COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MARKETS WITH A CONTINUUM OF TRADERS AND INCOMPLETE PREFERENCES.

Abstract

It is shown that a market with a continuum of traders possesses a competitive equilibrium even when the preferences are not complete. This generalizes further a result of Aumann, ('Econometrica'; 32: 39-50 (1964); 34: 1-17(1966)) who showed that the convexity assumption may be dispensed within the presence of a continuum of traders. The proof is inspired by the Arrow-Debreu ('Econometrica; 22: 265-290(1954)) proof for the finite case. (Author)

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 1966
Accession Number
AD0637704

Entities

People

  • David Schmeidler

Organizations

  • Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Applied Mathematics
  • Chemical Reaction Properties
  • Economics
  • Game Theory
  • Interdisciplinary Science
  • Mathematics
  • Operations Research

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Mathematical Modeling and Probability Theory.