The Violation of Arms-Control Agreements: Deterrence vs. Detection
Abstract
The principle is declared that study is needed not only into what a violator of an arms-control agreement may do to avoid detection, but also what he may do to escape his penalty. History shows that world opinion is an ineffective sanction for deterring the violation of agreements. An effective sanction depends, above all, on governmental decisions by the injured countries, but a democratic government has to overcome a number of obstacles before it can decide to react effectively to an evasion. One of the most effective deterrents to violation is the threat of a general increase in the military effort of the injured country. It is not enough merely to restore the situation that would exist had it not been for the arms-control agreement. A number of measures for deterring evasions ought to be pursued to make it more likely that sanctions will be applied and to make sanctions seem more threatening. Political measures would be helpful to make sanctions seem more certain. They would include such things as enabling legislation to facilitate executive action, parliamentary arrangements to publicize evasions, and interallied contingency plans for dealing with a violation if it occurs. To make sanctions seem more effective, technical and military preparations are needed so that a violator cannot obtain a technological or strategic lead.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1960
- Accession Number
- AD0627206
Entities
People
- Fred C. Ikle
Organizations
- RAND Corporation