A SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE THEOREM,
Abstract
In a wide class of social systems each agent has a range of actions among which he selects one. His choice is not however entirely free and the actions of all the other agents determine the subset to which his selection is restricted. Once the action of every agent is given, the outcome of the social activity is known. The preferences of each agent yield his complete ordering of the outcomes and each one of them tries by choosing his action in his restricting subset to bring about the best outcome according to his own preferences. The existence theorem presented here gives general conditions under which there is for such a social system an equilibrium, i.e., a situation where the action of every agent belongs to his restricting subset and no agent has incentive to choose another action.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 24, 1952
- Accession Number
- AD0604129
Entities
People
- Gerard Debreu
Organizations
- RAND Corporation