CONCESSION-MAKING IN EXPERIMENTAL NEGOTIATIONS
Abstract
Two seemingly contradictory hypotheses about concession-making were considered: that concession-making occurs only as a result of own failure (experienced when opponent lowers his offers), and that it occurs only as a result of reciprocity (as a reaction to opponent's concession-making). A total of 87 five-man experiments, bearing upon these hypotheses, were conducted. The findings were somewhat unexpected in that they suggested that opponent's behavior determines a negotiator's behavior far less than one might expect: by and large, a negotiator's demands depended on his own previous demands. To the extent, however, to which opponents' behavior was influential, the 'reciprocity' hypothesis appeared to be more nearly correct than the 'failure' hypothesis. It was found, furthermore, that concessionmaking tended to be a rather bad strategy, that a negotiator making few concessions tended to receive higher payoff than the negotiator who made many concessions. In accounting for the findings, it was shown that the deadline could play an important role in determining the final payoff, and that, were the time alloted for negotiation much shorter, concession-making might have been a more profitable strategy that it actually was.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 16, 1964
- Accession Number
- AD0617798
Entities
People
- Otomar J. Bartos
Organizations
- University of Hawaiʻi System