EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN GAMES WITH VECTOR PAYOFFS

Abstract

The payoff of a game sometimes takes the form of a vector having components that represent amounts of different things, such as ships, men, money, etc., of which the relative values are unknown. The purpose of this paper is to define and characterize the equilibriumpoint solutions of games of this kind.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Nov 15, 1956
Accession Number
AD0606589

Entities

People

  • Lloyd Shapley

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Ground and Sea Platforms

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Boundaries
  • Construction
  • Convex Sets
  • Corporations
  • Geometry
  • Mathematics
  • Microfiche
  • Photographic Materials
  • Photography

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Theoretical Analysis.