THE KERNEL AND BARGAINING SET FOR CONVEX GAMES
Abstract
Many solution concepts for cooperative games agree or partially agree if the game happens to be convex. For example, convex games have a unique von- Neumann Morgenstern solution which coincides with the core. Also, the (Shapley) value is a center of gravity of the extreme points of the core of a convex game; (namely, the center of gravity when the extreme points are assigned appropriate multiplicities). It is proved in this paper that the kernel (for the grand coalition) of a convex game lies in the relative interior of its core and that the bargaining set (for the grand coalition) coincides with the core.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 1967
- Accession Number
- AD0647250
Entities
People
- B. Peleg
- L. S. Shapley
- M. Maschler
Organizations
- Hebrew University of Jerusalem