in hardened silos, the number of hard targets almost certainly will be small relative to the number of available warheads in the U.S. or USSR ICBM and I/MRBM inventories, a small portion of which would be adequate to inflict heavy if not total attrition on the Chinese strategic attack force.

[redacted] Apparently the Chinese Communists do have some current interest in an SLBM force, although the indicators are not necessarily as strong as may appear at first glance. The Chinese Communists have one G-class submarine which they assembled themselves in 1964-1965. It is not known whether they fabricated any or all of the components, or whether they merely assembled what had been previously received from the USSR. Perhaps it was a mixture of assembly and native construction of components not supplied by the USSR. Most important, there is as yet no evidence of a second G-type submarine under construction nor are the

[1] [redacted] Implicitly this assumes a "less-than-totally-effective" U.S. ASW capability.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] ChiComs believed to have launched a missile from their existing single G-class submarine as yet.[1] On the other hand, such a missile launching could occur at any time, since information concerning the scope of the research and development effort at the missile test range is inadequate to determine whether or not a suitable missile has actually been undergoing flight tests there. The single G-class is likely to serve as a test bed for development and operational purposes, although the construction of additional units remain a possibility.

[redacted] Many operational problems face a Chinese Communist submarine force designed to operate against the United States. For instance, the diesel-powered G-class submarine operating against targets at the limit of its combat radius would probably be able to maintain itself on station for only about one or two days and would be limited by its range(in terms of the number of targets it could attack) to targets in the U.S. Northwest. Moreover, and more important, even the most direct route would probably require mid-sea refueling before the SLBM could reach targets on the West Coast of CONUS other than the Northwest. If mid-ocean refueling is necessary, the chances of detection and destruction by U.S. ASW would be increased. If the ChiComs decide to choose the option to develop an SLBM force, it is postulated that they will first develop and build a new type longer range diesel submarine (enabling them to cover at least all of CONUS West Coast targets). This submarine is assumed for study purposes to be capable of surface launching eight solid propellant missiles with a range of at least 1000 nmi. A missile with a range of 1000 miles would subject much of the United States to attack.

[redacted] If it is assumed that the Chinese Communists have both a solid propellant research program for development of a submarine-launched missile and a companion program for native design and construction of a new

---

[1] [redacted] The Chinese Communists are currently constructing copies of the R-class Soviet diesel attack submarine in their shipyards and have fabricated and constructed some W-class diesel attack submarines in the past.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] longer range diesel submarine, initial operational capability could be achieved by the mid to late 1970s.[1]

[redacted] It is highly unlikely, even if the submarine system that is discussed above is developed and deployed, that the Chinese Communists will be able to deploy a diesel-powered submarine force against the East Coast of the United States because of the very great distances involved, unless they acquire advance support bases in South America or Africa. Presumably, any attempt by the Chinese Communists to do so would engender a strong U.S. response to deny the use of such bases to Chinese Communist submarines. Moreover, the uncertain course of political fortunes in most of the candidate countries probably would not give the Chinese commander much confidence in the long-term availability of such ports, even if the United States were not able to deny submarine bases in African nations or South America.

[redacted] While a nuclear submarine would appear to be a highly desirable component of the Red Chinese strategic force, the problems involved in developing, producing, and deploying a nuclear submarine before the mid-1980s appear very formidable. If the Chinese Communists are going to have a nuclear submarine before 1980, the program should already be in the early research and development stages, with perhaps some mock-up work accomplished on the nuclear reactor. Thus, it is considered highly unlikely that the Chinese Communists will have the technology and resources required for a nuclear naval vessel program until the early 1980s.

E. The Strategic Aerodynamic Development Program (U)

1. SLCM Systems (U)

[redacted] Intelligence evidence indicates that as a part of the Soviet aid program, the SAMLET, STYX and possibly the SALISH cruise missiles

---

[1] [redacted] Construction of some of the development and test facilities required for native submarine design has been reported and there is good evidence of an indigenous ChiCom solid fuel RDT&E program.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] were provided to the ChiComs in limited numbers. Further indications exist concerning the existence of R&D facilities at Chin-Hsi, an operational flight test center at Ch'ang-Hsin-Tien and possible system production capability at Nan-Ch'ang. A relatively simple method of achieving a quick theater strategic weapon capability is to modify existing ChiCom W or R-class diesel-powered attack submarines to carry and launch native design nuclear-tipped cruise missiles developed from technology gained from the above-mentioned Soviet-supplied systems. Such a program would be assumed similar to the Soviet's W-conversion twin cylinder/SS-N-3 cruise missile systems. For purposes of this study a limited number of these postulated submarine-launched cruise missile systems are included as a part of the ChiCom Eurasian threat.

[redacted] There is also a strong possibility based on current ChiCom interest in cruise missiles that some type of cruise missile will be utilized by the land force either in a coastal defense role or possibly as a tactical surface-to-surface weapon.

2. Bomber Systems (U)

[redacted] The ChiComs currently have five bomber systems in their operational inventory: the IL-10 BEAST with a force level of 25-30; 75-100 TU-2 BATS; 275-325 IL-28 BEAGLES; 10-13 TU-4 BULLS and 2-3 TU-16 BADGERS. All systems were provided by the Soviets. There is some evidence that a Soviet-provided factory capable of producing BADGER-type airframes may have been completed a year or two ago, but evidently no aircraft have been produced. The reasons for the gap between capability and actual production are not known. Again, the candidate reasons range from technological and resource constraints to the Cultural Revolution with none of the reasons being mutually exclusive.

[redacted] a. Long Range Aircraft. There is little current evidence regarding either desire or research on the part of the ChiComs toward developing a long range strategic aircraft. However, one plausible method of augmenting the ChiCom strategic missile force in the mid-1970s would be for the ChiComs to purchase a few long range commercial transports (such as Boeing 707 or British VC-10 types) from some neutral or

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] friendly nation.[1] such an excursion is included in two of the posture projections. An analysis conducted in 1965 by the Boeing Company for the DEPEX study indicated that the modification of the transports to enable them to carry and deliver nuclear devices is feasible. Another possibility is that instead of BADGER aircraft the Chinese may attempt to develop a larger and longer range aircraft using turboprop engines.

[redacted] b. Medium Range Aircraft. The current operational ChiCom inventory includes very limited numbers of two Soviet-provided medium range aircraft, the ancient piston engine TU-4 BULL and the turbojet TU-16 BADGER. As previously noted, evidence indicates that an aircraft factory which could have the capability to produce aircraft the size of medium bombers may have been previously provided in part by the Soviets (this factory may have finally been completed by the ChiComs in 1966-1967) but, to date, no large bomber-type aircraft are known to have been produced. Production of medium range bombers might be desirable if the MRBM production capability is inadequate for the projected target requirements or, conversely, if theater requirements for flexibility appear important. The postulated bomber could either be a new indigenous turboprop or turbojet design, or a copy of the TU-16 BADGER. The estimated IOC for such systems ranges from 1972 to 1977, with the copy of the TU-16 having the earlier IOC.

[redacted] Conversion of the TU-4 BULL to turboprop propulsion, thereby extending the life and increasing the capability of that system, is also possible but not considered a high confidence approach to attaining the needed capability.

[redacted] c. Short Range Aircraft. The current operational ChiCom light bomber inventory consists entirely of aircraft provided by the Soviet Union prior to 1961. The force consists of small numbers of ancient piston engine TU-2 BAT and IL-10 BEAST along with 250-350 obsolescent turbojet IL-28 BEAGLE. For purposes of this study it has been postulated that the ChiComs will attempt to obtain early nuclear weapon

---

[redacted] This Stanford Research Institute postulation was also included in the DEPEX threat.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

delivery for theater targets by allocating fission weapons to about one-fifth of the IL-28 inventory. (No more than 25-50 nuclear weapons will be assumed available at any one time.)

[redacted] There is no current evidence of any native light bomber construction. One possibility for future construction is that the probable airframe plant provided by the Soviets mentioned above in the medium range bomber section could produce light bombers instead of larger medium range aircraft if and when that factory becomes operational. Another possibility is that some portion of the large existing ChiCom aircraft industry, producing copies of Soviet MIG-17 and MIG-19 aircraft, could be adapted in part to build light bombers. For purposes of this study, it is postulated that the ChiComs will decide to replace their current obsolescent light bomber force in the mid- or late-1970s with a native design turbojet aircraft.

G. Other Weapon Programs (U)

[redacted] The ChiCom military effort is not limited to the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems. Development and deployment of strategic defensive weapon systems such as surface-to-air missiles and radars appear to have equal priority. Moreover, the ChiComs have a relatively modern and large electronics industry production base which should be capable of delivering a considerable amount of material. Their remarkably extensive aircraft production facilities probably were designed primarily to develop and produce fighter aircraft for the strategic defense forces, and perhaps also to satisfy tactical air force requirements. They have an extensive conventional armaments industry which is producing a wide variety of weapons. As previously noted, they are constructing a small number of copies of Soviet-designed diesel attack submarines and also some copies of Soviet guided missile patrol boats. Hence, any assessment of the pace and magnitude of the future ChiCom strategic offensive programs must take into account that the SOF is only one claimant, and not necessarily the largest, on the ChiComs' scarce resources.

[redacted] During the period from the Korean War until the cessation of assistance in 1960, existing airframe facilities inherited from Japan

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

underwent considerable expansion and modernization, and a number of new plants and developmental facilities were constructed. Soviet aid during this period included most, if not all, of the developmental and test facilities required for a native aircraft design capability. Meanwhile, the Soviets assisted the ChiComs in putting into production two or three of their MIG fighter aircraft, the MI-4 HOUND helicopter, and a light transport, and are believed to have been in the process of preparing the ChiComs to produce the MIG-21 fighter. Effects of the Soviet withdrawal in 1960 were immediate and drastic in the aircraft industry. Production virtually ceased for several years; only a light piston engine model transport (CRATE) continued to be produced until the fighter aircraft (MIG-19) and HOUND production was resumed about three years ago. Production of these aircraft seems to have regained the pre-1960 levels in 1967 but is believed on the downturn again as a result of Mao's ideological campaign. Nevertheless, since 1960, the ChiComs have continued to expand both production and developmental facilities. The ChiComs apparently are working on constructing a native version of the MIG-21 (of which the Soviets also provided a few models), although it is not yet believed to be in production. Fabrication of satisfactory jet engines may be the biggest single obstacle to a much higher level of aircraft production.

[redacted] The ChiComs are credited with the production of a version of the SA-2 defensive surface-to-air missile system, although the volume thereof appears to be low. They have a continued interest in coast defense cruise missiles of the SAMLET and STYX types. Several radars with native CPR design elements have appeared in the air defense system.

[redacted] Weapons captured in Vietnam have provided considerable insight into the scale and magnitude of ChiCom production of conventional weapons. This area seems to have suffered less, if at all, from the effects of the Cultural Revolution. The CPR is producing a wide variety of infantry weapons, ammunition, antiaircraft machine guns, several types of artillery and a T-54-type tank.

[redacted]

IV POSTULATED FORCE POSTURES

This section presents the postulated force postures to support the strategies outlined in Section I above. Each posture is preceeded with a listing of the major assumptions used to develop the posture.

[redacted]

G-1 POSTURE DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS (U)

[redacted] The following assumptions concerning force design objectives control development of the G-1 threat posture.

- Strategy Emphasis - Limited Global Capability
- Strategic Offensive Forces
  - Early storable liquid propellant technology used primarily for R&D purposes and perhaps on space programs. Deployment of storable liquid ICBMs in small numbers only.
  - Extensive deployment of ICBMs delayed until the availability of solid propellant technology in the mid-70s.
  - Penetration of U.S. or USSR BMD achieved via selective exhaustion rather than development of penaid packages for ICBMs.
  - Moderate second strike capability achieved by 1985 through the development and deployment of an advanced long range diesel submarine SLBM system.
  - Limited development and deployment of Eurasian systems.
  - Eurasian threat development programs generally balanced between IRBM and theater bomber systems, but deployment of theater bomber systems given priority over IRBMs.
  - No SLCMs developed as strategic offensive systems.

[redacted]

Table G-3

Posture G-1

SYSTEM DESIGNATION	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
U.S. Launcher ICBMs																	
[illegible] ICBM-P1A			0-5	5-10	5-10	5-15	5-15	5-15	5-15	5-15	5-15	5-15	5-15	5-15	5-15	5-15	5-15
Hard Site Based ICBMs																	
[illegible] ICBM-X2						[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	65-200	85-200
TOTAL ICBMs			0-5	5-10	5-15	5-20	5-35	5-55	5-70	5-85	20-120	20-150	20-180	20-180	20-215	70-265	90-285
Sea Based Ballistic Missiles (SLBM/Missile)																	
Adv. Ballistic CSSN-SLBM-P2									0-144	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0-216	4/32-7/56	4/32-9/64
TOTAL SLBMs									[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	32-56	32-64

Table G-3 (Concluded) [redacted]

Posture G-1 CHICOM STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCE [illegible]

LIMITED GLOBAL STRATEGY BASE CASE - EURASIAN THREAT SYSTEMS (U)

[illegible]	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1983	1984	1985
Soft Launched ICBMs																
CSS-X-4/SLBM-P1			0-5	5-15	10-25	20-40	30-55	40-70	10-95	30-90	[illegible]	[illegible]	10-90	10-90	40-90	40-90
Hard-Launched Ballistic Missiles (Silo-Based)																
G-Type/CSS-SLBM-P1	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	[illegible]	[illegible]	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3
TOTAL SLBMs	0-0	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	[illegible]	[illegible]	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3
Medium Bombers																
TU-4 BULL	10-13	7-13	4-13	0-13	0-10	0-7	0-3									
TU-16 BADGER Type	2-3	2-3	2-5	5-10	10-20	15-30	20-40	25-50	25-50	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	25-50	25-50	25-50
TOTAL MEDIUM BOMBERS	12-16	9-16	6-18	5-23	10-30	15-37	20-43	25-50	25-50	25-50	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	25-50	25-50	25-50
Light Bombers																
IL-28 BEAGLE	200-250	175-225	150-200	125-175	100-150	75-125	50-100	25-75	0-50	0-25						
New ChiCom Light									0-10	0-25	[illegible]	[illegible]	0-70	0-85	0-100	0-115
TOTAL LIGHT BOMBERS	200-250	175-225	150-200	125-175	100-150	75-125	50-100	25-75	0-60	0-50	0-30	[illegible]	0-70	0-85	0-100	0-115

[redacted]

G-2 POSTURE DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS (U)

[redacted] The following assumptions concerning force design objectives control development of the G-2 threat posture.

- Strategy Emphasis - Limited Global Capability
- Strategic Offensive Force
  - An early 1970 ICBM capability achieved via very low number deployment of soft above-ground launch storable liquid systems.
  - Development of a second generation ICBM system results in deployment in moderate numbers of a follow-on storable liquid ICBM in the late 70s with larger payloads and better CEP than the first generation systems.
  - BMD penaid capability achieved by the development of a MRV payload for the second generation ICBM system in the late 1970s. This technology achievement considered median to high. Penaid package might include chaff, booster disposal or translation as appropriate.
  - A second strike force deployed via an advanced long range diesel submarine SLBM in the mid-70s. This IOC assumes high technology achievement and rapid rate of growth of native submarine state-of-the-art.
  - A small number of commercial aircraft converted to strategic bombers by modifying wing structures or adding bomb bays, as appropriate.
  - Eurasian systems are deployed in moderate numbers.
  - Eurasian threat capability emphasizes the development of theater bombers over IRBM systems.
  - No SLCMs developed as strategic offensive systems.

[redacted]

Table G-4 [redacted]

Posture G-2 [redacted]

LIMITED GLOBAL STRATEGY VARIANT ONE- CONUS [redacted]

SYSTEM DESIGNATION	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Soft Launcher ICBMs																
CSS-ICBM-P1A				0-5	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10
Hard Silo Based ICBMs																
CSS-ICBM-P3A								0-10	10-20	20-30	20-30	20-30	20-30	20-30	20-30	20-30
CSS-ICBM-P3B											1-3	3-10	10-25	20-40	30-55	40-70
TOTAL ICBMs				0-5	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-20	15-30	25-40	25-43	25-50	30-55	45-80	55-95	65-110
Sea Based Ballistic Missiles (SLB Missile)																
Adv. Diesel/ CSSX-SLBM-P2							0-1/8	0-1/8	1 8-2/16	1 16-3/24	2 16-4/32	2 16-4/32	3 24-6/48	3 24-7/56	4 32-8/64	4/32-9/72
TOTAL SLBMs							0-8	0-8	8-16	8-24	16-32	16-40	24-48	24-56	32-64	32-72
Long Range Strategic Aircraft																
Modified 707 or VC-10						0-3	0-6	0-10	0-10	0-10	0-10	0-10	0-10	0-10	0-10	0-10

Table G-4 (Concluded)

Posture G-2 CHICOM STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES [illegible]

LIMITED GLOBAL STRATEGY VARIANT ONE- EURASIAN [illegible]

SYSTEM DESIGNATION	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Hard Launcher IRBMs																
CSS-1 B"-P4						5-10	15-25	30-40	45-55	50-70	50-75	[illegible]	[illegible]	50-80	50-80	50-80
Sea Based Ballistic Missiles																
(Sub Missile)																
G-Type CSSN-SLBM-P1	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3
TOTAL [illegible]	0-3	0-3	0-3	[illegible]	[illegible]	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	0-3	0-3	0-3
Medium Bombers																
TU-16 BADGER Type	2-3	2-5	5-10	15-23	35-55	50-85	50-100	50-100	50-100	50-100	[illegible]	[illegible]	50-100	50-100	50-100	50-100
TU-4 BULL	13-10	10-8	7-4	4-0												
Modified TU-4 BULL	0-3	0-5	0-9	0-13	0-13	0-13	0-13	0-13	0-13	0-13	[illegible]	[illegible]	0-13	0-13	0-13	0-13
TOTAL MEDIUM BOMBERS	15-16	12-18	12-23	19-36	35-68	50-98	50-113	50-113	50-113	50-113	[illegible]	[illegible]	50-113	50-113	50-113	50-113
Light Bombers																
IL-28 BEAGLE	230-250	200-225	170-200	140-175	90-125	50-75	25-35									
New ChiCom Light							0-10	0-25	10-45	25-65	[illegible]	[illegible]	75-125	75-145	75-165	75-185
TOTAL LIGHT BOMBERS	230-250	200-225	170-200	140-175	90-125	50-75	25-45	0-25	10-45	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	75-145	75-165	75-185

[redacted]

G-3 POSTURE DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS (U)

[redacted] The following assumptions concerning force design objectives control development of the G-3 threat posture.

- Posture Emphasis - Eurasian Threat Capability
- Strategic Offensive Forces
  - Early deployment, but in very limited numbers, of storable liquid ICBM systems.
  - BMD penetration capability essentially non-existent except for selective exhaustion of several high value CONUS targets.
  - Moderate deployment in the late 70s of an advanced diesel SLBM system for second strike purposes. This technology achievement assumes a median to high rate of technological growth with respect to submarine and missile systems.
  - A small number of commercial aircraft converted into strategic bombers by modifying wing structure or adding bomb bays, as appropriate.
  - M/IRBMs and theater bomber systems developed and deployed with generally equal priority.
  - Theater missile force evolves from an early 1970 MRBM system through two IRBM solid propellant systems.
  - Theater bomber forces include development and deployment in moderate numbers of new native-design medium and light bombers.
  - Following the Soviet experience, a conversion program of attack submarines is undertaken beginning in the early 70s to add SLCMs to the theater strategic force. A new ChiCom-designed diesel submarine is developed and deployed in the mid-70s. This assumes a median technology achievement for the ChiCom SLCM submarine program.

[redacted]

Table G-5 [redacted]

Posture G-3 [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]	1970	1972	1974	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
[redacted]				5-10	10-15	15-20	15-20	15-20	15-20	15-20	15-20	15-20	15-20
[redacted]							0-5	[redacted]	[redacted]	10-15	10-15	10-15	[redacted]
[redacted]				-10	10-15	15-20	15-25	20-30	25-35	25-35	25-35	25-35	25-35
[redacted]								[redacted]	[redacted]	1/8-2/16	1/8-3/24	2/16-3/32	2/16-5/40
[redacted]								[redacted]	[redacted]	4-16	8-24	10-32	10-40
[redacted]					0-3	0-6	0-10	0-10	0-10	0-10	0-10	0-10	0-10

Table G-5 (Continued) [redacted]

Posture G-3 CHICOM STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE POWER 1970-1985

(Numbers Represent Launchers Unless Otherwise Noted)

SYSTEM DESIGNATION	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
[illegible]																
[illegible]			0-5	0-15	10-25	20-35	20-35	20-35	20-35	20-35	20-35	20-35	20-35	20-35	20-35	20-35
[illegible]																
[illegible]-P2						0-10	5-20	15-30	25-40	35-65	50-80	65-95	80-95	95	95	95
[illegible]-P2 (ICBM)													0-20	0-10	15-60	30-80
[illegible]																
					10-20	20-30	25-50	35-65	45-75	55-100	70-115	85-130	100-150	115-170	130-190	145-210
[illegible]																
[illegible]																
S Type [illegible] SLBM-P1		0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3
[illegible]		0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3
[illegible]																
[illegible]																
[illegible]/CSSN SLBM-P1	0-1/2	1/2-3/6	2/3-5/10	3/5-7/14	4/8-8/16	5/10-10/20	5/10-10/20	5/10-10/20	4/8-8/16	5/9-8/12	1/2-4/8	1/2-2/4				
[illegible]/CSSN-SLCM-P2									1/2-2/4	2/4-1/8	4/8-6/12	4/8-8/16	5/10-10/20	5/10-10/20	5/10-10/20	5/10-10/20
[illegible] Design/ CSSN-SLCM-P2							0-1/4	0-2/8	1/4-3/12	1/4-1/16	2/8-5/20	2/8-6/24	3/12-7/28	3/12-8/32	4/16-9/36	4/16-10/40
TOTAL SLCM	0-2	2-6	5-10	8-16	8-16	15-20	10-24	10-28	14-32	13-36	14-40	15-44	22-48	22-52	26-56	26-60
Medium Bombers																
TU-4 BULL	12-13	12-13	11-13	10-12	6-10	6-8	4-6	0-3								
TU-16 BADGER Type	2-5	2-15	5-25	10-35	15-45	20-50	25-50	25-50	25-50	25-50	25-50	25-50	25-50	25-50	25-50	25-50
New ChiCom Medium										0-5	0-10	0-20	0-30	0-40	0-50	0-60
Alternative One																
TOTAL MEDIUM BOMBERS	14-18	14-28	16-38	20-47	21-55	26-58	29-56	25-53	25-50	25-55	25-60	25-70	25-80	25-90	25-100	25-110
Light Bombers																
IL-28 Beagle	230-250	200-230	170-210	140-190	110-170	80-150	50-130	25-100	25-75	0-25						
New ChiCom Light									0-10	0-25	0-40	10-55	25-70	40-85	55-100	70-115
TOTAL LIGHT BOMBERS	230-250	200-230	170-210	140-190	110-170	80-150	50-130	25-100	25-85	0-50	0-40	10-55	25-70	40-85	55-100	70-115

[redacted]

G-4 POSTURE DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS (U)

[redacted] The following assumptions concerning force design objectives control development of G-4 threat posture.

- Posture Emphasis - Eurasian Threat Capability
- Strategic Offensive Forces
  - Deployment in the mid-70s of a very limited number of a first generation ICBM system utilizing storable liquid propellant technology.
  - BMD penetration capability essentially non-existent except for a selective exhaustion of several high value targets.
  - No CONUS threat second strike capability other than, perhaps, basing a small number of the first generation ICBMs in hard silos.
  - M/IRBMs and theater bomber systems developed and deployed with generally equal priority.
  - Early 1970 MRBM system employs storable liquid technology but follow-on MRBM and mid-70 and early-80 IRBM systems utilize solid propellants. The 1980 IRBM system might be mobile but more likely deployed on a fixed launcher or silo.
  - Theater bombers include development and deployment of both a new ChiCom-design light and medium bomber. Deployment of medium bombers emphasized over light bomber system.
  - SLCM systems not developed as an element of the theater strategic forces.

[redacted]

Table G-6

Posture G-4 CHICOM STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCE 1970-1985

EURASIAN EMPHASIS STRATEGY VARIANT ONE - CONUS [illegible]

[illegible] DESIGNATION	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
[illegible] ICBMs																
CSS-ICBM-P1A						0-5	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10	5-10
[illegible] ICBMs																
CSS-ICBM-P2									0-5	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	20-35
TOTAL ICBMs						0-5	5-10	5-10	5-15	10-25	15-35	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	25-45

Table G-6 (Concluded)

Posture G-4 CHICOM STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE [illegible]

EURASIAN EMPHASIS STRATEGY VARIANT ONE-EURASIAN [illegible]

SYSTEM DESIGNATION	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Soft Launcher IRBMs																
CSS-X-R3P1		0-5	5-15	15-25	25-35	35-45	35-45	35-45	35-45	35-45	35-45	35-45	35-45	35-45	35-45	35-45
CSS-X-R3P2						5-10	15-25	25-40	35-55	35-70	35-70	35-70	35-70	35-70	35-70	35-70
Hard Silo Based IRBMs																
CSS-IRBM-P2						0-5	5-20	15-35	25-50	35-65	45-80	55-95	65-100	75-100	85-100	95-100
CSS-IRBM-P2 (IWP)													0-20	0-40	10-60	20-80
TOTAL MIRBMs		0-5	5-15	15-25	25-35	40-60	55-90	75-120	95-150	105-190	115-195	125-210	135-235	145-255	165-275	185-295
Sea Based Ballistic Missiles (SLBM Missile)																
G-Type/CSSX-SLBM-P1	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3	0-1/3
TOTAL SLBMs	0-0	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3	0-3
Medium Bombers																
TU-4 BULL	10-13	10-13	10-13	8-10	6-8	4-6	0-3									
TU-16 BADGER Type	2-10	5-25	15-40	30-60	45-80	60-100	75-125	75-125	75-125	75-125	75-125	75-125	75-125	75-125	75-125	75-125
New ChiCom Medium Alternative Two									0-5	5-15	15-30	15-50	25-60	45-75	45-90	55-105
TOTAL MEDIUM BOMBERS	12-23	15-38	25-53	38-70	51-88	64-106	75-128	75-125	75-130	80-140	90-155	90-175	100-185	110-200	120-215	130-230
Light Bombers																
IL-28 BEAGLE	230-250	200-230	170-210	140-190	110-170	80-150	50-130	25-100	25-75	0-25						
New ChiCom Light								0-10	0-25	10-45	20-55	30-70	40-85	50-100	60-115	70-130
TOTAL LIGHT BOMBERS	230-250	200-230	170-210	140-190	110-170	80-150	50-130	25-110	25-100	10-70	20-55	30-70	40-85	50-100	60-115	70-130

V WEAPON SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS (U)

This section presents the weapon system characteristics for the systems which appear in the force posture of Section IV.

Table G-7 [redacted]

CHARACTERISTIC AND PERFORMANCE ESTIMATES FOR POSTULATED CHICOM ICBM SYSTEMS (S)[a]

Posture	System	IOC	Range (nm)	Payload Weight (lbs)	Warhead Weight (lbs)	No. of Warheads	Yield (MT)	CEP (nmi)	Guidance	Propellant	Force Reliability[b] Factor
C-1, C-2 C-3, C-4	CSS-ICBM-P1A	1972/76	5,000-6,000 6,000		~1,750	1	~2.0-3.0[c]	3.0-5.0[d]	Radio-Inertial	Storable Liquid	0.54
C-3	CSS-ICBM-P1B	1977/78	5,000-6,000 6,000		~4,750	1	~5.0	1.5-2.0	Radio-Inertial	Storable Liquid	0.55
C-1, C-4	CSS-ICBM-P2	1975/79	5,000-7,500 6,000		~1,000	1	~0.7-1.0[e]	1.5	Inertial	Solid	0.63
C-3	CSS-ICBM-P3A[f]	1977/78	6,000-9,000 [illegible]		~6,000	1	~5.0	1.0	Radio-Inertial	Storable Liquid	0.60
C-2	CSS-ICBM-P3B[f]	1978/80	6,000-12,000 7,000		~1,225 ea.	4[g] (MRV)	~0.3	1.5	Radio-Inertial	Storable Liquid	0.55

[a](S) CSS-ICBM-P1 derived from intelligence community estimates. All other systems are SRI postulates.

[b](S) Force reliability is the product of alert, launch, in-flight and warhead reliability factors. After three years of operations the overall reliability of each system is assumed to increase by 0.10.

[c](S) The CSS-ICBM-P1A in posture C-4 is assumed to have a warhead yield of 3.0 megatons. The lower yield is a function of later IOC. In postures C-1, C-2, and C-3 yield is assumed to be 2.0 megatons.

[d](S) CEP of this system is assumed to improve to 2.0 nm by 1977/78.

[e](S) The CSS-ICBM-P2 is assumed to have a yield of 1.0 megatons in posture C-4 due to later IOC. In posture C-1, yield is 0.7 megatons.

[f](S) See Table VI for more complete descriptions of postulated payload packages.

[g](S) Assumed to be spaced in such a manner as to require distinct targeting of each RV as a separate target.

Table G-8 [redacted]

CHARACTERISTIC ESTIMATES FOR POSTULATED CHICOM PENETRATION AID PACKAGES (U)[a]

Posture	Booster System	IOC	Payload Weight (lbs)	Warhead Weight (lbs)	Weight Allocation For Penaids and/or Deployment Module/Spacer		Number of Chaff Puffs[b]	Total Weight of Chaff System (lbs)	Booster Displacement Mode	
					Weight (lbs)	Percent of Total Payload Weight			Translation (lbs allocated)	Fragmentation (lbs allocated)
C-2	CSS-ICBM-P3A	1977/78	~9,000	6,200	2,800	31	15	450	500	100
C-2	CSS-ICBM-P3B	1978/80	~9,000	[redacted] 1,225 (4,900)	4,100	46	30	900	500	100

[a] (U) SRI postulates.

[b] [redacted] If the "loiter concept" Spartan BMD interceptor is deployed by the U.S. as part of Safeguard, then the ChiCom force planner may choose to delete all exoatmospheric decoys, increase throw-weight (as required) and employ only multiple RVs as a penaid technique.

Table G-9 [redacted]

CHARACTERISTIC AND PERFORMANCE ESTIMATES
FOR POSTULATED CHICOM SLBM SYSTEMS (U)

Posture	System (Sub/Missile)	Launch Tubes per Boat	IOC	Missile Range (n mi)	Launch Condition	Payload Weight (lbs)	Yield (mt)	CEP (n mi)	Guidance	Propellant	Force Reliability Factor[a]
C-1,C-2 C-3,C-4	G-type/ CSSN-SLBM-P1[b]	3	1970/71	200-300	Surfaced	~2,750	~0.05	2.5-3.0	Inertial	Storable Liquid	0.40
C-1,C-2 C-3	ADV-D/CSSN-SLBM-P2	8	1976/80	~1,000	c	~1,500	~0.7	2.0-2.5	Inertial	Solid	0.45

[redacted] Product of estimated reliability factors for percent at sea/on-station, alert, launch, in-flight and warhead. For ADV-D/CSSN-SLBM-P2, after three years of operations overall reliability is assumed to increase to 0.55.

[redacted] This system is not likely to enter series production. If a missile is developed for the single existing G-type submarine, the system will be assumed for EURASIAN Threat missions only.

[redacted] All systems built before 1980 will be assumed to require missile launchings from a surface condition. All systems built after 1980 will be assumed capable of submerged launch.

Table G-10 [redacted]

CHARACTERISTIC AND PERFORMANCE ESTIMATES FOR POSTULATED CHICOM MRBM AND IRBM SYSTEMS (U)[a]

Posture	System	IOC	Range (nmi)	Payload Weight (lbs)	Warhead Weight (lbs)	No. of Warheads	Yield (mt)	CEP (nmi)	Guidance	Propellant	Force Reliability Factor[b]
C-3,C-4	CSS-MRBM-P1	1971/74	600-1,000	~3,000	~2,250	1	~0.05[c]	2.0-3.0	Radio-Inertial	Storable Liquid	0.50
C-4	CSS-MRBM-P2	1975/76	800-1,000	~1,500	~1,000	1	~0.7	1.5	Inertial	Solid	0.50
C-1	CSS-IRBM-P1	1972/73	2,000	~3,000	~3,100	1	~1.2	2.0-3.0	Radio-Inertial	Storable Liquid	0.50
C-2,C-3, C-1	CSS-IRBM-P2	1975/76	2,000	~1,500	~1,000	1	~0.7	1.5	Inertial	Solid	0.50

[redacted] CSS-MRBM-P1 derived from intelligence community estimates. All other systems are SRI postulates.

[redacted] Force reliability is the product of alert, launch, in-flight and warhead reliability factors. After three years of operations the overall reliability of each system is assumed to increase by 0.10.

[redacted] This yield is applicable for warheads or boosters deployed before 1976. After 1976 a warhead with a yield of 1.5 MT is assumed to be retrofitted.

[redacted] An improved CSS-IRBM-P2, which has a 1982 IOC and appears in postures C-3 and C-4, has essentially the same characteristics as CSS-IRBM-P2, with several modifications. The force reliability factor is assumed to be 0.65 - 0.70; CEP is 0.73 - 1.0 nmi; and the warhead yield might be slightly increased.

Table G-11 [redacted]

CHARACTERISTIC AND PERFORMANCE ESTIMATES FOR POSTULATED CHICOM SLCM SYSTEMS (U)

Posture	System (Sub/Missile)	Launch Tubes Per Boat	IOC	Range (nmi)	Launch Condition	Payload Weight (lbs)	War-head Weight (lbs)	Yield (mt)	CEP[a] (nmi)	Guidance	Propel-lant	Force Reli-ability Factor
C-3	W-CONV/CSSN SLCM-P1[c]	2	1970/71	30-100	Surfaced	3,000	~2,250	~0.05	2.0-2.5	Command or Radio-Inertial	Turbojet with RATO Boost	0.40
C-3	New ChiCom/ CCSN-SLCM-P2	4	1976/78	200-250	Surfaced	3,000	~2,500	~3.0	1.5-2.0	Inertial[d]	Turbojet with RATO Boost	0.45

[redacted] Against land targets. CEP against naval targets may be smaller if terminal homing (infared) capability is achieved.

[redacted] Product of estimated reliability factors for percent at sea/on station, alert, launch, in-flight and warhead. After three years of operations, overall reliability for each system is assumed to increase by 0.10.

[redacted] In posture C-3, the CSSN-SLCM-P2 is assumed retrofitted in the late 1970s on the W-conversion submarines replacing the CSSN-SLCM-P1.

[redacted] If radar terminal guidance is incorporated, CEP against land targets can be assumed to decrease to 1.0 nm.

Table G-12 [redacted]

CHARACTERISTIC AND PERFORMANCE ESTIMATES FOR POSTULATED CHICOM BOMBERS (U)

Posture	System	IOC	Maximum Radius/ Range (nmi)	No. of Engines	Propulsion Type	Payload (lbs)	No. of Bombs Carried	Yield Each (mt)	Attack Altitude (ft)	Attack Speed (kts)
	Long Range Bombers									
C-2,C-3	Modified 707 or VC-10 type	1975/76	~5,000/8,200	4	Turbofan	~10,000	3	~1.5	<3,000	300
	Medium Range Bombers									
C-1,C-2, C-3,C-4	TU-4 Bull[a]	1950	~1,500/3,000	4	Piston	~10,000	2 or 3	~0.025[c]	20,000-25,000	250-300
C-1,C-2 C-3,C-4	TU-16 BADGER Type	1970/1973	~1,600/8,000	2	Turbojet	~6,000-10,000	2 or 3	~0.025[d]	25,000-35,000	450
	New ChiCom Medium[b]									
C-1	Alternative One	1978/1979	~2,000/3,500	2	Turbojet or Turbofan	~6,000	2	~1.5	~35,000	~560
C-3	Alternative One	1979-1980	~2,500/6,000	4	Turboprop	~10,000	3	~1.5	~35,000	~400
	Short Range Bombers									
C-1,C-2 C-3,C-4	IL-28 BEAGLE	1954	500/900	2	Turbojet	~3,000	1	~0.025	15,000	490
C-1,C-2, C-3,C-4	New ChiCom Light	1976/1981	350/750	2	Turbofan or Turbojet	~3,000	2 or 3	~0.5	~36,000	~800

[redacted] Life span and capability of this system could be increased if decision were made to convert to turboprop propulsion. In posture C-2, such an excursion has been assumed to take place between 1970-1973 on the high side of the posture range only.

[redacted] This SRI-postulated ChiCom-built medium range bomber could incorporate either turbojet or turboprop propulsion. Alternative One is assumed to appear in Posture C-3, alternative Two appears in C-4.

[redacted] If the TU-4 is maintained in the ChiCom inventory after 1975, as is postulated in posture C-2, then the yield for the weapons will be assumed to be 1.5 MT each.

[redacted] After 1975, the payload for this system will be assumed to be two 1.5 MT bombs.

Input Substudy H

REPRESENTATIVE SCENARIOS USING CNA

By: M. Earle, S. Stone, H. Rood, D. Marks

Input Substudy H

REPRESENTATIVE SCENARIOS USING CNA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	INTRODUCTION	H-1
I	DEFENSE OF NATIONAL ENTITY	H-3
II	STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE CONUS ATTACK	H-8
III	EXPANSION OF TRADITIONAL TERRITORIES	H-16
IV	EXPANSION OF AREAS OF INFLUENCE	H-20
V	POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT OF THE U.S.	H-24
VI	CATALYTIC WAR	H-28
VII	INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF U.S. DOMESTIC EVENTS	H-32
VIII	AS A MEANS TO GAIN REVENGE OR INFLICT PUNISHMENT	H-38
IX	IRRATIONAL ACTS	H-43
X	ASSESSMENT OF SCENARIOS	H-48

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this appendix is to examine in detail some situations in which the Chinese might make use of a clandestine nuclear device. None of these scenarios are predictions; rather a spectrum of type situations is defined. For some of the situations to occur rather sharp changes are assumed in the current relationships among major powers or in Chinese foreign policy. It is hoped that by studying even the most remote possibilities for use of a clandestine nuclear device, the full dimensions of the weapon will become apparent. The last section of the appendix, which examines the comparative likelihood of the various scenarios, attempts to place the "type situations" in some perspective.

All the scenarios represented are presumed to be within the technological grasp of the Chinese.

The format used is not that of the traditional scenario. Instead of lengthy plots involving much arbitrary detail, brief descriptions are used. Thus, given a basic situation, the reader may embellish a scenario with a variety of real world details. Stated another way the essence of the scenario is defined: given that this is credible even though the subjective probability of occurrence is very low, then the necessary detail could be added, if desired. A number of variants are included with each type situation in order to suggest some ancillary CNA applications to the basic scenario. Each class of scenarios is evaluated using a set of questions developed to highlight the important areas of CNA utility and credibility.

Table H-1. presents the classification of type situations used in the study. A series of scenarios were drafted from which general groupings were synthesized. It should be noted that situations could be defined which were identical to the set of five CNA purposes or general applications of Input Substudy C. However, as the initial scenarios were drafted, a relationship seemed to emerge that indicated a loose grouping of situations and objectives (e.g., expansion of traditional territories) would provide a better understanding of the utility of CNA.

[redacted]

TABLE H-1

REPRESENTATIVE SCENARIOS OR CLASSES OF SITUATIONS [redacted]

I. Defense of National Entity

II. Strategic Offensive CONUS Attack

a. Degradation of U.S. SOF/SDF Capability

b. Inflict Urban and Industrial Damage

III. Expansion of Traditional Territories

IV. Expansion of Areas of Influence

V. Political Embarrassment of the U.S.

VI. Catalytic War

VII. Influence the Outcome of U.S. Domestic Events

VIII. Gain Revenge or Inflict Punishment

IX. Irrational Acts [1]

(U)[1] "Irrational" implies a moral judgment. Often the gambits described in other classes of situations could be classified as irrational. However, if we assume the decision to use CNA was rationally reached in the other uses, their "irrational acts" seem to be a separate sub-set of CNA uses.

[redacted]

(U) I DEFENSE OF NATIONAL ENTITY[1]

A. Scenario

As a consequence of the entry of Chinese combat forces into northern Laos and Thailand, U.S. commitment to SEATO is activated with U.S. tactical air operations against transportation arteries in the Chinese-Laotian frontier areas; B-52 raids are launched against Chinese air and naval installations on Hainan and the Chinese coast of the Gulf of Tonkin; and, U.S. carrier aircraft strike military, naval and air installations along the coast of the South China and East China Seas. These attacks continue until the national entity of China is threatened. In order to forestall further strikes or to deter intensification of attacks against the Chinese homeland, the Chinese detonate a device in CONUS and threaten to detonate further devices if attacks on Chinese homeland are continued.

B. Typical Variants

1. A U.S./Chinese conflict occurs as a consequence of Chinese movements into Korea; Chinese landings on Formosa; Chinese air or naval attacks on U.S. carriers off the coast of China; or a Chinese invasion of India.

2. Instead of actually using CNA, China threatens its use in order to force negotiations or to deter attacks on the Chinese mainland by threatening retaliation if such attacks are continued.

(U) [1]Scenarios I, II (variations a and b) are essentially variations of the use of CNA as a military weapon during a US/China war.

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. China demonstrates the capability to deliver CNA against CONUS by detonating weapon in remote area as a prelude to negotiations on halting U.S. attacks on the Mainland.

4. China threatens or uses CNA against ally to gain objective vis-a-vis the U.S.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U)C. Interpretation of Scenario

[redacted] 1. Potential targets and number of weapons required to achieve CNA objectives

Targets: U.S. cities.

Number of Weapons: 2 - 20.

Since the objective would be to bring pressure on the U.S. to relent in its attacks on the Chinese homeland, the targets would be such as to convey the widest possible impact on the general population in order to arouse it to the dangers to the U.S. of continuing the attack on China.

[redacted] 2. Is the act repeatable?

a. Within a crisis if the stockpile is adequate further threats or declarations are possible.

b. If first crisis use is successful it could be used several years later.

[redacted] 3. Is the use of proxies possible (if not indicated in scenarios)?

Not realistically. Proxies are not necessary, although the use of a sympathetic group within the country might further impede U.S. policies abroad by forcing the government and the population to be distracted by the effort to eliminate the sympathetic group.

[redacted] 4. Need the CPR always be identified as the source of the CNA threat or detonation?

Yes, although it could be agreed that all that need be done is to identify the clandestine attack with U.S. assaults on China.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] 5. Is the situation more likely in the near term, far term, or is it time-invariant?

a. To a degree the near term is favored because the U.S. would be unlikely to attack China when it had a full nuclear capability.

b. As a second strike capability the use is time-invariant.

[redacted] 6. What is the most important aspect of the scenario which favors/encourages the use of CNA?

a. Fear of retaliation eleminated because China already being bombed. As the objective, preservation of the national entity, of highest priority.

b. Potential to inflict damage in the most direct manner possible.

[redacted] 7. What are the most sensitive aspects of the scenario relative to the accomplishment of the desired objective as viewed by the CPR?

a. Uncertainty as to the U.S. reaction to the threat of detonation, i.e., will the U.S. step up or stop the bombing.

b. Prepositioning of device.

c. Coordination of attack with other military gambits.

[redacted] 8. In what manner is the scenario sensitive to the evolution of the alternative world environments?

Generally independent of the power relationships once the war starts.

[redacted] 9. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the U.S. domestic situation?

Although at war, the attitude of the U.S. public about the war would condition the action of the President and the selection of a negotiation or stepped-up bombing strategy.

[redacted]

[redacted]

10. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the USSR/China relationship?

No. USSR would probably try to remain neutral unless the USSR and CPR have resolved all past differences.

11. What would make the scenario more credible? Less credible or irrational?

More credible

a. The realism of the events which lead up to the US/China war.

b. A U.S. commitment to defend territories on the periphery of China that carried the implication of direct attack on China.

Less credible

a. The greater China's nuclear war fighting capability the less likely is the U.S./China war.

b. Continued success of Chinese support of insurgencies as a means of extending Chinese influence into area peripheral to China.

12. What alternative means exist to accomplish the same objectives?

Depends on the assumptions concerning Chinas SOF capability at the time the war beings and the extent of U.S. bombing before the national entity is threatened. If the U.S. perceives a China SOF threat it is likely that the U.S's first strike would be against the SOF thus leaving only CNA to the Chinese.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) II STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE CONUS ATTACK

Variation a: Degradation of U.S. SOF/SDF Capability[1] (U)

A. Scenario

Chinese strategic capability evolves to the point where the Chinese leaders perceive that a combined SLBM, ICBM, and CNA attack could significantly reduce the U.S. capability to retaliate against China. China initiates actions in the Far East leading to direct conflict with the United States in the course of which China launches a nuclear attack including CNA attacks against U.S. command-control nodes.

B. Typical Variants

1. Different targets, same general setting; e.g., ICBM sites, ABM radars; to forward bases; or airfields.

2. Under circumstances where U.S./Soviet strategic nuclear forces are generally perceived at or near parity, China launches CNA to reduce U.S. strategic forces to a point where U.S. may not strike China with strategic weapons for fear of rendering itself vulnerable to a first-strike by Soviet Union.

3. U.S. attacking China and the Chinese use CNA against SOF/SDF to limit further damage.

4. China launches CNA to degrade U.S. SOF/SDF but does so in such a fashion as to escape identification as the culprit and therefore forestalls retaliation.

5. Achieve virtual attention of U.S. forces by holding an ally hostage (or detonate one weapon and thereafter more destruction).

(U)[1] Variations I, II (variations a and b) are essentially variations of the use of CNA as a military weapon during a US/China war.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) C. Interpretation of Scenario--Variation a: Degradation of U.S. SOF/SDF Capability

[redacted] 1. Potential targets and number of weapons required to achieve CNA objectives.

Scenario dependent: 6-30 unless ICBMs then 200-300.

[redacted] 2. Is the act repeatable?

No, within a given crisis. Perhaps repeatable if crisis separated 10-15 years.

[redacted] 3. Is the use of proxies possible (if not indicated in scenarios)?

Not realistically, but might be used in a situation of extreme adventurism where the purpose might be unidentified sabotage. In a sense, this might be less adventuristic, as chances of retaliation would be slimmer, if security were perfect.

[redacted] 4. Need the CPR always be identified as the source of the CNA threat or detonation?

Yes, but may be phrased to create initial confusion as to source.

[redacted] 5. Is the situation more likely in the near term, far term, or is it time-invariant?

Time-invariant, near term as a substitute for nuclear delivery systems; far term as a means to augment nuclear delivery systems or to attack special targets, e.g., ABM radars.

[redacted] 6. What is the most important aspect of the scenario which favors/encourages the use of CNA?

Potential to inflict maximum damage to the desired targets.

[redacted]

[redacted]

7. What is the most sensitive aspects of the scenario relative to the accomplishment of the desired objective as viewed by the CPR?

a. The entire scenario is sensitive to the CPR attaining quasi-nuclear parity.

b. Excessive number of weapons needed for some target classes and requirement to preposition.

c. Assured of U.S. retaliation.

8. In what manner is the scenario sensitive to the evolution of the alternative world environments?

If the alliance of major powers would permit multiple threats to the CPR, China would be less likely to initiate an attack against the U.S. Conversely, if alliances reinforce China's capability then China would be more likely to initiate nuclear attack.

9. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the U.S. domestic situation?

No.

10. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the USSR/China relationship?

Same as 8. above

11. What would make the scenario more credible? less credible or irrational?

More credible:

a. The greater their nuclear arsenal, the more credible the course of action.

b. The assessment of the Chinese leaders that a particular point in time had been reached for directly attacking the U.S.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. A significant prolonged period of tension between the U.S. and China.

Less credible

a. The lower the nuclear capability of China.

b. The lower the U.S. presence in Asia.

[redacted]

12. What alternative means exist to accomplish the same objectives?

Depends upon assumptions concerning extent of SOF capability. The greater the force the less the requirement for CNA.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Variation b: Inflict Urban and Industrial Damage[1] (U)

A. Scenario

China's nuclear strategic capability evolves to the point where the Chinese leaders perceive that under certain conditions some damage can be inflicted on the U.S. A crisis occurs and the Chinese preempt and attack one or more U.S. cities with CNA to prevent a full scale attack by the U.S. on China.

B. Typical Variants

1. Given a U.S. ABM deployment of some magnitude, the operational Chinese ICBMs are not adequate to ensure the desired level of damage to the U.S. CNAs spotted in certain big cities to supplement the attack on CONUS.

2. China threatens U.S. or allies with urban industrial damage to achieve a diplomatic objective, e.g., recognition of their supremacy in Asia at the expense of Japan.

3. China mounts unidentified attacks on U.S. cities as acts of terrorism. (See also Scenario VIII.)

4. CNA is launched to achieve urban/industrial damage while Chinese ICBMs are employed against U.S. strategic offensive and defensive forces.

(U) [1] Variations I, II (variations a and b) are essentially variations of the use of CNA as a military weapon during a US/China war, with the exception of variants 2 and 3 above.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) C. Interpretation of Scenario--Variation b: Urban and Industrial Damage

[redacted] 1. Potential targets and number of weapons required to achieve CNA objectives.

Target: cities.

Number of weapons: 2-20 for the primary scenarios and variant 2, p. J-12.
20-40 if desire to supplement the attack on CONUS.

[redacted] 2. Is the act repeatable?

a. Within a crisis if the stockpile is adequate further threats or declarations are possible.

b. If first crisis use is successful it could be used several years later.

[redacted] 3. Is the use of proxies possible (if not indicated in scenarios)?

Not realistically unless unidentified terrorism.

[redacted] 4. Need the CPR always be identified as the source of the CNA threat or detonation?

Yes, given the assumed U.S. China confrontation.
No, if terror the objective.

[redacted] 5. Is the situation more likely in the near term, far term, or is it time-invariant?

Time-invariant, near term favors CNA as a substitute for conventional nuclear weapons; far term favors CNA as a supplement. If the situation requires a fairly significant level of nuclear delivery capability then the far term is favored.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6. What is the most important aspect of the scenario which favors/encourages the use of CNA?

a. Clandestine nature if terror the objective.

b. The fact that the weapon is prepositioned and available with a zero CEP.

[redacted]

7. What is the most sensitive aspect of the scenario relative to the accomplishment of the desired objective as viewed by the CPR?

a. For clandestine attack - absolute security.

b. Uncertainty as to U.S. response if use CNA to to prevent U.S. strike.

c. Command control of detonation.

d. Necessity to preposition weapons.

[redacted]

8. In what manner is the scenario sensitive to the evolution of the alternative world environments?

If the alliance of major powers would permit multiple threats to the CPR they would be less likely to initiate an attack against the U.S. Conversely, if alliances reinforce China's capability then China would be more likely to initiate nuclear attack.

For undefined case the alternative world environments less important.

[redacted]

9. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the U.S. domestic situations?

a. For the clandestine attack, a higher degree of turmoil might favor the use of CNA.

b. For a conventional attack, no.

[redacted]

[redacted]

10. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the USSR/China relationship?

Yes, if the allicance of major powers would permit multiple threats to the CPR they would be less likely to initiate an attack against the U.S. Conversely, if alliances reinforce China's capability then China would be more likely to initiate nuclear attack.

For undefined case the alternative world environments less important

11. What would make the scenario more credible? Less credible or irrational?

More credible

a. The greater their nuclear arsenal, the more credible the course of action.

b. The realism of events leading to deployment, the assessment of the Chinese leaders that a particular point in time had been reached for directly attacking the U.S. and a significant prolonged period of tension between the U.S. and China.

3. The simpler and more foolproof the delivery and security concept the more credible the clandestine attack.

Less credible

a. The lower the nuclear capability of China.

b. The lower the U.S. presence in Asia.

12. What alternative means exist to accomplish the same objectives?

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) III EXPANSION OF TRADITIONAL TERRITORIES

A. Scenario

[redacted]

The Chinese threaten to detonate (or actually detonate) a small device on Taiwan to force the U.S. from Taiwan and to exert control over the island. In addition to the threat of further detonations on Taiwan, veiled (or direct) threats are made regarding CNA against the U.S.

[redacted]

B. Typical Variants

1. Expansion into territories other than Taiwan.

2. Use of CNA threat against U.S. to gain some advantage during a Chinese/Soviet confrontation over territory.

3. Detonate or threaten CNA against allies to gain objectives vis-a-vis the U.S.

4. Communicate to the U.S. government that an American city is hostage for removal of U.S. forces from an area like Thailand or Formosa.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) C. Interpretation of Scenario

[redacted] 1. Potential targets and number of weapons required to achieve CNA objectives.

Targets: cities.

Target country 3-6: U.S. claim or have deployed 2-4.

[redacted] 2. Is the act repeatable?

a. If not successful, not repeatable.

b. If successful, probably not repeatable against second target country.

[redacted] 3. Is the use of proxies possible (if not indicated in scenarios)?

Not realistically.

[redacted] 4. Need the CPR always be identified as the source of the CNA threat or detonation?

Yes.

[redacted] 5. Is the situation more likely in the near term, far term, or is it time-invariant?

ICBMs would be more effective as weapons, thus probably near term more likely. The psychological effects which would accompany such a threat would perhaps make the use time-invariant.

[redacted] 6. What is the most important aspect of the scenario which favors encourages the use of CNA?

a. If detonate device, the detonation clearly shows intent and capability.

b. If only theater, they retain options while not directly confronting the U.S.

[redacted]

[redacted]

7. What are the most sensitive aspects of the scenario relative to the accomplishment of the desired objective as viewed by the CPR?

a. Must convince the U.S. that intent real and priority of objective high to the Chinese while operating on the premise that U.S. will choose not to become directly involved.

b. Necessity to preposition the weapons.

8. In what manner is the scenario sensitive to the evolution of the alternative world environments?

If the U.S. follows the Nixon doctrine and desires to present a low profile in Asia, then it could be argued that the use of CNA in such situations is more probable than cases where clear treaty commitments are involved, i.e., the risk of U.S. retaliation is less. On the other hand, a hard line U.S. policy might raise the possibility that the use of CNA would be used against the U.S.

9. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the U.S. domestic situation?

Except for extreme domestic turmoil, the use is probably more sensitive to the degree to which the U.S. is threatened, the nature of our treaty commitments and the presidential leadership than to the U.S. domestic situation.

10. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the USSR/China relationship?

Yes, in three ways:

a. USSR would stand to gain propaganda victory over China were China to use nuclear weapons.

b. The degree of USSR concern would be related to the territory involved.

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. Actual detonation would likely increase the Soviet resolve relative to their objectives regarding China. The threat would make the USSR uncertain as to potential acts which the Chinese might commit under different conditions in the future.

11. What would make the scenario more credible? Less credible or irrational?

More credible

a. Degree to which Taiwan viewed as threat to China following a series of Taiwan initiatives.

b. The lower the degree to which the U.S. is directly threatened.

Less credible

a. Impulsive detonation with little or no buildup of diplomatic pressure.

b. Coupled with a series of CNA threats which are adventuristic.

c. Impossible terms, such as troop removal deadlines or hegemony requirements.

12. What alternative means exist to accomplish the same objectives?

Medium bombers and I/MRBMs

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) IV EXPANSION OF AREAS OF INFLUENCE

A. Scenario

U.S. involvement in Thailand continues while Chinese Communist subversive activities increase. The Chinese use the threat of CNA against continental U.S. cities to eliminate the U.S. presence.

B. Typical Variants

1. Same scenario, different countries in Asia.

2. Detonation of weapon in the U.S. to show resolve regarding a given limited objective, threaten further damage.

3. Threaten or detonation of CNA against ally to achieve objective vis-a-vis the U.S.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U)C. Interpretation of Scenario

[redacted] 1. Potential targets and number of weapons required to achieve CNA objectives.

Targets: cities.

Number of Weapons: 3-6 for target country
2-4 if threaten the U.S.

[redacted] 2. Is the act repeatable?

a. If not successful, not repeatable.

b. If successful, probably not repeatable against second target country.

[redacted] 3. Is the use of proxies possible (if not indicated in scenarios)?

Not realistically, but might be lent to revolutionary forces.

[redacted] 4. Need the CPR always be identified as the source of the CNA threat or detonation?

Yes, assuming CPR directly uses weapon.

[redacted] 5. Is the situation more likely in the near term, far term, or is it time-invariant?

To the extent the IRBMs are more effective as weapons, the near term one would be favored. The psychological effects of such a threat may make the use time-invariant.

[redacted] 6. What is the most important aspect of the scenario which favors/encourages the use of CNA?

a. If detonate device, the detonation clearly shows intent and capability.

b. If only theater, they retain options while not directly confronting the U.S.

[redacted]

[redacted]

7. What are the most sensitive aspects of the scenario relative to the accomplishment of the desired objective as viewed by the CPR?

a. Must convince the U.S. that intent real and priority of objective high to the Chinese while operating on the promise that U.S. will choose not to become directly involved.

b. Necessity to preposition the weapons.

8. In what manner is the scenario sensitive to the evolution of the alternative world environments?

If the U.S. follows the Nixon doctrine and desires to present a low profile in Asia, then it could be argued that the use of CNA in such situations is more probable than cases where clear treaty commitments are involved, i.e., the risk of U.S. retaliation is less. On the other hand, a hard line U.S. policy might raise the possibility that the use of CNA would be used against the U.S.

9. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the U.S. domestic situation?

Except for extreme domestic turmoil, the use is probably more sensitive to the degree to which the U.S. is threatened, the nature of our treaty commitments and the presidential leadership than to the U.S. domestic situation.

10. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the USSR/China relationship?

Yes, in three ways:

a. USSR would stand to gain propaganda victory over China were China to use nuclear weapons.

b. The degree of USSR concern would be related to the territory involved.

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. Actual detonation would likely increase the Soviet resolve relative to their objectives regarding China. The threat would make the USSR uncertain as to potential acts which the Chinese might commit under different conditions in the future.

11. What would make the scenario more credible? Less credible or irrational?

More credible

a. Nature of the events leading up to the threat or detonation create at least some aura of just cause for the Chinese action.

b. The lower the degree to which the U.S. is directly threatened.

Less credible

a. Impulsive detonation with little or no buildup of diplomatic pressure.

b. Coupled with a series of CNA threats which are adventuristic.

c. Impossible terms, such as troop removal deadlines or hegemony requirements.

12. What alternative means exist to accomplish the same objectives?

Guerrilla warfare and conventional forces.

[redacted]

(U) V POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT OF THE U.S.

A. Scenario

A clandestine device is detonated near a U.S. military installation in Japan to embarrass the U.S. and force the Japanese to cancel (or not to ratify depending upon the timing) the Mutual Defense Treaty. Several other Asian (and other ?) countries ask the U.S. to eliminate its military bases (or at a minimum nuclear stockpile) from their lands.

B. Typical Variants

1. Other countries chosen as the site of the detonation or other limited objectives the factors dictating the point in time the device detonated, e.g., Europe to force changes in NATO.

2. Detonation of a small device in the U.S. near a military installation to embarrass the U.S. at a critical time, e.g., renegotiation of base rights in Spain or the Philippines.

[redacted]

(U) C. Interpretation of Scenario

[redacted] 1. Potential targets and number of weapons required to achieve CNA objectives.

Targets: military installations but also selected urban areas.

Number of Weapons: One, but probably desire more than one, say 2-4.

[redacted] 2. Is the act repeatable?

Probably, but depends in part on the degree to which the U.S. able to convince other nations that China the source of the first detonation. The U.S. might announce the intention of direct retaliation should another weapon be detonated, thus decreasing the likelihood that the CPR would detonate a second device.

[redacted] 3. Is the use of proxies possible (if not indicated in scenarios)?

Yes, but the need for perfect security discourages use of proxies.

[redacted] 4. Need the CPR always be identified as the source of the CNA threat or detonation?

No. Identification not desired.

[redacted] 5. Is the situation more likely in the near term, far term, or is it time-invariant?

Time-invariant, but selection of specific point in time for detonation important relative to achieving a specific objective.

[redacted]

[redacted]

6. What is the most important aspect of the scenario which favors/encourages the use of CNA?

Potential to achieve objective vis-a-vis the U.S. without direct confrontation.

7. What are the most sensitive aspects of the scenario relative to the accomplishment of the desired objective as viewed by the CPR?

a. Perfect security to ensure China not implicated.

b. Prepositioning of weapons.

8. In what manner is the scenario sensitive to the evolution of the alternative world environments?

If the U.S. follows the Nixon doctrine and desires to present a low profile in Asia, then it could be argued that the use of CNA in such situations is more probable than cases where clear treaty commitments are involved, i.e., the risk of U.S. retaliation is less. On the other hand, a hard line U.S. policy might raise the possibility that the use of CNA would be used against the U.S.

9. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the U.S. domestic situation?

The higher the level of domestic unrest the greater the compound nature of the effect achieved - i.e., pressure on the U.S. leaders from the foreign countries and from U.S. sources.

10. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the USSR/China relationship?

To a degree. If the USSR and China settle their differences the USSR, if aware of the gambit, would probably consider it adventuristic. Otherwise, the USSR would stand to gain from the U.S. misfortune the same as the CPR with no risk.

[redacted]

[redacted]

11. What would make the scenario more credible? Less credible or irrational?

More credible

a. The more perfect the security perhaps through the use of simple delivery techniques and detonation schemes.

b. The more difficult the source of device is to identify following detonation.

c. The higher the state of tension in a given country regarding a specific event which the CPR is attempting to influence.

d. The more sensitive the target country is to the presence of U.S. nuclear stockpiles.

Less credible

a. The converses of a. to b. above.

12. What alternative means exist to accomplish the same objectives?

None. Can politically embarrass the U.S. but not in the manner implicit in the scenario. For example, detonate the explosives on a U.S. military installation.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) VI CATALYTIC WAR

A. Scenario

A device is detonated within the United States in such a fashion as to indicate a deliberate attack on the United States by the Soviet Union during a period of deep crisis between the two countries. The object of detonation would be to convey the notion that an effort had been made to destroy the decision making apparatus of the U.S. government in order that the nation might be helpless in the period when a major Soviet attack impended. The intent would be to panic the United States into a strategic nuclear strike on the Soviet Union in order to tie down both Soviet and Chinese power outside of Asia and permit China a free hand; and, perhaps leave both the Soviet Union and the United States incapable of interfering with future Chinese policies.

B. Typical Variants

1. Same objective, but European setting to achieve NATO/Warsaw Pact exchange followed, probably, by US/USSR nuclear exchange.

2. A similar attack during a deep Soviet-Chinese crisis in which the Chinese attempt to convey the notion of a Soviet attack on the U.S. or a U.S. attack on the Soviets, so that China may be relieved of some of the pressure of Soviet military power, or in the event of a Soviet attack on China, China can appeal to the United States for an alliance were the U.S. also under apparent attack by the USSR.

3. CNA against Soviet forces in Egypt in an effort to convey Israeli use of nuclear weapons and to force direct Soviet involvement against Israel with the hope it would involve the United States or at least keep the Soviet Union distracted in the Mid-East.

[redacted]

[redacted]

C. Interpretation of Scenario

1. Potential targets and number of weapons required to achieve CNA objectives.

Targets: Cities but might also be military installations.

Number of Weapons: 2-4.

2. Is the act repeatable?

Yes, as long as the source not identified. If a full nuclear exchange between the U.S. and USSR were to occur it is doubtful that the CNA requirement would soon repeat itself.

3. Is the use of proxies possible (if not indicated in scenarios)?

Yes, but the need for perfect security discourages use of proxies.

4. Need the CPR always be identified as the source of the CNA threat or detonation?

No. Idenfification not desired.

5. Is the situation more likely in the near term, far term, or is it time-invariant?

Time-invariant but selection of point in time to initiate the catalytic war important.

6. What are the most important aspects of the scenario which favors/encourages the use of CNA?

Potential to involve the U.S. and USSR without a direct involvement of China.

[redacted]

[redacted]

7. What are the most sensitive aspects of the scenario relative to the accomplishment of the desired objective as viewed by the CPR?

a. Danger that the gambit would backfire and both the U.S. and USSR would attack China.

b. Timing of significant importance; world situation must be such that U.S. and USSR moving toward direct confrontation anyway.

c. Prepositioning of weapons.

8. In what manner is the scenario sensitive to the evolution of the alternative world environments?

More likely if general world environment unstable and the roles of the U.S. and USSR in conflict, especially if China felt an important lag between herself as a power and these other nations.

9. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the U.S. domestic situation?

Only if there is extreme turmoil would the President be unable to mount a strike against the USSR. If the source is identified, a very high level of turmoil could conceivably inhibit or negate a direct strike on China. In all other instances the reaction of the U.S. would not be limited.

10. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the USSR/China relationship?

Yes, if a completely cooperative spirit existed between the CPR and USSR the scenario would be improbable.

11. What would make the scenario more credible? Less credible or irrational?

<u>More credible</u>

a. The higher the degree of security.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. The less probable that the U.S. or USSR could identify China as the source of the weapon.

c. The higher the state of tension between the USSR and the U.S. although it can't be too high or China would not have to extend herself - she could enjoy the benefits of the conflict anyway.

Less credible

a. The converses of a. thru c. above.

[redacted]

12. What alternative means exist to accomplish the same objectives?

None.

[redacted]

(U) VII INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF U. S. DOMESTIC EVENTS

A. Scenario

A period of major civil unrest occurs in the United States during which time the government is required to employ military forces against armed-persons waging a rebellion or uprising. Seeing an opportunity to exacerbate the situation in the United States, the Chinese arrange for the detonation of a nuclear device in the vicinity of the seat of government in a fashion that conveys the impression that an insurgent group is responsible. The object of such use would be to heighten the sense of domestic danger in the United States in order to distract the United States from events abroad, and, if possible to trigger repressive measures and heighten civil disorder to the point where the United States would be incapable of pursuing a coherent policy to counter Chinese moves abroad.

B. Typical Variants

1. Chinese agents approach dissident groups in the United States with the offer of assistance in fomenting violence against the government and using the organization but without revealing the ultimate purpose, to deploy the weapon or weapons.

2. CNA is used to create a constitutional crisis during the period of a presidential changeover by detonation of a nuclear device on the site of the inauguration ceremony while the ceremony was in progress. The intention of such an attack would be to create a hiatus in governmental direction of national affairs and to force a preoccupation with the solution of the problem created by the loss of national leaders of the three branches of government and of the two political parties.

[redacted]

[redacted]

3. Chinese agents take over and direct the operations of an insurgent or dissident group with the goal of building an organization for coordinated guerrilla attacks to accompany the use of CNA against governmental centers, communications, or populated areas.

4. CNA is used as one facet of guerrilla war carried on in the United States by small terrorist groups sympathetic to China after China has been defeated in a war in order to continue the war against the United States and to weaken American resolve to pacify China or occupy important areas of China in order to undertake reconstruction.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) C. Interpretation of Scenario

[redacted] 1. Potential targets and number of weapons required to achieve CNA objectives.

Targets: probably cities -- although the target is probably less important than the fact of the occurrence of the detonation during a time of internal troubles.

Number of Weapons: 3-10.
A single weapon would convey the implication of further weapons about to be detonated, forcing internal precautions, perhaps sparking general panic and certainly leading to strong control-measures on the part of federal, state and local governments. Such control-measures might serve to dampen the disturbances or might provoke more forcible ones.

[redacted] 2. Is the act repeatable?

Yes, if the security is perfect. Repetition of the act would be consistent with the precepts of guerrilla warfare wherein the chief impact of such warfare lies in dissipation of the efforts of conventional forces and the evocation of general atmosphere of terror and the reduction of confidence in the government.

[redacted] 3. Is the use of proxies possible (if not indicated in scenarios)?

Yes, but the need for perfect security discouraging unless the objectives are to be realized by having the third party take credit for the weapon, e.g., the Black Panthers.

[redacted]

[redacted]

4. Need the CPR always be identified as the source of the CNA threat or detonation?

No, identification not necessary unless Chinese perceive that open support of a dissident group will strengthen it without compromising Chinese security or eventuate in a U.S. strike against China.

5. Is the situation more likely in the near term, far term, or is it time-invariant?

Time-invariant but extremely time dependent as to when the threat or actual detonation occurs.

6. What is the most important aspect of the scenario which favors/encourages the use of CNA?

If security is perfect, low risk of retaliation and psychological impact of terror evoked by use of one such weapon and threat of use of further weapons particularly in the hands of domestic dissidents.

7. What are the most sensitive aspects of the scenario relative to the accomplishment of the desired objective as viewed by the CPR?

a. Uncertainty as to the real state of affairs in the U.S.

b. Control over the militants' use or disclosure of source (deliberate or security leak).

c. Prepositioning of weapons.

d. The difficulty of coordinating use of the weapon with other Chinese actions which use of the weapon is supposed to support or facilitate.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] 8. In what manner is the scenario sensitive to the evolution of the alternative world environments?

Generally sensitive to U.S. domestic situation not the alternative world environments. Might even try this gambit if U.S. had reduced totally its Asian presence.

[redacted] 9. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the U.S. domestic situation?

Yes. But it is more sensitive to the Chinese perception of U.S. domestic situation. That perception may be colored by Chinese ideology than by the actual situation existing in the United States.

[redacted] 10. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the USSR/China relationship?

No. Except that a <u>true</u> cooperative relationship would probably tend to have the Soviets discourage the use of such a weapon, were the Chinese to inform the USSR of their plans.

[redacted] 11. What would make the scenario more credible? Less credible or irrational?

<u>More credible</u>

a. More credible the higher the degree of internal turmoil perceived by the Chinese.

b. The presence of clandestine weapons on American soil before the outbreak of disorders in the United States.

c. The presence of a pro-Maoist or Maoist-sympathetic group as an element in the disorders.

d. The more perfect the security.

<u>Less Credible</u>

a. The necessity to infiltrate the weapons during a time of national crisis in the United States.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. The Chinese perception that the situation in the United States had already deteriorated in manner favorable to Chinese policy.

[redacted]

12. That alternative means exist to accomplish the same objectives.

a. Money, materials and cadres for leadership of Maoist-oriented groups to operate amongst American dissidents.

b. Clandestine support of dissident groups whatever their orientation.

c. CNA has some unique aspects over the other alternatives given its nuclear nature.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) VIII AS A MEANS TO GAIN REVENGE OR INFLICT PUNISHMENT

[redacted]

A. Scenario

China has been administered a decisive defeat by the United States and looks forward to the bleak prospect of relative impotence in foreign relations and postponing the accomplishment of its ideological and national objectives. In order to rob the occurrence of its triumph and to help restore the Chinese loss of face, the Chinese direct their organization in the United States to detonate one or more weapons.

[redacted]

B. Typical Variants

1. Chinese agents in the United States, prepared to launch a CNA, but not yet having been directed to do so, detonate a device in a populated area because of a decisive defeat of China by the United States.

2. In a Soviet preemptive attack, China suffers a decisive defeat, as a desperate act China launches CNA against the United States hoping that the USSR will be the apparent source thereby buying time for China by forcing American intervention in the war.

3. The Chinese suffer extreme loss of face over a given diplomatic or even limited conventional war failure and detonate a weapon to gain revenge.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) C. Interpretation of Scenario

[redacted] 1. Potential targets and number of weapons required to achieve CNA objectives.

Targets: cities, governmental centers.

Number of Weapons: 1 to realistic upper limit of potential to deploy CNAs.

[redacted] 2. Is the act repeatable?

a. Within a given crisis to the extent of CNA stockpile.

b. If the crises were separated 10-15 years, perhaps repeatable but doubtful.

[redacted] 3. Is the use of proxies possible (if not indicated in scenarios)?

Yes. Proxies, if acting as the unknowing agents of China are unlikely to respond to the pathology of the situation in the same fashion as a messianic type of leadership would. Proxies acting as the knowing agents of the Chinese government would be more apt to behave in a manner commensurate with the demands of self-interest if the defeat of China were known to them to be as certain as is implied in this scenario.

[redacted] 4. Need the CPR always be identified as the source of the CNA threat or detonation?

Under the circumstances presented in this scenario, it is most likely that psychic satisfaction could only be obtained if the United States were aware that the Chinese had perpetrated the attack. The nature of this kind of attack is that its consequences for China would be, in the scale of things, a matter of indifference to a leadership or apparatus seeking revenge.

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. Is the situation more likely in the near term, far term, or is it time-invariant?

It seems unlikely that CNA would be laid on for the sole purpose of revenge or to inflict punishment, but rather it would have been laid on as part of a general strategic preparation aimed at some objective to be obtained by CNA coordinated with other forms of action. The use of CNA for revenge would be a last-resort consideration. Thus, the time aspect of the threat depends on specific purpose for which the CNA was employed.

6. What is the most important aspect of the scenario which favors/encourages the use of CNA?

Once the capability for CNA had been established in the United States, its mere existence there would constitute a last resort for influencing U.S. behavior and in the event of a Chinese defeat, would provide the means for wreaking revenge or inflicting punishment. The fact that Chinese policy had been taken to such an extreme that it led to a Chinese defeat, would be an indication of the desperation with which China was confronting its problems.

7. What are the most sensitive aspects of the scenario relative to the accomplishment of the desired objective as viewed by the CPR?

Prepositioning of weapons.

8. In what manner is the scenario sensitive to the evolution of the alternative world environments?

Generally not after the U.S. and CPR are at war. To the extent the USSR backs China the war might not reach the point where China perceives a failure warranting revenge or punishment.

[redacted]

[redacted]

However, in the event of a Chinese-Soviet war, a Chinese defeat might evoke the same kind of inclination toward revenge or punishment against the United States as in a U.S.-China war, since China has tended to follow the line that both the USSR and U.S. are in conspiracy against China.

9. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the U.S. domestic situation?

No.

10. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the USSR/China relationship?

Yes. See 8. above.

11. What would make the scenario more credible? Less credible or irrational?

More credible

a. There is a certain irrational nature to the scenario which is implicit in its basic objective -- to gain revenge or inflict punishment.

b. The scenario would be more credible if a series of quasi-irrational acts were noted prior to or during the confrontation, such as a general atmosphere of desperation characterizing Chinese policy and actions, reflecting urgency and willingness to take heavy risks, or the emergence of policies that seem more messianic than practical with measures undertaken to carry out such policies.

Less credible

a. Emergence of a regime that appears willing to compromise or accommodate.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b. The more important the preservation of some form of central government would be, the less likely that China would have permitted the war to progress to this point.

[redacted]

12. What alternative means exist to accomplish the same objectives?

Elements of the Chinese SOF if still operable (doubtful) at the point in time desired.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) IX IRRATIONAL ACTS

A. Scenario

While any of the previous "representative scenarios" could have variants which are irrational (particularly the revenge or punishment scenarios) the grouping of situations which are "irrational" in their use of CNA indicates one general class of CNA scenarios. A "representative" example of such a scenario is the following. Mao dies and a group of young revolutionaries gain semi-control of the central government. They perceive that a significant success external to China is needed to cement their power position. Prior to Mao's death, devices had been planted in the U.S.; the revolutionaries detonate one or several of these believing the U.S. will not retaliate or would do so in a restrained manner. The U.S., however, retaliates with a full nuclear strike.

B. Typical Variants

1. A mad commander detonates a weapon without Peking authorization.

2. Miscalculation or misconception of given Chinese strategic capability at some future point in time.

3. Terror attack in which the probable consequences far out-weigh the potential psychological gains.

4. A Chinese agent in the United States, responsible for organizing and executing a CNA under circumstances that will benefit China, instead, because of some personal disappointment (spurned in love by his American sweetheart, passed over for promotion by his service, ill-supplied with funds to cover the expense of his project and of his personal needs, ordered to return home without accomplishing what he has been sent to accomplish, or because of rivalry within the group of which he is a part in the U.S.) detonates the weapon out of pique.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. Person recruited in the United States to assist in carrying out a CNA take possession of the device or devices to use for their own purposes against the government of the United States or to achieve personal gain, acting as a consequence at a time and place when China cannot take advantage of the operation of CNA or under circumstances where the blame will come to rest on China but China will be unable to escape responsibility for the act.

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) C. Interpretation of Scenario

[redacted] 1. Potential targets and number of weapons required to achieve CNA objectives.

Targets: Varied - cities to military targets possible.

Number of Weapons: Probably small but if different groups from the users proposition the weapons 4-20 possible.

[redacted] 2. Is the act repeatable?

Not necessarily - since "irrational" implies that retaliation is almost guaranteed.

[redacted] 3. Is the use of proxies possible (if not indicated in scenarios?

Yes, if part of the original plan.

[redacted] 4. Need the CPR always be identified as the source of the CNA threat or detonation?

Not necessary, but probably so.

[redacted] 5. Is the situation more likely in the near term, far term, or is it time-invariant?

Time-invariant.

[redacted] 6. What is the most important aspect of the scenario which favors/encourages the use of CNA?

The fact that the weapon is prepositioned permits the act.

[redacted]

[redacted]

7. What are the most sensitive aspects of the scenario relative to the accomplishment of the desired objectives as viewed by the CPR?

Prepositioning of the weapons.

8. In what manner is the scenario sensitive to the evolution of the alternative world environments?

Generally not sensitive but an evolving world in which the Chinese perceive they are winning would reduce the probability of an irrational act. The opposite side could also be argues; as they gain significant economic and military power they become reckless. Or, frustration in world affairs may lead to irrational acts -- unless ideological government gives way to a pragmatic one.

9. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the U.S. domestic situation?

Partially. An unstable U.S. might tend to make the use of CNA appear rational to the Chinese planner than a stable U.S. However, an unstable country is less predictable therefore the act could be interpreted as irrational.

10. Is the use of CNA sensitive to the USSR/China relationship?

Probably not.

11. What would make the scenario more credible. Less credible or irrational?

<u>More credible</u>

a. The greater the number of irrational acts observed in a crisis (or non-crisis) situation.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Less credible

a. The more stable the Chinese leadership and the greater the absoluteness of their control.

[redacted]

12. What alternative means exist to accomplish the same objectives?

Question really doesn't apply to the scenario. Could be irrational with any element of her strategic offensive forces.

[redacted]

[redacted]

X ASSESSMENT OF SCENARIOS (U)

[redacted] A considerable theoretical structure has been erected about the use of nuclear weapons in warfare and about their impact on international politics. Actual experience with nuclear weapons in war has been limited to that derived from the use of two air-dropped weapons against Japan in closing days of World War II. There is, therefore, no firm basis for making general predictions about how nuclear weapons will be employed or about how their employment will effect the outcome of war. Particularly is that true in considering Chinese employment of nuclear weapons for that country adheres to a uniquely Chinese approach to strategy, warfare and technology. That approach seems conditioned partly by Chinese historical experience, and the Chinese view of the world; and, partly by the imperatives of Chinese ideology. But it is clear, as well, that Chinese strategy, in order to be successful, must be drawn with the consideration that China is a weak power with ambitious goals, competing in an arena with strong powers.

[redacted] The use of a clandestine mode of nuclear attack seems improbable, yet the inherent characteristics of nuclear weapons, low weight to yield ratios, and the strong element of surprise inherent in a clandestinely mounted attack, commend the clandestine mode as a means of achieving widespread destruction and the greatest possible psychological impact while providing some prospect, under some circumstances, of evading retaliation.

[redacted] The irrational or strategically inconsequential use of CNA cannot be ruled out, but comprehension of the nature of the threat seems best understood if presented within the framework of concerted actions aimed at accomplishing fruitful strategic outcomes.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] The ten scenarios seem to reveal the possibilities for a weak power to credibly threaten damage to a strong power in order to deter or compel action under circumstances where the issue at stake is of less consequence to the strong power than the damage it might suffer if it failed to comply. The capability to threaten damage seems more credible to achieve than the capability to inflict significant damage. The goal sought by the weaker power must be modest enough (to the stronger power) so that there is a reasonable likelihood that negotiation can produce the desired outcome. It would seem that actual detonation, in most cases, is the last thing the Chinese Communists want for detonation carries a high risk of retaliation. Thus, a credible threat coupled with modest objectives appears to be the overriding desiderata associated with CNA employment.

[redacted] Other interesting characteristics of CNA use are disclosed by the ten scenarios. For example, it appears that the devices lend themselves more to political/diplomatic blackmail and framing rather than to strategic destruction -- although there are circumstances where the latter application might seem worthwhile. For if strategic destruction doesn't accomplish its purpose completely, the bellicose nature of the attack carries a high risk of an equally bellicose response. I is not certain that the Chinese command real insight into how the United States would react to the announcement of a CNA threat. The reaction would likely depend on the goals sought, the manner in which the threat is revealed and the domestic/international situation at the time.

[redacted] The scenarios reveal that the number of weapons necessary to establish CNA threats can range from one to thirty; therefore, those situations requiring the greater numbers of weapons will also require greater lead-time for preparation, more refined security measures and sensitivity to conditions in the United States. A tranquil state of affairs would facilitate introduction of the weapons.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] In some scenarios, the act is regarded as non-repeatable because of restraints of time or the prospect of retaliation. Similarly, the use of proxies is more to be avoided than utilized because of the additional security risks and the difficulty of adjusting detonation to the overall strategy.

[redacted] Some scenarios would require the Chinese to identify themselves in order to link the threat to the purpose. However framing the United States, or, inducing political embarrassment, would compel sub rosa action. There is an attractive ancillary aspect to these latter applications since they would permit the Chinese to dissassociate themselves from the act.

[redacted] The time invariant options, appear associated with longer range goals such as political embarrassment, whereas the near term option conforms more nearly to crisis situations or objectives requiring little or no time for a decision on the part of the United States.

[redacted] Each scenario presents a particular mode for enhancing the use of a CNA device; however, germane to each is the establishment of a relatively inflexible intent and palpable capability so as to coerce the United States into the desired course of action. In several situations an attractive feature is that the threat is directed against an ally of the United States involving treaty commitments forcing the United States to consider whether to act or withdraw as its interest seems to dictate. In any event, the threat of retaliation is substantially reduced. Conversely, a number of factors surface to render CNA use sensitive to several constraints; however, each of these must be assessed within the particular scenario. Retaliation is the greatest deterrent while security measures and uncertainty about United States reaction provide formidable problems for the Chinese.

[redacted] The United States domestic situation, the world environment and the contemporary relationships between the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China seem likely considerations before using CNA. But again, the manner and the time at which these factors

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] are most weighty emerge from individual scenarios but do not lend themselves to an overall or composite judgement.

[redacted] Several scenarios could become more credible or more irrational depending on the particular manner in which the situation develops, the type of crisis, the method of announcing the threat, Chinese impulsiveness, timing, the decision to detonate to show resolve, and lack of control over a rapidly developing situation. It is evident the list of uncertain factors can be projected almost ad infinitum.

[redacted] The choice of targets within the continental United States is critical not only because of the great array of potential targets and because also the country itself is of such size and diversity. A single weapon would have to be used against a target that would inflict grave damage or disrupt effective recovery for an appreciable length of time. If more than one weapon is to be used, the problems of introduction, placement, control, concealment and detonation are drastically increased. Such constraints are not normally associated with normal strategic or tactical nuclear targeting arrays; therefore, targets must be selected on the basis of their demonstrative importance and unalterable vulnerability.

[redacted] There are, of course, a wide range of counter threats and other political and military responses open to the United States if such a threat manifestsitself. The existence of these responses remains a strong deterrent to the type of action heretofore discussed. The combination of a few nuclear weapons and a clandestine delivery system to place them within the United States in no sense provides an otherwise inferior nation with parity to United States. It could, however, provide such a nation as Communist China with the capability to credibly threaten significant damage to the United States -- a capability which has previously resided with the Soviet Union alone.

[redacted] Based on these considerations, the rank order of likelihood of the scenarios by RISK seems to be the following (see Fig. H-1):

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] A. High to lower risk under conditions where security of the mode of attack is imperfect:

1. Catalytic war
2. Influence the outcome of U.S. domestic events
3. Political embarrassment

B. High to lower risk where mode of attack is known to be secure:

1. Influence the outcome of domestic events
2. Catalytic war
3. Political embarrassment

C. Risk is less a consideration than the purpose of the attack:

1. Military application in a U.S. - China war
2. Defense of Chinese National Entity
3. Revenge or irrational act

[redacted] Based on the priority of Chinese objectives the rank order of likelihood seems to be the following (see Fig. H-2):

A. Degradation of U.S. a World Power (lower to higher priority):

1. Military attack on United States
2. Influence the outcome of U.S. domestic events
3. Catalytic war
4. Political embarrassment of the United States

B. Canceling U.S. opposition to a specific Chinese objective (lower to higher):

1. Expansion of traditional territories
2. Expansion of areas of influence
3. Defense of Chinese National Entity

[redacted] Given perfect security, the lowest risk and highest priority uses of CNA seem to be the following (see Fig. H-3):

1. Political embarrassment of the United States to facilitate expansion of traditional territories or expand Chinese influence.
2. Defense of Chinese National Entity.

[redacted]



Figure H-1

USES OF CNA - DEGREE OF RISK TO CPR



Figure H-2

USE OF CNA - RELATIONSHIP TO PRIORITY OF CHINESE OBJECTIVES*

*Note: Revenge and irrational acts are excluded because they represent special cases.



Figure H-3

USES OF CNA - RELATIONSHIP OF DEGREE OF RISK TO NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Input Substudy I

CNA VULNERABILITY PLANNING DATA

By: Stephen Brown
John Ryan

Input Substudy I

CNA VULNERABILITY PLANNING FACTORS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	INTRODUCTION	I-1
I	POPULATION	I-3
II	MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES	I-6
III	PETROLEUM REFINING CAPACITY	I-8
IV	PRODUCT PIPELINES	I-10
V	PRIMARY ALUMINUM PRODUCTION	I-12
VI	RUBBER TIRES AND INNER TUBES	I-14
VII	INSTITUTIONS-MANAGEMENT	I-16
VIII	MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL	I-19
IX	OFFSHORE SEABORNE THREAT	I-21
X	STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES	I-23
XI	STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES	I-26
XII	ATTACKS ON WASHINGTON, D.C.	I-30

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this input substudy is to present vulnerability data for use in the analysis of the China CNA threat. Choice of resource targets was based on findings of National Entity Survival (NES) investigations which recognize the importance of particular industries and institutions to postattack recovery and the continuance of the U.S. political and economic structure as known today. Thus postattack recovery requires more than the physical survival of people and production capacity; in addition, the skills and institutions to organize and manage the physical resources are essential. The elements of the national entity are depicted in Figure I-1.

Target categories from the 3 major elements of the National Entity are included in this input substudy. Categories were selected for inclusion on the basis of NES findings which have identified critical targets vulnerable to nuclear attack because of their concentration in a few areas.

Figure I-1

ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL ENTITY



I POPULATION--FIGURE I-2

Fatalities were calculated for weapons placed in the most densely populated Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas according to 1980 population forecasts. The areas over which fatalities would occur were estimated from Hiroshima-Nagasaki data as reported in The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. Cube root scaling was used to estimate the areas for higher and lower yields.

The target cities for weapons shown in Figure I-2 are listed in Table I-1. As one would expect, New York City is the most attractive target for CNA.

Reference

Goodrich, D. W. et al., Defense Model Studies Volume III, Stanford Research Institute, 1969 (UNCLASSIFIED).

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Samuel Glasstone, Ed., U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1962, (UNCLASSIFIED).

Figure I-2
POPULATION FATALITIES-1980 DENSITIES



Table I-1

TARGET CITIES FOR POPULATION

	10 KT	100 KT	1 MT	10 MT
1	New York	New York	New York	New York
2	New York	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Chicago
3	New York	Jersey City	New York	Philadelphia
4	New York	Wilmington	New York	Los Angeles
5	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	New York	New York
6	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Chicago	New York
7	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	Baltimore	New York
8	Jersey City	Philadelphia	New York	Washington, D.C.
9	Wilmington	Philadelphia	New York	Anaheim
10	Philadelphia	Philadelphia	New York	Boston
11	Philadelphia	Baltimore	New York	
12	Philadelphia	Las Vegas	New York	
13	Philadelphia	New York	Chicago	
14	Philadelphia	New York	Chicago	
15	Baltimore	New York	Chicago	
16	Baltimore	New York	Newark	
17	Baltimore	New York	New Orleans	
18	Las Vegas	New York	Washington, D.C.	
19	New York	Reno	Anaheim	
20	New York	San Francisco	San Francisco	
21	New York	Cincinnati	Rochester	
22	New York	San Jose	Los Angeles	
23	New York	Oxnard	Houston	
24	Reno	Honolulu	Boston	
25	San Francisco	Washington, D.C.	Cincinnati	
26	Cincinnati	New York	Philadelphia	
27	San Jose	New York	Philadelphia	
28	Oxnard	New York	Philadelphia	
29	Honolulu	New York	Jersey City	
30	Washington, D.C.	New York	Milwaukee	

II MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES--FIGURE I-3

The estimated concentration in 1975 of manufacturing activity in 5 kilometer squares is shown in Figure I-3 for 5 industry groups:

SIC 28 Chemicals and Allied Products

SIC 33 Primary Metal Industries

SIC 34 Fabricated Metal Products

SIC 35 Machinery, except Electrical

SIC 38 Instruments and Related Products

The manufacturing value added in this data base covers large plants only (large plant = 100 employees or more).

These industries are central to the nation's economic activity and present an interesting range of vulnerability to small attacks. Weapons of at least one megaton are required to insure moderate damage over an entire 5-km square, though in some cases one plant may account for all value in a square and allow the use of smaller weapons.

Reference

Laurino, R., et al, National Entity Survival Study, Phase I (U) Stanford Research Institute, June 1967 (SECRET)

Ryan, J., Projections of Large Plant Manufacturing Value Added to 1975, unpublished, Stanford Research Institute, June 1968.

Figure I-3
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1975



III PETROLEUM REFINING CAPACITY--FIGURE I-4

The vulnerability of the United States' petroleum refineries is depicted in Figure I-4. The lower curve shows the capacity that could be damaged by 1 to 30 weapons if each refinery were targeted individually. The concentration of refineries in certain areas makes the industry particularly attractive to megaton range weapons. The advantage to be gained by attacking clusters of refineries is shown by the upper curve.

References

Goen, R. L., et al., National Vulnerabilities Affecting Postattack Recovery, Stanford Research Institute, October 1969.

Walker, F. W., Estimating Production and Repair Effort in Blast-Damaged Petroleum Refineries, Stanford Research Institute, July 1969.

Figure I-4

PETROLEUM REFINING CAPACITY SIC 2911



IV PRODUCT PIPELINES--TABLE I-2

Petroleum products moved by pipeline in 1967 accounted for over 55 percent of total petroleum processed. Pipeline transportation is recognized as the major method of distributing refined petroleum products to distant markets.

Over 63 percent of pipeline barrel-miles in 1967 was carried by the three lines named in Table I-2. To disable a pipeline requires knowledge of feeder lines and major pump stations, but once the network is known it can be disabled with relatively few weapons.

Reference

Goen, R. L., et al., National Vulnerabilities Affecting Post Attach Recovery. Stanford Research Institute, October 1969, Chapter IV.

Table I-2

VULNERABILITY OF MAJOR PRODUCT PIPELINES

Pipeline Company	Percent of Barrel-Miles Shipped	Number of Weapons
Colonial	50.0%	3
Plantation	8.6	22
Texas Eastern Trans.	4.7	5
Totals	63.3%	10

V PRIMARY ALUMINUM PRODUCTION--FIGURE I-5

The production of primary aluminum is concentrated in 30 plants which account for 80 percent of primary aluminum shipped from all producers--both primary and secondary. These plants are dispersed so that no two together offer an attractive target.

Reference

Goen, R. L., et al, National Vulnerabilities Affecting Post Attack Recovery, Stanford Research Institute, October 1969.

Figure I-5

PRIMARY ALUMINUM SMELTING SIC 3334



VI RUBBER TIRES AND INNERTUBES--FIGURE I-6

The production of rubber tires is concentrated in large plants owned by 8 major companies. Establishments classified in SIC 3011 accounted for 99 percent of all shipments of tires and tubes in 1967.

Concentrations of plants in Akron, Ohio and Los Angeles, California, allow simultaneous targeting of 2 plants using 1 MT weapons, so that the percent of capacity destroyed can be improved over the results obtained targeting each plant individually.

Reference

Goen, R. L., et al, Location of Critical Industries, Stanford Research Institute, October 1969.

Figure I-6

TIRES AND INNER TUBES SIC 3011



VII INSTITUTIONS-MANAGEMENT--Table I-3

The rationale behind "national entity" studies is that attacks including major institutions, especially industrial, financial and government management, will have disruptive effects reaching far beyond indications derived from the number of fatalities involved.

Table I-3a is based on Dun and Bradstreet data on headquarters location of 46,000 corporations with a net worth over $.5 million in 1966. The data shows simply number of headquarters without regard to measures of size such as sales or employment. New York County is probably the only attractive CNA target by reason of its compactness, and even then weapons in the megaton range would be required to insure adequate coverage.

Supplementing the above is data on location and sales from the Fortune "500 Survey of 1966". The summary in Table I-3b reiterates the importance of New York in terms of size, but reveals that the size of corporations headquartered in Detroit and Pittsburgh make them attractive targets if an attacker's goals include economic disruption.

Indicators of other economic institutions--banks, stock exchanges, unions--merely emphasize the importance of New York City as a key economic center in terms of companies and assets controlled.

Federal management is perhaps the primary area where New York relinquishes first place. Washington, D.C., and environs employs over 20 percent of total Federal employment, and obviously this includes all major officials and administrators.

Table I-3

INSTITUTIONAL CONCENTRATIONS

a. Corporate Headquarters--D&B

County	City	No. of Hqs.	Percent of Major Hqs.
New York	New York	3,110	6.7%
Cook	Chicago	2,167	4.7
Los Angeles	Los Angeles	1,567	3.4
Wayne	Detroit	687	1.5
Dallas	Dallas	683	1.5

b. Corporate Headquarters--Fortune 500

City	No. of Hqs.	Sales (billions)	Percent "500" Sales
New York	128	$98.8	33.1%
Detroit	12	30.1	10.0
Chicago	39	20.4	6.8
Pittsburgh	21	13.9	4.7
Dearborn	1	11.5	3.9

References

Laurino, R. et al., National Entity Survival Study--Phase I (U), Stanford Research Institute, June 1967 (SECRET).

"The Business Markets," Dun's Review and Modern Industry, July 1966.

"The 500 Largest Industrial Corporations," Fortune, July 1966.

VIII MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL--TABLE I-4

There are several classes of attractive military targets discussed in the previous report on CNA. One might concentrate on retaliatory forces, such as, Polaris bases, SAC bases, and ICBM sites, or the national command authority depending on attackers' objectives and available weapons. In order to indicate the numbers involved, Table I-4 lists major command and control centers without regard to yields necessary to neutralize such targets. For further discussion and target lists see the previous report referred to above.

References

E. M. Kinderman, T. B. Taylor, and W. R. Van Cleave, The Unconventional Nuclear Threat--A Preliminary Survey (U), Stanford Research Institute, May 1969 (SECRET, RD).

[redacted]

[redacted] Table I-4

MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTERS (U)

White House	Washington, D.C.
Pentagon	
AJCC	Ft. Ritchie, Maryland, and Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania (Classified Location, Bluemont, Virginia)
ALT DAHQ	Fayetteville, N.C.
CINCNORAD	Colorado Springs, Colo.
CINCLANT	Norfolk, Va.
CINCSAC	Offutt AFB, Omaha, Neb.
CINCSTR	McDill AFB, Tampa, Fla.
CGARADCM	Peterson Field, near Colorado Springs
CNRCC	Richards-Gebaur AFB, near Kansas City, Kan.
CINSTRAL	Cross City, Fla.
CINCALSTIKE	Newport News, Va.
CINCARST AC	Petersburg, Va.
ENRCC	Newburgh, N.Y.
HIGHPOINT	Upperville, Va.
JCS/Pentagon	Washington, D.C.
12 AF HA	Waco, Tex.
SAC-A 2	Barksdale AFB, Shreveport, La.
SNRCC	Montgomery, Ala.
SAC-A 8	Westover, AFB., Holyoke, Mass.
SAC-A 15	March AFB., Riverside, Calif.
WNRC	Novato, Calif.-Hamilton AFB
SAGE/BUIC	Baudette, Minn; Calumet, Mich; Charleston, Main; Fallon, Nev; Fortuna, N.D.; Ft. Fisher, N.C.; Havre, Mont; Keno, Ore; N. Laguna, Cal; N. Truro, Mass; Othello, Wash; Tyndall, Fla.

[redacted]

[redacted]

IX OFFSHORE SEABORNE THREAT--TABLE I-5

[redacted] Table I-5 indicates the possible fallout fatalities from 1 MT weapons detonated off the United States coast, assuming no warning and no shelters. The possible reduction in fatalities using fallout shelters varies considerably from city to city.

[redacted] The results in Table I-5 are based on wind statistics for an entire year. Expected fatalities would increase considerably if the attacker could choose the most favorable wind; for example, Detroit fatalities from one weapon increase by a factor of 7 using a high confidence wind forecast assumption.

[redacted] Weapon yields affect estimates of fatalities considerably. Figures are not available for the unsheltered case, but for the sheltered case, a 10 MT weapon produced 19 times as many fatalities in New York as a 1 MT weapon. In Los Angeles the ratio was 3, substantially different, but the scarcity of shelter makes the population highly vulnerable whether available shelter is used or not.

[redacted] Weapon yields larger than 1 MT are certainly possible, and indeed probable for the seaborne offshore threat where weapon weight is not a constraint.

Reference

Baum, Sanford and Fred Miercort, Light Attack Shelter Requirements and Defense Avoidance Fallout Tactics (U), Stanford Research Institute RM 5205-19, July 1966 [redacted].

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Table I-5

OFFSHORE FALLOUT THREAT (U)

a. Expected Return for Fallout Attacks on Selected Cities

SMSA	Expected Fatalities per 1 MT Weapon (thousands)
Los Angeles	918
New York	837
Chicago	579
San Francisco	344
Philadelphia	302
Detroit	301
Boston	217
Washington	192
Miami	168
Buffalo	150

b. Expected Fallout Fatalities from Multiple Weapons

SMSA	No. 1 MT Weapons	Total Expected Fatalities (thousands)	Percent 1975 SMSA Pop.
Los Angeles	12	5,620	54%
New York	4	3,165	25
Chicago	4	1,892	25
San Francisco	4	1,259	27
Philadelphia	4	1,130	23
Detroit	3	1,008	26

[redacted]

X STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES--TABLES I-6, I-7

Three forces are included as strategic offensive forces--SAC bombers, SAC missiles, and Polaris submarines; in general, they are widely dispersed and not particularly vulnerable to small nuclear attacks.

SAC bomber bases including satellites number well over 40, and stringent security measures would probably preclude the possiblity of damaging several planes at one base. The possibility of inflicting damage on a major portion of the SAC bomber forces would appear quite remote.

SAC missile bases, as shown in Table I-6, number only 9, but the missile silos themselves are widely dispersed and would require far more than 9 weapons to damage even a small portion.

Weapons effects on buried structures are not predictable with a great degree of certainty, but tests have shown that light damage to "moderately deep underground structures" occurs at distances 2-1/2 - 3 times crater radii. The implications for weapons placement in CNA are shown below.

Yield	Crater Radius (ft.)	3x Crater Radius (ft.)
10 KT	130	390
100 KT	280	840
1 MT	800	2,400
10 MT	1,400	4,200

Thus, even very large weapons require placement within one mile of buried targets, making it impossible to damage a major portion of ICBM silos with small CNAs.

Polaris bases are shown in Table I-7; however, since few submarines are in port at one time, simultaneous destruction of all Polaris bases, even if possible, would damage a very small portion of the Polaris force.

Table I-6

SAC MISSILE BASES (U)

Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz.

Ellsworth AFB, S.D.

Grand Forks AFB, N.D.

Malmstrom AFB, Mont.

McConnell AFB, Kan.

Minot AFB, N.D.

Vandenberg AFB, Calif.

Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyo.

Whiteman AFB, Mo.

Source: E. M. Kinderman, T. B. Taylor, and W. R. Van Cleave, The Unconventional Nuclear Threat--A Preliminary Study (U) Stanford Research Institute, May 1969 (SECRET-RD)-- Figure I-1

[redacted]

Table I-7

POLARIS BASES (U)

N.S., San Diego, Calif.

Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, Calif.

N.S., Norfolk, Va.

Naval Supply Depot, Newport, R.I.

Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, S.C.

Naval Station Mayport, Fla.

Naval Submarine Base, New London, Conn.

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, Washington

Source: R. de Sobrino, Working Paper on Major Control Centers (U) Stanford Research Institute (unpublished) June 1969. SECRET.

[redacted]

XI STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE FORCES--TABLES I-8, I-9

(U) Strategic defensive forces fall into four classes:

- Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Sites
- Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Bases
- Air Defense Fighter Bases
- Air National Guard Fighter Bases

(U) All four classes are vulnerable to nuclear weapons effects; however, fighter bases would seem to be unattractive targets since there are over 50, including dispersal bases.

(U) ABM sites planned under Safeguard are listed in Table I-8 The radars are the softest and most vulnerable part of the system. If CNA is planned as a precursor to ballistic missile attack, then these sites are be prime targets.

Assuming 15 psi overpressure will damage PARs and MSRs the following tabulation shows the ground range for surface bursts which produces 15 psi:

Yield	Distance (ft.)
100 KT	3,850
1 MT	8,300
5 MT	13,000

Dust and thermal effects also will degrade the operation of PARs and MSRs, hence would be factors only during BM attack. These effects can be induced by weapons in the megaton range at distances of 10 miles and more.

Sea and Air ASW bases are listed in Table I 9. Their attractiveness as targets depends on the submarine forces of the attacker; however, there are some ASW bases which are vulnerable because of proximity to Polaris bases, which might be a consideration in targeting.

References

M. Morgan, "Spartan Nuclear Environmental Criteria," (U), Memorandum, Stanford Research Institute (Unpublished) May 1970, SECRET, RD.

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Samuel Glasstone, Ed., U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1962 (UNCLASSIFIED).

[redacted]

Table I-8

SAFEGUARD RADARS (U)

	PAR	MSR
Grand Forks, N.D.	1	1
Malmstrom, Mont.	1	1
Whiteman, Mo.		1
Warren, Wyo.		1
So. New England	1	1
Washington, D.C.		1
Upper Northwest	1	1
Central California		1
Mich-Ind-Ohio	1	1
Florida-Georgia	1	1
Central Texas		1
So. California	1	1
Totals	7	12

Source: Stanford Research Institute Work Paper--Project No. 5205; July 1969 [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Table I-9

ASW FORCE BASES (SEA AND AIR) (U)

NAS	Adak, Alaska
NS	Boston, Mass.
NAS	Brunswick, Mo.
NS	Charleston, S.C.
NAS	Jacksonville, Fla.
NS and NAS	Key West, Fla.
NS and NAS	Norfolk, Va.
NAS	Quonset Pt., R.I.
NAS	Moffett, Calif.
NS	New London, Conn.
NS	Newport, R.I.
NAS	North Island, San Diego, Calif.
NAS	Patuxent Rivers, Md.
NAS	Whidbey Is., Wash.
NS	San Diego, Calif.

Source: R. de Sobrino, Working Papers on Major Control Centers (U), Stanford Research Institute (Unpublished) June 1969 [redacted]

[redacted]

XII ATTACKS ON WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Nation's capital is particularly vulnerable to the CNA because of the close proximity of important targets such as the White House, the Capitol Building, and the Pentagon. Attacks on such targets are quite probable if the objective is to disrupt and collapse the government. The extent of damage that could be inflicted by single surface weapons in the megaton range is presented below.

A sketch of Washington, D.C., showing the relative location of the White House, Capitol Building, and Pentagon is presented in Figure I-7.

A 5 MT weapon placed midway between the Pentagon and Capitol Building (in the vicinity of the Jefferson Memorial) will result in 50 psi to both, while the White House would receive over 65 psi overpressure.

A 2 MT weapon placed midway between the Pentagon and the White House will result in 50 psi to both. The Capitol Building is within the radius of 50 percent probability of severe damage for 3-story reinforced concrete buildings.

In this location a 1 MT weapon would enclose both the White House and the Pentagon within the radius of 50 percent probability of damage for 3-story reinforced concrete buildings. Such buildings are harder than "Monumental" type; i.e., the White House, but the applicability of this damage curve in the case of the Pentagon is questionable. However, the Pentagon would receive over 25 psi overpressure.

Weapons effects would reach most Federal departments from megaton weapons in the general vicinity discussed above. The following buildings are within a 2-mile radius of the White House.



Figure I-7
Washington, D.C.

House and Senate Office Buildings

Library of Congress

Supreme Court

Health, Education and Welfare

State Department

Department of the Interior

Department of Commerce

Department of Labor

Interstate Commerce Commission

Internal Revenue Service

Justice Department

Coast Guard

Navy Department

Federal Reserve Board

In addition the following institutions among others would be affected:

Smithsonian Institution

Brookings Institute

George Washington University

Population fatality estimates for single megaton weapons detonated in central Washington, D.C., are as follows:

Yield	Estimated Fatalities (1980 Pop. Thousands)	Percent SMSA 1980 Population
1 MT	428	11.5%
2 MT	557	14.9
5 MT	934	25.1
10 MT	1,400	37.6

References

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Samuel Glasstone, Ed., U.S. G.P.O., April 1962.

Goodrich, D. W., et al., Defense Model Studies Volume III, Stanford Research Institute, 1969 (UNCLASSIFIED).

Newmark, Hansen and Associates, "Damage to Structures and Equipment from Nuclear Blast Effects (U)," DASIAC Special Report 82, May 1969 (Advance Draft Material for Revision of DASA EM-1, "Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons) SECRET-RD.

Input Substudy J

SURVEY OF CHINA EXPERTS ON SELECTED TOPICS

By: T. Koujakian
S. Stone

Input Substudy J

SURVEY OF CHINA EXPERTS ON

SELECTED TOPICS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION		J-1
QUESTION I:	THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF THE COMMUNIST CHINESE REGIME	J-4
QUESTION II-1:	THE COMMUNIST CHINESE CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD AND OF ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD	J-21
QUESTION II-2:	THE COMMUNIST CHINESE CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD AND OF ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD: THE LIN PIAO STATEMENT	J-42
QUESTION III:	THE COMMUNIST CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES	J-49
QUESTION IV:	THE COMMUNIST CHINESE TENDENCY TO ACCOMPLISH FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES (NATIONAL GOALS) THROUGH MILITARY MEANS	J-65
QUESTION V:	THE ROLE AND UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS	J-80
QUESTION VI:	THE INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS ON CHINA'S EXTERNAL (DIPLOMATIC-MILITARY) BEHAVIOR	J-85
QUESTION VII:	AMERICA'S CHINA POLICY	J-96

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The first purpose of this survey is to indicate how this perception or treatment of Communist China's leadership, world outlook, etc., compares with the China specialists' perception of these matters as expressed in their writings and testimonies of the 1960's; the questions raised revolve around this purpose. Second, the survey is intended to add credibility to the assumptions, analysis and conclusion of Input Substudy B.

Methodology

Involved in this survey are seven questions and the answers of more than a dozen China specialists to these questions:

I. The nature and future of the Communist Chinese leadership.

II. The Communist Chinese conception of the world and of China's role in it. (In this respect, the specialists' interpretation of the Lin Piao statement has been solicited.)

III. Communist China's foreign policy objectives.

IV. The Communist Chinese tendency to resort to force in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives.

V. The Communist Chinese perception of the role and utility of nuclear weapons.

VI. The internal constraints on Communist China's external (diplomatic and military) behavior.

VII. Should America's China policy, i.e., containment through isolation, be altered? If yes, then in what direction, why, and how would Communist China react?

Though some of the questions (and necessarily, their answers) e.g., Questions I and II, are interrelated, each question is nevertheless raised and answered separately; for the benefit of the reader, a brief introduction summarizing the views of the specialists on each particular question precedes the specialists' reply (in direct quotes) to each question.

The core of the China experts surveyed in this Appendix testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, in March, 1966; these are: George Taylor, J. M. H. Lindbeck, Samuel Griffith III, Morton Halperin, Benjamin Schwartz, Robert Scalapino, A. D. Barnett, John K. Fairbank, Harold Hinton, and Donald Zagoria. Hans Morgenthau, the noted expert on U. S. Foreign Policy, also testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with the above group, and he has been arbitrarily included in this survey as a China specialist. The testimonies of these and other China specialists were printed by the U. S. Government Printing Office for the use of the Committee; the publication is known as the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, on U. S. Policy with respect to Mainland China (March 8, 10, 16, 18, 21, 28, 30, 1966).

The other specialists involved in this survey are Alice L. Hsieh, Ralph L. Powell, C. P. Fizgerald and V. P. Dutt; they were chosen at random.

On the whole, this survey relies quite heavily--though not exclusively--on these March 1966 Hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; the Hearings were held within the context of the Vietnam War and of the relevant question of American involvement in Indo-China in general. This may be one of the shortcomings of the survey, but it also has a number of advantages. First, it greatly facilitated the task, for it is not very often that China specialists

summarize their views on Communist China in ten or less pages. Second, during the question and answer period, the Senators raised questions which are quite relevant to our study and which China specialists had presumably pondered but not bothered to answer in their books and articles. Not all specialists directly answer all of these seven questions; therefore, where appropriate, quotations have been inserted that answer the questions only indirectly, i.e., by implication.

For Question III, the answers have been included only of those specialists (Hsieh, Halperin, and Powell) who have devoted a great amount of their time and writings to the study of Communist China's attitude toward nuclear weapons.

While only summaries of the source material could be presented, it appears worthwhile to present extracts from which the summaries are derived. Thus, although the substudy is longer than originally planned the material is in a form readily available for future reference. Finally, we would like to add that unless otherwise noted, the page number at the end of each quotation refers to the Hearings.

Question I: The Nature and Future of the Communist Chinese Regime

A. Summary

In discussing the nature of the Communist Chinese leadership, the China specialists address themselves primarily to three questions: the importance of internal versus external affairs to the Communist Chinese; the rationality or irrationality of the Communist Chinese in foreign affairs; and the influence of tradition as against Communist ideology on these leaders.[1]

Lindbeck feels that "China's Communist leaders are specialists in Chinese domestic politics, but amateurs in the field of international politics;" he believes that most of their time and resources are invested in the management of domestic affairs and that due to a lack of interest, the Communist Chinese leaders are out of touch with reality in international relations. Lindbeck further maintains that the Communist Chinese are laboring under a number of misconceptions and have thus created a very unfavorable international situation for themselves. Halperin concurs that most of Communist Chinese leaderships' attention is devoted to nation-building, and Morgenthau supports the idea that the Communist Chinese lack an adequate understanding of the outside world. Both Morgenthau and Lindbeck consider the parochial attitudes of the current Communist Chinese regime consistant with traditional Chinese foreign policy. Fairbank, too, argues that the Communist Chinese leadership lacks a rational concept of world affairs: "Peking is not only unrealistic about us, Chairman Mao even thinks of himself as the successor of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin." Fairbanks feels that Mao is the

[1] For a discussion of this point, see Question II.

successor of the emperors of China (an argument also supported by Lindbeck, Morgenthau, Dutt, and Fitzgerald); he suggests that the Communist Chinese are fanatic and doctrinaire (implying a lack of rationality on their part).

Other experts such as Griffith, Taylor and Scalapino also imply that the Communist Chinese leaders are irrational (in the manner suggested by Fairbank). This group of specialists feels that this irrationality stems from Communist China's rigid and militant Communist ideology, of which it is an intrinsic part.

Barnett, like Lindbeck, accentuates the domestic effectuality of the Communist Chinese even though "the impact of the regime has been harsh and painful for millions of Chinese." However, Barnett sees this effort to strengthen the home base as part of a striving for international power, rather than as the ultimate objective in itself. Like Taylor, Griffith, and Scalapino, he believes that the Communist Chinese are "outward-looking," and suggests that they are strongly motivated by the desirability of a communist world as they see it. Hinton, too, believes that the Chinese are "expansionist" but he sees this as part of their heritage.[1] Nevertheless, as is discussed below under Question IV, it is the experts' consensus that militarily, the Communist Chinese, ". . . have usually been quite realistic in assessing the power balance in concrete situations; they have generally been calculating and even cautious in avoiding military 'adventurism' and limiting their risk..."

The experts tend to be in agreement with regard to the future character of the Chinese Communist regime. All see an eventual "mellowing" of the Communist Chinese leadership as the most probable long-range trend. There is, however, some variation in opinion as to how and when this mellowing might occur and what it would involve.

---

[1] For a discussion of this point, see Question IV.

Zagoria, Barnett, Hinton, and Scalapino indicate that they do not consider an overthrow of the Communist government very likely in the perceptible future. There seems to be no disagreement on this point by the other experts. These four make it clear, however, that they do expect a period of great and unpredictable change upon the death of Mao and the other top-ranking officials, all of whom are quite aged. Zagoria is particularly hesitant at attempting to predict what might occur then, and compares the period following Mao's death to that following the death of Stalin, in which he feels no one was able to anticipate how events might evolve.

Barnett points out in great detail a fact which is not ignored by the other China experts: that there are two divergent schools of thought in China today, the technical bureaucrats and the ideologists. The ideologists are currently dominant. Barnett and Hinton feel that immediately following Mao's death there will be greater ideological militancy but that this will eventually mellow. (Scalapino today feels that the successors to Mao will be rigid ideologues.) Hinton opines that the period of increased militancy could be as short as five years, but that the period of militancy might not end until Mao's militant successors themselves are removed from power; he believes that this rate of change in the direction of moderation on the part of Chinese leaders will prove crucial in the development of world affairs.

Morgenthau, Hinton, Halperin, and Scalapino maintain that changing world conditions as well as internal developments will induce changes in behavior of the Chinese government. Hinton, for example, believes that a "long-term mellowing is the most likely outlook for future Chinese policy, unless the United States gives China reason to act differently by relaxing its containment policy." Halperin on the other hand argues that "if the Chinese can become convinced that they do not face imminent

threat of an American nuclear attack, that they are likely to withdraw even more from the world while continuing to issue revolutionary proclamations and concentrate on their internal difficulties and opportunities."

Morgenthau believes that even though the new generation of leaders will be less given to Marxist rhetoric and to the propagation of revolution, they will remain intransigent "when it comes to the restoration of China's traditional domain in Asia." Hinton argues that China always has and will threaten the sovereignty of other Asian nations, when strong enough to do so.

B. Quotes

Lindbeck:

"The regime is authoritarian in character. The party leaders are skilled in trying to limit popular dissatisfactions and keeping them down to manageable proportions. . . .

"The party politicians are responsive to a degree to popular attitudes. They are well aware of the dangers of being alienated from the masses. (p189) . . .

"China's Communist leaders are specialists in Chinese domestic politics, but amateurs in the field of international politics.

". . .for a regime that is professedly internationalist in nature, relatively modest amounts of attention and resources are allocated to activities relating to external relationships. (187) . . .

". . .these men seem to me to reveal oversensitivity to prestige and ideological considerations, ignorance, and misconceptions; lack of experience and sophistication, and narrow-mindedness in their handling of China's relations with its external environment. (p186) . . .

"Ideologically they are committed to the notion that history is producing major changes in the globe that tend to favor them and the kind

Lindbeck (contd):

of system they represent. (p205) . . .

"It is true that within the framework of their doctrinal perspectives these men believe there is a close relationship between external and domestic affairs. They believe, for example, that the main forces shaping history---economic and social changes, proletarian revolutions, opposition to imperialism, to expansion of socialism--transcend national boundaries. They see developments in China as part of a larger transnational historic movement. But the "fundamental task" which they set for themselves in the party constitution of 1956 during the period of transition to communism is the "Socialist transformation" of the society and economy and the industrialization of the country. It is their own interests and those of China, as they interpret these, that are foremost in their minds.

"Instead of successfully finding ways to extend Chinese power and influence in their international affairs, as they have in domestic affairs, they are now pitted simultaneously against the United States and the Soviet Union, they are estranged from a majority of nations in the world, they are unpopular and feared by most of their neighbors in east Asia.

"I believe that this, in part at least, is the result of their parochial Chinese background and experience and the doctrinaire inflexibility of their perspectives on the world."(pp186-187)

Morgenthau:

". . .(China) is the seat of a Communist Government with a particularly virulent and militant outlook upon the world.

"This militancy and this almost mad ranting with regard to the outside world, together with this lack of understanding of the outside world, is again a continuation of an old Chinese tradition which looks

Morgenthau (Cont'd)

at the outside world as being naturally inferior to China, which regards China as the only power worthy of consideration, the only sovereign power of the world, to which all other nations by nature are tributaries. Thus the Chinese for ages have refused to deal with the outside world on equal terms. They have a great deal of contempt for it, and are quite ignorant of it, for the simple reason that they didn't think it was necessary for them to know anything about the outside world. I would say that the present attitude of the Chinese government toward the outside world is very much in this Chinese tradition, aggravated, and, in a sense, concealed by the Marxist-Leninist ideology. (p552) . . .

"It can be expected that both the present and the coming generation of Chinese leaders will continue to learn from experience and to adapt their policies to the real world. . . .

"It is also quite possible that the coming generation will be less given to militant Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and to the instigation and support of subversion throughout the world. But it would be futile to expect that the new generation will be more accommodating than is the old one when it comes to the restoration of China's traditional domain in Asia." (p 557)

Hinton:

". . . a long-term mellowing is the most likely outlook for future Chinese policy, unless the United States gives China reason to act differently by relaxing its containment policy. . . .

"Nor is there any reason to think that the possession of more than token nuclear power, which will accrue not to the present Chinese leadership but to its successors, will pose a mortal threat to peace in the absence of formal disarmament. In the nuclear age, power confers vulnerability as well, and therefore, tends to lead to responsibility and

Hinton (contd):

the acceptance of at least tacit arms control agreements. (p380) . . .

"The impending death of Mao Tse-tung is almost certain to produce an atmosphere of political uncertainty and insecurity. Sufficiently careful preparations for this event have been made so that the regime will probably survive it without collapsing. What we know of the views of Mao's likely successor suggests that for five or ten years after Mao's death there will not be many changes in basic domestic and foreign policies: if anything, what changes occur may be in the direction of greater toughness and militancy. On the other hand, there is reasonable chance that ten or fifteen years after Mao's death the new generation of leaders who will be coming to the top will hold views that are significantly less militant and doctrinaire, at any rate in foreign policy. In short, a long-term trend toward "mellowing," such as has occurred in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin, is a reasonable expectation, although the interval before it sets in may be substantial. . . An American policy of firmness and even toughness is more likely to accelerate such a mellowing process than is a policy of conciliatio or appeasement. (Communist China in World Politics, p. 490) . . .

". . . China when strong has always been a problem for the rest of Asia. This was true of the Nationalists in the days of their greatest powers, in the 1930's and briefly after 1945. It has been still truer, and will remain still truer, of the Communist successors." (Ibid., p. 490)

Zagoria:

". . .it seems to me that by now most people have come to the conclusion that the Communist regime in China is not just a passing phenomenon: that it is here to stay. There is very little chance, I think most experts would say, that the regime is going to be overthrown from

Zagoria (contd):

within or that there is a reasonable chance of overthrowing it from without, without taking the kind of risks that we wouldn't want to take. (pp. 385-86) . . .

"I think these people are very convinced, dedicated Communist and Nationalist Revolutionaries with a great sense of national pride, with a great sense of humiliation at the hands of the West.(p.390) . . .

"I think that we must all acknowledge that it is very difficult, and in fact impossible, to know what policy the successors to Mao will follow. . . I don't think one can make the argument that is often made that the people who participated on the Long March with Mao are going to follow exactly the same policies that Mao followed just because they were on the Long March with him. It seems to me if we know anything about Communist regimes it is that when as important and as key a dictator as Mao dies, there will inevitably be a great change in the regime.

"And I think one could also anticipate the likelihood of different leaders, some of whom may be out to succeed Mao of having different views about Chinese policies. I think we can already see some evidence that there are divergent views in the Chinese leadership about policies to follow now, and I think a pretty good guess is that after Mao dies these differences which already exist will be exacerbated, some will want to continue the old policies, others will call for an evaluation and change.

"But I think the fundamental point to keep in mind is that the changes, both internally and in foreign policy that occurred after Stalin died were really very fundamental, were not anticipated by many people, and I think we ought to keep in mind, at least, the possibility that the same thing will happen in Communist China." (p. 383)

Barnett:

". . . the first thing to note is that China's leaders obviously have very ambitious long-term goals. Moved by intense nationalism, they aim to build a strong base of power at home and to strengthen China's security. . . .

". . . (Communist Chinese leaders may be regarded) as first generation revolutionary leaders, and true believers in the Maoist version of Marxism-Leninism. . . .

". . . (the Chinese Communists) have usually been quite realistic in assessing the power balance in concrete situations; they have generally been calculating and even cautious in avoiding military 'adventurism' and limiting their risk.(p.10) . . .

"Well, I think they are strongly motivated by the desirability of a Communist world as they would see it . . .
I think they are outward looking. But it is important to recognize the terms in which they look outward, and the limitations on what they are likely to be prepared to do, as well as on their rather ambitious aspirations. (p.26) . . .

". . . I do not think the Chinese Communists are outward looking in the sense of old-fashioned military conquest. I think that they feel that the world is going through a revolutionary process. I think that they, in some respects, are very sensitive to changes that are going on in the world. (p. 25) . . .

"Perhaps the first thing that should be noted about the political situation in China is that the Communists have created a very strong totalitarian apparatus that has unified and exercises effective control over the entire China mainland, and they have used their power to promote uninterrupted revolution aimed at restructuring the nation's economy, social structure, and system of values.

Barnett (contd):

" While the impact of the regime has been harsh and painful for millions of Chinese, the Communists have built a strong base of organized support, partly on the basis of appeals to nationalism as well as promises of future accomplishments. They have also demonstrated a remarkable capacity to make and implement decisions and an impressive ability to mobilize people and resources. (p. 7) . . .

. . ."I believe that among the leaders in China there are significant differences on policies, under the surface - especially differences regarding domestic policies but some of them are relevant to foreign policy issues as well-and that one can differentiate between groups that might be labeled the technical bureaucrats or managers and the specialists in power, politics, and ideology.

"I further believe that these differences are reflected, even today, in the complex mixture of policies in China, and that in the future they are likely to become increasingly important, especially after the death of Mao.

"The biggest question about the future arises from the fact that Communist China is on the verge of an historic transition period in which virtually the entire top leadership will pass from the scene in a relatively brief period of time. To date the unity as well as longevity of the Chinese Communist leaders has been remarkable, but what has been an asset to the regime in the past is now becoming a liability, as the leaders steadily age and resist bringing younger men into the top inner circle.

"When Mao and other top leaders die, therefore, I would expect China to enter a period in which there could be a great deal more fluidity and uncertainty about both leaders and policies than in recent years.(p.8) . . .

"I am inclined to think that, as I suggested in my paper, even now you can find in domestic policy in China a mixture that reflects the

Barnett (contd):

pressures of two groups--there are more than two groups but to simplify things I have lumped them into two--and, crudely speaking there is one group of people who are preoccupied, I think, with political control, with keeping up political tension and revolutionary momentum, and so on, keeping up ideological fervor. Then there is another group of people who are more preoccupied with the practical problems of running the economy and other aspects of the country.

"I have a feeling that there might, for a period, be trends in directions that would be bad from our point of view; in the immediate takeover period, the men I call the specialists in power politics in ideology are, perhaps, more likely to move into the driver's seat as new leaders and be defensive about their position and, perhaps, try to harden positions inside China.

"But my own estimate is that they would not get away with this for very long; that they would not, like Mao, be able to make decisions and get them accepted by fiat; that they would not be--they would be even less successful than Mao in trying to use extreme political means to solve domestic problems.

"My own guess and, as I say, it is very speculative, is that over a period of time those I call the technical bureaucrats or the managers would begin, in effect, determining large areas of policy in China. (p. 52) . . .

"In short, the regime is not a passing phenomenon. In time it may change its character, but it will continue to exist, as we will continue to deal with it, for the predictable future." (p.4) . . .

Griffith:

"Frequently in the American press, the Chinese leadership is represented as a group of almost superhuman Machiavellis. But these men, and the members of the authoritarian bureaucracy over which tye preside, can make mistakes. They have made serious errors in the past, and they will make them in the future.

"Nevertheless, of one thing we may be certain: they are determined to extend their influence, at the least risk and cost to themselves, to susceptible areas." (The Military Potential of China, p. 91)

Hsieh:

"Far from conforming with this public image of warlike bellicosity, China's external military policies in pursuit of her long-term foreign policy objectives. . . have been characterized by a considerable degree of caution." (Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Nov. 1967, p. 76)

"I hate to use the word "pragmatic" but it is the one that seems best to describe the type of non-Maoist leadership in China. I would say there seems to be in the cards a more pragmatic, sober, responsible leadership, perhaps concentrating more on internal development than on ideological issues." (Ibid., p.84)

Halperin:

". . . there remains a considerable range of uncertainty, particularly in attempting to predict future Chinese behavior. In part, this is true because the Chinese themselves are very likely undecided about what they would do in various possible contingencies of interest to us. (p. 283) . . .

". . . in the long run, the third generation of Chinese leaders may come to abandon their faith in this path of revolutionary power as it becomes clearer and clearer that it is doomed to failure. (p. 285) . . .

"I believe that if the Chinese can become convinced that they do not face imminent threat of an American nuclear attack, that they are likely to withdraw even more from the world while continuing to issue revolutionary proclamations and concentrate on their internal difficulties and opportunities.(p.287) . . .

"It is important to emphasize. . . that most of the attention of the top leadership and most of the resources of China always have and

Halperin (contd):
will continue to be directed at creating a new revolutionary society in China and building an economically developed state." (p. 287)

Taylor:

". . . there is a great reluctance on the part of China specialists . . . to admit that the Chinese Communists are really Communists. . . .

"Their world view is not conditioned by the imperial past although they are willing to exploit it. (p. 455) . . .

"Communists hate the middle, they hate the people who want sane, sensible reform. They want to polarize the (international) political situation, this is their general tactic." (p. 475)

Fairbank:

"Peking is not only unrealistic about us, Chairman Mao even thinks of himself as the successor to Marx, Lenin and Stalin. Whereas in actual fact, as the ruler of China, he is much more the successor of the emperors who ruled at Peking until 1912 when Mao was already 18 years of age.

"To hear the Peking leaders talk you would think they were an off-shoot of European socialism. Actually the problems they face and the methods they use are in large part inherited from Chinese history. (p 98) . . .

"There is a great example of the China dynasty, a unified dynasty, and which lasted 20 years, unified by the Draconian method of killing people, and then it was gone.

"The Sui dynasty in the sixth century, and after 20 years it was gone.

"I am not saying that the Chinese Communists are likely to go, but I am saying it would not be illogical for them to adopt a somewhat milder policy. (p.175) . . .

Fairbank (contd):

"I have suggested, I think, they (the Chinese Communists) are a minority type, that is, they are the fanatic type and take power and just have no limits of what they want to do in changing everything. They are very doctrinaire. They have a vast plant. They want everybody right in on it, toeing the line, following all the proper doctrines.

"This, I think, will pass in the course of time. But at present, they are a very bellicose group." (p. 152)

Fitzgerald:

"The Chinese now claim to be the upholders of pure Marxism. . . (The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, p. 58) . . .

". . . it is still clear that the Chinese Communist Party has not merely"restored the rule of the T'ang" --revised the Chinese Empire in new guise; it has also reshaped it on very different lines. . . The Chinese Communists themselves have finally buried the notion, cherished by their opponents, that the People's Republic and the Communist Party were nothing but the agents of Russia. . . . The alternative possibility, that the Chinese still retain their former (i.e., traditional) view of the world and their place in it, can be supported by positive evidence. (Ibid., pp.46-48) . . .

"They see the outside world as either openly hostile, covertly opposed, or jealous of China's rise. This causes no surprise, for the Chinese had little reason to think that they had friends abroad before, and had never expected to find any. They remain convinced that their new way is as superior to all competing ways as they were formerly convinced that the Confucian Empire was superior to the barbarians." (Ibid.,p66)

Scalapino:

"The thrust of my earlier analysis was that we face a China both militantly nationalist and strongly ideological at present, a China

Scalapino (contd):

whose leaders committed a series of excesses from which they must now beat some retreat, but who still appear to be intent upon cultivating power in all of its aspects and quite prepared to use violence to effect revolutionary change throughout the world.(p.571) . . .

"What are the Chinese goals: Three have been oft proclaimed: To remove all Western influence from Asia; to encourage by a variety of means an ideology politically uniform Asia cast in the image of 'the new China'; and to enlist this 'progressive' Asia in the global struggle against both the 'revisionists' and the 'imperialists.' The words are those of the Chinese.

"These are scarcely the goals of an elite that is primarily oriented toward defense, and posing its objectives in very limited terms. . . .

". . . it is wise to remember that there is not a pacifist bone in a Maoist body.(p.565) . . .

". . . The main thrust of Chinese Communist foreign policy, as suggested earlier, has been characterized by revolutionary fervor, global commitment, and relatively inflexible division of the world into comrades and enemies. The line has been hard, advanced by practicing ideologues fiercely impatient with the existing order and anxious to challenge it in radical fashion.(pp.566-67) . . .

"The question is often asked, 'Can we anticipate major changes in China in the near future?' If by major changes, one means an overthrow of the Communist Party, the chances seem to me remote, barring global war or some other major and unforeseeable crisis. This is not because dissidence is absent in China. We have no accurate method of measuring such dissidence, but I am inclined to believe that if one could measure the total spectrum of opposition--from the most passive 'grumblers' to the active or potential 'subversives'--it would be relatively high, despite the fact that certain groups have clearly benefitted from the revolution and are grateful.

Scalapino (contd):

"The point, however, is that Communists more than most modern rulers have mastered the science of power. Consequently, dissidence can be relatively high and still pose no serious threat to a regime such as that of Peking because the dissidents cannot find or develop an organizational outlet. Without depreciating the significance of ideology or policy, I regard organization as still the most important weapon of the Communists, especially when it can operate in an unorganized or disorganized environment.

". . . in all probability, the most meaningful question is that so frequently posed recently, 'Will a younger generation of party leaders diverge considerably from the group of old Bolsheviks currently holding absolute power, so that the resulting changes, while taking place within the party, will nonetheless be profound and, in general, in the direction of realism and moderation?'

"This is a crucial question, and one that cannot be answered with any complete certainty. My own belief is that such changes will occur but that the critical element of timing will depend heavily upon both the internal and the external environment. Even under the best of circumstances, I am inclined to feel that the struggle for a more pragmatic realistic, and moderate political elite in China will be long and arduous, extending considerably beyond one generation. But the rate and nature of change will certainly be affected by the degree to which a wide range of subtle external pressures and alternatives can be developed. . . .

"No political regime can be totally rigid and survive. Clearly, current Chinese leaders have been forced to make substantial adjustments to various programs that have failed, at home and abroad. That will continue." (p 562-563)

Powell:

"The aging Chinese Communist leaders are militant revolutionaries but they are not unusually irrational. . . . The leaders of Communist China. . . are both Communists and nationalists. (Current History, Sept. 1965, "Communist China as a Military Power," p. 126)

"The government of Peking is, by its own declarations, more revolutionary than that of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party is strongly nationalistic and ambitious." (Foreign Affairs Quarterly, July 1965, "China's Bomb: Exploitation and Reactions," p.616)

Schwartz:

"I think that the Chinese are expansive nationalists in the sense that their conception of what the proper borders of China are is a Maximalianist conception. Almost anything that had any brush with the Chinese empire in the past is part of 'China irridenta,' if you will, and, by the way, they differ probably in no great respect from the Nationalist Government in this conception of the great China." (p. 224)

Dutt:

". . . the fact that he (Mao) is greatly influenced by his traditional thinking and is highly conscious of China's traditional position and role is important. (China and the World, p.30) . . .

"In this regard the thinking of Mao was little different from that of the previous rulers of the Universal Empire--that China had a central position in the world and that what was true of China was true of the rest of the world. (Ibid.,p.20) . . .

"Ideologically, Peking functioned on the presumption that this was an age of revolution, a period not only of the disintegration of the (Ibid.,p.37) . . .

"It seems that the Chinese leadership today is an ageing leadership in a hurry." (Ibid.,p.327)

Question II-1: The Communist Chinese Conception of the World and of Its Role in the World

A. Summary

As far as Communist China's contemporary world outlook is concerned, the China specialists surveyed here may be differentiated on the basis of the emphasis each specialist places on the sources of this outlook. Although the role of China's experience with the West (1840's-1940's) as one such source is by no means neglected, it is on the question of tradition vs. ideology that the differences arise.

One group of specialists (e.g., Fairbank and Fitzgerald)[1] argue that the Communist Chinese world outlook is the traditional Chinese outlook couched in Marxist-Leninist ideology. This group maintains that the Communist Chinese are merely attempting to restore the traditional Chinese Empire.

Another group (e.g., Hinton, Zagoria, Barnett and Powell), acknowledge the contribution of both tradition & Marxism-Leninism to the contemporary world outlook of Communist China. The implication is that Marxism-Leninism is a source in its own right and not just an envelope, as the first group tends to argue. Having accepted the influence of both tradition and ideology on the contemporary Communist Chinese world outlook on an equal footing, the members of the second group differ among themselves according to the relative importance each attaches to one of the sources as against the other.

A third group (e.g., Taylor) considers Communism as the sole source of Communist China's contemporary world view not only at the expense of tradition but nationalism as well.

---

[1] Morgenthau also falls into this group.

There is a concensus among all three groups to the effect that the Communist Chinese world outlook is a very "embattled one;" needless to say, the various groups discussed above attribute this to either Chinese tradition or Communism, or a combination thereof. Furthermore, it is also agreed that (whether to spread Communism or restore the traditional Chinese Empire) Communist China is an anti-status quo nation.

As for Communist China's conception of its role in the world, there is agreement to the effect that (again, whether due to tradition or ideology) the Communist Chinese consider themselves as the center of the universe and a model for mankind; those who tend to stress the Communist element of the Communist Chinese world outlook assign Communist China another role: the leadership of the Communist camp.

B. Quotes

Morgenthau:

"Finally, China is not only a great power, and she is not only a great power of a peculiar character, but she is also the seat of a Communist Government with a particularly virulent and militant outlook upon the world.

"This militancy and this almost mad ranting with regard to the outside world, together with this lack of understanding of the outside world, is again a continuation of an old Chinese tradition which looks at the outside world as being naturally inferior to China, which regards China as the only power worthy of consideration, the only sovereign power of the world, to which all other nations by nature are tributaries. Thus the Chinese for ages have refused to deal with the outside world on equal terms. They have had a great deal of contempt for it, and are quite ignorant of it, for the simple reason that they didn't think it was necessary for them to know anything about the outside world. I would say that the present attitude of the Chinese Government toward the outside world is very much in this Chinese tradition, aggravated and, in a sense, concealed by the Marxist-Leninist ideology. . . .

Morgenthau (cont'd):

"As a great Asian power, China seeks to restore the position she occupied before she was reduced to a semicolonial status about a century ago. That goal has been proclaimed by the Chinese leaders, and the policies actually pursued by them with regard to the offshore islands and Taiwan, Korea, Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, Tibet, and India conform to a consistent pattern: restoration of the territorial boundaries and of the influence the Chinese Empire possessed before its modern decline. These boundaries are likely to comprise Taiwan and the offshore islands, Outer Mongolia, and the Asian territories claimed by China and annexed by the Soviet Union during the 19th century. Physically, considering the distribution of power on the Asian mainland, China could go much further, she could go virtually as far as she wanted to. But she has never done so in the past, and she is not likely to do so in the future. The reasons are to be found in the peculiar Chinese outlook upon the world.

"According to Prof. C. P. Fitzgerald, one of the most eminent experts in the field, 'Rather more than a thousand years ago, the T'ang dynasty thus fixed the geographic limits in which the Chinese people were to live until modern times.' Instead of conquering neighboring states, which she could have conquered without undue risk, China has been traditionally satisfied with the establishment at her southern and southwestern borders of friendly governments, whose political identity was left intact and whose friendliness was assured and symbolized through tributary relationships of different kinds and degrees.

"These subtle and indirect relationships are the result of the traditional Chinese conception of China as the center of the political universe, the only sovereign power worthy of the name, to which all other nations owe tribute. This extreme ethnocentrism goes hand in hand with contempt for, and ignorance of, the outside world, which from the Chinese point of view really does not need to be understood and to be dealt with on terms of equality with China. As the present relations between China,

Morgenthau (cont'd):
on the one hand, and Cambodia and Burma, on the other, can be regarded as a modern version of the tributary relations of old, so the present ignorance of the Chinese leaders of the outside world, their verbal assaults upon it, and their ineffective policies with regard to it can be understood as a modern version of China's traditional ethnocentrism. . ." (p 552)

Fairbank:

"The retrospective humiliation and sense of grievance over the enormous disaster of the 19th century has made modern Chinese feel that their country was victimized, so it was, by fate.

"Circumstances made China the worst accident case in history. But Marxism-Leninism offers a devil-theory to explain it: how 'capitalist imperialism' combined with 'feudal reaction' to attack, betray, and exploit the Chinese people and distort their otherwise normal development toward 'capitalism' and 'socialism.' Thus a great Communist myth of 'imperialist' victimization becomes the new national myth.

"It would not be naive to agree that China's early sense of superiority had some justification, and that her modern sense of victimization also has some justification. To have been so advanced and superior and then to find herself so backward and weak was a shattering experience. Now that Maoism is in power, we see the continued desire to set a model for mankind, to be the center from which civilization is derived." (p 102) . . .

> "Senator McCarthy, 'You think that the force of Chinese culture and history and tradition would probably be a stronger force even though they might think they are Leninists and Stalinists when the succession comes along?'
>
> Dr. Fairbank, 'I think their culture is do distinctive that they are bound to be separate and different from other Communists. This doesn't necessarily help us but it means we have got to study that aspect, too, not just their communism.'" (p 131). . .

Fairbank (cont'd):

"And the Chinese Communists' view of the world is a very embattled one. They have been revolutionaries all their lives, those leaders, of course. They believe in their revolution. It worked in China, they think it ought to work in South Vietnam, and if it does not work now it will work later. (p 139) . . .

"Applying all this background to the present moment, I suggest we should not get too excited over Peking's vast blueprints for the onward course of the Maoist revolution. Some American commentators who really ought to know better have overreacted to the visionary blueprint of world revolution put out by Lin Piao last September in Peking (about the strangling of the world's advanced countries or 'cities' from the underdeveloped countries or 'countryside')" This was, I think, a reassertion of faith, that the Chinese Communists' own parochial example of rural-based revolution is the model for the rest of the underdeveloped world to emulate. It was put out mainly as compensation for China's recent defeats in many parts of the globe.

"To compare it to Hitler's Mein Kampf would be quite misleading. Rule-by-virtue required that the rulers proclaim their true teaching, claiming that it will still win the world even if they themselves are too weak to support it in practice. . . . (p.101)

"I think the Lin Piao statement really has to be seen as a profession of faith. It tells how the world is going to proceed in its history from the Chinese Communist point of view . . . .

"It gives the Chinese Communists the central role that they aspire to of being the teachers and modelmakers. It gives the underdeveloped countries, who are going to have their troubles, a chance to go ahead on their own because it is a do-it-yourself model in which the Chinese do not have to be there. They just give the model on how you do it." (p 149)

Fitzgerald:

"The Chinese view of the world has not fundamentally changed: it has been adjusted to take account of the modern world, but only so far as to permit China to occupy, still, the central place in the picture. To do this it was necessary to accept from the West a new doctrine to replace the inadequate Confucian teaching, which was too limited. After a long struggle China found that the doctrine which suited her was the one which the West had repudiated: and it may well be that this in itself was a reason for making Communism, the outcast of Western origin, welcome in China. It was more easily digestible, could be assimilated to Chinese ways without bringing with it the full force of the Western influence. What was not possible was for China to continue for long to acknowledge the debt, and accept the position of pupil. Mao Tse-tung had to 'enrich the treasury of Marxist-Leninist thought', so that the contents of that treasury could become current coin in China; it was inevitable that Chinese Marxism should be found to be purer than that of Russia, that Mao should be hailed as the greater prophet, and that 'some people' should be shown to be in error. There cannot be two suns in one sky. (The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, pp. 71-72) ....

"The Chinese people have some cause to think that their rulers are in the right. For all but the oldest generation their memories are of the chaos and misery of the warlord period, the corruption and weakness of the Nationalist regime, followed by the Japanese invasion. Then came the Communists, and since then China has been restored to ordered government, an advancing economy, national power and prestige. To a large generation of the young this last phase is their real experience, and it has been an intensely stimulating one. They see the outside world as either openly hostile, covertly opposed, or jealous of China's rise. This causes no surprise, for the Chinese had little reason to think that they had friends abroad before, and had never expected to find any. They remain convinced

Fitzgerald (cont'd):

that their new way is as superior to all competing ways as they were formerly convinced that the Confucian Empire was superior to the barbarians. (The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, Ibid, p.66). . .

"As far back as 1949 Liu Shao-ch'i, in a speech to the W.F.T.U. Conference in Peking, claimed that their revolution was the model for the underdeveloped, or 'semi-colonial' countries. Mao Tse-tung had added to the 'treasury of Marxist-Leninist thought,' a claim never made by any other Communist leader, and barely admitted, if at all, by the Russian leadership.

"The implications of such a claim were deep. If China had provided the model on which future revolutions among the peoples of Asia (and perhaps later of Africa) should be based, this was also a claim that China should lead and guide these revolutions towards their goal: the claim that Mao had added new truths to Marxism, meaning the experience and practice of the Chinese revolution, was also a claim that China could provide that interpretation of the orthodox doctrines of Communism most applicable in her region. These arguments amounted to a restatement in modern terms of two of the fundamental postulates of the old Chinese of the world: that China was the centre of civilization, the model which less advanced states and peoples should copy if they were to be accepted within the pale, and that the ruler of China was the expounder of orthodox doctrine; that, after all and always, Chinese interpretations were the right ones; truth and right thinking must come from China and conform with Chinese teaching." (The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, Ibid. p.48-49)

Hinton:

"The Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949 determined not only to wipe out China's past humiliations at the hands of what it called foreign imperialism but to make China the leading state in Asia and a model and source of support for other Communist revolutions in Asia. The scope of its ambitions was soon broadened to include the whole of the underdeveloped areas and even the attainment of the status of the world power." (p 376)

Hinton (cont'd):

"In recent years the CPC has elaborated, how much in earnest and how much for propaganda purposes it is difficult to say, an image of world politics substantially along the following lines. On the left stands the 'Socialist camp,' from which Yugoslavia is excluded and to which Cuba has been admitted since June 1963. Between the 'socialist camp' and its main enemy, the United States, there is a 'vast intermediate zone,' no part of which should be written off as irreversibly committed to the United States. The struggle between the 'socialist camp' and the United States will be decided in the 'oppressed nations' (underdeveloped countries) within the 'vast intermediate zone,' not through proletarian revolutions in the capitalist countries. It is impossible for the working class in the European and American capitalist countries to liberate itself unless it unites with the oppressed nations and unless those nations are liberated." There are serious "contradictions" between the United States and the other capitalist countries including West Germany and Japan, and the latter are experiencing a resurgence of militarism.

"Apart from leaders who are pro-'imperialist' or otherwise reactionary, there are two major political forces at work in the 'oppressed nations' --oppressed, that is, by 'imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism.' One is the (non-Communist) 'national liberation movement,' the other the (Communist) 'people's revolutionary movement.' Since both have a common immediate objective, the expulsion of 'imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism' the two can work together for the present, although ultimate revolutionary leadership is of course expected to pass to the 'people's revolutionary movement.' The two are referred to collectively as the 'national revolutionary movement' or the 'national (and) democratic revolution,' the implication being that even Communists in the 'oppressed nations' are working for the present toward a 'democratic' rather than a 'socialist' revolution.

"Some secret Chinese documents recently published add certain details to this picture without contradicting it. Direct relations between the

Hinton (cont'd):

CPR and the United States are essentially a stalemate. A resolution of the stalemate can be achieved only if the United States gives in on all the disputed issues, such as Taiwan, at one time. While the bilateral stalemate continues, the main arena of struggle is of course the underdeveloped countries, and in particular Africa and Indochina." (Communist China in World Politics, p. 103-104)

"Communist China's policy toward the underdeveloped areas consists essentially, although not entirely, of overtly inciting and covertly aiding Chinese-style armed revolutions, not necessarily Communist led but aimed at 'imperialist' influence in the country in question, within the limits of supposed feasibility. The purpose seems to be twofold: not only to promote eventually the spread of Communism but to weaken the United States and distract it from the Far East by involving it in crises and brushfire wars elsewhere in the underdeveloped areas. The best known formulation of this strategy is Marshal Lin Piao's article of September 3 last on 'people's war,' in which he says that the Japanese army in China produced its own defeat by driving the Chinese people into the arms of the Communists, that the United States is now doing in the underdeveloped areas as a whole exactly what the Japanese did in China, and that the peoples of the underdeveloped areas, therefore, can and should imitate the Chinese people's example without relying for decisive aid on Communist China or any other external source. So central to Lin's argument, and yet so fantastic, is the analogy between imperial Japan and the United States that one is tempted, even before examining the evidence, to conclude that the Chinese hope for widespread anti-imperialist risings in the underdeveloped countries is poorly founded." (p 379)

Zagoria:

"I would suggest to you that the Chinese Communists are one of the many countries in the world who are profoundly dissatisfied with the status quo and that is, has been, and is going to continue to be a source of great

Zagoria (cont'd):

tension between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand and China on the other . . . (p 390)

"The extent of the crisis facing the Chinese Communist leadership in the field of foreign policy is dramatically pointed up in the now-notorious statement made by Marshal Lin Piao last September. Ironically, there are two--and, in my opinion, only two--countries in the world where Lin Piao's revolutionary smorgasbord is regarded as some kind of magic weapon: one is China, and the other is the United States.

"Two, in my opinion, equally erroneous interpretations of Lin Piao's statement are current, and both, it seems to me, to miss the point. On the one hand there are those who dismiss it as 4th of July rhetoric. On the other are those part-time Pekinologists who call this Lin Piao's Mein Kampf, blithely ignoring the fact that it is basically a rehash of what Chinese Communist leaders have been saying on and off since at least 1949.

"The analogy with Mein Kampf comes, therefore, a little late, to say the least. But, more importantly, it is harmful and misleading because it equates Maoist and Nazi ideology in such a way as to evoke the spector of overt Chinese Communist military and territorial expansion in Asia. Neither in the Lin Piao statement nor in the multitude of similar statements made in the past is there any suggestion of Chinese Communist intentions to engage in direct, Hitler-style expansionism.

"In fact, a cardinal point of Lin Piao's message is the Vietcong and other Communist revolutionaries throughout the world must make their revolutions on their own, that they should not count on Chinese or any other outside assistance. Far from giving notice of any intention to intervene aggressively, Lin Piao is rationalizing Peking's unwillingness to go to the aid of the Vietcong, in a struggle which--let there be no doubt--the Chinese Communist (sic) regard as just and which is taking place on their very borders.

Zagoria (cont'd):

"The difference between Hitler and Mao, then, is that Mein Kampf was a blueprint for what Germany herself, under Hitler, would do; Lin Piao's statement, on the contrary, is designed to tell other Communist parties what they should do, to recommend strategy. It is, thus, simply not Fourth of July oratory." (pp.370-371)

Halperin:

> "Senator Church: 'Professor Halperin, from the general tone of the initial statement you made this morning, would it be fair to say that you view the outlook of the Chinese leaders on the world as doctrinaire, naive, parochial?'
> Dr. Halperin: 'Well, yes in the sense that they believe that bands of revolutionaries are going to form in every country and are going to try to overthrow the government. That is their view, and I think it is incorrect. We should not just assume because they say it, it is true.'
> Senator Church: 'Do you think their rigid outlook stems from an insufficient knowledge about the real facts in the outside world?'
> Dr. Halperin: 'I think to some extent it does. I think it also stems to some extent from the fact that they spent 30 years doing that, and when you spend 30 years in an activity, you come to believe that is the way things should be done." (p 306)

"Peking genuinely sees the world as engaged in a prolonged, continuous, and intense revolutionary struggle, and this simple fact has profound implications.

"The world-wide struggle which is now going on is regarded by the Chinese Communists as one in which great social, economic, and political forces--some identified with particular national states and others cutting across national lines--are contending for supremacy.

"The concept of the united front, which played an important part in the Communist victory within China, is often applied by Peking in its strategy abroad, both in its relations with other governments, and in its nonofficial, revolutionary campaigns to mobilize present or potential

Barnett (cont'd):

followers. Its aim is to achieve everywhere the broadest possible alignment of both national and class forces, to bring them under Communist influence or leadership, and to harness them to cooperate in struggling for common goals. Peking has been willing to accept major tactical compromises on short-term goals in order to achieve a broad alignment of forces which supports its long-range aims. The exact composition of the 'united front' has been subject to frequent redefinition, depending on the Chinese Communists' views of current political needs and opportunities. Most recently, since about 1956, it has been defined in such broad terms as to encompass almost any nationalist, anticolonial, and anti-Western forces.

"Peking's leaders inevitably classify all countries into certain groups or blocs, in accordance with their varying roles in the central struggle between communism and 'imperialism' and their relationship to two clearly defined poles. At one pole is the Soviet Union, 'the leader of the socialist camp.' To this pole Communist China is attached by what the Communists label an 'indestructible friendship,' and, although within the Communist bloc Peking has risen to a position of associate leadership with Moscow, it still acknowledges the primacy of the Soviet Union.* The Soviet-led bloc also embraces the 'people's democracies,' including both Russia's East European satellites and the smaller Communist states in Asia which stand in a special relationship to Communist China as well as to the Soviet Union.

---

*The Soviet leadership is now replaced to the Chinese leadership.

"At the other pole stands the United States, the strongest member of the 'world imperialist camp.' Attached to it are other 'imperialist,' 'colonialist,' 'capitalist,' and 'reactionary' countries which are its allies and dependents. Whereas the 'socialist camp' is viewed as a new 'world system' which has developed a special type of unbreakable fraternal

Barnett (cont'd):

cooperation among 'equals,' the 'imperialist camp' is described as one divided and weakened by fatal internal 'contradictions,' or conflicts of interest among its members, in particular between the United States and all its other members. However topsy-turvy this view of the world may seem to people outside the Communist bloc, it is rigidly upheld within the Communist orbit." (Communist China in Asia, pp. 70-72)

Griffith:

"Chinese Communist dogma postulates certain axioms fundamental to long-term grand strategy. Principal among these is the stereotyped concept of a bi-polar world in which the forces of 'imperialism' are inexorably arrayed against the forces of 'socialism.' This concept specifically excludes the possibilities on 'non-alignment' and neutralism. There can be no middle way, no third road, no fence straddling. A nation must, in Mao's word, 'lean' to one side or the other.

"According to Lenin's theories, at least as the Chinese leadership interprets them, conflict between the two irreconcilable forces of 'progress' and 'decay' is inescapable, and although it may be postponed, victory of the socialist camp is inevitable. The struggle to hasten this consummation must be waged constantly, at all levels, in all susceptible areas, and by all appropriate means." (China and the Peace of Asia, "The Military Potential of China," p. 85)

Griffith (cont'd):

> "...'Once man has eliminated capitalism he will attain the era of perpetual peace, and there will be no more need for war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military aircraft, no poison gas will then be needed. Thereafter and for all time, mankind will never again know war.'*

But this Utopia can only be achieved by force of arms: the Chinese leadership believes, as an article of faith that struggle - and they specify violent and mortal struggle - is inevitable as long as 'class society' exists. There is a corollary: it is the sacred duty of all good Communists - and particularly Chinese Communists - to hasten the demise of the competing society by whatever means possible, including war.

*Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War Selected Military Writings, (1963) p. 223," (quoted by Griffith). (China and the Peace of Asia, "The Military Potential of China,") p. 71.

Powell:

". . . . Furthermore, Peking claims that 'wars of liberation' are inevitable in this era and that a 'tit-for-tat' struggle against the United States is essential. (Current History, Sept. 1965, "Communist China as a Military Power," p. 140)

"The document, 'Long Live the Victory of People's War,' is a Utopian Maoist blueprint for the achievement of the long-range Marxian goal of the universal triumph of communism. In the past a doctrinal treatise of this importance would have been signed by Mao Tse-tung himself or at least by Liu Shao-ch'i, the titular chief of state and long number two man in the Party, or possibly by Premier Chou En-lai, the Party's chief foreign policy spokesman." (Ibid., pp. 49-50)

". . . . Third, in contradiction to its own protestations of self-defense and the support of peace, Peking has again demonstrated a strong

Powell (cont'd):

sense of revolutionary mission. It has attempted to use its atomic explosions to raise the morale and militancy of revolutionary forces throughout the world, and to convince them of China's continuing determination and increased ability to support their revolutionary activities. Combined with all of this has been the advocacy of nuclear disarmament, but on terms which would alter the world balance of power in Communist China's favor." (Foreign Affairs Quarterly, July 1965, "China's Bomb: Exploitation and Reactions" p 617)

Scalapino:

"What are the Chinese goals? Three have been often proclaimed: To remove all Western influence from Asia; to encourage by a variety of means an ideologically politically uniform Asia cast in the image of 'the new China'; and to enlist this 'progressive' Asia in the global struggle against both the 'revisionists' and the 'imperialists.' The words are those of the Chinese . . .

"What have been the major source-springs of Chinese foreign policy under the Communists? Three forces seem to me of central importance: Tradition, nationalism, and MLM (Marx-Lenin-Maoism). In certain respects, the current Chinese leaders still think of their problem as how to handle the barbarians. They still divide the world into those who accept Chinese culture (now to be read 'ideology') and those who live outside the pale. The former are the 'civilized' or the 'progressive' people, to use their terms; the latter are barbarians, be they 'revisionists,' 'imperialists,' or 'neutrals.'

• • •

"The nationalist quotient in Chinese foreign policy is, of course, extremely high. In many respects, China is behaving in much the same fashion as have other major societies en route to power. First, she has sought to define and defend her boundaries as she interprets these;

Scalapino (Cont'd):

secondly, she has sought to create a buffer state system around her; and finally, she has sought hegemony in the world in which she lives: the Asian world, the non-Western world, and the Communist world. . . .

"The final source-spring of Chinese Communist foreign policy, I have labeled MLM. The Maoists think of themselves as orthodox Marxist-Leninists, indeed, as the only legitimate leaders of the world Marxist movement. At the same time, however, they pride themselves upon having 'applied Marxism-Leninism creativity' to the conditions of China. Perhaps it is accurate to define the Maoist element in Chinese Marxism as the practical development of a five-stage revolutionary progression which places heavy reliance initially upon intellectual leadership and a peasant-based radical movement that has its roots in the countryside.

"The Maoist revolutionary formula begins with the creation of a Communist Party which must never lose control of the revolutionary movement. That party proceeds to guide the creation of a united front, using nationalist and socioeconomic appeals, but relying heavily upon organization, and using freely the instruments of coercion as well as those of persuasion. When the front has been prepared, the movement into guerrilla warfare is the next stage, and then the advance to positional warfare. When military victory has been attained, the so-called People's Democratic Republic is established under the complete control of the Communist Party.

"Long before Lin Piao's speech of last summer, it was clear that the Chinese Communists regarded this revolutionary formula broadly applicable to the world scene--from the Congo to Vietnam. In very high degree, indeed, the old Bolsheviks of China, so strongly isolated from world reality, have seen the world mirrored in their own ideological-revolutionary image and history. The need for a true Communist party means that one must fight such false Marxists-Leninists as the Russians. The united front with its emphasis upon a union of peasants, workers, intellectuals, and

Scalapino (cont'd):

national bourgeois under the leadership of the vanguard party spells out the Chinese determination to unite the world peasantry (the Afro-Asian societies) and certain susceptible bourgeois elements (clearly France was once in mind) under Peking's banners. (pp. 565-569) . . .

"China, on the other hand, not being able to conceive of the possibility of nation-to-nation competition with the United States in the near future, and having no basic responsibility for the maintenance of peace or the prosecution of a nuclear war, argues the classical Bolshevik thesis that America must be challenged by the technique of unfolding the world revolution. The Chinese theme is that primary emphasis must be placed upon mobilizing the non-Western World for a rapid, continuous assault, upon the 'capitalist West, led by the United States.' Thus, the Russians are rebuked for their refusal to take massive risks on behalf of global revolution, and they are now charged by Peking with active collaboration with Washington for purpose of world domination. At the moment, China asserts that Vietnam is the supreme test of the validity of her position and her principles. The United States is a paper tiger which, if challenged resolutely and in accordance with Maoist principles, will collapse as a result of internal and external pressures. Maoism will be vindicated on the battlefields of Vietnam--and in the streets of the United States--against the combination of American imperialism and Soviet sabotage. That is the Chinese position." (pp. 567-568)

Schwartz:

". . . .It seems to me that the Lin Piao's statement does reflect what I would call the highest hopes, you might say, the optimum vision of the regime.

"What their hope consists of is that history will move in the direction of their vision. I think they are quite ready to help history if it moves in that direction and perhaps to intervene with advice and aid when circumstances emerge in various areas--as in the Congo, when a situation

Schwartz (cont'd):

developed which seemed to be favorable to their vision. In such cases, they will try to support it, but the basic faith is in the movement of history itself. I also would add that the Lin Piao document in itself is a contradictory document if one examines it carefully.

"While it projects this optimum vision it has in it certain saving clauses. For instance, the optimum vision involves the notion that the only real national liberation movements are movements led by Communist parties and I assume by now they would mean Communist parties oriented to Peking; that any government that comes to power under the leadership of other elites is not a genuine revolutionary government. In fact, such a government might almost be called a puppet of the imperialists.

"This has not led them to attack all the existing governments of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In fact, they continue to cultivate these governments and to describe some of them as 'progressive.' So that you might say that while the Lin Piao statement contains the maximum vision, it also contains what might be called dilutions of this maximum vision which reflect adjustments which they have actually had to make to a world which has not corresponded on the whole to their maximum vision. I think they will continue to make adjustments to a world which does not correspond to their ultimate hopes. This world is richer than anything dreamt of in Mao's philosophy." (pp. 198-99)

Dutt:

". . . .While the domestic situation did not warrant any relaxation at home, foreign policy and foreign relations too came in for a review; and and for somewhat similar reasons, the Chinese turned their back on external relaxation. The world viewed at from Peking presented quite a different scene from what it did from Moscow and Washington. Peking saw a dark and turbulent world, overcast with ominous clouds. It was a world full of hostile forces, peopled by numerous enemies of China, on the prowl, and

Dutt (cont'd):

waiting to pounce upon it at the first available opportunity. At the very least it was a far from friendly world and there seemed to be no justification whatsoever to get off guard, to smile and beam and exude sweet reasonableness (as Khrushchev seemed to be doing) and to think that all was well. China had no reason to be nice to its enemies and much to gain from being truculent and unyielding." (China and the World, p. 21)

". . .China has always functioned, consciously or subconsciously, on the assumption that the truth as seen in China was the universal truth and that whatever happened in China was significant for every other part of the world. In this regard the thinking of Mao was little different from that of the previous rulers of the Universal Empire--that China and a central position in the world and that what was true of China was true of the rest of the world. While the international context had no doubt changed and Mao was not necessarily looking upon the rest of the world as barbarians, the influence of traditional thinking remained strong in regarding Chinese experience as having unique relevance for the rest of the world and in looking at the world almost exclusively through the Chinese prism." (Ibid., p. 20) . . .

"The Chinese Communists have gone further than merely holding up the Chinese experience for Afro-Asian countries. They are now claiming that it has universal significance. As Marshal Lin Piao, the Chinese Defence Minister and member of the Politbureau of the Chinese Communist Party, put it:

> 'Comrad Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war is not only a product of the Chinese revolution but also has the characteristics of our epoch. The new experiences gained in the people's revolutionary struggles in various countries since World II have provided continuous evidence that Mao Tse-tung's thought is a common asset of the revolutionary people of the whole world. This is the great international significance of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.'

Dutt (cont'd):

"Mao has even advanced the slogan of overwhelming the advanced, industrialized countries of the world through the joint struggle, with Peking as its leader, of the developing, struggling countries of the world. Typically, this again is an application of the Chinese experience to the international scene in the belief that the truth as seen in China has universal validity. Since Mao succeeded in China by working through the rural areas and leading the peasantry to march on the cities and storming the citadels of power with his rural army, he believes he can also elevate that experience into global strategy and mobilize the rural areas of the world, encircling and overwhelming the industrialized countries. (China and the World, pp. 324-325)

". . .Obviously, if the American Government continues to support Chiang Kai-shek in the Security Council and maintain its bases in Formosa, it can be doctrinally argued that the imperailists can never change their nature and the only thing to do is to carry on a ceaseless battle against them and bring them to their knees, and in this the odds are with you because the balance is constantly changing in your favour. This in plain language is the Chinese argument . . . .

"There is one variant in the Chinese theme which Mao appears to have allowed for commendation to the revolutionary movements and parties: they should, wherever possible, force the pace and take the initiative in resorting to arms as a quick way--a short cut--to power. It seems that the Chinese leadership today is an aging leadership in a hurry. Protracted guerilla warfare may be necessary in some cases, but it takes a long time to succeed; the process ought to be shortened to serve Peking's grand design of foreign policy. Peking has, therefore, openly and surreptitiously, publicly and privately, advised some of the friendly movements and parties in other countries to accelerate the struggle and try, if permitted by circumstances, to capture power through coups and putsches. As I have said before, the Chinese leaders either do not believe in, or have lost

Dutt (cont'd):

patience with, the 'inexorable' march of history, and they think that history must be given a violent push in order to bring the desired results from their point of view. They have, therefore, tried to queer the pitch, wherever possible, from Indonesia to Kenya, from Thailand to Malawi, and from Malaysia to Burundi." (Ibid., p. 27)

Taylor:

". . .It is necessary to mention this because there is a great reluctance on the part of China specialists, perhaps because they love the Chinese so much, to admit that the Chinese Communists are really Communists. Their world view is not conditioned by the imperial past although they are willing to exploit it. (p. 455) . . .

". . .In my view it (the Lin Piao statement) should be taken seriously as a general indication of the objectives and strategies of the Peking wing of the movement. It is not impossible that this strategy could be made to work. It is based on the assumption that the revolution is not going to occur in the great industrial states, that the Achilles heel of the West is the third world, that the promotion of wars of national liberation in Africa, Latin America and southeast Asia will distract and waste the energies of the Western Powers, confuse their peoples, and demoralize their leaders." (pp. 456-457)

Question II-2: The Communist Chinese Conception of the World and of Its Role in the World: The Lin Piao Statement.

A. Summary

The latest expression of Communist China's contemporary world outlook was the Lin Piao statement of September, 1965 - entitled "Long Live the Victory of the People's War."

During the U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings on "U. S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China," the Committee solicited the reactions of the various witnesses---American China scholars - to Lin Piao's statement. The reaction of these scholars may be summarized in the following manner: although they agreed that the Lin Piao statement constitutes an articulate expression of Communist China's contemporary world outlook, these scholars disagreed as to whether or not the statement is the blueprint of the strategy Communist China intends to pursue (or is pursuing) for the purposes of political expansion and territorial conquest.

The American China scholars' interpretation of the Lin Piao statement ranged from "the statement is a 'reassertion of faith,'" on the one extreme, to "the statement is China's 'grandiose strategy' for political expansion." These interpretations are summarized in Figure J-1 and this figure(combined with the statements provided below) is basically self-explanatory; nonetheless, the reader's attention is directed to the following points - for the sake of clarity:

1. The period 1964-1965 witnessed the greatest setbacks in Communist Chinese foreign policy - particularly in the case of Sino-Third World relations; in this context, the "reassertion of faith" in the Communist Chinese model becomes somewhat more

FIGURE J-1


THE LIN PIAO STATEMENT
(September 1965)
Is
Statement
Oriented
Barnett
Morton H. Halperin
A. Doak
Donald S. Zagoria
Benjamin I. Schwartz
Samuel B. Griffith, II
Ralph L. Powell
George E. Taylor
II
III
Lin Piao statement is a "Projection of Hopes and Aspirations;" a Recommendation of Strategy
Lin Piao statement is a recommendation of strategy to National Liberation Movements: A means of expanding communist Chinese influence around the world
I
IV
Lin Piao statement is a "Reassertion of Faith" (=Part the Chinese Model as Full Guide)
Lin Piao statement is "A General Indication" of Peking's objectives and strategy

understandable. One may argue that, in effect, Lin Piao was saying to his people: "all right, we failed; but this does not mean our model is not viable. We still believe in the viability of our model - now more than ever;" and,

2. In Figure J-1 , as one looks at the shaded area (into which Section II merges and out of which Section III emerges), the level of Communist support to (or direct involvement in) national liberation movements increases (even though the Chinese support or involvement continues to remain low-level): from providing moral support (to national liberation movements) to training foreign revolutionaries in Communist China, to providing national liberation movements with petty cash, to equipping national revolutionaries with small armies. However, it does not necessarily follow that the level of Communist Chinese direct involvement in (or support to) national liberation movement will increase (marginally or unabated) as one moves into Section IV; the level of support or involvement may remain stationary.

B. Quotes

Fairbank:

". . . (the statement was) reassertion of faith, that the Chinese Communists' own parochial example of rural-based revolution is the model for the rest of the underdeveloped world to emulate. It was put out mainly as compensation for China's recent defeats in many parts of the globe.

"To compare it to Hitler's 'Mein Kampf' would be quite misleading. Rule-by-virtue required that the rulers proclaim their true teaching, claiming that it will still win the world even if they themselves are too weak to support it in practice." (p. 101)

Lindbeck:

"My own inclination is to believe that it was addressed primarily to a domestic audience, a restatement of great ideals as visualized by the Communists; it was a statement of reassurance to the Chinese people that the great vision of the transformation of the world had not come to an end, but that this process of change would continue to take place under the workings of the large forces of history." (p. 197)

Schwartz:

". . . it seems to me that the Lin Piao's statement does reflect what I would call the highest hopes, you might say, the optimum vision of the regime.

"What their hope consists of is that history will move in the direction of their vision. I think they are quite ready to help history if it moves in that direction and perhaps to intervene with advice and aid when circumstances emerge in various areas - as in the Congo, when a situation developed which seemed to be favorable to their vision. (pp. 198-199) . . .

". . . while the Lin Piao statement contains the maximum vision, it also contains what might be called dilutions of this maximum vision which reflect adjustments which they have actually had to make to a world which has not corresponded on the whole to their maximum vision. I think they will continue to make adjustments to a world which does not correspond to their ultimate hopes. (p. 199) . . .

". . . I would again like to stress that I do not believe that the Lin Piao statement is not meant by the Chinese. This is a projection of their hopes, of their aspirations. But this hope is not based on the export of Chinese soldiers. It is based on the export of Chinese strategy and on their faith that history will develop in a way which will be favorable to their strategy. . ." (pp. 256-257)

Zagoria:

". . . neither in the statement nor in the multitude of similar statements made in the past is there any suggestion of Chinese Communist intentions to engage in direct, Hitler-style expansionism.

"In fact a cardinal point of Lin Piao's message is the Vietcong and other Communist revolutionaries throughout the world must make their revolutions on their own, that they should not count on Chinese or any other outside assistance. Far from giving notice of any intention to intervene aggressively, Lin Piao is rationalizing Peking's unwillingness to go to the aid of the Vietcong, in a struggle which--let there be no doubt--the Chinese Communist regard as just and which is taking place on their very borders.

"The difference between Hitler and Mao, then, is that Mein Kampf was a blueprint for what Germany herself, under Hitler, would do; Lin Piao's statement, on the contrary, is designed to tell other Communist parties what they should do, to recommend strategy. It is, thus, simply not Fourth of July oratory. (p. 371) . . .

". . . I take it seriously as an indication of the maximal Chinese strategy that they recommend, are recommending, have been recommending for some time to other Communist parties. . . .

"In that respect, I take it seriously, I do not regard it as a statement of what China intends to do herself in other words." (p.406)

Barnett:

"Incidentally in the Lin Piao statement that has been cited many times, one of the messages that I think is overlooked often, is that they stressed to the Vietnamese, to the North Vietnamese, and the Vietcong, that their revolution was important, that China's path pointed the way, but that they had to be self-reliant--and don't rely on concrete external support. I think, in effect, one thing they were saying to the Vietnamese in this speech was 'This is an important revolution, keep it up, but you have got to do it yourself essentially.'

Barnett (cont'd):

"So I do not see the Chinese thinking, even in revolutionary terms, of a very high level of direct Chinese participation and involvement in revolutionary struggles, but more in terms of inspiration, moral support, and training, of the ideological model that they think they have provided, and these are two different things. I think they are outward looking. But it is important to recognize the terms in which they look outward, and the limitations on what they are likely to be prepared to do, as well as on their rather ambitious aspirations."(p.26)

Halperin:

". . . they aspire in the long run to be a world power playing a role in supporting revolution and what they see as leftwing Communist groups throughout the world. But they are not expansionist in the sense of having plans to use their own armies to march into countries and conquer them." (p. 296)

Griffith:

". . . what they want to do is, and I agree with Mr. Halperin, to expand their influence in the world, and they hope, they would like to do this by using Lin Piao's theses of national liberation wars." (p. 296)

Taylor:

". . . in my view it should be taken seriously as a general indication of the objectives and strategy of the Peking wing of the movement. It is not impossible that this strategy could be made to work. It is based on the assumption that the revolution is not going to occur in the great industrial states, that the Achilles heel of the West is the third world, that the promotion of wars of national liberation in Africa, Latin America, and southeast Asia will distract and waste the energies of the Western Powers, confuse their peoples, and demoralize their leaders." (p. 456)

Powell:

"The document, 'Long Live the Victory of the People's War,' is a Utopian Maoist blueprint for the achievement of the long-range Marxian goal of the universal triumph of communism." ("The Increasing Power of Lin Piao and the Party-Soldiers 1959-1966," in China Quarterly, April-June, 1968, pp. 49-50).

Question III: The Communist Chinese Foreign Policy Objectives

A. Summary

The Communist Chinese basic foreign policy objective is the preservation of Communist China's territorial and political integrity and the maintenance of the Communist rule in China. The China specialists agree the Communist Chinese are also seeking to elevate the international status of the country to one of a great world power; according to Dutt,

> "A big power solicits security on its frontiers; it needs 'friendly' regimes in neighboring states; it has to have a sphere of influence of its own. It cultivates its own proteges and seeks and dominates its own alliance system. If it cannot get these things peacefully and smoothly it will create trouble and use all possible methods to realize its objectives."

What are Communist China's potential spheres of influence? Scalapino believes these are "the Asian world, the non-Western world, and the Communist world."

In the Asian world, Communist China has two objectives; first, to regain total political control over the traditional Chinese territories, of which Taiwan is the most important. China's second objective in Asia is the establishment of Chinese hegemony in the area.

The specialists agree that the Communist Chinese are also interested in extending their influence in the third world. However, there is some difference of opinion among the experts as to the relative importance to the Chinese of increasing their influence in the third world. Barnett thinks "they are strongly motivated by the desirability of a Communist world as they would see it." Morgenthau, on the other hand, considers this sphere to be of low priority.

The third sphere in which the Communist Chinese wish to gain influence is the world Communist movement; the Chinese are attempting to wrest the leadership of the movement away from their Soviet neighbors through a "greater ideological purity, and a more aggressively militant stance."

The main obstacles to the Chinese realization of their objectives are American power and influence, and Soviet dominance in the worldwide Communist movement. Communist China's primary tool for achieving its objectives is the war of national liberation in the third world; such wars, the Chinese maintain, weaken U.S. power and influence and increase Communist Chinese influence. Taylor suggests that the Chinese use this tool mainly because they are "obviously in no position to seek a head-on collision with the United States."

Nuclear weapons are another tool for the realization of Communist China's objectives. Hsieh, Halperin, and Barnett believe that the Chinese could exploit their nuclear arsenal to gain psychological and political benefits that would contribute to the realization of Communist China's foreign policy objectives. Taylor suggests the Chinese may use these weapons directly in an effort to realize their objectives through force.

B. Quote

Fairbank:

"In gradually manipulating Peking into an acceptance of the international world, as an alternative to trying to subvert it we must motivate Chinese behavior according to China's needs:

> (1) One of these is the craving for greater prestige in the world to redress the balance of the last century's humiliations. For China to be in the center of the world's councils would seem to a Chinese patriot only right and proper.
>
> (2) We can also use the Peking government's need for prestige to maintain itself domestically. It is still true that the virtue of the rulers, as advertised in their acknowledged achievements is a vital element sustaining any regime in China.

Fairbank (cont'd):

(3) In addition, the Chinese people positively need certain kinds of aid through exchanges of technology or of goods, like all developing countries.

(4) Peking may also be motivated by the opportunity to manipulate foreigners against one another. This traditional way of dealing with outsiders can be attempted in any conclave like the United Nations. But any number can play this game, and, in fact, it is the essence of diplomacy." (p. 107)

Hsieh:

"A 'hostage' type theater capability would enable the Chinese to claim--with what plausibility is another matter--that the U.S. nuclear deterrent was canceled out or neutralized and that her superior conventional forces tilted the regional balance of military power in her favor.

"In any event, Peking would hope thereby to exploit Asian fear of involvement in a nuclear war, Asian anxiety that the hosting of U.S. bases would attract a nuclear strike, and concern that any U.S. confrontation with a nuclear-armed China would escalate into nuclear if not general war. Peking would hope to encourage U.S. allies -

(1) To question the reliability and desirability of U.S. security arrangements;

(2) To impose restraints on U.S. military policies in the area by attempts to reinterpret or modify the terms of the alliance and by restricting the use of American bases or extracting from the United States a greater return for the use of such bases;

(3) To pressure the United States to avoid a confrontation with China at any level; and

(4) To seek to persuade the United States to seek some rapproachement with China, if necessary on Chinese terms. (Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Nov. 1962, P. 82). . .

"Rather in accordance with Peking's preferred foreign policy style, the Chinese are likely to make a new low-risk and subtle use of their nuclear delivery capability along political-military and propaganda lines with a view to achieving it via the following objectives:

Hsieh (cont'd):

(1) The enhancement of China's international political stature;

(2) The imposition of restraints on U.S. military policies in the area and the undermining of the United States-Asian alliance and base system;

(3) The inhibition of Asian nations' self-defense efforts; and

(4) The fostering of internal instability and national liberation movements in the area." (Ibid., p.81)

Dutt:

"China has already started acting and behaving like an independent Big Power. A Big Power solicits security on its frontiers; it needs "friendly" regimes in neighboring states; it has to have a sphere of influence of its own. It cultivates its own proteges and seeks and dominates its own alliance system. If it cannot get these things peacefully and smoothly it will create trouble and use all possible methods to realize its objectives." (China and the World, p. 31)

Scalapino:

"In many respects, China is behaving in much the same fashion as have other major societies en route to power. First, she has sought to define and defend her boundaries as she interprets these; secondly, she has sought to create a buffer state system around her; and finally, she has sought hegemony in the world in which she lives, the Asian world, the non-Western World, and the Communist world.

"In pursuit of these objectives, the Chinese Communists have been no more able to follow a totally consistent foreign policy than the leaders of other major states. The main thrust of Chinese Communist foreign policy, as suggested earlier, has been characterized by revolutionary fervor, global commitment, and relatively inflexible division of the world into comrades and enemies. (The line has been hard, advanced by practicing ideologues fiercely impatient with the existing order and anxious to challenge it in radical fashion.) And yet, for

Scalapino (cont'd):

tactical reasons and out of necessity, these leaders have adopted a great variety of approaches. On occasion, they have not hesitated to consort with 'feudalists' and support 'reactionary' regimes; sometimes, they have used the soft line, as at the time of Baudung; not infrequently, they have been caught in such un-Marxian stances as making an appeal to race. Indeed, one is forced to conclude that the one element of major consistency is that which runs through the policies of all nations: the consistent expression of what appears to the political elite as in their national interests. And it is precisely this fact that offers hope of some flexibility, even among hard-core ideologues. (pp.556-567) . . .

"What are the Chinese goals? Three have been oft proclaimed: To remove all Western influence from Asia; to encourage by a variety of means an ideologically politically uniform Asia cast in the image of 'the new China'; and to enlist this 'progressive' Asia in the global struggle against both the 'revisionists' and the 'imperialists.' The words are those of the Chinese. ...

"The fact, however, that China is forced to react defensively and partly from fear at this point should not obscure the very strong commitment which the current generation of Chinese leaders have had to global influence. From the moment they emerged into full control, these leaders committed themselves and their society to the cultivation of power in all of its forms: military, political, psychological, and economic." (pp.565-566)

Clemens:

"After mid-1963 it could no longer be doubted that Peking intended to challenge the Soviet Union's vanguard position in the Communist movement... (The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations, p. 232) . . .

Clemons (cont'd):

"While Moscow tends on the whole to prefer the preservation of existing frontiers, Peking wants to change them, to move again toward a grand design of a middle kingdom, and is calling for the overthrow of existing governments all over the world." (Ibid., p. 237)

Zagoria:

"The current crisis in Communist China's foreign policy has its roots in 1957 when Mao, incorrectly assuming that the development of Soviet ICBM capabilities had wrought a decisive change in the world balance of power, abandoned Peking's previous caution and embarked on a more militant course to achieve his primary foreign policy goals; elimination of U.S. military power from Asia, repossession of Taiwan, and international recognition of Communist China as a great power...Peking then turned to the underdeveloped countries to join in an anti-American alliance. (p. 369) . . .

"There are a whole lot of other background, underlying reasons for Chinese hostilities toward the United States, the Korean War, American military bases that are maintained in the western Pacific, the economic embargo, air opposition to their entry into the United Nations which is a symbol of great power status and so far all of these I think the Chinese Communists have come to the not unreasonable view - from their position - that the United States is their No. 1 enemy in the world and for them to achieve their national objectives the United States has got to be weakened and opposed. (p. 396) . . .

"I would suggest to you that the Chinese Communists are one of the many countries in the world who are profoundly dissatisfied with the status quo and that is, has been and is going to be a source of great tension between the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand and China on the other." (p. 390)

Barnett:

"For the predictable future, therefore, Peking's leaders are likely to use China's limited nuclear arsenal primarily for political purposes - although they doubtless also hope that they will be able to deter and cancel out the significance of American nuclear power in Asia. (p. 13) . . .

"Well, I think they are strongly motivated by the desirability of a Communist world as they would see it. But in terms of their concrete ability and willingness to support revolution, they think primarily in terms of giving moral support, giving ideological leadership, of encouraging struggles. (p. 26) . . .

"In examining Peking's general foreign policy, the first thing to note is that China's leaders obviously have very ambitious long-term goals. Moved by intense nationalism, they aim to build a strong base of power at home and to strengthen China's security; they also hope to recover what they consider to be 'lost territories' (including Taiwan); and they are determined to play the role of a major power on the world stage.

"At the present time, they view the United States as the major obstacle and threat to many of their aims and interests - and call, therefore, for the removal of American power from Asia - but they also regard the Soviet Union at present as a serious obstacle to Chinese aspirations and therefore compete with it, too, whenever and wherever feasible.

"As first generation revolutionary leaders, and true believers in the Maoist version of Marxism-Leninism, Peking's leaders are also dedicated to the promotion of revolutionary struggles, especially in the underdeveloped world. Their public pronouncements now tend to concentrate on this aim and in at least some areas, such as Vietnam, they are prepared to give significant support to revolutionary forces, even though they have avoided direct Chinese military intervention.

"While it is important to recognize Peking's ambitious goals, it is equally important to note that, on the basis of available evidence and

Barnett (cont'd):

Communist China's performance to date, the Chinese Communists do not appear to think primarily in terms of spreading their influence through direct military and territorial expansion; they appear to recognize the limits to their capabilities for military action outside of China's borders; they have usually been quite realistic in assessing the power balance in concrete situations; they have generally been calculating and even cautious in avoiding military 'adventurism' and limiting their risks; they have tended to think in long-range terms about their most ambitious goals; and they have repeatedly been flexible and pragmatic (at least until recently) in adapting their strategy and tactics to fit changing situations in pursuit of their short-run goals." (p. 10)

Halperin:

"...China...has a desire to control its neighbors, but only a very limited capability to do so." (p. 288)

"Considered in terms of objectives rather than motivations, the Peking regime has had a hierarchy of territorial objectives, the first being to maintain the area currently under Communist control, and the second being to fill out the borders of China. In the case of Tibet, China could and did expand her boundaries without jeopardizing the home territory, but in the Taiwan Straits, where there was and is a conflict, priority has been given to the security of present Chinese Communist territory. Beyond the maintenance of control over traditional Chinese territory, the Peking regime seems to be interested in the first instance in having friendly neutral nations on its periphery - countries that would not accept American military bases on their soil and that would in general accept Communist China's lead in foreign policy. In a longer perspective, the Chinese appear to be interested in the establishment of Communist regimes throughout the world as well as on their own borders.

Halperin (cont'd):

"The Peking regime has a more intangible goal as well: to establish China as one of the great powers of the world. It has sought to assert China's right to be consulted on all major international questions, in particular with reference to the Far East, as well as on questions of general disarmament. For example, China both served her national interest and bid for international status when she openly accused the Soviet Union of 'weakening the socialist camp' by signing a test-ban treaty with the United States. Within the Communist block, Peking has claimed to be equal to the Soviet Union in directing Communist parties and regimes in nations throughout the world. It has pressed for the acceptance of its more militant strategy as a basic guide for Communist parties. And the Chinese detonation of a nuclear device has reinforced its belief in the validity of these views." (China and the Bomb, pp. 12-13)

"Their perception of the damage which would be done to them in nuclear war has led the Chinese to a determination not to provoke a nuclear attack on China. While the Chinese have been and are prepared to risk such an attack when the survival of the Communist regime in China was at stake, they have attached a very high priority to avoiding a nuclear war. (p. 286) . . .

"...the Chinese believe that they will get some increased prestige in the third world and within the Communist bloc from this development of nuclear weapons. (p. 287) . . .

"...most of the attention of the top leadership and most of the resources of China always have and will continue to be directed at creating a new revolutionary society in China and building an economically developed state." (p. 287)

Morgenthau:

"...The verbal expressions of the Chinese leaders have all pointed toward the restoration of the Chinese empire as it existed about 100 years

Morgenthau (cont'd):

ago, before the period of China's humiliation started and lowered the restoration of China's traditional influence on the Asian continent.

"It is, of course, obvious that in actuality the Chinese Government has gone farther than that. It has meddled in the internal affairs of a number of nations in Africa and Latin America by virtue of its Communist militancy. Here we are in the presence of an additional factor which the foreign policy of the United States must take into account.(p.552) . . .

"I personally think it unlikely that China has permanent political military aspirations in the outside Asia world. The machinations in which she has been engaged in Africa and Latin America can be explained primarily in terms of her competition with the Soviet Union for the dominance of the world Communist movement." (p. 555)

Taylor:

"To bring stability and prosperity to the third world requires a combination of tremendous human dedication, enormous technical and economic help, and far-reaching social and political changes. To disrupt the process takes comparatively small material resources when they are combined with a forceful and appealing program - and with organization. Peking has such a program, expects reverses, and has persuaded several Communist parties in other nations that it has the right answer for the future shape of Communist expansion." (p. 458)

Griffith:

"...of one thing we may be certain: they are determined to extend their influence, at the least risk and cost to themselves, to susceptible areas." (Military Potential of China, p. 91)

"I think China is expansionist to a limited degree. I don't believe that, and I want to make myself as clear as I can on this, the Chinese do not, I believe, have the slightest intention of physically occupying southeast Asia. All they want in southeast Asia is to exercise a benevolent, if you will, hegemony over that region.(p.295) . . .

Griffith (cont'd):

"China wishes to regain her ancient position in Asia. She considers this aspiration to be justified by propinquity, by history, by cultural affiliation, and by economic fact. She sees us then as alien meddlers; neocolonialists; exploiters in a word - and she wishes above all to remove our presence from Asia. Her strategy, be it ambiguous or evidence, indirect or direct, will be focused for the foreseeable future to attainment of this objective. (p. 280) . . .

"Well, I think, Senator, what they want to do is, and I agree with Mr. Halperin, to expand their influence in the world, and they hope, they would like to do this by using Lin Piao's theses of national liberation wars." (p. 296)

Hinton:

". . .In 1956, . .Communist China decided that it must have nuclear weapons and delivery systems of its own." (p. 378)

"Chinese incitement and aid to 'national liberation movements' and other friendly regimes, in Asia and elsewhere in the underdeveloped world, has become a serious problem and may become an even more serious one. The most obvious purpose of such activity by the CPR, of course, is to advance the cause of Communism." (Communist China in World Politics, pp. 490-491)

"Communist China's policy toward the underdeveloped areas consists essentially, although not entirely, of overtly inciting and covertly aiding Chinese - style armed revolutions, not necessarily Communist led but aimed at 'imperialist' influence in the country in question, within the limits of supposed feasibility. The purpose seems to be twofold: not only to promote eventually the spread of Communism but to weaken the United States and distract it from the Far East by involving it in crises and brushfire wars elsewhere in the underdeveloped areas.(p.379) . . .

"Undaunted, China has continued its drive to become a nuclear power. (p. 378) . . .

Hinton (cont'd):

"A first step in Communist China's quest for influence was the acquisition of all territory claimed as Chinese. (p. 377) . . .

"...the Chinese interest in the developed countries is by no means entirely economic. China hopes to lure them away from the United States, and keep them away from the Soviet Union, in order to use them if possible against both. (p. 378) . . .

"The Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949 determined not only to wipe out China's past humiliations at the hands of what is called foreign imperialism but to make China the leading state in Asia and a model and source of support for other Communist revolutions in Asia. The scope of its ambitions was soon broadened to include the whole of the underdeveloped areas and even the attainment of the status of the world power." (p. 376)

Lindbeck:

"...they are talking about and thinking about the emergence of states dominated by Communist parties in Asia but not necessarily under the immediate control of German-type gauleiters sent from China. (p. 205) . . .

"Only after the Chinese Communists came to power did they take over the principle, which had been clearly stated by the Nationalists, that all peoples living in territory claimed by China, or who had been under Chinese administrative control were to be citizens of China. The principle of the right to political independence of ethnic and cultural minorities was abandoned. (p. 226) . . .

". . . These Chinese try to affect the situation abroad through other than military means." (p. 250)

Fitzgerald:

"The Chinese know well that they will not be wooed by America, and there is nothing to be obtained from taking a conciliatory attitude towards the West. They have reason to believe that force and power will be respected but weakness will be exploited and ignored. There is clear

Fitzgerald (cont'd):

evidence that only the possession of nuclear weapons on a sufficient scale to act as a real deterrent can win for any nation in the contemporary world a place among the final arbiters of war and peace, the real standing of a Great Power. (The Chinese View of Their Place in the World, p. 67) . . .

"America was, and is, to China enemy number-one. America has refused to recognize Peking, has supported and allied herself with Chiang K'ai-shek (in Chinese eyes a dissident rebel), blocks China's claim to her seat at the United Nations, continues, no matter which party controls the administration, to take a hostile stance, to exclude China as much as possible, to impose a trade embargo, travel bans, and all other hostile actions short of war. (Ibid., p.62) . . .

"Apart from the belief that a revolutionary war will in the end lead to the victory of the revolutionary side, the aim of Chinese policy in Vietnam would seem to be to involve America as deeply as possible in a struggle which the Chinese are convinced can never be won by intervening foreign forces. (Ibid.,p.67) . . .

"There are in the present Chinese foreign policy, and behind that in the outlook of the Chinese Communist Party, two unreconciled and divergent aims. The first, to regain the full territory and standing of the Chinese Empire at its peak, is the continuation of the movement to 'revive China' which actuated the early revolutionaries and reformers. It makes equal appeal to all Chinese, of the party, against the party, or without party. It is therefore a force for national unification, and one which tends to draw the sting of opposition criticism. ...But policies designed to implement this aim conflict with those which seek to assert Chinese moral and material leadership in the Communist movement and beyond it. The quarrel with India, whether partly justified or not,

Fitzgerald (cont'd):

may have alienated some of China's Asian neighbors. The continuing hostility to America, and still more the violence of the language used in expressing it, are not calculated to further Chinese policy, even if this policy is ideologically 'correct'." (Ibid.,p.68)

Taylor:

"...China is obviously in no position to seek a head-on collision with the United States and is most unlikely to give us the opportunity to declare war on her, but she is quite capable of fostering wars of national liberation wherever opportunities are provided." (p. 452)

Dutt:

"...the Chinese Communists worked ceaselessly to break through the cordon sanitaire imposed by the United States, to wear down the U.S. alliance system, to force American withdrawal from as many areas in Asia as possible and to project their own hegemony over the whole of Asia. This has been the chief struggle in Asia and the Chinese have not hesitated to woo lesser enemies and attack friends suspected of cultivating the principal enemy. (China in the World, p. 86) . . .

"In all their actions the Chinese leaders are goaded by a relentless drive for power status for China. ...

"It is not being suggested here that Mao wants to recover all the lost territories and recreate the empire in its pristine glory. That cannot be done now; but the fact that he is greatly influenced by this traditional thinking and is highly conscious of China's traditional position and role is important. It is humiliating to Mao that China as a great nation should be relegated to the sidelines and that he as a great leader of a great nation should not be asked to sit along with the leaders of USA and Soviet Union and the other Big Powers to consider the great issues of the day. This keen sense of humiliation and frustration constantly erupts in manifestation of aggressive nationalism,

Dutt (cont'd):

whether within the Communist bloc or outside.(Ibid.,pp.29-30) . . .

"One of the basic assumptions of current Chinese foreign policy is this total, virulent and unremitting hostility towards the United States. This hostility is all the more dangerous because it stems not only from ideological sources but also from national interests and frustrations. As Peking sees it, the United States stands in the way of Communist China in the fulfillment of practically every national objective. The United States stands between Peking and the United Nations; the United States balks Communist China's achieving her rightful status as a world Power by refusing to accept its admittance into the Security Council where China is a permanent member with veto power but is currently represented by the Formosan regime. It is the United States which prevents the take-over of Formosa and the completion of China's national consolidation under the Peking regime. It is the United States which has thrown a tight ring around China's frontiers and established hostile alliances and bases all around Chinese territory. And it is the United States which forbids the export of heavy machinery and capital goods by the Western nations and Japan to China.

"To the Peking regime, Formosa is the most vital issue between the U.S. and China. This issue, perhaps more than anything else, poisons and plagues relations between the two. All Chinese, no matter what their political alignment, whether in Peking or in Taipeh, regard Formosa as a part of China. The integration of Formosa with the mainland under one flag is, therefore, to Peking, an important symbol of consolidation of national power. That symbol, that prize is being denied to Peking by the United States Seventh Fleet which guards the Formosan waters against an attack from the mainland. Moreover, Formosa, only a hundred miles off the mainland, in unfriendly hands is a constant threat to the security of

Dutt (cont'd):

the mainland regime. This infuriates the Communist leaders almost to the point of irrational hatred and, consequently, of irrational conduct." (Ibid.,p.24)

Question IV: The Communist Chinese Tendency to Accomplish Foreign Policy Objectives (National Goals) Through Military Means

A. Summary

Those China specialists in this survey who do discuss Communist Chinese military behavior concur that "Far from conforming with this image of war-like bellicosity, China's external military policies in pursuit of her long-term foreign policy objectives have been characterized by a considerable degree of caution." It is also the common consensus that Communist China's main threat to Asia and the U. S. is not a clear-cut military one: hordes of Chinese soldiers are not expected to cross the border into neighboring countries in the Hitlerian fashion. Rather the threat to Asia and the U. S. is cultural and/or political, i.e., subversive. In other words, China is expansionistic, but in the cultural/political and not military sense. (Scalapino and Taylor[1] suggest that Communist China's threat to Asia and the U. S. may be more than cultural/political, and perhaps even military.)

All this does not necessarily prove that the Chinese are unwilling to resort to force in pursuit of their foreign policy objectives; on the contrary, it is also the common consensus that the Chinese are willing to employ force toward the realization of their objectives.

Fairbank and Morgenthau argue that China resorts to force only when her vital interests are threatened and for the reclamation of alienated Chinese territories--territories that have belonged to China for centuries and that both Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek assert is Chinese. These

---

[1] See his remarks on the Lin Piao statement under Question II.

are the only two foreign policy objectives toward whose realization the Chinese are willing to employ force.

Other China specialists argue that the Chinese have resorted to force and are probably willing to resort to force when China's vital interests were threatened (Hinton, Halperin, Hsieh, Barnett, Scalapino, and Powell); for the reclamation of alienated Chinese territory, particularly, Taiwan (Griffith and Halperin); when they think they can get away with it (Lindbeck); when the "pay-off" is handsome while the risk is low (Griffith); and to effect "revolutionary change" (Scalapino). These specialists maintain that the reason why the Chinese have so far behaved cautiously is found--mainly but not solely--in America's policy of containing China; furthermore, it is argued that though China is quite willing to resort to force in pursuit of her foreign policy objectives, she will continue to pursue a cautious military policy so long as the U. S. keeps the risks high.

One is left with the impression that this second group considers the Communist Chinese militarily expansionist; for how could one argue that China will not embark on an incautious and risky military policy so long as the U. S. keeps the risks high unless one assumes that the Chinese have a tendency to employ force for purposes of expansion. Such a reasoning, however, is inconsistent with our earlier statement to the effect that the China specialists (including this second group) consider the Chinese threat to Asia and the U. S. a cultural/political and not a military one. For example, Griffith's belief that the Chinese do not have "the slightest intention of physically occupying Southeast Asia," is not altogether consistent with his assertion that "If a limited military adventure offers a handsome pay-off at very low risk, they will probably embark on it."

Short of further investigation (i.e., personal interviews with the specialists) we will have to assume that this inconsistency is inherent in the statements of the various specialists. For purposes of speculation, however, it is possible to overcome this inconsistency by advancing one of the following arguments:

1. The specialists assume that the U. S. will keep the risks high; on such a basis China's expansionism will be restricted to cultural and political expansion; or,
2. the specialists believe the Communist Chinese will resort to force, i.e., engage in military expansionism, only for purposes of recovering alienated Chinese territories. Other than that, the Chinese threat is cultural and political.

B. Quotes

Haieh:

". . .In my analysis in the years I have studied Chinese military policy, I have seen no suicidal tendencies on their part. (Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Military Applicators of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Nov. 1967, p.86) . . .

"Far from conforming with this public image of warlike bellicosity, China's external military policies in pursuit of her long-term foreign policy objectives have been characterized by a considerable degree of caution. (Ibid., p. 76) . . .

"As indicated earlier, this does not mean that situations could not arise where the Chinese believed their national interests so threatened that they would (not) forego the use of military power.

"The Chinese clearly could not tolerate U. S. action that directly threatened the security of China or a persistent pattern of U. S. action that directly threatened the security of China or a persistent pattern of U. S. actions which changed their perception of U. S. strategic intentions toward China. (Ibid, p.80) . . .

"The probability is low that there will be any major change in Peking's military doctrine or style of risk-taking in military policy as a result of acquiring operational nuclear capabilities. . . .

"However, I do not mean to minimize the challenge China is likely to pose to the United States in the future.

Hsieh (cont'd):

"Because the challenge and problems will not be clear-cut military ones, adequate responses to them on the part of the United States are likely to be difficult. . . . (Ibid.,p. 83) . . .

"Rather in accordance within Peking's preferred foreign policy style, the Chinese are likely to make a new low-risk and subtle use of their nuclear delivery capability along political-military and propaganda lines. . . . (Ibid.,p.81) . . .

"In sum, provided the United States keeps high for the Chinese the risks of overt aggression, past and current Chinese military doctrine and policies argue against China's adoption oi incautious military initiative at a time she acquires a nuclear delivery capability whether of an intercontinental or regional character." (Ibid.,p. 83)

Hinton:

"An important element of power is of course the extent to which the possessor is generally believed to be willing to use it. In this respect the CPC has been remarkably successful, even if one ignores its occasional remarks implying a bullish attitude toward a Third World War. By means of repeated, carefully calculated resort to force--notably in Korea, over the offshore islands in 1954-55 and 1958, and along the Sino-Indian frontier in 1962--the CPR has succeeded among other things in keeping alive a fairly general and somewhat exaggerated idea of its willingness to take its power out of reserve and commit it to action. This willingness, real and still more assumed, must be accounted a major component of the CPR's national power." (Communist China in World Politics, p.113)

"Thus Communist China's overeager promotion of its own security and influence, although it enhanced its influence somewhat by creating in many quarters an exaggerated impression of its readiness to resort to force, also created a greater and continuing threat to Chinese security. (p. 377) . . .

"Communist China's policy toward the underdeveloped areas consists essentially, although not entirely,of overtly inciting and covertly aiding Chinese-style armed revolutions, not necessarily Communist led but

Hinton (Cont'd):

aimed at 'imperialist' influence in the country in question, within the limits of supposed feasibility. (p. 379) . . .

"Senator Clark. 'Dr. Hinton, as I appraise your paper, the thrust of it is that China is not for the time being a serious threat outside its own boundaries from either a military or a diplomatic point of view. Is that a fair appraisal?'

Dr. Hinton. ' With some qualifications, yes, sir. In other words, under certain conditions this ---'

Senator Clark. 'Do you want to state the qualifications briefly or restate them?'

Dr. Hinton. 'Well, I believe the fact that the Chinese threat is no greater than it is, is due, in very large measure, to the policies that the United States has so far followed and I think, therefore, it would be a great mistake, when our policy has achieved certain results, certainly not all the results we have hoped for, to reverse it. Certain modifications, yes, but I think not a radical reversal.'

Senator Clark. 'You would think then if we were to alter our present containment policy, not only military, but diplomatic, that China might then become more of a threat than it is at present, is that correct?'

Dr. Hinton. 'Yes, sir. I think you put your finger on the crucial question, what would be the effect on Chinese militancy of a significant relaxation of American counterpressures or whatever term you choose to use. I personally believe it would tend to strengthen the more extremist attitude in Peking rather than more moderate ones, at least in the short or medium term.'" (p. 405)

"On the other hand, as this book has suggested, Chinese efforts to exercise leadership in Asia will not necessarily be of an overt military kind." (Communist China in World Politics, p. 490)

Hinton (cont'd)

"In general, the CPC has tended to reserve overt violence for the defense of its security - as interpreted of course by itself - and has attempted to enhance its influence mainly through semiviolent and nonviolent means. On the other hand, whereas the CPC has shown itself to be willing to use violence in defense of its security, including violence of a preemptive or forestalling kind, it has always (except in the spring of 1951, in Korea) shown great caution in its employment of even defensive violence. The main, but not sole, restraint has been the fear of American retaliation. The same consideration has dictated even greater restraint on any unambiguously offensive use of force. Notwithstanding all the talk about Chinese bellicosity, one looks in vain for instances in recent years of Chinese military aggression, in the sense of attacks against neighboring countries or foreign forces that were not motivated, largely at least, by fear for Chinese security. Offensive action is restrained not only by fear of American retaliation or other military consequences, but also by a realization that acts of aggression would adversely affect the prospects for achieving the CPR's long-term political objectives." (p. 121)

Lindbeck:

". . . The Communists, the Chinese Communists, as well as other Communist regimes, have in the past worked through party organizations that have been linked with them with large Communist powers. These Chinese try to affect the situation abroad through other than military means. . . .This is what Mr. Schwartz referred to when he talked about containment of subversion. (p. 250) . . .

"I should like to add that I believe the Chinese are prepared to use military force if they think they can gain real advantages from this." (p. 228)

Griffith:

"General Griffith. 'Well, Senator, I think that I wouldn't be quite as dogmatic in my opinion as whoever made the statement. I think China is expansionist to a limited degree. I don't believe that, and I want to make myself as clear as I can on this, the Chinese do not, I believe, have the slightest intention of physically occupying southeast Asia. All they want in southeast Asia is to exercise a benevolent, if you will, hegemony over that region.

'They want their influence to be felt in that region for the reasons that I have stated, and I don't believe that the present Communist government is acting--is feeling--any differently in this respect than a very powerful nationalist government might feel. These are traditional areas of Chinese culture, they have always been traditional areas of Chinese influence, and I feel that this is only natural for the Chinese to want to have fruitful relations in which they play perhaps a dominant position with these smaller countries. But I don't think that they propose to go in there and try to run those countries. That would be my reaction.'

Dr. Halperin. 'I think I would accept that. I would add only two points.

'One is that Taiwan is an exception. The Chinese look upon Taiwan as a part of China and they would use military force to take Taiwan if they thought that could be successful.'

General Griffith. 'Right.'" (pp. 295-296)

"Nevertheless, of one thing we may be certain: they are determined to extend their influence, at the least risk and cost to themselves, to susceptible areas. If a limited military adventure offers a handsome pay-off at very low risk, they will probably embark on it. It is part of our business to narrow the field of choices open to them and thus to deny them strategic options from which they may reap large returns on small investments." (China and the Peace of Asia, "The Military Potential of China", p. 91)

Halperin:

"I think I would accept that (i.e., Sam Griffith's statement on same page concerning Chinese expansionism). I would add only two points.

"One is that Taiwan is an exception. The Chinese loop upon Taiwan as a part of China and they would use military force to take Taiwan if they thought that could be successful.

"The second point I would add I think, the Chinese want to expand their influence not only throughout southeast Asia but throughout the world. They aspire in the long run to be a world power playing a role in supporting revolution and what they see as leftwing Communist groups throughout the world. But they are not expansionist in the sense of having plans to use their own armies to march into countries and conquer them. (p. 295) . . .

"The Peking regime views the relation of force to policy in terms of the Maoist doctrine that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.' Military force will be at the base of any Chinese Communist effort to implement its foreign-policy objectives, then, in that force, in the minds of the Peking leaders, is an inevitable and necessary instrument of foreign policy." (p. 13)

". . . . Therefore, while the Chinese accept the legitimacy of the use of force, they also accept the need to avoid provoking the enemy and the tactical prudence of respecting him. Thus, their actual employment of force has been marked by their desire to pursue objectives as vigorously as possible short of provoking an American attack on the Chinese mainland. The Chinese Communist have always had to strike a balance between the two, and in doing so they appear to be acting so as to avoid provocation. . . .

"The Chinese Communists have resorted to the direct use of military force relatively rarely, and only when security objectives or the wish to reincorporate Chinese territory under the control of Peking seemed to be at issue." (China and the Bomb, p. 14)

Taylor:

"Senator Lausche. 'Dr. Taylor, you mentioned aggression by Red China evidencing an absence of desire for peace. Will you follow me and see if I am correct? Have they been guilty of aggression in Tibet?'

Dr. Taylor. 'I would think so, yes.'

Senator Lausche. 'In India?'

Dr. Taylor. 'Yes.'

Senator Lausche. 'In Malaysia?'

Dr. Taylor. 'Definitely.'

Senator Lausche. 'In Korea?'

Dr. Taylor. 'Yes.'

Senator Lausche. 'In South Vietnam?'

Dr. Taylor. 'We are accepting a fairly broad definition of aggression. Yes.'

Senator Lausche. 'In Laos?'

Dr. Taylor. 'Yes.'

Senator Lausche. 'Thailand also, as mentioned by Senator Symington. Can either of you point out a single instance where Mao Tse-tung and the Communist Party have been the promoters of peace and brotherhood and good neighborliness, and not centering all of their intention in trying to communize the world?'

Dr. Taylor. 'Well, sir, I think to find such an example would be rather a difficult assignment. I would, if I may, Mr. Senator, suggest that my answers were predicated on a fairly broad definition of aggression. I do not think of military action with flags flying and bugles sounding as the only form of aggression. The peculiar type of subpolitical, social, economic, subversive activity in which the Communists have now excelled so well is possibly the more dangerous type that we have to contend with today, and I would think it very important to keep in mind that the Chinese threat is not the threat of large armies marching over small borders, but of powerful support of those who wish to subvert a society.'"(pp 472 and 473)

Morgenthau:

". . . . Let me now take a look at the actual policies pursued by the Communist Government of China in the last 16 years. I think the first observation one must make is the impressive contrast between the extreme and almost mad statements Chinese leaders have made with regard to the outside world, and the extreme caution with which China has actually acted with regard to the outside world. (p. 552) . . .

". . . . First of all, the threat which China constitutes to Asia is not primarily of a military nature. It is not, as I have tried to say before, the threat of Chinese armies sweeping across the Asian continent. It is rather the natural, and in a sense inevitable, attraction which this enormous empire and this imposing culture have always exerted, and have started to exert again, upon the mainland of Asia. (p. 554) . . .

"Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me say a word about the worldwide containment of China. I personally think it unlikely that China has permanent political military aspirations in the outside Asia world. The machinations in which she has been engaged in Africa and Latin America can be explained primarily in terms of her competition with the Soviet Union for the dominance of the world Communist movement. But a cautious statesman will take into account the most pessimistic interpretation and will be prepared for the worst. (p. 555) . . .

"It is here, I think, that we must correct one misconception about China's foreign policy, which is very common among us. We tend to think in terms of historic analogies and we can't help thinking of China in terms of our experience with Nazi Germany. That is to say, we have in our minds the image of Chinese armies being poised at their borders and ready to march across Asia as the hordes of Genghis Khan did, if they are not contained locally on the spot.

"However, traditionally, especially insofar as China's neighbors to the west and southwest are concerned, China has not primarily relied upon military expansion but rather upon the establishment of subtle and complex tributary relationships between herself and her neighbors." (p. 551)

Scalapino:

". . . . The thrust of my earlier analysis was that we face a China both militantly nationalist and strongly ideological at present, a China whose leaders have committed a series of excesses from which they must now beat some retreat, but who still appear to be intent upon cultivating power in all of its aspects and quite prepared to use violence to effect revolutionary change throughout the world. At this point, presumably, the Chinese leaders are sufficiently realistic to want to avoid war with the United States, and even with less powerful forces. The time may not be too long, however, before China's military capacities come closer to matching her political visions. We must prepare for that eventuality now. (p. 571) . . .

". . . . I would suggest that Asia is always going to be marked by a diversity of cultures as well as a diversity of politics. China will not dominate all of Asia in either sense unless it is done by forceful means. (p. 578) . . .

". . . today, China must calculate defensively because the United States, and in some degree the Soviet Union, will not permit her to calculate offensively on any significant scale.

"Her defensive calculations undoubtedly include a determination in each specific instance as to what she can and cannot tolerate from the standpoint of her own national interests, and what risks, correspondingly, she is prepared to run. Personally, I do not believe that the Chinese Communists are prepared to take the risks of an open war with the United States at this time except under the most extraordinary of circumstances or under conditions where they misinterpret American signals." (p. 565)

Powell:

"The aging Chinese Communist leaders are militant revolutionaries, but they are not unusually irrational. Still, the ambitions and military potential of the CPR are such that they provide a threat to China's neighbors and to the peace of the world. . .

Powell (cont'd)

"To support the military and security aspects of their basic objectives, the Chinese Communist leaders maintain the largest conventional armed forces in the world, and they are placing the highest priority on the development of a nuclear capability. (Current History, Sept. 1965, "Communist China as a World Power," p. 37) . . .

". . . . The military doctrine of Mao Tse-tung is characterized by prudent aggressiveness. (Ibid., p. 180) . . .

"Fortunately, in recent years, Peking's foreign policy actions have usually been somewhat more cautious than her vitriolic propaganda would indicate. For example, she has avoided a direct and irreversible confrontation with the military might of the United States. (Ibid.,p.136). . .

"In the foreseeable future, prospects for peaceful relationships between Communist China and her neighbors or with the United States are not encouraging. There are no indications that the CPR will actually become less aggressive as her military potential increases. . . .

". . . Hence, it is believed the Communist Chinese will actually utilize a restricted nuclear force to support political, economic and psychological efforts to advance her objectives. Atomic arms will probably be used primarily as political and psychological weapons." (Ibid., p. 141)

Barnett:

"'A moment ago, I believe you said you see no evidence or desire for territorial expansion; is that correct?'

Mr. Barnett. 'Yes; in any general sense.'

Mr. Barnett. 'I have tried to make clear that in my view the main problem is not the threat of general territorial expansionism by Communist China and, therefore, I do not jump to the conclusion that this is the major problem we have to face.

Barnett (cont'd)·

'However, having said that, I think it would be equally erroneous to ignore China's growing power, its ambitions, its hostility - open hostility - to many countries on its periphery, and its willingness to use a variety of pressures and a variety of instruments of policy, and a variety of types of influences - I think it would be a mistake to overlook these facts, too.'" (pp. 68-69) . . .

"Incidentally in the Lin Piao statement that has been cited many times, one of the messages that I think is overlooked often, is that they stressed to the Vietnamese, to the North Vietnamese, and the Vietcong, that their revolution was important, that China's path pointed the way, but that they had to be self-reliant - and don't rely on concrete external support. I think, it effect, one thing they were saying to the Vietnamese in this speech was 'This is an important revolution, keep it up, but you have got to do it yourself essentially.

"So I do not see the Chinese thinking, even in revolutionary terms, of a very high level of direct Chinese participation and involvement in revolutionary struggles, but more in terms of inspiration, moral support, and training, of the ideological model that they think they have provided and these are two different things. I think they are outward looking. But it is important to recognize the terms in which they look outward, and the limitations on what they are likely to be prepared to do, as well as on their rather ambitious aspirations. (p. 26) . . .

"While it is important to recognize Peking's ambitious goals, it is equally important to note that, on the basis of available evidence and Communist China's performance to date, the Chinese Communists do not appear to think primarily in terms of spreading their influence through direct military and territorial expansion; they appear to recognize the limits to their capabilities for military action outside of China's borders; they have usually been quite realistic in assessing the power balance in concrete situations; they have generally been calculating and even cautious in avoiding military 'adventurism' and limiting their risks; they have tended to think in long-range terms about their most

Barnett (cont'd):

ambitious goals; and they have repeatedly been flexible and pragmatic (at least until recently) in adapting their strategy and tactics to fit changing situations in pursuit of their short-run goals.

"However, it would be a dangerous error to conclude that Communist China would not risk major war if it genuinely felt that its vital interests were threatened. In regard to Vietnam particularly, there is considerable evidence, I believe, that while Peking hopes to avoid any major conflict with the United States it fears that American escalation will create situations demanding escalation on the Chinese side, which could lead to major conflict. (p. 13) . . .

"Senator Morse. 'At the time of the military border incidents between China and India, what is your understanding as to who was the original aggressor?'

Mr. Barnett. 'This is an issue on which there can be some argument, but I believe that the Chinese took the initiative and should be considered the aggressive party in this particular situation. There is some basis for arguing that the particular timing of the Chinese action in 1962 was partially in response to the fact that the Indians were building up posts farther and farther north, and at one point Prime Minister Nehru did make a statement that they would take back all the territory that the Chinese had which the Indians claimed, and this may have been a factor on a purely tactical level but I think the 1962 operation was much more than just a response to this situation and to Indian action. (p. 29)

Fairbank:

The Chairman. 'Professor Fairbank, if I may recapitulate a bit, I take it that you feel that China is not militarily aggressive, is not a danger in the immediate or foreseeable future of military attack upon her neighbors, is that correct?'

Dr. Fairbank. 'Yes, I think the Chinese are not aiming to go over their frontiers. (p. 132) . . .

Fairbank(cont'd):

"The Chinese in the past have sometimes expanded from their central area, and it wouldn't be correct to say that they have been pacifists, of course, they have fought wars and all that sort of thing. If you look at the Chinese expansion in the past, however, maybe this map would be useful--I understand you gentlemen have a map of China showing their boundaries in red--you will see that the Chinese people have always lived in the southeastern quarter holds about 600 million people at least, and the rest of it holds maybe 50 million people.

"In the old days there were only 2 or 3 million Mongols at the most out in Mongolia, and an equal number in Tibet, perhaps - Tibetans - when there were several hundred million Chinese in the southeast.

"Now, the Chinese expansion has been out from their center of population into Inner Asia, even to Mongolia, across to Central Asia, and only recently into Tibet. And these have formed the boundaries of the empire as under the last dynasty of the Manchu dynasty, the Ching, down to 1912. Expansion has been on those boundaries. When China has been pushed into her quarter there by invasions from Central Asia, she has then pushed back out again and taken over Central Asia and Mongolia. But the fighting has been in that imperial area, and the Chinese have not expanded outside except to control their frontiers. (pp. 109-110). . .

". . . . So, I would say that the Chinese expansionism is within the continental limits of the Chinese empire. (p. 110). . .

"Do you think that bombings of the Chinese nuclear bases or bombing any site in Red China would in all probability produce a war between the United States and Red China?

Dr. Fairbank . 'Oh yes.'

"There is no question we would have considerable aftertaste from any effort of that kind. I think the world community would manifest a considerable dismay. We might get a vote of a hundred nations against us on a thing like that. Why not?'" (p. 114)

Question V: The Role and Utility of Nuclear Weapons

A. Summary

Our survey of those China specialists with a particular interest in Communist Chinese attitudes toward nuclear weapons indicates that basically these experts (Hseih, Halperin, and Powell) are very much in agreement. Specifically, the specialists agree that:

1. Communist China's development of nuclear weapons is for purposes of defense through deterrence; the acquisition of nuclear weapons will not induce any radical changes in Communist China's "style of risk-taking."

2. As for deterrence, the Communist Chinese will probably adopt the hostage theory, deter the U.S. by using America's allies in East and Southeast Asia as hostages for America's good behavior.

3. Communist China's nuclear weapons and particularly a minimum-deterrent vis-a-vis the U.S. will also be employed as political and psychological weapons, to promote the morale and militancy of the revolutionary forces of the world and the establishment of Chinese hegemony in Asia. China would also reap other political and psychological advantages from its nuclear weapons and minimum-deterrent; such benefits would include a great power status and prestige in the Communist bloc and the third world.

B. Quotes

Powell:

"....Third, in contradiction to its own protestations of self-defense and the support of peace, Peking has again demonstrated a strong sense of revolutionary mission. It has attempted to use its atomic explosions to raise the morale and militancy of revolutionary forces throughout the world, and to convince them of China's continuing determination and increased ability to support their revolutionary activities." (Foreign Affairs Quarterly, July 1965, "China's Bomb: Exploitation and Reactions", p. 617)

Powell (Continued):

"...Her criticism of the 'cowardice' of the Soviet Union indicates that Communist China may be more willing than the U.S.S.R. to employ atomic sabre rattling to support insurrections and 'wars of liberation.' (Current History, Sept. 1965, "Communist China- as a Military Power," p. 180)

"....It is only prudent to assume that within five years Communist China will be able to threaten all her neighbors with weapons of mass destruction. Yet it would not be rational for her to seek to achieve foreign policy objectives by aggressively employing a limited atomic force. For Peking actually to initiate a nuclear war could be suicidal. Hence, it is believed the Communist Chinese will actually utilize a restricted nuclear force to support political, economic and psychological efforts to advance her objectives. Atomic arms will probably be used primarily as political and psychological weapons." (Ibid., p.141)

"Until China can produce a credible delivery capability, Peking is unlikely to adopt a high-risk policy that would invite the use of nuclear weapons against it. Although it cannot match the increasingly sophisticated thermonuclear might of the United States or the Soviet Union, it may be satisfied in the short run to obtain a deterrent based on the threat of retaliation against its neighbors. This could permit China to pursue its ambitions more aggressively, holding the peripheral states as hostages. The United States can perhaps find consolation in the fact that under roughly comparable circumstances in the early 1950s, the Soviet Union failed to make gains in Western Europe. Yet, events to come will surely test both the intestinal fortitude of the free Asian peoples and the continuing credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. More than Europe of a decade ago, Asia suffers from poverty, communal conflicts and political instabilities which will provide the Chinese Communists with opportunities to use direct or indirect nuclear blackmail in the service of revolution and insurrection."
(Foreign Affairs Quarterly,July 1965, "China's Bomb: Exploitation and Reactions," p. 625)

Powell (Continued):

"Although the Chinese Communists may continue to act with some caution, as well as with belligerence, the degree of caution that they will use in exploiting a growing nuclear capability will depend in large measure on the future credibility of the United States nuclear umbrella over the non-Communist states of Asia."
(Current History, Sept. 1965, "Communist China as a Military Power", p. 180)

Halperin:

"It appears that the Chinese development of an atomic capability is related primarily to defensive objectives - to power status and subtle threats - rather than to specific plans to expand by the use of nuclear force." (China and the Bomb, p. 26)

"The intense Chinese drive for an operational nuclear capability is, I believe, related to their longstanding fear of an American nuclear attack. At a fundamental level, the Chinese desire for nuclear weapons is simply a logical extension of their intention to become a great power. However, the priority given to the effort, the resources devoted to it is, I believe, attributable to their belief that they need to develop a deterrent against American nuclear attack. The development of such a capability will leave the Chinese freer to press their efforts to establish their hegemony in Asia and t give such support as they can to 'people's wars.' . . . .

"In addition, the Chinese believe that they will get some increased prestige in the third world and within the Communist bloc from their development of nuclear weapons." (pp. 286-87)

"The fundamental Chinese motivation in trying to acquire a nuclear capability is the notion that all great powers have nuclear weapons, that China is a great power, and therefore must have nuclear weapons, ...

"The Chinese now see nuclear weapons as important to them to

Halperin (Continued):

increase their power within the Communist world. They feel that if they are ever going to successfully challenge the current regime in Moscow they will have to do it on a basis of increased power, and in particular nuclear power. Finally the Chinese see nuclear weapons as of some marginal value in support of their political objectives in Asia as a background threat against Asian countries." (China's Strategic Outlook, pp.103-104)

"Because of what I think is the widespread confusion about general Chinese attitude toward nuclear weapons, I propose to make a few assertions about Chinese nuclear doctrine which I would be glad to elaborate upon during the discussion and questioning. The Chinese recognize very well the destructive power of nuclear weapons. They know that these weapons could destroy all of the industry and in fact the entire modernized sector of China.

"Since 1946 the Chinese have been concerned about American possession of atomic weapons and have attempted to calculate the damage that the United States could do to China with these weapons. When Mao in 1957 in a widely quoted statement stated privately that 300 million Chinese would be killed in a nuclear war, he was apparently reporting the results of a calculation and not expressing any lack of concern that such an attack would seriously damage the mainland of China.

"Their perception of the damage which would be done to them in nuclear war has led the Chinese to a determination not to provoke a nuclear attack on China. While the Chinese have been and are prepared to risk such an attack when the survival of the Communist regime in China was at stake, they have attached a very high priority to avoiding a nuclear war. In short, there is no reason to believe that the Chinese want a nuclear war or are not as determined as any political leadership to avoid a nuclear attack if possible. Nevertheless, as I have said, the Chinese believe there is a real possibility growing out of an attack in the Vietnam conflict."(pp. 285-6)

Halperin (Continued):

"....In the absence of Soviet support, the Chinese would probably try to deter the United States by making retaliatory threats directed at Asian countries. In order to accomplish this, it appears, they are seeking to develop an intermediate-range missile force that could be targeted on Asian cities. The Chinese could expect such a force to serve as a powerful deterrent against an American attack on China resulting from the expansion of a Sino-American conflict on her borders. (China and the Bomb, p. 48)

Hsieh:

"The probability is low that there will be any major change in Peking's military doctrine or style of risk-taking in military policy (see Question IV) as a result of acquiring operational nuclear capabilities.

" A nuclear-armed China is likely to find ample opportunity to advance toward her long-term objectives of great power status and beginning in Asia through reliance on low-risk political-military and economic instability that characterizes most of the under-developed areas of the region." (Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy , November 1965, p. 83) . . . .

"In brief, Chinese thinking concerning a nuclear war with the United States has been and remains, despite the detonation of six nuclear devices, entirely defensive. (Ibid, p. 79) . . . .

"As a deterrent to U. S. conventional intervention or escalation to the nuclear level, a regional Chinese retaliatory capability -- against U.S. forces in Asia and against U.S. allies -- may appear to the Chinese far more credible and hence more useful than an intercontinental threat to the U.S.Z.I. whose use or threat of use would only invite overwhelming U.S. retaliation." (Ibid., p. 81)

Question VI: The Internal Constraints on China's External (Diplomatic-Military) Behavior

A. Summary

The experts underline three factors which constrain the Chinese Communists in their striving for international power and influence: their limited military capability, their economic weakness, and their "parochialism" in dealing with other nations, i.e., inexperience in international relations.

Almost all the experts quoted here agree that China is incapable of carrying out a military campaign beyond her periphery. She is competing internationally with the United States and the Soviet Union and yet she cannot begin to match them logistically. China's nuclear capability is still in an embryonic stage; thus she cannot engage in any high-risk action which would invite retaliation. As to China's ground combat forces, they may serve as a deterrent to invasion, but these forces do not enable China to engage in any high-level action.

China's military limitations are related to her lack of economic and technological strength; the Communist Chinese force a constant battle to keep agricultural growth ahead of population growth. Lindbeck remarks that:

> "There are in-built limitations stemming from poor agricultural performance. They need the reserves or the surplus from agriculture to support growth in other spheres. The process of capital growth and capital investment has undoubtedly been slowed down in the past few years when agricultural productivity was low."

Agrarian productivity is necessary to develop the technological structure which in turn is the basis of power. Hinton points this out:

> "Power in the modern world of course requires an economic base, communications in particular. Measured against the standards of the modern West (including the Soviet Union) or those of its own ambitions, the CDR is still seriously deficient in these respects."

Griffith and Zagoria state that China's comparative poverty limits China's ability to gain influence in underdeveloped countries. Whereas more powerful nations are able to give substantial aid, she can only provide ideology.

Because of what Zagoria calls "an erroneous assessment of the forces at work in the Afro-Asian world," China has suffered some major foreign policy setbacks. She has failed to understand that nations are often more interested in self-realization than in anti-Americanism. Through clumsy and unbending diplomacy she has upon occasion, repulsed the very nations she was attempting to attract. Thus an insensitive foreign policy has provided a third important constraint on her progress toward a position of world power.

B. Quotes

Powell:

"Until China can produce a credible delivery capability, Peking is unlikely to adopt a high-risk policy that would invite the use of nuclear weapons against it. Although it cannot match the increasingly sophisticated thermonuclear might of the United States or the Soviet Union, it may be satisfied in the short run to obtain a deterrent based on the threat of retaliation against its neighbors. This could permit China to pursue its ambitions more aggressively, holding the peripheral states as hostages." (Foreign Affairs Quarterly, July 1965, "China's Bomb: Exploitations and Reactions," p. 625)

Halperin:

"...China...has a desire to control its neighbors, but only a very limited capability to do so." (p. 288)

Griffith:

"At present, save through application of her doctrine of national liberation wars, China cannot influence events outside peripheral areas. This is a very frustrating situation in which an ancient, great, and proud nation finds herself. We may be sure that she will do all that her resources allow to rectify this condition. (p. 280) ...

"General Griffith: 'Well, sir, I would like to preface what I say by the remark that except in regional terms China is, to use her own expression 'a paper tiger' and is likely to remain one for, in my opinion, probably 5 or 6 years; let us say, in terms of projecting power other than nuclear, perhaps a decade or perhaps more probably two decades.' (p. 289) ...

Senator Case: 'What are the Chinese going to come in with? You explained they have practically nothing in a military way for aggressive action beyond the very narrow periphery; that is correct, I take it?'

General Griffith. 'That is my feeling; yes, sir." (p. 311)

"Now, there is no way, aside from wars of national liberation, as I see it, that at the present time China can influence events. She cannot influence them in economic terms. Her economic aid is of a very low order. It is almost, all of it is, given to the showy type of thing.

"A lot of our aid is given in areas that do not even show, but the Chinese aid to Nepal, for instance, the visible aid, when I was in Katmandu a couple of years ago, was a very ugly fence around a public park. This was the first Chinese economic aid to Nepal.

"Of course, they are building a road now for them. But, in other words, Senator, I mean she does not have the resources to influence events, say, in Latin America. She hopes that this doctrine of wars of liberation will influence events along the lines that she would like to see them go, but she does not have any other means at the moment." (p. 312) ...

Hsieh (cont'd):

in Peking's intention to avoid any military initiatives that might lead to a direct confrontation with U.S. forces, conventional or nuclear." (Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Nov. 1967, p. 79)

Scalapino:

"...The Chinese Communists, moreover, have consummated alliances large and small, undertaken aid and technical assistance programs far beyond their economic capacities, and engaged in a range of political activities throughout the world that caused most nations, friend and foe, to label China 'major power designate.' That is a significant accomplishment, incidentally, because such a status grants certain rights without conveying the requisite responsibilities. (p. 566) ...

"In my opinion, the truth is approached as one combines these two views, treating them as more complementary than in conflict. China is weak in a variety of ways. Her economic recovery from the disasters of a few years ago is scarcely complete, and despite remarkable feats in certain areas of production and distribution, overall increases - particularly in agrarian production - appear to be modest, especially when measured against population growth. Moreover, the changing of the political guard is at hand and even if the resulting changes may not be dramatic, some internal tension must be present in the Chinese Communist Party at this point, heightened by the significant setbacks in foreign policy. Finally, China is scarcely a military match for the United States, and she undoubtedly fears American power." (p. 564)

Barnett:

"While it is important to recognize Peking's ambitious goals, it is equally important to note that, on the basis of available evidence and Communist China's performance to date, the Chinese Communists do not appear to think primarily in terms of spreading their influence through

Griffith (cont'd):

"However, despite the paucity of factual data, one may with some confidence make a few generalizations. First, the force structure of the PLA is now, and will for some time necessarily remain, in a condition of serious imbalance. The party hopes to correct this, of course, because this imbalance restricts the strategic options open to the Chinese, and imposes severe operational constraints.

"But, even given this situation, the PLA is a potent regional military instrument. True, the Chinese cannot yet project conventional power beyond immediately peripheral areas. And it will be some time, certainly 10 years at least, until they will be able to do so. For them, the vista is defined by resource limitations. There simply is not enough cake to go around.

"It is not yet clear in what directions they are going to move these scarce resources. But I would suspect that modernization of conventional ground forces will receive a low priority. Some selective modernization, yes, in terms of armor and motor transport. Air defense is being emphasized. A limited amphibious capability will receive attention, and as Chinese capacity to produce modern aircraft improves, some increases in airborne capabilities must be anticipated." (pp. 272-73)

Hsieh:

"China's military leadership clearly considers the capability for ground combat as a deterrent to invasion. They probably do not see these forces as enabling them to engage in prolonged high-level actions that would require extensive logistic support and involve high risk of U.S. counteraction. ...

"China's recognition of the implications of nuclear warfare, or her vulnerability to nuclear attack, of her military - technological inferiority to the United States, and of her inability to count on Soviet military backing in support of her external objectives is strongly reflected

Barnett (cont'd):

direct military and territorial expansion; they appear to recognize the limits to their capabilities for military action outside of China's borders; they have usually been quite realistic in assessing the power balance in concrete situations; they have generally been calculating and even cautious in avoiding military 'adventurism' and limiting their risks; they have tended to think in a long-range terms about their most ambitious goals; and they have repeatedly been flexible and pragmatic (at least until recently) in adapting their strategy and tactics to fit changing situations in pursuit of their short-run goals. (p. 10) ...

"Where the Chinese Communists have been dogmatically and rigidly militant in the recent period, they have suffered a series of major setbacks and policy defeats - in relations with the Soviet Union, at the Algiers Conference last fall, and in such widely scattered countries as Indonesia, Cuba, and Ghana. (p. 11) ...

"Turning to the question of Communist China's military position, several things should be noted. First of all, the Peking regime has developed China into a significant military power, with large, modernized, conventional land forces and a sizable air force. However, these forces appear to be designed mainly for defense, and Peking lacks many of the prerequisites for successful operation outside of China against the forces of a major power such as the United States. The strength of Communist China's military establishment far exceeds that of its Asian neighbors, though, and its mere existence argues for the maintenance of adequate counterbalancing forces in Asia, which at the present time must be provided largely by the United States. (p. 12) ...

"Peking's leaders will probably continue to be sensitive to the actual balance of military strength, and reluctant to take excessive risks; for a while, in fact, the vulnerability of their embryonic nuclear establishment may actually impose additional restraints on them.

Barnett (cont'd):

"However, it would be a dangerous error to conclude that Communist China would not risk major war if it genuinely felt that its vital interests were threatened. In regard to Vietnam particularly, there is considerable evidence, I believe, that while Peking hopes to avoid any major conflict with the United States it fears that American escalation will create situations demanding escalation on the Chinese side, which could lead to major conflict." (p. 13)

Hinton:

"...In reality, Communist China's ability to invade other Asian countries is severely limited by logistics and is almost canceled by the threat of American retaliation and the political liabilities that would follow an actual invasion, as distinct from a mere threat or assumed capability to invade." (p. 377)

"Power in the modern world of course requires an economic base, communications and heavy industry in particular. Measured against the standards of the modern West (including the Soviet Union) or those of its own ambitions, the CPR is still seriously deficient in these respects. On the other hand, by comparison with pre-Communist China or with any other Asian country except Japan, its performance has been fairly impressive. The highway and to a lesser extent the rail systems are being steadily extended into the border regions and toward the frontiers, for economic reasons as well as for political and military ones, whether offensive or defensive. Industrial growth, which was rapid although precarious down to 1960, was reversed by the crisis of that year, which was accentuated by the withdrawal of most Soviet aid, and it has not yet recovered from this disaster.

"The CPR's power in the sense of the ability to enforce its will against objections or opposition, has almost certainly declined somewhat since 1960. Furthermore, it has never had the ability to project its

Hinton (cont'd):

power across salt water - to Japan, Taiwan (since 1950), or Indonesia, in particular. Nevertheless, and although the CPR still lives in the shadow of the vastly superior power of the United States and the Soviet Union, it remains the strongest strictly indigenous regime on the mainland of Asia, far ahead of its closest rivals, North and South Korea, North Vietnam, India, and Pakistan." (Communist China in World Politics, p. 112)

"As for future foreign policy, it must be remembered that, notwithstanding the roseate view of China and the Chinese that prevailed among Americans from the late nineteenth century until about 1949, China when strong has always been a problem for the rest of Asia. This was true of the Nationalists in the days of their greatest power, in the 1930s and briefly after 1945. It has been still truer, and will remain still truer, of their Communist successors.

"On the other hand, as this book has suggested, Chinese efforts to exercise leadership in Asia will not necessarily be of an overt military kind. The CPC learned by about 1951 that, as long as the United States remained a military power in Asia, China could not dominate Asia by force. It then turned to subtler and more political methods, some of which however have been far from peaceful." (Ibid., p. 490)

Zagoria:

"...This crisis...(in foreign policy)...is largely the outgrowth of rigidly dogmatic postures assumed in recent years by Mao and his closest collaborators. The crisis is of such magnitude as to have seriously weakened Peking's influence in the underdeveloped countries, cast doubt on the legitimacy and viability of even the regime's reasonable international aspirations, and greatly sharpened existing divergencies among Communist movements all over the world. It is a crisis which will not be resolved without basic changes in Chinese Communist policy - changes which may

Zagoria (cont'd):

not come until after Mao's death, but which could occur sooner and, in any case, in my opinion, are bound to happen in the foreseeable future ...

"The current crisis in Communist China's foreign policy has its roots in 1957 when Mao, incorrectly assuming that the development of Soviet ICBM capabilities had wrought a decisive change in the world balance of power, abandoned Peking's previous caution and embarked on a more militant course to achieve his primary foreign policy goals; elimination of U.S. military power from Asia, repossession of Taiwan, and international recognition of Communist China as a great power. (p. 369) ...

"China's failures are essentially the result of its erroneous assessment of the forces at work in the Afro-Asian world. National self-realization rather than instant social revolution or an anti-American crusade is the immediate goal sought by the new countries, and Peking's product mix of subversion, helpful revolutionary hints, and polemics on the evils of imperialism has inevitably found only a limited market where economic development and nation-building are the primary concerns. By the same token, Peking cannot compete with Russia or the United States when it comes to economic and military aid.

"Similarly, Peking's loss of influence in the international Communist movement is the direct consequence of Chinese intransigence, which even the most radical Communist parties have come to regard as unrealistic. Mao's failure last year to cooperate in a reported Soviet plan to send a limited number of Russian troops into North Vietnam and to station Soviet fighter planes in southern Chinese airfields provides a striking example of Peking's unwillingness to accept realistic alternatives in a situation of deep concern to the international Communist movement."
(p. 370)

Lindbeck:

"Instead of successfully finding ways to extend Chinese power and influence in their international affairs, as they have in domestic affairs, they now are pitted simultaneously against the United States and the Soviet Union; they are estranged from a majority of nations in the world; they are unpopular and feared by most of their neighbors in east Asia.

"I believe that this, in part at least, is the result of their parochial Chinese background and experience and the doctrinaire inflexibility of their perspectives on the world. (p. 187) ...

"...on the point of its effect on the economic strength of the entire system, I think you are quite right. There are in-built limitations stemming from poor agricultural performance. They need the reserves or the surplus from agriculture to support growth in other spheres. The process of capital growth and capital investment has undoubtedly been slowed down in the past few years when agricultural productivity was low. ...

"On the matter of China's total natural resources, I think the general feeling is that China is fairly well equipped with a wide variety of mineral and other resources; these put her in position, if she develops these resources, to become a fairly powerful nation." (p. 239)

Eckstein:

"In the end, agricultural stagnation and a sudden radicalization of economic policy based on a highly unrealistic assessment of the economy's capabilities produced an acute crisis. Between 1960 and 1961, this crisis led not only to the slowing down in the pace of growth but to a far-reaching decline in absolute terms as well. Thus, the economy of the Chinese mainland entered the throes of a deep depression, from which it has been recovering only quite slowly. As a result, it may take about 10 years for Chinese agriculture to recover to its 1957 level of output

Eckstein (cont'd):

per capita, and the peak national product levels of 1958-60 may not be attained until the later 1960's. In short, it may turn out that the great leap will have cost the Chinese economy roughly a decade of growth.

"This setback has undoubtedly reduced China's expansionist power and forced it to pursue a relatively cautious foreign and domestic policy, at least for the time being." (p. 330)

Question VII: America's China Policy

A. Summary

Out of eleven China specialists surveyed on this particular question, nine (Schwartz, Scalapino, Fairbank, Hinton, Halperin, Griffith, Zagoria, Lindbeck, and Barnett) maintained that America's China policy ought to be changed from one of containment and isolation to one of containment but de-isolation. De-isolation would involve one (or more) of the following: working toward the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, recognition of Communist China,[1] promotion of a greater involvement of Communist China in world affairs such as international conference and sports, establishment of cultural and trade (in non-strategic goods) relations, relaxation of passport controls and travel restrictions, and exchange of medical doctors, scholars, reporters, and businessmen. In this respect, Hinton insists that America's moves toward the de-isolation of China be reciprocated by the Communist Chinese.

The reasons behind this recommended change of policy are many, but all boil down to the following: the policy of containment through isolation (or isolation as a policy) is inadequate and unsatisfactory. These reasons and recommendations not withstanding, the nine China specialists who advocate a policy of "containment but de-isolation" admit that Communist China's initial response to America's de-isolation initiatives would most certainly be in the negative.[2]

---

[1] Hinton takes exception to this, and Scalapino argues that the recognition of China is not a first priority item given the present (i.e., 1966) circumstances. Halperin and Zagoria maintain that the U. S. should first announce its readiness to exchange diplomats. Barnett argues that the U. S. should announce its willingness to extend de jure recognition and to exchange diplomatic representatives.

[2] Except perhaps for the exchange of scholars (Halperin).

Morgenthau, too, recommends a change in America's China policy. He opposes the military containment of China because such a policy is 'ineffective,' and he opposes the policy of isolating China because 'the policy of isolation has been a complete failure.' Instead, Morgenthau recommends the containment of China through political means and the reliance on our 'retaliatory nuclear capability' to deter China from 'Asian or world conquest.'

Taylor does not recommend any changes in America's policy of containment through isolation. His main argument for preserving such a policy is that it has worked effectively.

B. Quotes:

Schwartz:

"Senator Case. 'If I have any time left, I would like to ask you, as I asked Mr. Barnett and Dr. Fairbank, if you would develop your reasons for favoring the containment side as well as the deisolation side of the proposition.

'You generally take this position, I take it.'

Dr. Schwartz. 'Well, I support it but I would like to add certain remarks to it. It seems to me one of the reasons why our containment policy in Europe was successful is because we had many living and viable societies which were cooperating with us in this containment policy. There was a desire on the part of most states in Europe to contain the Soviet Union.'

Senator Case. 'For fear that they couldn't.'

Dr. Schwartz. 'Fear that they couldn't, but also a desire to do so. I do feel that even the bulk of states in Asia desire to contain China and I think we can collaborate with them in the military sphere.

'Now, so far as containment of subversion is concerned, this is a somewhat different proposition. Here we require the active cooperation of many elements in the society itself.

Dr. Schwartz (cont'd). 'Well, I believe that as long as the Chinese do have faith in what I call their optimum vision this means that they would perhaps try to impose their model on any other society which they would be able to control and to this extent I believe that they must be Contained.' (p. 217)

The Chairman. 'I was trying to clarify the real facts of life. The idea that we presume to contain China, let us say, a Communist country, is a kind of an unlimited undertaking; is it not? If containment goes beyond military containment, if we are going to say they shall not have influence, they shall not spread their ideas, this becomes quite a job to do; does it not? Do you think it is a feasible or intelligent one?'

Dr. Schwartz. 'No. I certainly do not think we can prevent their influence from spreading. I really do not have such fear that their influence will have the hypnotic effect that some people think it will.' (p. 248) . . .

'If we have made recommendations that the channels be opened to them to participate in whatever feeble structure of world order we now have, this is not based on any assumption that they are suddenly going to be converted to sweetness and light overnight. It is based on a long-range hope.'(p.212)

The Chairman. 'I believe you were already asked about the admission to the United Nations of Red China, and you thought that would be a good thing, did you not?'

Dr. Schwartz. 'Yes, sir.'

'...my view of recognition is, without overemphasizing its importance, it does give a channel of access to the protagonist government, and one has people on the scene who can learn something about the local situation. I think it has certainly a marginal utility to recognize a government.

'I think there are some sweeping views on the other side which would tend to indicate that the mere act of recognition changes the whole quality of the relationship between two societies. I am not sure that this is so. . .

Dr. Schwartz (cont'd). "...a good part of the hostility originated on the other side. It was based on their view of the world also. I do not think that their behavior was wholly a function of our behavior." (p. 247)

"I am not willing to support the view that the whole nature of our relationship with China would have been changed radically by it. In recent years it has become somewhat academic, even though I approve of it in principle, because of the other side's insistence that they will not accept recognition while we continue to recognize the Taiwan Government. (p. 248) . . .

". . . . I think that what we can do is favor rather than disfavor all movements to bring the Chinese into the world order as a whole, tenuous as that world order is right now: that we should be more concerned with the question of how can we reconcile ourselves to their coming into the United Nations - and I know that it is not an easy question - rather than how can we keep them out. That we actually welcome their participation in world affairs, their improvement over time of relations with others rather than immediately with ourselves." (p. 214)

Scalapino:

"A policy of containment by isolation robbed the United States of initiative or leverage, and tended to posit our rigidity against that of Peking. This in turn served to separate us from our allies and the neutrals, making collective thinking and action with respect to China vastly more difficult. It also rendered far less effective the type of multiple external pressures that are essential if the element of extremism in Chinese foreign policy is to be effectively curbed or countered. . .

"Our past policy has been insufficient in certain other respects. To foster isolation is to foster fanaticism. . . .

Scalapino (cont'd):

"A policy of containment by isolation, in short, not only provides an inadequate approach from the standpoint of international political realities, but it is also highly unsatisfactory from the standpoint of its impact upon the Chinese nation itself. In immediate terms, therefore, we must move from such a policy toward one that heightens the element of choice for the Chinese political elite by providing additional incentives for moderation and firm, explicit deterrents to extremism. We must find a way of making peaceful coexistence the only conceivable path for the next generation of Chinese leaders and we must do this without abandoning any of the basic rights or requirements of the non-Communist world. (p. 540) . . .

"Progressively, we must make it clear by concrete actions that if China is isolated, the initiative lies with her, that we are prepared to enter into cultural relations with her, engage in trade on the same basis as with other Communist nations, and negotiate with her on all matters of international importance. At the same time, we should accept in principle the desirability of universal membership in the United Nations, a principle which among other things would make natural the acceptance of both China and Taiwan as de facto states deserving international representation. Bilateral recognition between the United States and China is not, in my opinion, a first priority item under present circumstances. Once again, however, I believe that we should move toward the establishment of a general principle, namely the complete divorcement of recognition from the question of moral or political approval.

"Having supported the above actions, let me make it emphatically clear that I am under no illusions about the initial Chinese response. Peking will not help us develop a new China policy because basically she likes our old one and does not want us to change. As has already been implied, she believes that our present policy isolates us more than her; makes the United States available as a perfect scapegoat both before

Scalapino (cont'd):

her own people and before others; and prevents or at least mitigates the types of pressures developing upon her from the outside that might otherwise be created.

"Thus, we can assume that the torrent of abuse against us will continue to flow out of China, and that initial responses to our overtures will be almost completely negative. As in so many other situations today, this will test our patience and our sophistication. We must neither be driven back into rigidity nor panicked into making unwarranted concessions. Suppose, for example, that at this time, China does not permit American scientists or scholars other than those prepared to support the Peking regime into the country. Upon whom does the onus lie, if our doors are kept open. Suppose China refuses to accept a United Nations seat once terms such as those suggested above have been established, and that seat lies vacant for a time. Upon whom will the pressures mount?" (pp. 571-72)

Fairbank:

". . . .I would favor their admission even if they are claiming they are going to dynamite the place as soon as they get in. Because I think on balance it is more constructive to have them in, and let them wear themselves out antagonizing everybody if they want to be obnoxious. (p. 131) . . .

". . . . China should be included in all international conferences, as on disarmament, and in international associations, both professional and functional, in international sports, not just ping-pong, and in trade with everyone, including ourselves, except for strategic goods. One thinks naturally of the U. S. agencies and participation in the Security Council as well as the Assembly. Yet all this can come only step by step, with altercation all along the way - not an easy process but a lot more constructive than warfare. (p. 106) . . .

Fairbank (cont'd):

". . . . The list of items that Mr. Barnett mentioned appealed to me. I mean, they are technical steps. Allowing travel--this is in the morning press. I think the administration sees this. Exchanges of all kinds. Trade not in strategic goods but otherwise all right. And I would be interested particularly in efforts that give the Chinese some feeling of acceptance, if ever they will accept any proferred efforts, particularly in connection with the United Nations. (p. 173) . . .

"Opening the door for China's participation in the world scene is only one part of an American policy. The other part is to hold the line. The Chinese are no more amenable to pure sweetness and light than other revolutionaries. Encouraging them to participate in the U. N. and other parts of the international scene has to be combined with a cognate attitude of firmness backed by force. Military containment on the Korean border, in the Taiwan Straits, and somehow in Vietnam cannot soon be abandoned and may have to be maintained for some time. But containment alone is a blind alley unless we add policies of constructive competition and of international contact.

"In short, my reading of history is that Peking's rulers shout aggressively out of manifold frustrations, that isolation intensifies their ailment and makes it self-perpetuating, and that we need to encourage international contact with China on many fronts." (p. 107)

Hinton:

". . . what would be the effect on Chinese military of a significant relaxation of American counterpressures or whatever term you choose to use. I personally believe it would tend to strengthen the more extremist attitude in Peking rather than more moderate ones, at best in the short or medium term. (p. 405) . . .

". . . American policy has been moderating, at least marginally, over the last several years. . . This, I think is entirely desirable. . . but I feel very strongly. . . that we really do need some sign from the other side. (p. 395) . . .

Hinton (cont'd):

". . . I think it is neither necessary nor feasible for the United States to recognize Communist China. . . it is quite clear that the Chinese are not interested in any such relationship." (p. 387)

"The Chairman: 'So you would agree that this question of isolation which has been discussed before the committee, is not a valid policy as contrasted to what you call containment?'

Dr. Hinton: 'I agree, sir.'" (p. 381)...

"I think the growth of trade between Communist China and other countries, leaving aside the United States, is probably inevitable. I do not think it is a very useful field for the United States to put pressure on other countries. (p. 381) . . .

". . . just as the maintenance of a military balance with respect to the Soviet Union requires an American military presence on the European continent, so the maintenance of a military balance with respect to China requires an American military presence in continental east Asia. This presence should, of course, be used to contain Chinese power, political as well as military, not to attack it on its home ground." (p. 380)

Halperin/Griffith:

"Dr. Halperin. 'I think it certainly would be in our interest to have a high level Chinese delegation at the United Nations.

'The Chinese have very distorted views about the United States, about the American economy, about the extent to which we are facing a revolution from the Negro population, and so on. What I am getting at is that I don't see why our country always has to adopt this negative attitude. Why can't we take some initiatives--many of these initiatives the Chinese will reject and we know they will reject them. But----.'

Senator Sparkman. 'You think we ought to keep on trying?'

General Griffith. 'We ought to keep on trying because it helps our position in the world. I believe our position is being eroded in various parts of the world by what is going on in Vietnam. Well, that is a fact of life, but on the other hand can't we try to build it up in some way? Can't we take some positive approaches to the China question?'

Senator Sparkman. 'That is what both of you are suggesting, as I understand it.'

General Griffith. 'I believe so.'

Dr. Halperin. 'I would add that I think the main purpose that I see is in beginning a dialogue with the Chinese. I would, I think, give less weight than perhaps the General does to the effect on world opinion. It seems to me it is in our interest to have Americans in China and to have Chinese in the United States. I would hope that the encouraging reaction that has come in the United States to the announcements that new medical doctors and scholars can go to China will lead the State Department to decide to go all the way and simply remove the restrictions on travel for all Americans to China.

'It seems to me we have everything to gain from that and nothing to lose.'

Senator Sparkman. 'Whether China permits our people to enter or not?'

Dr. Halperin. 'Well, I think the Chinese would probably admit some of our people to start with, and maybe more as we went on.' (pp. 294-95)

'. . . I think getting the Chinese here and letting them see the vitality of American life, our strength, and the fundamental support that the Government has from the people would be extremely valuable.'

Senator Church. 'Do you agree or disagree with that?'

General Griffith. 'I agree a hundred percent.'" (p. 307)

Griffith:

"The Chinese are going to get into the United Nations, I think, Senator, whether we like it or not, but eventually they will be voted in but will they accept? No, not until what they call the Chiang Kai-shek gang is evicted.

Griffith (cont'd.):

"They have said this repeatedly.

"Now, I think they can be elected but let's put the monkey on their backs instead of all the time saying well, you can't shoot your way in. (p. 291) . . .

"Senator Sparkman. 'I believe they went further, did they not, and said we would allow Chinese reporters to come here, whether they allowed ours to go there or not?'

General Griffith. 'I don't think that would be a bad idea. I don't think that 20 Chinese reporters are going to subvert the Government of the United States, Senator." (p. 294)

Halperin:

". . . . Well, I suggested we should announce our willingness to discuss this with them. I think it is quite clear they are not going to exchange ambassadors with us as long as we recognize Taiwan. (p. 292) . . .

". . . It seems to me it is in our interest to have Americans in China and to have Chinese in the United States. (p. 295) . . .

". . . no matter how well we do in Vietnam, I think this will not affect the Chinese perception that they should push wars of liberation elsewhere. (p. 303) . . .

". . . we have talked so long about our desire to overthrow the regime in Peking, I think we are going to have to go pretty far to convince them that that isn't our objective before they start taking seriously what we say (p. 292) . . .

". . . From the standpoint of our relations with China, and I would emphasize that there are a great many other factors involved, it is important for the United States to remain in Vietnam and to prevent a military victory by the Vietcong employing what the Chinese believe to be their model of revolutionary violence. This means, I think, that it is important for us to use our military forces in ways that suggest our confidence in overcoming the Vietcong challenge and our determination not to be driven from Vietnam by the Vietcong.

Halperin (cont'd):

"Second. China's current stance suggests the importance of American assurances to China that we are not looking for an opportunity to attack Chinese nuclear installations or to launch an even larger attack on the Chinese mainland. I believe that an American declaration that was prepared to discuss with Peking the exchange of ambassadors would make an important contribution to this objective, as would American proposals - even though they would be deplored in Peking - to seat both China and Taiwan in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

"Third, I think it is important for the United States to avoid the appearance of overreacting to very limited Chinese capabilities. The Chinese, I believe, are correctly amused by the credit we give them for every act of violence anywhere in the world. Such statements and our overreaction to the Chinese nuclear force, which 6 months ago we were deprecating, only serve to increase the belief in China and elsewhere in Asia that we are overly fearful of the Chinese and are likely to respond either by preventive war or by precipitous withdrawal.

"Finally, I believe that we should avoid using China as a simple justification for our policies. The policy choices that we face in Vietnam and elsewhere in Asia are exceedingly complex. We are unlikely to make the right choices if we confine ourselves to an analysis of what will best contain a China which has a desire to control its neighbors, but only a very limited capability to do so." (pp. 287-288)

Zagoria:

"I think two complementary lines of policy on our part will enhance the prospects for those kinds of changes.

"On the one hand, a continuation of the containment policy in the sense that we make clear to the Chinese that the direct military expansion of Communism is going to be opposed by us while, at the same time, holding open to the Chinese some alternative, extending some indirection to them that we are prepared to entertain and to discuss with them their legitimate role that any great power in Asia will eventually have to play. (p. 426) . . .

Zagoria (cont'd):

"I don't think if the United States announced tomorrow night its willingness to exchange diplomatic representation with Communist China, I don't think they would accept. I am quite confident they would denounce it as a trick by the American imperialists...I think in time their position would change. (p. 386) . . .

". . . . I think that one small step that could be taken by the United States is a lifting of one embargo on trade in nonstrategic goods which in fact is taking place anyway. I think another step we ought to take is to change our policy vis-a-vis Chinese membership in the United Nations...I think we ought to announce our readiness to exchange diplomatic representation with Communist China while making it quite clear that this is not to prejudice our determination to defend Formosa against attack, and while also insisting on the principle of self-determination as the final solution for the Formosa question.(p.832) . . .

"...A change in our policy toward China now could provide an alternative to those Chinese leaders who believe that Mao's policy has been too rigid.

"It might be countered by some that if China is in such serious difficulty why is there any need for a change in our policy? I believe such a change is necessary at some point if we are ever to achieve stability in Asia and to solve a host of international questions that cannot be resolved without Chinese participation, including arms control and disarmament. In the past, objections have been raised to a change in U.S. policy on the grounds that it would be interpreted as weakness by the other side. But if this is the case, what better time is there for such a change when it is quite clear that we are not leading from weakness?

"Moreover, there are many countries and people, particularly in Asia, who believe that Chinese intransigence and militance is largely the result of isolation by the United States. We can prove that they are wrong only by ending our policy of isolation. If the Chinese continue,

Zagoria (cont'd):

as they have done in the past to isolate themselves by their own inept policies, at least the onus will be on them.

"Finally, and not least important, our only hope to achieve a stable and tolerable relationship with China is to do all we can to promote not a change of the system - which can be done only by war - but a change within the system. The kind of evolution that is already transforming Russia and the East European Communist countries will have to come one day in China too. We can help to hasten its growth." (pp. 75-76)

Taylor:

"Dr. Taylor. '. . .the use of the phrase 'containment but not isolation' is a way of trying to loosen up the situation, as it were, by men who feel that our China policy is static, rigid, and even reactionary. I think the same people who say we would continue to contain do support our stand in Vietnam, but they do seem to suggest that apart from that there is not much else to contain, that wars of national liberation are not for export, that they haven't succeeded anywhere except possibly in Vietnam, and that China is not a great military power. This seems to me to miss the point, of course. I feel that the danger from China is not her formal military power, but her genius at coup d'etat subversion, and wars of national liberation. (p. 475)...

'How do we contain this sort of threat, when the rich countries are getting richer and the poor, poorer; when population growth outstrips economic growth in most of the underdeveloped countries? Certainly not by denying its existence.

'The answer is clearly to assist in building up viable states in the many parts of the world that might come under Communist pressures, Chinese or Soviet. To do this is going to require not force backed by a political program, but a political program backed by force, the sort of program that was given some substance recently at Honolulu. It is best to start before massive force is required

Taylor (cont'd):

but if we come in late, as we have in Vietnam, then force is necessary to hold the line so that the real war - on the intellectual, economic, and social fronts - can be won. (p. 457-458) . . .

'Containment without isolation, comes I think, from a very genuine and thoughtful effort for us to recover the diplomatic initiative. I think this is the general aim. The feeling is that the Chinese would not come into the United Nations if we invited them. They wouldn't recognize us if we offered recognition, so, what do we have to lose by offering to do so? It is a part of a diplomatic game. But it is also part of a move to try to get the Chinese into a discussion of our mutual relations in the hope that eventually Taiwan and Peking will agree to some sort of modus vivendi that will permit us to have some sort of diplomatic recognition of Communist China, and for Communist China to have some sort of position in the United Nations.

'If that could be done without damaging our present position and our interests in the present stage of the civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists in China, I personally would be in favor of anything that could be done to establish normal relationships as far as the U. N. is concerned, since 1956 when we accepted the package deals, membership in the U. N. is certainly not limited to the peace-loving types. Everybody is in there now. But my feeling is that this is completely unrealistic. We are talking the problem away instead of facing it.'

Senator Mundt. 'The question is can it be done under those terms and with those repercussions.'

Dr. Taylor. 'I don't think so. I am all in favor of any devices that could put the Chinese Communists on the defensive so that the American public wouldn't have the picture of our government refusing, as they think, to have anything to do with Communist China. I hope it can be done, but I think it would be quite a neat trick to do it.

Dr. Taylor(cont'd). 'At the present time I think the phrase containment without isolation is merely a neat formula to conceal a move to deemphasize our relations with Taiwan, to get away from eventually from our commitments there, and to bring the Chinese Communists into closer relations with the great world institutions in the hope that we can have some influence on them.

'I think I have made it clear, I am against it.' (p. 475)

Senator Mundt. 'I noticed in your enumeration of the proposed changes which have been suggested to our committee, including establishment of official diplomatic relations by the U. S. Government expansion of trade relations, and admission of Red China to the U. N., you point out that that tends to help the enemy and destroy containment instead of helping it. You have been very precise. You didn't mention another change, a fourth change which has been suggested from time to time about developing or encouraging cultural exchanges. Will you comment on that?'

Dr. Taylor. 'I would be happy to. I would personally be in favor of cultural exchanges as I was in the case of the Soviet Union. I am in favor of all sorts of intellectual and cultural contacts with Communist China. I would feel that we have much more to gain from them than they have. There is more chance that they might like our ideas than that we are going to like theirs. "(p. 477)

". . . . We must obviously make it clear to Peking that we welcome and are always ready to accept any overtures directed toward improvement of relations.

". . . .At the present time there is no advantage to the United States in talking about recognition or admission to the U. N. and there are a great many disadvantages. Why help the Peking regime when it is in trouble? What conceivable interest do we have in assisting this regime to become a great power?" (p. 458)

Morgenthau:

"Senator Church, '. . . Now, we presently support Taiwan against the Peking claim and we maintain bases close to China in the name of containment, which raises the question: Do you believe that our present policies are effectively designed to accomplish containment or is your notion of containment entirely different from the notion of the State Department?'

Dr. Morgenthau, 'I would answer your first question in the negative and your second in the positive.

'First of all, the expansionism of China is primarily political and cultural and the defense must be commensurate with the threat. So the answer to your question concerning containment, insofar as it is political and cultural, lies in strengthening the likely objects of Chinese expansionism politically, culturally, economically, and socially and, of course, this refers primarily to India.

'Secondly, the decisive question is, where do you draw the lines at which you want to contain? Do you want to draw a line which separates an integral part of Chinese territory from the rest of China, or do you want to draw the line at the historic limits of China as it existed, say, approximately 100, 110, or 120 years ago?

'And when it comes to worldwide containment, we must contain China, as we have been containing the Soviet Union, through the credible threat of nuclear retaliation.'

Senator Church, 'If you were drawing the line, I take it you would draw it to conform with the Chinese boundaries, in the last century prior to the Western intervention in Chinese affairs.'

Dr. Morgenthau, 'Exactly.'" (pp. 599-600)

"We have pursued in the past two policies vis-a-vis China: the policy of isolation and the policy of peripheral military containment.

"We have tried to isolate China diplomatically, commercially, and politically, in order to impair the legitimacy of her Communist government. (p. 553) . . .

Morgenthau (cont'd):

"It is obvious that the policy of isolation has been a complete failure. As far as the admission of China to normal diplomatic, political, and commercial relations is concerned, it is the United States which is isolated, and not China. Insofar as China is isolated, as she actually is in relation to the other Communist nations, it is her doing and not ours. In other words, insofar as our policy of isolating China has had any effect, it has been self-defeating because we have isolated ourselves, and insofar as China is actually isolated, it is not the result of our policy of isolation, but of the policies of the Chinese Government itself.

"I should also say that to give up the policy of isolation, as has been suggested to this committee, may be wise or unwise, but it is not decisive. This suggestion misses the decisive point of our relations with China, which is the problem of containment. That is to say even if we were able to send professors and journalists and doctors to China and vice versa, and even if the Communist government of China were admitted to the United Nations, the basic issue, the basic conflict of interests between ourselves and China would be unaffected by such moves, however much they might improve the international climate of opinion. The decisive, crucial issue is the issue of containment. (pp. 553-554)

"We have been trying to contain China at its periphery through isolated military strong points especially that the policy of military containment, which was so successful vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in Europe in the forties and fifties, could be as successful in Asia. But I think this is a fundamental mistake, and I should say right away it is the fundamental mistake of our policy vis-a-vis China. For the threat which we were facing in Europe in the form of the Soviet Union was primarily of a military nature. The Red army stood in the center of Europe, and the nations of Western Europe were under threat of Communist revolution and subversion. There was a real danger that the conjunction of those two factors, the internal disintegration of France and Italy,

Morgenthau (cont'd):

for instance, together with the threatening presence of the Red army nearby, would lead to the downfall of those and the other democratic governments of Western Europe.

"Furthermore, the policy of containment was an eminent success, not because of the six divisions we stationed beyond the Rhine in opposition to the Red army, but because those six divisions were a token or our determination to use our retaliatory nuclear power if a Russian soldier should step over the line of military demarcation of 1945.

"This character of our European policy of containment and the reasons for its success are very relevant for an understanding of the weakness of our policy of containment vis-a-vis China. First of all, the threat which China constitutes to Asia is not primarily of a military nature. It is not, as I have tried to say before, the threat of Chinese armies sweeping across the Asian continent. It is rather the natural, and in a sense inevitable attraction which this enormous empire and this imposing culture have always exerted, and have started to exert again, upon the mainland of Asia.

"The primary threat China presents is cultural and political. Such a threat cannot be contained by local military means in Taiwan or Vietnam or Korea or Thailand or elsewhere, because the Chinese have simply jumped over those so-called military barriers and have exerted at times very considerable influence in Indonesia, in Tanzania, in Mali, in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), and elsewhere. (p. 554) . . .

"Thus the policy of peripheral military containment is bound to be ineffective. It has been effective for the time being only by virtue of the temporary military weakness of China. If we are convinced that the cultural and political influence which China is bound to exert upon Asia is not compatible with the vital interests of the United States, it will not be sufficient to try to contain China at the periphery of its empire by military means. We have to strike at the power of China itself.

Morgenthau (cont'd):

We have to destroy China. We have to go to war with China. I think this is the inevitable logical conclusion to be drawn from the assumption that the paramountcy of the Chinese power on the Asian mainland is incompatible with the interests of the United States.

"Yet considering the policy we are actually pursuing, we are trying to achieve an end which cannot be achieved with the means which we are willing to employ; we cannot contain the political influence of China without going to war with her. Thus we have to make up our mind as to whether we want to achieve that end with the drastic means appropriate to it--that is to say, through war against China--or whether we want to cut down our aims in order to bring them into harmony with the means which we are willing to employ. (p. 555)

"What follows from this analysis for the policies of the United States vis-a-vis China? In view of the vital interests of the United States in the Asian and world balance of power, five basic principles ought to guide the policies of the United States with regard to China:

"First, the policy of peripheral military containment ought to be gradually liquidated. This policy is not only irrelevant to the interests of the United States but actually runs counter to them.

"Second, both the policy of isolating China and the policy of ending that isolation are essentially irrelevant to the issue at hand. One may aggravate, and the other ameliorate, the international climate; but they have no relevance, one way or the other, to the basic issue of containment.

"Third, since the expansion of Chinese power and influence, threatening the Asian and world balance of power, proceeds by political rather than military means, it must be contained by political means. To that purpose, it is necessary to strengthen politically, socially, and economically, the nations of Asia which are within China's reach, without exacting in return political and military alinements directed against China.

Morgenthau (cont'd):

We ought to pursue a similar policy with regard to the uncommitted nations in which China in the recent past has attempted to gain a foothold.

"Fourth, we ought to be clear, in our minds that if we should continue the present policy of the peripheral military containment of China, we will find ourselves in all likelihood sooner or later at war with China. If we want to avoid such a war, we must change our policy. If we do not want to change our policy, we must be ready to go to war. That is to say, either we bring the means we are willing to employ into line with our objectives, or we cut down our objectives to the measure of the means we are willing to employ.

"Fifth, the ultimate instrument for containing China is the same that has contained the Soviet Union: the retaliatory nuclear capability of the United States. It must be brought home to China, as it was brought home to the Soviet Union, that in the unlikely event that she should embark upon a policy of Asian or world conquest, she is bound to be at war with the United States." (pp 561) . . .

"Senator Hickenlooper. 'I might suggest that a lot of people believe there has been an overabundance of unilateral operations on the part of the United States, but that is not the point at all. There comes a time when there should be some willingness on the other side to give some indication that they are really desirous of edging a little bit more into the community of nations as the world. French and British recognition of the Red Chinese and actions by other nations who have at least tried to keep the door open don't seem to have broken the ice very much. The Red Chinese consistently have slammed the door in their faces. Now whether the Chinese are trying to get us into that group or not, I don't know.'

Dr. Morgenthau. 'If I may just say a word about this problem. I agree essentially, Senator Hickenlooper, with the thrust of your question. I think as far as recognition of China is concerned, it is not a question today as to whether we want to recognize China but whether China wants to be recognized by us. I also think that the gestures which have been suggested are essentially in the nature of public relations enterprises, which are not likely to change materially the international situation.

'I think if we were to support tomorrow, as seems likely, the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, while the Chiang Kai-shek government is there, it is perfectly obvious to everybody concerned that the Communist Chinese will contemptuously reject such an overture. We are not going to impress anybody with our generosity, which is recognized by everybody as rather a sham, because we would be making this proposal for the exact purpose to have it rejected by China.' (pp. 583-584) . . .

Senator Case. 'But I just wonder if you would comment on this suggestion. Many of your colleagues have been urging containment yes, but isolation, no, as a means of trying to lift this rigidity. Aren't you going counter to this worthy effort?'

Dr. Morgenthau. 'This idea of abandoning isolation but maintaining unchanged containment, and of simply applying to Asia the principles of the containment of the Soviet Union without taking into account what it is we are trying to contain - this idea is an attempt to evade the issue.

'The policy of isolation is essentially irrelevant to the central issue, and the policy of abolishing isolation is equally irrelevant to the central issue. It is an attempt to have it both ways, to look flexible, enlightened, and benevolent, on the one hand, and at the same time to continue the status quo where it really counts. This policy will not succeed." (p. 595) . . .

"Senator Fulbright. '. . . . You mentioned a moment ago that you thought these exchanges of students, and journalists, were of no importance really so long as we kept the fleet in the Taiwan Straits.

'Assuming that this idea in time would be accepted by the Chinese, could it not be that exchanges, while it doesn't change the essential substance of the quarrel, might they not contribute to the question of creating an atmosphere which would make it feasible for political leaders here to take measures that, would be of substance and importance?'

Dr. Morgenthau. 'Well, I would certainly agree with you. I am not at all against cultural exchanges. I have made this point in my paper. But what I am saying is that the Chinese will be extremely unlikely to accept any such proposals as long as the basic issue, which they have always defined as the issue of Taiwan, remains in status quo.'

The Chairman. 'At one time they did say they would receive journalists and we said they couldn't go. This was some years ago, isn't that a fact?' (p. 598)

Senator Case. 'Is this generally your thinking about this, Dr. Lindbeck?' (Referring to Dr. Schwartz' remarks on the matter of containment but deisolation.)

Lindbeck:

Dr. Lindbeck. 'Yes, it is. I would in general agree with that." (p.217)

"So, in a general sense, the west is lodged with some responsibility as the result of the long period when it controlled large numbers of peoples in Asia, I, therefore, regard this containment policy as one that should not depend only on the United States, but on all our associates in Europe who once controlled these areas as part of their imperial orders. (p. 218) . . .

"It seems to me we have partly imposed upon ourselves the need for containment. Encouraging, for example, the Japanese not to move into the military field has left one part of Asia very vulnerable. In a sense, there is a normal obligation on our part to compensate for this lack of military force on one margin of China. (p. 217) . . .

Lindbeck (cont'd):

"I think it very important that the Chinese be involved in international forms of all sorts, and the United Nations strikes me as one of these...it seems to me we must try to open up alternatives to the Chinese Communist regime. If they refuse to accept these new alternatives, that is their decision. (p. 257) . . .

"...Our current policy of embargoing trade with the mainland doesn't serve any major purpose...It is ineffective in putting pressures or constraints on China. In general it seems to me that the notion...of involving China in more normal economic relations, as well as other types of relations, with the outside world is likely, in the long run, to be productive of political good. (p. 232) . . .

"I shouldn't perhaps be saying merely that I concur with my colleague here, but in general, I share his attitude on many questions. There is one further point I would make on China's place in the world, and that has to do with America's place in the world. I think that in opening up lines of communication, striking down obstacles and restrictions to the flow of ideas, and opening up all channels for increased understanding are important for us. (p. 214) . . .

"My own feeling is that we have certain obligations toward the Chinese on Taiwan. For a variety of reasons, which I am sure we could agree on, we can't disregard these obligations which we have assumed. I think that, on the other hand, we ought to move toward normality in our relations with the Chinese on the mainland. I agree with Mr. Schwartz that they are unlikely to respond at present to our overtures. (p.215) . . .

"...I do not necessarily conclude that the same sequence of events is likely to occur in the case of China (as was the case in U.S.-Soviet relations). But I should be in favor of trying to lay the groundwork, at least, by any feasible means for entering upon normal diplomatic political relations with the Chinese.

Lindbeck (cont'd):

"In the long run it seems to me--well to put it another way--if for the next 10 to 20 years we do not recognize the Chinese nor have any regular and customary political and diplomatic dealings with the them, our situation looked at in terms of the long run of history would appear to be ludicrous--two major countries out of communications in a small world.

"The Chairman. 'It does not achieve any useful purpose for us to continue that isolation.' (i.e., non-recognition)

Dr. Lindbeck. 'I should think no purpose.'" (p. 216)

". . . One of my main concerns has been the fact that the Chinese have isolated themselves, as well as being isolated by others; this may lead to growing misunderstandings and misconceptions on their part about what we are like and about what other parts of the world are like...The Chinese leadership, in a sense, needs to be helped by the rest of the world to reform some of the ways and the categories they use in assessing what goes on in the world." (p. 214)

Barnett:

"I would like, right at the start, to state my own belief that there is a need for basic changes in the overall U. S. posture toward Communist China. For almost 17 years we have pursued a policy that might best be characterized as one aimed at containment and isolation of Communist China.

"In my view, the element of containment - using this term in a very broad sense to include both military and nonmilitary measures to block threats posed by China to its neighbors - has been an essential part of our policy and has been, in some respects at least, fairly successful. Our power has played an important and necessary role in creating a counterbalance to Communist China's power in Asia, and we have contributed significantly to the task of gradually building stable non-Communist societies in areas [illegible] lie in China's shadow. But the U. S. attempt to isolate Commun[illegible]ina has been, in my opinion, unwise

Barnett (cont'd):

and, in a fundamental sense, unsuccessful, and it cannot, I believe, provide a basis for a sound, long-term policy that aims not only at containing and restraining Chinese power but also at reducing tensions, exerting a moderating influence on Peking, broadening the areas of non-Communist agreement on issues relating to China, and slowly involving Communist China in more normal patterns of international intercourse.

"I strongly believe, therefore, that the time has come - even though the United States is now engaged in a bitter struggle in Vietnam - for our country to alter its posture toward Communist China and adopt a policy of containment but not isolation, a policy that would aim on the one hand at checking military or subversive threats and pressures emanating from Peking, but at the same time would air at maximum contacts with and maximum involvement of the Chinese Communists in the international community....

"While continuing to fulfill our pledge to defend Taiwan against attack, we should clearly and explicitly acknowledge the Chinese Communist regime as the de facto Government of the China mainland and state our desire to extend de jure recognition and exchange diplomatic representatives with Peking if and when it indicates that it would be prepared to reciprocate.

"We should press in every way we can to encourage nonofficial contacts. We should instead of embargoing all trade with the China mainland, restrict only trade in strategic items and encourage American businessmen to explore other opportunities for trade contacts. And within the United Nations we should work for the acceptance of some formula which would provide seats for both Communist China and Nationalist China. In taking these steps, we will have to do so in full recognition of the fact that Peking's initial reaction is almost certain to be negative and even hostile and that any changes in our posture will create some new problems. (p. 4) . . .

Barnett (cont'd):

"I think the world situation as it has evolved unfortunately creates a kind of relationship between the United States and China which will not be easily resolved in the foreseeable future. I think for a long time the Chinese Communists will regard the United States as a power which blocks many of their aspirations even if we do change many aspects of our policy.

"But I think the virulence of the attitude that they now hold could be affected by changes of posture on our side. (p. 17) . . .

"It would be to our interest, therefore, to take the initiative in the General Assembly in promoting a solution in which the Assembly would declare that there are now two successor states ruling the territory of the original China which joined the United Nations when it was formed in 1945, and that both should have seats in the Assembly. Neither the Chinese Communists nor the Chinese Nationalists are presently willing to accept such a solution, and conceivably both might boycott the United Nations for a period of time, if such a solution were adopted. Nevertheless, it is a realistic and reasonable position for the international community as a whole to adopt, and I believe that, if it were adopted, there would be numerous pressures operating over time to induce Peking and Taipei eventually to reexamine their positions and consider accepting seats even under these conditions.

"If and when Communist China does assume a seat in the United Nations, its initial impact is likely to be disruptive, but I firmly believe that over the long run it is nonetheless desirable to involve Peking in this complicated political arena where it will have to deal on a day-to-day basis with such a wide variety of countries and issues. It will soon learn, I think, that dogmatic arrogance will result only in self-isolation and that even a major nation must make compromises to operate with any success in the present world community. (p. 14) . . .

Barnett (cont'd):

"...But, despite Peking's current intransigence, we should continue searching for every possible opportunity for contact, in the hope that Peking will eventually modify its present stand, and should encourage scholars, businessmen, and others, as well as newsmen and doctors, to try to visit mainland China.

"As a part of our effort to increase unofficial contacts with Communist China we should, in my opinion, end our embargo on all trade and permit trade in nonstrategic items.

"The question of de jure recognition of Communist China--which in some discussions of China policy is given more attention than it deserves--is really a question for the future rather than the present. Until Peking indicates a willingness to exchange diplomatic representatives with us, there are no strong arguments for our unilaterally extending official recognition that would not be reciprocated.

"Our aim, certainly, should be to work toward eventual establishment of normal diplomatic relations, but it is likely to be some time--even if we alter our own overall position--before that is possible. We can and should, however, clearly indicate now--in much more explicit fashion than we have to date--that we do recognize the Peking regime in a de facto sense. One might argue that our frequent ambassadorial meetings with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw already constitute a form of de facto recognition, but officially we have refused to acknowledge any sort of recognition--de jure or de facto--and we should now do so." (p.15)

DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY
DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER
8725 JOHN J KINGMAN RD STE 0944
FT BELVOIR VA 22060-6218

IN REPLY REFER TO DTIC-RS (FOIA 2001-169) 02-F-0156 OCT 11 2001

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information (FOIA) Request

TO: Ms. Tricia Rohrkemper
General Counsels Office
Advanced Research Projects Agency
3701 North Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22203-1714

1. Reference FOIA request from [redacted] dated August 23, 2001 (enclosure).

2. Release of document AD0594137, entitled *Communist China and Clandestine Nuclear Weapons - Input Substudies A through J,* may only be performed by the appropriate controlling activity. Our records indicate document AD0594137 is classified and was produced by the Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, California Strategic Studies Center under contract number DAHC15-68-C-0377. At time of publication, the controlling activity was identified as the Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, ATTN: TIO, Washington, DC 20301. Therefore, we are forwarding this request to you for processing and direct response back to [redacted]. We have notified Mr. Burr of this action. Please note [redacted] request has been forwarded to the appropriate controlling activity for the other documents listed in his request.

3. Should your review of the document result in a determination to declassify and/or delimit (make available to the public) the document or a determination that the distribution statement should be changed, please advise this office in writing so we may mark our records accordingly.

DTIC-RS (FOIA 2001-169)

OCT 1 1 2001

[redacted]

4. The category of this request was **"news media."** [redacted] incurred no assessable fees for services from DTIC in processing this request. If you need a copy of the document to review, contact our Reference Team in the Network Services Division at (703) 767-8274 for instructions and procedures to obtain the document. If you have any questions, please call me at (703) 767-9194.

FOR THE ADMINISTRATOR:

Kelly D. Akers

1 Encl

KELLY D. AKERS
FOIA Program Manager

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
3701 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VA 22203-1714

November 20, 2001

Ms. Kelly Akers
Defense Technical Information Center
8725 John J. Kingman Road
Suite 0944
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Dear Ms. Akers:

This is to advise you that the following documents have been reviewed and/or declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act.

- Document Number: AD 803668
  Unclassified Title: Sailwing Wind Tunnel Test Program
  Report Date: September 30, 1966

- Document Number: AD 461202
  Unclassified Title: XV-8A Flexible Wing Aerial Utility Vehicle
  Report Date: February 1, 1965

- Document Number: AD 460405
  Unclassified Title: XV-8A Flexible Wing Aerial Utility Vehicle
  Report Date: February 1, 1965

- Document Number: AD 431128
  Unclassified Title: Operational Demonstration and Evaluation of the Flexible Wing Precision Drop Glider in Thailand
  Report Date: March-July 1963

- Document Number: AD 594 137L
  Unclassified Title: Communist China and Clandestine Nuclear Weapons-Input Substudies A-J, SRI Report
  Report Date: October 1970

- Document Number: AD B 176711
  Unclassified Title: Overlay and Grating Line Shape Metrology Using Optical Scatterometry
  Report Date: August 31, 1993

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Fred Koether, our Declassification Specialist, at (703) 696-0176.

TELCON, 4 DEC 2001, MR. KOETHER STATED THAT ABOVE DOCUMENTS ARE APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
Tony Nourmbery

Sincerely,

for Douglas J. Gaston

Nancy M. Kassner
Director
Security and Intelligence Directorate

[redacted]
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

8 October 2003

Mr. H. J. McIntyre, Director
Department of Defense
Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review
1155 Defense, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

Reference: F-2003-01142//02-F-0156 [redacted]

Dear Mr. McIntyre:

This is in response to your 20 June 2003 memorandum (enclosed) in which you referred one document for our review and response to you. Specifically, we refer to the 23 August 2001 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of [redacted] for information concerning the Defense Technical Information Center.

We have determined that the CIA information contained in the enclosed document (MORI Doc ID: 994729) can be released in its entirety.

If you have questions concerning this, please call Laurence C. on 703-613-1312.

Sincerely,

Bob H.,
for

Robert T. Herman
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosure

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Defense Threat Reduction Agency
8725 John J. Kingman Road MSC 6201
Ft Belvoir, VA 22060-6201

FEB 18 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND SECURITY REVIEW, ROOM 2C757, 1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request of [redacted]
OFOISR Case Number 02-F-0156, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Case Number 03-096

We are returning the enclosed FOIA request and responsive document that was forwarded to our agency for review and response back to your office.

After a careful review and research of current classification guides, we recommend that subject to the concurrence of the Central Intelligence Agency, the document be declassified and released in its entirety.

Should you have any questions concerning this case, you may contact the FOIA action officer, Mr. Carter at (703) 921-1682.

Sincerely,

Juanita Y. Haines

Andrew Walker
for Freedom of Information/
Privacy Act Officer

Enclosures:
1. FOIA Request
2. Responsive Document

[redacted] [redacted]