PROBABILITY OF A PURE EQUILIBRIUM POINT IN n-PERSON GAMES
Abstract
A random n-person noncooperative game--that game that prohibits communication and therefore coalitions among n players--is shown to have a pure strategy solution with a high probability. A solution of a game is an equilibrium point or set of strategies, one for each player, such that if n - 1 players use their equilibrium strategies, then the n-th player has no reason to deviate from his equilibrium strategy. It is shown that the probability of a solution in pure strategies for large random games converges to 1 - 1/e for all n greater than or equal to 2.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 1968
- Accession Number
- AD0678040
Entities
People
- Melvin Dresher
Organizations
- RAND Corporation