COMMUNIST CHINA AND NUCLEAR WARFARE,
Abstract
The Chinese Communists, on coming to power, were confronted with a set of strategic problems totally new to them. No longer a mobile force operating from the countryside, they were after 1949 in control of cities, and were rapidly developing a vested interest in industrial complexes, communication centers, and transportation facilities. Although the Korean War awakened them to the importance of modernized, regular forces, the problem of decision-making in the field of military affairs was exacerbated and complicated by the revolution in weaponry and strategic thinking that had occurred outside China in the very period during which the Chinese Communists were gaining and consolidating their power. The report explores the nature of the Chinese response to this revolution in weaponry and strategic thinking; the divisive effect that a growing appreciation of the implications of nuclear warfare had on Chinese military circles and on relations between the Party and the Army; and the significance of the evolving Chinese attitudes for the Sino-Soviet strategic relationship.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 1960
- Accession Number
- AD0616511
Entities
People
- Alice Langley Hsieh
Organizations
- RAND Corporation