THE EFFECT OF VARIATIONS IN INTERNAL POWER PATTERN ON COALITION FORMATION IN TETRADS.
Abstract
The study is an extension of Vinacke's study of alliance formation in triads under differing internal power arrangements. The experiment employed a competitive board game with tetrads homogeneously composed with respect to sex. Weak winning pair alliances with deals related to the players' power weights were typical of triads. The hypotheses that strong winning pair alliances would be typical of tetrads was upheld; however, the weak winning triple alliance appeared above chance expectancy. Division of winnings for pairs was related to that expected on a strictly proportional deal but somewhat larger. Sex of players, internal power distribution, and incentive variation influenced alliance choice and division of the prize. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 20, 1965
- Accession Number
- AD0625492
Entities
People
- Loyda M. Shears
Organizations
- University at Buffalo