COORDINATED WEAPONS PRODUCTION IN NATO: A STUDY OF ALLIANCE PROCESSES,
Abstract
This study analyzes and compares the ways in which nations can be encouraged to pool their efforts in military production. It begins by drawing a fundamental distinction between two methods that have been used, the 'institutional' and the 'permissive' systems. The institutional method is the theoretical ideal for arriving at arrangements for coordinated production. At its heart is the Armaments Committee, which coordinates the activities of a complex network of interlacing agencies, including the Production, Logistics, and Infrastructure section of the International Staff, the Military Committee, the Standing Group, and Ad Hoc Mixed Working Groups appointed for the specific weapons under discussion. In the permissive process, manufacturers interested in selling and governments interested in buying a given article can join in an international consortium to produce an already developed weapon. The permissive differs most obviously from the institutional system in that formative negotiations are conducted outside the formal NATO structure and the consortium is brought under NATO auspices only after the critical arrangements for control of the consortium have been made. The permissive system of coordinating production that has evolved in NATO's fifteen years has surpassed alternative methods because it is politically viable. Because NATO is not a government but a voluntary association of independent nations, mechanisms for centralized, unitary decision-making inevitably founder on the rocks of national sovereignty.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 1964
- Accession Number
- AD0614982
Entities
People
- E. Vandevanter Jr.
Organizations
- RAND Corporation