THE KERNAL AND BARGAINING SET FOR CONVEX GAMES
Abstract
In game theory, a convex game is a competitive situation characterized by increasing marginal utility for coalition membership as coalitions grow larger. The core of any n-person game is the set of outcomes that cannot profitably be blocked by a coalition. For the case of convex games, two other solution concepts--the kernel and the bargaining set--prove to be closely related to the core. The kernel lies in the relative interior of the core, and the bargaining set coincides with the core. RM-4571-PR, which introduced the convex game, showed that the core is similarly related to two other solution concepts: the value solution is the center of gravity of the extreme points of the core, and the Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set solution coincides with the core.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 01, 1967
- Accession Number
- AD0657332
Entities
People
- B. Peleg
- Lloyd Shapley
- M. Maschler
Organizations
- RAND Corporation