STRATEGIC SURPRISE IN THE KOREAN WAR

Abstract

Three assumptions seem to have developed after Pearl Harbor about intelligence problems relating to surprise attack. One is that if intelligence teams collect everything, they will be reasonably sure not to miss key intelligence items. The second is that improved coordination between organizations and a wider sharing of intelligence data between individuals and organizations will help safeguard the United States against surprise. The third belief is that because the U. S. needs to have strategic warning in order to survive in the age of nuclear plenty, it will somehow get this warning and will make the necessary responses. The purpose of the paper is to urge a review of these assumptions in the light of the Korean war experience of the United States. It calls attention to the importance of the prevailing climate of military-political opinion in the evaluation of intelligence materials.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 1962
Accession Number
AD0612431

Entities

People

  • H. A. Deweerd

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Aircrafts
  • Congress
  • Department Of State
  • Far East
  • Governments
  • Korean War
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Personnel
  • National Security
  • North Korea
  • Second World War
  • South Korea
  • United Nations
  • United States
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Geospatial Intelligence and Artificial Intelligence Analytics
  • Strategic Security Studies