IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTING

Abstract

Present defense procurement policy relies heavily on the use of incentive contracts to provide contractors with some inducement to control costs. The intent is to encourage contractors through increased profits toward more efficient performance and improved cost control. This paper identifies the various effects that incentive contracts may have on contract costs, and questions the validity of the cost savings commonly attributed to these contracts. Several possible strategies for improving their effectiveness are also discussed.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jul 01, 1968
Accession Number
AD0673332

Entities

People

  • I. N. Fisher

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Contractors
  • Contracts
  • Corporations
  • Cost Analysis
  • Cost Estimates
  • Cost Overruns
  • Costs
  • Department Of Defense
  • Governments
  • Incentive Contracts
  • Motivation
  • Operations Research
  • Probability
  • Procurement
  • Public Administration
  • Random Variables
  • Weapon Systems

Fields of Study

  • Economics
  • Political science

Readers

  • Government Contracting/Procurement.
  • Life Cycle Cost Analysis