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AUTOMATED CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE RECORDS OF THE
JAPANESE IMPERIAL CONFERENCES USING THE GENERAL INQUIRER *Part III*

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Final report of research completed under that part of Office
of Naval Research Contract N00014-67-A-0112-0005 concerned
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1. Introduction

Game theory specifies what conditions must obtain if rational decisions are to be made. It assumes complete information, that is, that utilities and payoffs are known and that decision makers, utilizing this information, will strive to maximize their gains. Because of its logical rigor and elegance, game theory, as theory, has much appeal. It has stimulated a good deal of thinking and writing, particularly about decision making in conflict situations, and has exerted considerable influence on strategic analysis. There now exists a substantial body of literature reporting the results of experimental work stemming directly or indirectly from game theory.

Yet despite its appeal and intellectual power, the theory of games has not led to many studies of real-life situations. One reason is that utilities and payoffs are not known generally. The theory tells us how people ought to act when involved in conflicts if they are to be rational; but we know that people do not always act in ways game theory prescribes. When it comes to the question of how decision makers actually behave in conflict situations, game theory is inadequate "because there is no room in that theory for the psychological make-up of the participants."¹

Our task in this report is to deal with some of the psychological dimensions of decision makers behaving in a conflict situation using historical documents rather than experimental

data. Specifically we will be studying certain aspects of the process whereby Japanese leaders decided to go to war with the United States in 1941. Our concern will be with the perceptions these leaders had of themselves, and of other countries with whom they were interacting either as friend or foe.

Our focus on perceptions rests on the basic assumption that leaders do not make choices in a haphazard or random way, but act in reasonably consistent ways when choosing among alternatives which appear to be open to them. As Professor Brody has argued, "if men are responsible for the conduct of international affairs, their perceptions of what other nations are doing to their nation will be an important factor in accounting for their policy choices."²

II. Research Method

Source of data: One of the problems an investigator encounters in studying how leaders actually make policy choices, especially when vital issues such as war and peace are involved, is in obtaining reliable data in detail. Sometimes what top-level leaders said and did in times of national crises are not recorded on the spot, and even if they are recorded, they may not be made public, even years after the event, because of security or political reasons. One relatively common source of data on policy choices are memoirs written by statesmen and military leaders. Illuminating as these frequently are, they present obvious shortcomings as sources of data. Human memory

is often fallible, the author will quite likely be selective in what he writes in order to present himself in the best possible light, and other biases might well color his recollections of what happened and why they happened.

For purposes of scientific analysis, written records of meetings of top-level decision makers would be more useful than memoirs. Fortunately, in the case of Japan such records are available for the critical months preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor. The records cover what transpired in two kinds of top-level conferences--the Liaison Conferences and the Imperial Conferences. Detailed notes were kept of what was said in these meetings by the Army Chief of Staff and his assistants. Incidentally, English translations of these records were prepared recently by the present author and published by the Stanford University Press.

The Liaison Conference was an extra-constitutional body which became the prime instrument for formulating foreign policy starting in November, 1940. As the name implies, its purpose was to provide liaison between the government and the armed forces. Such liaison was necessitated by the fact that the armed forces enjoyed what came to be known as the "independence of the supreme command." The armed forces were represented in the government through the War Minister and the Navy Minister, but these service ministers were principally in charge of military administration. Military operations and strategic planning, on the other hand, were the responsibility of the Army and Navy General Staffs, who were not members of the government.

Instead of reporting to the Prime Minister they were directly responsible to the Emperor. In theory as the head of state, the Emperor coordinated the policies and actions of the government, whose leader was the Prime Minister, and the Army and Navy General Staffs. In practice, however, the Emperor never made decisions himself but followed the advice of his ministers, military and naval leaders, and senior statesmen. It was necessary, therefore, that his top advisers first agree among themselves as to what the policy should be.

Since in the 1930's and 1940's most foreign policy decisions involved strong initiative on the part of the army and navy, particularly the former, it was crucial that the armed forces take part in making foreign policy choices. This need eventually gave rise to the Liaison Conferences. These conferences were held every four or five days, and they brought together the Prime Minister, and the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Ministers, the Chiefs and Vice Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, and the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry, plus the Director of the Planning Board.

Whenever a major policy decision was arrived at through a series of Liaison Conferences, an Imperial Conference was summoned. Its purpose was to ratify the decision, to give it the stamp of legality, and to make it difficult to ignore or alter at a later date. As the name suggests, the Imperial Conference was held in the presence of the Emperor and was marked with

great solemnity. Its participants included the regular members of the Liaison Conference plus several others, the most important of whom was the President of the Privy Council, which was one of the principal agencies set up to advise the Emperor, especially on vital foreign policy matters. Since the Emperor, although present, seldom took part in the proceedings, by custom the President of the Privy Council acted as a kind of Imperial spokesman. The procedure was to have the texts of the policy decision or decisions printed up and circulated, and the leading participants made formal oral statements regarding the decision. Following the oral presentations, the President of the Privy Council asked questions directed at a number of participants, made comments on points which he approved of, or asked questions, and in the end he gave his formal approval. After the Imperial Conference the Emperor affixed his seal (the equivalent of a signature) to the necessary documents.

As this brief description of the Imperial Conference suggests, this was not a policy making body. Nevertheless in the proceedings the leading arguments and rationalizations used in the Liaison Conferences were generally repeated, so that the Imperial Conference represented the Liaison Conferences in capsule form in so far as the arguments were concerned. The proceedings are particularly useful for studying perceptions of decision makers because what was said was not intended for public consumption. (The notes of these conferences would probably never have been published but for the fact that Japan lost the war.) Rather the points of view expressed by the participants

represented arguments used by the top decision makers to persuade themselves and one another. Presumably for this reason, the views expressed were more representative of their true thoughts and feelings than views expressed for public consumption.

Altogether we have analyzed the proceedings, including the formal documents presented, of five Imperial Conferences. The dates of the conferences and the decisions that were ratified are summarized in the following table:

Table 1

List of Imperial Conferences

Date	Nature of Decision
Sept. 19, 1940	Approved signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.
July 2, 1941	Approved decision to occupy southern French Indo-China; prepare for possible war against the Soviet Union.
Sept. 6, 1941	Approved decision to complete preparations for possible war against the United States and Great Britain starting late October; but continue negotiations with the U.S., hoping for a diplomatic settlement.
Nov. 5, 1941	Approved decision to commence war against the United States and Britain at the beginning of December; but if negotiations with the U.S. are successful by December 1, Japan will not go to war.
Dec. 1, 1941	Approved decision for war.

Data analysis: The analysis of what was said at the Imperial Conferences was made on the basis of the English translation rather than on the original Japanese material. Undoubtedly it

would have been preferable to use the Japanese language text, but unfortunately as yet it is not possible to feed in Japanese language texts in the General Inquirer used by the Stanford Studies in International Conflict and Integration because the political dictionary (to be described later) is based on English language materials. So far as we know, a similar dictionary based on Japanese language sources does not exist, even in Japan.

The English text of the conference notes was first coded and then punched on IBM cards, using the standardize procedures that have been developed. Briefly the procedures involved identifying themes and adding numerical subscripts to proper terms and their modifiers, using the following categories and subscripts: the perceiver (1), agent of action (3), the action or attitude (4), and the target of action (7). For example, one of the statements was coded as follows:

(Togo) (Great Britain/3) took/4 all kinds of measures/4
to obstruct/4 us (Japan/7) from the beginning

Here Togo, the Foreign Minister, the author of the statement, is the perceiver. The agent is Great Britain, who acted, i.e., namely took measures to obstruct, and the target of such action is Japan.

A total of 45,111 words of textual material covering five Imperial Conferences was so coded, resulting in a little over 7,200 punched IBM cards. The cards were then processed by the computer using the BALGOL program and the Stanford political dictionary.

This political dictionary is one of the key instruments in the data analysis. The dictionary currently contains about 3,500 entries. Each entry was judged by a panel and "tagged" and then scaled for intensity. Each word was tagged along three dimensions, resulting in six categories:

Positive affect	Negative affect
Strength	Weakness
Activity	Passivity

Words were also judged for intensity from 1 to 3 (the larger the number the more intense). For example, the word "abandon" is rated as negative affect with intensity of 2, weakness with intensity of 3, and passivity with intensity of 3.

The three dimensions--positive-negative affect, strength-weakness, and activity-passivity--were derived from the work of Professor C. E. Osgood and his associates on the Semantic Differential. The three dimensions represent the evaluative plus potency and activity, which are cognitive. These dimensions are believed to be basic to human expression and presumably do not vary greatly from culture to culture. "The dictionary," according to Professor Ole Holsti, "thus reflects the proposition that when decision-makers perceive themselves, other nations, events--or any stimulus--the most relevant discriminations are made in a space defined by these three factors."⁴

Incidentally some studies using these dimensions with Japanese respondents have been made, and they indicate that in the main the three dimensions are valid for Japanese culture, although there are some differences which presumably are not so

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salient. Quite probably our results would have been somewhat different if a Japanese political dictionary had existed and we had used it to analyze our documents in the original Japanese text, but our presumption (which cannot be proved or disproved at this point) is that the differences would have been minor.

The result of the computer operation using the punched cards and the political dictionary was a series of print outs with the weighted scores for the three dimensions as well as for agents and targets. What the computer did was to score statements which embodied attitudes or actions. The weighted scores were arrived at by multiplying the frequency of appearance of words with the intensity. Thus six references scored "positive 3," plus one reference scored "positive 1" would result in a score of 19 [(6 x 3) plus (1 x 1)].

In addition the computer scored statements indicating action and paired agent and target. An example would be statements which said, "country A sent a protest to country B." In those instances when negative statements were encountered, the action was given a reverse score, i.e., words which were tagged "positive 2, strong 3, active 2" were scored "negative 2, weak 3, passive 2." Moreover, statements were coded for mode of expression. Thus distinctions were made among statements containing words like "may," "hope," "ought," "must," etc. The different modes of expression were weighted as follows:

Mode of Expression	Score
Aspiration	.4
Probability	.5
Normative	.6
Imperative	.7
Indicative	1.0
Comparative	1.0
Interrogative	1.0

As a result, for example, a statement indicating aspiration (i.e., hopes to) was multiplied by 0.4 so that "positive 2" was scored as "positive 0.8."

The first pass on the computer scored countries against three dimensions. Naturally the countries chosen were those most important to Japan's foreign relations in 1940-41: the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., Germany-Italy, the Netherlands, China, France, and Thailand. Countries not in the above list were scored under "Other" countries. The second pass scored certain themes which appeared to us to be of particular interest: Greater East Asia, Russo-Japanese War, China Incident, Encirclement, War, Peace, Negotiations, Self-defense, Trade, Deadline, Tripartite Pact, and Status Quo. Again these themes were scored against the three dimensions--evaluative, potency, and activity.

III. The Results

We know from the documents that Japan's decision to go

to war with the United States and her allies was not made on the spur of the moment in a fit of anger, but rather was the result of a long deliberative process. We also know that the decision process involved evaluation of Japan's strength as well as consideration of various alternatives and their consequences.

As stated earlier, our assumption is that perceptions are an important factor in policy choices. What perceptions did Japanese leaders have of themselves? Since they were contemplating going to war with a major power, we might presume that they thought of themselves in positive terms, that is, that they were good, strong, and active. Stated in the form of a hypothesis, it would be that the self-perceptions of Japanese leaders contemplating a major war scored high along the evaluative, potency, and activity dimensions. To test this hypothesis, let us turn to the analysis of our data on Japanese perceptions when Japan was the agent of action or an attitude.

(1) Japan as Agent of Action. First, all statements in which Japan or Japanese leaders were the agents of action or expressed an attitude (that is, equivalent to the subject in a subject-verb-object relationship) were studied. The results on the potency and activity dimension were consistent with what we had expected, that is, they scored high. But our findings on the affect dimension were a little surprising. We thought that the Japanese would evaluate themselves highly, but our data did not confirm this prediction, as the following table indicates:

Table 2
Japanese Self-perceptions: Evaluative

Date of Conference	Evaluation	Score	Difference
Sept. 19, 1940	Positive	6.0	plus 1
	Negative		
July 2, 1940	Positive	8.0	minus 8
	Negative	16.0	
Sept. 6, 1941	Positive	34.0	plus 9
	Negative	25.0	
Nov. 5, 1941	Positive	70.0	minus 6
	Negative	76.0	
Dec. 1, 1941	Positive	84.0	plus 60
	Negative	24.0	

In two of the documents, Japanese self-perceptions on the affect scale were negative, and the score was highly positive only in one, the notes of the December 1st meeting, which formalized the final decision for war.

One explanation for the somewhat negative affect score might be that the Japanese were aware that many nations disapproved of and actively opposed their foreign policy. They knew that much of the world was against them, called them aggressors; and it hurt. For instance in the July 2nd conference, which produced a negative affect score, we find statements such as these. "...I believe that our Empire is confronted with a literally unprecedented danger..." "It is to be expected that in trying to achieve these objectives our Empire will encounter interference and obstructions from various quarters." "I think it is all right to persuade Indo-China with armed

force in the background, but I do not think it wise for Japan to resort to direct and unilateral military action and be called an aggressor."

The profile is somewhat different when we turn to the potency dimension. Here the Japanese self-perception was one of strength.

Table 3
Japanese Self-perceptions: Potency

Date of Conference	Potency	Score	Difference
Sept. 19, 1940	Strong	15.0	plus 15
	Weak	0.0	
July 2, 1941	Strong	79.0	plus 73
	Weak	6.0	
Sept. 6, 1941	Strong	139.0	plus 124
	Weak	15.0	
Nov. 5, 1941	Strong	219.0	plus 204
	Weak	15.0	
Dec. 1, 1941	Strong	186.0	plus 180
	Weak	6.0	

Clearly as Table 3 shows, Japan's decision makers perceived their country as being strong. In one sense this is not surprising; we would expect that a country contemplating going to war with a major power would think of itself as being strong. Yet in another sense this finding is unexpected because in the Liaison Conferences there were clear statements that expressed self doubt about the ability to win a war against the United States and Great Britain if such a war should be prolonged.

For example, the following statements occur in the notes of a historic Liaison Conference on November 1, 1941 which stipulated that war would begin on December 1, if negotiations with the United States were not successful by that date: "In general, the prospects if we go to war are not bright. We all wonder if there isn't some way to proceed peacefully. There is no one willing to say: 'Don't worry, even if the war is prolonged. I will assume all responsibility.' On the other hand, it is not possible to maintain the status quo. Hence one unavoidable reaches the conclusion that we must go to war."

There appears to be a discrepancy between such statements and the high score on the strength-weakness dimension. One possible explanation would be that while the issue of war or peace was being debated in the Liaison Conference, it was proper to indicate self doubt about the ability to win a war against the United States, but once a decision was reached and was formalized in an Imperial Conference, it was no longer appropriate to express views which would undermine the decision.

Next we turn to the active category. Here Japanese leaders perceived themselves as being active rather than passive. The scores on the activity dimension were as follows:

Table 4

Japanese Self-perceptions: Activity

Date of Conference	Activity	Score	Difference
Sept. 19, 1940	Active	6.0	plus 6
	Passive	0.0	
July 2, 1941	Active	24.0	plus 18
	Passive	6.0	

Sept. 6, 1941	Active	43.0	plus 30
	Passive	13.0	
Nov. 5, 1941	Active	108.0	plus 91
	Passive	17.0	
Dec. 1, 1941	Active	83.0	plus 50
	Passive	33.0	

To summarize, the "self" ratings of Japan's leaders were not so high on the evaluative dimension, but were consistently high on the potency and activity dimensions.

(2) Japan as Target of Action. The previous section analyzed "self" ratings where Japan was the agent, and now we take up statements where Japan was the target of action, i.e., object of sentence.

In general there was no appreciable difference in the profiles. The decision makers' perceptions of themselves when they were targets of action on the part of other countries tended to be low on the evaluative dimension, somewhat positive on the activity dimension, and quite positive on the potency dimension. The actual scores were as follows:

Table 5

Japanese Self-perceptions: Target

	Date of Conference				
	12/19/1940	7/2/1941	9/6/1941	11/5/1941	12/1/1941
Evaluative:					
positive	0.0	17.0	30.0	28.0	90.0
negative	7.0	10.0	11.0	121.0	95.0
Potency:					
strong	20.0	23.0	59.0	153.0	184.0
weak	6.0	5.0	7.0	36.0	38.0

Activity:					
active	4.0	6.0	37.0	115.0	89.0
passive	0.0	8.0	25.0	15.0	65.0

(3) Japan as both Agent and Target of Action. It is possible to have statements where Japan was taking action with itself as a target. These statements would also give us some idea of Japanese self-perceptions.

Essentially these statements did not differ appreciably from the profiles obtained when Japan was an agent, and when it was a target. The affect scores sometimes were negative, but both potency and activity scores were positive. The details are in Table 6:

Table 6

Japanese Self-perceptions: Agent and Target

	Date of Conference				
	9/19/1940	7/2/1941	9/6/1941	11/5/1941	12/1/1941
Evaluative:					
positive	0.0	5.0	17.5	40.4	23.7
negative	4.5	7.8	20.9	40.9	22.2
Potency:					
strong	13.5	11.3	44.3	105.4	80.2
weak	4.5	3.5	15.9	13.1	9.7
Activity:					
active	7.2	14.1	45.8	82.9	71.5
passive	4.5	7.4	12.8	15.2	18.8

Thus the profile that emerges from the analysis is one where Japanese leaders did not always see themselves in a positive fashion, but did have self-perceptions of strength and activity, both of which are related to a sense of dynamism. In general the picture suggests a situation of considerable

dissatisfaction and would appear to be consistent with the decision for war, that is, the use of force to break out of a frustrating environment. In any case, a part of our initial hypothesis was disproved. Countries contemplating going to war may not always see themselves as positive in affect, and strong and active.

(4) The United States as Agent and Target of Action. Having looked at Japanese self-perceptions, we now shift our attention to Japanese perceptions of the United States, the chief adversary. Did the Japanese perceive the United States to be bad, weak, and passive? Such a perception would be consistent with the decision to attack the United States. Stated in the form of a hypothesis, our proposition would be that when a country contemplates attacking another country, it perceives the enemy nation to be bad, weak and passive.

Our data shows that, first, as to evaluation, the United States, when scores for both agent and target were combined, was perceived more often in negative terms than positive. It is not altogether surprising that actual or potential enemies in war should be seen as "bad."

Table 7

Date of Conference	Evaluation	The U.S. as Agent and Target: Evaluative Score	
		As Agent	As Target
Sept. 19, 1940	positive	0.0	1.0
	negative	0.0	6.0

July 2, 1941	positive	1.0	2.0
	negative	5.0	23.0
Sept. 6, 1941	positive	3.0	3.0
	negative	0.0	6.0
Nov. 5, 1941	positive	4.0	0.0
	negative	3.0	2.0
Dec. 1, 1941	positive	3.0	0.0
	negative	0.0	1.0

If we compare the pairs of the positives and negatives for each conference in the above table, we get 3 instances of positive, 6 instances of negative and 1 neutral. The overall picture is one of negative affect.

On the potency dimension, however, the United States was not perceived as weak but rather as strong. This was certainly consistent with reality and suggests that Japanese leaders were not wearing blinders when they were evaluating their potential enemy. One conclusion that could be drawn from this observation is that perceptions of American strength did not deter Japanese decision makers from attacking the United States. The details of the potency dimension are provided in Table 8:

Table 8

Date of Conference	Potency	The U.S. as Agent and Target: Potency Score	
		As Agent	As Target
Sept. 19, 1940	strong	0.0	8.0
	weak	0.0	0.0
July 2, 1941	strong	8.0	30.0
	weak	0.0	0.0
Sept. 6, 1941	strong	13.0	12.0
	weak	0.0	0.0

Nov. 5, 1941	strong	22.0	10.0
	weak	0.0	0.0
Dec. 1, 1941	strong	10.0	4.0
	weak	0.0	1.0

Here the picture is very clear. In the ten pairs of scores in the above table, the strong scores are larger in 9 instances, with 1 neutral.

What is the situation with respect to the other cognitive component--activity? Here again the United States scored high, as shown in the following table:

Table 9

The U.S. as Agent and Target: Activity

Date of Conference	Activity	Score	
		as Agent	as Target
Sept. 19, 1940	activity	0.0	6.0
	passivity	0.3	0.0
July 2, 1941	activity	6.0	27.0
	passivity	0.0	0.0
Sept. 6, 1941	activity	5.0	10.0
	passivity	1.0	4.0
Nov. 5, 1941	activity	8.0	3.0
	passivity	3.0	0.0
Dec. 1, 1941	activity	0.0	1.0
	passivity	5.0	1.0

The box score in the activity dimension comes out 7 pairs indicating activity, 2 instances of passivity, and one pair neutral. Quite clearly the United States was seen to be high on the activity scale.

Thus, to summarize, Japanese perceptions of the United States were not exactly what one might have expected. The

United States was on balance pictured as evil or bad, but American dynamism was clearly recognized. One other comment might be made about Japanese perceptions of the United States, and that is, as the relatively low scores would indicate, there were not so many statements about the United States as one might have expected. This is particularly noticeable in the records of the December 1st meeting which formalized the decision for war. Perhaps by this time the "die was cast" and the decision makers felt no need to enter into an extended discussion of American motives and strength.

Our initial hypothesis that a potential enemy would be seen in negative terms on the evaluative, potency, and activity dimensions was not substantiated.

(5) The U.S. as Agent with Japan as Target of Action. The previous section inquired into Japanese perceptions of the United States when it was seen as the agent undertaking action or indicating attitude, or was the target. Here we will narrow our scope and specifically study Japanese perceptions of the United States when it was taking action against Japan. What we would like to know is whether Japanese perceptions of American actions and attitudes squared with their perceptions of what America was doing to them. In short, were attitudes and performance congruent? Here we find that the leaders of Japan saw the United States as acting toward them mostly in a negative way so far as affect was concerned. This was certainly consistent with Japanese perceptions of American attitudes.

Table 10 gives the scores on the evaluative dimension:

Table 10

The U.S. as Agent with Japan as Target: Evaluative

Date of Conference	Evaluation	Score	Difference
Sept. 19, 1940	positive	0.0	minus 7.0
	negative	7.0	
July 2, 1941	positive	0.5	minus 9.2
	negative	9.7	
Sept. 6, 1941	positive	3.0	plus 3.0
	negative	0.0	
Nov. 5, 1941	positive	3.0	minus 4
	negative	7.0	
Dec. 1, 1941	positive	1.2	minus 0.8
	negative		

When we come to the potency dimension, the picture again is rather realistic. Japanese decision makers perceived American actions toward them as being characterized by strength. America was a strong adversary, not weak, as Table 11 suggests:

Table 11

The U.S. as Agent with Japan as Target: Potency

Date of Conference	Potency	Score	Difference
Sept. 19, 1940	strong	5.0	plus 3
	weak	2.0	
July 2, 1941	strong	13.3	plus 12.8
	weak	1.5	
Sept. 6, 1941	strong	1.0	plus 1
	weak	0.0	
Nov. 5, 1941	strong	11.1	plus 11
	weak	0.0	
Dec. 1, 1941	strong	1.0	minus 2.0
	weak	3.0	

Our findings on the third dimension, namely activity, were mixed. As Japanese leaders saw it, sometimes American acted toward them in active fashion, and sometimes in a passive fashion. The following table gives the breakdown:

Table 12

The U.S. as Agent with Japan as Target: Activity

Date of Conference	Activity	Score	Difference
Sept. 19, 1940	active	0.0	minus 3.0
	passive	3.0	
July 2, 1941	active	7.0	plus 5.8
	passive	1.4	
Sept. 6, 1941	active	2.0	minus 3.0
	passive	5.0	
Nov. 5, 1941	active	11.0	plus 3.0
	passive	8.0	
Dec. 1, 1941	active	3.0	plus 0.2
	passive	2.8	

To summarize, when we narrowed the scope of our inquiry from perceptions of American attitudes to perceptions of American actions towards Japan we found that the two were rather congruent.

(6) Japan as Agent with the United States as Target of Action.

In the previous section we looked at Japanese perceptions of the United States when it was taking action against Japan. We will now turn the situation around, that is, analyze Japanese perceptions of itself as an agent acting against the United States as the target.

When we look at the data no clear cut profile seems to

emerge, but there was a tendency to see their own actions toward the United States in negative terms so far as affect was concerned. This in itself is not so surprising since the United States was the adversary. What is surprising is that it was not sharply negative. As for the potency and activity dimension, Japanese actions were viewed for the most part in the way we would anticipate, that is, strong and active.

Table 13

Japan as Agent with the U.S. as Target of Action

	Date of Conference				
	9/19/1940	7/2/1941	9/6/1941	11/5/1941	12/1/1941
Evaluative:					
positive	0.0	13.0	2.0	0.0	1.0
negative	0.0	29.7	2.0	5.0	0.7
Potency:					
strong	0.0	29.7	0.0	7.5	3.8
weak	0.0	14.9	0.0	2.0	2.8
Activity:					
active	0.0	30.9	1.0	8.5	8.5
passive	0.0	20.3	4.0	1.0	2.1

(7) Japanese Perceptions of Germany and Italy. Under the terms of the Tripartite Pact signed in September, 1940, Japan entered into a military alliance with the Axis powers, Germany and Italy. Under the circumstances, one would expect that Japan had a favorable image of her alliance partners. Accordingly, our hypothesis would be that German and Italy scored high in the evaluative, potency, and activity dimensions.

Our data, however, does not exactly confirm our hypothesis. But first of all, perhaps the most striking feature of our data

is that the Axis partners do not appear to be of great concern to Japanese decision makers. The computer picked up relatively few references to Germany and Italy, as the following table shows:

Table 14

Perceptions of Germany and Italy

Date of Conference: Sept 19, 1940	Germany-Italy as Subject	Target
Evaluative:		
positive	--	8.0
negative	--	--
Potency:		
strong	--	10.0
weak	--	--
Activity:		
active	--	--
passive	--	--
Date of Conference: July 2, 1941		
Evaluation:		
positive	--	--
negative	3.0	--
Potency:		
strong	3.0	--
weak	--	--
Activity:		
active	4.0	--
passive	--	2.0
Date of Conference: Sept. 6, 1941		
Potency:		
strong	--	3.0
weak	--	--
(No other perceptions)		

Date of Conference: Nov. 5, 1941

Evaluation:		
positive	--	7.0
negative	--	13.0
Potency:		
strong	3.0	8.0
weak	--	4.0
Activity:		
active	--	11.0
passive	--	5.0

Date of Conference: Dec. 1, 1941

(No perceptions)

The September 19, 1940 conference is of special interest because this was the one that approved the Tripartite Pact. In the record of that conference Germany was seen to be good as well as strong, but no perceptions were registered on the activity dimension. In the later conferences, Japanese evaluation of Germany-Italy changed to negative, but the potency dimension was consistently strong. Also the activity scale was more active than passive.

We might speculate as to the reasons for these somewhat unexpected perceptions. First, the relative scarcity of references could mean that Japan took it for granted that Germany would win the war in Europe, and hence the Japanese felt no need to be concerned about her. An alternative explanation might be that the alliance was more symbolic than real. In the final analysis, Japan and her Axis allies had no easy and practicable way of sending large scale military and economic aid to each other, especially after the outbreak of the German-Soviet

war in June, 1941. The Japanese-German alliance was quite a different sort of partnership from the U.S.-British alliance. If our reasoning is correct, then we could conclude that the Tripartite Pact was important more for its symbolic and psychological effects than for its practical reasons. In any case, one wonders if the insistent demand on the part of Secretary Hull that Japan formally renounce the Tripartite Pact, a demand which was one of the principal obstacles to successful American-Japanese negotiations, was wise.

(8) Japanese Perceptions of the Soviet Union. Russia was Japan's traditional enemy. The imperial ambitions of these two countries had clashed over the control of Korea and later of Manchuria. After the Bolshevik revolution, Japan began to fear and hate the Soviet Union as the homeland of communist doctrine. Despite this history of antipathy, Japan concluded a Neutrality Pact with the Soviets in 1941, but its status was soon rendered precarious with the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet war in June, 1941. Under the circumstances, we would anticipate that Japanese leaders would negatively evaluate the Russians, and our data in very broad terms confirmed this. Analyses of statements in which the Soviet Union was the agent and in which it was the target generally revealed a profile showing the Soviets to be mostly strong and active. On the evaluation dimension, there was less consistency, and there was a shift from negative to positive and back to negative. (Details are given in the Appendix.)

(9) Perceptions of other Countries. Japanese perceptions of several other countries, in addition to those already discussed, were also analyzed. These countries were Great Britain, the Netherlands, China, France, and Thailand.

There was almost no data on the Netherlands and Thailand, suggesting that Japanese decision makers felt little concern for these nations. Among Great Britain, China, and France, Britain was mentioned in the documents most frequently. It would not be particularly meaningful to give a detailed breakdown of the data here (readers who are interested should consult the Appendix), and suffice it to say that in general the Japanese perceived Great Britain negatively in terms of affect, but also perceived her to be strong and active.

Given the Japanese involvement in China, the relatively small number of references to China was surprising. Moreover, there emerged no consistent profile of China. The July 2, 1941 record was negative in affect and passive, while the September 6, 1941 conference notes recorded negative affect and was slightly weak on the potency scale. However, in the December 1, 1941 notes, China was perceived as positive in affect and strong and active. One reason for the high potency score appears to be the fact that by this time China was grouped together with the United States and other allies as one of the nations engaged in the "encirclement" of Japan. On the affect dimension, I believe it is true that the Japanese never viewed China as being "bad," but merely "misguided," and if so, our data seems to be consistent with such a view.

Although there was not enough information to provide a clear profile, France emerged slightly positive in terms of affect, and somewhat active and strong. Finally in the "Other" countries category, there was a slight tendency to perceive them as bad, strong, and active.

(10) Results from the Second Pass. We have been discussing the more significant findings from the first pass on the computer, which scored certain countries along the evaluative, potency, and activity dimensions. The unit of analysis of the second pass was not countries but rather certain themes which prima facie appeared to be worth studying, based on our knowledge of what had transpired during the period of history covered by the documents. To be specific, the themes were Greater East Asia, Russo-Japanese War, the China Incident, Encirclement, War, Peace, Negotiations, Self-defense, Trade, Deadlines, the Tripartite Pact, and Status Quo. There was also a catch-all category, "Other."

Unfortunately, the results from the second pass were not particularly illuminating because it turned out that there were not too many references in the documents to these themes as such. Our discussion, therefore, will be limited to a few themes where the content analysis registered worthwhile scores.

Our first category, Greater East Asia, one of Japan's foreign policy goals, produced scores for all but the September 19, 1940 Conference. We would have presumed that the concept of Greater East Asia would score high on the evaluative,

potency, and activity scales, but the profile is not consistent. Table 16 gives the details:

Table 16
Perceptions of Greater East Asia

Date of Conference	Evaluative		Potency		Activity	
	Pos.	Neg.	Str.	Weak	Act.	Pas.
July 2, 1941	20.0	0.0	18.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sept. 6, 1941	3.0	10.0	2.0	12.0	4.0	0.0
Nov. 5, 1941	24.0	17.0	20.0	11.0	37.0	8.0
Dec. 1, 1941	9.0	2.0	10.0	3.0	5.0	3.0

As Table 16 shows, except for the September 6, 1941 conference records, the concept of Greater East Asia was perceived as positive in terms of the evaluative dimension and strong in the potency category. It is also mostly seen as active. With the exception of the one document mentioned, (there appears to be no obvious explanation for the deviation) the data is in general in keeping with what we would expect of Japanese perceptions of Greater East Asia.

The second theme which produced enough scores to make it worth discussing was war. Of the five documents, war scored negative in affect 4 times, and positive once (by a score of positive 1, negative 0). Only three of the documents contained perceptions on the potency dimension, and of these two on balance revealed strength, and one registered weak. The activity scale was more active than passive. Thus in general it may be said that Japanese decision makers viewed war as negative in

affect, and slightly high in potency and activity.

The third theme was the Tripartite Pact. There were not so many references as one might have anticipated, and the data suggests that the Japanese did not think all that highly of the Axis Pact. This, in fact, was also suggested by the data, previously analyzed, on the Axis partners, Germany and Italy.

In the five documents, the Tripartite Pact scored negative in affect 3 times and positive twice. On the potency scale, it was strong twice and weak once, while it was perceived as active twice and passive once. Clearly we have a mixed picture here. The Tripartite Pact was not seen as positive, strong, and active as one might have supposed.

IV. Summary and Conclusions

We began this report with the proposition that game theory, despite its logical power, is inadequate to deal with real life conflict situations. The theory of games assumes that utilities and payoffs are completely known, whereas in reality they are not.

We argued that one way to get around some of the difficulties inherent in game theory is to study perceptions of national decision makers. With accurate knowledge of decision makers' perceptions of themselves and the international environment which was impinging on them, we might begin to get some idea of the utilities and expected payoffs assigned by leaders to certain kinds of actions. It was our position that perceptions were an important factor in policy choices made by leaders.

Our method of studying perceptions was to analyze documents by means of computerized content analysis. The tool was the General Inquirer which measures statements along three dimensions--evaluative, potency, and activity.

We analyzed five documents representing records of five Imperial Conferences held between September, 1940 and December, 1941. The analysis of these documents produced a series of profiles of perceptions held by Japan's decision makers of themselves, of the leading countries with which Japan was interacting at the time, and of certain themes.

A simple model of conflict situations was postulated, namely that a nation contemplating war would perceive itself to be good, strong, and active, while its adversary would be seen as bad, weak, and passive. Our data suggests that this is too simple a model. The Japanese did not see themselves necessarily as good. Perhaps more important, Japanese leaders did not perceive the United States as weak and passive. Instead they perceived the United States to be strong and active, just as they perceived themselves to be strong and active. Perception of American strength, therefore, did not deter Japan from attacking the United States.

Japanese perceptions of other countries were not always negative in affect, and were quite often high in the potency scale. Of particular interest was the perception of Germany and Italy. Although Japan was an ally of Germany and Italy, these countries did not rate high in affect, potency, and activity. Additional evidence of a general lack of esteem for

her partners may be found in our data on the Tripartite Pact, which again is not strongly positive. The evidence suggests that the Axis Pact was not all that important to the Japanese.

One final comment on the potency dimension is in order. As already indicated, we noted that Japan's decision makers perceived both themselves and the United States to be strong. The question is what expectations did Japanese leaders have of the future? Did they anticipate that in the future they would be weak while the United States would continue to be strong? Our impression is that this is so, but our impressions need to be systematically and objectively checked against the data. This will be our next task.

Footnotes

1. Rapoport, Anatol, Two Person Game Theory; The Essential Ideas, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966, p. 206.
2. Brody, Richard, A., "Cognition and Behavior: A Model of International Relations," in Experience, Structure, and Adaptability, edited by O.J. Harvey, New York: Springer Publishing Co., 1966, p. 334.
3. Ike, Nobutaka (Translator and Editor), Japan's Decision for War, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967.
4. Holsti, Ole, "An Adaptation of the 'General Inquirer' for the Systematic Analysis of Political Documents," Behavioral Science, Vol. 9 (No. 4), October, 1964, p. 383.
5. This is based on information provided me by Professor Yasumasa Tanaka, of Gakushuin University in Tokyo. One of several articles he has published on this topic is "A Cross-Cultural Study of National Stereotypes held by American and Japanese College Graduate Students," The Japanese Psychological Research, Vol. 4, No. 2, (July, 1962).
6. This interpretation was suggested to me by Professor Ole Holsti, formerly of Stanford and now of the University of British Columbia. I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to him for his generous assistance in all phases of this research undertaking. His paper, "Content Analysis Research in the Social Sciences," provides a good guide to the General Inquirer method of analysis.

NUMBER OF WORDS IN TEXT- 4579

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONAGENT

	U.S.	USSR	G.I.	GB	NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	6.000	.000	9.000	16.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.002	.003
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	5.000	.000	6.000	11.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.001	.002
STRONG000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	15.000	1.000	18.000	34.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.003	.000	.004	.007
WEAK000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	3.000	3.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.001
ACTIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	6.000	.000	4.000	10.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.001	.002
PASSIVE	3.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	12.000	15.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.003	.003

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONTARGET

	U.S.	USSR	G.I.	GB	NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	1.000	.000	8.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	12.000	23.000
	.000	.000	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.003	.005
NEGATIVE AFFECT	6.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	7.000	.000	47.000	60.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.000	.010	.013
STRONG	8.000	3.000	10.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	20.000	1.000	19.000	61.000
	.002	.001	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.004	.000	.004	.013
WEAK000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	6.000	.000	2.000	8.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.002
ACTIVE	6.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	4.000	.000	12.000	22.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.003	.005
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	1.000	2.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

ACTION PERCEPTIONS

AGENT-- U.S.

	U.S.	USSR	TARGET NATIONS		NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
			G.I.	GB								
POSITIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	7.000	.000	.000	7.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.000	.000	.002
STRONG000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	5.000	.000	.000	5.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001
WEAK000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	2.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ACTIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	3.000	.000	.000	3.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001

AGENT-- G.I.

	U.S.	USSR	TARGET NATIONS		NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
			G.I.	GB								
POSITIVE AFFECT	2.400	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.600	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	5.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
NEGATIVE AFFECT	1.600	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	3.600
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
STRONG	3.200	.000	.000	.000	.000	.800	.000	.000	1.000	.000	2.400	7.400
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.002
WEAK000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ACTIVE	1.600	.000	.000	.000	.000	.800	.000	.000	2.000	.000	1.800	6.200
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
PASSIVE	1.600	1.500	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	4.000	7.100
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.002

AGENT-- GB

	U.S.	USSR	TARGET NATIONS		NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
			G.I.	GB								
POSITIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	4.000
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
STRONG000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	5.400	.000	.500	5.900
WEAK000	.000	.000	.000	.000	3.000	4.000	2.000	.001	.000	1.000	15.800
ACTIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.003
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.500	.000	.000	1.500
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	3.100	.000	1.500	6.600
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

AGENT-- JAPAN

	U.S.	USSR	TARGET NATIONS		NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
			G.I.	GB								
POSITIVE AFFECT	13.000	2.000	1.500	11.700	.000	2.500	7.400	.000	5.000	.000	36.700	79.800
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.002	.000	.000	.002	.000	.000	.001	.000	.001	.000	.006	.013
STRONG	29.700	8.700	.000	17.000	.000	4.900	8.200	1.000	7.800	.000	13.800	91.100
WEAK005	.001	.000	.003	.000	.001	.001	.000	.001	.000	.002	.015
ACTIVE	29.700	14.900	.500	16.600	.000	9.900	28.600	4.500	11.300	.000	58.100	174.100
PASSIVE005	.002	.000	.003	.000	.002	.005	.001	.002	.000	.010	.029
	14.900	.000	.000	13.500	.000	1.800	2.000	2.000	3.500	.000	10.000	47.700
	.002	.000	.000	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.002	.008
	30.900	10.100	1.000	17.900	.000	16.400	29.700	2.500	14.100	.000	49.600	172.200
	.005	.002	.000	.003	.000	.003	.005	.000	.002	.000	.008	.028
	20.300	.000	3.900	19.400	.000	3.600	5.600	5.000	7.400	.000	24.900	90.100
	.003	.000	.001	.003	.000	.001	.001	.001	.001	.000	.004	.015

2002 IMP CONF/1

090641 JAPANESE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

NUMBER OF WORDS IN TEXT- 8410

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONAGENT

	U.S.	USSR	G.I.	GB	NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	3.000	3.000	.000	15.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	34.000	.000	3.000	60.000
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.004	.000	.000	.007
STRONG000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	25.000	.000	3.000	30.000
WEAK	13.070	8.000	.000	38.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.003	.000	.000	.004
ACTIVE002	.001	.000	.005	.000	.000	3.000	.000	139.000	.000	19.000	220.000
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.017	.000	.002	.026
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	15.000	.000	.000	15.000
	5.000	4.000	.000	6.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.000	.000	.002
	.001	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	5.000	.000	43.000	.000	10.000	73.000
	1.000	2.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.005	.000	.001	.009
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.000	.000	.002

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONTARGET

	U.S.	USSR	G.I.	GB	NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	3.000	6.000	.000	5.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	30.000	1.000	11.000	56.000
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.001	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.004	.000	.001	.007
STRONG	6.000	2.000	.000	1.000	.000	4.000	.000	2.000	11.000	.000	14.000	40.000
WEAK001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.002	.005
ACTIVE	12.000	9.000	3.000	8.000	1.000	3.000	2.000	2.000	59.000	.000	12.000	111.000
PASSIVE001	.001	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.007	.000	.001	.013
	.000	4.000	.000	.000	.000	5.000	.000	4.000	7.000	.000	14.000	34.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001	.000	.002	.004
	10.000	.000	.000	5.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	37.000	.000	17.000	69.000
	.001	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.004	.000	.002	.008
	4.000	3.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	25.000	1.000	10.000	43.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.003	.000	.001	.005

ACTION PERCEPTIONS

AGENT-- U.S.

			TARGET NATIONS							RES.	OTHER	TOTAL	
	U.S.	USSR	G.I.	GB	NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN				
POSITIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	3.000	.000	.000	3.000
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
STRONG000	.000	.000	2.000	2.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	7.000
WEAK000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
ACTIVE000	.000	.000	4.000	4.000	4.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	14.000
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	5.000	.000	.000	5.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.001

AGENT-- GB

			TARGET NATIONS							RES.	OTHER	TOTAL	
	U.S.	USSR	G.I.	GB	NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN				
POSITIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.800	.000	.000	2.800
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	2.100	.000	.000	.000	2.100	.000	2.100	8.000	.000	2.100	.000	16.400
STRONG000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.500	.000	10.400	.000	2.000	.000	12.900
WEAK000	3.400	.000	.000	.000	3.400	.000	5.400	2.100	.000	4.800	.000	19.100
ACTIVE000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	2.000	12.400	.000	5.400	.001	21.800
PASSIVE000	.700	.000	.000	.000	.700	.000	.700	1.400	.000	.700	.001	4.200
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

AGENT-- JAPAN

			TARGET NATIONS							RES.	OTHER	TOTAL	
	U.S.	USSR	G.I.	GB	NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN				
POSITIVE AFFECT	2.000	.000	6.000	4.100	2.000	2.000	4.000	.000	17.500	2.000	13.000	.000	52.600
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.000	.002	.000	.006
STRONG	2.000	1.500	2.000	13.100	6.000	1.000	1.000	.000	20.900	.000	9.300	.000	56.800
WEAK000	.000	.000	.002	.001	.000	.000	.000	.002	.000	.001	.000	.007
ACTIVE000	1.500	4.000	17.900	8.000	3.000	2.000	.000	44.300	2.000	18.000	.000	100.700
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.002	.001	.000	.000	.000	.005	.000	.002	.000	.012
	.000	.000	.000	3.000	.000	5.000	5.000	3.000	15.900	.000	1.000	.000	32.900
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.001	.000	.002	.000	.000	.000	.004
	1.000	1.500	6.000	17.600	9.000	.000	5.400	.000	45.800	.000	19.500	.000	105.800
	.000	.000	.001	.002	.001	.000	.001	.000	.005	.000	.002	.000	.013
	4.000	1.000	8.000	3.000	.000	8.000	5.000	3.000	12.800	.000	11.000	.000	55.800
	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001	.001	.000	.002	.000	.001	.000	.007

2003 IMP CONF/1

110541 JAPANESE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

NUMBER OF WORDS IN TEXT- 15764

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONAGENT

	U.S.	USSR	G.I.	GB	NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	4.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	70.000	.000	15.000	91.000
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.004	.000	.001	.006
STRONG	3.000	35.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	76.000	.000	43.000	157.000
WEAK000	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.005	.000	.003	.010
ACTIVE	22.000	18.000	3.000	20.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	219.000	.000	41.000	323.000
PASSIVE001	.001	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.014	.000	.003	.020
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	15.000	.000	6.000	21.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001
	8.000	12.000	.000	4.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	108.000	.000	31.000	163.000
	.001	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.007	.000	.002	.010
	3.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	17.000	.000	2.000	22.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001

AGENT-- GB

	U.S.	USSR	TARGET NATIONS		NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
			G.I.	GB								
POSITIVE AFFECT	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	3.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	5.000	.000	3.000	8.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
STRONG000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	9.500	.000	5.000	17.500
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001
WEAK000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
ACTIVE000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	7.000	.000	1.000	11.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

AGENT-- JAPAN

	U.S.	USSR	TARGET NATIONS		NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
			G.I.	GB								
POSITIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	4.800	2.000	.000	9.000	.000	.000	40.400	1.400	24.300	81.900
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.003	.000	.002	.005
NEGATIVE AFFECT	5.000	.000	.800	5.500	2.700	10.000	2.000	.000	40.900	.000	37.700	104.600
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.003	.000	.002	.007
STRONG	7.500	3.800	15.700	20.000	3.600	17.000	5.500	2.500	105.400	1.400	81.700	264.100
	.000	.000	.001	.001	.000	.001	.000	.000	.007	.000	.005	.017
WEAK	2.000	.000	6.000	.000	.000	3.000	4.000	.000	13.100	.000	18.800	46.900
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.001	.003
ACTIVE	8.500	2.400	18.300	19.500	2.900	10.000	9.400	1.400	82.900	.000	80.200	235.500
	.001	.000	.001	.001	.000	.001	.001	.000	.005	.000	.005	.015
PASSIVE	1.000	.000	5.800	.000	.000	11.000	3.000	.000	15.200	.000	37.100	73.100
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001	.000	.002	.005

2004 IMP CONF/1

120141 JAPANESE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

NUMBER OF WORDS IN TEXT- 10263

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONAGENT

	U.S.	USSR	G.I.	GB	NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.008	.000	.001	.010
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	3.000	.000	.000	24.000	.000	7.000	34.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.000	.001	.003
STRONG	10.000	.000	.000	41.000	.000	9.000	.000	.000	186.000	.000	12.000	258.000
	.001	.000	.000	.004	.000	.001	.000	.000	.018	.000	.001	.025
WEAK000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	6.000	.000	.000	8.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001
ACTIVE000	.000	.000	15.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	83.000	.000	11.000	111.000
	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.008	.000	.001	.011
PASSIVE	5.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	33.000	.000	1.000	40.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.003	.000	.000	.004

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONTARGET

	U.S.	USSR	G.I.	GB	NETH	CHINA	FR.	THAI	JAPAN	RES.	OTHER	TOTAL
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.009	.000	.004	.015
NEGATIVE AFFECT	1.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	95.000	.000	14.000	112.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.009	.000	.001	.011
STRONG	4.000	4.000	.000	5.000	.000	12.000	.000	3.000	184.000	.000	35.000	247.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.018	.000	.003	.024
WEAK	1.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	3.000	1.000	1.000	38.000	.000	6.000	50.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.004	.000	.001	.005
ACTIVE	1.000	5.000	.000	.000	1.000	4.000	.000	2.000	89.000	.000	15.000	117.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.009	.000	.001	.011
PASSIVE	1.000	.000	.000	5.000	.000	4.000	.000	2.000	65.000	.000	8.000	85.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.006	.000	.001	.008

2001 IMP CONF/1

070241 JAPANESE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

NUMBER OF WORDS IN TEXT- 6090

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONAGENT

	G.ASIA	RJ WAR	CH.INC	ENCIRC	WAR	PEACE	NEGOT.	SELF-D	TRADE	DEADL.	T.PACT	ST.QUO	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	13.000	15.000
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.002
STRONG000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.006	.007
WEAK000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.018	.018
ACTIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.002
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.008	.008
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.001

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONTARGET

	G.ASIA	RJ WAR	CH.INC	ENCIRC	WAR	PEACE	NEGOT.	SELF-D	TRADE	DEADL.	T.PACT	ST.QUO	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	20.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	6.000	.000	53.000	82.000
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.009	.013
STRONG000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.022	.023
WEAK	18.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	100.000	121.000
	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.016	.020
ACTIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.002
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.002
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.011	.011
	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.011	.011
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.005	.005

2002 IMP CONF/1

090641 JAPANESE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

NUMBER OF WORDS IN TEXT- 8401

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONAGENT

	G.ASIA	RJ WAR	CH.INC	ENCIRC	WAR	PEACE	NEGOT.	SELF-D	TRADE	DEADL.	T.PACT	ST.QUO	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	58.000	58.000
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.007	.007
STRONG000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.002
WEAK000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.025	.025
ACTIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.002
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.007	.007
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.002

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONTARGET

	G.ASIA	RJ WAR	CH.INC	ENCIRC	WAR	PEACE	NEGOT.	SELF-D	TRADE	DEADL.	T.PACT	ST.QUO	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	3.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	44.000	50.000
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.005	.006
STRONG	10.000	.000	.000	.000	8.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	21.000	39.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.003
WEAK	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	100.000	104.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.012	.012
ACTIVE	12.000	.000	.000	.000	3.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	22.000	37.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.003	.004
PASSIVE	4.000	.000	.000	.000	5.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	55.000	65.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.007	.008
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.007	.008
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.005	.005

2003 IMP CONF/1

110541 JAPANESE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

NUMBER OF WORDS IN TEXT- 15767

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONAGENT

	G.ASIA	RJ WAR	CH.INC	ENCIRC	WAR	PEACE	NEGOT.	SELF-D	TRADE	DEADL.	T.PACT	ST.QUO	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	9.000	.000	3.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	65.000	79.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.004	.005
NEGATIVE AFFECT	8.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	140.000	148.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.009	.009
STRONG	37.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	290.000	330.000
	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.018	.021
WEAK	3.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	18.000	21.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.001
ACTIVE	29.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	125.000	155.000
	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.008	.010
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	22.000	22.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.001

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONTARGET

	G.ASIA	RJ WAR	CH.INC	ENCIRC	WAR	PEACE	NEGOT.	SELF-D	TRADE	DEADL.	T.PACT	ST.QUO	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	11.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	51.000	63.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.003	.004
NEGATIVE AFFECT	9.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	3.000	.000	198.000	214.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.013	.014
STRONG	17.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	219.000	238.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.014	.015
WEAK	8.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	69.000	79.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.004	.005
ACTIVE	7.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	3.000	.000	128.000	138.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.008	.009
PASSIVE	6.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	37.000	43.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.003

2004 IMP CONF/1

120141 JAPANESE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

NUMBER OF WORDS IN TEXT- 10259

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONAGENT

	G.ASIA	RJ WAR	CH.INC	ENCIRC	WAR	PEACE	NEGOT.	SELF-D	TRADE	DEADL.	T.PACT	ST.QUO	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	2.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	6.000	.000	.000	.000	87.000	96.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.000	.000	.008	.009
NEGATIVE AFFECT	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	2.000	.000	30.000	34.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.003	.003
STRONG	1.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	2.000	.000	251.000	258.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.024	.025
WEAK000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	8.000	8.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.001
ACTIVE	1.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	110.000	111.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.011	.011
PASSIVE000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	40.000	40.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.004	.004

EVALUATIVE PERCEPTIONTARGET

	G.ASIA	RJ WAR	CH.INC	ENCIRC	WAR	PEACE	NEGOT.	SELF-D	TRADE	DEADL.	T.PACT	ST.QUO	OTHER	TOTAL
POSITIVE AFFECT	7.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	4.000	.000	.000	.000	131.000	142.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.013	.014
NEGATIVE AFFECT	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	3.000	.000	99.000	106.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.010	.010
STRONG	9.000	.000	.000	.000	2.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	232.000	243.000
	.001	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.023	.024
WEAK	3.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	3.000	.000	44.000	50.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.004	.005
ACTIVE	4.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	1.000	.000	.000	.000	106.000	111.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.010	.011
PASSIVE	3.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	4.000	.000	78.000	85.000
	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.008	.008

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10. AVAILABILITY/LIMITATION NOTICES Qualified requesters may obtain copies of report from DDC.		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY Office of Naval Research Group Psychology Branch Washington 25, D. C.	
13. ABSTRACT <p>The General Inquirer system of content analysis was used to study the records of five Japanese Imperial Conferences between September 1940 and December 1941. The results suggest that the leaders of Japan did not perceive the United States to be weak and passive, but rather as strong and active. Nevertheless, they decided on war. Moreover, Japanese leaders did not perceive their Axis allies, Germany and Italy, as being high in affect, potency and activity. The evidence suggests that Japanese leaders did not particularly esteem their allies.</p>		

14. KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
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