DECISION-MAKING IN BILATERAL MONOPOLISTIC BARGAINING.
Abstract
It was confirmed that where information is complete, a pair of bilateral monopolistic bargainers will reach a bargain at a specificially predictable price and quantity. Eight basic types of sources of error in problem-solving are suggested. These are derived from a notion that the environment of a human task can be considered to have four aspects: physical, internal, social, and cultural; and that the environment of any task at any specific time consists of that which is perceived, and that which is not, and that which is relevant to the task and that which is not. It is hypothesized that error and inefficiency in problem-solving arise from a lack of congruence between perception and relevance in any of the four aspects of environment. Two of the types of sources of error are introduced into the bargaining situation: (1) perceived, irrelevant social relations, and (2) unperceived, relevant cultural entities. The former reduced bargaining efficiency, and the latter reduced bargaining accuracy. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1944
- Accession Number
- AD0601672
Entities
People
- Emile Grunberg
- Norman F. Washburne
- Robert Black
Organizations
- University of Akron