AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF ALLIANCES

Abstract

The report presents a new theoretical model of military alliances and other international organizations. The assumptions basic to the model are that nations act in their own best interests and that there is a 'public goods' aspect to all joint undertakings. The main conclusions drawn from the analysis are that (1) a less than optimal amount of resources will be devoted to an alliance or other international organization; (2) the burden of an alliance will be borne in a disproportional way, the larger members paying more than their proportional share. Empirical data from NATO and the United Nations are presented in support of these conclusions.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Oct 01, 1966
Accession Number
AD0641855

Entities

People

  • Mancur Olson Jr.
  • Richard Zeckhauser

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Autonomy
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Corporations
  • Economics
  • Finance
  • Foreign Aid
  • Governments
  • International Organizations
  • International Relations
  • Military Budgets
  • Military Capabilities
  • Money
  • Nato
  • Political Science
  • Public Policy
  • Treaties
  • United Nations
  • United States

Readers

  • Strategic Security Studies
  • Systems Analysis and Design