THE EFFECT OF TIME PRESSURE, TIME ELAPSED, AND THE OPPONENT'S CONCESSION RATE ON BEHAVIOR IN NEGOTIATION

Abstract

Eighty students were run in a laboratory paradigm of negotiation resembling that employed by Siegel and Fouraker. Time pressure produced, on the first trial, less ambitious goals, lower levels of demand and less bluffing. Over the later trials, level of demand and amount of bluffing were reduced at a diminishing rate, but goals remained unchanged. Neither time pressure nor the other negotiator's rate of concession affected the rate of change in demand or bluffing over time. Several items of evidence suggested the presence of substantial wishful thinking about the other negotiator's goals.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 15, 1967
Accession Number
AD0664492

Entities

People

  • Dean G. Pruitt
  • Julie L. Drews

Organizations

  • University at Buffalo

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter IED
  • Human Systems
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Analysis Of Variance
  • Bargaining
  • Behavioral Sciences
  • Classification
  • Commerce
  • Contracts
  • Instructions
  • Military Research
  • Negotiations
  • New York
  • Psychological Phenomena And Processes
  • Psychology
  • Security
  • Standards
  • Thinking
  • United States Government

Fields of Study

  • Psychology

Readers

  • International Relations and European Studies
  • Mathematics or Statistics
  • Systems Analysis and Design