PAETO OPTIMALALITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY: SUBJECTIVITY, EFFICIENCY, AND SIMILARITY OF BELIEFS.

Abstract

The paper investigates the conditions under which general equilibrium under uncertainty leads to ex post Pareto optimality. When the conditions are fulfilled uncertainty creates no mis-allocation of resources. The negation of these conditions therefore indicates when information will promote inefficiency. (Author)

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Oct 01, 1968
Accession Number
AD0690066

Entities

People

  • Ross M. Starr

Organizations

  • Harvard University

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Chemical Reaction Properties
  • Economic Systems
  • Efficiency
  • Uncertainty

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Computational Modeling and Simulation
  • Operations Research