The Effect of Incentive Magnitude on Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Abstract

A basic Prisoner's Dilemma matrix was multiplied by one cent, five cents, ten cents, or one hundred cents so as to alter the payoff magnitudes without affecting any of the ratios of values within the matrix. In addition to varying the amount of money at stake, we studied the effect of 'imaginary' versus 'real' money by comparing the situation in which real dollars were used with one in which 'imaginary dollars' were employed. The results indicate that the subjects were more rather than less competitive when playing for 'real' rather than 'imaginary' dollars. No significant differences were obtained among the four real money conditions. These results question the assumption made by some investigators that it is the 'weak incentives' employed in experimental games which lead to the relatively high degree of competition.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Oct 15, 1967
Accession Number
AD0662662

Entities

People

  • Morton Deutsch
  • Peter Gumpert
  • Yakov Epstein

Organizations

  • Teachers College

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Analysis Of Variance
  • Bargaining
  • Classification
  • Competition
  • Contracts
  • Control Panels
  • Cooperation
  • Instructions
  • Instructors
  • Military Research
  • Motivation
  • New York
  • Prisoners
  • Security
  • Tape Recording
  • Universities

Readers

  • Economics
  • Linear Algebra