CUTTHROAT GAMES.
Abstract
A natural generalization of a two-person zero-sum game is a 'cut-throat game' in which both players have directly opposing goals. Certain properties of zero-sum games are shown to hold for cutthroat games. Noncooperative n-person games are broken into equivalence classes according to preference patterns. The normalization of a cutthroat game to a zero-sum game is justified: a game is cutthroat if and only if it is equivalent to a zero-sum game; the equilibrium points of equivalent games are naturally related. The sup-inf values of equivalent games are discussed in detail. Because of interpersonal comparisons of utility the tools developed in this article are not useful for analyzing n-person cooperative games. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1966
- Accession Number
- AD0638220
Entities
People
- Steven L. Jordan