EQUAL PROFITS AS A FAIR DIVISION
Abstract
This paper reports the results of a duopoly experiment in which each firm was represented by one subject, and the two subjects comprising a duopoly could send messages to one another prior to making their decisions. The questions to which the experiment is addressed are: (1) To what extent are a pair of subjects able to agree on a joint course of action. (2) When subjects agree, is the profit point they agree upon Pareto optimal, and (3) Among Pareto optimal points chosen, does any particular point, such as the joint profit maximum, the Nash cooperative game solution, or the point of equal profits, predominate.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 18, 1966
- Accession Number
- AD0633739
Entities
People
- James W. Friedman
Organizations
- Yale University