COUNTERINSURGENCY: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN VIET-NAM

Abstract

The criteria and indicators used for measuring success in counterinsurgency are discussed. Three phases of guerrilla warfare are described. It is concluded that a military victory is not possible for the Viet-Cong in South Viet-Nam as long as the U.S. is supporting the government. U. S. financial contribution is compared to U.S. and French costs of the 1945-1954 Indo-China war, and technical assistance and direct military support measures and their effects on the scarce resources--trained manpower, communications, transportation, and government infrastructures--are described. The principles of Viet-Cong tactics are listed and illustrated. The paper suggests the problems of motivating the Vietnamese soldier to fight a war which he no longer feels will be won in the near future.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 01, 1964
Accession Number
AD0611871

Entities

People

  • James T. Farmer

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Air Power
  • Aircrafts
  • California
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Counterinsurgency
  • Fixed Wing Aircraft
  • Governments
  • Guerrilla Warfare
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Personnel
  • Reconnaissance
  • Security
  • Transportation
  • United States
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Auditory Neuroscience/Auditory Physiology.
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Systems Analysis and Design