Techniques of Inducing Cooperation Between Adversaries

Abstract

The data may be briefly summarized as indicating that: the bargainers were more cooperative when bargaining for money rather than points; in the unequal power conditions, subjects bluff somewhat more than they do in the equal power conditions; the more rewarding a contract agreement was in relation to the values available to the bargainers without an agreement, the greater the likelihood that they would come to an agreement; the differences among the sites were marked as much so among the American locations as between the locations in different nations.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Oct 01, 1967
Accession Number
AD0662664

Entities

People

  • Morton Deutsch

Organizations

  • Columbia University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Analysis Of Variance
  • Bargaining
  • Contracts
  • Cooperation
  • Factorial Design
  • Hypotheses
  • Instructors
  • New York
  • Observers
  • Orientation (Direction)
  • Sequences
  • Task Performance And Analysis
  • United States
  • Universities

Fields of Study

  • Psychology

Readers

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