SOLVABLE NUCLEAR WAR MODELS

Abstract

This report deals with an aggregated, two-sided war game, one of several designed to study the use of abstract models for strategic planning. A payoff function for the war game is defined making use of an assumption of increasing concern as a critical level of damage is approached. A very simple, oneweapon version of the central nuclear war game has an analytic solution, indicating the existence of a stable (equilibrium) point in pure strategies if each side has a nonegligible counterforce capability.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 01, 1964
Accession Number
AD0601122

Entities

People

  • Norman C. Dalkey

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Command And Control
  • Deterrence
  • Disasters
  • Doctrine
  • Equations
  • Literature
  • Natural Disasters
  • Probability
  • Sensitivity
  • War Games

Readers

  • Calculus or Mathematical Analysis
  • Game Theory.
  • Strategic Security Studies