DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAND MANAGEMENT,
Abstract
The study applies economic analysis to the decisionmaking processes governing land resource allocation for defense. A detailed examination of existing laws and regulations reveals a set of rights-to-land that in essence are neither transferable nor exclusive. This leads to a situation where there is no economic incentive to evaluate alternatives and no appropriate mechanism to effect trade-offs in land allocation. Suitable changes in the system are discussed which should help to remedy the deficiency. One suggestion involves the conversion of land rights to a set of transferable land rights which are assigned to three 'landlords,' one for each of the Military Services. In the other change discussed, the effect of nontransferable rights is altered through the establishment of a central 'landlord' in the Department of Defense which imposes use costs (rents) on the decisionmakers in the Services. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 1966
- Accession Number
- AD0670736
Entities
People
- Jora R. Minasian
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses