ON RELATING NON-TECHNICAL ELEMENTS TO SYSTEM STUDIES,
Abstract
The paper examines military capabilities in the narrower sense, speculating on the inherent limitations of analyses that neglect nonmilitary factors and considering whether the structuring or the implementation of such studies has indeed contributed to policy failures. Five major themes are developed: First, the omission of certain broader political social factors does imply an inherent limitation in military systems studies. Second, to a certain degree such self-imposed limitations are defensible in the attempt to deal (suboptimally) with a critical portion of the overall problem. Third, the chief difficulties arise in the transition from these analytical studies, admittedly suboptimized, to decisionmaking. Fourth, major systems studies, though assumed to be suboptimized, inevitably incorporate a number of non-technical assemptions, though typically in a tangential and implicit fashion. Fifth, in many decisions the use of specialized studies without buttressing by the explicit and extensive examination of the non-technical factors does lead to incomplete results and inadequate conclusions -- which may be highly embarrassing with respect to national policy. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 1967
- Accession Number
- AD0650846
Entities
People
- James R. Schlesinger
Organizations
- RAND Corporation