TULLOCK ON VOTING AND OTHER ASPECTS OF POLITICS

Abstract

The following theorem in political science is demonstrated: the set of social feasible alternatives is closed, bounded and convex, and if the set of alternatives preferred by some majority of the voters to any given alternative is always convex, then there exists a feasible alternative preferred by a majority of the voters to any other feasible alternatives.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 01, 1969
Accession Number
AD0690067

Entities

People

  • Kenneth J. Arrow

Organizations

  • Harvard University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Convex Sets
  • Economic Systems
  • Economics
  • Elections
  • Governments
  • Human Behavior
  • Hypotheses
  • Mathematics
  • Military Research
  • Point Theorem
  • Political Parties
  • Political Science
  • Political Systems
  • Theorems
  • Two Dimensional
  • United States
  • United States Government

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Mathematical Modeling and Probability Theory.
  • Systems Analysis and Design