FOR THE ABANDONMENT OF SYMMETRY IN THE THEORY OF COOPERATIVE GAMES

Abstract

The first part of this paper argues that the pure, 'moveless' bargaining game analyzed by Nash, Harsanyi, Luce and Raiffa, and others, may not exist or, if it does, is of a different character from what has been generally supposed; the point of departure for this argument is the operational meaning of agreement, a concept that is almost invariably left undefined. The second part of the paper argues that symmetry in the solution of bargaining games cannot be supported on the notion 'rational expec tations'; the point of departure for this argument is the operational identification of irrational expectations.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 29, 1958
Accession Number
AD0606928

Entities

People

  • T. C. Schelling

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Arbitration
  • Bargaining
  • Boundaries
  • Contracts
  • Cooperative Games
  • Hard Copy
  • Identification
  • Keyboards
  • Microfiche
  • Motivation
  • Negotiations
  • Personality
  • Symmetry

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Game Theory.
  • Theoretical Analysis.