A THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY

Abstract

In this paper an attempt is made to describe a theory of bureaucratic decisionmaking aimed at achieving predictability. The theory is based upon the fundamental hypothesis that bureaucratic officials, like all other agents in society, are motivated by their own self interests at least part of the time. Therefore, this theory follows the tradition of economic thought from Adam Smith forward, and is consistent with recent contributions to political science made by such writers as Simmel, Truman, Schattschneider, Buchanan, Tullock, Riker, Simon, and March.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Nov 01, 1964
Accession Number
AD0609191

Entities

People

  • Anthony Downs

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Corporations
  • Department Of State
  • Economics
  • Employment
  • Environment
  • Governments
  • Hard Copy
  • Hierarchies
  • Hypotheses
  • Labor Markets
  • Local Governments
  • Money
  • National Governments
  • Organizational Structure
  • Political Science
  • Public Administration
  • Real Estate

Readers

  • Military History
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Theoretical Analysis.