COUNTERFORCE, DAMAGE-LIMITING, AND DETERRENCE

Abstract

The relationship of counterforce and damage-limiting to a policy of deterrence is discussed. Deterrence is essentially a threat relationship. Deterrence of the widest range of enemy aggressive actions is provided by a credible capability to strike first. Today, this is tantamount to a counterforce strategy. The credibility of a counterforce posture is in turn enhanced by conspicuous damage-limiting measures and particularly by defensive measures that make nuclear interchange outcomes less 'unthinkable' even under the least favorable conditions. To the extent that this can be buttressed by second strike retaliatory capabilities that guarantee overwhelming punishment of the aggressor in the event of a surprise, preventive, or preemptive attack, deterrence policy can continue to play a key role in safeguarding our society. It is concluded that the psychological and political attractions of certain strategies and certain capabilities may in the end prove more important than any rational, strategic calculus.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jul 01, 1967
Accession Number
AD0655341

Entities

People

  • William A. Stewart

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Ground and Sea Platforms
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Accuracy
  • Air Defense
  • Aircrafts
  • Anti-Ballistic Missiles
  • Antimissile Defense Systems
  • Ballistic Missiles
  • Bomber Aircraft
  • Civil Defense
  • Defense Systems
  • Military Operations
  • Military Strategy
  • National Security
  • Reliability
  • Strategic Weapons
  • United States
  • Weapons
  • Weapons Effects

Readers

  • Strategic Security Studies