INSIDE BUREAUCRACY,
Abstract
A theory of bureaucratic decisionmaking is presented. The theory is based upon the fundamental hypothesis that bureaucratic officials, like all other agents in society, are motivated by their own self interests at least part of the time. Therefore, this theory follows the tradition of economic thought from Adam Smith forward, and is consistent with recent contributions to political science made by such writers as Simmel, Truman, Schattschneider, Buchanan, Tullock, Riker and Simon. The theory consists of the following parts: (1) definition of terms, (2) a few central hypotheses, (3) an assumed environment, and (4) a series of propositions arrived at by logically applying the hypotheses to the environment.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1964
- Accession Number
- AD0604847
Entities
Organizations
- RAND Corporation