REWARD STRUCTURE AND INFORMATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION IN TWO-PERSON, TWO-CHOICE GAMES.
Abstract
The study investigated the development of cooperation in three types of matrix games: a bargaining game, a trust game (a Prisoner's Dilemma Game), and a mixed game (in which the incentives to cooperate and to compete are equated). In addition, the effects of four levels of information were investigated in each type of game. The four levels were: (1) Minimal (non-social). Players were told simply that they must, on each trial, select one of two possible responses and they would then receive a score. They were told they were working on a problem or puzzle with solutions, not a game of chance. They were given no indication that another player was involved and that the other player's choice could affect his outcomes. (2) Own Pay-off known (non-social). This condition is identical with the one just described except that the player was told the two possible outcomes that were associated with each of the two choices available to him. (3) Other's presence known. The only difference between (2) and (3) is that here each player is informed that the particular score he receives of the two possible ones for each of his possible responses is determined by the behavior of another player. (4) Full information. Here each player is shown the full matrix and the consequences of each response combination are explained in detail. Subjects played one or another of the three games, in one or another of the information conditions, for 100 trials with another real subject. That is, whether or not the subject knew that the game involved another player, his outcomes were determined in part by another subject with whom he was paired. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 15, 1965
- Accession Number
- AD0624920
Entities
People
- William P. Smith
Organizations
- Teachers College