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Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army: A 1951 Study

A Team Research Study
by Staff Members, Consultants, and Subcontractors of
The Operations Research Office of
The Johns Hopkins University

Alfred H. Haubrath, Project Director

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PREFACE

This report was prepared and is issued at the request of the Department of the Army in order to make it available to the general public and to scholars who have urged that the substance of the Project CLEAR study be released as a document of some historical and current significance. It is a condensation and an unclassified edition of a seven-volume study conducted in 1951 in response to an urgent need of the Department of the Army at that time. A condensed but classified version of the original study was prepared in 1955 for limited special use within the Army.

The subject of this study continues to be of widespread interest and relates to a problem of serious concern in today's world. Many requests have been received by the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense for release of Project CLEAR. There had long been recognition within ORO and the Army that the report needed review, synthesis, and reorganization of material in view of the limitations originally imposed by the Army's pressing need for the data at the time of the Korean conflict. In the meantime, the Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) was created and became operational on 1 September 1961 as an independent research organization, continuing the functions previously assigned to the Operations Research Office. Later, at the request of the Department of the Army the way was cleared for the original project director, Alfred H. Hausrath, to give his attention to preparing an edition free from privileged and classified material, with a concurrent review by representatives of the interested Department of the Army staff agencies.

The Research Analysis Corporation has performed the service of making available this unclassified edition of work done originally under the Operations Research Office of The Johns Hopkins University.

Frank A. Parker
President, Research Analysis Corporation

FOREWORD

In Korea in 1950 and early 1951 the problem of manpower in the US Armed Forces was not limited to one of sufficient numbers; it centered even more pointedly on the effective use of all US soldiers present in the theater of combat. To meet the urgent need for replacements, available personnel in Korea were assigned to battle units without conformity to customary assignment procedures. This condition, which was prompted by military necessity, provided a laboratory of experience in the use of Negro manpower in various ways.

Strong differences in opinion existed within the military establishment regarding the utilization of Negro personnel and their effectiveness in various assignments. At the same time there was growing concern at the national policy level about conservation of human resources and equality of treatment and opportunity. The Army, as one of the nation's largest users of manpower, had a prime responsibility to ensure the effectiveness of its role in protecting the security of the nation, to utilize its personnel effectively, and to spread the combat burden with reasonable equity among the military-age manpower made available to it through Selective Service.

The Negro manpower problem was not new to the Army. In Korea it was possible for the first time to make comparative studies in field-army situations involving the employment of white and Negro personnel in the same units. In March 1951 the Office of the Chief of Staff of the US Army requested the Operations Research Office of The Johns Hopkins University (whose contract responsibilities were assumed by the Research Analysis Corporation on 1 September 1961) to undertake a study of "The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army." Other than to specify that the study should draw on the experience in Korea, the scope and nature of the study was left largely to the discretion of the research organization. The study was conducted and delivered to the Department of the Army on 1 July 1951.

The evidence presented in the report was basic to and is regarded as having influenced or crystallized the Army's decision to utilize the results of the study. The order deactivating all-Negro units and stating that integration would be the policy throughout the Far East Command was issued on 26 July 1951 and announced to the public. Having accepted the preliminary report, the Chief of Staff of the Army requested ORO to extend the study in Korea, to investigate "safe" levels of integration, and to look into the problem in the continental US. This extended study completed, the second report was delivered on 1 November 1951. Shortly thereafter the policy of integration was established for the Military District of Washington and for the US Army in Europe.

Because of the early deadlines set for the reports, it was agreed that the Army would accept and act on unedited preliminary reports. A final report, with the benefit of adequate editing and printing, was to be delivered later at the convenience of ORO. The preliminary reports were intended for use only within the Army, and no effort was made at that time to separate privileged and classified from unclassified source material.

Priorities on other studies related to the Korean war effort and the pressures of the changing world situation postponed the publication of a condensed and edited, classified report (ORO-R-11) until April 1955.

The study comprised a group of interrelated substudies contributing to the Army's continuing efforts to achieve maximum effectiveness in the utilization of its manpower. It represents a team approach to the Army's problem of the most effective utilization of its manpower. In addition, it is considered by some to be a pioneering effort in the application of operations research to social problems, which are regarded as more difficult to identify and to analyze than problems of weapons development and use. It continues, in some aspects, the classic studies of Stouffer and his associates, reported in "The American Soldier" series.

One point needs to be particularly emphasized: This study was not conceived as an investigation of the desirability of feasibility of segregation or integration. These issues evolved during the course of study, as having a determinant relation within the broader problem of efficiency in utilizing manpower resources. Another point to be especially noted is that moral or compassionate aspects of the problem were excluded from the research. Many of the subjects who contributed to or participated in the study had deeply rooted attitudes and strong emotional involvement in the issues represented. The research staff concerned itself only with facts and findings and their meanings so far as these could be objectively determined.

BACKGROUND

This report was prepared and is issued at the request of the Department of the Army in order to make it available to the general public and to scholars who have urged that the substance of the Project CLEAR study be released as a document of some historical and current significance. It is a condensation and an unclassified edition of a seven-volume study conducted in 1951 in response to an urgent need of the Department of the Army at that time. A condensed but classified version of the original study was prepared in 1955.

In this current edition certain classified and privileged material was excised, inaccuracies corrected, and minor editorial modifications and deletions were made. The organization of this edition contains much of the content and format of the original 1951 report to the Army, and the context conforms to the original. Some whole sections were omitted. These included material of military importance only to the Army at that time, such as specific battle action reports, privileged courts martial, Inspector General, and medical records, order of battle data, and preliminary data from the 1950 census, since released.

The study has its origin in a memorandum dated 29 March 1951 to the Director, Operations Research Office, from Maj Gen Ward H. Maris, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, for Research and Development, Department of the Army; the Operations Research Office, as a contract agency of the Army, was requested to conduct a special study on the utilization of Negro manpower. This memorandum stated:

> The Department of the Army has an urgent requirement for information concerning the most effective utilization of Negro manpower. The Operations Research Office is requested to initiate a project to determine how best to utilize Negro personnel within the Army. The analysis will include:
>
> (a) A review of World War II historical data on operations pertaining to the subject.
>
> (b) A review of existing Department of the Army studies, reports, and other publications pertaining to the subject.
>
> (c) A review of studies made by Service Institutions on the subject, to include the Command and General Staff College and the National War College.
>
> (d) A review of Negro participation in Korean operations.
>
> The project will be completed and reports made available to this office by 1 July 1951. The study as a whole shall carry a security classification of Secret.*

*Memo dated 29 Mar 51, to the Director, ORO, subject "Special Study on the Utilization of Negro Manpower," from Ward H. Maris, Major General, GSC, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, for Research and Development.

Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, Director of ORO, responded that he would initiate the study as requested, but because of the early deadline would have to deliver the report in preliminary form, i.e., an unedited and unreviewed draft in a limited number of copies, instead of a final, printed report. These conditions being acceptable to the Army, the Director, on 3 April 1951, designated Alfred H. Hausrath as project chairman and director of the study, assigned a small supporting staff of analysts, identified the study by the code name "Project CLEAR," and requested Dr. George S. Pettee, Deputy Director of ORO, to advise and facilitate the project in every way that might be needed.

Although the project director had previous experience in manpower utilization, he had no specific identification with race problems. Neither had any of the other staff members assigned to the study. Partly because of this, and also with the general desire to capitalize on the experience of scholars who had concentrated on racial problems, an advisory committee was established from among historians, political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, anthropologists, educators, and others known to have made studies in this field.

The advisory committee was convened on 17 April 1951 to review initial plans, to provide suggestions for the organization and division of the study into manageable parts that could be pursued simultaneously by different teams of researchers, and to suggest individuals and organizations or universities considered to be most competent to participate in the study. Nominations were also made of other scholars who might be added to the advisory group or used as consultants.

Control and coordination of the entire project was under the project director. The research agencies with which subcontractual arrangements were made to conduct certain substudies included The American Institute for Research (AIR), Dr. John C. Flanagan, President; International Public Opinion Research, Inc.* (IPOR), Mr. Elmo C. Wilson, President; Bureau of Applied Social Research (BASR), Columbia University, Dr. Kingsley Davis, Director; and The Bureau of Social Science Research (BSSR), American University, Dr. Robert T. Bower, Director.

A progress report dated 18 May 1951 stated that the study had been designed, that the research teams had been formed and dispatched to the field, and that the effort already under way indicated a preliminary report on the project could be completed as required by 1 July 1951. It outlined the anticipated scope as:

1. A review of existing Army studies.
2. A preliminary judgment of the data reported by the Gillem Board and the Chamberlin Committee based on the conclusions of "outside" investigators who have made somewhat similar general studies.
3. A quick review of the most-cited studies done in the Army and a report on their general "findings."
4. A collection of a limited amount of existing statistical data from the 1950 census, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the AGO which provides basis data on such factors as population ratios, learning ability as measured by AGCT scores, educational levels, etc.
5. A quick and rather superficial summary of an attitude survey and reports of performance in Korea and a report prepared covering some of the more obvious generalizations of the investigators as a result of their experience in collecting the data.
6. Tentative conclusions inferred from the evidence considered.

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The office of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the various staff sections concerned with the study facilitated arrangements and cooperated in every way. Security clearances on personnel and travel priorities to the Far East and throughout the Far East Command were obtained. Teams were dispatched and data were collected abroad and in the continental US. Research for each part of the study was carried out on a "crash" basis, and such methods were employed as were amenable to analysis in the limited time available. After data collection and analysis the individual reports were written and submitted to the project director. Each substudy report included a summary, which contained conclusions. A small group of ORO analysts working under the supervision of the director reviewed and analyzed these reports; reconciled the data, findings, and conclusions of each; and synthesized them into a composite report for the project as a whole. The composite report comprised Vol I of ORO-T-99. Volumes II and III reproduced the individual reports of the substudies. This three-volume Secret report, ORO-T-99, was delivered to the Army in mimeographed form on 1 July 1951.

After a quick review of the three-volume report, the Army staff sections most directly involved submitted their reactions to Vice Chief of Staff Lt Gen John E. Hull. The Vice Chief called for a briefing by the ORO Project Director and any others he chose. With the invited participation of the IPOR field-team leader, Dr. Leo Bogart, this briefing was given in the office of the Vice Chief of Staff on 13 July 1951. Present were Lt Gen John E. Hull, Maj Gen Maxwell D. Taylor, Asst Chief of Staff for Operations, Maj Gen Anthony C. McAuliffe, the Asst Chief of Staff for personnel, and one or two other general officers. At its conclusion Gen Hull indicated that he wished a similar briefing for the Chief of Staff, Gen J. Lawton Collins; the Secretary of the Army, Hon. Frank Pace; and the rest of the Army Policy Council, as early as could be arranged. Accordingly this was presented on 23 July 1951. This briefing was followed by an extensive period of questioning and discussion concerning the studies undertaken, the details of certain findings, and the conclusions. Toward the end of this meeting the Chief of Staff announced that, with the concurrence of the Secretary of the Army, the conclusions were accepted, and that a policy of integration would be initiated in the Far East Command.* The Chief of Staff also asked that ORO extend the study on Project CLEAR to include:

(a) An attitude survey of troops in the continental US.

(b) A further study in Korea on combat performance.

(c) Special consideration of the results of integration at various ratios of Negros to whites, particularly in infantry squads.

(d) A study of interracial social contacts on and near Army posts in the US.

It was requested that a report on the new phases of the study be delivered to the Army by 1 November 1951. Again, because of the short period of time, an unedited, limited edition report was regarded as acceptable. Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, the ORO Director, acquiesced to extension of the study on these terms.

*Subsequently, orders were issued to General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, who, on 26 July (Washington time), announced the dissolution of the Army's only remaining all-Negro regiment (the 24th Infantry, serving in Korea) and the policy of racial integration throughout the command.

Later, a further special section of the study by International Public Opinion Research, Inc.,* was delivered to ORO as a supplement to IPOR's earlier report, which had been submitted as Volume II of ORO-T-99. This special section was subsequently published 1 December 1951 as Vol II, Supplement, to ORO-T-99, and made available to the Army although the Army had already taken action on the study represented by the six volumes submitted by 1 November 1951. The reason for the later supplementary report is indicated by the following excerpt:

> The original report was prepared in great haste. An important body of questionnaire data—obtained in the only two segregated white regiments remaining in Korea at the time of the survey—was delayed in transit and could not be included in the analysis. The present supplement offers a comparison of these data with those in the main report, and also includes more intensive analysis of the original data. All the findings reported here are based on statistical tabulations of the questionnaire responses.

By the time the extended study was requested, the problem of integration had emerged as a basic consideration in the whole problem of the utilization of Negro troops. The new phase was therefore approached with the specific objectives of determining how well integration had worked out in the intervening period in Korea, how far it had gone, how whites and Negroes had reacted to it, and most importantly, what effect, if any, integration had had on the performance of the Negro soldier and the units that had received Negroes. These questions, augmented by consideration of the level to which integration might be safely carried and the special problems that might apply under conditions existing in local communities within the United States, became the principal emphasis of the new study.

By extending the study 3 months, an opportunity was provided to explore more fully some aspects that had not been included because of the earlier due date. Among these were the analyses of more recent statistics on the composition of the Army and the data on all-white units, which were not available earlier. Further work was done to check and verify the hurriedly assembled data; additional statistical treatment was applied, including scaling and measures of significance; earlier conclusions were reexamined, unfettered by the pressures of the first deadline, and an attempt was made to improve the clarity and precision of the language. The research team had engaged previously in extensive preliminary searches, conferences, and interviews that helped to identify certain hypotheses for more rigorous investigation in the study. These efforts also helped to give the research staff some insights into the problems and areas requiring further exploration. In addition a number of preliminary substudies provided guidance in selecting the major areas for further exploration.

On 1 November 1951 a report of the extended study of Project CLEAR was submitted to the Army as ORO-R-11, also in three volumes. This edition, too, was preliminary, unedited, and Secret. A later, edited version of the seven volumes was to be delivered to the Army to fulfill the contractual requirements and make the report available for distribution as needed within the Army.

An analyst not previously associated with the project was assigned to prepare a condensed and edited version. This one-volume edition contained privileged and classified material. It was processed by the Editorial Division and

*Now International Research Associates, Inc.

issued in April 1955 as the contractual Report of Project CLEAR, ORO-R-11, "The Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army"; its classification was Confidential. That edition is no longer available.

Later, in 1963 at the request of a high official of the Department of Defense a special abridged edition was prepared by the original project director; that one-volume edition was delivered to the Pentagon in March 1963, and it is the basis of the present unclassified report.

Alfred H. Hausrath
Project Director

McLean, Virginia
July 1967

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The members of the Project CLEAR staff wish to express their appreciation and thanks to the many agencies and individuals for their helpful cooperation and for the valuable data, material, and advice they made available.

The project staff desires to acknowledge the special assistance given by the following Department of the Army and Department of Defense agencies: Human Relations Branch, G1; Analysis Section, Troop Program Branch, G1; Personnel Research and Procedures Branch, The Adjutant General's Office; Strength Accounting Branch, The Adjutant General's Office; The Surgeon General's Office; Office of the Chief of Military History; Library Services, Command and General Staff College; Library, Army War College; Classified Unit, National War College; and Classified Records Section, Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Other agencies that supplied valuable information include: Bureau of the Census; Headquarters, Selective Service; Bureau of Labor Statistics; Library of Congress; National Archives; Ford Foundation; Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University; and Cornell University Social Science Research Center. A number of ORO consultants, some of whom participated as an advisory group, were a constant source of advice throughout the study.

The project staff also wishes to extend its thanks to the Commanding Generals, their staffs, and the students of The Infantry Center, The Artillery Center, The Engineer Center, and The Armored Center, for their full cooperation in assisting with our field research. The Commanding Generals and their staffs of the following installations also cooperated most helpfully in the field research for this study: Fort Bragg, Camp Breckinridge, Fort Campbell, Fort Devens, Fort Dix, Fort Hood, Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Fort Jackson, Fort Lee, Letterman Army Hospital, Camp McCoy, Fort Ord, Percy Jones Army Hospital, Fort Riley, Camp Roberts, Fort Rucker, Fort Sam Houston, Valley Forge Army Hospital, and Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

Invaluable assistance was given by staff members of the Department of the Army. Above all, the project staff wishes to express its thanks and appreciation to the officers and men of the Eighth US Army in Korea. The willingness of battle-weary soldiers on the front lines and throughout the combat area to cooperate in this effort provided an important foundation of basic evidence for the study.

Among the advisory committee participants and ORO consultants were Dr. Thomas G. Andrews, Prof. of Psychology, University of Maryland; Dr. Leo Bogart, IPOR staff member, Research Coordinator, Public Relations Department, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey; Dr. Robert T. Bower, Director,

Bureau of Social Science Research, American University; Dr. Kingsley Davis, Prof. of Pyschology and Associate Director, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University; Dr. Charles Dollard, President, Carnegie Corporation; Dr. Harry F. Harlow, Prof. of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, on leave to work with the Research and Development Branch, G4, Department of the Army; Dr. E. Pendleton Herring, President, Social Science Research Council; Dr. David G. Mandelbaum, Prof. of Anthropology, University of California; Dr. Donald C. Marquis, Prof. of Psychology, University of Michigan; Dr. George P. Murdock, Prof. of Anthropology, Yale University; Dr. George S. Pettee, Political Scientist, Deputy Director of ORO and Advisor to Project CLEAR; Dr. John Riley, Prof. of Sociology, Rutgers University; Roy T. Sessums, Dean of Engineering, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute; Dr. David Truman, Prof. of Political Science, Columbia University; Dr. Robin Williams, Prof. of Sociology and Anthropology, Cornel University; Elmo C. Wilson, President, International Public Opinion Research, Inc.*; and Dr. Donald Young, President, Russell Sage Foundation.

Among others who represented their research agencies at the advisory committee meetings were: Maj Ulysses G. Lee, Army Historical Service; Ira H. Cisin, Information and Education Branch, Department of Defense; Dr. John Finan, Department of the Army, G4, Research and Development Branch; Mrs. Eva Stunkel and Robert Tiemann of the Personnel Research Branch, The Adjutant General's Office; Harris Huey, International Public Opinion Research, Inc.*; and Alfred H. Hausrath, ORO, Chairman and Project Director.

The following researchers participated in the project, either as regular or augmented staff members of ORO and its cooperating subcontractors: (a) For The American Institute of Research (AIR) and ORO, Dr. John C. Flanagan, President, AIR; Dr. Harley O. Preston, Director, Washington Office, IPOR*; Dr. Stanford C. Ericksen, Prof. of Psychology, Vanderbilt University; Dr. Richard P. Youtz, Prof. of Psychology, Columbia University; and AIR staff members Dr. Robert L. Weislogel, David Henderson, Murray Mitts, H. Riley Patton, Harold A. Phelps, and George H. Shames. (b) For International Public Opinion Research, Inc.* (IPOR): Elmo C. Wilson, President; Dr. Leo Bogart, Study Director; Dr. John A. Morsell, Study Associate Director, and Research Associate, BASR, Columbia University; and associates or staff members Prof. Robert T. Bower; Ira H. Cisin; Dr. Tilman C. Cothran, Prof. of Sociology, Agriculture, Mechanical and Normal College, Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Dr. Curtis E. Tuthill, Dept. of Psychology, George Washington University; Dr. Preston Valien, Department of Sociology, Fisk University; Gertrude L. Abramson; Calvin W. Gordon; Dr. Robert W. Habenstein, Instructor, University of Missouri; Rita Hausknecht; Dr. Hiley Hill; Eric Marder; James A. Moss; Henry Senft; Leila A. Sussman. (c) For Bureau of Applied Social Research (BASR), Columbia University, Dr. Kingsley Davis, Associate Director, and staff members Abram Jaffe, Lois Pratt, and Samuel Pratt, Demographers. (d) For the Bureau of Social Science Research (BSSR): Dr. Gerhart D. Wiebe, Resident Psychologist, CBS Radio. (e) For ORO, staff members Dr. Suzanne G. Billingsley, Psychologist; Dr. Joseph F. McCloskey, Historian; L. Van Loan Naisawald, Military

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Historian; Florence K. Nierman, Psychologist; Florence N. Trefethen, Humanist; Dr. George S. Pettee, Deputy Director and Project Adviser; Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, Historian; and Alfred H. Hausrath, Educator, Project Chairman; and Joseph W. Gwyer, Intelligence Specialist, and Dr. Ansel St. John, Physicist, staff members of the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.

Mrs. Helen S. Milton of the ORO staff prepared the contractual 1955 condensed edition, with the production assistance of ORO's Editorial Department, Oscar W. Torreson, Editor; Charles P. Chadsey, Managing Editor; Merton Henry, Assistant Editor; Mrs. Estelle Wiser, Copy Editor; and Art Department, under H. Garver Miller and Vaughn Jackson.

Credit for publication assistance on this edition belongs to the Editorial Division of RAC, specifically Charles P. Chadsey, Editor; Merton Henry, Managing Editor; and Mrs. Bernice G. Nunley, Copy Editor. Mrs. Ruth F. Voigt, formerly an ORO editor and more recently a RAC staff member, served as the principal assistant to the project director in preparing this edition.

Throughout the project the Library staff of ORO, and later RAC, under the direction of Miss Margaret Emerson and with the special assistance of Robert Greathouse, provided invaluable support in locating documentary source materials.

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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

The problem is to determine the most effective means of utilizing Negro manpower in the Army.

BACKGROUND

One of the most pressing problems continuously confronting the nation is the efficient and effective utilization of its manpower resources. A significant segment of these resources is Negro. At the time of this study Negroes generally had been employed at lower levels of productiveness than other available manpower. In 1951 there was a growing recognition of the fact that fuller and more effective use must be made of this source of manpower. It is in the interest of national security and over-all efficiency of the Army that Negro soldiers be utilized with maximum effectiveness.

This study was designed to explore Negro manpower resources in terms of qualifications, fitness, educational background, skills, leadership and training requirements, attitudes and morale, adaptability for various assignments, performance of military duties, and the social and administrative problems engendered. As these various facets of the problem of utilizing Negroes with maximum effectiveness were explored during the early phases, it became more and more obvious that segregation greatly restricted the efficient disposition of this vital component of Army manpower. An assessment of the effects of the integration underway in Korea therefore became of primary importance.

The Korean conflict brought about, more or less accidentally and by improvisation, a new departure in employing Negro manpower in the Army.* The scarcity of white replacements and the surplus of Negro replacements in the US Eighth Army resulted in the assignment of Negroes to white combat units. In view of the urgency of the situation, the custom of assigning whites to white units and Negroes to Negro units was disregarded.

Mixed units were not in themselves a novelty. Hundreds of individual Negroes served in integrated units during the Revolutionary War. After the Battle of the Bulge in World War II, platoons of Negro infantry volunteers were assigned to depleted white infantry companies. But these situations represented exceptions to traditional practice rather than the rule.

Official Army policy from the time of the Civil War was to assign Negro soldiers to Negro units of regimental size or larger, which might or might not have Negro officers. This policy was set, in part, by an act of the Reconstruction Congress, which ruled that there should be four colored regiments in the Army. This legislation held in principle until the eve of the Korean conflict, when the Army Reorganization Act of 1950 restored to the Army the freedom to determine the composition of all its units.

Even though service in mixed units was contrary to custom, it was in line with some of the proposals and policy determinations of the 1940's pertaining to nondiscrimination and

* For a detailed review of the historical use of Negro troops, see App C, Part I, p C-I-1.

to the effective use of the Negro in the US military establishment. Army studies were then underway to determine the feasibility of new proposals directed toward the use of Negroes in mixed Negro-white units. But the reality of integrated units was present in Korea in 1950–51, and Maj Gen Ward H. Maris, G–4, asked the Operations Research Office late in March 1951 to analyze that reality with the view of determining what Army policy should be for the most effective utilization of the Negro.

Although Negroes have served in the Armed Forces since the Revolutionary War, their utilization has varied and their value has been the subject of much debate. Minor changes in the Army's policy of segregation were initiated in the late 1930's, but the emphasis on possibilities of major changes came during and following World War II. That war severely taxed the nation's manpower resources and changed the nature of the problem of the utilization of Negroes from whether they should or could be used to how they must be used in order to achieve maximum military performance and efficiency. The problem of such use pertains to approximately one-tenth of the Army's manpower, the approximate ratio of Negroes in the total population.

Economic strains on manpower resources and social demands have had repercussions in military policy. Such changes and exceptions as were made by the Armed Forces in the employment of the Negro prior to 1950 may be explained largely in terms of the changing position of the Negro *as a source of manpower* after the depression of the 1930's. Six economic factors account, in large part, for the increasing significance of the Negro in the nation's total manpower resources: (a) restrictive immigration legislation, slowing the increase in the nation's labor force; (b) the low birth rate, especially in the depression years of the early 1930's, when young men of military age were being born; (c) the drying up of rural areas as a source of surplus manpower resulting from the general trend of population migration from rural to urban areas; (d) the increased requirements of the Armed Forces during and after World War II relative to the requirements between World Wars I and II; (e) the phenomenal growth of the economy during and after World War II; and (f) the ebb and flow of an unemployed reserve.

This combination of factors, tending to restrict available numbers at a time of increasing demand for manpower, was creating a situation over a 15-year period, the full effects of which were not really felt until Korea added its demands. The Army as one of the nation's large manpower users was seriously affected. For example, in 1940 the mobilization effort could be cushioned by nearly 6 million unemployed; in 1950, that pool had shrunk to just over 2 million, and was soon to shrink to about half of that.

During the postwar period, 1945–50, a number of challenges were directed against the traditional Army views relative to the use of the Negro in the Armed Forces. A number of Army studies were undertaken to re-examine the position of the Negro in the light of World War II experience. These reported varying points of views and recommendations.

A special board headed by Lt Gen Alvan Gillem, Jr., recommended in 1945 that additional opportunities be opened to the Negro in the Army and advocated the assignment of Negro and white groups in composite units. Though it supported the prevalent policies of segregation and racial quotas, it left to the future any changes in attitudes toward integration. The Chamberlin Board, in 1950, supported these views. While Army War College studies immediately following World War II assumed the continuation of segregation, War College studies in 1950–51 concluded that effective use of the Negro

was to be gained from establishing a composite organization of Negro and white units, with optimum effectiveness of all personnel to be achieved from gradual integration.

A change in the existing program of segregation was facilitated by the Executive Order of the President in July 1948, which declared a policy of equality of opportunity and treatment in the Armed Services. This was followed by the appointment of the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, a civilian group, to study the effects of the Order. In 1950, the committee, chaired by Mr. Charles Fahy, recommended that the Army eliminate its all-Negro units by removing the enlistment quota restrictions and assigning men to units in terms of qualification rather than race.

The enlistment quota concept, developed in the late 1930's, had been applied after World War II when enlistment in the Army at large replaced the old system of enlistment in a unit. Its application then was deemed necessary since a disproportionately large number of Negro veterans sought to remain in the Army—more than the designated Negro units could absorb. The alternative would have been to establish more Negro units; this the Army was reluctant to do in view of the continuing studies of the policies affecting the Negro and the possibilities of basic changes.

The postwar studies had already resulted in increased opportunities for Negro soldiers in that specially qualified Negroes could be assigned to "overhead units," and composite groups of white and Negro units were authorized. The Army and civilian policy actions and reviews resulted in further changes. On 1 October 1949, the Army opened all service jobs and schools to qualified soldiers, regardless of race, and abolished racial quotas for attendance at schools. On 16 January 1950, special Army regulations were issued identifying the basic policy of "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Army without regard to race, color, religion or national origin." In March 1950, the Army abolished the recruiting quota system for enlistments.

By not designating additional Negro units surplus to the needs of the Army force structure, additional changes in procedures were made inevitable. A surge of Negro enlistments occurring through August 1950, following the removal of the quota restrictions, reached approximately one-fourth of the total enlistments. The training divisions receiving the recruits soon met the problem by assigning Negroes in the same units with white soldiers, rather than attempting to train overstrength Negro companies alongside understrength white companies or having groups of either race wait for unit space in established companies.

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea coincided almost exactly with the abolition of the racial quota and the unpremeditated initiation of integrated units. These two new policies were to be tested in the war in Korea; the findings would aid in determining future policy developments.

It occurred to the researchers that, in line with Army studies and experience, an over-all policy of integration of Negro with white troops might be one possible solution to the problem of more effective use of Negro manpower in the Army. Both the Navy and Air Force also had taken steps in this direction. In terms of numbers involved and personnel assignments, the problem for the Army is greater and much more acute. As the ORO study progressed, it became evident that the basic obstacle to efficient utilization of Negro manpower in the Army was segregation, thereby identifying integration as one of the principal problems to be considered.

SUMMARY

With such a focal point established, one set of specific objectives of the study was pointed toward determining how well integration had worked in Korea, how far it had gone, how whites and Negroes had reacted to it, and most importantly, what effect, if any, integration had had on the performance of the Negro soldier and on the units which received the Negro soldier. In addition, an attempt was made to determine whether integration would be feasible within the US, in view of the special conditions which might militate against it.

Various approaches were utilized in arriving at answers to the different questions. Research studies were conducted both in Korea, among the front lines and the rear areas, and in the US. A wide range of techniques of the social sciences was considered in determining the methods for collecting and analyzing the data. The pertinent items of the results are identified here in a summary of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of this study on the utilization of Negro manpower in the Army.* The data on which these items are based form the substance of the entire report that follows this Summary.

FINDINGS

Negro Manpower in the Armed Services: (a) Negroes currently represent approximately one-eighth of the Army's strength and will stabilize between 10 and 15 percent; they now represent approximately one-tenth of the total US population. (b) Negroes in large numbers fall into the two least qualified groups as determined by Army classification tests. If segregation is complete, Negro units will have about 62 percent low-scoring personnel as rated by the Army's intelligence and aptitude tests in contrast to 33 percent for white units and an Army average of 37 percent. (c) In 1951, 58 percent of Negro enlisted personnel were assigned to service branches and 42 percent to the combat arms, in contrast to 88 percent and 12 percent during World War II.

Performance: (a) The all-Negro combat unit of regimental size or larger is less reliable than comparable all-white units. The effectiveness of small Negro units is variable. (b) Negroes perform better in integrated than in all-Negro combat units, according to the judgments of officers with experience in integrated units in Korea. Individual behavior data indicate that performance of Negroes in integrated units approximates that of white soldiers in the same units. (c) The presence of one, two, or three Negroes in a squad appears not to affect adversely the squad's performance in combat. Insufficient data are available to determine whether this holds true for larger numbers of Negroes per squad.

Leadership: (a) The concentration of low-scoring personnel in all-Negro units limits the availability of leadership talent for such units. (b) White officers commanding all-Negro units tend to attribute their problems to race; white officers commanding integrated units tend to regard their problems as military. (c) The data confirm the findings of previous Army studies that Negro soldiers do not prefer white officers but accept them on the basis of merit. Interview data indicate that efficient Negro noncoms and company-grade officers are accepted by whites.

Morale: The addition of limited numbers of Negroes to a previously all-white unit does not lower the morale of whites in that unit. The morale of Negroes is raised.

* It should be remembered that the findings and conclusions are based on the manpower utilization situation of 1951 as pointed up by the research studies.

Integration: (a) SR 600-629-1, "Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army," 16 January 1950, does not commit the Army to a policy of integration. It may be construed as permitting it. It does not provide for assignment of whites to Negro units (reverse integration). (b) Virtually all Negro soldiers, regardless of region of origin or type of unit, are in favor of integration. (c) Indications are that white soldiers in predominantly Negro units and those serving in all-white units adjacent to large all-Negro units are generally the most opposed to integration. Soldiers in all-white combat units, however strongly opposed they may be to the idea of integration, indicate that they would show no overt hostility toward Negro replacements. (d) In most situations, attitudes of white soldiers toward serving in the same units with Negroes become more favorable as a result of experience with integration. (e) Integration has been generally accepted by white soldiers in all-white federalized National Guard units surveyed in this study. (f) Two Negroes per squad is the number most often given as the maximum level of integration for combat squads by officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units. (g) There is not sufficient experience on which to determine a maximum level of integration or to judge the feasibility of reverse integration.

Off-Duty Relations: (a) Integration within military units tends to increase biracial association in off-duty activities on the post. (b) In general, the closer the personal contact involved in a given social activity, the less willing are white soldiers to accept biracial participation in it. The off-duty facilities of the military post can be arranged roughly on a scale which indicates the relative degrees of tension produced by interracial contacts. From "most acceptable" to "least acceptable" to white soldiers are: post buses; post-exchange shopping facilities; post theaters; athletic areas, except swimming pools; service clubs; noncommissioned officers' messes, officers' messes, and snack bars; housing areas; post schools; swimming pools; and dance halls. (c) The incidents in which Negro soldiers are likely to come in conflict with local racial customs are most apt to relate to admittance to or service in civilian shops, restaurants, bars, and theaters. (d) The interview data indicate that integration on the post is considered by local civilians as a military policy which bears little relationship to community affairs.

CONCLUSIONS

1. *The continued existence of racial segregation limits the effectiveness of the Army.* It results in the concentration of low-scoring personnel, which, in turn, intensifies problems of leadership, training, and command. The low average qualification of personnel in a Negro unit limits its adaptability and encourages the concentration of Negroes in a few service branches where lack of qualification is less vital than in combat. The concentration of low-scoring personnel in all-Negro combat units results in generally inadequate performance; this causes a wide variation in the reliability of units, which hinders their tactical employment.

2. *Integration enhances the effectiveness of the Army.* Under it, full use can be made of the skills (such as leadership and technical abilities) of all individuals. Poorly qualified Negro personnel can be spread throughout the Army in the same manner as poorly qualified white personnel. Under integration, the combat performance of Negro soldiers tends to approach or equal the performance of white soldiers with whom they are serving. Finally,

it makes possible the more efficient tactical disposition of units by reducing wide differences in their reliability.

3. *The Army-wide extension of integration is feasible.* Integration has been effected and is working in a sufficient variety of units and under a sufficient variety of circumstances to justify its extension. The performance of a unit in combat or garrison is not adversely affected when integration is carried out under the usual circumstances in which Negroes are a minority. A maximum of 15–20 percent Negro personnel seems to be an effective interim working level. Those racial difficulties involving military personnel which might arise out of personal feelings and local racial customs should not present insurmountable obstacles.

4. *No quota limitation is necessary at this time (1951).* Population projections indicate that the Negro component of the Army will remain stable at between 10 and 15 percent of strength (assuming that present selection standards are maintained).

It is interesting to note that today, in 1963, the applications of the policy of integration are generally in line with the conclusions developed in these ORO studies of 1951.

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UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER IN THE ARMY: A 1951 STUDY

PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

A basic factor in effective utilization of Negro manpower pertains to the qualifications of that manpower.

While Negroes as a group meet the Army's physical requirements as well as, and in some instances slightly better than, the whites, the group is less qualified in aptitude and achievement, education, and economic experience. These disadvantages are reflected in all considerations of the utilization of Negro manpower in the Army.

Currently (1951) Negroes represent approximately one-eighth of the total Army strength, a somewhat larger proportion than they represent in the total US population. In January 1950, 60 percent of the Negro enlisted men, in contrast to 29 percent of the white enlisted men, were among the least qualified according to aptitude-achievement test ratings. The high proportion of poorly qualified Negroes identifies in some measure the problem which the Army has in training and placing its Negro manpower within the military organization.

Aptitude and Achievement

The Army employs the Army General Classification Test (AGCT) and, more recently, the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) as measures of aptitude and appropriate assignment. Achievement in these tests reflects differences in educational and economic backgrounds of Negro and white soldiers.* Not only are the average test ratings lower for Negroes, but also proportionately more Negroes than whites are rejected for military service for failing to meet minimum educational standards. However, the margin of difference between Negroes and whites has lessened in recent years.

While increased numbers of Americans in each generation have been getting more formal schooling, the increase has been especially noticeable in recent years in the South, where more than two-thirds of the nation's Negroes live. In 1950 the proportions of white and Negro soldiers in the least educated group were approximately equal, with the difference in education appearing within the high-school level.

In economic status, the Negro is heavily represented in the less skilled and lower-paid categories of employment. For example, the average earnings of nonfarm Negro families are about half those of nonfarm white families. But the economic status of the Negro has risen considerably in the past ten years. Negroes are employed in many more office and selling jobs and increasingly as craftsmen, foremen, and in other types of skilled labor.

* For detailed data on education and economic factors, see App C, Part II (p C-II-1).

In relation to the Army's manpower problems, increases in both the level of education and occupational skills of the Negro are significant. The new tools, machines, and weapons of war and the new modes of warfare call for more and more highly qualified personnel. The census data on school attendance and on occupational skills indicate that Negroes may be expected to attain increasingly higher levels in the future. The time, however, when Negro educational and occupational status will approach that of the white is beyond the period for which the Army must now make its plans.

Comparative Ratings in Army Tests

The qualification differentials* show up markedly in a comparison of the scores achieved on the Army General Classification Test (AGCT) as shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF AGCT SCORES OF MEN IN ARMY, 1941–50

AGCT group	Grade range	Percentage distribution of scores for three periods					
		Mar 1941–May 1946		Mar 1949		Jan 1950[a]	
		White, %	Negro, %	White, %	Negro, %	White, %	Negro, %
I	130 and over	6	0	4	0	4	1
II	110–129	29	3	27	7	27	8
III	90–109	33	13	36	31	40	31
IV	60–89	26	48	30	58	28	54
V	59 and under	6	36	3	4	1	6

[a] Regular Army enlisted men only.

Proportionately, nearly twice as many Negroes as whites were in the two lowest categories during the 1941–50 period. A similar pattern of Negro-white differences appeared in the current Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). On the mechanical aptitude tests, Negroes scored much lower than whites — a result that might be expected, inasmuch as civilian opportunities for gaining mechanical experience in technical fields have been more limited for Negroes than for whites.

The problem of utilizing Negro personnel in the Army is essentially a problem of utilizing poorly qualified personnel. For the whole Army under present conditions, the proportion of low-scoring personnel in Groups IV and V is 37 percent. On a basis of complete segregation all-Negro units will have about 62 percent low-scoring personnel, and all-white units will have about 33 percent.

The Army has the continuing problem of how best to utilize all low-scoring personnel.† Though fewer in actual numbers, the Negro low-scoring personnel present a far greater problem than the white. Under established policy, the low-scoring white soldiers are scattered throughout the Army, so that they are "lost" in approximately 90 percent of the units. The poorly qualified Negro soldiers, on the other hand, are concentrated in

* Given in detail in App C, Part II(p C-II-1).

† Under the Marshall Directive of May 1951, procedures are being established to equalize the levels of manpower abilities in the various arms of the military services.

10 percent of the units. Hence, all-Negro units generally maintain a lower level of all-around military adaptability than all-white units, and are more usually used for service duties in construction battalions, port battalions, truck companies, and the like.

Leadership Factors

The corollary to the concentration of low-scoring personnel is the lack, at the other end of the scale, of persons qualified to serve in positions of leadership.

Army officer commissions depend on fulfilling educational requirements. There will continue to be a smaller proportion of Negro officers in relation to total Negro strength, because proportionately fewer Negroes have the qualifications for entering officer-candidate schools. In addition, within an average all-Negro unit there are relatively few men qualified for jobs requiring leadership and technical skill to serve as noncommissioned officers or specialists. This situation may be tolerable in garrison where the turnover of personnel is slow, but it is intolerable in battle where the requirements for replacements may be high.

Under the quota concept, the existing Negro units accommodated the Negroes accepted into the Army; hence, about the same percentage of Negroes as of whites held noncommissioned rank. Considering the lower average qualifications of Negroes, this meant that the opportunity for promotion was greater for Negroes than for whites in terms of relative qualifications, with a resulting lower level of leadership in the Negro troops. With more limited employment opportunities in civilian life, Negroes tend to remain in services longer than whites; this also enhances their chances to obtain higher ratings.

Poor leadership is reflected in poor training and poor performance. On the basis of the test scores, the commander of an all-Negro unit can expect about two-thirds of his men to fall into the two lowest groups. In such units, slow learners are apt to be taught by "slow" teachers.

In contrast, there is no comparable limitation among the whites on numbers of accredited applicants for commissions nor on qualified personnel for noncommissioned rank. While a commander of an all-white unit can expect about one-third of his men to fall into the two lowest aptitude groups, he usually has ample talent among the other two-thirds qualifying for leadership assignments.

The contrasts are apparent in the "X" Infantry Regiment, a composite unit of one Negro and two white battalions.* This particular regiment was selected as an example because it lived, trained, and worked as a unit, rather than as separate battalions. The median scores of the enlisted men in the battalion's lettered companies are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 indicates that the median scores for the white battalions are higher and have a smaller range than those for the Negro battalion. The grossly lower median scores of privates in the Negro battalion indicates that the battalion commander has depleted his reserves of better-qualified personnel for noncommissioned rank to a much greater extent than have the commanders in the white battalions.

The comparative levels of leadership within noncommissioned ratings and the range of opportunity for promotion are pointed up in the comparison of the numbers and ratings of officers of noncommissioned rank. In the 1st and 2d battalions, there were 203 and 156 men of sergeant rank, respectively. Fewer than one-fourth of these noncoms scored less than 81. In the Negro battalion, there were only 78 such noncoms, of whom nearly half scored less than 81. Hence, while qualified white corporals and privates had little chance for promotion, there were proportionally many more low-scoring Negroes holding

* The Negro complement totaled 36.6 percent of the entire regiment.

sergeant rank and many vacancies in the higher noncom ranks of the segregated Negro unit to be filled.

A realignment of the personnel of this regiment on an integrated basis indicates the differences in levels of leadership of segregated and integrated troops.

TABLE 2

MEDIAN APTITUDE AREA I SCORES, "X" INFANTRY REGIMENT, BY RANK

Rank	Battalion median scores			
	1st bn, white	2d bn, white	3d bn, Negro	Combined score
M/Sgt	99	105	89	100
Sfc	99	91	80	93
Sgt	89	91	85	89
Cpl	89	96	86	89
Pfc	90	102	76	90
Pvt (1 and 2)	90	98	71	81

Assuming that an infantry regiment requires 35–40 percent of its personnel for noncommissioned officers and specialist assignments, the all-Negro battalion of the "X" Infantry Regiment must draw heavily upon Groups IV and V personnel for leaders, while the all-white battalions can draw from the higher grades (see Table 2). If the personnel




Fig. 1—Leadership Requirements and Availability, Based on Aptitude Area I (AGCT) Scores, "X" Infantry Regiment, October 1951

of the regiment were mixed regardless of race, the leadership requirements could be met from Groups I, II, and the top level of III without difficulty, as indicated in Fig. 1.

Based on the distribution of personnel for the Army as a whole, a regiment made up of a representative sample of white enlisted men would be able to draw most of its leaders from Groups I and II and the remainder from the upper part of Group III. An all-Negro

regiment, similarly made up, would have to use all of Groups I, II, and III and also dip into Group IV. Not only would the all-Negro regiment have to rely on one of its least able groups for some of its leaders, it would have no depth of leadership to compensate for attrition. But if whites and Negroes were integrated in the approximate ratio of Negroes to total Army strength, the integrated regiment would have practically as rich a source of leaders as the all-white regiment (see Fig. 2).




Fig. 2—Leadership Requirements and Availability in the US Army, Based on Aptitude Area I (AGCT) Scores

On the basis of Army classification scores, the indications are that all-white units would not be reduced in leadership depth to any considerable extent when they received a proportionate number of Negro soldiers, but all-Negro units would undergo a remarkable improvement in adaptability when they received an Army-wide proportionate number of white soldiers.

Quota Restrictions

A review of population statistics and Army records of Negro acquisitions indicates that the proportion of Negroes to total Army strength will probably fluctuate around 8 to 13 percent. It should decline in the event of more intense mobilization. It might increase during a period of economic recession as a result of the decrease in number of civilian job opportunities.

The question of possible reestablishment of the quota concept rests primarily on whether the Army can maximize the utilization of the current or a slightly increased volume of manpower of lower average qualifications. Hence, in relation to the studies of utilization, the recommendation as to the quota is based on whether the present number of Negroes, representing 12.5 percent of the Army's manpower, can be used to the advantage of the Army. If utilization is effective at a level of 12–15 percent Negro, there is no cause for concern in the present and anticipated numerical balance.

The concept of the quota system represents not only a racial control but a technique to restrict the number of low-scoring personnel entering the military services. The current (1951) military study* of the feasibility of restrictive measures limiting the total number of low-qualified personnel entering the services, as well as the continuing research on the utilization of low-qualified personnel, could lead to a revision of entrance requirements.

In principle, a quota may seem expedient as a means of protecting the Army against a possible influx of low-scoring personnel with limited usefulness to the Army; in practice, it is not needed. Qualitative standards for acceptance into the Army constitute a more direct method and are more effective. A quota system only adds administrative impediments.

* Continuing studies of The Adjutant General's Office.

PERFORMANCE

The effectiveness with which Negro manpower may be utilized by the Army is directly dependent upon the efficiency with which Negroes, as individuals and in groups, perform their military duties. Until recently, the principal method of evaluating the performance of Negro troops in combat was to compare the performance of all-Negro units with the standards set by comparable all-white units in similar but only remotely comparable situations. The traditional views concerning the combat efficiency of Negroes were established largely on the basis of such comparisons. In other words, Negro unit performance was evaluated by the judgments of commanders as to how white units would have performed under such circumstances, or vice versa. There were few opportunities for direct simultaneous observation of both types of units in similar situations.

The integration of some US units in Korea late in 1950, in the same area where all-white and all-Negro units were fighting, made it possible to judge the effectiveness of the three types of organizations under more nearly comparable conditions. This summary of performance data is based largely upon research studies made among such troops on the battle lines and behind the lines in Korea.

Since the over-all objective was to determine the best pattern of use of Negro manpower to assure the efficiency of the Army, judgments of unit performance as well as individual performance within units were considered. The data are summarized under these topics:

Performance of all-Negro units in combat.
Performance of integrated units in combat.
Level of integration in combat units.
Performance of individual Negro soldiers in integrated combat units.

PERFORMANCE OF ALL-NEGRO UNITS

Information concerning the performance of all-Negro units in World War II and Korea was drawn primarily from Army studies and records, including evaluations by military investigators.* The judgments and opinions of competent military observers in both wars agreed in the evaluation of the combat performance of large all-Negro units as unsatisfactory.

A wartime investigating board appointed by the Commanding General of the Mediterranean Theater in World War II reported unsatisfactory performance for the 92d Infantry Division. A majority of officers testifying before the Gillem and Chamberlin Boards in the postwar period supported this view and reported similarly on many all-Negro regiments. Evidence was presented that these units suffered in effectiveness because of such weaknesses as susceptibility to panic, straggling, and carelessness in regard to equipment.

The World War II record was repeated in Korea. There too, large Negro units were reputed to suffer from straggling, malingering, loss of equipment, and panic under enemy assault. Such units required close officer supervision, constant exertion of discipline,

*The Korean evidence is given in greater detail in App C, Part I (p C-I-1).

and ever-present physical leadership on the battle front. Officer casualty rates were considerably higher in all-Negro units than in other units in Korea. The commander of one infantry regiment reported that the Negro battalion in his regiment had given a good account of itself, but its replacement needs had drained the good officers from his other battalions.

The all-Negro 24th Infantry Regiment was reported to be unreliable and unsatisfactory in combat, and was the subject of official investigations. Reports of the investigations were unanimous in recommending its dissolution.* At the same time, Maj Gen William B. Kean emphasized that criticism was directed toward the all-Negro unit, not the individual Negro soldiers. The testimony of white officers of the regiment again stressed factors such as "not to be trusted in combat" and "waste of equipment." One unofficial observer noted the unusual number of disciplinary incidents, including that of a lieutenant who withdrew his command from an outpost line without orders.†

Considerable improvement in morale and performance was noted for this regiment in Korea when its commanding officer set out to dispel exaggerated fears of the enemy and to restore the regiment's self-esteem. Various commanders, however, questioned whether the long effort expended was worth the time, the loss of equipment, and the loss of life it entailed.

The views of military observers in regard to performance of smaller all-Negro units showed greater variance than for the large units. During World War II a Negro tank battalion, an antiaircraft battalion, tank destroyer units, and field artillery units all gained praise in the European Theater. Probably the outstanding example of effective performance of all-Negro units occurred in the incident noted earlier when platoons of Negro infantry volunteers were assigned to depleted white infantry companies after the Battle of the Bulge. In Korea, too, many officers spoke highly of individual, small, all-Negro units.

The general consensus based on military experience seemed to be that large all-Negro combat units were unsatisfactory and unreliable. In sizes up to battalion strength, Negro units appeared to be satisfactory when led by well-trained, capable officers, although somewhat less satisfactory than comparable white units. The value of both the large and small Negro units in the combat lines was questioned primarily on the basis of performance effectiveness and excessive leadership requirements.

PERFORMANCE OF INTEGRATED UNITS

The Korean record of units racially integrated at the squad level indicated that the performance of squads containing from one to three Negroes was equal or nearly equal to that of comparable all-white units.

To evaluate the performance of integrated units using the performance of all-white units as a basis for comparison, evidence was drawn from a number of separate studies. In many the respondents were unaware of the intent to compare white and Negro performance. When an individual was asked to identify race, it was from a comprehensive listing including white, Nisei, Chinese-American, Negro, and Mexican. In several instances, the exact racial composition of the squads was identified subsequent to obtaining the individual reports.

Reported Incidents of Squad Behavior as a Team

In a study of incidents occurring during advances and withdrawals of units in combat, effective and ineffective actions were ascribed with approximately equal frequency to both

*See App A, Part IV, "Reports on the Performance of Negro Troops," p A-IV-14.
†This case was widely publicized in the newspapers of the time.

all-white and integrated squads.* The incidents were reported by 91 platoon lieutenants and sergeants who had had experience with integrated troops in Korea. Categories of incidents reflecting effective behavior included outstanding teamwork, aid to other units, and success in carrying out orders. Categories of ineffective behavior included lack of discipline and morale, lack of training, failure in carrying out orders, and general disorder. Such reporting required the leaders to recall and judge the squad's behavior as a team on the basis of fairly specific incidents.

The analysis of the incidents showed that there were no important differences in the effectiveness of integrated combat rifle squads in contrast to the all-white squads. In general, the similarities far outweighed the differences, as indicated in Tables 3 and 4.

TABLE 3

SQUADS SHOWING EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR DURING ADVANCE

Incident distribution	Squad combat behavior			
	Effective		Ineffective	
	Number	%	Number	%
All-white squads	54	59	45	49
Integrated squads	37	41	46	51
Total	91	100	91	100

Of the all-white and integrated squads described as showing effective behavior in an advance, a somewhat higher proportion were all white. Of those identified as showing ineffective behavior, the proportions for white and integrated were approximately equal.

TABLE 4

SQUADS SHOWING EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR DURING WITHDRAWAL

Incident distribution	Squad combat behavior			
	Effective		Ineffective	
	Number	%	Number	%
All-white squads	42	56	47	60
Integrated squads	34	44	29	40
Total	76	100	76	100

A higher proportion of white than integrated squads was described as exhibiting effective behavior in a withdrawal, but a higher proportion of white squads also was described as showing ineffective action.

*See App A, Part I, "Results and Related Conclusions of Forms I, II, and III and Documentary Evidence," p A-I-11.

Opinion Surveys on Performance

Further impressions on the performance of integrated versus white units were gathered in the course of an attitude survey in Korea in May and June 1951.* A comparison was made of the judgments of commanding officers and enlisted men of several all-white and integrated combat infantry units as to the performance of their own units in combat. There was no indication that the presence of Negroes was in any way related to the efficiency of a unit.

Regardless of racial composition, most units received a majority rating of "performed very well." Within the units there was general agreement among both officers and enlisted men in their evaluations, and white soldiers in integrated units rated the performance of their units as highly as did the white soldiers in all-white units.

Specific Aspects of Combat Behavior

When integrated and all-white units were compared in terms of specific aspects of combat behavior, rather than on over-all performance, the evidence supported the thesis that little or no difference existed between the two types of units in combat.

TABLE 5

COMPARISON OF INTEGRATED AND WHITE UNIT COMBAT BEHAVIOR BY MEN WITH INTEGRATION EXPERIENCE

Combat behavior	Surveyed in Korea,[a] 185 officers, %	Surveyed in US[b] 123 EM, %	78 officers, %
Aggressiveness in attack			
Integrated unit superior to white	2	2	1
Integrated unit equal to white	82	56	64
Integrated unit inferior to white	10	30	27
No answer	6	12	8
Degree of teamwork			
Integrated unit superior to white	5	9	9
Integrated unit equal to white	84	54	72
Integrated unit inferior to white	9	24	17
No answer	2	13	2
Morale			
Integrated unit superior to white	11	12	15
Integrated unit equal to white	84	71	75
Integrated unit inferior to white	4	9	9
No answer	1	8	1

[a] Predominantly white observers.
[b] All-white observers.

In an interview and questionnaire survey conducted in Korea and in the continental US, officers and enlisted men with combat experience in integrated units were asked to evaluate the "morale," "teamwork," and "aggressiveness in combat" of integrated units as compared with all-white outfits.† The results are presented in Table 5.

Approximately nine out of ten officers (predominantly white observers) contacted in Korea rated integrated units equal or superior to all-white units in the three behavior

* See App A, Parts III and IV.
† App A, Parts I and II.

aspects, and a majority of the officers and enlisted men, surveyed after their return to the US, held the same views. Each group of respondents ranked morale first, teamwork second, and aggressiveness in attack third. Of particular interest in regard to morale was the fact that from 11 to 15 percent of all the respondents believed that integrated combat units were superior to all-white units.

Summary

The analysis of the several studies points to the fact that performance of integrated units approximately equalled that of white units. Any margins of difference shown in individual studies are slight.

In comparing these reports of performance with those pertaining to all-Negro units, the indications are that Negroes as individual members of a unit perform better when serving in integrated units than in segregated units.

LEVEL OF INTEGRATION IN A COMBAT UNIT

If Negroes actually perform better in integrated than in segregated units, as the evidence suggests, is there a maximum or critical level of integration beyond which unit performance is impaired? The integrated units studied included, in most cases, from one to three Negroes per squad. Did the combat squad function as well with two Negroes as with one, as well with three Negroes as with two, and so on?

This question is of serious concern to the Army. The effort to achieve full utilization of a group constituting approximately one-eighth of the Army's total strength is of little value if, in the process, the efficiency of the remaining seven-eighths is impaired. However, it should be noted that only one Negro per squad equals the Negro percentage of the total US population, and two per squad substantially exceeds the Negro percentage in the Army.

The performance patterns of integrated units were discussed in the preceding section on the basis of comparisons with comparable all-white units. Studies were also directed both to determining the relation between performance and level of integration and to identifying the maximum percentage of Negroes which could be assimilated into a unit without lowering its efficiency.

Squad Performance

One method of investigating the relation of performance to level of integration was to analyze the racial composition of squads cited in the performance study as having shown particularly effective or ineffective action during combat advances and withdrawals. The incidents described by platoon lieutenants and sergeants provided relatively objective performance data on integrated rifle squads which varied in numbers of Negro members. The information was obtained without any reference to the racial composition of squads described, so that the influence of racial prejudice and bias on these data was at a minimum. The incident data are summarized on the basis of the racial composition of the squads in Tables 6 and 7.*

From this record of incidents, the squads with increasing percentages of Negroes were neither more effective nor ineffective than squads with small Negro percentages. By this measure, the performance pattern of integrated squads was not affected by the proportion of Negroes in each squad. However, the number of squads on which such data could be gathered was small, and no generalization can be made from these data alone.

*For detailed data, see App A, Part I, "Results and Related Conclusions of Forms I, II, and III and Documentary Evidence," p A-I-11.

The indication that there was no direct relation between number of Negroes per squad and performance effectiveness was supported by the ratings given by commanding officers on the morale, teamwork, and aggressiveness of integrated units in Korean combat situations. These data, as noted, were analyzed in the comparison of performance of integrated and all-white units. Further analysis of the data on integrated units was made on the basis of the number of Negroes in each unit. No indication was found that the proportion of Negroes in a unit was in any way related to the efficiency of the unit as rated by its commanding officer.

TABLE 6

COMBAT SQUADS WITH VARIED INTEGRATION LEVELS SHOWING EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR DURING ADVANCE

Squad combat behavior	Number squads cited when number Negroes per squad is:					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Effective	15	13	7	2	0	0
Ineffective	19	16	7	2	1	1

TABLE 7

COMBAT SQUADS WITH VARIED INTEGRATION LEVELS SHOWING EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE BEHAVIOR DURING WITHDRAWAL

Combat behavior	Number squads cited when number Negroes per squad is:					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Effective	21	5	6	2	0	0
Ineffective	15	11	4	1	0	0

In a poll of officers at one integrated training division in the US, there was a wide variance in views as to efficiency of units containing varying numbers of Negroes. For the same companies, however, the ratings of regimental commanders in the end-of-cycle inspections indicated no relation between the ratio of Negroes to whites and the unit performance (shown in Table 8).*

Maximum Level of Integration

Except in the training divisions in the US, existing levels of integration are generally low; hence judgments as to maximum level are based on conjecture rather than experience.†

The opinions of officers and men who served in integrated units in Korea indicated that the number of Negroes in an integrated squad should not exceed one, two, or perhaps

*See also App B, Part I, "Performance," p B-I-40.

†For detailed information on maximum integration levels, see App A, Part I, "Opinions, Shown on ORO Questionnaire, of Combat-Experienced Officers Commanding Integrated Units," p A-I-46. See also App A, Part II, "Findings from Questionnaire Responses," p A-II-7.

TABLE 8

PERFORMANCE RELATED TO NEGRO-WHITE RATIO, FROM END-OF-CYCLE RATINGS OF TRAINING COMPANIES

Negro percentage in each company	Number units at each performance level		
	Above average	Average	Below average
1- 5	2	4	0
6- 9	5	5	0
10-35[a]	4	2	2[b]
63-92	2	2	0

[a] No companies reported in the 36-62 percent classification.
[b] These two units, one 34 percent and one 35 percent Negro, were reported by division officers to have had a high proportion of physically classified "C" profile personnel, both Negro and white, which limited their assignments.

three. When questioned as to the highest level of integration possible without lowering the efficiency of the nine-man squad, 157 respondents of 386 interviewed selected two Negroes per squad as the maximum. Table 9 summarizes the opinions of these experienced personnel as to effective levels of integration.

TABLE 9

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF NEGROES DESIRABLE IN INTEGRATED COMBAT SQUADS[a]

Maximum desirable squad integration	Percent of squad strength	Opinions surveyed in Korea,[b] 185 officers, %	Opinions surveyed in US[c]	
			78 officers, %	123 EM, %
No Negroes	—	4	4	10
1 Negro	11	14	32	11
2 Negroes	22	47	33	36
3 Negroes	33	28	14	19
4-5 Negroes	44-55	6	8	16
6-8 Negroes	66-88	0	1	2
No response	—	1	8	6

[a] Opinions of officers and enlisted men who had commanded or served in integrated combat units.
[b] Predominantly white observers.
[c] All-white observers.

The opinions of officers interviewed in Korea tended toward a higher proportion of Negroes than those of officers interviewed in the States, based on the top preferences of the Korean officers in the order of two, three, and one and the top preferences of stateside officers for two, one, and three. Among the enlisted men, all of whom were interviewed in the States, the top preference again was for two Negroes per squad; other choices indicated a wider range of opinion as to the maximum than was shown by the officers.

When asked what might happen if the recommended maximum level were exceeded, the most frequent response was that Negroes would form cliques and divide the squad into racial groups. Many responded simply that the combat efficiency of the whole unit would decline.

There are some indications that the assignment of white soldiers to Negro units in what may be called "reverse integration" creates a less favorable atmosphere. Other than in the training divisions, reverse integration has resulted in large part from the assignment of white specialists to Negro units. In the few cases studied, the situation caused no trouble. However, more of the white trainees in units containing a Negro majority were opposed to integration than in units containing the smaller proportion of Negroes.

It might be well to permit commanders who are satisfied that military efficiency will not suffer to establish reverse integration in selected units to provide a basis for judgment on its effectiveness.

Summary

Objective behavior data which have been collected on the combat performance of integrated units with varying proportions of Negroes indicate no clear-cut relationship between the Negro-white ratio and unit efficiency. Squads containing one, two, and three Negroes did not appear to differ significantly in their combat performance in Korea. Similarly, the proportion of Negroes in companies in a US training division had no relation to commanders' ratings of unit performance. According to the judgment of a majority of officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated combat units, however, the number of Negroes to be placed in an integrated combat squad should not exceed one, two, or three Negroes.

PERFORMANCE OF NEGROES IN INTEGRATED UNITS

The emphasis thus far has been on unit performance, the behavior of groups of men, rather than on individual performance. In combat, especially in modern warfare, it is unit performance which seems to be of primary importance. It is obvious, however, that the abilities, proficiencies, and behavior characteristics of the individuals in the unit play major roles in determining its effectiveness.

It is of practical significance here to consider the Negro soldier as an individual and to compare his combat efficiency with that of the white soldier in an integrated unit. To obtain information on pertinent questions, a number of types of evidence were considered. An analysis of the aptitude test scores and other service records of individual Negroes indicated that the sample of integrated Negro troops observed in this study tended to be fairly representative of all Negroes in the Army.

Combat Behavior Observed by Squad Members and Leaders

The reports on combat behavior indicated no substantial differences in the frequency with which Negro and white soldiers exhibited great or little courage, skill, or morale in combat. As part of a study of combat performance in Korea, a comparison was made of the relative frequency with which desirable and undesirable behaviors were exhibited by Negro and white members of 21 rifle companies.* The average frequencies of six types of combat behavior are given in Table 10.

Whether observed by whites or Negroes, favorable behavior was reported more often than unfavorable. In categories where differences appeared, the higher frequencies for desirable behavior reported by the white observers generally favored the white soldier; those reported by the Negro observers generally favored the Negro. But the emphasis on racial differences was slight. The similarities for the two races far outweighed the differences. The comparatively minor differences identified for the white and Negro observer

* See App A, Part I, "Results and Related Conclusions of Forms I, II, and III and Documentary Evidence," p A-I-11.

groups indicated that the combat squad members judged their mates quite consistently by actual behavior and not by prejudice.

In the record of incidents in which individual soldiers were especially helpful or failed to do their share in accomplishing particular missions, the total of ineffective incidents indicated a somewhat larger proportion of less-proficient Negro soldiers, but the number of effective incidents indicated only slightly fewer outstanding Negro than white soldiers. Here again the differences were not large. However, this sample was small; the incidents, reported by 103 platoon leaders in integrated units, involved 187 white and only 19 Negro soldiers.

TABLE 10

FREQUENCIES OF COMBAT BEHAVIOR OBSERVED IN NEGRO AND WHITE SQUAD MEMBERS

Men observed [a]	Observers' races	Average frequencies of observed behavior (Lowest possible score 0.0; highest possible score 3.0)					
		Courage, aggressiveness	Lack of courage	Judgment, skill	Lack of skill	Good morale under stress	Poor morale
1563 white	White	1.0	0.3	1.1	0.3	1.5	0.3
359 white	Negro	0.8	0.3	1.2	0.3	1.6	0.2
221 Negro	White	0.9	0.3	1.0	0.3	1.4	0.2
97 Negro	Negro	1.1	0.3	1.3	0.4	1.8	0.3

[a] Reported by fellow squad members in integrated rifle companies.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF FAVORABLE CRITICAL INCIDENTS INVOLVING NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS

Combat behavior	Racial distribution of incidents of favorable behavior			
	Negro		White	
	Number	%	Number	%
Minimized wounds	11	7.5	19	11.2
Rescue activities	15	10.3	14	8.3
Helped others	13	8.9	10	5.9
Leadership activities	27	18.5	32	18.9
Judgment and skill	13	8.9	27	16.0
Followed orders	40	27.4	32	18.9
Aggressive action	19	13.0	29	17.2
General comments	8	5.5	6	3.6
Total	146	100.0	169	100.0

Critical incidents pertaining to outstanding and inferior performance of white and Negro soldiers as reported by 185 officers with integration experience indicated no important differences in the types of combat behavior selected as being outstanding for the Negro soldiers in contrast to the white. The types of incidents representing inferior performance were also essentially the same, with the exception that more of the Negroes were described as showing poor care of equipment while more of the white soldiers were described as displaying poor leadership. Tables 11 and 12 summarize the distribution of

favorable and unfavorable incidents among Negro and white soldiers as reported by this group of officers interviewed in Korea.*

TABLE 12

DISTRIBUTION OF UNFAVORABLE CRITICAL INCIDENTS INVOLVING NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS

Combat behavior	Racial distribution of incidents of unfavorable behavior			
	Negro		White	
	Number	%	Number	%
Ran from enemy	19	22.3	18	20.0
Poor care of equipment	11	13.0	4	4.4
Lazy or poor attitude	17	20.0	11	12.2
Took advantage of others	3	3.5	6	6.7
Malingered	11	13.0	13	14.4
Refused to move forward	9	10.6	11	12.2
Poor leadership	3	3.5	14	15.6
General comments	12	14.1	13	14.5
Total	85	100.0	90	100.0

Results of Opinion Surveys

An over-all evaluation of the Negro soldier as a fighter was made in a number of opinion surveys conducted in Korea and in the continental US. One summary based on these studies is presented in Table 13.

TABLE 13

COMPARISON OF NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS AS FIGHTERS[a]

Responses	Opinions of men with combat integration experience				Opinions of men without combat integration experience			
	Surveyed in US		Surveyed in Korea		Surveyed in US			Surveyed in Korea, 195 EM, %
	123 EM, %	78 officers, %	1024 EM, %	185 officers, %[b]	38 EM, %	72 officers, %	385 officers (training divisions), %[b]	
Negroes are better fighters	0	1	1	1	0	3	0	0
Negroes are just about as good	47	69	50	74	29	34	23	31
Negroes are not as good	53	25	48	22	58	37	46	66
No answer	0	5	1	3	13	26	31	3

[a] All-white observers except as noted.
[b] Predominantly white observers.

* See App A, Part I, "Opinions, Shown on ORO Questionnaire, of Combat-Experienced Officers Commanding Integrated Units," p A-I-46.

Men who had no opportunity to observe Negro soldiers fighting in integrated units more frequently rated the Negro as inferior to the white soldier in his ability to fight. Men who had direct personal experience commanding or serving in integrated combat units, however, more frequently rated the Negro soldier as equal.

Enlisted men with integration experience surveyed were fairly evenly divided in their opinions as to whether the Negro soldier was as good a fighter as the white soldier. The officers with experience had a more favorable opinion of the fighting ability of the Negro soldier — from two-thirds to three-fourths of them reported the Negro equal to the white soldier in over-all fighting ability.

The more favorable opinions of men with integration experience are also shown in the comparison of the views of the experienced officers and the opinions of inexperienced stateside officers as to specific combat reactions of Negroes (shown in Table 14).

TABLE 14

SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF NEGRO PERFORMANCE IN INTEGRATED UNITS

Combat aspects in which Negro performance equals white	Opinions of officers surveyed in US[a]		Opinions of officers surveyed in Korea,[b] 185 commanding integrated units, %
	72 without Korean integration experience, %	78 with Korean integration experience, %	
Season to combat and acquire combat skills	29	58	66
Maintain weapons in good condition	49	83	90
Use weapons and ammunition effectively	31	57	78
Carry out orders to the letter	35	53	73
Are observant and alert in scouting and patrol work	42	52	61
Use good judgment in getting out of tough spot in combat	32	47	68
Hold ground in hand-to-hand combat	29	42	61
Stand up under mass attack	35	67	76
Go to pieces as result of sustained combat	42	62	78
Are preoccupied with fears of death or injury	39	54	77

[a] All-white observers.
[b] Predominantly white observers.

As Table 14 indicates, only a minority of those officers who lacked personal integration experience rated Negro soldiers equal to white soldiers in these aspects of combat performance.* On the other hand, a large majority of officers interviewed in Korea at the time they were in command of integrated units rated the performance of Negro soldiers as equal. Of the officers with integration experience who were contacted after their return to the US, a somewhat smaller majority rated Negro soldiers on a par with whites. These

*For further data, see App A: Table A9 (p A-I-48) and Table A17 (p A-II-10).

officers participated in the integration experiment during its early stages and hence may not have had as much satisfactory experience with it as did men who served in the later stages.

The same pattern of higher ratings on Negro performance by officers with integration experience was shown in the survey of training divisions in the continental US. Comparative ratings on military characteristics of Negroes by 385 officers in an integrated training division and 233 officers on posts where Negroes were segregated are summarized in Table 15.

TABLE 15

COMPARISON OF NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS' MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS*

Rating scale	Ratings by men in integrated divisions and posts maintaining segregation					
	Job performance		Equipment care		Response to orders	
	Segregated, %	Integrated, %	Segregated, %	Integrated, %	Segregated, %	Integrated, %
Negroes better than whites	3	4	0	1	3	4
Negroes as good as whites	17	61	34	55	43	63
Negroes worse than whites	79	28	65	40	53	31
No answer	1	7	1	4	1	2

* Ratings given in US by 385 officers in an integrated training division and 233 officers on posts where Negroes were segregated.

Again, officers who had direct experience with Negroes in integrated units were far more likely to say that "Negroes are as good as whites" in job performance, equipment care, and response to orders than were officers who had experience with Negroes only in segregated units.

The significant differences between integration-experienced and -inexperienced officers' ratings on these items suggest that service in integrated units results in improved performance on the part of the Negro soldier.

Summary

When the individual Negro soldier in an integrated unit is compared with the white soldier, the evidence from objective behavior data indicates that there is very little difference in their combat performance. Ratings by officers and men who had experience with Negroes in integrated combat units also indicate that the individual Negro soldier is as effective or nearly as effective as the white soldier. Officers who have not had first-hand experience with integration, however, are less likely to consider Negro soldiers on a par with white soldiers.

LEADERSHIP AND MORALE

The analysis of aptitude ratings presented in the chapter on personnel qualifications indicated that the spread of leadership talent throughout all segments of the Army was a major benefit to be achieved under integration. Under such a policy, appointments to leadership jobs would be made on the same basis as other job assignments — that of qualification. While respondents in Korea and the continental US almost unanimously favored the assignment of qualified Negroes to all types of combat and service jobs, the assignment of officer ratings to Negroes in integrated units is generally regarded as one of the more sensitive areas in the problem of integration.

Various other factors pertaining to morale have been identified in previous Army investigations as tending to make integration both undesirable and impractical.* One is the contention that the mixture of races would create such friction that performance would be impaired. Another is the fear that an influx of Negroes with the lower Army test scores would tend to deflate morale and thereby adversely affect efficiency.

The attitude surveys revealed that many men in all-white units in Korea and the US held similar views. They, too, anticipated a wide social gap between the races, conflicts within mixed groups, and reduced efficiency in integrated units. On the other hand, the white soldiers in integrated units predicted such antagonisms and conflicts much less frequently.

To obtain information regarding troop attitudes toward current situations and possible utilization practices, questionnaires and interview schedules were designed to draw out opinions on topics such as interracial relations, morale, the combat value and leadership potential of Negro soldiers, and the types of jobs and units to which Negroes should be assigned. When the questionnaire responses of soldiers in all-white units were compared with those of white soldiers in integrated units with comparable backgrounds and military experience, it could be assumed that differences in attitudes would reflect the differences in experience with Negro troops.

Leadership †

Since Negroes in positions of leadership are relatively rare in the US, it was thought that white soldiers might be reluctant, or might actually refuse, to take orders from Negro officers and noncoms. There was no evidence in the Korean or US data to support this assumption. This does not mean that there was neither resistance nor predictions of trouble.

* Testimony offered before the Chamberlin Committee, "Report of the Board of Officers on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army," Feb 1950, p. 4; also AGF Memo (S) for WD, G-3, 11 Nov 1942, referred to by Maj B. I. Wiley, in "The Training of Negro Troops," Study 36, Historical Sec AGF, 1946, pp. 2-3.

† The leadership factor is significant in many of the questionnaires and interviews covered in the appendices. Specific references include: App A, Part IV, "Reactions to Negro and White Leadership" and "Army Integration Policy and the Leadership Role"; and App B, Part I, "Leadership in Negro and Integrated Units."

Many of the men indicated various degrees of personal dislike, and forecast various reactions to the possibility of serving under Negro leadership. However, in units headed by Negro officers or noncoms, such predictions of trouble did not materialize.

Problems of Unit Leaders. There was a pronounced difference in general outlook between white officers commanding Negro troops in Negro units and those commanding Negroes in integrated units as to problems confronted. In general, the problems of leadership in Negro units appeared to be more numerous and perplexing than in all-white or integrated units. Seemingly, the same problems lost some of their significance in integrated units. If and when they occurred, they generally remained the responsibility of individual noncoms rather than progressing to the attention of troop commanders at higher echelons. From the officers' point of view, leaders commanding integrated units were primarily concerned with their missions and had few problems in race relations.

Officer Preferences among Negroes. The belief that Negro soldiers prefer white officers is quite common among white officers and enlisted men. However, surveys made in World War II showed that Negro troops overwhelmingly preferred Negro officers;* the recent studies in Korea and the US showed a similar pattern. The majority of the opinions of the Negro soldiers interviewed assumed one of two positions: that color did not matter so long as a man was a good officer or that they preferred Negro officers. The latter preference seemed to be due largely to the fear that a white officer would be prejudiced.

The fear of prejudice also appeared to be the Negroes' major concern when considering opportunity for advancement under a policy of integration. However, so long as they felt assured that promotions would be based on merit, they appeared willing to take their chances along with other soldiers.

Reactions to Negro Leadership. Opinions about Negro noncoms and officers appeared to be no more and no less varied than were soldier opinions of white officers, including responses such as "the best" or "no good." In some instances, references to individuals as Negroes were appended, but judgment as to quality of performance seemed to be the major criterion of judgment.

The questionnaire responses of the officers with integration experience interviewed in Korea (predominantly white observers) indicated that 88 percent of that group believed that "Negro leaders lead by personal example and stay with their men in combat just as much as white leaders." Over two-thirds believed that "hazardous combat missions will succeed equally well if led by either a Negro or a white soldier."

The incidents of Negro leadership cited by white soldiers indicated that Negro leaders experienced few of the difficulties projected in the apprehensions of white soldiers. Once a noncom or officer assignment or promotion for a Negro became an accomplished fact, the men in integrated units adjusted without overt hostility — for many white soldiers a situation to be accepted pragmatically, if not enthusiastically, as are so many situations in Army life.

By and large, Negro leadership in integrated units appeared to present no special problems. Negro officers and noncoms were, in general, accepted within the framework of military discipline and were judged in terms of their performance as leaders, regardless of the personal attitudes of the men they led.

* Stouffer, S. A., *et al.*, *The American Soldier*, Vol. 1, Chart 16, p. 581.

Morale

Two main questions arise regarding the effect of integration upon morale: First, will the presence of Negroes lower the morale of the white troops? Second, how will it affect the morale of the Negro troops? *

The definition of "morale" is elusive, for it is made up of a complex of factors. The troop surveys in Korea and the US were based on the men's general evaluation of the morale of their units, reactions to unit leaders, job satisfaction, personal adjustment, and commitment to the military campaign.

There were some indications that the presence of Negroes in a unit not only does not lower the morale of the unit, but actually improves it. Seemingly the morale of the individual Negro soldier is lifted by a transfer from a segregated to an integrated unit. However, the surveys revealed no *real* differences in the morale of integrated and segregated units whether in combat or in training.

From the Army point of view, high unit morale in all-white and integrated units is an asset, but in an all-Negro unit may represent a disturbing factor. There is some evidence that high morale in segregated Negro units may reflect group cohesion based upon awareness and resentment of presumed discrimination — a type of morale which may arouse the concern, rather than the approval, of their officers.

Responses to the interviews, particularly in Korea, suggested that segregated units of the one color resented segregated units of the other color. In all-white units, the men complained about colored soldiers "getting all the ratings and soft jobs behind the lines." On the other hand, men in all-Negro units felt discriminated against. The soldiers in one such unit complained, after two months in the combat line, that they had been singled out for the assignment.

In integrated units these feelings of unfavorable and unfair treatment had no racial basis and represented the normal soldier's gripes. All the men in one mixed unit bitterly resented their regiment's experience of two months in the line, but neither the Negro nor the white soldiers referred to the injustices as personal or racial affronts.

Both Negro and white soldiers agreed that the morale of the Negro soldier is improved when he is placed in an integrated unit. A sense of participation in the common effort seemed to replace the antagonism and fear of discrimination quite prevalent in segregated units. One Negro pioneer in integration "wanted a few more Negroes around to talk to once in awhile," but expressions such as this were exceptions and were often followed by an observation such as "things would improve for those who come after."

Behavior Patterns Predicted and Advocated for Interracial Situations. When Pfc Joe Doakes, the white soldier of the questionnaire series, met situations offering several alternatives, white soldiers averse to serving in integrated units rarely predicted hostile behavior on Joe's part.† Generally, the white troops in Korea replied that if they disliked a situation involving interracial contact, they would be more likely to withdraw than be antagonistic. The reactions of some 1400 infantrymen, summarized in Table 16, are representative. Even the Southern National Guardsmen contacted in the US, the group showing the highest proportion of strong objections to service with Negroes, did not anticipate aggressive action from Joe Doakes. No doubt the realities of military discipline tempered personal views to some degree.

* For a detailed discussion of morale findings, see: App A, Part III, "Detailed Analysis of Questionnaire Responses" and Tables A50–A78; App A, Part IV, "Adjustment to Integration"; and App B, Part I, "Morale and Personal Adjustment."

† For the Joe Doakes questions, see App A, Part IV, "Questionnaire and Further Tabulation of Responses"; for summary tables, see App A, Part IV, Tables A101–A144.

TABLE 16

BEHAVIOR PREDICTED AND ADVOCATED FOR HYPOTHETICAL SOLDIER JOE DOAKES IN INTERRACIAL SITUATIONS*

Projected interracial situations	Percent of responses predicting and advocating each type of behavior					
	Hostile behavior		Avoidance Behavior		Favorable behavior	
	Predicted, %	Advocated, %	Predicted, %	Advocated, %	Predicted, %	Advocated, %
Unit integration with Negro noncoms	5	1	46	33	43	61
Unit integration with Negro majority	3	1	61	46	32	48
Integrated seating at movies	4	3	56	50	35	41
Integrated service club	8	4	42	29	45	61
Street fight between Negro and white soldier	21	10	15	12	58	73
Using services of Negro Army dentist	14	11	30	15	51	68
Negro soldier talking to white soldier's Korean girl friend	29	18	33	37	32	37

* Responses are those of 1407 white combat infantrymen. "No answer" on individual items averaged 5 percent of the total responses

When Joe Doakes was described as having been assigned as a replacement to a unit containing Negro noncommissioned officers or in which Negro personnel were in the majority, only 3–5 percent of the white respondents predicted that they would try to "make things tough" for the Negro noncoms or "goof off." But larger proportions predicted avoidance behavior in such situations than in situations where white soldiers were in the majority. Apparently, many of the men would have attempted to transfer out of reversely integrated units.

Aggressive behavior was predicted most often in the situation in which Joe discovered a Negro soldier talking to his Korean girl friend. Although this situation touched one of the most controversial areas in Negro-white relations, it is probable that a number of men would have predicted similar reactions if any soldier, regardless of color, had been thought to be poaching.

On the whole, aggressive behavior was seldom predicted and rarely advocated, especially in interracial situations directly under military control. For all situations described, more than 66 percent of the predictions indicated favorable or avoidance behavior; more than 80 percent of the respondents prescribed such behavior as what one *should* do.

Actual Troop Reactions to Interracial Situations. The accounts of troop behavior under integration in Korea substantiated the predictions. Men with integration experience indicated that white troops usually adopted "wait and see" attitudes on receiving news of Negro replacements. The soldiers who were most opposed to integration tended to withdraw from interracial controversy rather than promote it. This did not mean that no friction occurred, but reports of open conflict were rare. Those that were reported

generally occurred among segregated garrison units in Japan or the US, and then in situations which were less directly under control of the military, such as off-the-post contacts. The weight of military authority was such that, in Korea, integration was accomplished without overt hostility regardless of individual attitudes.

As to efficiency, there was little criticism of the Negro personnel. There were a number of instances in which the performance of Negro replacements was so much better than had been expected that explanations were rationalized. In some cases, such efficiency was attributed to special selection of replacements by the Army Command, which was not the case.

Allowance should be made, however, for the favorable circumstances in Korea in which the integration of Negro troops took place. South Korean soldiers had previously been integrated in a number of US divisions, and small units of other United Nations troops were attached to those divisions. In contrast to the contacts with foreign soldiers involving language and cultural barriers, the integration of Negro troops presented relatively few problems. Even so, the Korean experience was not unlike that reported for composite units in which Negroes and whites served during World War II.*

Summary

The surveys pertaining to the leadership factor identified no specific stumbling blocks to the success of white and Negro officers serving in integrated units. Success in this capacity is based primarily on abilities and characteristics of individuals. Hence, the uniform spread of leadership talent throughout the Army (projected as an advantage in the section on personnel qualifications and assignments) is feasible. In practice, it should prove one of the major gains obtained from a policy of integration.

As to the elusive factor of morale, the surveys indicated no significant differences as to the levels of morale among all-white, all-Negro, and mixed units. They did show that the assignment of Negroes to a formerly all-white group did not lower unit morale and possibly tended to improve it. And there was general agreement among both whites and Negroes interviewed that the morale of the individual Negro was raised through serving in an integrated unit.

* *The Utilization of Negro Infantry Platoons in White Companies*, Research Branch, I&E Div, HQ, ETOUSA, Jun 1945, Report E118.

INTERRACIAL ASSOCIATION IN OFF-DUTY LIFE

The preceding sections pertained primarily to Negro-white relations within Army combat units under strict military discipline. The experience of men trained or serving in integrated units indicates that interracial military association tends to increase interracial association in off-duty situations in which military discipline is more relaxed.*

A large majority of the Negro soldiers surveyed favored an integrated pattern of Army post activities, while white soldiers responded with varying degrees of satisfaction and resentment to different situations. The acceptability to white soldiers of any off-duty form of interracial association on the post appeared largely a function of three variables: (a) the novelty or familiarity of the situation in terms of Army or civilian practice; (b) the amount of conversational contact and physical proximity required by the situation; and (c) the degree to which the situation involved the participation of women.

Three questions asked in interviews with soldiers in Korea were designed to determine their attitude toward interracial association in three different situations: at the post exchange, the rest area behind the lines, and the service club. In respect to post exchanges, the least "social" of the three facilities, a sizable majority of both Northern and Southern white soldiers thought that racial sharing of the facility worked out as well as, or better than, any other arrangement. A somewhat smaller majority responded similarly as to rest areas behind the lines. When answering for service clubs, less than half of the Southern white soldiers and a small majority of Northern white soldiers supported biracial use.

The responses of those Negro soldiers questioned, though more favorable to integration for all three facilities, followed the same trend as the white soldiers, the least favorable being in reply to the question of shared service clubs.

Out of the combat areas, questions pertaining to biracial use of other facilities took on added significance; housing, schools, swimming pools, and post dances are discussed.

Housing and Schools

Biracial housing and schools are potential sources of greater tension than post exchanges and post theaters. An interracial pattern has not been widely adopted for housing facilities, though, in some areas, living quarters are assigned without regard to race. The fact of being neighbors usually requires some social contact. To be obliged to make such neighborhood associations may be resented particularly if the adjacent civilian pattern is one of segregation.

Generally, the racial composition of schools on a military reservation complies with the state's laws and customs.† Theoretically, failure to do so could result in post schools

* See the Joe Doakes discussion in App A, Parts III and IV; see also App B.

† This situation is presented as of 1951, which was prior to the US Supreme Court decision of 17 May 1954 banning segregation in the District of Columbia schools.

not being accredited and the teachers losing their state certification. However, in at least one instance at the time of this survey, arrangements had been made for integration in the school on a Southern post, although segregation was retained in the civilian schools.

While some degree of resentment may be expected, it is unlikely that it would expand to disorder on a military reservation as it has, at times, in the civilian community. The question of integration for post housing and schools is within the discretion of the local commander. It is to his interest to maintain a balance between an equitable arrangement for all soldiers living on the post and a harmonious relationship with the surrounding civilian community.

Swimming Pools

Two factors make swimming on the post a more sensitive area for interracial association than any other athletic activity. First, the post swimming pool is generally used not only by military personnel, but by friends and dependents as well, and there is less tolerance for interracial associations in activities where women are involved. Second, both within the Army and without, the rate of venereal disease among Negroes greatly exceeds that among whites. The fear of infection, regardless of the facts concerning the possibility of infection, increases antagonism to interracial use of pools. Resentments, however, have rarely developed into disorder under the restraints imposed by military discipline.

Post Dances

The enlisted men's dance is the form of integrated recreation which is potentially most productive of friction. The participation of women and the close physical proximity in dancing tend to make interracial association in this activity less acceptable to white soldiers than other integrated recreation programs.

Among those men interviewed in the US, regardless of whether they were opposed, indifferent, or favorably disposed to serving in integrated platoons or sharing of service clubs, many believed that "white soldiers should have their own dances and colored soldiers their own dances." Of 2351 white soldiers interviewed, approximately three-fourths would not mind colored couples on the same dance floor, while almost two-thirds would object to colored soldiers dancing with white girls. The antagonisms of almost one-fifth of the group indicate that racially mixed couples would represent a potential source of friction.

Actually, integrated dances which have been conducted on posts have produced only a few instances of racial friction. It is obvious, however, that white soldiers are less willing to respond favorably or indifferently to interracial associations in dancing than in most other forms of military recreational activity.

Summary of Post Interracial Associations

The pattern of social segregation on Army posts in the US has tended to evolve into one of interracial association in varying degree. Interracial association has already become the accepted pattern of behavior in post exchanges, athletic activities, and theaters at several camps. The practice of segregation has held more firmly for such off-duty facilities as housing, schools, mess halls, swimming pools, and post dances. However, the wide variation in racial association patterns at different posts indicates: (a) There is no form of off-duty activity which is not operating successfully on an integrated basis at some posts in the US; (b) Almost every installation which houses Negro personnel has some off-duty facilities shared by both races; and (c) Integration has extended to a smaller number of off-duty facilities at Southern posts than at posts in other parts of the country.

Off-duty facilities can be roughly arranged in a scale which indicates the relative degrees of interracial tension produced by each. Such a scale ranges from that situation

least productive of tension, the sharing of post buses (which has been Army practice for several years), to mixed dancing, which is a new situation divergent from civilian patterns.

Off-Duty Military Facilities

Scaled from "most acceptable" to "least acceptable" to white soldiers as areas of interracial contact are: (a) post buses; (b) post exchange shopping facilities; (c) post theaters; (d) athletic areas, except swimming pools; (e) service clubs; (f) NCO messes, officers' messes, and snack bars; (g) housing areas; (h) post schools; (i) swimming pools; and (j) dance halls.

Suggestions to Post Commanders

Although the patterns of association vary greatly from post to post, there is a clear trend away from segregation in off-duty facilities. During this period when racial practices are in a state of flux, there will be some degree of resentment which might expand into instances of disorderly behavior. Such instances can be minimized if a few pertinent factors are considered by local commanders.

First, a majority of the soldiers surveyed in integrated units both in Korea and in the US claimed to be well disposed toward soldiers of the other race.

Second, the survey of instances of racial friction indicates that, whatever the situation of interracial association, resentment is less likely to be expressed by disorderly behavior on military territory than off the post. Because of the restraint imposed by military discipline, the post is a more favorable area for interracial social activities than is the neighboring civilian community.

Third, the same survey indicates that, in biracial situations which are strongly competitive, resentment or frustration is likely to take on the character of an interracial struggle. The provision of facilities adequate to the number of men involved should reduce the possibility of disruptive incidents.

Finally, when integration is to be extended to new areas of off-duty activity, it is advisable to follow the sequence downward along the scale of acceptability given in the preceding section.

INTEGRATION AS A FACTOR IN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMMUNITY RELATIONS

One focus of the discussion up to this point has been the military aspects of integration as a factor in the Army's use of Negro manpower. Inherent in the consideration of integration as an Army-wide policy are the questions pertaining to military and civilian relations.* The practice of integration on military posts to date has not seemed to alarm neighboring civilian communities. Local residents appear to regard it as a military matter that bears little direct relation to their own customs and laws.

It is likely, however, that on-post integration will have indirect repercussions on interracial associations in surrounding areas. Local civilians who are employed on the post or who, as guests, participate in recreational activities, will be obliged to adopt the interracial association pattern on the post. If this pattern is discordant with that of their home communities, they may resent the post situation or become critical of local civilian practices. Negro and white soldiers who are friends on the post are likely to continue their associations off the post. Where this association is discordant with local laws or customs, the civilian population will tend to grow more vigilant or more relaxed in maintaining the *status quo*.

Interracial Contacts in Communities near Army Posts

The development of race relations problems in communities adjacent to Army camps was found to be contingent upon the types of communities concerned and the behavior of soldiers while in these communities. What a town thinks about Negro soldiers is, to some extent, dependent upon the behavior of all soldiers who visit the town, Negro and white. In any community, the friendly or unfriendly attitudes of white soldiers toward Negro soldiers from the same post will have some influence on local residents. In like manner, the degree to which soldiers participate in interracial associations off the post is influenced by the pattern prevailing in the civilian community.†

The Negro soldier leaving the post for an evening or weekend in the neighboring town or city is confronted with one of four types of civilian communities and possibilities of various reactions.

In two of the four types the reactions of white residents are predictable. The community which includes a Negro population sufficiently large to absorb the Negro soldier visitors would probably not find their presence any special problem. In a community which has no Negro population because residence is discouraged or forbidden, the presence of Negro soldiers would be highly objectionable.

* For further information, see App B, Part II.

† In a survey of 1730 white trainees serving in units containing varying proportions of Negro soldiers, 19 percent reported that they had spent off-duty time with Negro soldiers off the post as well as on the post. Fifty-nine percent of the 776 Negro trainees interviewed in the same units had spent off-duty time with white soldiers off the post.

Members of a third type of community, one which includes a Negro population too small to absorb the Negro soldiers, may or may not resent an influx of Negro servicemen. The reactions of townsmen in the fourth community, one which has no Negro population because Negroes have not desired or attempted to reside there, is unpredictable. They might accept Negro soldiers on the same basis as white soldiers or might resent their intrusion.

Incidents as Indicators of Problems

Both pleasant and unpleasant relations between military and civilian communities are noted in the record of incidents involving soldiers and civilians of the two races. Analysis of the observers' reports helps to point up the potential trouble spots in post-community relations.

Observers included whites and Negroes, both military and civilian,* in areas of military installations. The five Army bases selected for the survey were located in different sections of the country: Fort Dix, New Jersey; Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Camp McCoy, Wisconsin; and Fort Riley, Kansas. Their neighboring communities ranged in size from the small farming community to the urban metropolis, and in population from those which normally contained almost no Negro civilians to those containing large Negro populations.

The respondents described cases of both interracial cooperation and friction between civilians and military personnel. The intent was to determine what kinds of interactions led to either hostility or cooperation, where these interactions occurred, and in what situations they occurred.

A summary of the types and extent of favorable and unfavorable incidents reported and a detailed breakdown for the unfavorable are shown graphically in Figs. 3 and 4. Of the total of 824 incidents described, 455 are classified as being unfavorable. Since circumstances of friction are often more readily obvious than interchanges of friendliness, it is quite natural that the record includes a somewhat greater number of hostile situations than friendly ones.

While by far the greatest number of incidents of friction are shown in Fig. 3 to be in the category of "Engaging in informal social relationships with civilians," this is also the category of the highest number of favorable incidents.

On the unfavorable side, 26.4 percent of the incidents were those of the category which leads the list in Fig. 4, "Obtaining entrance to or service in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment." Almost 20 percent are represented by the second category in Fig. 4, "Interacting with civilians in casual or street contacts."

Whether the incidents described were reported by military personnel or civilians, by whites or by Negroes, the large excess of unfavorable over favorable incidents in the category, "Obtaining entrance to or service in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment," is constant. When these incidents are arranged according to geographic area in which they occurred, they do not show a concentration in the South. The excess of the unfavorable incidents is significant in areas adjacent to Fort Dix, Fort Sam Houston, and Fort Riley.

Cases were isolated from the total group of incidents which mentioned tensions arising from the civilian pattern of interracial association. More attempts were reported to enforce segregation in places such as bars, restaurants, and stores than in any other area of reported interracial relations. Incidents arising from such enforcement measures or from the lack of enforcement made an unfavorable impression upon a large number of observers.

* Respondents included 415 whites and 180 Negroes; of them, 421 were military personnel ranking from private to colonel, and 174 were civilians representing 38 different occupations.

The preponderance of favorable over unfavorable incidents in the category, "Carrying out assignments involving contact with civilians," as shown in Fig. 3, is due in large part to the many incidents relating to assistance rendered by Fort Riley soldiers of both races during the 1951 flood in Kansas.




Fig. 3—Percent of Total Favorable and Unfavorable Incidents in Each Critical Area of Military-Civilian Interracial Relations

These broad behavior areas are composed of the following subareas in Fig. 4:

(a) 8, 15
(b) 1, 2, 3, 4, 16
(c) 5, 7, 9, 14, 18
(d) 10, 11, 12, 17
(e) 6, 13

An analysis of published reports of interracial incidents shows that from 1937 to 1948 interracial association provoked approximately the same proportion of the military as the civilian incidents, but more than two-thirds of such military incidents developed in civilian communities. But in that period, conflicts involving servicemen occurred largely in Southern and border states, although conflicts involving only civilians were not concentrated in any particular section of the country. While irregular contacts with police were reported more frequently in military than in civilian incidents, in most of the cases involving military personnel, both military and civilian law enforcement agents were involved. In all, 352 military and nonmilitary interracial incidents were reported.*

* *The Negro Year Book*, *The Negro Handbook*, and *Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations.*




Fig. 4—Percent of 455 Unfavorable Incidents in Each Subarea of Critical Behavior

Suggestions for Prevention of Racial Friction Involving Soldiers

Certain factors tend to preclude the development of racial incidents. Businessmen and usually the townsmen appreciate the economic benefits accruing from soldier patronage. The realization that serious disorder at taverns or cafes may result in their being put off limits to military personnel serves as an incentive to proprietors to prevent disturbances. The pressure of military discipline, although less direct upon the soldier when he is off the post, continues to act as a strong deterrent to disorderly or provocative behavior. In addition, civilian tolerance and sympathy for the service man in uniform are likely to permit him some latitude when he infringes upon the local pattern of interracial association.

The frequency of racial incidents in communities near Army posts may be reduced by efforts exerted by the post itself. Although it is often said that the Army cannot act as an agent of social reform, the military post by its nature can and does influence the pattern of military and civilian interracial relations in the neighboring communities. Commanders have, for example, required firm and impartial conduct on the past of the military police to prevent or interrupt incidents arising from racial friction involving soldiers.

In addition to the influence which the Army post exerts, local commanders can take three direct steps to facilitate post-community harmony: (a) Provide adequate, varied recreation programs on the post, thereby increasing the incentives to stay on the post and reducing the opportunity for off-the-post incidents of interracial friction; (b) Maintain liaison with civilian authorities in the neighboring towns to promote mutual understanding between military and civilian heads, particularly in areas where Negro soldiers are reluctantly received; and (c) Establish an indoctrination program for military personnel in localities where post-community relations include problems or potential problems of race relations.

An orientation program would be of greatest benefit in areas where segregation is the established civilian practice and in areas where the local population has had little or no experience with Negroes. Such a program could include briefings for military police, officers, and key noncommissioned officers on the types of friction likely to arise and possible methods of averting friction. The local segregation laws and customs could be explained to all white and Negro troops on arrival at the post through lectures, posters, or other means.

All troops should understand that, in activities not under the control of the military, they are expected to conform to civilian laws and customs. Deliberate refusals to observe local laws off the post become subject to military discipline. Adjusting to such restrictions may be difficult for many of both races — to Negroes, particularly those of Northern origin, and to white soldiers who have been accustomed to free and public association with Negro friends. For maintenance of good race relations between the post and community, however, Negro and white soldiers must be required to make appropriate concessions while off the post—concessions which are, in fact, comparable to those that many Southern white soldiers are required to make on the post.

APPLICATION OF AN INTEGRATION POLICY

The actuality of integration occurred in Korea as a practical solution in the existing situation. The satisfactory results led to the authorization of integration throughout that command. Within the continental US, certain problems have been resolved in similar fashion.

The studies of the practices as summarized here provide a measure of some of the factors involved. They also point to some of the factors pertaining to the application of an over-all Army policy of integration.

Integration in Korea

In the exigencies of the combat situation, replacements were assigned without regard to race. Thus Korea provided a pragmatic test of integration. The effectiveness of the emergency practice was indicated by its rapid extension. By May 1951, 61 percent of the line infantry combat companies in the Eighth Army were integrated. On 26 July 1951, the Department of the Army announced integration as the official policy throughout the Far East Command.




Fig. 5—Utilization of Negro Enlisted Strength in Korea

A survey in August 1951 identified the marked change in the distribution of Negro manpower which resulted from the increased tempo of integration following the order. In three months, the proportion of Negro enlisted strength in integrated units had more than tripled. The proportion in reversely integrated units had increased by more than half (see Fig. 5).

Integration in the US

Just as in Korea, practical considerations have led to a certain amount of integration in Army programs within the continental US. Rather than establish segregated officer candidate schools during World War II, white schools were operated on an integrated basis. A similar program was instituted for some enlisted schools.

While official policy has not required integration of all Army personnel in the US,* the January 1950 declaration (SR 600–629–1) provides that Negroes may be assigned to vacancies in all types of white units. This policy has been implemented to some degree by assignment on the basis of special qualifications. Since there have not been enough Negro units to accommodate all Negroes entering the Army, assignment to formerly all-white units has served as a practical solution to the problem of vacancies and numbers. In February 1950, the Army took active steps toward integration in the WAC center at Fort Lee and in the training centers at Fort Ord and Fort Riley. During 1950–51, the ten training divisions in the US were integrated.

During the same period, composite military police companies tended to become fully integrated, as did selected units at various posts throughout the country, including those assigned to replacement training centers. By 31 July 1951, 190 organized units in the US had some degree of racial mixture.

Integration Policy Recommended

The success of the integration program in the Korean combat area speaks for itself. On the basis of the records of performance, leadership, and morale for Negro, white, and integrated units as shown in the surveys reported here, integration effects a higher average standard of effectiveness of Army combat units. An Army-wide policy of integration would result in the dissolution of the less efficient all-Negro units and the establishment of racially mixed units under leadership of uniformly high quality.

Off-duty social relations among whites and Negroes and diverse military and civilian social patterns represent more sensitive areas within the continental US than was the case in the combat area of Korea. However, the indications are that adjustment to integration is made effectively within the framework of military discipline.

As a military measure, integration is recommended.

As to procedures for instituting such a policy, these studies have pointed up certain factors that will not only aid the formulation of policy directives, but will help individual commanders charged with carrying out the program.

Inasmuch as integration will succeed best in the "climate" regarded as most favorable by most men, it should be effected where possible by assigning Negroes to white units via the normal replacement stream with the ratio limited to 15–20 percent Negroes in units of company size and larger. Higher ratios in the smaller groups could be maintained subject to the expediency of the situation and the judgment of those in charge.

In establishing an over-all policy of integration, the military aspects should be instituted by firm military commitment with a statement of the intent to gain greater military efficiency contained in the policy directive.

Regulations pertaining to off-duty facilities of Army posts need not follow such a stringent pattern. This responsibility should remain with post commanders. The scale of sensitivity to racial friction for off-duty facilities indicates a progression which a post commander might follow in moving toward an integrated post program. Likewise, in

*Subsequent to the time of this study, integration was authorized for the Military District of Washington, Alaska, and for the US Army in Europe.

the common-sense approach to amicable military-civilian relations, the suggestions for commanders regarding community relations may be adapted to individual situations.

Some problems, however, remain outside the full authority of the Armed Forces.

Problem of Integration in the National Guard and Army Reserves

The special problems associated with the National Guard relate to the control exercised by the individual states.

Right after World War II, New Jersey adopted a new constitution which forbade segregation in the "militia." This posed the question, in relation to the Army policy of segregation, of whether federal recognition would be withheld from National Guard integrated units. After considerable debate, an exception to Army policy was made, and New Jersey was permitted to enlist Negroes in its hitherto white units of the National Guard.*

Eight states now prohibit segregation in the National Guard. In turn, the Army has modified its policy and has endorsed integration in the National Guard to the extent of agreeing not to withhold federal recognition on this ground when integration is effected as a result of law or executive order of the state. Hence, there is currently a dual pattern of segregation and integration among the various states.

There has been strong resistance to any Negro representation in the Guard in the Deep South. If integration were to be required in Guard units while under the jurisdiction of the states, the antagonism in some Southern states would represent a major problem.

It would be impractical to deal with the problem of the National Guard by establishing one policy for the Regular Army and another for Guard units in federal service If the Army adopts a policy of integration, it must apply to all units. Otherwise, Negro Guard units would present the same problems as existing Negro units in the Regular Army.

The policy of integration in Guard units while in the federal service need not apply when the unit is not in federal service. Within the rights of the states to determine recruiting policies, they may choose to continue enrolling whites and Negroes in separate units. It would be within the authority of the Army, however, in support of a federal policy of integration, to withhold or withdraw recognition from segregated National Guard units. But such a possibility would not be considered, at least until the Army had completed the liquidation of its own Negro units.

Such a federal-state jurisdictional problem concerning the state aspects of the program is necessarily a human relations problem as well. The implementation of an Army-wide integration policy in regard to National Guard units might well be modified to meet state regulations, just as the current Army segregation policy has been modified to meet state requirements concerning integration of National Guard units.

The problem of the Reserve is comparable to but much simpler than that of the National Guard, because of the greater degree of control exercised by the Army. If a national program of universal military training were to be established with provision for a period of service in the Reserve after initial training, then problems might develop more nearly like those presented by the Guard.

Recruitment without Quota Restrictions

The question of whether a maximum limit should be reinstated on the number of Negroes entering the Army rested in part on the results of the investigation of the effectiveness of integration and in part on population projections.

* Letter, Secretary of the Army to Governor of New Jersey, 7 Feb 1948.

The indications are, as pointed out earlier in this report, that Negro strength under a no-quota system will fluctuate around 13 percent of the total Army strength. In view of the conclusion that integration of Negroes up to a level of 15–20 percent on an over-all Army basis would enhance Army efficiency, there is no need to consider the reimposition of the quota system at this time.

Appendix A

KOREAN SURVEYS

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Appendix A, Part I

COMBAT PERFORMANCE OF NEGRO TROOPS IN INTEGRATED UNITS, AUG-SEP 1951

by

A Research team of the
American Institute for Research*
composed of:

Richard P. Youtz
Stanford C. Ericksen
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*A research study conducted for ORO under a subcontract.

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SUMMARY

PROBLEM

This study was undertaken in 1951 by American Institute for Research, under contract with the Operations Research Office, in order to obtain more objective data on the combat performance and military effectiveness of Negro soldiers in Korea. One goal was to obtain information on the performance of Negro troops in comparison with that of white troops under comparable circumstances.

Of particular interest was the question of the effect on combat proficiency of the presence of one, two, three, or more Negro soldiers in an infantry squad. Opinions of experienced officers on the effectiveness of Negroes in integrated squads were also desired.

PROCEDURE

In August and September, 1951, field investigators visited companies in each of the six infantry divisions in Korea, selecting particularly those rifle companies containing officers and integrated squads that had been in combat recently.

Critical incident reports were obtained from platoon lieutenants and sergeants concerning effective and ineffective combat behavior by individual soldiers and by squads. The goal of the study was presented as being entirely one of effective and ineffective combat incidents, with no mention of the Negro proficiency aspect.

Subsequent information on the race of the individuals and on the racial composition of the squads was obtained, so that analyses could be made of the relation between effective and ineffective incidents and race of individual or racial composition of squads.

Squad members gave reports of the frequency with which they had observed certain desirable and less desirable combat behaviors in fellow squad members with whom they had been in combat one month or more.

Officers who had been in combat with integrated units one month or more were asked to fill out a questionnaire which frankly asked their opinion of various aspects of combat effectiveness of Negroes and whites.

CONCLUSIONS

1. On the basis of favorable and unfavorable incidents reported by 103 platoon officers who had combat experience with integrated troops, it was concluded that: (a) Negro soldiers contributed only a little less than their proportional share of outstandingly proficient combat infantrymen; (b) Negro troops showed somewhat lesser combat proficiency, although overlapping of proficiency ranges is extremely large; and (c) In general, most individual Negro troops turn out to be very nearly as good as individual white soldiers.

2. From 336 critical incidents involving effective and ineffective squad action during advance and withdrawal, as seen by platoon officers who had had combat experience with

integrated squads, it was concluded that there is no consistent difference in the number of Negroes in squads that are described as effective or ineffective during either an advance or a withdrawal.

3. With a goal of using integrated squads containing Negroes and whites who had been in combat together a month or more, frequencies of various combat behaviors reported by squad mates were obtained on 221 Negro and 1563 white soldiers. From these data it was concluded: (a) The Negro soldier shows substantially the same frequencies of desirable and undesirable combat behaviors as the white soldier; (b) The distributions of frequencies of desirable and undesirable behaviors by white and Negro rifle squad members show almost complete overlapping; (c) Desirable combat behavior is reported in consistently higher frequencies than undesirable combat behavior, for both Negroes and whites.

4. A selected sample of 245 officers who had had recent combat experience with Negro and white soldiers in integrated units completed a questionnaire on the topic. Their responses may be summarized as follows: (a) On almost every item, from 66 to 90 percent of the officers rate the Negroes as about on a par with the white soldiers; (b) Ninety percent of the officers state that one, two, or three Negroes is the maximum number that should be placed in an integrated combat squad; and (c) In general, the evidence from this opinion poll of experienced combat officers shows strong support for the integration program.

5. A comparison of Negro and white soldiers on AFQT scores, aptitude test scores, VD rate, and AWOL rate shows that there is a consistent tendency for the Negro to have less desirable scores and distributions of scores than the white soldier. The score distributions, however, overlap almost completely.

PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY

Basic Questions

The central problem is one of measuring accurately the combat effectiveness of Negro troops in integrated units in Korea. More specifically, the problem becomes one of measuring the combat performance of white troops as well as of Negro troops so that one may have a standard with which to compare the performance of the Negro troops. This problem may be posed as a series of questions:

1. How does the Negro soldier on an integrated squad compare in combat effectiveness with the white soldier on the same squad, as seen by fellow squad members? (AIR Form I is designed to answer this question.)

2. How do the Negroes in an integrated unit compare in combat effectiveness with the white soldiers, as seen by their combat leaders, the platoon sergeants and lieutenants? (AIR Form III is designed to answer this question.)

3. Does the presence of Negroes on integrated squads decrease the combat effectiveness of the squad? Or in more specific terms: How do combat squads compare in effectiveness when they contain no Negroes, one Negro, two Negroes, or three, or four, or more? (AIR Form II is designed to answer this question.)

4. What is the considered opinion on these questions by company and battalion officers who have had recent combat experience with Negroes and whites in integrated units? (The ORO questionnaire is designed to obtain this information.)

5. How do Negro soldiers compare with whites on such considerations as AFQT or AGCT scores, years of schooling, aptitude test scores, VD rate, and AWOL rate? (Documentary evidence was gathered on these points.)

In the preceding questions, Question 4 is concerned with the opinion of experienced officers when asked specific questions explicitly mentioning Negroes and whites. These selected officers were, of course, aware of the nature of the basic problem because of the explicit nature of the questions concerning Negroes and whites.

The answers to Question 5 were obtained from Army documents such as the Form 20 and the Service Record, which were located at Division Rear Headquarters, and also from the Medical Section of GHQ, FEC.

In answering Questions 1, 2, and 3, the goal was to obtain objective data on which to base a judgment of the effectiveness of Negro troops. In order to keep the data as objective as possible, the experimental design had three aims: (a) obtain unbiased descriptions of combat behavior of Negro troops; (b) obtain unbiased descriptions of combat behavior of white troops under closely comparable circumstances in order to have a fair standard with which to compare the performance of Negro troops; (c) obtain the above information under circumstances which did not arouse in the respondents any possible attitudes and prejudices that may have been carried over from precombat opinions concerning Negroes and whites.

Special Methods

In order to achieve these goals, two special procedures were used. First, in dealing with squad members and also with platoon sergeants and lieutenants the main purpose of the investigation was disguised. It was presented as a study of combat proficiency with no mention of race. The investigators stated that their interest was in the nature and frequency of especially effective and less effective combat procedures that experienced soldiers had personally observed in recent actions. This explanation was very well accepted, usually with a following discussion of the possible advantages accruing to the Army of continuing job analyses of this sort. This explanation fitted in very well with the "critical incident" technique, the other of the two special procedures.

Critical Incident Technique

The "critical incident" technique is a method of interviewing which has been found especially useful in obtaining reliable information from respondents who have made recent personal observations of the behavior being analysed. A "critical incident" is an account of a specific action or behavior which resulted in performing an important part of some task either outstandingly well or poorly. The technique induces selective recall by directing the respondent's attention particularly to areas in which he has made judgments of effectiveness or the lack of it. In this way the respondents are able to recall more accurately, possibly because they are describing incidents to which they originally paid closer attention and on which they exercised their judgment. AIR Forms II and III are variations of the "critical incident" technique. AIR Form I is a procedure for evaluating performance by using critical incidents as the basic unit for reporting.

In AIR Form I each squad member is asked to report on the frequency of observation of certain selected kinds of behavior (critical incident) for each other member on his squad with whom he has been one month or more in combat. In AIR Form III platoon sergeants and lieutenants are asked to report critical incidents of effective and ineffective combat behavior with specific details and give a statement of why the behavior was effective or less effective. In AIR Form II the platoon sergeants and lieutenants are asked to describe particularly effective and less effective behavior of squad units during an advance and, similarly, particularly effective and less effective behavior of squad units during a withdrawal. Specific details are required concerning time and place and nature of behavior of the squad units. With each of these three forms no mention was made of race at all. The goal was stated entirely in terms of effective and less effective combat behavior of individuals and squad units.

Disguise of Basic Purpose

For AIR Form I the information on race of squad members was obtained after the test from the company commander and company clerk. For the incidents on individual soldiers reported by the platoon sergeants and lieutenants, after Form III was filled out it was turned in individually to the field investigator. At that time the investigator asked the platoon leader, as an added question of some interest, to give the race of the soldier described, i.e., whether the soldier was white, Nisei, Negro, American Chinese, American Indian, Mexican, or to specify any other race. In the same way the racial composition of each squad described on AIR Form II was asked after the form had been filled out and was being turned in by the respondent. The information concerning race was asked only after the incident concerning more effective or less effective behavior of individuals or squad units had been committed to paper. In all cases, except for authorized inquirers, the mission of the AIR investigators was described in terms of a critical-incident job analysis of effective and ineffective combat procedures.

In each of the three AIR forms the frequency of reports of effective and ineffective behavior for Negroes and whites is crucial to this investigation. The actual content of the critical incidents on AIR Forms II and III has also been analyzed to see if Negroes and whites show frequencies which differ to any important extent in the various classifications of effective and ineffective behavior.

The AIR forms and the ORO questionnaire are reproduced in this Appendix (pp A-I-35, A-I-59).

Planning and Testing Procedures

Preliminary planning conferences, attended by members of the ORO staff and the AIR staff, were held in Washington, D. C., for development of the various forms to be used. AIR Forms I, II, and III are modifications of the critical incident technique and an observer reporting technique previously developed by AIR. These modifications were discussed in the light of the requirements of the present problem. ORO developed the officer questionnaire and requested that the AIR field investigators administer it to a sample of combat-experienced officers in Korea. The AIR field investigators (R. P. Youtz and S. C. Ericksen) further developed the AIR forms with the aid of valuable advice on infantry procedures and terminology from Col William R. Breckenridge, an experienced infantry officer. Members of the ORO office in Tokyo and a number of staff officers at GHQ, FEC, also supplied helpful information concerning conditions in Korea. The three forms and the questionnaire were offset-printed under the supervision of the Tokyo office of ORO.

Arrangements were made through G-3, EUSAK Forward Headquarters, Seoul, for two jeeps and trailers for the two field investigators. Six sergeants were also assigned to the two investigators to assist in the field work. One day was spent at EUSAK Main Headquarters, Taegu, investigating the percent of Negroes in company units in the six infantry divisions in Korea. Certain companies were selected for testing. (The sample is described later in this section.)

After checking the availability of these selected companies, the two teams, each composed of an investigator and three sergeants with jeep and trailer, moved to 24th Division Forward Headquarters. Two companies were tested by both investigators together in order to standardize administration procedures. The two teams then worked separately, testing the selected companies that were available in the 24th Div, which was in reserve at the time. The 1st Cav Div, the 3d Div, the 25th Div, and the 2d Div were visited and those companies that met the criteria for the sample and that were available at the time were tested.

Since the first two field investigators had to return to the States to start the data analysis, John C. Flanagan and Jack Folley of AIR then visited the 7th Div and administered the forms and questionnaire to available personnel meeting the criteria. Forms and records from companies in the 7th Div were forwarded by them and included in the data analysis.

Analysis of most of the data was completed with the aid of clerical staffs. In the case of AIR Form I, however, the size and complexity of the computations indicated analysis by IBM methods. Rosters were prepared with number symbols only and the IBM computations were done by Statistical Tabulating Company, 89 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.

Administration of Forms

The basic purpose of the study was not mentioned in the administration of AIR Forms I, II, and III. To soldiers on infantry squads and to platoon sergeants and lieutenants the study was presented as concerned only with effective and less effective combat procedures. In administering the forms, the investigators emphasized to members and leaders of combat squads and platoons that they were the persons with the clearest, most recent recollections of critical combat incidents. It was found that this was a point on which all could agree.

It was clearly stated to both squad members and platoon officers that the study was being done by a civilian agency and that no names were to be transmitted to the Army. It was also clearly and forcefully stated to the respondents that their participation in this study would in no way affect their careers or the careers of anyone whose behavior, effective or ineffective, they reported. This seemed to be very generally accepted. (Almost the only questions that were raised, other than clarification and procedural questions, were those having to do with implementing the rotation policy.) The investigators felt that they were received and treated throughout with understanding and cooperation.

Sources of Documentary Evidence

In searching for documentary evidence of the sort to be found on Morning Reports, Form 20's, Service Records, Company Punishment Records, Medical Records, etc., the investigators found that relatively few records were kept at the forward divisional, regimental, and company headquarters. All records that became available were found at the rear headquarters of the various divisions.

Since it was desired to obtain further information on the white and Negro soldiers investigated by means of the AIR Form I, the aid of the Signal Corps was enlisted and a photographer with his equipment and two of the assigned sergeants were sent to the various divisional rear headquarters. There the men photographed both sides of the Form 20's and the portions of the Service Records relevant to AW 107 and courts-martial for those soldiers on whom reports were available on AIR Form I. The films were developed and printed in 4″ × 5″ enlargements in Tokyo. A number of items from these records were placed on the IBM rosters.

Description of the Sample

Since this study has as its goal a report of Negro behavior in combat, and since this information can best be evaluated by comparing it with the behavior of white soldiers under comparable conditions, the sample of soldiers and officers for this study has been restricted to those who have had one month or more in combat in integrated units. It was felt that only in this way would comparative reports of behavior be based on personal experience rather than on hearsay.

For this reason, on the day after reaching Korea the investigators visited the Machine Records Unit of the Statistical and Accounting Branch, AG Section, EUSAK Main Headquarters, Taegu.

There it was found that as of 26 Aug 1951, the percentage of Negroes in each of the divisions was as follows: 1st Cav Div, 8.2; 2d Div, 12.7; 3d Div, 18.3; 7th Div, 7.0; 24th Div, 7.9; and 25th Div, 21.0.

Since it was desirable to obtain information on squads and companies containing varying percentages of Negroes, the records for companies in each of these divisions were examined. It was found that the high percentage of Negroes in the 25th Div was the result principally of the presence of the 24th Inf Reg, and that the percentages in the 2d and 3d Divs were principally due to battalions composed entirely of Negroes.

A tabulation was then made, from records based on Morning Reports of 9–12 Aug 1951, of those companies that were integrated and contained 10 percent or more Negroes. Since it was desired also that the sample contain Negroes and whites who had been in combat together one month or more, the percent of Negroes in these same tabulated companies was investigated for the Morning Report period two months earlier, 8–12 Jun 1951. Although there were many companies which had few or no Negroes in Jun 1951, there were also a number that had *more* than 7 percent in June and conformed to our criteria.

Sample Coverage

In the six infantry divisions in Korea, all of those units that conformed to our criteria and that were available were tested. Frequently, of course, selected units were in the line and could not be tested. It was not feasible, for instance, to administer the AIR Form I to squad members unless most of a company could be assembled at one time. Even when squad members could not be assembled, however, it was frequently possible to administer AIR Forms II and III to some of the platoon officers and to give the ORO questionnaire to individual officers.

With AIR Form I, usable information was obtained on 1784 squad members, of which there were 221 Negro and 1563 white. The Negroes thus made up a little more than 12 percent of the total group. This high percentage of Negroes in experienced rifle companies was obtained by the selection procedures described.

The AIR Form I was administered to 23 companies in 8 regiments in 4 divisions. The units were the following: 1st Cav Div, 7th Cav Regt, Co A, and 8th Cav Regt, Cos A and C; 3d Div, 15th Regt, Cos A, C, E, and G; 7th Div, 17th Regt, Cos A, B, and C, and 32d Regt, Cos A, B, and C; 24th Div, 5th Regt, Cos D, E, and MTk, 19th Regt, Cos I and K, and 21st Regt, Cos C, E, F, G, and I. Except in two cases these 23 were all rifle companies. A weapons company, Co D, 5th Regt, 24th Div, and a medium tank company, 5th Regt, 24th Div, were tested early in the administration period.

It was found that the three forms and the questionnaire, which had been designed for rifle companies and used appropriate examples, were only with difficulty filled out by members of other types of companies. For this reason and also because combat behavior in rifle companies was the principal objective of the study, only rifle companies were tested thereafter. Because the forms and questionnaire were constructed for rifle companies, it was also not feasible to administer them to the various kinds of service companies, although many service companies had larger percentages of integrated Negro troops than did the rifle companies. If information on the service companies is desired, specially designed forms would be better adapted to obtaining this information.

A total of 136 platoon sergeants and lieutenants filled out part or all of AIR Form III. Thus, there were collected some 230 critical incidents of effective and ineffective individual combat behavior. Of these 230, there were 206, collected from 103 platoon officers, that were completely usable in the analysis. Of the 23 incomplete forms, most were filled out on the "effective" side only. "Ineffective" behavior was only reluctantly reported.

Altogether 133 platoon sergeants and lieutenants filled out AIR Form II. The total number of critical incidents obtained on the four parts was some 408. Of these 408, there were 336 that were completely usable in the analysis. Ninety-one of the men had described both "effective" and "ineffective" incidents during an advance. Seventy-one filled out "effective" and "ineffective" incidents during a withdrawal.

In collecting the responses to AIR Form II, the investigators found that sergeants and lieutenants were most able to describe *effective* action during an advance. They were somewhat less willing to describe *ineffectiveness* during an advance. They were still less willing to describe *any* action concerned with a withdrawal and even less able to describe

ineffective action during a withdrawal. Loyalty to their own units was very strong and may have been a factor in this situation.

AIR Forms II and III were administered in all but three of the companies where the Form I was given. In addition, there were 14 other companies where AIR Forms II and III were administered although it was not feasible to administer Form I. Thus the Forms II and III were administered to 34 companies in 9 regiments in the 4 divisions.

A total of 245 officers filled out the ORO questionnaire. These officers came from 70 different companies in 11 regiments of the 6 infantry divisions. Since the ORO questionnaire was administered to officers with recent combat experience with integrated units, and who were at the company, battalion, and sometimes regimental level, it was possible to obtain respondents in all six of the infantry divisions, the 1st Cav, the 2d, the 3d, the 7th, the 24th, and the 25th Divs. This was possible even when none of the AIR forms could be administered. The ORO questionnaire was largely self-administering and could be left with an individual officer, or series of officers, and then picked up on a return trip.

Selection of Individuals

In testing an individual company, the following procedure was used. At regimental or battalion headquarters the recent combat experience was investigated for those companies that were available. Then, in conference with the company commander, an appropriate date was selected such that soldiers entering the company on or before that date would have had one month or more of combat experience. When the company was assembled for testing, those men entering the company after this date were dismissed. Also dismissed were those soldiers not on combat squads, e.g., jeep drivers, cooks, etc. Form I was then administered to men with one month or more of combat experience who were members of combat squads.

Platoon sergeants and lieutenants were given Forms II and III if they had had one month or more combat experience with integrated units. The same was true for the officers who were asked to fill out the ORO questionnaire.

RESULTS AND RELATED CONCLUSIONS OF FORMS I, II, AND III AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

In this section will be presented results and related conclusions for AIR Forms I, II, and III and for the documentary evidence that was obtained concerning Negro and white soldiers in Korea. The results of the ORO questionnaire will be presented in the following section.

REPORTS ON COMBAT SQUAD MEMBERS BY SQUAD MEMBERS *

The Question

How does the Negro soldier on an integrated squad compare in combat effectiveness with the white soldier on the same squad, as seen by fellow squad members?

The AIR Form I is designed to answer this question by asking each squad member to report the frequency with which he has observed six important kinds of combat behavior in his fellow squad members. These six kinds of behavior are the positive and negative aspects of three dimensions of combat behavior described in *The American Soldier*.† These three important dimensions of combat behavior may be summarized as: (a) courage and aggressiveness, or lack of it; (b) knowledge and adequate performance on the job, or the lack of it; and (c) high morale under difficulties, or the lack of it.

In the AIR Form I each of the six kinds of behavior is described, one on each page, and for each kind of behavior two examples are given. When a squad member was filling out the form on his fellow squad members, his task was to make a check mark in a column showing how many times he had observed each kind of behavior in each of his fellow squad members. There was a column headed "N.O." where he could check if he had had "no opportunity to observe" this kind of behavior. Each squad member, acting as observer, thus reported on the number of times he had actually observed certain kinds of behavior in each of the other members of his squad with whom he had been in combat. In other words, he was asked to report on the frequency of behavior, and was not being asked to make judgments on the personality or characteristics of his fellow squad members. It is believed that somewhat more objective information is obtained when observers are asked for reports of events instead of more abstract personal characteristics.

Observations of Each Squad Member by Fellow Squad Members

The average frequencies for each kind of combat behavior for Negro and white squad members as reported by fellow squad members in 21 companies are shown in Table A1.

In obtaining the information in Table A1, the following procedures were used. For each white squad member, his average frequency of a particular kind of behavior was ob-

* The AIR Forms I, II, and III are reproduced at the end of this section.

† Stouffer, S. A., *et al., The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermaths*, Vol. II of *Studies of Social Psychology in World War II*, p. 134, Princeton University Press, 1949.

tained by averaging the frequencies given him by each white soldier on his squad. Another average frequency was obtained for each white soldier by averaging the frequencies reported for him by the Negro soldiers on his squad. Thus, each white soldier has two sets of frequencies, one from the other white soldiers on his squad, and the other from the Negro soldiers on his squad. A similar procedure was followed for the Negro squad members, so that each Negro soldier has an average frequency from the white soldiers on his squad, and also an average frequency given him by the Negro soldiers on his squad.

TABLE A1

AVERAGE FREQUENCIES OF COMBAT BEHAVIOR BY SQUAD MEMBERS, REPORTED BY FELLOW SQUAD MEMBERS

Combat squad members		Race of observers	Frequency of behavior observed (Lowest possible score is 0.0; highest possible score is 3.0)					
Race	Number		Courage and aggressiveness	Lack of courage	Judgment and skill	Lack of skill	Good morale under stress	Poor morale
White	1563	White	1.0	0.3	1.1	0.3	1.5	0.3
White	359	Negro	0.8	0.3	1.2	0.3	1.6	0.2
Negro	221	White	0.9	0.3	1.0	0.3	1.4	0.2
Negro	97	Negro	1.1	0.3	1.3	0.4	1.8	0.3

Table A1 shows, for instance, that under "Courage and Aggressiveness" 1563 white squad members, as observed by other white squad members, were given an average frequency of 1.0 incidents showing courage and aggressiveness. The 359 white squad members observed by Negro squad members have an average of 0.8 incidents showing courage and aggressiveness. The Negroes observed by white squad mates had 0.9, and the Negroes observed by Negro squad mates had an average frequency of 1.1 incidents of this sort.

It is useful in reading the table to know that the minimum possible score is 0.0, while the highest possible score is 3.0. On AIR Form I the squad members checked the "number of times observed" in a range from 0 to 5+. The psychological difference between "0" frequency and a frequency of "1" was considered relatively large. In order to increase the relative importance of this step on the scale of frequencies the scale was changed as follows: the "0" column was scored as 0; the "1" column was scored as 1; the "2–4" was scored as 2; and the "5+" column was scored as 3. In all of the calculations made on these data, any check made in the "N.O." column was disregarded entirely.

The data shown in Table A1 are based on the 1784 cases obtained in 21 of the 23 companies tested. On the other two companies a new procedure was tried out with Form I in which the observer was asked to *rank* his fellow squad members instead of reporting frequencies of observed behavior. On these other two companies the rankings have been converted into standard scores and an examination made of the relative standings of whites observed by whites and Negroes, and Negroes observed by whites and Negroes. The relative results are similar to those shown in Table A1 but have not been put in a form suitable for presentation in this report.

It will be noted in Table A1 that favorable incidents are reported with consistently higher frequencies than unfavorable incidents. Considering all of the different frequencies for all of the different groups, even the highest frequency for undesirable behavior is well below the lowest frequency for desirable behavior. For each group of squad members, whether observed by whites or Negroes, more behavior of a desirable sort than of an undesirable sort is reported.

It will also be noted in Table A1 that while the values for any particular kind of behavior vary to some extent, the variations are not large. Larger variations appear for "Courage and Aggressiveness," "Judgment and Skill," and "Morale under Stress." It is unlikely, however, that these differences are important ones.

Certain minor differences are apparent if one compares the white and Negro squad members observed by the white observers. To do this one compares the values in lines 1 and 3 in Table A1. Three of the four differences which occur favor the white squad members. On the other hand, if one compares white and Negro squad members as reported by Negro observers, lines 2 and 4 of the figures in Table A1, it is seen that three of the five differences are in favor of the Negroes.

In order to separate out this difference among the observers the following procedure was used. From the data for the first 17 companies examined, those white squad members who had been observed and reported on by Negroes were selected out. For those white squad members the frequencies reported by other white squad members were obtained. Similarly, for the Negroes, those Negroes who had been observed by Negroes were selected out and frequencies for this group by both Negroes and whites were obtained. Presumably, if the 231 white squad members who were observed by both Negroes and whites turn out to have consistently different frequencies of observation by the two observer groups, there may reasonably be inferred to be some observer differences.

Table A2 shows the average frequencies of each kind of behavior for the 231 white squad members observed by both Negroes and whites and the average frequencies for the 75 Negro squad members observed by both Negroes and whites in 17 companies. For both Negro and white squad members, it is seen that differences between Negro and white observers are small and that variations are not always in the same direction.

TABLE A2

BEHAVIOR FREQUENCIES OF SAME SQUAD MEMBERS AS OBSERVED BY WHITE OR NEGRO SQUAD MATES

Combat squad members		Race of observers	Frequency of behavior observed (Lowest possible score is 0.0; highest possible score is 3.0)					
Race	Number		Courage and aggressiveness	Lack of courage	Judgment and skill	Lack of skill	Good morale under stress	Poor morale
White	231	White	1.0	0.3	1.0	0.3	1.6	0.3
White	231	Negro	0.8	0.3	1.1	0.3	1.5	0.3
Negro	75	White	1.0	0.3	1.0	0.3	1.5	0.2
Negro	75	Negro	1.0	0.3	1.2	0.3	1.8	0.3

To see the extent to which the differences in the averages presented in Table A1 were reflected in the distributions, a frequency distribution was made for each kind of behavior for each of the observation groups. These are shown as Figs. A1–A6. These figures show the distributions for each of the observation groups, the whites observed by whites, the whites observed by Negroes, the Negroes observed by whites, and the Negroes observed by Negroes. Comparing the four distributions, one can see that they are remarkably similar. The overlapping in these four distribution groups is much more prominent than the slight differences which appear.




Fig. A1—Courage and Aggressiveness




Fig A2—Lack of Courage




Fig. A3—Judgment and Skill




Fig. A4—Lack of Skill




Fig. A5—Morale under Stress




Fig. A6—Poor Morale

Conclusions

In comparing the behavior of Negro and white rifle squad members, when their behavior has been observed and reported by both Negroes and whites, the following conclusions seem justified:

1. Desirable combat behavior is reported in consistently higher frequencies than undesirable combat behavior, for both Negroes and whites.

2. As observed and reported by squad mates, both Negro and white, the Negro soldier shows substantially the same frequencies of desirable and undesirable combat behaviors as the white soldier. Such differences as appear are extremely small.

3. An examination of the distributions of frequencies of desirable and undesirable behaviors by white and Negro rifle squad members shows that the overlapping of the two groups is almost complete.

4. In general the similarities between Negro and white behavior on combat rifle squads far outweigh the differences. One might reasonably infer that combat rifle squad members are apparently judged more by their behavior than by their skin color.

CRITICAL INCIDENTS ON INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS

The Question

How do the individual Negroes in integrated units compare in combat effectiveness with individual white soldiers, as seen by their combat leaders, the platoon sergeants and lieutenants?

AIR Form III is divided into two parts: part *a* on one side of the sheet and part *b* on the other. In Form III*a*, platoon sergeants and lieutenants were asked first to think of the most recent situation in which their group was engaged in operations in a combat area. They were then asked to write down *when* this was and *where* this was, and then were asked to select a soldier whom they had observed to be "especially helpful" to the group in accomplishing the mission. Each sergeant or lieutenant was asked to write down briefly *what* the mission was, *what* the soldier did, and *why* he felt this was an especially good thing for the soldier to do in this situation. He was then asked to write down the soldier's name and unit but did not have to identify himself beyond giving his grade and his assignment at the time of the incident.

On the other side of the sheet, in Form III*b*, the questions were similar except that he was asked to describe an incident in which a soldier "did not do his part in carrying out the mission of the group."

As previously described, the platoon lieutenant or sergeant was *not* aware of the investigator's interest in Negro and white soldiers. The form was filled out entirely in terms of a description of a soldier in combat. One incident was of a soldier "especially helpful" and the other incident was in terms of a soldier who "did not do his part." Only after this form was filled out and after the lieutenant or sergeant had also filled out Form II and was handing both in to the investigator was the platoon officer asked for the race of the soldiers described on Form III. And even then he was asked only whether the soldier was white, Nisei, Negro, American Chinese, Hawaiian, Mexican, etc.

Incidents on Individual Negroes and Whites

In Table A3 are shown the numbers and percents of white and Negro soldiers described in favorable and unfavorable incidents. This table is particularly significant because the platoon lieutenants and sergeants described the incidents and identified the soldiers by name before being asked to identify the soldier as belonging to one of several races. It will be noted that for the 103 favorable incidents, 7 percent were on Negroes.

In considering the percentage relationships in Table A3, one should keep in mind that the percent of Negroes in the Army population from which the platoon sergeants and lieutenants chose their incidents varies approximately from 5 to 15 percent. The 19 Negroes described in the total of 206 favorable and unfavorable incidents make up about 9 percent. While Negroes made up 12 percent of the unfavorable incidents, it should not be overlooked that they also made up 7 percent of the favorable incidents. While the proportion of less proficient Negro troops is somewhat larger than the proportion of less proficient white troops, it should also be kept in mind that, proportionally speaking, the number of outstandingly proficient Negro troops is probably only a little less than the number of outstandingly proficient white troops.

TABLE A3

SOLDIERS DESCRIBED IN FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS BY PLATOON OFFICERS

Race of men described	Number and percent of each race in each type incident					
	Favorable incidents		Unfavorable incidents		Total incidents	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
White	96	93	91	88	187	91
Negro	7	7	12	12	19	9
Total	103	100	103	100	206	100

Content Analysis

In the content analysis an attempt has been made to categorize the various incidents that were reported on AIR Form III. While it is sometimes difficult to obtain completely independent categories, some idea may be obtained of the relative frequency of appearance of Negroes and whites in the various kinds of critical incidents obtained.

TABLE A4

KINDS OF FAVORABLE CRITICAL INCIDENTS OBSERVED FOR NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS, FORM IIIa

Incident category	Number and percent of incidents for each race					
	Negro incidents		White incidents		Total incidents	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Applying fundamental training	4	9	41	91	45	100
Showing ingenuity	1	5	18	95	19	100
Taking initiative	1	5	20	95	21	100
Making decisions	0	0	12	100	12	100

Table A4 shows for each kind of category the percent of Negroes and the percent of whites showing each kind of desirable behavior. Since only six Negroes are involved, the percentages cannot be considered as stable.

The following are more specific statements of the different categories: (a) Applying fundamental training: handled equipment well, was aggressive in contacts with enemy, or

aided wounded effectively; (b) Showing ingenuity: thought quickly and originally, threw grenades when gun was useless, used effective device when BAR jammed; (c) Taking initiative: volunteered for a job, took leadership responsibility; and (d) Making decisions: decided to join other squad to assist in attack; advanced into enemy position to take prisoners.

Table A5 shows the categories of critical incidents for the unfavorable behavior. Again the results show that the percentage of Negroes does not differ much from the 5–15 percent in the population under consideration.

TABLE A5

KINDS OF UNFAVORABLE CRITICAL INCIDENTS OBSERVED FOR NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS, FORM 116

Incident category	Number and percent of incidents for each race					
	Negro incidents		White incidents		Total incidents	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Lack of applying fundamental training	5	13	33	87	38	100
Lack of adjustment to combat stresses	5	13	34	87	39	100
Lack of initiative or good judgment	1	5	19	95	20	100

The following are more specific statements of the different categories: (a) Lack of applying fundamental training: failed to carry out specific orders, was inefficient in the use of weapons, failed to give proper aid to wounded, and in the case of squad leaders, failed to show leadership ability; (b) Lack of adjustment to combat stresses: left his post in time of danger, deserted squad in time of attack, or inflicted self-injury to avoid combat; and (c) Lack of initiative or good judgment: unable to act quickly in a situation demanding judgment rather than merely carrying out orders; gave orders to retreat, exposing another squad; failed to notify rest of the squad of an observation of the enemy which would have aided in attack.

Conclusions

On the basis of favorable and unfavorable incidents given by 103 platoon sergeants or lieutenants who had had combat experience with integrated troops, the following is concluded:

1. If we assume that Negroes represent about 5–15 percent of the troops observed by these selected platoon officers, then the 12 percent unfavorable incidents and the 7 percent favorable incidents for the Negroes fall well within a reasonable range of variability.
2. These results again indicate the somewhat lesser proficiency of Negro troops, although overlapping of proficiency ranges is extremely large.
3. Negro troops contributed only a little less than their proportional share of outstandingly proficient troops.
4. One may conclude that as individuals, Negro troops turn out to be very nearly as good as individual white soldiers.

THE NEGRO AS MEMBER OF AN INTEGRATED SQUAD

The Question

Does the presence of Negroes on integrated squads decrease the combat effectiveness of the squad? Or, in the more specific relational form in which the experimental question is asked: How do combat squads compare in effectiveness when they contain no Negroes, one Negro, two Negroes, three, four, or more?

The AIR Form II is divided into four parts. Parts II*a* and II*b* ask, respectively, for the platoon lieutenant or sergeant to write a brief description of effective action of a squad during an *advance* and for *ineffective* action of a *squad* during an *advance*. Parts II*c* and II*d* ask for *effective* action of a *squad* during a *withdrawal* and also for *ineffective* action of a *squad* during a *withdrawal*.

The platoon officers were asked to describe separate incidents for *advance* and *withdrawal* because of the frequently heard statement that Negroes do well when the unit is advancing but do much more poorly when the unit has to withdraw. Since Form II asked for descriptions of critical incidents concerning the behavior of squad units, if the preceding statement is true, one would expect that the squads described under ineffective action during a withdrawal would be likely to have more Negroes on them.

Form II is a particularly interesting one. It was an especially difficult one for platoon lieutenants and sergeants because it was asking for fairly specific behavior, effective or ineffective, during advance or withdrawal. And it was also asking for recall and judgment of the squad's behavior as a team. This is certainly more abstract than discussion of behavior of the individual soldier (as in Form III) and was visibly more difficult for the platoon officers to fill out. Although it was difficult, most of the officers appreciated the importance of team behavior of squads and tried hard to give useful and appropriate information.

When a platoon officer filled out Form II*a* and *b* concerning effective and ineffective squad action during an advance, he of course selected a squad from his memory of squad action that had been effective. He then selected another squad that had been less effective during an advance. Since the platoon officer believed the investigators were interested only in combat incidents and did not know of any interest in Negroes and whites, he was free to concentrate on the problem of squad effectiveness or the lack of it.

If the platoon officer chose for his effective incident a squad with a larger number of Negroes on it, and chose for his ineffective incident a squad with a smaller number of Negroes on it, he had, in effect, reported that at least in the incidents he knew about, at least one squad containing more Negroes had been more effective than another squad containing fewer Negroes.

In order to summarize this information, the difference between the number of Negroes on the squad described in the effective incident and the number of Negroes on the squad described in the ineffective incident was calculated for the incidents given by each platoon officer. These relationships are shown in Figs. A7 to A12 (pp A-I-24 to A-I-29).

Number Negroes on Squad versus Effectiveness of Squad

Figures A7, A8, and A9, concerned with squads, illustrate effective and ineffective incidents during an advance.

Figure A7 shows the difference between percent of Negroes on effective incident squads and percent of Negroes on ineffective incident squads during an advance. As can be seen, by far the largest number of percent differences fall at zero. Forty of the 91 differences are zero. The others lie almost symmetrically around the zero point and do not indicate either an advantage or a disadvantage for the squads with higher or lower percentages of Negroes.

Figure A8 expresses the same idea as Fig. A7, but uses the *number* of Negroes on the effective incident squad minus the number of Negroes on the ineffective incident squad. Again the largest number of differences falls at zero, with only slight variations in the numbers of positive differences and negative differences.




Fig. A7—Difference between Percent Negroes in Effective Incident Squads and Percent in Ineffective Incident Squads during Advance

Figure A9 shows the number of effective incident squads and ineffective incident squads containing each number of Negro squad members. Again, the differences at each point are very minor.

Figures A10, A11, and A12 are concerned with effective incident squads and ineffective incident squads during a withdrawal.




Fig. A8—Difference between Number Negroes in Effective Incident Squads and Number in Ineffective Incident Squads during Advance

Figure A10 shows the difference between percent of Negroes on effective incident squads and percent of Negroes on ineffective incident squads during a withdrawal. Again, most of the differences fall at the zero point with the positive differences and negative differences just about balanced.

Figure A11 shows the difference between the *number* of Negroes on effective incident squads and the number of Negroes on ineffective incident squads during a withdrawal. Most of the differences fall at zero, with the positive and negative sides again about balanced.

Figure A12 shows the number of effective incident squads and ineffective incident squads containing the indicated number of Negroes. The differences again are slight, with no clear trend in either direction.

Content Analysis

The content analysis shows principally that squads with different numbers of Negroes appear in each category of effective and ineffective action during both advance and withdrawal. This information is briefly summarized in Tables A6 and A7.




Fig. A9—Number of Effective Incident Squads and Ineffective Incident Squads Containing Indicated Number Negroes during Advance

On Forms IIa and IIc (reproduced at the end of this section), Item G asked: "Was effectiveness of squad due to leader alone or to action of squad?" The answers to this question ran as follows on Form IIa: action of squad leader, 15; action of squad, 37; action of both leader and squad, 29; and unspecified, 10. For Form IIc, the numbers are as follows:

TABLE A6

NUMBER NEGROES ON SQUADS SHOWING VARIOUS KINDS OF EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE ACTION DURING ADVANCE

Action category	Number Negroes on squad					Total Negroes
	0	1	2	3	4	
Effective						
Outstanding teamwork in taking an objective	18	5	3	1	0	27
Gave support or covering action for another unit	12	3	3	0	0	18
Carried out orders successfully	24	9	5	6	2	46
Total						91
Ineffective						
Lack of morale or discipline	13	8	1	2	1	25
Lack of proper training or facilities	17	6	7	3	2	35
Irrelevant responses or no responses	–	–	–	–	–	31
Total						91




Fig. A10–Difference between Percent Negroes in Effective Incident Squads and Percent in Ineffective Incident Squads during Withdrawal

TABLE A7

NUMBER NEGROES ON SQUADS SHOWING VARIOUS KINDS OF EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE ACTION DURING WITHDRAWAL

Action category	Number Negroes on squad					Total Negroes
	0	1	2	3	4	
Effective						
Gave support to another unit	29	14	3	3	1	50
Successful carrying out of orders and duties	13	8	1	3	1	26
Total						76
Ineffective						
Lack of discipline or morale	7	2	0	1	0	10
Not successful in carrying out orders	21	2	7	2	1	33
Disorderly withdrawal	19	11	3	0	0	33
Total						76




Fig. A11—Difference between Number Negroes in Effective Incident Squads and Number in Ineffective Incident Squads during Withdrawal

action of squad leader, 24; action of squad, 24; both leader and squad, 18; and unspecified, 10. In comparing this grouping with the subcategories of effective action, no new information was found. On the whole, the same ratio of each of the "leader," "squad," or "both" categories was found within each type of effective or ineffective action.




Fig. A12—Number of Effective Incident Squads and Ineffective Incident Squads Containing Indicated Number Negroes during Withdrawal

Conclusions

This question is in many ways the most important one of the whole investigation: How do combat squads compare in effectiveness when they contain no Negroes, one Negro, two Negroes, three, four, or more?

The number of Negroes on the squads described in effective and ineffective incidents during an advance varied from zero to six. There were altogether 182 effective and ineffective incidents concerned with these squads during an advance. For the 154 effective and ineffective incidents during a withdrawal, the number of Negroes on the squad varied from zero to four. From these figures and the analysis of these data, the following conclusions seem justified:

1. There is no consistent difference in the number of Negroes on squads described as effective or ineffective during either advance or withdrawal.

2. The hypothesis that squads with more Negroes on them do more poorly during a withdrawal was not confirmed by these data.

3. Neither the number nor percent of Negroes on effective incident squads as compared with the number or percent of Negroes on ineffective incident squads showed any trend related to the presence of Negroes.

4. These data have been collected from 91 platoon sergeants and lieutenants in four different infantry divisions who have had combat experience with integrated squads with varying numbers of Negroes. These platoon officers are believed to be a reasonably representative sample of experienced officers at this level. From this fact and from the above information, we may reasonably conclude that in numbers up to two or three Negroes per squad, squads containing Negroes do not differ appreciably from all-white squads.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS

The Question

How do Negro soldiers compare with whites on such considerations as AFQT or AGCT scores, years of schooling, aptitude test scores, AWOL rate, and VD rate?

Information on these points was gathered from the photographed Form 20's of soldiers on integrated squads who were tested on AIR Form I. Information was obtained on 1344 white soldiers and 205 Negro soldiers. The AWOL information was obtained from the Service Records of these same soldiers. The VD rate was not obtainable from the Division Rear Headquarters, but some information on this point was obtained from the Medical Section of GHQ, FEC.

The Information

Table A8 shows the average years of schooling, AFQT grade, and four aptitude test scores on a sample of white and Negro soldiers in 21 infantry companies in Korea.

TABLE A8

AVERAGE YEARS OF SCHOOLING, AFQT GRADE, AND APTITUDE TEST SCORES ON A SAMPLE OF SOLDIERS

Race of men	Number men	Schooling years	AFQT or AGCT grade[a]	Test scores			
				Reading-Vocabulary	Arithmetic reasoning	Pattern analysis	Mechanical aptitude
White	1344	9.6	3.5	92.5	88.9	95.3	98.4
Negro	205	9.4	4.2	75.4	72.9	79.4	82.7

[a] On a 1–5 scale, where 1 is the highest group.

On the average, white soldiers have a little more schooling, a little better AFQT or AGCT grade, and consistently higher aptitude test scores in reading-vocabulary, arithmetic reasoning, pattern analysis, and mechanical aptitude tests.

Figures A13 through A18 show the distributions of the Negro and white soldiers from the 21 rifle companies in Korea on these various measures. Inspection of these figures shows that there is very great overlapping of the two distributions, Negro and white. There is a tendency, shown on each of Figs. A13 through A18, for slightly greater numbers of Negroes to appear at the lower end of each scale and slightly greater numbers of white soldiers to appear at the upper end of each scale. This is in line with previous findings. Again one may observe that while the average scores for the Negroes are somewhat lower

than for the white soldiers in the distribution curves, the overlapping is so great that the Negro should probably not be overlooked as a source of manpower and military proficiency.

On the AWOL rates for Negroes and whites, some interesting differences appear. Information was gathered from the Service Records for 1331 white soldiers and 204 Negro soldiers.




Fig. A13—Distribution of Negro and White Soldiers by Years of School Completed

Of the 1331 white soldiers, 120, or 9 percent, had some AWOL information on their Service Records. These 120 soldiers were absent for a total of 2396 days, or an average of 20 days for each soldier who went AWOL. Spreading the AWOL days over the total group of white soldiers one finds an average of two AWOL days for each white soldier.

Of the 204 Negro soldiers, 31, or 15 percent, were absent for a total of 193 AWOL days. Those 31 Negro soldiers who went AWOL have an average of 6 days AWOL per soldier. Spreading the AWOL days over the 204 Negro soldiers, one finds an average of 0.9 AWOL days for all Negro soldiers.

Apparently, a slightly greater percent of Negro soldiers go AWOL for a smaller number of days. Probably the over-all AWOL rate for Negro and white soldiers does not differ materially.

Information on VD rate was apparently available only through medical channels. The investigators received the impression that VD was not regarded as seriously as formerly because hospitalization is rarely necessary. In addition, efforts have apparently been made to separate the VD information from the individual soldier's record. Some information was obtained, however, from the Medical Section, GHQ, FEC, concerning new-report-




Fig. A14—Distribution of Negro and White Soldiers by AFQT or AGCT Grade

ing cases of VD for white and Negro troops in Korea. In Jun 1951, the new reporting cases for white soldiers was at the rate of 124 cases per 1000 troops per year; for Negro soldiers the corresponding figure was 307 per 1000 troops per year. In Jul 1951, the figure for white troops was 161 per 1000 troops per year and for Negro troops was 360 per 1000 troops per year. The rate for Negro troops in Korea was apparently something more than twice the rate for white troops.

The information on courts-martial was so seldom obtained that no calculations could be made on it. Service Records were inspected for this information but only 7 cases were found in over 1000 troops. One possible reason is that after a serious court-martial conviction, the soldier is no longer with his company and the Service Record is no longer kept with company records.




Fig. A15—Distribution of Negro and White Soldiers by Reading and Vocabulary Aptitude Test




Fig. A16—Distribution of Negro and White Soldiers by Arithmetic Reasoning Aptitude Test




Fig. A17—Distribution of Negro and White Soldiers by Pattern Analysis Aptitude Test




Fig. A18—Distribution of Negro and White Soldiers by Mechanical Aptitude Test

Conclusions

The information in this section is very similar to the information on these topics in previous studies. One may conclude that:

1. Negroes fall slightly below whites on such considerations as AFQT or AGCT scores, years of schooling, aptitude test scores, and have less desirable averages on VD rate and AWOL rate.

2. Almost complete overlap is found when one examines the distributions for Negro and white soldiers for each of the above factors. There is a consistent tendency for the Negro to have slightly less desirable distributions than the white soldier, but the outstanding and striking tendency is the high degree of overlapping.

REPRODUCTION OF AIR FORMS I, II, AND III

Following are AIR Forms I, II, and III shown as administered to the troops.

AIR
A–47
8/24/51

Form I

Name: _____; Squad _____; Company _____
(Print last name first)

Battalion _____; Regiment _____; Division _____; Date _____

INSTRUCTIONS

On the following pages you will find descriptions and examples of various ways in which soldiers may act in combat operations. You are asked to make some ratings of all the other men in your squad.

To make these ratings all you need to do is to show how many times you have seen each of the squad members act in about the same way as is described at the top of each sheet.

The first thing you do is to write down the names of all the *other* members of your squad. The place for these names is on the last page. When you have written the names, you are ready to start with the ratings.

Just below the Examples on every page are five columns of empty boxes, with one row of boxes opposite each of the names you have written on the last page. *You put a check mark (√) in one of the boxes by each man's name to show how often you have seen him act in about the same way described on that page.* The numbers at the top of the columns have the following meanings:

N.O.	I have had *no opportunity to observe* this type of behavior by this squad member.
0	I have observed this squad member in situations where he could have acted in this way, but I have *never observed* this type of behavior by this soldier.
1	I have observed *one* instance of this type of behavior by this soldier.
2–4	I have observed examples of this type of behavior by this soldier *two, three, or four times.*
5+	I have observed examples of this type of behavior by this soldier *five or more* times.

Opposite each name, you should make a check mark in the correct box to show how often you have observed examples of this general type of behavior by this particular squad member. When you have finished, each of the 6 charts in this booklet should have *one* check mark opposite the name of each squad member.

Read carefully the *Description of behavior* and the two *Examples* given on each page before filling in the boxes with your check marks.

1. *Description of behavior* — He is a good man to have in the outfit because he helps morale. When the going gets pretty tough he can smile or make a wise-crack.

Example 1. King Company had been holding a forward position during a week of almost constant rain. Everyone was pretty miserable but somehow one Pfc could nearly always say or do something to help cheer up the squad. One morning after a wet patrol he said, "It was dawn before I discovered I was wading across the fields and digging fox holes in the Han river."

Example 2. One Company was back at the front after only 3 days rest out of the 10 days they expected. Everyone was griped, especially when they received the immediate assignment to attack and secure a forward hill. A BAR Cpl soon set the pace and went running into the trees yelling and waving the others forward. The brush was too thick for effective use of his BAR so he started throwing grenades. He was the advance man and while he wasn't doing too much damage to the enemy, his example put the fighting spirit into the entire Company.

[You may never have seen anyone show exactly the kind of behavior described in the two examples. But you may have seen other kinds of action by your squad buddies which showed high morale and ability to "take it." For each man on your list, how many times have you seen him show an especially good spirit. This is the number that tells you where to put your check mark.]

	Number of Times Observed					Names
	N.O.	0	1	2-4	5+	Squad Members (Print Last Name First)
1.						1.
2.						2.
3.						3.
4.						4.
5.						5.
6.						6.
7.						7.
8.						8.
9.						9.
10.						10.

2. *Description of behavior* — This soldier did not plan ahead and because of poor judgment or lack of skill was not able to get maximum use from his weapon.

Example 1. In a short and active surprise contact with the enemy, one soldier soon jammed his BAR because he had let dirt get in the muzzle during the march. He then started running around trying to get another weapon but the squad leader finally had to tell him to stop moving and to lie still on the ground.

Example 2. During a hot afternoon march to a forward position, a Pfc became uncomfortable and threw away his ammunition and hid his poncho on one of the Company trucks. Later a heavy summer storm stalled the supply trucks. The soldier was soaking wet and was unable to get more ammunition to use in the night contact with the enemy.

[As you did on the previous page, you are to check the correct column to the left of the name of each of the other squad members. You should try to remember things they did that are examples of the kinds of behavior described above.]

	Number of Times Observed				Names
	N.O.	0	1.	2-4	5+	Squad Members (Print Last Name First)
1.						1.
2.						2.
3.						3.
4.						4.
5.						5.
6.						6.
7.						7.
8.						8.
9.						9.
10.						10.

3. *Description of behavior* — This soldier seemed to lag behind or not do his part when the rest of the group was making a strong aggressive effort.

Example 1. Charlie Company was trying hard to get through the snow to its assigned jump-off point for a 0623 attack. One squad member complains that they should stop immediately in order to get some rest and then be used as a reserve unit.

Example 2. While one unit was fighting desperately to defend its ridge position, one soldier huddled in the back of a fox hole and tried to screen himself with some branches.

	Number of Times Observed				Names
	N.O.	0	1	2-4	5+	Squad Members (Print Last Name First)
1.						1.
2.						2.
3.						3.
4.						4.
5.						5.
6.						6.
7.						7.
8.						8.
9.						9.
10.						10.

4. *Description of behavior* — This man showed good judgment and planning and was skillful in performing his job. He knew how to "dish it out."

Example 1. A squad was advancing through a field of high grass and soon drew enemy fire. They dived into the grass but a Cpl soon realized that the squad might get widely scattered and lose contact with each other. To prevent this he crawled around to regroup the squad so they could continue to crawl and wriggle forward as a unit.

Example 2. A squad was covering the advance of a flamethrower team. A Pfc was at the machine gun but it soon jammed. Since continuous covering fire was necessary, he started throwing hand grenades and firing a spare M1. By the time the action was over he was firing the BAR of a wounded squad member. He was a good man with any weapon.

	Number of Times Observed					Names
	N.O.	0	1	2-4	5+	Squad Members (Print Last Name First)
1.						1.
2.						2.
3.						3.
4.						4.
5.						5.
6.						6.
7.						7.
8.						8.
9.						9.
10.						10.

5. *Description of behavior* — This soldier was a bad influence on the morale of the group. He was always griping about conditions and about the other men and officers. Because of his attitude he caused quite a bit of trouble in the group.

Example 1. A Pvt in a combat Company got the idea he could force the CO to provide better chow by organizing a "slow down" strike. He encouraged the other soldiers to complain that they were too weak to fight or march very well because the food was so poor. The officers soon found out about this man but not until morale got pretty bad in the outfit.

Example 2. One of the soldiers couldn't "take it." He would frequently complain of physical aches and pains and had a record of too many failures. In one attack he dropped his M1 and turned to helping the walking wounded back to the aid station. The Capt finally had to force the man to get back into action.

	Number of Times Observed				Names
N.O.	0	1	2–4	5+	Squad Members (Print Last Name First)
1.					1.
2.					2.
3.					3.
4.					4.
5.					5.
6.					6.
7.					7.
8.					8.
9.					9.
10.					10.

6. *Description of behavior* — In a situation where the group was under pressure, this soldier showed courage by continuing aggressive action.

Example 1. During a charge up a hill against a strong enemy position one Pfc had a slug cut his BAR sling and another slug knocked out the rear sight. They hit so hard that he was knocked down but he jumped up and continued running up the hill.

Example 2. Two riflemen and one BAR man were unable to locate the source of some punishing sniper fire. One of the riflemen volunteered to move about 50 yards to the flank where he stood up and fired his M1 and dropped behind cover. He drew sniper fire, thus showing the sniper's position to his partners.

	Number of Times Observed				Names
N.O.	0	1	2–4	5+	Squad Members (Print Last Name First)
1.					1.
2.					2.
3.					3.
4.					4.
5.					5.
6.					6.
7.					7.
8.					8.
9.					9.
10.					10.

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Form II

II a.

EFFECTIVE ACTION OF A *SQUAD* DURING AN *ADVANCE*

1. Think of the most recent situation in which your group was making an advance in a combat area.

A. *When* was this? _____

B. *Where* was this? _____

Now select a squad that you observed to be of special help to the group in this situation in accomplishing the mission. This squad should be selected because they were of real help as a unit in getting the job done.

C. What was the situation? _____

_____

_____

D. What did the squad do? _____

_____

_____

E. Why did you feel this was an especially good thing for them to do? _____

_____

_____

F. It was Squad _____; in Platoon _____; Company _____; Battalion _____ ;

Regiment _____; Division _____.

G. Was effectiveness of squad due to leader alone or to action of squad? _____

_____

*** *** *** *** ***

II. What was *your* grade at the time? _____

I. What was *your* assignment at the time? _____

_____

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II b.

INEFFECTIVE ACTION OF A *SQUAD* DURING AN *ADVANCE*

2. Think of the most recent situation in which your group was making an advance in a combat area.

A. *When* was this? _____

B. *Where* was this? _____

Now select a squad that you observed to be not doing its part in that situation to carry out the mission of the group. This squad should be selected because their poor action as a unit was of little help in getting the job done.

C. What was the situation? _____

_____

_____

D. What did the squad do? _____

_____

_____

E. Why did you feel this was not a good thing for the squad to do? _____

_____

_____

F. It was Squad _____; in Platoon _____; Company _____; Battalion _____; Regiment _____; Division _____.

G. For what main reason (other than leadership problems) did this ineffective action happen? _____

_____

*** *** *** *** ***

H. What was *your* grade at the time? _____

I. What was *your* assignment at the time? _____

_____

II c.

EFFECTIVE ACTION OF A *SQUAD* DURING A *WITHDRAWAL*

3. Think of the most recent situation in which your group was making a withdrawal in a combat area.

A. *When* was this? _____

B. *Where* was this? _____

Now select a squad that you observed to be especially helpful to the group in accomplishing the withdrawal in an effective way. This squad should be selected because they were of real help as a unit in getting the job done.

C. What was the situation? _____

_____

_____

D. What did the squad do? _____

_____

_____

E. Why did you feel this was an especially good thing for them to do? _____

_____

_____

F. It was Squad _____; in Platoon _____; Company _____; Battalion _____; Regiment _____; Division _____.

G. Was effectiveness of squad due to leader alone or to action of squad? _____

*** *** *** *** ***

H. What was *your* grade at the time? _____

I. What was *your* assignment at the time? _____

_____

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II d.

INEFFECTIVE ACTION OF A *SQUAD* DURING A *WITHDRAWAL*

4. Think of the most recent situation in which your group was making a withdrawal in a combat area.

A. *When* was this? _____

B. *Where* was this? _____

Now select a squad that you observed to be not doing its part in that situation to carry out the mission of the group. This squad should be selected because their poor action as a unit was of little help in getting the job done.

C. What was the situation? _____

_____

_____

D. What did the squad do? _____

_____

_____

E. Why did you feel this was not a good thing for the squad to do? _____

_____

_____

F. It was Squad _____; in Platoon _____; Company _____; Battalion _____; Regiment _____; Division _____.

G. For what main reason (other than leadership problems) did this ineffective action happen? _____

_____

*** *** *** *** ***

H. What was *your* grade at the time? _____

I. What was *your* assignment at the time? _____

_____

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Form III

III a.

INCIDENT IN WHICH A SOLDIER *WAS ESPECIALLY HELPFUL* IN CARRYING OUT THE MISSION OF THE GROUP

1. Think of the most recent situation in which your group was engaged in operations in a combat area.

A. *When* was this? _____

B. *Where* was this? _____

Now select a soldier whom you observed to be of special help to the group in this situation in accomplishing the mission. This soldier should be selected because he was of real help in getting the job done.

C. What was the situation? _____

_____

_____

D. What did the soldier do? _____

_____

_____

E. Why did you feel this was an especially good thing for the soldier to do in this situation?

_____

_____

F. The soldier's name: _____

G. The soldier's grade: _____

H. His Squad _____; Platoon _____; Company _____; Battalion _____; Regiment _____; Division _____.

*** *** *** *** ***

I. What was your grade at the time? _____

J. What was your assignment at the time? _____

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III b.

INCIDENT IN WHICH A SOLDIER *DID NOT DO HIS PART* IN CARRYING OUT THE MISSION OF THE GROUP

2. Think of the most recent situation in which your group was engaged in operations in a combat area.

A. *When* was this? _____

B. *Where* was this? _____

Now select a soldier whom you observed in this situation who didn't do his part or who was a special hindrance in carrying out the mission of the group. This soldier should be selected because he did not do his part in getting the job done.

C. What was the situation? _____

_____

_____

D. What did the soldier do, or fail to do? _____

_____

_____

E. Why did you feel that this was especially poor activity in this situation? _____

_____

_____

F. The soldier's name: _____

G. The soldier's grade: _____

H. His Squad _____; Platoon _____; Company _____; Battalion _____; Regiment _____; Division _____.

*** *** *** *** ***

I. What was your grade at the time? _____

J. What was your assignment at the time? _____

OPINIONS, SHOWN ON ORO QUESTIONNAIRE, OF COMBAT-EXPERIENCED OFFICERS COMMANDING INTEGRATED UNITS

PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

Purpose

Among the valuable sources of information for evaluating the Army's integration policy are the opinions of combat-experienced officers who have worked with integrated units in the Korean campaign. No other group of officers is in a better position to report direct experiences obtained while supervising and observing white and Negro soldiers fighting side by side in actual combat. This section of the report presents the results of a systematic polling of more than 200 officers who have had direct experience with integrated units in combat situations.

It should be emphasized immediately, however, that these will be *opinions* and not an objective record of the actual performance of Negro soldiers fighting in integrated units. These opinions, nevertheless, are vitally important to complete the over-all picture of the operation of the Army's integration program. It is important to know the opinions of the immediately involved officers not only because they reflect and predict the acceptance of the integration program but because to a certain extent these opinions also indicate the actual proficiency of the Negro and white soldiers working together in these combat units.

By the very nature of his assignment and combat experience, each of the officers can be considered an expert on the integration problem. To obtain a consolidated opinion from these men, a formal questionnaire was prepared. Questionnaires have many limitations but because of the severe restrictions in time and facilities, personal interviews with a large number of combat-experienced officers were not feasible but the questionnaire quite adequately provided the means to combine the opinions of a larger number of officers into a composite picture.

It is important to point out again that the officers selected for polling with this questionnaire were carefully selected against the criterion of combat experience with integrated units. The data, therefore, are based on direct experience and observation.

Procedure

The Form. A copy of the questionnaire used in this survey is presented at the end of this section. The questionnaire was prepared by the Operations Research Office.

Most of the officers were able to complete the form in about thirty minutes. Nearly all the respondents seemed quite willing and cooperative, and showed no particular objections despite the fact that they were operating on busy schedules. As a matter of fact, more often than not the officers seemed to appreciate the opportunity to express the opinions they had come to hold as the result of their experiences as combat officers in the integrated units.

The Sample. The officers cooperating in this questionnaire study were at the battalion and company level. Any officer who had less than one month of actual combat experience in an integrated unit was excused from completing the questionnaire. The divisions, regiments, and companies sampled on the ORO questionnaire were the following: 1st Cav Div, 8th Cav Regt, Cos Hq, HM, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I; 2d Div, 9th Regt, Cos Hq, F, and K; 3d Div, 7th Regt, Cos Hq, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, K, L, and M, 9th Regt, FA Btries 77 and 97, and 15th Regt, Cos Hq, Tk, A, D, and G; 7th Div, 17th Regt, Cos Hq, A, B, and C, 31st Regt, Cos Hq, TR, A, B, C, F, G, K, and L, and 32d Regt, Cos A, B, and C; 24th Div, 5th Regt, Cos Hq, A, B, D, and I, 19th Regt, Cos Hq, C, and I, and 21st Regt, Cos Hq, A, B, C, D, E, F, H, I, K, L, and M; 25th Div, 24th Regt.

Administration. In all cases, the questionnaire was the last form administered to any unit from which research data were being obtained; i.e., AIR Forms I, II, and III were always completed before any of the officers was asked to fill out the questionnaire. This was obviously necessary since the content of the questionnaire immediately indicated the true nature of the research problem. Many of the questionnaires were administered individually to officers on the combat line. Wherever possible, the attempt was made to gather them together in groups of six to ten. In some cases, due to the pressure of time, it was necessary to leave the blanks with the S-1 or the battalion commanding officer who assumed responsibility for distributing the forms to all qualified officers in his unit. This procedure seemed to work quite satisfactorily. The only staff officers who completed the questionnaire were men who had worked with the combat soldiers in some previous assignment when Negroes were present in the unit.

RESULTS

To facilitate the analysis and interpretation, all of the questionnaire results were transposed to rosters, with the written-in marginal notes and the critical incident statements typed verbatim from the questionnaire form.

Over-all Important Interpretations

The following comments simply highlight what appear to be the more important interpretations that might be made from the responses to each item of the questionnaire. These interpretations are made on the basis of the results tabulated in Table A9, the column headed "Commanded Integrated Units." These are the opinions of the 185 officers who had had command experience in integrated units.

Item 1: Three out of four officers believe that "the Negro soldiers are just about as good" when compared with the white soldiers. This is a general item and reflects an overall evaluation of the Negroes compared with the white soldiers as combat fighters.

Item 2: Eighty percent of the respondents believe that the "same Negro soldiers will perform better in an integrated unit than in an all-Negro unit." This is an important opinion and indicates strong support for the integration program as the most effective use of the available manpower.

Item 3a: Almost half of the officers believe that the maximum number of Negroes assigned to integrated units should be two Negroes with seven whites; 75 percent believe that either two or three Negroes should be the maximum number. The top limit for any of these respondents was four Negroes with five whites.

Item 4: Nine out of ten officers believe that the Negroes "maintain their weapons about as well as white soldiers."

Item 5: About two-thirds of the replies indicate that the Negro soldiers "season to combat conditions and acquire combat skills just as readily as the white soldier."

TABLE A9

DISTRIBUTION OF CHOICES OF OFFICERS COMPLETING THE ORO QUESTIONNAIRE

Abbreviated statement of each item	Response choice [a]	Percent of choices of officers with varied backgrounds							
		Type unit commanded			Area of origin			Respondent's race	
		Integrated, 185, % [b]	All-white, 24, % [c]	All-Negro, 28, % [d]	West N. Cent, N. East, 146, %	Deep South, 61, %	Borderline South, 27, %	White, 234, % [e]	Negro, 11, % [f]
1. Negroes vs whites in performance as fighters	+	0.6	0.0	0.0	1.4	3.5	0.0	0.9	0.0
	−	22.9	34.5	32.1	22.7	42.1	25.9	25.4	10.0
	O	76.5	65.5	67.9	75.9	54.4	74.1	73.7	90.0
	Omit	(6)	(0)	(0)	(5)	(4)	(0)	(6)	(1)
2. Same Negroes' performance in combat in integrated vs all-Negro unit	+	80.8	91.7	89.3	83.3	78.0	77.8	81.4	81.8
	−	3.3	0.0	0.0	4.2	1.7	3.7	3.4	0.0
	O	15.9	8.3	10.7	12.5	20.3	18.5	15.2	18.2
	Omit	(3)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(2)	(0)	(3)	(0)
3a. Recommended maximum number of Negro EMs in integrated combat squad	Immaterial	3.8	8.3	17.8	5.6	5.3	7.4	6.1	30.0
	1	14.4	20.9	14.3	18.0	7.0	7.4	14.0	0.0
	2	47.5	33.3	28.6	40.3	49.1	59.3	43.7	30.0
	3	28.2	25.0	25.0	25.0	36.8	25.9	28.8	20.0
	4	6.1	8.3	14.3	9.7	1.8	0.0	6.6	20.0
	5	0.0	4.2	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0
	6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0
	Omit	(4)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(4)	(0)	(5)	(1)
4. Negroes vs whites in maintenance of weapons	+	3.8	0.0	3.7	4.8	1.6	0.0	3.4	0.0
	−	6.0	13.0	22.2	4.8	13.1	18.5	8.6	0.0
	O	90.2	87.0	74.1	90.4	85.3	81.5	88.0	100.0
	Omit	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(1)	(2)
5. Negroes vs whites in seasoning to combat conditions	+	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.8	0.4	0.0
	−	32.2	40.9	30.4	31.0	46.7	46.2	35.4	0.0
	O	67.2	59.1	69.6	69.0	53.3	50.0	64.2	100.0
	Omit	(2)	(2)	(5)	(4)	(1)	(1)	(5)	(3)
6. Negroes vs whites in holding ground in hand-to-hand combat	+	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	−	30.7	40.0	39.1	28.7	41.5	44.0	33.7	37.5
	O	69.3	60.0	60.9	71.3	58.5	56.0	66.3	62.5
	Omit	(22)	(4)	(5)	(17)	(8)	(2)	(26)	(3)
7. All-white vs integrated units in aggressiveness in attack	−	10.9	14.3	13.1	6.6	22.8	28.0	12.7	0.0
	+	2.3	4.7	4.3	2.2	7.0	4.0	1.8	50.0
	O	86.8	81.0	82.6	91.2	70.2	68.0	85.5	50.0
	Omit	(10)	(3)	(5)	(9)	(4)	(2)	(13)	(3)
8. Negroes vs whites in combat judgment	+	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.5	0.0
	−	27.8	47.6	33.3	27.9	43.9	48.0	33.3	0.0
	O	71.6	52.4	66.7	72.1	54.4	52.0	66.2	100.0
	Omit	(9)	(3)	(4)	(6)	(4)	(2)	(12)	(3)
9. Success of Negro vs white leaders in hazardous missions	+	1.2	0.0	0.0	1.5	2.0	0.0	1.4	10.0
	−	30.3	52.4	41.7	26.1	53.1	50.0	35.6	0.0
	O	68.5	47.6	58.3	72.4	44.9	50.0	63.0	90.0
	Omit	(20)	(3)	(4)	(12)	(12)	(3)	(26)	(1)

TABLE A9 (continued)

Abbreviated statement of each item	Response choice [a]	Percent of choices of officers with varied backgrounds							
		Type unit commanded			Area of origin			Respondent's race	
		Integrated, 185, % [b]	All-white, 24, % [c]	All-Negro, 28, % [d]	West N. Cent, N. East, 146, %	Deep South, 61, %	Borderline South, 27, %	White, 234, % [e]	Negro, 11, % [f]
10. Negro vs white preoccupation with fear of death or injury	−	20.4	28.6	16.7	21.1	27.1	32.0	23.5	0.0
	+	0.6	4.8	8.3	0.7	3.4	0.0	1.3	28.6
	O	79.0	66.6	75.0	78.2	69.5	68.0	75.2	71.4
	Omit	(4)	(3)	(4)	(4)	(2)	(2)	(8)	(4)
11. Integrated vs all-white unit in morale	+	10.9	4.5	12.0	9.8	8.3	15.4	9.6	66.7
	−	4.4	4.5	4.0	3.8	8.3	15.4	6.1	0.0
	O	84.7	91.0	84.0	86.4	83.4	69.2	84.3	33.3
	Omit	(2)	(2)	(3)	(13)	(1)	(1)	(5)	(2)
12. Negroes vs whites in "going to pieces" in combat	−	12.6	15.0	13.0	8.8	18.9	29.2	13.4	0.0
	+	5.2	10.0	8.7	3.6	7.5	12.5	5.6	28.6
	O	82.2	75.0	78.3	87.6	73.6	58.3	81.0	71.4
	Omit	(11)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(8)	(3)	(18)	(4)
13. Negroes vs whites in breaking under mass attack	−	14.5	21.1	29.2	11.3	34.0	25.0	18.7	0.0
	+	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.7
	O	85.5	78.9	70.8	87.9	66.0	75.0	81.3	83.3
	Omit	(20)	(5)	(4)	(14)	(8)	(3)	(25)	(5)
14. Negroes vs whites in carrying out orders	+	2.2	4.8	9.1	2.1	4.9	3.8	3.1	12.5
	−	24.4	42.9	36.4	22.7	32.8	53.9	28.8	0.0
	O	73.4	52.3	54.5	75.2	62.3	42.3	68.1	87.5
	Omit	(1)	(3)	(6)	(5)	(0)	(1)	(5)	(3)
15. Negroes vs whites in reluctance to engage enemy	−	16.1	10.0	13.1	11.8	26.2	19.2	16.2	12.5
	+	8.3	5.0	4.3	8.1	8.2	11.6	8.5	12.5
	O	75.6	85.0	82.6	80.1	65.6	69.2	75.3	75.0
	Omit	(5)	(4)	(5)	(10)	(0)	(1)	(11)	(3)
16. Negroes vs whites in effective use of weapons and ammunition	+	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	−	18.6	28.6	36.4	14.0	33.9	34.6	21.6	0.0
	O	81.4	71.4	63.6	86.0	66.1	65.4	78.4	100.0
	Omit	(8)	(3)	(6)	(10)	(2)	(1)	(12)	(4)
17. Willingness of Negro vs white leaders to take calculated risks	+	3.8	9.1	4.4	3.9	2.1	13.6	4.1	25.0
	−	18.4	18.2	13.0	13.9	25.6	36.4	18.8	0.0
	O	77.8	72.7	82.6	82.2	72.3	50.0	77.1	75.0
	Omit	(27)	(2)	(5)	(17)	(14)	(5)	(37)	(3)
18. Integrated vs all-white units in teamwork	O	85.7	87.0	92.0	89.5	80.0	80.8	86.0	37.5
	+	5.5	4.3	4.0	4.9	1.7	7.7	3.9	62.5
	−	8.8	8.7	4.0	5.6	18.3	11.5	10.1	0.0
	Omit	(3)	(1)	(3)	(3)	(1)	(1)	(5)	(3)
19. Negroes vs whites in alertness in scouting and patrol work	+	15.5	4.8	8.3	14.7	18.2	4.4	13.0	18.6
	−	17.3	14.3	12.5	14.0	25.4	21.7	18.7	10.0
	O	67.2	80.9	79.2	71.3	56.4	73.9	68.3	71.4
	Omit	(17)	(3)	(4)	(17)	(6)	(4)	(26)	(4)

TABLE A9 (continued)

Abbreviated statement of each item	Response choice [a]	Percent of choices of officers with varied backgrounds							
		Type unit commanded			Area of origin			Respondent's race	
		Integrated, 185, % [b]	All-white, 24, % [c]	All-Negro, 28, % [d]	West N. Cent, N. East, 146, %	Deep South, 61, %	Borderline South, 27, %	White, 234, % [e]	Negro, 11, % [f]
20. Negro vs white leaders in setting personal example and staying with men	+	5.2	4.8	4.3	2.4	9.7	5.0	4.7	37.5
	−	6.6	9.5	8.7	9.0	17.1	10.0	7.9	0.0
	O	88.2	85.7	87.0	88.6	73.2	85.0	87.4	62.5
	Omit	(32)	(3)	(5)	(23)	(20)	(7)	(44)	(3)
21. Basis for answers									
Unit command									
Integrated		100.0	0.0	0.0	80.0	63.9	70.8	73.7	20.0
All-white		77.8	100.0	42.9	72.4	60.7	62.5	68.5	10.0
All-Negro		14.1	58.3	100.0	22.8	16.4	33.3	21.6	70.0
Unit contact									
Integrated		57.3	54.2	53.6	62.8	59.0	66.7	63.8	60.0
All-white		47.6	54.2	53.6	50.3	52.4	58.3	50.9	40.0
All-Negro		38.4	54.2	42.9	44.1	34.4	45.8	40.9	50.0
Indirect information									
Integrated		18.4	33.3	28.6	22.1	24.6	20.8	22.0	30.0
All-white		11.9	8.3	3.6	12.4	14.8	4.2	12.5	0.0
All-Negro		35.7	20.8	3.6	31.0	42.6	29.2	33.2	0.0
Exp with Negro NCOs in integrated units		64.9	29.2	7.1	59.3	44.3	45.8	54.3	30.0
Omit		(0)	(0)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(2)	(2)
22a. Kinds of Negro assignments									
Comb Dml Man		41.5	50.0	53.6	41.9	36.6	41.7	39.6	60.0
Hv Mort Sqd Ldr		42.7	70.8	71.4	50.4	34.6	41.7	44.3	80.0
Med Plat Sgt		37.2	54.2	28.6	40.3	30.8	41.7	37.1	60.0
FA MGunr		48.8	50.0	60.7	49.6	48.1	57.1	48.6	60.0
Tk Cannoneer		46.9	58.3	64.3	46.5	51.9	61.9	48.1	70.0
Rifleman		85.4	70.8	64.3	86.0	73.1	81.0	78.6	80.0
Unit Sup Sgt		47.6	60.7	67.9	53.4	44.2	52.4	49.5	70.0
Comb Engr Sqd Ldr		34.1	45.8	46.4	38.0	30.8	33.3	33.8	50.0
FA C/Gun Sec		34.1	45.8	53.6	38.0	36.6	23.8	34.8	70.0
Hv Mort Gunr		48.8	75.0	78.6	53.5	51.9	61.9	51.4	90.0
Med Aidman		55.5	75.0	60.7	60.0	57.7	81.0	58.6	60.0
Tk Comdr		29.3	33.3	39.3	36.4	23.1	14.3	20.7	50.0
Rifle Sqd Ldr		64.6	66.7	57.1	69.0	30.8	42.9	59.0	80.0
Armorer		44.6	75.0	75.0	50.4	48.1	41.7	49.0	60.0
Omit		(21)	(0)	(0)	(17)	(9)	(3)	(25)	(1)

TABLE A9 (continued)

Abbreviated statement of each item	Response choice [a]	Percent of choices of officers with varied backgrounds							
		Type unit commanded			Area of origin			Respondent's race	
		Integrated, 185, % [b]	All-white, 24, % [c]	All-Negro, 28, % [d]	West N. Cent, N. East, 146, %	Deep South, 61, %	Borderline South, 27, %	White, 234, % [e]	Negro, 11, % [f]
27a. Negroes vs whites in intelligence	+	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0
	−	48.0	68.2	70.8	47.8	66.1	58.3	54.1	16.7
	O	52.0	31.8	29.2	51.5	33.9	41.7	45.5	83.3
	Omit	(6)	(2)	(4)	(10)	(2)	(3)	(14)	(5)
27b. Basis of judgment									
Daily performance		96.6	90.5	73.9	93.2	93.1	87.5	91.2	50.0
Record forms		12.4	19.0	17.4	12.9	10.3	20.8	12.1	33.0
Other		4.5	4.8	8.7	4.5	5.2	4.2	5.1	16.7
Omit		(7)	(3)	(5)	(14)	(3)	(3)	(19)	(5)

[a] Of three alternatives that the officers could check, the "+" sign indicates the choice which was favorable to the Negro, the "−" sign unfavorable to the Negro, and the "O" the alternative in which the Negro and the white were judged to be about equal. "Omit" indicates "no response." In Item 3, the numbers indicate actual numbers of Negroes.

[b] These are the results for the officers who checked the first entry in Item 21: "Experience commanding integrated units of Negro and white soldiers." Many of these officers also checked one or more of the other blanks. The results are given in terms of the percent of the men answering the item who checked one of the three alternatives. The number in parenthesis is the number of officers who omitted the item. The results for Item 1, therefore, are percents based on 179 cases. With Items 21, 22, and 27b, the officers could check more than one item. In these cases, therefore, the percentages will add up to more than 100.

[c] These are the results of the 24 officers who did not check the first entry, but did check the second entry in Item 21: "Experience commanding all-white units." These men may also have checked other blanks, except the first one.

[d] Twenty-eight officers checked the third blank; "Experience commanding all-Negro units," but did not check either the first or second alternatives. It was possible to get the opinion of these officers since a special visit was made to some all-Negro battalions with the request that the officers complete the questionnaire.

[e] Summary of the results of all the white officers regardless of the type of command experience.

[f] Negro officers only.

Item 6: Over two-thirds of the officers believe that the Negro soldier "will hold his ground about the same as the white soldier;" 30 percent believe that the Negro is inferior in this respect.

Item 7: Only 11 percent believe that the "all-white units are more aggressive in attack than the integrated units" while 87 percent feel that the all-white units and integrated units are about the same.

Item 8: Seventy-two percent believe that the Negro uses "good judgment and common sense about the same as the white soldier."

Item 9: The data show that slightly over two-thirds of the officers believe that hazardous combat missions "will succeed equally well if led by either a Negro or a white soldier." This is an important leadership item.

Item 10: A majority of the officers (79 percent) believe that the Negroes and the whites have about the same preoccupation with fears of death or injury.

Item 11: Eighty-five percent of the respondents believe that there is no essential difference in the morale between integrated and all-white outfits.

Item 12: Better than four out of five officers believe that under conditions of sustained combat, there is no essential difference between the Negro and white soldiers as to their tendency to "go to pieces."

Item 13: Six out of seven officers believe that "the Negro and white soldiers stand up under mass attack about the same."

Item 14: Seventy-three percent believe that Negro soldiers "carry out orders to the letter about the same as the white soldiers."

Item 15: Three-fourths of the officers indicated that there is no difference between the Negro and white soldier in their reluctance to engage the enemy.

Item 16: Four out of five hold the opinion that "the Negro soldier uses his weapons just as effectively as the white soldier."

Item 17: Again, slightly over three-fourths of the officers believe that "Negro leaders take about the same number of calculated risks as the white leaders."

Item 18: Here the Negroes receive a fairly high score. Nearly 86 percent of the officers believe that the integrated unit shows "about the same degree of teamwork as an all-white outfit."

Item 19: Two-thirds of the officers believe that in scouting and patrol work the Negro is "just about as observant and alert as the white soldier is."

Item 20: This is another important leadership item in which 88 percent of the officers believe that "Negro leaders lead by personal example and stay with their men in combat just as much as white leaders." This refers to an integrated unit.

(Items 21–26 are given in the next section.)

Item 27: The officers were split almost fifty-fifty as to whether the Negro soldier is just as intelligent or has lower intelligence than the white soldier. Ninety-six percent of these judgments were based on "observation and daily performance."

Results of "Write-In" Items 3b and 21–26

Item 3a requested information as to the maximum number of Negroes which could be placed effectively in an integrated combat squad. Item 3b asked what happens when that number is exceeded.

Table A10 shows the types of reasons given in Item 3b for each of the choices made in Item 3a. An analysis of these data shows that nearly one-third of all comments expressed the idea that if the number of Negroes recommended by the officer is exceeded, the squad will divide into groups on the basis of color. One-fifth of all comments suggested that combat efficiency would be lowered if the number of Negroes exceeded the proportion specified.

Item 21: This question gives information as to the type of command experience officer respondents have had. The 185 officers with command experience in integrated units are used as the basis for the foregoing report.

Item 22a: This question provides a summary as to the type of assignments the officer respondents believe are the most suitable for the Negro soldier. Considerable weight might be given the replies of officers who have all had combat experience with integrated units, and presumably, therefore, have seen Negroes working side by side with white soldiers in a variety of different assignments. The respondents could check as many positions as they chose. The most frequently selected assignment was 85.4 percent for "rifleman." Only 29 percent, however, would assign the Negro to the position of tank commander. The other values varied between these two extremes. The question and results are as follows:

> Item 22a. As an officer, suppose that you have been called upon to place Negro soldiers within the military organization. In the light of your experience with

troops in combat situations, which of the following specific jobs could individual Negro soldiers be expected to perform efficiently?

The 185 officer respondents could check more than one assignment. The percent of officers checking each job was as follows: combat demolition man, 41.5; heavy mortar squad leader, 42.7; medical platoon sergeant, 37.2; field artillery machine gunner, 48.8;

TABLE A10

OFFICER REASONS FOR NOT EXCEEDING GIVEN NUMBER OF NEGRO EM PER SQUAD

Reason for not exceeding given number Negro EM	Distribution of reasons for varied numbers of Negroes per squad					Number responses	Percent of total responses
	Number makes no difference	Negroes per squad					
		1	2	3	4		
Form cliques or divide into groups on basis of color	1	15	38	18	2	72	32.3
Loss of Negroes' spirit of competition with whites	0	1	8	5	2	16	7.2
Loss of combat efficiency	0	7	24	17	0	48	21.5
Loss of teamwork within groups	0	0	2	6	1	9	4.0
Negroes will do more griping, stir up more trouble	0	0	3	1	0	4	1.8
Negro loss of pride when in majority	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.9
Development of internal friction and resentment	1	2	6	4	1	14	6.3
Reduced willingness to fight	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.4
Individual Negroes perform less well; poor soldiering, irresponsibility increase	0	2	4	0	0	6	2.7
Both Negro and white loss of confidence in squad	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.4
Nothing happens; makes no difference	7	4	2	0	3	16	7.2
Negroes more prone to complain of discrimination	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.4
Would tend to function as all-Negro unit again	0	0	1	1	1	3	1.3
Negroes don't trust each other in combat, but will trust whites	0	0	1	1	0	2	0.9
Loss of group discipline, willingness to accept others	0	0	7	2	0	9	4.0
Negroes tend to influence whites	0	0	0	2	1	3	1.3
It depends on the leaders	1	1	1	0	0	3	1.3
Whites lose interest in their command	0	0	1	0	1	2	0.9
Unit becomes more jumpy or nervous	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.4
Whites liable to attempt to maintain majority opinion	0	1	0	0	1	2	0.9
Some Negroes get too cocky	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.4
Don't want any Negroes at all	—	—	—	—	—	2	0.9
Other responses not classified in preceding	0	1	3	1	0	5	2.2

tank cannoneer, 46.9; rifleman, 85.4; unit supply sergeant, 47.6; combat engineer squad leader, 34.1; field artillery chief of gun section, 31.1; heavy mortar gunner, 48.8; medical aidman, 55.5; tank commander, 29.3; riflesquad leader, 64.6; and armorer, 44.6.

There were 94 write-in responses given; the frequency of the additional military jobs was as follows: truck driver, 15; cook, 11; cannoneer, 9; machine gunner, 8; ammo bearer, 7; BAR man, 6; wireman, 6; mechanic, 4; mess sergeant, 3; switchboard operator, 3; artillery gunnery sergeant, 2; field lineman, 2; forward observer, 2; jeep driver, 2; P & A section, 2; radio operator, 2; 57 or 75 mm R. rifleman, 2; assistant weapons sergeant, 1; clerk, 1; communications section, 1; prime mover driver, 1; QM supply depot port Cos, 1; rifle platoon sergeant, 1; runner or messenger, 1; and S-2 section, 1.

Only 13 respondents made any special comments in Item 22a. Most of these served to call attention to the fact that it was the individual and not the race that must qualify for the job; e.g., "It depends upon the man. A good man regardless of color can do any of the jobs. A sorry man will do none of them."

Analysis of Critical Incident Items

Items 23, 24, 25, and 26 of the questionnaire were designed to elicit critical incidents pertaining to outstanding and inferior performance of both white and Negro soldiers.

Items 23 and 24 present critical incidents of outstanding favorable performance of the Negro and white soldiers, respectively. In Table A11 are presented the different categories used to analyze these incidents and the number and percent of incidents falling in each category.

TABLE A11

DISTRIBUTION OF FAVORABLE CRITICAL INCIDENTS FOR NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS, BY CATEGORY

Favorable category	Distribution of incidents for each race			
	Negro (Item 23)		White (Item 24)	
	Number	%	Number	%
Minimize wounds	11	7.5	19	11.2
Rescue activities	15	10.3	14	8.3
Helping others	13	8.9	10	5.9
Leadership activities	27	18.5	32	18.9
Judgment and skill	13	8.9	27	16.0
Follows orders	40	27.4	32	18.9
Aggressive action	19	13.0	29	17.2
General statement	8	5.5	6	3.6
Total	146	100.0	169	100.0

The corresponding information for the unfavorable incidents, Items 25 and 26, is given in Table A12. In all of these analyses, if a given incident expressed two or more different ideas or types of behavior, it was then listed under two or more headings.

Comparing results in Item 23 for the Negro soldier with Item 24 for the white soldier, note that there is no outstanding difference in the pattern of replies. The most frequently given description for the Negro is the category "Follows orders or carries out duties," with the next most frequent category being "Leadership activities." These two categories were also the higher ones for the white soldiers. It is probably important to note that the Negro soldiers contribute just as many outstanding leadership incidents as we find for the white soldiers.

It was more difficult for the respondents to write down unfavorable incidents since the number of cases is distinctly less for Items 25 and 26 than for Items 23 and 24. Comparing the Negro with the white soldier on these two unfavorable items produces approximately the same pattern of results. The two most noticeable exceptions are "Poor care of equipment," which is more frequently applied to the Negro soldier, and "Poor leadership," which is more frequently applied to the white soldier. In this latter case, of course, it should be recognized that the white soldiers are more often the leaders and therefore have greater opportunity to show inferior performance. However, referring to "Leadership Activities," note that in the favorable incidents, the proportion of outstanding leadership activities assigned to Negroes is about the same as the white.

The following are more detailed statements of the eight different categories: (a) Minimize wounds: applies to those incidents where the soldier continues on with his attack or with whatever duties he was performing despite a wound which he had received; (b) Rescue activities: soldier went out of his way or exposed himself to additional hazard to rescue other soldiers; (c) Helping others: he put forth extra effort or went out of his way to help other soldiers who were in a difficult position or whose equipment was not operating; (d) Leadership activity: indicates that the soldier carried out his assigned leadership duties with unusual effectiveness, or that a lower-rated soldier assumed greater responsibility than those normally assigned to him; (e) Judgment and skill: soldier showed particularly intelligent decision as to what he or his unit should do, or demonstrated skill in handling, repair and/or maintenance of equipment; (f) Follows orders or carries out duties: soldiers show unusual diligence in completing their assignment or persisting with the duties assigned to them; (g) Aggressive action: showed unusual aggressiveness and initiative in some combat situation; and (h) General statement: once in a while, a statement does not describe a particular activity of a given soldier, but simply reflects a general evaluation of the Negro-white personnel.

TABLE A12

DISTRIBUTION OF UNFAVORABLE CRITICAL INCIDENTS FOR NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS, BY CATEGORY

Unfavorable category	Distribution of incidents for each race			
	Negro (Item 25)		White (Item 26)	
	Number	%	Number	%
Ran away from enemy	19	22.3	18	20.0
Poor care of equipment	11	13.0	4	4.4
Lazy or poor attitude	17	20.0	11	12.2
Takes advantage of others	3	3.5	6	6.7
Malingering	11	13.0	13	14.4
Refused to move forward	9	10.6	11	12.2
Poor leadership	3	3.5	14	15.6
General comments	12	14.1	13	14.5
Total	85	100.0	90	100.0

The unfavorable categories given in Table A12 may be defined as follows: (a) Ran away from enemy: all those incidents in which the primary failure was to run away or pull back from contact with the enemy; (b) Poor care of equipment: improper use or maintenance of equipment of any type; (c) Lazy or poor attitude: this category should be distinguished from fear or cowardice and should also be separated from malingering;

(d) Takes advantage of others: some incidents describe a situation in which the soldier tried to improve his personal lot by taking advantage of others; (e) Malingering: includes the self-inflicted wounds or shirking of responsibility; (f) Refused to move forward: whatever the reason, indicates the soldier did not move forward to carry his part of the attack; (g) Poor leadership: incidents in which the leader failed or was unsatisfactory in his leadership responsibility; and (h) General comments: any general comments which cannot be placed in the other categories or which do not refer to a specific soldier's behavior.

On the basis of the comments given in the critical incidents, an additional analysis was made with respect to: (a) Aidmen: 12 of the incidents given for the Negroes in Item 23 were identified as being for aidmen compared to only four for the white soldiers; (b) Decorations: 14 of the favorable incidents involving the Negro soldiers resulted in the award of, or recommendation for, a decoration, while decorations were awarded or recommended in 17 of the incidents involving white soldiers; and (c) KIA: none of the Negro soldiers was reported being killed in connection with the favorable critical incident, while 17 of the white soldiers were reported killed in completing their critical incident behavior. This is a difficult fact to interpret and probably should be set aside in the absence of more definite research information.

Comments by Respondents

Item 28 is simply the request for any additional comments on the "subjects covered in the questionnaire or any other subjects." Eighty-three officers made comments, but about a third of these could not be classified with respect to the problem of the integration of Negro troops. Such responses were merely notes as to why the respondent had answered the previous questions as he did, e.g., "unable to answer several questions due to type unit," "short time in present unit," or "those questions not answered I do not feel qualified to answer or pass an opinion on."

Fourteen percent of the respondents criticized the questionnaire in one way or another. Of these, the most common types of comments were: "You can't consider Negroes (or whites) as a group, it always depends on the specific individuals involved," or "This questionnaire is creating mountains out of molehills," or "The more we talk about the problem of integration or the problem of the Negro soldier, the more problems there will be."

Whereas only 3.6 percent of the respondents felt that the integration was not worthwhile or was not working out well, 16 percent specifically stated that integration was a good idea. Thirty-one percent of all of the responses to this final item expressed attitudes which included the notion that leadership, not color, is the most important in combat and that there is no real difference between the Negro and the white, Negro soldiers being just as good as whites.

SUMMARY

A selected sample of 245 officers completed the ORO questionnaire indicating their opinions on the problem of the integration of Negro soldiers. All of the forms were completed early in Sep 1951 near the battle lines in Korea by officers with one month or more of combat experience with integrated units.

There were 28 different items in the questionnaire covering most of the important questions involved in the integration program. The general pattern of results is consistently uniform; on nearly every item from 66 to 90 percent of the officers rate the Negroes about on a par with the white soldiers.

Some of the more specific questionnaire results are as follows:

1. Seventy-six percent of the officers rate the Negro soldiers as just about as good fighters as the white soldiers.

2. Eighty percent believe the same Negro will perform better in an integrated unit than in an all-Negro unit.

3. Ninety percent of the officers state that one, two, or three Negroes is the maximum number to be placed in an integrated combat squad.

4. Ninety percent are of the opinion that there is no essential difference between the Negro and white soldier as to the care and maintenance of weapons.

5. Two-thirds of the officers believe that a hazardous mission will succeed equally well if led by either a Negro or white soldier.

6. Six out of seven believe that the Negro and white soldier stand up under mass attack about the same.

7. Eighty-eight percent accept the statement that Negroes lead by personal example and stay with their men in combat just about as much as white leaders.

8. Nearly all of the usual infantry combat assignments were checked as being appropriate for Negro soldiers. However, the most frequently selected military position was that of rifleman. Eighty-five percent of the respondents checked this as a specific job.

9. Officers from the southern states are generally less favorable to the Negro in comparison to the white soldier.

The respondents were asked to describe two incidents of outstanding performance, one for a Negro and one for a white soldier, and two incidents of inferior performance. The analysis of these incidents showed that there was no important difference in the type of combat behavior selected as being outstanding for the Negro soldiers in contrast to the white. The incidents describing inferior performance were also essentially the same with the exception that more of the Negroes were described as showing poor care of equipment while more of the white soldiers were described as displaying poor leadership.

In summary, the evidence from this opinion polling of experienced combat officers working with Negro and white soldiers shows strong support for the Army's integration program. While there are some minor differences in ratings of Negro and white soldiers, the bulk of the evidence indicates that the officers who had had immediate and direct experience with integrated units felt that in nearly all categories the Negro soldier was about on a par with the white soldier. Such an opinion seemed to be the consensus of from 66 to 90 percent of the officers completing the questionnaire.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions on this study will be presented as answers to the five basic questions that were asked at the beginning of the study.

How Does the Negro Soldier on an Integrated Squad Compare in Combat Effectiveness with the White Soldier on the Same Squad, as Seen by Fellow Squad Members?

In comparing the behavior of Negro and white rifle squad members, when their behavior has been observed and reported by both Negro and white squad members, the following conclusions seem justified:

1. As observed and reported by squad mates, both Negro and white, the Negro soldier shows substantially the same frequencies of desirable and undesirable combat behaviors as the white soldier.

2. An examination of the distributions of frequencies of desirable and undesirable behaviors by white and Negro rifle squad members shows that the overlapping of the two groups is almost complete.

3. Desirable combat behavior is reported in consistently higher frequencies than undesirable combat behavior, for both Negroes and whites.

4. In most of the cases where differences appear, the white soldier is reported as having slightly higher frequencies of desirable behavior than the Negro soldier. However, to the Negro observer some of these differences are in favor of the Negro.

5. In general, the similarities between Negro and white behavior on combat rifle squads far outweigh the differences. One might reasonably infer that combat rifle squad members are apparently judged more by their behavior than by their skin color.

How Do the Individual Negroes in Integrated Units Compare in Combat Effectiveness with Individual White Soldiers, as Seen by Their Combat Leaders, the Platoon Sergeants and Lieutenants?

On the basis of favorable and unfavorable incidents given by 103 platoon sergeants or lieutenants who had had combat experience with integrated troops, the following may be concluded:

1. If it is assumed that Negroes represent about 5-15 percent of the troops observed by these selected platoon officers, then the 12 percent unfavorable incidents and the 7 percent favorable incidents for the Negroes fall well within a reasonable range of variability.

2. These results again indicate the somewhat lesser proficiency of Negro troops, although overlapping of proficiency ranges is extremely large.

3. Negro troops contributed only a little less than their proportional share of outstandingly proficient troops.

4. One may conclude that as individuals, Negro troops turn out to be very nearly as good as individual white soldiers.

Does the Presence of Negroes on Integrated Squads Decrease the Combat Effectiveness of the Squad? or, More Specifically: How Do Combat Squads Compare in Effectiveness when They Contain No Negroes, One Negro, Two Negroes, Three, Four, or More?

From 336 critical incidents on effective and ineffective squad action during advance and withdrawal, as seen by platoon officers who have had experience with integrated squads, the following may be concluded:

1. There is no consistent difference in the number of Negroes on squads described as effective or ineffective during either advance or withdrawal.

2. The hypothesis that squads with more Negroes on them do more poorly during a withdrawal was not confirmed by these data.

3. Neither the number nor percent of Negroes on effective incident squads as compared with the number or percent of Negroes on ineffective incident squads showed any trend related to the presence of Negroes.

4. These data have been collected from 91 platoon sergeants and lieutenants in four different infantry divisions who have had combat experience with integrated squads with varying numbers of Negroes. From this fact and from the above information, it may be reasonably concluded that in numbers up to two or three Negroes per squad, squads containing Negroes do not differ appreciably from all-white squads.

What Is the Considered Opinion on the Negro-White Problem by Company and Battalion Officers Who Have Had Recent Combat Experience with Negroes and Whites in Integrated Units?

A selected sample of 245 officers completed a questionnaire on which they indicated their opinions on the problem of the integration of Negro soldiers. Their responses may be summarized as follows:

1. The general pattern of results is consistent, since with nearly every item from 66 to 90 percent of the officers rated the Negroes as about on a par with the white soldiers.

2. Seventy-six percent of the officers rate the Negro soldiers as just about as good fighters as the white soldiers.

3. Ninety percent of the officers state that one, two, or three Negroes is the maximum number that should be placed in an integrated combat squad.

4. Nearly all of the usual infantry combat assignments were checked as being appropriate for Negro soldiers. However, the most frequently selected military position was that of riflemen, which was checked by 85 percent of the respondents.

5. In general, the evidence from this opinion polling of experienced combat officers shows strong support for the Army's integration program.

How Do Negro Soldiers Compare with Whites on Such Considerations as AFQT or AGCT Scores, Years of Schooling, Aptitude Test Scores, AWOL Rate, and VD Rate?

The information in this section is very similar to the information on these topics in previous studies. One may conclude that:

1. Negroes fall slightly below whites on such considerations as AFQT or AGCT scores, years of schooling, aptitude test scores, and have less desirable averages on VD rate and AWOL rate.

2. Almost complete overlap is found when one examines the distributions for Negro and white soldiers for each of the above factors. There is a consistent tendency for the Negro to have slightly less desirable distributions than the white soldier, but the outstanding and striking tendency is the high degree of overlap.

REPRODUCTION OF THE ORO QUESTIONNAIRE

Following is the questionnaire prepared by ORO analysts. It was administered to 245 officers whose answers are tabulated in Table A9. The same questionnaire was also administered to officers who had returned to the US.

QUESTIONNAIRE ON PERFORMANCE OF TROOPS

The results of this questionnaire are to be used in a study of combat performance of troops in Korea. In order to obtain reliable information on the combat behavior of Negro and white troops, commanding officers are asked to answer the following questions as carefully and specifically as possible. It is expected that answers will differ, depending upon the nature and extent of experience with Negro troops, and it is highly important that each officer give his own opinions accurately and frankly — without regard to commonly held views or Army policy.

Please answer every question, selecting the one alternative response which most closely expresses your best military judgment. If you feel that the alternative response you have checked does not reflect your judgment exactly, please use the margin to amplify or clarify your response.

The identification data requested below will be used only in the statistical analysis of the questionnaire results; there will be no linking of specific responses to either the officers or the troops involved.

Rank: _____

Race: _____ Home State _____

Name and designation of unit: _____

Dates of command: _____

Date unit first engaged in combat in Korea: _____

Date of most recent combat of unit in Korea: _____

Total length of active service in the Armed Forces: ____ ____years ____ ____months

What component do you belong to? _____

Racial composition of unit: (Please identify the units under your command * and classify according to the following categories, giving for each integrated unit the approximate numbers of Negroes and whites. See following example.)

All-white units (No Negro EM)	All-Negro units (No white EM)	Integrated units (Some Negro EM Some white EM)	*Number* Negroes	Whites	Total EM in your Command
1st platoon, Company K 3rd platoon, Company K	None	2nd platoon, Company K	1-2 (Feb-May) 3-4 (May-present)	36-38 32-36	115-160 (Feb-May) 145-150 (May-present)

1. How do Negro soldiers perform as fighters, compared with white soldiers? On the whole, are they just about as good, better, or not as good? (Check one)

   ____ Negro soldiers are better fighters.

   ____ Negro soldiers are not as good fighters.

   ____ Negro soldiers are just about as good.

2. In actual combat, do you think that the same Negro soldiers would perform better, poorer, or just the same in an integrated unit as in an all-Negro unit? (Check one)

   ____ The same Negro soldiers would perform better in an integrated unit than in an all-Negro unit.

   ____ The same Negro soldiers would perform poorer in an integrated unit than in an all-Negro unit.

   ____ The same Negro soldiers would perform just the same in an integrated unit as in an all-Negro unit.

* Company commanders report by platoons; platoon commanders report by squad

3. a. In your opinion, what is the maximum number of Negro EMs it would be wise to place in an integrated combat squad? (Check one)

____ The number of Negroes makes no difference.

____ 1 Negro with 8 whites.

____ 2 Negroes with 7 whites.

____ 3 Negroes with 6 whites.

____ 4 Negroes with 5 whites.

____ 5 Negroes with 4 whites.

____ 6 Negroes with 3 whites.

____ 7 Negroes with 2 whites.

____ 8 Negroes with 1 white.

b. What do you think happens when the number you checked is exceeded?

_____

_____

c. What is the basis for your answers to a. and b. above?

_____

_____

_____

4. In an integrated unit do the Negro soldiers maintain their weapons in good condition better, less well, or about as well as the white soldiers when in combat? (Check one)

____ They maintain their weapons better than the white soldiers.

____ They maintain their weapons less well than the white soldiers.

____ They maintain their weapons about as well as the white soldiers.

5. In an integrated unit do the Negro soldiers season to combat conditions and acquire combat skills more readily, less readily, or just as readily as the white soldiers? (Check one)

____ They season to combat conditions and acquire combat skills more readily than the white soldiers.

____ They season to combat conditions and acquire combat skills less readily than the white soldiers.

____ They season to combat conditions and acquire combat skills just as readily as the white soldiers.

6. In hand to hand combat can you depend on the Negro soldier in an integrated unit to hold his ground better than, not as well as, or about the same as the white soldier? (Check one)

____ The Negro soldier will hold his ground better than the white soldier.

____ The Negro soldier will not hold his ground as well as the white soldier.

____ The Negro soldier will hold his ground about the same as the white soldier.

7. Are all-white units more aggressive, less aggressive, or just as aggressive in attack as integrated units? (Check one)

____ All-white units are more aggressive in attack than integrated units.

____ All-white units are less aggressive in attack than integrated units.

____ All-white units are just as aggressive in attack as integrated units.

8. In an integrated unit do the Negro soldiers tend to use good judgment and common sense in getting out of a tough spot during combat more than, less than, or about the same as the white soldiers? (Check one)

____ They use good judgment and common sense more than the white soldiers.

____ They use good judgment and common sense less than the white soldiers.

____ They use good judgment and common sense about the same as the white soldiers.

9. Is a hazardous combat mission more, less or just as likely to be successfully achieved if an integrated unit is led by a Negro leader as compared to a white leader? (Check one)

____ The mission is more likely to succeed if led by a Negro.

____ The mission is less likely to succeed if led by a Negro.

____ The mission will succeed equally well if led by either a Negro or a white soldier.

10. In an integrated unit do the Negro soldiers tend to be preoccupied with fears of death or injury more than, less than, or about the same as the white soldiers? (Check one)

____ They are preoccupied with such fears more than the white soldiers.

____ They are preoccupied with such fears less than the white soldiers.

____ They are preoccupied with such fears about the same as the white soldiers.

11. When in combat, is the morale of an integrated outfit of Negro and white soldiers higher, lower, or about the same as that of an all-white outfit? (Check one)

____ The morale of an integrated outfit is higher.

____ The morale of an integrated outfit is lower.

____ There doesn't seem to be much difference in morale between the integrated and all-white outfits.

12. As a result of sustained combat do the Negro soldiers in an integrated unit tend to go to pieces just as much, more, or less than the white soldiers? (Check one)

____ They tend to go to pieces more than the white soldiers.

____ They tend to go to pieces less than the white soldiers.

____ They tend to go to pieces just as much as the white soldiers.

13. Are the Negro soldiers in an integrated unit of Negro and white soldiers generally the first to break under a mass attack? (Check one)

____ Yes, the Negro soldier is generally the first to break under a mass attack.

____ No, the Negro soldier generally stands up under a mass attack better than the white soldier.

____ The Negro and white soldiers stand up under a mass attack about the same.

14. In a combat situation do the Negro soldiers in an integrated unit carry out orders to the letter more than, less than, or about the same as the white soldiers? (Check one)

____ They carry out orders to the letter more than the white soldiers.

____ They carry out orders to the letter less than the white soldiers.

____ They carry out orders to the letter about the same as the white soldiers. (Check one)

15. In general, is the Negro soldier in an integrated unit more or less reluctant than the white soldier to engage the enemy in combat? (Check one)

____ The Negro soldier is more reluctant to engage the enemy.

____ The Negro soldier is less reluctant to engage the enemy.

____ Negro and white soldiers are reluctant to about the same extent to engage the enemy.

16. In an integrated unit does the Negro soldier tend to use his weapons and ammunition supplies less effectively, more effectively or just as effectively as the white soldier? (Check one)

____ The Negro soldier uses his weapons more effectively than the white soldier.

____ The Negro soldier uses his weapons less effectively than the white soldier.

____ The Negro soldier uses his weapons just as effectively as the white soldier.

17. According to your combat experience, do Negro leaders in an integrated unit tend to take more, less, or about the same number of calculated risks as do white leaders? (Check one)

____ Negro leaders take more calculated risks.

____ Negro leaders take less calculated risks.

____ Negro leaders take about the same number of calculated risks as white leaders.

18. Do men in an integrated outfit of Negro and white soldiers show the same degree of teamwork, a greater degree of teamwork, or less teamwork than men in all-white outfits? (Check one)

____ They show about the same degree of teamwork as an all-white outfit.

____ They show a greater degree of teamwork than an all-white outfit.

____ They show less teamwork than an all-white outfit.

19. In scouting and patrol work do the Negro soldiers in an integrated unit tend to be more observant and alert, less observant and alert, or just about as observant and alert as the white soldiers? (Check one)

____ They tend to be more observant and alert than the white soldiers.

____ They tend to be less observant and alert than the white soldiers.

____ They tend to be just about as observant and alert as the white soldiers.

20. Do Negro leaders in an integrated unit tend to lead by personal example and stay with their men in combat more than, less than, or just about as much as white leaders? (Check one)

____ Negro leaders lead by personal example and stay with their men in combat more than white leaders.

____ Negro leaders lead by personal example and stay with their men in combat less than white leaders.

____ Negro leaders lead by personal example and stay with their men in combat just about as much as white leaders.

21. What has been the basis of your answers to the above questions (Questions 1 through 20)? (Check as many of the following as are applicable.)

____ Experience commanding integrated units of Negro and white soldiers.

____ Experience commanding all-white units.

____ Experience commanding all-Negro units.

____ Contact with, and observation of, integrated units.

____ Contact with, and observation of, all-white units.

____ Contact with, and observation of, all-Negro units.

____ Indirect information about integrated units.

____ Indirect information about all-white units.

____ Indirect information about all-Negro units.

____ Experience with, or observation of, Negro NCO's in integrated units.

____ Other. Please write in. _____

_____

_____

22. a. As an officer, suppose that you have been called upon to place Negro soldiers within the military organization. In the light of your experience with troops in combat situations, which of the following specific jobs could individual Negro soldiers be expected to perform efficiently? (Write in any additional jobs.)

____ Combat demolition man

____ Heavy mortar squad leader

____ Medical platoon sergeant

____ Tank commander

____ Rifle squad leader

____ Armorer

____ Field artillery machine gunner _____

____ Tank cannoneer _____

____ Rifleman _____

____ Unit supply sergeant _____

____ Combat engineer squad leader

____ Field artillery chief of gun section

____ Heavy mortar gunner

____ Medical aidman

b. Would you state the reasons for the selections you have written in, if possible basing your reasons on your own experience.

_____

_____

_____

23. Please describe below one or more incidents or examples illustrating outstanding performance of a Negro soldier in your unit.

Your best recollection of date and location: _____

_____

Incident: (Use names of persons and places) _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

24. Please describe below one or more incidents or examples illustrating outstanding performance of a white soldier in your unit.

Your best recollection of date and location: _____

_____

Incident: (Use names of persons and places) _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

25. Please describe below one or more incidents or examples illustrating inferior performance of a Negro soldier in your unit.

Your best recollection of date and location: _____

_____

Incident: _____

_____

_____

_____

26. Please describe below one or more incidents or examples illustrating inferior performance of a white soldier in your unit.

Your best recollection of date and location: _____

_____

Incident: _____

_____

_____

_____

27. a. Considered as a whole, was the intelligence of the Negro soldiers in your outfit higher, lower, or just about the same as that of the white soldiers?

____ The intelligence of the Negro soldiers was higher than that of the white soldiers.

____ The intelligence of the Negro soldiers was lower than that of the white soldiers.

____ The intelligence of the Negro soldiers was just about the same as that of the white soldiers.

b. What is the basis of your opinion?

____ Judgment based on daily performance.

____ Inspection of record forms of individual soldiers.

____ Other. Please write in: _____

_____

_____

28. Use the space below to make any additional comments on the subjects covered in this questionnaire or on any other subjects.

Appendix A, Part II

COMBAT PERFORMANCE STUDY, AUG-SEP 1951

by

Operations Research Office

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Negro soldiers are just about as good as white soldiers in their ability to fight, according to two-thirds of the officers and about half the enlisted men with experience in integrated units in Korea.

Negroes may be expected to perform efficiently in a variety of combat jobs, according to the judgment of men with experience in integrated units. Approximately one-third of the respondents express doubts concerning the ability of Negroes to perform certain kinds of jobs or believe that Negroes possess certain characteristics limiting their efficient utilization in various combat jobs.

The belief that the same Negro soldiers would perform better in integrated than in all-Negro units is held by almost all officers and a large majority of enlisted men with experience in integrated units. Only a small percentage of enlisted men think that Negroes would perform better in segregated units.

There are varying opinions concerning the maximum number of Negroes that can be placed in an integrated combat squad without lowering the efficiency of the squad. A majority of officers and enlisted men with actual experience in integrated units believe that no more than one, two, or three Negroes should be placed in a nine-man squad, the most frequent response being two Negroes with seven whites.

Various reasons for limiting the number of Negroes in an integrated squad are given by officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units. The most frequent reason is that Negroes may form a clique within the squad. Other reasons given for limiting the number of Negroes per squad include lowering of combat effectiveness, internal friction, and increase in disciplinary problems.

Integrated units perform as well as, or better than, all-white units, according to a majority of officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units.

In most cases Negroes in integrated units are equal to white soldiers in individual aspects of combat performance, according to a majority of officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units.

The performance of Negro leaders in integrated units is comparable to that of white leaders, according to a majority of enlisted men with experience in integrated units. A smaller proportion of officers hold this opinion.

Negro soldiers are selected as examples of outstanding performance somewhat less frequently than white soldiers by officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units. Negroes, however, are selected as examples of inferior performance no more frequently than are white soldiers.

Officers and enlisted men who have had personal experience commanding or serving in integrated units generally rate the individual Negro soldier's combat performance as equal to that of the white soldier far more frequently than do officers and enlisted men who have not had a chance to observe Negroes in integrated combat units.

PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY

Problem

This study draws upon the Korean experience in an attempt to answer eight questions concerning the performance of integrated units in combat, and the performance of Negro soldiers within these units:

1. How do Negro soldiers in general compare with white soldiers in their ability to fight?
2. What combat jobs can be efficiently performed by Negroes?
3. Can the same Negro soldiers be expected to perform differently in integrated than in all-Negro units?
4. Do integrated combat units perform in a manner similar to all-white units, or in a different manner? Does adding Negroes to a white unit decrease the combat effectiveness of that unit?
5. How many Negroes can be placed in an integrated unit without decreasing the combat effectiveness of that unit?
6. What occurs when the optimum level of integration is exceeded?
7. How well do Negro soldiers perform in an integrated combat unit as compared with white soldiers?
8. How successfully do Negro leaders perform in an integrated unit as compared with white leaders?

Preparation of Combat-Performance Questionnaire

Efforts to obtain reliable and objective measurements of combat performance of soldiers individually or in units have been largely unsuccessful in the past. One of the major stumbling blocks has been the difficulty in arriving at a precise definition of good or bad performance. Although there is general military agreement, at least in terms of results, about what constitutes effective performance in combat, particular aspects, such as courage, morale, and teamwork, are difficult to define operationally and to measure objectively. It was not possible in the present short-term study of Negro combat performance to devise objective measures. For this reason the present study was based on the judgments of competent military observers concerning the relative combat performance of Negro and white soldiers in integrated units in 1951.

A combat-performance questionnaire (reproduced at the end of the final section in Part I) was designed for use with officers who had direct experience in integrated units in Korea. The instructions contained a general statement of the problem under investigation, and emphasized the need for accurate and frank judgments of Negro and white performance, based on the observer's own experience with integrated troops in combat. Although officers were asked to give certain information about themselves, such as rank, home state,

etc., the questionnaires were anonymous, and it was stressed that no attempt would be made to identify the officers responding.

Four major types of questions were included in the questionnaire. The first type was fairly general in nature, designed to get an over-all evaluation of Negroes as fighters, an opinion as to the relative performance of Negroes in integrated as contrasted with all-Negro units, and an opinion concerning the maximum number of Negroes it would be wise to place in an integrated combat unit. Another question in this group was concerned with the kind of combat jobs which Negroes could be expected to perform efficiently.

The questions in the second group were specific in nature, designed to elicit information concerning the relative proficiency of Negro and white soldiers in integrated units in a number of aspects of combat behavior. These included effective use of weapons and supplies, ability to hold ground in hand-to-hand combat, ability to carry out orders exactly, alertness in scouting and patrol missions, etc. Several questions concerned the relative performance of Negro versus white leaders in integrated units.

In the third series of questions, officers were asked to compare integrated and all-white units on several specific aspects of behavior: aggressiveness in attack, morale, and degree of teamwork.

The last part of the questionnaire contained space for writing in incidents or examples of outstanding and inferior performance by individual white and Negro soldiers.

Subjects

Original plans called for administration of the questionnaire to officers serving with integrated units in Korea, in 1951. However, it was found that a fairly large number of officers with experience in integrated units had returned from Korea on rotation, as battle casualties, or for advanced training. Therefore, the study was extended to include this group. The data reported in this section have been gathered from men in the continental US only. Data from officers contacted in Korea were gathered by a field team and are analyzed separately in Part I of this appendix.

Questionnaires were completed by 298 officers returned from Korea. Of these, 40 were filled out by hospitalized men at the Walter Reed, Valley Forge, Percy Jones, and Letterman Army Hospitals. The other officers were contacted at the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, the Armored Center at Fort Knox, and the Artillery Center at Fort Sill. Of this total group of officers 30 were field grade officers in Korea, 268 were company grade officers.

Although the questionnaire was designed for officers, it was also given to a group of 228 enlisted men, most of whom were Korea battle casualties in the five Army hospitals listed above. In addition, a small number of enlisted men recently returned from Korea were given the questionnaire at Fort Sill. The total group of enlisted men included 68 sergeants, 71 corporals, and 89 privates. The majority of both officers and enlisted men had been in the infantry in Korea.

The questionnaires were administered during Aug and Sep 1951 by ORO staff members to groups of men at Army posts and in some cases to groups of convalescents at Army hospitals; a large number of questionnaires obtained at the hospitals were given individually to men in wards. In the case of both group and individual administration, the investigator stressed that the questionnaires were anonymous, and that an accurate and frank judgment of the combat performance of Negro and white soldiers was desired. The men were urged to answer every question, and to write in any additional comments or qualifications in the margin. Men filling out the questionnaire sometimes complained that they were unable to make judgments on certain aspects of combat performance which they had little or no opportunity to observe. In these cases they were instructed to leave the question blank or to note in the margin that they were unable to answer the question.

It was requested that the men not discuss the questionnaire with others while filling it out, as their own opinions, based on their own experience, was what was wanted.

It was planned to administer the questionnaire to Negro as well as to white officers and enlisted men. However, the total group of Negroes available at Army hospitals and posts was so small that the questionnaires obtained from these men have not been analyzed in this report. Data presented in this study are derived solely from the questionnaires completed by white officers and white enlisted men.

Analysis of Data

Since the main purpose of the study was to obtain information on the relative performance of Negro and white soldiers in integrated combat units, the judgments of officers and men who commanded or served in integrated units were of primary concern. These were the men who had had an opportunity to make firsthand observations and who could be expected to give the most reliable and accurate information. Questionnaire results from this group of subjects are therefore of major importance. A total group of 201 men (78 officers and 123 enlisted men) fell into the group with direct experience in integrated combat units. The experience of the remainder of the subjects varied. A total of 149 men (97 officers and 52 enlisted men) had observed other integrated units in combat or had had only slight experience with integration in their own units. (Men in the second experience category included those who had had less than two Negroes in their company, or who had served in an integrated unit less than four weeks.) The remainder of the subjects, 176 officers and enlisted men, had had no direct experience with integrated units in combat, and had had little or no contact with, or chance to observe, other integrated units in combat. Approximately 110 of these men had had no direct contact with Negroes in combat in any unit, integrated or segregated. These subjects were included in the study as a control group with which the group with experience in integrated units could be compared.

FINDINGS FROM QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

Analysis of the questionnaire responses of men with actual experience in integrated combat units constitutes the first and major portion of this report. The effect of experience with integration on the judgments in 1951 of Negro and white performance in combat is considered secondarily. The complete set of response percentages is given in Table A17.

Negro Soldier as a Fighter

Two questions in the questionnaire provided data on the general performance of Negroes without specifying type of unit. Question 1 dealt with the relative performance of Negroes as fighters, compared with white soldiers. Approximately seven out of ten officers with experience in integrated units believe that Negro soldiers are just about as good fighters as white soldiers. One-fourth of the officers believe that Negroes are not as good. Enlisted men with experience in integrated units are fairly evenly divided in their response to this question, approximately half of the group thinking Negroes to be as good fighters as white soldiers and the other half believing Negroes are not as good. The percentage of officers and enlisted men making these responses is shown in Table A13. The fact that quite a few of the respondents wrote in such qualifications as "Negroes are not as good fighters in their own units" suggests that this question may have elicited a general opinion about Negro combat performance rather than about the performance of Negroes in the respondent's own unit.

TABLE A13

VARIOUS RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON NEGRO ABILITY AS A FIGHTER*

Negro fighter performance as compared with white	Response distribution of integration-experienced men	
	78 officers, %	123 enlisted men, %
Not as good	25	53
Just about as good	69	47

* See Table A17 for the complete set of percentages on responses to this question.

Jobs Negro Soldiers Can Perform Efficiently

In a second question dealing with combat performance of Negroes in general (not specifying whether in an integrated or an all-Negro unit), the respondents were asked to check the jobs individual Negro soldiers can be expected to perform efficiently. Fourteen jobs, covering various branches of service and levels of responsibility, were listed; any or all of them could be checked. Spaces were provided in which additional jobs could be recorded, and respondents were asked to give the reasons for the selections they made.

The percentage of men with experience in integrated units who checked each job is shown for officers and enlisted men in Table A14. Jobs are arranged by career field, with the more responsible job preceding the less responsible job in each case. Both officers and enlisted men checked rifleman most frequently of the 14 jobs listed. Other jobs checked frequently by officers and enlisted men were field-artillery machine gunner, medical aidman, and heavy-mortar gunner. Least frequently checked were tank commander, combat demolition man, and combat engineer squad leader. Leadership jobs were checked less frequently by both officers and enlisted men than nonleadership jobs, on the whole, except in the case of the supply and engineer jobs. The frequent selection of infantry, artillery and medical aid jobs by both officers and enlisted men probably reflects their experience with Negroes in these jobs. A fairly common comment on this question was "I have seen Negroes in these jobs and they do them well."

TABLE A14

JOBS NEGRO SOLDIERS CAN BE EXPECTED TO PERFORM EFFICIENTLY, SELECTED BY INTEGRATION-EXPERIENCED RESPONDENTS

Jobs selected, by career field	Response distribution	
	78 officers, %	123 enlisted men, %
Infantry		
Rifle squad leader	46	20
Rifleman	69	46
Heavy mortar squad leader	47	15
Heavy mortar gunner	48	21
Armored		
Tank commander	29	7
Tank cannoneer	42	16
Artillery		
Field artillery chief of gun section	35	15
Field artillery machine gunner	47	28
Supply		
Unit supply sergeant	42	19
Armorer	44	20
Engineering		
Combat engineer squad leader	23	13
Combat demolition man	22	12
Medical		
Medical platoon sergeant	31	15
Medical aidman	47	28

Another type of analysis was made of the responses to this question by officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units in Korea. Responses were categorized as follows: (a) All 14 jobs checked, and/or a statement to the effect that Negro soldiers can perform any job, or any job for which they are qualified; (b) Some jobs checked, accompanied by a statement to the effect that the respondent has seen Negroes perform well in these jobs; and (c) Some jobs checked, accompanied by a statement expressing a feeling or belief that Negro soldiers possess certain characteristics which limit their performance on some jobs.

Questionnaires from men who gave no answer to the question, or who checked some of the jobs without giving any reason for their selection, were discarded for the purposes of this analysis. Results are summarized in Table A15.

Of the officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units included in this analysis, about seven out of ten (groups a and b) look upon the Negro as a soldier and say that he can be expected to perform efficiently any job he is trained and qualified for, or that he has performed a variety of particular jobs. About three out of ten (group c) have doubts about the Negro soldier's ability to perform certain jobs efficiently. The doubts entertained by men in this group follow no particular pattern. Ten respondents checked jobs that would keep the Negro out of close combat and/or in rear areas; six had doubts about his capabilities in positions of leadership; six felt that the Negro soldier had to be

TABLE A15

ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON JOB ASSIGNMENT OF NEGRO SOLDIERS

Response categories	Response distribution of integration-experienced men	
	71 officers, %	67 enlisted men, %
All 14 jobs checked, and/or statement to effect that Negro soldiers can perform any job, or any job for which qualified	20	18
Some jobs checked, accompanied by statement to effect that the respondent has seen Negroes perform well in these jobs	51	49
Some jobs checked, accompanied by statement expressing feeling or belief that Negro soldiers possess certain characteristics which limit their performance on some jobs	29	33

in positions where he would be under white scrutiny, otherwise he would be undependable; four would confine him to jobs of a routine nature involving little or no responsibility; three said the Negro can't be trusted; two implied cowardice and one implied laziness; the remainder limited the Negro to jobs he "likes" because he is mechanically inclined, likes to make noise, doesn't like to be around explosives, etc.

These data indicate that a large majority of both officers and enlisted men look on the Negro as just another soldier, subject to the same limitations as any other soldier.

Negro Performance in Integrated versus Segregated Units

Opinions of officers and enlisted men concerning the relative performance of Negro soldiers in integrated and all-Negro units were obtained in Question 2. The proportions of officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units making various responses to this question are shown in Table A16.

Almost all of the officers, and approximately eight out of ten of the enlisted men, think the same Negro soldiers would perform just as well, or better, in an integrated unit as in an all-Negro unit. Nine out of ten officers believe integration results in an improvement in Negro performance. The responses of enlisted men, although in the same direction as the responses of officers, are not as clearcut. This, of course, was a purely hypothetical question. Few, if any, of the respondents had actually had a chance to observe the *same* Negro soldiers performing on one occasion in a segregated unit and on another occasion in an integrated unit. Nevertheless, a large majority of both officers and enlisted men agree in their opinion that Negroes would perform at least as well, if not better, in an integrated unit as in an all-Negro unit.

TABLE A16

VARIOUS RESPONSES TO QUESTION ON NEGRO PERFORMANCE IN INTEGRATED VERSUS ALL-NEGRO UNITS [a]

Negro performance in integrated combat unit compared with same men's performance in all-Negro unit	Response distribution of integration-experienced men	
	78 officers, %	123 enlisted men, %
Better performance when integrated	90	46
Poorer performance when integrated	1	16
Performance the same in both units	8	36

[a] See Table A17 for the complete set of percentages on responses to this question.

Maximum Number Negroes in Integrated Combat Squad

The third question was designed to elicit opinions concerning the maximum number of Negroes that could be placed in an integrated combat squad without lowering the efficiency of the squad. Figure A19 shows the percentage of officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units giving various types of response to this question. A small percentage of officers and enlisted men believe that the number of Negroes in an integrated squad makes no difference. However, a majority of the respondents think that from one to three Negroes should be the maximum number to be placed in a squad. The most frequent response for both officers and enlisted men is two Negroes with seven white soldiers per squad.

TABLE A17

QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES OF MEN WITH DIFFERENT TYPES OF EXPERIENCE WITH NEGRO SOLDIERS IN COMBAT [a]

Question [b]	Response category [b]	Officers				Enlisted men			
		78 E, %	97 C, %	51 N+, %	72 N−, %	123 E, %	52 C, %	15 N+, %	38 N−, %
1. Negroes perform as fighters, as compared with whites	Better	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	0
	Not as good	25	35	53	38	53	60	71	58
	About as good	69	61	47	34	47	35	23	29
	No response [c]	5	2	0	26	0	5	6	13
2. Same Negroes perform in integrated unit, as compared to all-Negro unit	Better	90	82	86	71	46	42	40	34
	More poorly	1	4	4	5	16	29	27	20
	Just the same	8	10	8	7	36	25	33	24
	No response	1	4	2	17	2	4	0	16
3a. Maximum number Negroes in integrated combat squad	Doesn't matter	4	3	0	4	10	12	13	11
	One Negro	32	16	17	17	11	4	34	18
	Two Negroes	33	37	24	35	36	23	7	21
	Three Negroes	14	31	35	31	19	29	13	10
	Four–Five Negroes	8	8	12	5	16	17	13	16
	Six–Eight Negroes	1	0	2	0	2	0	7	0
	No response	8	5	10	8	6	15	13	24
4. Negroes maintain weapons in good condition, as compared with whites	Better	1	4	2	5	1	2	0	8
	Less well	13	20	18	11	10	9	33	13
	About as well	83	65	45	49	87	81	47	58
	No response	3	11	35	35	2	8	20	21

TABLE A17 (continued)

Question [b]	Response category [b]	Officers				Enlisted men			
		78 E, %	97 C, %	51 N+, %	72 N−, %	123 E, %	52 C, %	15 N+, %	38 N−, %
5. Negroes season to combat and acquire combat skills, as compared with whites	More readily	0	1	2	1	0	2	0	2
	Less readily	41	43	35	39	43	39	73	45
	Just as readily	58	46	26	29	51	48	20	29
	No response	1	10	37	31	6	11	7	24
6. In hand-to-han combat, Negroes hold ground, as compared to whites	Better	0	1	0	0	2	14	0	0
	Not as well	45	34	39	45	38	40	73	45
	About the same	42	47	32	29	45	35	20	29
	No response	13	18	29	26	15	11	7	26
7. Aggressiveness of all-white units in attack, as compared with integrated units	More	27	40	35	40	30	42	67	39
	Less	1	0	0	0	2	2	7	4
	Same	64	52	37	39	56	44	20	31
	No response	8	8	28	21	12	12	6	26
8. Negroes use good judgment and common sense in getting out of tough spot in combat, as compared with whites	More	0	1	0	0	1	4	0	0
	Less	45	43	37	37	36	36	67	37
	About the same	47	43	28	32	53	52	27	37
	No response	8	13	35	31	10	8	6	26
9. Likelihood of hazardous combat mission being successful if led by Negro, as compared with white	More likely	0	1	0	0	3	4	0	5
	Less likely	44	43	45	43	29	42	73	32
	Equally likely	33	37	24	32	51	44	20	34
	No response	23	19	31	25	17	10	7	29
10. Negroes preoccupied with fears of death or injury, as compared with whites	More	38	49	32	36	42	50	67	42
	Less	0	2	0	0	2	21	0	3
	About the same	54	39	35	39	47	23	27	34
	No response	8	10	33	25	9	6	8	21
11. Morale of integrated unit, as compared with all-white unit	Higher	15	3	0	3	12	8	7	8
	Lower	9	18	14	17	9	27	60	8
	No difference	75	69	43	51	71	59	26	55
	No response	1	10	43	29	8	9	7	29
12. As result of sustained combat, Negroes go to pieces as compared with whites	More	23	34	16	21	27	31	53	45
	Less	4	5	2	1	3	8	7	0
	Just as much	62	45	45	42	59	48	33	29
	No response	11	16	37	36	11	13	7	26

TABLE A17 (continued)

Question [b]	Response category [b]	Officers				Enlisted men			
		78 E, %	97 C, %	51 N+, %	72 N−, %	123 E, %	52 C, %	15 N+, %	38 N−, %
13. Negroes stand up under mass attack, as compared with whites	Not as well	18	29	22	32	34	33	67	37
	Better	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	3
	About the same	67	44	33	35	47	46	27	26
	No response	15	27	45	33	16	19	6	34
14. Negroes carry out orders to letter, as compared with whites	More	2	4	0	6	3	4	0	5
	Less	41	44	30	33	20	31	53	32
	About the same	53	41	31	35	65	56	40	34
	No response	4	11	39	26	12	9	7	29
15. Negroes reluctant to engage enemy in combat, as compared with whites	More	25	22	24	25	17	15	33	11
	Less	6	15	6	10	23	35	20	26
	About the same	63	54	29	33	48	39	27	29
	No response	6	9	41	32	12	11	20	34
16. Negroes use weapons and ammunition supplies effectively as compared with whites	More	0	0	2	1	2	8	0	0
	Less	37	50	35	33	27	23	40	13
	Same	57	40	24	31	58	54	47	58
	No response	6	10	39	35	13	15	13	29
17. Negro leaders take calculated risks, as compared with white leaders	More	8	5	6	3	7	2	7	0
	Less	26	21	25	21	24	38	47	26
	About the same	41	46	28	31	44	35	33	37
	No response	25	28	41	46	25	25	13	37
18. Integrated unit shows teamwork, as compared with all-white unit	Same	72	65	35	56	54	42	20	37
	Greater	9	5	4	4	9	10	0	5
	Less	17	21	24	18	24	35	73	32
	No response	2	9	37	22	13	13	7	26
19. In scouting and patrol work, Negroes observant and alert, as compared with whites	More	15	9	4	7	21	16	7	8
	Less	15	18	14	15	16	15	53	18
	About the same	52	46	43	42	52	48	33	40
	No response	18	27	39	36	11	21	7	34
20. Negro leaders lead by personal example and stay with their men, as compared with white leaders	More	4	7	2	4	1	2	0	3
	Less	15	16	24	17	14	8	33	13
	Just as much	54	46	31	36	57	59	54	39
	No response	27	31	43	43	28	31	13	45
22a. Jobs Negroes could be expected to perform efficiently	Comb Dml Man	22	22	22	28	12	8	7	3
	Hv Mort Sqd Ldr	47	32	31	39	16	12	0	8
	Med Plat Sgt	31	38	39	35	15	17	7	8
	FA MGunr	47	46	51	74	28	23	33	11

TABLE A17 (continued)

Question [b]	Response category [b]	Officers				Enlisted men			
		78 E, %	97 C, %	51 N+, %	72 N−, %	123 E, %	52 C, %	15 N+, %	38 N−, %
	Tk Cannoneer	42	46	35	44	16	17	7	8
	Rifleman	69	54	43	57	46	35	13	32
	Unit Sup Sgt	42	49	45	43	19	36	27	16
	Comb Engr Sqd Ldr	23	26	22	31	13	14	13	5
	FA C/Gun Sec	35	45	39	44	15	25	20	8
	Hv Mort Gunr	48	47	43	50	21	23	13	11
	Med Aidman	47	60	43	42	28	29	40	16
	Tk Cmdr	29	23	12	25	7	8	0	3
	Rifle Sqd Ldr	46	41	29	36	20	10	0	8
	Armorer	44	38	35	49	20	23	7	8
27a. Intelligence of Negroes, as compared with whites	Higher	1	1	2	1	2	0	0	0
	Lower	50	49	51	26	30	40	47	21
	About the same	41	15	6	10	49	29	0	21
	No response	8	35	41	63	19	31	53	58

[a] Types of experience are categorized as follows: E = actual experience with integrated units; C = some contact with integrated units; N^+ = no experience or contact with integrated units; experience or contact with all-Negro units; N^- = no experience or contact with integrated units; generally no experience or contact with all-Negro units.

[b] Questions and response categories given here in very abbreviated form; see sample questionnaire, end of Part I, for actual wording. Numbers here correspond to questionnaire numbers.

[c] "No response" includes questions left completely blank, questions in which two alternative responses were checked, and questions with written comments or qualifications, but no single alternative checked.

Each respondent was asked to state in Question 3b what might happen if the number of Negroes in a squad exceeded the maximum number he had checked in 3a. Of the total group of men with experience in integrated units, 149 gave pertinent responses to this question. Answers range from general statements such as "combat efficiency drops," or "cliques form," to specific statements such as "they become clannish and self-conscious and reject authority." Although it was difficult to make a systematic content analysis of these diverse and multiple answers, the replies were grouped into general categories. Table A18 shows the most frequent types of reasons given for each of the choices made in Question 3a, by officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units.

It is seen that almost one-third of all responses express the belief that the number of Negroes in an integrated unit should be limited in order to prevent the formation of cliques and the division of the squad into two separate racial groups. Approximately one-fifth of the responses indicate that unless the number of Negroes in a squad is kept below a given number, the combat efficiency of the squad will be lowered.

No striking differences appear among the types of reasons given by respondents selecting one, two, three or more Negroes as the maximum number which should be assigned to an integrated squad.




Fig. A19—Responses to Question on Maximum Number Negroes Possible in an Integrated Combat Squad

TABLE A18

REASONS FOR NOT EXCEEDING GIVEN NUMBER OF NEGRO EM PER SQUAD, GIVEN BY 149 INTEGRATION-EXPERIENCED OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN

Reasons for not exceeding maximum number Negro EM	Distribution of responses for varied numbers of Negroes per squad							151 total responses	
	Makes no difference	Negroes per squad					No response	Number	%
		1	2	3	4-5	6-8			
Form cliques, or divide into groups on basis of color	0	18	21	4	0	0	2	45	30
Loss of combat efficiency	0	10	14	4	2	1	1	32	21
Loss of group discipline, willingness to accept orders	0	0	9	4	5	1	0	19	13
Internal friction and resentment would develop	0	1	4	6	1	0	1	13	9
Individual Negroes perform less well, poor soldiering, irresponsibility increases	0	4	7	0	0	0	0	11	7
Negroes would dominate whites	0	1	4	6	0	0	0	11	7
Nothing happens; it makes no difference	3	2	0	1	5	0	0	11	7
Willingness to fight is reduced	0	2	2	1	4	0	0	9	6

Performance of Integrated versus All-White Combat Units

Responses to three questions yielded information on the relative performance of integrated and all-white units. The responses of officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units are summarized in Table A19.

TABLE A19

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON PERFORMANCE OF INTEGRATED VERSUS ALL-WHITE UNITS[a]

Performance characteristics of integrated units as compared with all-white units	Response distribution of integration-experienced men	
	78 officers, %	123 enlisted men, %
Aggressiveness		
More or just as aggressive	65	58
Less aggressive	27	30
Morale		
Same or higher	84	80
Lower	15	12
Degree of teamwork		
Same or greater	81	63
Less	17	24

[a] See Table A17 for the complete set of percentages on responses to these questions.

In the case of both officers and enlisted men, a substantial majority (58–84 percent) report that integrated units are equal to or better than all-white units in morale, teamwork, and aggressiveness in combat. Less than one-third of the respondents say that integrated

units are inferior to all-white units in these aspects of performance. Officers and enlisted men agree most closely in their judgment concerning the equal or superior morale of integrated units as compared with all-white units.

Performance of Soldiers in Integrated Units

The main body of the questionnaire was made up of specific questions concerning the relative performance of Negro and white soldiers in integrated units in combat. These comprised ten questions in all (Question 15 was not included in the analysis because ambiguity of its wording made it difficult for many of the respondents to understand and answer), touching on various aspects of combat performance. Table A20 presents in summary form the responses of officers and enlisted men on these questions.

TABLE A20

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS IN INTEGRATED UNITS[a]

Negro performance characteristics as compared with white	Response distribution of integration-experienced men	
	78 officers, %	123 enlisted men, %
Season to combat and acquire combat skills		
Less readily	41	43
Just as readily	58	51
Maintain weapons in good condition		
Less well	13	10
About as well	83	87
Use weapons and ammunition supplies effectively		
Less	37	27
About the same	57	58
Carry out orders to the letter		
Less	41	20
About the same	53	65
In scouting and patrol work, observant and alert		
More	15	21
Less	15	16
About the same	52	52
Use good judgment and common sense in getting out of tough spot in combat		
Less	45	36
About the same	47	53
In hand-to-hand combat, hold ground		
Not as well	45	45
About the same	42	45
Stand up under mass attack		
Not as well	18	34
About the same	67	47
As result of sustained combat, go to pieces		
More	23	27
Just as much	62	59
Preoccupied with fears of death or injury		
More	38	42
About the same	54	47

[a] See Table A17 for the complete set of percentages on responses to these questions.

A majority of both officers and enlisted men with experience in integrated units report that Negro soldiers season to combat conditions and acquire combat skills just as readily as white soldiers; however, approximately 40 percent say that Negro soldiers adapt to combat less readily than white soldiers. Over 80 percent of both officers and enlisted men report that Negro soldiers maintain their weapons as well as white soldiers. A majority of both groups of respondents say that Negroes use their weapons and ammunition supplies just as effectively as white soldiers, and that Negroes follow orders to the letter about the same as white soldiers. From 20 to 40 percent of officers and enlisted men believe that Negro soldiers are less efficient in these respects. A negligible percentage say that Negro soldiers perform better than whites in these ways.

On the question of whether Negro soldiers in scouting and patrol work tend to be observant and alert, 52 percent of the respondents report Negroes to be about the same as white soldiers. Approximately 15 percent say that Negroes are less observant and alert than whites, and 15 percent of the officers and 21 percent of the enlisted men state that Negro soldiers tend to be more observant and alert than white soldiers. Men making the latter response frequently explained (either verbally while filling out the questionnaire, or in writing) that they felt Negroes tend to be more alert because of fear. As one respondent expressed it, Negro soldiers tend to be more observant and alert than white soldiers "because they are scared half to death."

Three questions dealt with performance in defensive action. About 40–50 percent of the respondents say that the Negroes are about the same as white soldiers in their ability to get out of a tough spot in combat and their ability to hold ground in hand-to-hand combat. However, approximately 40 percent of the respondents report that Negroes perform less well than white soldiers in these ways. Answers to a third question concerning the relative ability of Negro and white soldiers to stand up under a mass attack show some differences in the opinions of officers and enlisted men. About two-thirds of the officers and less than half of the enlisted men report that Negroes and whites stand up equally well under attack. Conversely 18 percent of the officers and 34 percent of the enlisted men say that Negro soldiers are generally the first to break under a mass attack. None of the officers and only a few of the enlisted men state that Negroes are superior to white soldiers in showing good judgment in getting out of a tough spot in combat, holding ground in hand-to-hand combat, or standing up under a mass attack.

The general area of psychological breakdown and fear reaction is touched on in two questions. Approximately six out of ten officers and enlisted men say that Negro and white soldiers are equally likely to go to pieces as a result of sustained combat. About one out of four of the respondents state that Negro soldiers break down more than white soldiers do. A little over half of the officers and slightly less than half of the enlisted men report that Negro soldiers are preoccupied with fears of death and injury to about the same extent as white soldiers. Approximately four out of ten officers and enlisted men report that Negroes are more preoccupied with such fears than are white soldiers. A number of respondents commented that Negro soldiers may reveal their fears more readily than whites (may talk about them more freely), but this does not necessarily mean that Negroes are more preoccupied with these fears than the white soldiers who may express their feelings less openly. Thus one respondent wrote: "The Negroes that are preoccupied with fear will talk much more about it than the white, giving the impression that a greater number are 'scary.'"

Performance of Negro Leaders in Integrated Units

Two questions dealt with Negro leaders in integrated units. (Responses to a third question, Question 17, were not analyzed, since the wording on the question was ambiguous

and the question was not understood by a great number of respondents.) Men were asked whether a hazardous combat mission is just as likely to succeed if an integrated unit is led by a Negro as compared to a white leader. Responses by men with experience in integrated units are presented in Table A21.

TABLE A21

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ON NEGRO VERSUS WHITE LEADERS IN INTEGRATED UNITS*

Areas of comparison	Response distribution of integration-experienced men	
	78 officers, %	123 enlisted men, %
Likelihood of hazardous combat mission succeeding if unit led by Negro leader, as compared with white leader		
Less likely	44	29
Equally likely	33	51
Negro leaders lead by personal example and stay with their men, as compared with white leaders		
Less	15	14
Just as much	54	57

* See Table A17 for complete set of percentages on responses to these questions.

About one-third of the officers and half of the enlisted men say the mission would succeed equally well whether led by a Negro or a white soldier. About four out of ten officers and three out of ten enlisted men say such a mission would be less likely to succeed if led by a Negro. In another question on the performance of Negro leaders in integrated units, a majority of officers and enlisted men report that Negro leaders lead by personal example and stay with their men in combat just about as much as white leaders. A small percentage say Negro leaders lead by personal example more than white leaders; 15 percent say that Negro leaders lead by personal example less than white leaders.

Approximately 20–30 percent of the officers and enlisted men did not answer these two questions at all, presumably because they had had little or no chance to observe Negro leaders. Also many of the respondents failed to answer the question by checking one of the alternative responses, but wrote in comments such as: "It doesn't matter whether a leader is Negro or white as long as he's good."

Intelligence of Negro Soldiers Compared with That of White Soldiers

A final question was asked concerning the intelligence of Negro and white soldiers. Half of the officers report that the intelligence of the Negro soldier was lower than that of the white soldiers in their units. Approximately four out of ten officers report that the intelligence of the Negroes was just about the same as that of the whites. On the other hand, only about one-third of the enlisted men believe that the intelligence of the Negroes was lower than that of the whites, and approximately half say that the intelligence of the two groups was about the same. Eight percent of the officers and 19 percent of the enlisted men did not answer the question.

Of those answering the question, a small number claim that their response is based on an actual inspection of the records of the men in their units, but most state that it is based on their own judgment; that is, they infer intelligence from performance, not from objective measurements.

Incidents of Good and Poor Performance by Soldiers

Four questions were designed to elicit from each respondent examples of good and poor performance which he had personally observed. The respondent was asked to describe two incidents of exceptionally good performance in his unit, one by a Negro and one by a white soldier, and two incidents of inferior performance in his unit, one by a Negro and one by a white soldier. Respondents were encouraged to be as specific as possible, giving dates and names of persons and places described in the incident.




Fig. A20—Examples of Good and Poor Performance by Individual Soldiers, as Reported by Integration-Experienced Officers (63) and Enlisted Men (69)

Results of an analysis of the incident data are shown in Fig. A20. Sixty-three officers with experience in integrated units responded to the questions and described a total of 173 performance incidents. Of the incidents, 106 are illustrations of good performance, 57 percent by white soldiers and 43 percent by Negro soldiers. Of the 67 incidents describing poor performance, 51 percent concern the performance of white soldiers and 49 percent that of Negro soldiers.

Sixty-nine enlisted men with experience in integrated units responded to the questions and described a total of 147 performance incidents. Of these, 94 are illustrations of good performance, 62 percent by individual white soldiers and 38 percent by individual Negro soldiers. Of the 53 incidents of poor performance, 49 percent concern white soldiers and 51 percent Negro soldiers.

Both officers and enlisted men more frequently report incidents of good performance for white than for Negro soldiers. This difference cannot entirely be explained by the fact that the respondents observed more white than Negro soldiers in action, since the incidents of poor performance given by both officers and enlisted men are divided almost equally between whites and Negroes. The evidence obtained from responses by officers and enlisted men to the four performance incident questions suggests that Negro soldiers

perform poorly in combat no more frequently than white soldiers, but that they perform in an outstanding way somewhat less frequently than white soldiers.

Effect of Integration Experience on Combat-Performance Opinions

Since this 1951 study was designed to obtain information about the relative performance of Negro and white soldiers in integrated units, the judgments of officers and enlisted men who had actually commanded or served in integrated units constituted the basic data for analysis. However, it was considered desirable to compare the opinions of men experienced in integration with the opinions of those without such experience. Table A17 presented questionnaire responses by four groups of officers and enlisted men with different types of experience with Negro soldiers in combat. For the purposes of this "experience — no experience" comparison two groups were selected:* officers and enlisted men with actual

TABLE A22

OPINION DIFFERENCES ON VARIOUS QUESTIONS HELD BY OFFICERS WITH AND WITHOUT INTEGRATION EXPERIENCE*

Questionnaire response categories	Distribution of officer responses	
	78 with integration experience, %	72 without integration experience, %
Negroes are just about as good fighters as white soldiers	69	34
Same Negroes would perform better in integrated unit than in all-Negro unit	90	71
In integrated combat unit:		
Negroes maintain weapons as well as whites	83	49
Negroes adapt to combat as readily as whites	58	29
Negroes go to pieces as result of sustained combat as much as whites	62	42
Negroes stand up under mass attack about same as whites	67	35
Negroes carry out orders to letter about same as whites	53	35
Negroes use weapons as effectively as whites	57	31
Negro leaders lead by personal example about as much as white leaders	54	36
Integrated versus all-white units:		
Integrated units are as aggressive in attack as all-white units	64	39
Morale of integrated units is same as morale of all-white units	75	51
Integrated units show same teamwork as all-white units	72	56

* See Table A17 for the complete set of percentages on responses to these questions.

experience in integrated units; and officers and enlisted men who had had no experience or contact with integrated units in combat, and who, for the most part, had had no direct contact with all-Negro units in combat.

Results show a fairly consistent pattern of differences, both for officers and enlisted men, between the responses of those with experience in integrated units and those without such experience. Responses to some of the questions which show this difference most clearly are summarized in Table A22. Men who have seen Negroes perform in integrated

* The second experience category (some contact with integrated units) was not used as a control group, since it included men who had served briefly in integrated units or had some contact with integrated units. The third group was also omitted; although these men met the requirement of no experience or contact with integrated units in combat, the number of respondents in this category was small, both for officers and the enlisted men.

combat units say that the Negro is as good a fighter as the white soldier more frequently than do respondents who have not seen Negro soldiers in integrated units. The latter respondents are answering this and other questions not on the basis of any real knowledge of Negro combat performance, but rather on the basis of hearsay, indirect information, and their own attitudes, opinions, and biases.

A greater proportion of the officers with experience in integrated units than those without experience with integration believe the same Negroes would perform better in an integrated unit than in an all-Negro unit. A larger percentage of the officers with actual experience in integrated units than those without such experience report that Negro soldiers in integrated units maintain their weapons as well as whites, adapt to combat as readily, carry out orders as well, stand up under attack as well, use their weapons and supplies as effectively, and go to pieces about as much as white soldiers. Officers with integration experience more frequently than those without integration experience report that Negro leaders lead by personal example as much as white leaders. More officers with integration experience than officers without this experience believe that integrated units are equal to all-white units in respect to morale, amount of teamwork, and aggressiveness in attack.

Analysis of questionnaire responses according to other variables such as region of origin and rank of respondent failed to produce the clearcut pattern of differences revealed between men with experience in integrated units and men without such experience. Officers and enlisted men who have had direct, personal experience with Negro soldiers performing in integrated units rate the Negro soldier's performance as equal to that of the white soldier's performance far more frequently than do officers and men who have not had a chance to observe Negroes in integrated units.

Appendix A, Part III

SUMMARY OF ATTITUDE SURVEY IN KOREA, MAY-JUN 1951

by

International Public Opinion Research, Inc.
(now International Research Associates, Inc.)

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SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM AND MAJOR FINDINGS

The data on which Part III is based, although collected as part of the IPOR Korean Survey, were analyzed separately at a later date because of a delay in transit. Part III provides a comparison of these data with those in Part IV, and also includes a more intensive analysis of the original data. It is a statistical analysis based on questionnaire responses made by white troops, primarily infantryment with combat experience.

The data from statistical tabulation of the questionnaire responses are studied to see what light is shed on the question of how integration affects the combat efficiency and performance of white troops. A unit-by-unit comparison of the findings is made for this purpose. Subsequently, the relationship between attitudes toward integration and personal morale is scrutinized. To gain a better understanding of how men of different backgrounds feel about the mixing of white and Negro troops, attitudes on this point are studied in terms of such individual characteristics as education, type of enlistment, and so forth.

There are six major findings:

1. Experience with integration makes white troops more favorable to it. Soldiers in mixed units (both combat infantry and rear-echelon quartermaster) are more favorable to integration than soldiers with equivalent backgrounds who are in all-white units. Men who have experienced integration in basic training or in previous service are more favorable than men who have not had such experience. Changes in attitude take place in terms of the kinds of situation in which a man knows integration at first hand: rear-echelon troops do not change their opinions on the relative merits of mixed and separate units in combat; combat troops' opinions of Negroes in garrison situations change more slowly than their opinions of Negroes in combat.

2. Contact with large, highly visible all-Negro units makes the attitudes of white troops less favorable. Thus, while the Negro soldier is generally accepted when he is seen as part of the team, he arouses criticism when he is seen as part of his own separate group.

3. In indicating how the average soldier behaves in some typical situations involving contact with Negroes, few men predict any acts of hostility. This is particularly true for those situations in which Army rules and authority are directly involved.

4. Men who say they strongly object to serving in a mixed unit do not predict acts of hostility in concrete situations of contact with Negroes. Instead they appear to withdraw as far as possible from the contact. Even men in mixed units who object strongly to integration do not appear to express their hostility in aggressive action.

5. There is no indication in the Korean data available that infantry units containing Negroes as well as whites are inferior in morale or performance to all-white units.

6. Those enlisted men on whom the success of any integration program is most dependent, the senior noncoms, are, in Korea, most favorably disposed.

DETAILED ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

EFFECTS OF INTERRACIAL CONTACT ON ATTITUDES

Evidence submitted in Part IV points to the conclusion that contact with Negroes in integrated units in Korea makes white soldiers more favorable toward integration. The significance of this "educational effect," it is pointed out, is that "an initial attitude of opposition or apathy toward integration might ultimately become one of acceptance or support, if the necessary conditions were established."

This section, based on new questionnaire data from all-white infantry companies and on further study of the original data, fully supports the conclusion in Part IV. In brief, it shows that: (a) Among white combat infantrymen, as well as among the rear-echelon quartermaster troops, experience in a mixed unit leads to more favorable attitudes. (b) Among white infantrymen in both integrated and all-white companies, men with prior experience in mixed training units are more favorable to integration than men without such experience. (c) Changes in attitude take place in terms of the specific kinds of integration which soldiers experience; they do not necessarily carry over to integration in a different context. (d) The differences of opinion noted are clearly due to contact with Negroes in mixed units. They are not caused by differences in personal characteristics in civilian interracial experience, or individual morale and personal adjustment.

Favorable Attitudes in Mixed Units

Attitude changes among white combat soldiers in integrated units take place with respect to opinion regarding integration as Army policy, preferences in the matter of integration, and conceptions of Negro soldiers as individuals.

TABLE A23

PROPORTION ADVOCATING EQUAL JOB ASSIGNMENT FOR WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS

White respondents	Responses advocating equal jobs	
	Together in the same outfits, %	In separate outfits, %
195 in all-white units	36	55
1024 in integrated units	52	39

Attitude toward Integration Policy. White infantrymen in mixed units are more favorable than men in all-white units to a policy of assigning Negroes as individuals, rather than in all-Negro units of platoon, company, battalion or regimental strength. Approximately half the white soldiers in integrated units and a third of those in all-white units believe

that Negroes should be assigned without regard to color. Virtually all white soldiers, irrespective of the kind of unit they are in, feel that Negro soldiers should do the same kinds of Army jobs as white soldiers. However, there is a significant difference in opinion as to whether or not this should be in the same unit with white soldiers; the men in mixed units (most typical of the Army in Korea) predominantly favor assignments in integrated units. This is shown in Table A23. (Except where otherwise noted, differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 confidence level; that is, they could occur by chance alone less than once in a hundred times.)

Presumably a crucial criterion in the combat soldier's judgment of a procedure is its contribution to success or failure in combat. Although half the men in all-white infantry companies think it is better, in combat, for Negroes to be in separate units, only one white soldier in three, in the mixed companies, feels this way (Table A24).

TABLE A24

OPINIONS ON WHETHER IT IS BETTER IN COMBAT TO PUT WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS TOGETHER IN SAME OUTFIT OR IN SEPARATE OUTFITS

White respondents	Unit assignments recommended			
	Better in same outfits, %	About same either way, %	Better in separate outfits, %	No answer, %
195 in all-white units	22	24	51	3
1024 in integrated units	34	33	31	2

Integration and Personal Preference. White combat-soldier opinion is about evenly divided as to whether Negro troops will be mostly in mixed units in the future. As might be expected, men now in mixed units are somewhat more likely than others to expect this. A clear majority (59 percent) say they would prefer continued separation. However, experience with integration reduces the proportion who feel this way. Following is a tabulation of those who would like to see Negroes "mostly in outfits of their own":

White respondents	*Total responses, %*
195 in all-white units	68
1024 in integrated units	58[a]

While most white combat soldiers say they would prefer to see colored troops retained in separate units, a much smaller proportion feel intensely on this subject. Whether in all-white or in integrated units, less than one-third of the men say that they "would object strongly" to a completely integrated experience, involving working, training, and living together in the same barracks. Again, the men in mixed units are more favorable. (Attitude toward service in a platoon together with Negro soldiers is clearly related to other responses dealing with race and integration. Men favorable to the idea of service in an integrated platoon also express varying degrees of favorable attitudes on related matters.) Following is the proportion who said, "I would object to it strongly," in regard to serving in a platoon containing both white and colored soldiers, all working and training together, sleeping in the same barracks, and eating in the same mess hall.

White respondents	*Total responses, %*
195 in all-white units	33[a]
1024 in integrated units	25

[a] Differences significant at 0.05 level.

Opinions on Negro Soldiers as Individuals

White infantrymen in mixed and all-white units not only differ in their views on integration itself; they hold different conceptions of Negro soldiers as individuals. In view of the widely prevalent criticism of the combat performance of all-Negro infantry units, it is significant that whites who have served in the same units with Negroes rate their fighting abilities higher than do whites who have not had the experience. Following is the proportion who say, "Colored soldiers are just about as good" to the question, "How would you rate US colored soldiers as fighters, compared with white US soldiers?"

White respondents	*Total responses, %*
195 in all-white units	31
1024 in integrated units	50

This changed judgment of Negro soldiers among whites in mixed units extends beyond the question of fighting capacities. Substantially more in mixed than in all-white units believe that "white and colored soldiers get along better with each other in the Army than in civilian life," and they are less than half as likely to say that Negro soldiers "have it easier in the Army than the white soldiers do." (Both differences are significant at the .01 level.) Asked "From what you know about them, how do you personally feel about US colored soldiers?" only a small proportion of all the soldiers indicate definite dislike (11 percent). White soldiers mixed in integrated units reply most often that they "Like them very much."

Influence of Mixed Training on Opinion

It is evident that service in a unit which was mixed at the time of the survey makes white soldiers more favorable to integration. Prior service in a mixed unit also produces the same favorable effects. Fifty-five percent of all the white infantrymen in the sample reported that they had at one time or another been in mixed training units or Army schools. When these soldiers were compared with those who did not have such experience, they were found to be more favorably disposed toward integration. The differences are not very large, but they hold true for soldiers who are now in both mixed and all-white units, as Table A25 shows.

TABLE A25

PROPORTION REPLYING: "IT WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE TO ME" OR "I WOULD LIKE IT" TO QUESTION ON SERVING IN PLATOON CONTAINING WHITES AND NEGROES WORKING AND TRAINING TOGETHER, SLEEPING IN SAME BARRACKS, AND EATING IN SAME MESS HALL

White respondents	Response distribution			
	With integration experience		Without integration experience	
	Number	%	Number	%
In all-white units	74	38 *	64	32 *
In segregated units	574	44	457	37

* Difference is not statistically significant at 0.05 level.

Attitude Change Centering on Situation in Which Integration Is Experienced

Among combat infantrymen changes in attitude on the question of serving in a mixed platoon are, though clearly apparent, less than on any other relevant item in the questionnaire. This may be because the wording of the question evokes a picture relatively remote from the actual conditions of integration for these combat troops. Sleeping in the same barracks and eating in the same mess hall constitute a different setting for visualizing integration than the reality of field kitchens and scattered shelter halves in which it was being experienced at the time of the survey. On the other hand, the integration-separation comparison among quartermaster troops in Pusan, as measured by the same question, shows differences of significant size. Following is the tabulation of the soldiers who say they would not object strongly to serving in an integrated platoon.

White respondents	*Total responses, %*
68 in an all-white unit	42
99 in an integrated unit	86

These differences, so much greater than those found among the combat troops, probably reflect the fact that company facilities in Pusan did include mess halls and the equivalent of barracks (i.e., semipermanent squad tents, fitted with bunks.) Furthermore quartermaster troops in white and mixed units differ similarly in their views on mixed use of service clubs, movie theaters, PX, and rest camps — facilities that are available to some extent in Pusan, but, of course, totally absent at the front. There is no difference on these items between combat troops in all-white and in mixed companies.

Similar findings are obtained when men in integrated and all-white units are compared on their responses to the "Joe Doakes" questions, and in which typical race contact situations are presented for judgment as to how an average soldier would react to them. Differences appear among the quartermaster troops but not among the infantrymen. This is shown in Table A26; the questions themselves are reproduced in Part IV of App A.

TABLE A26

PROPORTION PREDICTING JOE DOAKES WILL ACT FAVORABLY*

Question numbers	White respondents predicting favorable behavior			
	Combat units		Quartermaster units	
	1212 integrated, %	195 segregated, %	99 integrated, %	72 segregated, %
80	44	40	47	25
81	33	30	28	18
82	54	65	47	27
83	65	60	60	39
84	32	30	40	23
85	51	50	64	46
86	58	61	64	70
87	35	38	43	26
88	45	41	44	33

* As opposed to those who predict he will withdraw, or show hostility.

None of the Joe Doakes questions deals specifically with a combat situation. However, many deal with social contacts in a town behind the lines. This accounts for the fact that white infantrymen in mixed units, whose changes in attitude are confined to the question of integration in combat, do not answer differently from infantrymen in all-white units.

For the quartermaster troops these situations are less hypothetical and closer to a familiar area of experience. Those in the mixed units accordingly show the usual pattern of favorable influence.

It has already been shown that experience with integration does produce significant differences among combat troops on points relevant to that experience. Quartermaster troops in white and mixed units, on the other hand, do not differ significantly in the proportions who believe that integration works out better than segregation in combat; for them, this is a question on a subject outside their experience.

In summary, soldiers become more favorable to integration in the particular setting in which they experience it.

Attitude Changes Attributable Only to Integration

The comparisons which have been made of white troops in all-white and mixed units have tacitly assumed that the attitude differences noted represent attitude changes resulting from experience with integration. It is necessary, however, to demonstrate that men in the two types of units are actually comparable, and that they do not differ in other respects which might explain the difference in attitudes.

Comparison of Personal Characteristics of White Infantrymen

A detailed analysis shows that, as might be expected, soldiers in the all-white companies resemble the white troops in mixed companies (see Table A35). Integrated and nonintegrated white combat soldiers do not differ significantly (in most cases not at all) with respect to the following items: age, education, region of origin, type of enlistment (Regular Army, draftee, National Guard, Reserve), grade and rank, marital status, length of total active duty in the Armed Forces, length of time in their present outfits, length of time in the Far East Command.

Civilian Interracial Experience of White Infantrymen

Similar responses are obtained to the question: "How much personal contact have you had with colored people in civilian life, before you entered the Army?" among mixed and all-white units (see Table A48). Virtually the same proportions of both groups have had Negro friends, have worked with Negroes, or have had only infrequent or no contacts with Negroes. Differences in attitudes toward integration are thus not accountable on the basis of any differences in premilitary experience with Negroes. It is worth noting in this connection that the two groups are also just about the same in their views and expectations regarding Negro-white civilian relationships in general.

Over a wide range of items dealing with morale, with satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their personal situations, and with commitment to their combat assignment, white soldiers in integrated and segregated units are found to be quite similar. Among the more important of these, shown in Tables A36–A43, were such as the following: evaluations of how their outfits do their jobs and how well they look after the welfare of the enlisted men; satisfaction with the other men in their outfits; estimates of their outfits' morale; estimates of the importance of their present jobs; satisfaction with their chances of promotion; estimates of the fairness of the "deal" they are getting with respect to others in their outfits; and attitudes toward living and working "together with soldiers of all races and nationalities"; opinions on the worthwhileness of fighting the Korean war. On certain other items, there are small but fairly consistent differences between the integrated and nonintegrated troops but these are such as to indicate lower morale in the all-white units (Tables A44–A47). Soldiers in these units: more often say they would prefer to be in an outfit with some other kind of duty; more often say they would like to be in some other

outfit; are somewhat less likely to choose "being in the Army" as the way they could do most for their country; and are significantly more likely to feel that they are getting "a poor deal" with respect to other troops in the Far East Command.

These differences may be explained by the fact that the all-white units had, at the time of the survey, just withstood a major enemy offensive, and theirs was the most active section of the front. That their responses should indicate a certain degree of battle weariness is not surprising.

Comparison of Background Characteristics of White Quartermaster Troops

A more detailed analysis of the findings for white quartermaster troops in Pusan confirms the conclusions drawn in Part IV of App A. (Extended comparisons between white quartermaster troops in integrated and all-white units have not been made for all of the items covered among the infantrymen, chiefly because the much smaller number involved would have made the detailed breakdowns involved statistically unreliable.) Men in the mixed and all-white units are not significantly different from each other in age, grade, rank, and length of total active duty time. They do differ in region of origin, education, and type of enlistment (see Table A49). The men in the integrated unit include relatively fewer southerners, and are better educated. They are preponderantly Regular Army men, while those in the all-white unit are preponderantly enlisted reservists.

However, the relationship between experience with integration and attitude toward integration remains the same when only men with similar characteristics are compared in the two types of unit. Table A27 shows that the proportion who say they would not object strongly to serving in a mixed platoon is consistent for both groups of quartermaster troops when region of origin, type of enlistment and then education are taken into consideration.

TABLE A27

PROPORTION WHO WOULD NOT OBJECT STRONGLY TO SERVING IN MIXED PLATOON

Respondents' characteristics	White respondents			
	All-white units		Integrated	
	Number	%	Number	%
Area of origin				
South	27	37	26	85
Other area	41	46	73	86
Type of enlistment				
Regular Army	43	44	25	40
Reserve, Guard, or draftee	37	92	62	82
Education				
Below high school graduation	46	43	47	83
High school graduate and above	22	41	52	88

It is clear that among quartermaster troops in Pusan, as among combat infantrymen at the front, white men in mixed units are more favorable toward integration than those in all-white units only because of their firsthand experience in a unit with Negro soldiers.

Effects of Contact with All-Negro Units

The attitudes of white combat infantrymen toward integration are favorably influenced, as we have seen, by service in units together with Negro soldiers. However, the

less intimate kind of contact with Negroes in all-Negro units appears to have the opposite effect. This is seen when the records of such contact are examined for each of the nine integrated infantry companies in which questionnaires were administered.

Opinions in these nine units divide in rather striking fashion. Following are the proportions of the white soldiers who believe that Negro soldiers "should be assigned to outfits as individuals without regard to color" when asked: "Which of the following comes closest to your idea of how colored troops should be assigned to units?"

Units sampled	*Total responses, %*
1st Cav Div	
5th Cav Regt	55
7th Cav Regt	59
8th Cav Regt	53
3d Inf Div	
7th Inf Regt (two companies)	59 and 55
2d Inf Div	
9th Inf Regt	38
25th Inf Div	
27th Inf Regt	34
35th Inf Regt (two companies)	30 and 16

In attempting to explain this sharp division a number of the circumstances under which integration occurred have been examined. It may be thought, for example, that advance briefing by the commanding officer on the treatment of Negro replacements might have eased the integration process and produced more favorable results. However, units in which the commanding officer reports having done such briefing are no more likely to fall into the more favorable group than those in which no briefing was done.

The personal attitude of the commanding officer toward integration has also been examined in relation to the attitude of the unit as a whole. Only one commander expresses a definitely unfavorable attitude and his is the most unfavorable of the integrated units. It is the only one in which a majority of men say it would work out better in combat if Negroes were in separate outfits. Of the remaining commanders, most express a definitely favorable attitude toward integration and a few are lukewarm. No relationship can be found between these attitudes and the feelings of the men.

Other unit characteristics which have been examined and which show no relationship to attitudes toward integration are the average ratings of unit morale and the commander's estimate of the casualty rate.

The explanation for the sharp break in attitudes between the first five and last four companies in the listing may be found in the fact that the last four units have in common a record of combat actions shortly before the survey, in which their positions in the line were adjacent to all-Negro units of regimental or battalion size. These Negro units are reported to have failed to hold their positions and to have seriously endangered the flanks of the adjoining units. In some cases this is said to have happened more than once. For example, personal interviews with white soldiers in the 35th Inf Regt, whose regiment had fought alongside the now defunct all-Negro 24th Regt, are invariably and intensely bitter on this subject. It is pointed out in greater detail in Part IV that even where men express violent opinions about the unreliability of Negro soldiers in the all-Negro units, they do not, as a rule, hold unfavorable opinions of the individual Negro soldiers who are members of their units. These, they feel, are "different." In other words, as a "member

of the team," the Negro is accepted. Where he is singled out and visible in a unit of his own, he invites attention and criticism.

Integration may be seen as having both a direct and an indirect effect on attitudes. Directly, experience with integration makes white soldiers more favorable to it. Indirectly, insofar as a full-scale policy of integration implies the disbandment of all-Negro units, it tends to eliminate a kind of situation in which the attitudes of white soldiers become less favorable.

INTEGRATION RELATED TO UNIT PERFORMANCE AS REPORTED BY COMMANDING OFFICERS

The Army's Research Branch has sought for years to devise an adequate and universally acceptable indicator of unit performance. Up to the present time no such measure, completely reliable, impersonal, and objective, can be said to exist. In this study the problem of assessing performance has been approached through the use of both a unit profile check list completed through an interview with the commanding officer of each unit surveyed and a performance rating of his own unit by each man who filled out a questionnaire.

The unit profile check list includes the commander's report of outstanding unit achievements, of unit citations, of casualty rate (combat and noncombat), and of the combat effectiveness of his unit. All-white units, and mixed units in which there were varying proportions of Negroes, have been compared to see whether any relationship could be found between integration and the commanding officers' estimates of performance. No indication has been found, in a careful examination of the available data, that the presence or proportion of Negroes is in any way related to the efficiency of a unit as rated by its commanding officer.

The evidence obtained from analysis of the questionnaire results is in keeping with this finding. In the questionnaire the men are asked to rate their company on how well it did its job. For these ratings to be considered as having any objective meaning they would have to be fairly homogeneous within any given unit. That this is actually the case can be seen in Table A28. Not only do the majority of the men in each unit usually agree on a performance rating, but the majority of the enlisted men are usually in agreement with the majority of noncoms and officers on what the performance rating of the unit should be.

In the seven units where a majority of men do not agree on a rating of "very well," the majority are split about evenly between "very well" and "fairly well."

The homogeneity of performance ratings within units encourages a comparison of mixed and all-white units on performance ratings given by their members. Such a comparison, made in Table A29, shows no difference in unit performance ratings given by men in integrated and segregated companies. Most units get a majority rating of "very well" regardless of their racial composition.

On attitudes toward integration and unit performance ratings, the limited evidence available does not support the argument that the addition of some Negroes to an all-white unit is likely to lower its performance. Even those white soldiers in mixed units who want Negroes to be assigned to separate companies do not appear to think that the addition of Negroes to their company has lowered its performance. In Table A30 these men are compared in the way they rated the performance of their units, with white soldiers in mixed units who believe that Negroes should be assigned "without regard to color."

TABLE A28

PROPORTION BELIEVING OWN OUTFIT DOES JOB VERY WELL COMPARED TO OTHER OUTFITS OF SAME KIND

Total responses	Enlisted men responses, %	Noncom and officer responses, %
68	100	83
74	100	66
68	95	88
138	94	93
171	91	96
143	90	97
137	87	92
139	86	88
93	86	74
216	84	84
119	82	77
159	80	89
94	80	85
160	80	85
91	80	70
168	78	77
172	77	84
37	75	87
209	75	73
127	73	74
154	66	79
36	56	100
109	41	51
92	41	43
94	37	—
97	34	64
99	31	47
67	27	33
72	26	44

TABLE A29

MAJORITY OPINIONS ON COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE RATINGS

Majority opinions on how unit does its job	Integrated units	All-white units
"Very well"	12	4
"Fairly well"	1	—
Divided between "very well" and "fairly well"	2	3

Clearly the men in mixed units who oppose integration do not rate the performance of these units any differently from men who approve of integration. Performance rating and attitude toward integration are not related. (It has already been pointed out that there is no evidence in the Korean data that the presence of Negro troops is harmful to unit morale.)

TABLE A30

UNIT PERFORMANCE RATINGS *

Total responses	Percent of men in each integrated unit who say the unit performs "very well" among those who say Negroes should be assigned:	
	To segregated units, %	Without regard to color, %
128	93	94
171	90	93
137	90	89
37	87	83
160	86	88
93	86	82
119	85	75
172	76	83
168	72	80
79	70	63
209	70	78
152	66	68
47	44	42
99	28	24
67	24	34

* Include quartermaster and Japanese garrison respondents.

BEHAVIOR UNDER INTEGRATION

The intensive interview data analyzed in Part IV of App A indicate clearly that integration in Korea has proceeded smoothly, without any evidence of conflict or tension. How does the evidence accord with the unfavorable attitudes which many soldiers express toward integration? The questionnaire findings have been studied further to see what information they yield on the actual behavior of white troops in concrete instances of contact with Negroes.

TABLE A31

PREDICTIONS OF DOAKES' BEHAVIOR

Interracial situation	Percent of 1407 white combat infantrymen predicting:			
	Hostile behavior	Withdrawal behavior	Favorable behavior	No answer
Integration in unit with Negro majority	3	61	32	4
Seating at movies	4	56	35	5
Integration in unit with Negro noncoms	5	46	43	6
Captain's attitude favorable to Negro replacements	8	42	45	5
Integrated service club	8	42	45	5
Using service of Negro Army dentist	14	30	51	5
Captain's attitude unfavorable to Negro replacements	16	26	53	5
Street fight between Negro and white soldier	21	15	58	6
Negro soldier talks to white soldier's Korean girl friend	29	33	32	6

TABLE A32

BEHAVIOR ADVOCATED FOR DOAKES

Interracial situation	Percent of white combat infantrymen advocating:			
	Hostile behavior	Withdrawal behavior	Favorable behavior	No answer
Integration in unit with Negro noncoms	1	33	61	5
Integration in unit with Negro majority	1	46	48	5
Seating at movies	3	50	41	5
Integrated service club	4	29	61	5
Captain's attitude unfavorable to Negro replacements	4	15	76	5
Captain's attitude favorable to Negro replacements	6	15	75	4
Street fight between Negro and white soldier	10	12	73	5
Using services of Army dentist	11	15	68	6
Negro soldier talks to white soldier's Korean girl friend	18	37	37	8

To get at such behavior, a group of questions included in the questionnaire describe Joe Doakes, a white soldier, in a series of situations involving interracial contact. In some of the situations there is an element of Army authority supporting the pattern of integration and in others there is not. In some of the cases described, Negro-white relationships are relatively impersonal; in others some intimacy is implied.

For each situation there are a number of alternate ways for Joe to behave toward Negro soldiers. He may act favorably; he may show hostility; or he may try to avoid the situation altogether. The questionnaire asks, for each case, how Joe does behave and how he should behave.

Table A31 summarizes the statements of white combat infantrymen as to how Joe does behave in each situation. Table A32 summarizes how Joe should behave in each situation. (The questions are given in full at the end of Part IV.)

The responses in Tables A31 and A32 afford some basis for predicting the actual behavior of white troops in such situations.

Hostile Behavior Seldom Predicted or Advocated

For every one of the situations presented more than two-thirds of the white combat infantrymen questioned predict that Joe would either behave favorably or try to withdraw from the situation. More than 80 percent say he should do one of these two things on every question. Aggressive behavior is seldom predicted and very rarely advocated. This, of course, is in complete accord with the intensive interview findings in Part IV.

Where Negro replacements are coming into a previously all-white unit and the captain encourages his men to welcome them, 64 percent of the respondents predict that Joe will either be especially nice to them or treat them just like any other replacements. Fifty-eight percent predict that Joe will try to break up a street fight between a Negro and a white soldier; however, 21 percent predict that he will join in on the side of the white. Relatively few think he will just pass by. Fifty-one percent think that Joe will use the services of a Negro Army dentist rather than try to avoid him.

Aggressive behavior is predicted most often in the situation where Joe comes upon a Negro soldier talking to his Korean girl friend. Eighteen percent of the men predict that he will "tell the colored soldier to move along and keep away from his girl friend"; another 11 percent predict that he will tell the girl to keep away from colored soldiers.

Relation of Attitudes to Actual Behavior

Does the person who is hostile to integration, or to Negroes generally, express his hostility in concrete instances of interracial contact? The evidence indicates that he does not commit any hostile acts, but rather withdraws as far as he can from the contact.

Statements as to how Joe does and should behave have been related to the respondents' own attitudes toward integration. Those who say that platoon integration would make no difference to them or that they would like it are most likely to say that Joe does and should act favorably.

Of those who say they would object strongly to service in an integrated platoon, only a handful predict or justify hostile behavior. About three-fourths predict that Joe would try to duck the situation and almost as many think that this is what he should do.

This pattern of responses, which holds true with small variations for all the questions, can be seen clearly in the answers to a question on assignment to a mixed platoon in which there are Negro noncoms.

It is probable that the big gap between "does" and "should" responses from the men who are favorable toward integration reflects a certain pessimism about how the "typical" soldier (not the one answering the question) would behave.

The gap between "does" and "should" from those who would rather not be in an integrated platoon, but think it wouldn't make much difference, might reflect a certain amount of internal conflict. At least some of these men may feel that they don't quite live up to their own standards of what is right.

Those who object strongly to integration show the least gap between "does" and "should." They think that Joe would try to dodge most contact situations and they feel that this is the way such situations should be handled.

TABLE A33

WHITE COMBAT SOLDIERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD PLATOON INTEGRATION *

Joe Doakes' behavior patterns	Respondents' attitudes to integration		
	577 would like it or it would make no difference, %	440 rather not, but it would make little difference, %	366 object strongly, %
Expected behavior			
Joe acts as he would in any other outfit	58	43	21
Joe tries to goof off or to get out of the outfit	31	46	71
Joe tries to make things tough for the colored noncoms	6	4	3
No answer	5	7	4
Advocated behavior			
Joe should act as he would in any other outfit	87	59	27
Joe should try to goof off or transfer out of the outfit	9	35	69
Joe should try to make it tough for the colored noncoms	1	1	1
No answer	3	5	3

* Attitudes voiced in response to hypothetical situation in which Joe Doakes, who has always been in all-white outfits, is sent to an integrated outfit and assigned to a squad with both a colored squad leader and a colored platoon sergeant.

It is of striking interest that among the three groups of attitudes in Table A33 there are virtually no differences in the predictions or justification of aggressive acts. No matter what their attitudes toward integration, most men do not think that hostile behavior is right and few of them expect it to occur.

Comparison of Objectors in All-White and Mixed Units

The minority who object strongly to integration do not become troublemakers even when they are involuntarily placed in a mixed unit. They predict just as much unprejudiced behavior and just as little hostile or aggressive behavior as the objectors who are in all-white units. Table A34 shows this.

The same pattern holds true for the strong objectors among the quartermaster troops. When objectors to integration are placed in an integrated unit, their attitude may not become significantly more favorable, but the situation does not provoke their overt hostility.

In summary, the statistical analysis confirms the conclusion drawn from the intensive interviews in Part IV of App A: Integration in Korea is not accompanied by any display of conflict.

TABLE A34

PREDICTION OF BEHAVIOR BY WHITE COMBAT INFANTRYMEN WHO OBJECT STRONGLY TO PLATOON INTEGRATION*

Interracial situations	Percent objecting strongly who predict:			
	Favorable behavior		Hostile behavior	
	From integrated units	From all-white units	From integrated units	From all-white units
Integration in unit with Negro noncoms	21	22	3	5
Integration in unit with Negro majority	14	10	2	6
Captain's attitude unfavorable to Negro replacements	30	27	19	25
Captain's attitude favorable to Negro replacements	42	42	14	8
Negro soldier talks to white soldier's Korean girl friend	19	17	33	19
Using services of Negro Army dentist	38	36	23	17
Street fight between Negro and white soldier	62	55	30	25
Seating at movies	49	46	53	56
Integrated service club	33	38	14	12

* Respondents in integrated units number 1212; in all-white units, 195.

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AS RELATED TO MORALE AND ATTITUDES

The findings reported in the preceding sections deal largely with attitudes toward integration insofar as these have been shaped by the Korean experience. But there are many individual traits and characteristics which relate to attitude, and which can be considered in the light of the evidence accumulated in the Korean questionnaires. Some of these are discussed in Part IV. Of the others, the following major findings are true for white combat infantrymen.*

* The tables on which these statements are based appear in the final section of this part, "Further Tabulations of Responses by White Troops."

Effect of Education on Attitude

There is little evidence of any relationship between the amount of education a soldier has had and his attitudes toward integration. Better educated men are more likely than others to say that mixed units are better than separate units in actual combat. However, men at all educational levels give the same kinds of answers on questions dealing with service in an integrated platoon, beliefs concerning Army policy on the assignment of Negroes, opinions as to how Negroes should be assigned, or comparisons of Negroes and whites as fighters.

Similarly, there is little evidence in the Korean data (although there is some in World War II studies) that an individual's schooling is related to his morale (as indicated by answers on such items as his judgments of unit morale, whether or not he feels he is getting a fair deal in his outfit, his reactions to orders which he does not understand, and his opinion as to whether or not the Korean war is worth fighting).

Type of Enlistment and Attitude

Regular Army men are most favorable to integration, Enlisted Reservists next most favorable, and draftees are found to be the least favorable. However, these differences are largely confined to personnel from the Southern states. Apparently Southern Regular Army men, who may have been stationed for periods of time in other parts of the US, come to modify their original beliefs (while the draftees, relatively newly arrived from civilian life, retain the opinions of their home communities). Regular Army men probably are more apt than the others to think in terms of the "good of the Army," so that their answers on integration as a policy are relatively more favorable than their conceptions of Negroes as individuals.

Regular Army men, regardless of whether they come from the South or other parts of the US, show the strongest personal commitment to the Army and to the Korean war effort. Enlisted Reservists resemble them closely in this respect. Draftees, by contrast, are lowest.

Army Grade and Attitude

Enlisted men in the higher grades (sergeant and above) are most favorable to integration. They are most apt to approve service with other races and nationalities, to accept service in the same platoon with Negroes, and to believe that Negroes should be assigned without regard to color. Since the higher-ranking noncoms are most apt to be Regular Army men, this pattern of response parallels the one reported above. The noncommissioned officer is more likely than the men under him to think of how things work out on an over-all basis rather than of his personal likes and dislikes.

There is no evidence that men with higher rank show any better morale than privates and corporals. However, as career men, a greater proportion say they can do most for their country by serving in the Army.

Attitude on Integration and Personal Morale

Those soldiers who show high morale and personal adjustment are slightly more favorable toward integration than those with lower morale. In part this may be because high-ranking Regular Army men, who show the highest morale, are for independent reasons most favorable to integration.

In summary, it may be reported that those enlisted men on whom the success of any integration program is most dependent, the senior noncoms, are, in Korea at least, most favorably disposed.

FURTHER TABULATIONS OF RESPONSES BY WHITE TROOPS

RESPONSES OF COMBAT INFANTRYMEN IN ALL-WHITE AND INTEGRATED UNITS

Tables A35 to A48 are based on the responses of 195 white soldiers in all-white units and 1024 white soldiers in integrated units.

TABLE A35

CHARACTERISTICS OF INFANTRY RESPONDENTS

Soldier characteristics	Response distribution	
	195 in all-white units, %	1024 integrated, %
Age		
Under 21	30	32
21	10	11
22-25	45	41
26 or more	15	16
No answer	0	0
Education		
No high school	27	29
Some high school	38	37
High school graduate	35	33
No answer	0	1
Region of origin		
South	33	34
Other	53	53
No answer	14	13
Type of enlistment		
Draftee	24	21
Regular Army	51	54
National Guard or Reserve	25	25
Grade and rank		
Lower 4 grades	83	80
Noncoms and officers	17	20
No answer	0	0
Marital status		
Married	19	20
Single	79	77
Divorced, etc.	2	3
Length of total active duty in Armed Forces		
6 months or less	15	9
6 months-1 year	28	31
1-3 years	30	36
3 years or more	26	24
No answer	1	0
Length of time in present outfit		
Up to 3 months	33	34
3-6 months.	37	32
6 months-1 year	21	26
1 year or more	9	8
Length of time in Far East Command		
Up to 3 months	27	28
Over 3 months	73	72

TABLE A36

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON OPINIONS OF HOW WELL OWN OUTFITS DO ASSIGNED JOB, COMPARED WITH OTHER OUTFITS OF SAME KIND

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
I am not in a regular outfit now.	1	1
It does its job very well.	82	82
It does its job fairly well.	12	13
It does its job not too well.	2	2
It does its job very poorly.	0	2
No answer	3	0

TABLE A37

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON RESPONSES TO: "DO YOU LIKE TO WORK WITH THE OTHER MEN IN YOUR OUTFIT?"

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
Yes, with practically all of them	60	64
Yes, with most of them	30	31
With only a few of them	8	5
With hardly any of them	1	0
No answer	1	0

TABLE A38

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON RESPONSES TO: "IN GENERAL, HOW IS MORALE OF MEN IN YOUR OUTFIT?"

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
Very high	21	20
High	26	30
Just so-so	35	34
Low	18	7
Very low	0	8
No answer	0	1

TABLE A39

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON RESPONSES TO: "HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT IMPORTANCE OF WORK YOU ARE DOING AS COMPARED WITH OTHER ARMY JOBS YOU MIGHT BE DOING?"

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
It is as important as any other job I could do.	58	57
It is fairly important, but I could do more important work.	33	35
It hardly seems important at all.	8	7
No answer	1	1

TABLE A40

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON RESPONSES TO: "HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT YOUR PRESENT CHANCES FOR PROMOTION?"

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
Very well satisfied	27	31
Fairly well satisfied	34	34
Somewhat satisfied	23	17
Very dissatisfied	15	17
No answer	1	1

TABLE A41

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON RESPONSES TO: "COMPARED WITH OTHER MEN IN YOUR OUTFIT, HAVE YOU BEEN GETTING A DEAL THAT'S BETTER THAN AVERAGE, FAIR, OR POOR?"

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
Better than average deal	13	12
A fair deal	66	69
A poor deal	21	18
No answer	0	1

TABLE A42

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON OPINIONS OF WORKING AND LIVING CLOSELY WITH SOLDIERS OF OTHER RACES AND NATIONALITIES

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
I dislike the whole idea.	17	15
I don't care one way or the other.	52	54
I don't like the idea.	30	31
No answer	1	0

TABLE A43

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON RESPONSES TO: "DO YOU EVER GET THE FEELING THIS WAR IN KOREA IS NOT WORTH FIGHTING?"

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
Very often	50	48
Sometimes	33	33
Only once in a great while	11	11
Never get the feeling	6	8

TABLE A44

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON RESPONSES TO: "IN GENERAL, HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT BEING IN AN OUTFIT THAT HAS THE KIND OF DUTY YOUR OUTFIT HAS ASSIGNED TO IT?"

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
I like being in an outfit that has this kind of duty assigned to it.	13	19
It makes no difference whether I'm assigned to this kind of outfit or some other.	13	20
I would rather be in an outfit that has some other kind of duty assigned to it.	71	58
I am not in a regular outfit now, and can't answer this question.	2	2
No answer	1	1

TABLE A45

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON RESPONSES TO: "IF YOU HAD YOUR CHOICE, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARMY JOBS WOULD YOU PREFER TO HAVE?"

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
My present job in my present outfit	17	26
The same kind of job I have now, but in some other outfit	5	6
A different kind of job in my present outfit	24	23
A different kind of job in some other outfit	53	43
No answer	1	2

TABLE A46

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON RESPONSES TO: "IF IT WERE UP TO YOU TO CHOOSE, WHERE DO YOU THINK YOU COULD DO MOST FOR YOUR COUNTRY?"

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
Being in the Army	36	44
Working in a civilian job	49	42
Going to school or college as a civilian	13	12
No answer	2	2

TABLE A47

INFLUENCE OF UNIT TYPE ON RESPONSES TO: "COMPARED WITH OTHER US TROOPS IN FAR EAST COMMAND, HAVE YOU BEEN GETTING A DEAL THAT'S BETTER THAN AVERAGE, FAIR, OR POOR?"

Responses	White respondents	
	In all-white units, %	Integrated, %
Better than average deal	5	8
Fair deal	49	59
Poor deal	45	33
No answer	1	0

Influence of Education

Tables A50 to A61 are based on the responses of 420 white combat infantrymen with no high-school education, 554 with some, and 489 with high-school graduation or above.

TABLE A50

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO OPINIONS ON MORALE IN OWN OUTFIT

Morale situation	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, 420, %	Some, 554, %	Graduation and above, 489, %
Very high	26	21	18
High	27	29	36
Just so-so	30	35	32
Low	8	6	8
Very low	9	9	6

TABLE A51

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO RESPONSES TO: "IF IT WERE UP TO YOU TO CHOOSE, WHERE DO YOU THINK YOU COULD DO MOST FOR YOUR COUNTRY?"

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
Being in the Army	44	45	36
Working in a civilian job	49	41	44
Going to school or college as a civilian	5	10	19
No answer	2	4	1

TABLE A52

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO RESPONSES TO: "IF YOU HAD YOUR CHOICE, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARMY JOBS WOULD YOU PREFER TO HAVE?"

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
My present job in my present outfit	31	28	29
The same kind of job I have now but in some other outfit	6	5	5
A different kind of job in my present outfit	25	23	25
A different kind of job in some other outfit	34	42	48
No answer	4	2	2

Influence of Education

Tables A50 to A61 are based on the responses of 420 white combat infantrymen with no high-school education, 554 with some, and 489 with high-school graduation or above.

TABLE A50

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO OPINIONS ON MORALE IN OWN OUTFIT

Morale situation	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, 420, %	Some, 554, %	Graduation and above, 489, %
Very high	26	21	18
High	27	29	36
Just so-so	30	35	32
Low	8	6	8
Very low	9	9	6

TABLE A51

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO RESPONSES TO: "IF IT WERE UP TO YOU TO CHOOSE, WHERE DO YOU THINK YOU COULD DO MOST FOR YOUR COUNTRY?"

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
Being in the Army	44	45	36
Working in a civilian job	49	41	44
Going to school or college as a civilian	5	10	19
No answer	2	4	1

TABLE A52

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO RESPONSES TO: "IF YOU HAD YOUR CHOICE, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARMY JOBS WOULD YOU PREFER TO HAVE?"

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
My present job in my present outfit	31	28	29
The same kind of job I have now but in some other outfit	6	5	5
A different kind of job in my present outfit	25	23	25
A different kind of job in some other outfit	34	42	48
No answer	4	2	2

TABLE A53

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO RESPONSES TO: "DOES YOUR PRESENT ARMY JOB GIVE YOU A CHANCE TO USE YOUR SKILL AND EXPERIENCE?"

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
A very good chance	30	25	18
A fairly good chance	19	18	14
Not much of a chance	18	17	21
No chance at all	33	39	46
No answer	0	1	1

TABLE A54

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO RESPONSES TO: "COMPARED WITH OTHER MEN IN YOUR OUTFIT, HAVE YOU BEEN GETTING A DEAL THAT'S BETTER THAN AVERAGE, FAIR, OR POOR?"

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
Better than average deal	10	10	15
A fair deal	70	70	65
A poor deal	19	17	16
No answer	1	3	4

TABLE A55

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO RESPONSES TO: "HOW MUCH DOES IT BOTHER YOU WHEN YOU ARE ORDERED TO DO THINGS THAT YOU DO NOT SEE A GOOD REASON FOR DOING?"

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
It bothers me a great deal.	24	24	26
It bothers me quite a bit.	27	27	33
It does not bother me much.	36	38	34
It does not bother me at all.	12	8	6
No answer	1	3	1

TABLE A56

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO RESPONSES TO: "DO YOU EVER GET THE FEELING THIS WAR IN KOREA IS NOT WORTH FIGHTING?"

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
Very often	46	49	48
Sometimes	32	31	35
Only once in a great while	12	12	10
Never get the feeling that it's not worth fighting	9	8	7
No answer	1	0	0

TABLE A57

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO OPINIONS ON SERVING IN PLATOON CONTAINING BOTH WHITES AND NEGROES, WORKING AND TRAINING TOGETHER, SLEEPING IN SAME BARRACKS, AND EATING IN SAME MESS HALL

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
I would object to it strongly.	27	28	21
I would rather not, but it would not matter too much.	35	28	29
It would make no difference to me.	28	33	39
I would like it.	7	10	10
No answer	3	1	1

TABLE A58

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO OPINIONS ON WHAT FAR EAST COMMAND OFFICIAL POLICY IS IN DEALING WITH NEGRO SOLDIERS

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
To keep them in completely separate battalions or regiments	31	29	29
To put Negro companies in white battalions	10	10	8
To put Negro platoons in white companies	2	2	1
To put Negro squads in white platoons	3	1	2
To assign soldiers to outfits without regard to color	51	54	57
No answer	3	4	3

TABLE A59

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO RESPONSES TO: "WHICH OF FOLLOWING COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR IDEA OF HOW COLORED TROOPS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO OUTFITS?"

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
In all-Negro battalions or regiments	46	45	42
Negro companies in white regiments	5	6	6
Negro platoons in white battalions	2	2	1
Negro squads in white platoons	4	1	1
As individuals without regard to color	39	45	48
No answer	4	1	2

TABLE A60

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO COMPARISON OF NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS AS FIGHTERS

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
Colored soldiers are better fighters.	3	3	0
Colored soldiers are just about as good.	50	47	48
Colored soldiers are not as good.	45	48	51
No answer	2	2	1

TABLE A61

RELATION OF EDUCATION TO OPINIONS ON WHETHER IT WORKS OUT BETTER IN COMBAT WHEN WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS ARE TOGETHER IN SAME OUTFITS OR IN SEPARATE OUTFITS

Responses	Extent respondents' high school education		
	None, %	Some, %	Graduation and above, %
Works out better in same outfits	26	32	40
Works out better in separate outfits	38	35	31
Works out about same either way	33	31	27
No answer	3	2	2

Influence of Type of Enlistment

Tables A62 to A72 are based on the responses of white combat infantrymen — 339 draftees, 597 Regular Army, and 278 Enlisted Reserves.

TABLE A62

RELATION OF ENLISTMENT TO RESPONSES TO: "IF IT WERE UP TO YOU TO CHOOSE, WHERE DO YOU THINK YOU COULD DO MOST FOR YOUR COUNTRY?"

Responses	Response distribution		
	339 draftees, %	597 Regular Army, %	278 Enlisted Reserves, %
Being in the Army	26	58	27
Working in a civilian job	64	29	58
Going to school or college as a civilian	8	12	13
No answer	2	1	2

TABLE A63

RELATION OF ENLISTMENT TO RESPONSES TO: "HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT IMPORTANCE OF WORK YOU ARE DOING AS COMPARED WITH OTHER ARMY JOBS YOU MIGHT BE DOING?"

Responses	Response distribution		
	Draftees, %	Regular Army, %	Enlisted Reserves, %
It is as important as any other job I could do.	49	64	54
It is fairly important, but I could do more important work.	41	29	38
It hardly seems important at all.	8	6	7
No answer	2	1	1

TABLE A64

RELATION OF ENLISTMENT TO RESPONSES TO: "IF YOU HAD YOUR CHOICE, WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING ARMY JOBS WOULD YOU PREFER TO HAVE?"

Responses	Response distribution		
	Draftees, %	Regular Army, %	Enlisted Reserves, %
My present job in my present outfit	16	32	24
Same kind of job I have now but in some other outfit	2	6	5
Different kind of job in my present outfit	35	20	21
Different kind of job in some other outfit	45	41	48
No answer	2	1	2

TABLE A65

RELATION OF ENLISTMENT TO RESPONSES TO: "COMPARED WITH OTHER MEN IN YOUR OUTFIT, HAVE YOU BEEN GETTING A DEAL THAT'S BETTER THAN AVERAGE, FAIR, OR POOR?"

Responses	Response distribution		
	Draftees, %	Regular Army, %	Enlisted Reserves, %
Better than average deal	8	11	17
A fair deal	78	66	69
A poor deal	13	22	14
No answer	1	1	0

TABLE A66

RELATION OF ENLISTMENT TO RESPONSES TO: "FROM WHAT YOU KNOW ABOUT THEM, HOW DO YOU PERSONALLY FEEL ABOUT US COLORED SOLDIERS?"

Responses	Response distribution		
	Draftees, %	Regular Army, %	Enlisted Reserves, %
I like them very much.	20	23	15
I like them fairly well.	66	63	72
I don't like them.	12	11	11
I hate them.	1	1	1
No answer	1	2	1

TABLE A67

RELATION OF ENLISTMENT TO RESPONSES TO: "WHICH OF FOLLOWING COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR IDEA OF HOW COLORED TROOPS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO OUTFITS?"

Responses	Response distribution		
	Draftees, %	Regular Army, %	Enlisted Reserves, %
In all-Negro battalions of regiments	53	43	45
As Negro companies in white battalions	9	5	4
As Negro platoons in white companies	2	0	2
As Negro squads in white platoons	2	2	1
As individuals without regard to color	32	49	48
No answer	2	1	0

TABLE A68

RELATION OF ENLISTMENT TO RESPONSES TO: "AS TIME GOES ON, DO YOU THINK MOST COLORED SOLDIERS WILL BE FOUND LIVING AND WORKING WITH WHITE SOLDIERS, OR WILL THEY BE MOSTLY IN OUTFITS OF THEIR OWN? WHAT WOULD YOU PERSONALLY LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN?"

Responses	Response distribution		
	Draftees, %	Regular Army, %	Enlisted Reserves, %
I'd like to see them live and work with white soldiers.	26	37	34
I'd like to see them in outfits of their own.	69	57	62
No answer	5	6	4

TABLE A69

RELATION OF ENLISTMENT TO OPINIONS ON WHETHER IT WORKS OUT BETTER IN COMBAT WHEN WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS ARE TOGETHER IN SAME OUTFITS, OR IN SEPARATE OUTFITS

Responses	Response distribution		
	Draftees, %	Regular Army, %	Enlisted Reserves, %
It works out better when they're in the same outfits.	29	32	38
It works out about the same way.	27	32	29
It works out better when they're in separate outfits.	42	34	33
No answer	2	2	0

TABLE A70

RELATION OF ENLISTMENT TO COMPARISON OF NEGRO AND WHITE SOLDIERS AS FIGHTERS

Responses	Response distribution		
	Draftees, %	Regular Army, %	Enlisted Reserves, %
Negro soldiers are better fighters.	0	1	0
Negro soldiers are just about as good.	45	50	47
Negro soldiers are not as good fighters.	52	47	52
No answer	3	2	1

The following two tables illustrate the greater effect of enlistment status on attitude among Southern troops.

TABLE A71

RELATION OF ENLISTMENT TO OPINIONS ON SERVING IN PLATOON CONTAINING BOTH WHITES AND NEGROES, WORKING AND TRAINING TOGETHER, SLEEPING IN SAME BARRACKS, AND EATING IN SAME MESS HALL

Responses	Response distribution					
	Draftees		Regular Army		Enlisted Reserves	
	Southerners, %	Others, %	Southerners, %	Others, %	Southerners, %	Others, %
I would object strongly.	47	25	28	17	36	18
I would rather not, but it would not matter too much.	39	31	38	28	32	30
It would make no difference to me.	12	35	27	43	29	43
I would like it.	2	9	7	12	3	9

TABLE A72

RELATION OF ENLISTMENT TO OPINIONS ON HOW WHITES AND NEGROES GET ALONG WITH EACH OTHER IN ARMY AS COMPARED WITH CIVILIAN LIFE

Responses	Response distribution					
	Draftees		Regular Army		Enlisted Reserves	
	Southerners, %	Others, %	Southerners, %	Others, %	Southerners, %	Others, %
They get along better in Army.	54	61	70	68	56	69
They get along about same in Army as civilian life.	40	31	24	26	32	28
They get along better in civilian life.	5	6	4	0	10	3
No answer	1	2	2	6	2	0

Influence of Army Grade and Rank

Tables A73 to A78 are based on the responses of 1161 white enlisted men and 244 white noncoms and officers.

TABLE A73

RELATION OF GRADE AND RANK TO RESPONSES TO: "IF IT WERE UP TO YOU TO CHOOSE, WHERE DO YOU THINK YOU COULD DO MOST FOR YOUR COUNTRY?"

Responses	Response distribution	
	1161 enlisted men, %	244 Noncoms and officers, %
Being in the Army	37	60
Working in a civilian job	49	30
Going to school or college as a civilian	12	9
No answer	2	1

TABLE A74

RELATION OF GRADE AND RANK TO OPINIONS ON MORALE IN OWN OUTFIT

Responses	Response distribution	
	Enlisted men, %	Noncoms and officers, %
Very high	21	22
High	30	31
Just so-so	33	30
Low	7	9
Very low	8	7
No answer	1	1

TABLE A75

RELATION OF GRADE AND RANK TO OPINIONS ON WORKING AND LIVING CLOSELY WITH SOLDIERS OF OTHER RACES AND NATIONALITIES

Responses	Response distribution	
	Enlisted men, %	Noncoms and officers, %
Dislike whole idea	15	15
Don't care one way or other	57	48
Like idea	27	36
No answer	1	1

TABLE A76

RELATION OF GRADE AND RANK TO RESPONSES TO: "WHICH OF FOLLOWING COMES CLOSEST TO YOUR IDEA OF HOW COLORED TROOPS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO OUTFITS?"

Responses	Response distribution	
	Enlisted men, %	Noncoms and officers, %
In all-Negro battalions or regiments	45	44
As colored companies in white battalions	6	2
As colored platoons in white companies	2	2
As colored squads in white platoons	3	2
As individuals without regard to color	42	50
No answer	2	0

TABLE A77

RELATION OF GRADE AND RANK TO RESPONSES TO: "WHAT WOULD YOU PERSONALLY LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN?"

Responses	Response distribution	
	Enlisted men, %	Noncoms and officers, %
I'd like to see them live and work with white soldiers.	33	37
I'd like to see them in outfits of their own.	61	57
No answer	6	6

TABLE A78

RELATION OF GRADE AND RANK TO OPINIONS ON SERVING IN PLATOON CONTAINING BOTH WHITES AND NEGROES, WORKING AND TRAINING TOGETHER, SLEEPING IN SAME BARRACKS, AND EATING IN SAME MESS HALL

Responses	Response distribution	
	Enlisted men, %	Noncoms and officers, %
I would object to it strongly.	27	21
I would rather not, but it would not matter too much.	31	32
It would make no difference to me.	33	37
I would like it.	7	10
No answer	2	0

Appendix A, Part IV

ATTITUDE SURVEY IN KOREA, MAY-JUN 1951

by

International Public Opinion Research, Inc.
(now International Research Associates, Inc.)

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SUMMARY

Problem.

The over-all problem to which this report addresses itself is that of how best Negro troops can be utilized in the US Army. The Korean experience furnishes the occasion for an examination of the following aspects of this over-all problem: How have Negro troops been used in the Korean war? What problems have arisen in regard to their use? What are the prevailing attitudes of Negro and white officers and enlisted men on the subject? What lessons can be drawn from the Korean experience?

Method

This section includes data summarized in the preceding section, Part III. Field work on this report took place during May-Jun 1951, and included a study of relevant documentary evidence, administration of questionnaires to more than 3000 troops in the field, and intensive interviews with 150 officers and 450 enlisted men of all ranks in every division in the Far East Command, and in rear-echelon units. (The questionnaire is reproduced in the section headed "Questionnaire and Further Tabulation of Responses"; the interview guide in the section headed "Problem and Method of Field Research.")

Facts Bearing on Problem

(a) Most Negroes in Korea are in all-Negro units, many of the service type. In the last half year a sizable proportion has been integrated at the man level into formerly white units.

(b) It is the consensus of officer opinion, and of previous official reports, that Negroes perform more effectively in integrated units than in segregated units.

(c) Negroes both in integrated and in segregated units overwhelmingly prefer integration.

(d) Integration has occurred without incident or friction both in combat and rear-echelon units, in units which are predominantly white as well as in those which are predominantly Negro.

(e) Introduction of Negroes into white units does not lower the performance or morale of white troops in those units. On the other hand it does appear to raise the performance and morale of the Negroes.

(f) There is evidence that contact with Negro troops results in attitude changes on the part of whites, making them more favorable to integration, and in general more favorably disposed toward Negroes.

(g) There is agreement among most whites and Negroes that Negroes should hold both combat and service jobs, and should be assigned to these on the same basis as whites.

(h) Instances in which white troops have Negro leaders do not constitute problem situations.

(i) Although conditions in Korea are more favorable to integration than conditions in the US, the survey findings do not indicate that integration in garrison would arouse strong objection from most white troops (especially those who have already had experience with integration).

(j) Existing Army policy statements with respect to the use of Negro manpower are diversely interpreted by both officers and troops and in fact lend themselves to such diverse interpretations because of their failure to clarify the disposition of Negro units.

Conclusions

Integration of Negro and white personnel in Korea has been successful to the extent that it has been put into effect. Where Negroes have been mixed into white units, it has proceeded smoothly without conflict. There is overwhelming opinion among officers that Negroes should serve in both noncombat and combat units on an integrated basis. There is a difference of opinion on this score among white troops, but experience with Negroes in integrated units makes for a more favorable attitude toward integration.

INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the use of Negro troops in the Korean campaign. Its purpose is to review the Korean experiences insofar as these demonstrate problems encountered in the use of Negro troops and ways in which these problems have been met.

The report begins with a statement of the problem and proceeds to present the factual evidence gathered through questionnaires and interviews with troops in the field. As is conventional in social science research, the raw data (statistics, excerpts from documents, and interview transcripts) are set forth and ordered by means of a running interpretive commentary.

The report traces historically the use of Negro troops in Korea and the development of policy with respect to the use of those troops. It presents data on the distribution of Negro soldiers in various types of units. A review is made of recent official reports on the use of Negroes in the Far East Command. This is followed by a discussion of opinion and assumptions current among staff officers and troop commanders.

The attitudes of both Negro and white enlisted men are examined on subjects related to the use, distribution, performance, and morale of Negro soldiers. The report goes on to describe actual experiences arising in the use of Negro troops under varying conditions.

Some implications are drawn from the previous findings for the Zone of the Interior. The role of leadership in interpreting and executing official policy is considered.

The planning, execution, and analysis of this study were done in May–Jun 1951, by members of the same research team. The team members were: Dr. Leo Bogart, Research Coordinator, Public Relations Department, Standard Oil Company, N.J. (on leave to make this study); Professor Robert T. Bower, Director, Bureau of Social Science Research, The American University; Mr. Ira Cisin, Senior Research Analyst, Attitude Research Branch, US Department of Defense (on leave to make this study); Dr. Tilman Cothran, Professor of Sociology, Arkansas State A.M. and N. College (on leave to make this study); Dr. John Morsell, Study Director, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University (on leave to make this study); Mr. Robert Abernethy, IPOR; and Mr. Arthur Pearlroth, IPOR. Mr. Harris Huey was in charge of administration of this study for IPOR.

PROBLEM AND METHOD OF FIELD RESEARCH

The Army's over-all manpower needs make it important to find out whether Negro troops are now being used with the greatest possible efficiency, and how their efficiency can be raised. These questions are of particular interest because the caliber and performance of Negro troops have long been subjects for considerable discussion and criticism.

Because Negroes have traditionally been placed in specially designated Army units, they constitute a special assignment problem. The changing position of the Negro in American society has its counterpart in recent changes in the status of Negro personnel in the Armed Forces. Because Army policy and practice are currently undergoing changes, it is possible to compare the use of Negro troops under different circumstances, and to make the appropriate inferences from this comparison.

Statement of the Problem

The Korean campaign furnishes the occasion for a study of this kind to be made under actual combat conditions. In examining the use of Negro troops in this campaign, the following questions present themselves:

(a) How have Negro troops been used in the Korean war? Have any changes taken place in the way in which they are used? If so, how have these changes come about? What changes in official policy, if any, have occurred as the result of field experience?

(b) What is the actual current picture regarding the use of Negro troops in Korea? What types of jobs do they perform? To what types of units are they assigned? How are they distributed with reference to other troops?

(c) What special problems have arisen in the use of Negro troops? What opinions are expressed by them, by their commanders, by other personnel regarding their performance in both combat and noncombat types of jobs? Under what circumstances is this performance most successful? How can it be improved?

(d) What are the attitudes prevalent among white officers and troops toward Negro soldiers and their utilization by the Army? What influences those attitudes and under what circumstances do they appear to undergo change?

(e) What are the attitudes of Negro soldiers with respect to their treatment by the Army? What has their own subjective experience been under varying conditions?

(f) What has actually happened in instances where traditional Army practices in handling Negro troops have changed as the result either of changes in policy or of accident? What friction, if any, arises between white and Negro troops, and under what circumstances does it arise? What special problems, if any, occur in units where Negro and white soldiers are mixed?

(g) What lessons can be drawn from the Korean experience in this area for the Army as a whole?

Objectives of the Field Study

The specific objectives of the field study were to gather and evaluate: (a) Historical data, including strength statistics, reports made by field commanders and inspectors, and narrative reports gathered by the research team assigned to the project. (b) Intensive personal interviews with members of the Far East Command, ranging from the private in the front-line Korean foxhole through all the echelons of command in the forward areas as well as in the rear. Every Army division and many rear-echelon units were covered in this phase of the study. Virtually all the arms and services are represented. In all, approximately 450 enlisted men and 150 officers were contacted in such interview-conversations. In many cases several men were approached at the same time by the group interview method. (c) Quantitative attitude data, consisting of responses to a prepared questionnaire administered to over 3000 enlisted men (and to a few company-grade officers) in Korea and in Japan. No attempt was made to obtain a cross-section sample of *all* the troops in the Far East Command. Rather, the men chosen as respondents to the questionnaire were members of units which conformed to a research plan designed to illustrate significant contrasting situations. The bulk of the questionnaires were administered to men in infantry companies on the Korean front.

The Questionnaires

For the quantitative phase of the study, a special questionnaire was constructed (reprinted in the section headed "Questionnaire and Further Tabulation of Responses"). This was in two parts, the first dealing with individual background and morale, and the second focusing on the subject of Negro troops. The following subjects were covered by the questionnaire: (a) Morale problems — general evaluation of unit morale, success of unit leaders, reaction to military discipline, job satisfaction, personal adjustment, identification with the Army, and commitment to the Korean campaign effort; (b) Utilization of Negro manpower — types of jobs to which Negroes should be assigned, how good Negroes are as combat troops, types of units — segregated or integrated — to which Negroes should be assigned; (c) Race relations — prediction of and attitude toward the trend in race relations in the Army and in civilian life, prediction of behavior, and standards of behavior in typical Army situations involving interracial contact.

It must be emphasized at this point that the questionnaire was designed with a more careful analysis in mind than could be made in the limited time available. Many of the questions were included to permit scale construction, and their purpose may therefore not be immediately apparent on a hasty reading.

By the basic design of the questionnaire study, units in Korea were selected which would typify variations in the following respects: (a) Combat experience — service units in rear areas, combat replacements (men without combat experience who were destined for assignment to combat units), precombat (men without combat experience who were in combat units), and combat (men in combat units during or immediately after combat); (b) Integration — whites in all-white units, Negroes in all-Negro units, and whites and Negroes in integrated units.

In addition to the preceding kinds of units, special samples were obtained in National Guard units stationed in Japan as well as in one all-Negro field artillery unit in Korea.

Units were chosen as representative of their types. In each selected unit, all available men were assembled at a time and place convenient to the command, a short briefing was given by a member of the research team, and the men themselves filled out questionnaires under conditions of strict anonymity. The high level of interest exhibited by the respondents, as well as the excellent cooperation of command at all echelons, made it possible for the research team to gather a large body of relevant data in a minimum time period.

In the intensive interviews, an attempt was made to discover and to probe the experiences and attitudes of both white men and Negroes in integrated and segregated units. Interviews were also conducted with noncommissioned officers and officers who had commanded Negro troops, and with high-ranking officers who were responsible for policies relating to the utilization of Negroes. Essentially these interviews covered the same subject matter as the questionnaires. The qualitative interviews, however, provided background and depth essential to a full understanding of the statistical materials. In addition they permitted the collection of many case histories and illustrations. They provide the evidence for observations and conclusions based on concrete situations and on actual behavior as well as opinions.

The research team took detailed notes during all interviews conducted with enlisted men and in most interviews with officers. Many interviews were recorded verbatim in shorthand. Guarantees of strict anonymity were given at the outset of each interview.

Interviews were conducted according to an outline guide which was modified as necessary. All respondents were encouraged to pursue their own lines of reflection on the subject, and in cases where several men were interviewed at once they were stimulated to discuss the subject among themselves.

Negroes were interviewed only by Negro interviewers; whites only by whites. The interview outline guide reproduced as follows was intended for use with whites in mixed units. Interviewers made appropriate modifications for use with officers and Negroes and for use in segregated units:

Introduction: I've been sent by the Department of the Army and I'm working on a study of how the men over here in Korea are getting along together. We're trying to talk to as many people as we can, at all ranks, to get all the ideas and help we can. I'd like to hear what you have to say. All of this is completely anonymous. We're not interested in writing down the names of the men or their units—unless you want to put something down on record. (Pause and wait for comments to start. Let the respondent continue for a while. Then interrupt:)

1. One thing we're especially interested in finding out more about is how the colored soldiers are getting along in this war. Do you have any colored soldiers in this outfit? (If yes) How many?

2. How long is it since there have been colored men in this outfit?

a. Were you with the outfit when they first came? How did the men feel when they first heard about it? Was anything said or done when they first showed up? What happened then?

b. How do you think the officers (men) feel about having them here?

3. How do they get along with the rest of the men? (Probe intensively, searching for illustrations, incidents, explanations, etc.)

a. Have you ever noticed any bad feelings between the colored and white soldiers—any trouble or fighting?

b. Do the colored fellows here mingle with the rest of the men? How do they all get along?

c. Is everybody friendly together, or do the colored mostly stick together and the whites together? For instance, would you ever find colored men with white men as their buddies?

4. Speaking frankly, how well would you say the colored fellows in this outfit are doing their jobs? (In a combat outfit, add:) How well do they do in combat?

5. Are there any colored noncoms or officers in this outfit? (If yes) How do the white soldiers feel about taking orders from them? (If no) How would you feel if you had a colored noncom or officer over you?

6. Do you think it's a good idea for them to be in the same outfit with the other men, or do you think it's better to have them in outfits of their own? How do you think it would work out in garrison, back in the States?

7. As far as you can judge, what's the official Army policy in dealing with colored troops? Why do you think that's the policy? Do you think the official policy is being carried out? If not, why not? Where does it bog down? Do you think the official policy is a good one, or could it be improved?

8. Have you yourself changed your opinion about colored soldiers in any way? In what way? Why? How do you think it's going to carry over when you get back to the States?

HISTORY AND DISTRIBUTION OF NEGRO TROOPS IN KOREA

Both policy and practice regarding the use of Negro troops in Korea and the Far East Command were in a state of transition at the time this part of the report was written (1951) and were undergoing change throughout the period of the field study. The remainder of this section discusses the 1951 situation in the present tense.

Changes in Assignment of Negro Personnel

Both the Japanese garrison units originally committed in Korea and the units which followed them from the US included the usual proportion of units designated as Class II (Negro) by TO&E. All of these units, including the 24th Inf Regt, battalions of the 9th and 15th Regts, and a number of other battalions in other arms and services, are still in Korea and are still designated as Class II units.

In the last half year, however, there has been an accelerated movement of Negro personnel into units not officially designated as Class II. Negro replacements in such otherwise white units do not constitute any significant proportion of the personnel in these organizations. Their appearance does, however, constitute a marked departure from previous Army policy. Almost without exception, integration has taken place at the man level rather than by placing Negro platoons or companies in white companies or battalions.

There are several concurrent explanations for this change in practice: (a) the conscientious effort of personnel officers in FECOM and Eighth Army to carry out Department of the Army SR 600-629-1, calling for assignment on the basis of individual qualifications without regard to race; (b) the increasing demand for replacements caused by battle losses and by the institution of the troop rotation scheme; (c) the availability of Negro personnel in excess of those required as replacements in all-Negro units; and (d) accidental assignment of Negro replacements to white units without awareness, on the part of those responsible, that the replacements involved were Negro.

Problems in Using Negro Troops

Any study of the use of Negro manpower in Korea cannot omit mention of the fact that large-scale Negro combat units (especially the 24th Inf Regt) have constituted a major manpower problem in the eyes of commanders in the field.

A most vigorous expression of dissatisfaction with the performance of the 24th Regt resulted in a request that the regiment be returned to the Zone of the Interior and deactivated. Following this extraordinary request, five separate reports originating within the Eighth Army or the Far East Command have dealt with the problem of the large all-Negro unit. (These are summarized in the following section.)

Eighth Army Policy

As early as Jan 1951, it was recognized by personnel officers at Eighth Army Headquarters that, since Negro units would soon reach their fully authorized strength, two

courses of action offered themselves: to discontinue the flow of Negro replacements to Korea when the full quota in Class II units was reached, to continue to receive all available Negro replacements and to assign Negro personnel to white units. It was felt that to request discontinuance of the flow of Negro replacements to Korea would reduce the amount of available manpower and thereby reduce the combat effectiveness of the command. It was also assumed that discontinuing the flow of Negro replacements would be contrary to the intent of SR 600-629-1. Accordingly official Eighth Army policy became one of assigning Negroes to units in Korea, white or Negro, that were below authorized strength. This policy was adopted in spite of the objections of a number of divisional commanders to any further assignment of Negro personnel to their divisions. These objections have lost their force in the intervening period.

Inconsistencies in Practice

It is important to point out that the Eighth Army's practice in assignment is not a consistent one throughout the theater. To begin with, there continues to be a general effort to maintain all-Negro TO&E units at strength or even at overstrength at the same time that integration proceeds elsewhere. Since the drain on manpower is greater on divisional troops than on those assigned to corps, army, or service commands, integration has progressed farther within the infantry divisions than in such nondivisional organizations. Among the divisions, however, a consistent policy has not been maintained.

"Reverse" Integration

In a number of cases, because of the shortages of manpower, deliberate design, or accident, white replacements have been sent in recent months to units designated as Negro by TO&E. However, in many of these cases, these white troops have been withdrawn when the immediate manpower pressure was alleviated or when the "accident" was discovered.

Distribution of Negroes

The bulk of Negro troops in Korea are still (1951) in Class II TO&E units, with a disproportionate concentration in the service rather than the combat arms.

The 17 May weekly report of EUSAK lists 27,710 Negroes, amounting to 13.5 percent of total US strength. A total of 43 percent were in combat arms (infantry, artillery, and armor), with 57 percent in other units.

These troops were distributed approximately as follows:

Types of units		*Total force, %*
In integrated units		20
Combat arms (infantry, artillery, armor)	12	
Other units	8	
In all-Negro units		80
Combat arms (infantry, artillery, armor)	31	
Other units	49	

It is apparent that at this time four of every five Negroes in Korea were in Class II units, and that the largest single group (49 percent) were in segregated service units.

These figures are already out of date, because the sharp increase in the flow of Negro replacements during the last two weeks of May made for a sharp change in the distribution statistics.

In the May 17 report, for instance, 59 percent of the Negroes listed were in nondivisional units and 41 percent in the division. By 1 Jun, Eighth Army reported a total of 31,844 Negroes assigned (an increase of 14 percent) and a complete shift of the proportions assigned to divisional (59 percent) and nondivisional (41 percent) units. This means, of course, that Negro replacements have been increasingly assigned to integrated combat units, while Class II units (formerly at overstrength) may actually have declined in numbers.

Distribution of Integrated Units

Table A79 indicates the extent of integration in the 228 line infantry companies in Korea, as of May 17 (1951).

TABLE A79

NEGRO INTEGRATION IN LINE INFANTRY COMBAT COMPANIES, EIGHTH ARMY

Types of companies	Total companies	
	Number	Percent
All-white companies	73	32
All-Negro companies	16	7
Integrated companies	139 [a]	61
Total	228	100

[a] Four of these integrated companies make up the third battalion of the 9th Inf Regt (2d Div). This battalion was primarily all-Negro but has received some white troops as replacements. These four companies and several of the other companies in the 9th Inf contain a high proportion of Negroes, since Negroes have not been placed in the other two regiments of the division. The integrated companies in the other divisions contain low proportions of Negroes.

Thirty-two of the 73 all-white companies are in the 2d Div. In the case of the remaining 41 all-white companies, the degree of integration is undoubtedly somewhat higher than these figures indicate. The table is based upon an examination of only four different points in time between Jan and May 1951, and it may be that in other periods some of these companies did contain Negroes. (A company was classified as "integrated" if it contained both Negroes and whites at any one of these points in time). It has already been noted that the rate of integration was stepped up in May. Also, within a battalion, the all-white companies are apt to be heavy-weapons companies, in which the men have frequent contact in combat conditions with the men in the other (usually integrated) companies in the battalion. In a word, integration at the squad and platoon level has been experienced by the vast majority of the line infantry combat troops in the Eighth Army.

Integration has taken place in approximately the same fashion in the other divicional units, except in the case of specialized organizations for which few Negroes meet the MOS qualifications. It has already been noted that integration has progressed more slowly among service units than in the divisions, because of the slower turnover and replacement rate in these units.

REPORTS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF NEGRO TROOPS

It might be expected that the performance of Negro troops would be profoundly influenced by the conditions under which they are used. Since these conditions are in turn set, controlled, or influenced by troop commanders, the views of these officers are of considerable importance quite apart from the objectivity of their observations or the validity of their conclusions.

Accordingly, this study is concerned with the views of senior officers, expressed in reports and interviews, not only because they represent military judgments on the subject of Negro manpower, but because they reveal the assumptions and premises which underlie the official handling of Negro personnel and which shape official policy.

Since this study was conducted by a team of social scientists rather than by military experts, it is not within its sphere of competence to pass judgment on the military performance of Negro troops. It does become relevant, however, to summarize military opinion on the efficiency of Negro troops under different conditions.

In gathering opinions of the performance and morale of Negro troops in Korea, it becomes immediately apparent that, both in the views of white observers and of the Negroes themselves, a sharp distinction must be made between Negroes in all-Negro units and those who are integrated in white units. This is clearly recognized in all previous reports on the subject.

Special Reports

In a letter recommending the dissolution of the 24th Inf Regt and the dispersion of its personnel, a senior officer supports this proposal with extensive testimony, taken largely from white officers in the regiment. The principal assertions in this testimony are that within the 24th Inf, at least, Negro troops are unreliable in combat, particularly on the defensive and at night: that they are wasteful of equipment; that they leave positions suddenly, without adequate warning to the troops protecting their flanks; that they are prone to sudden panic and hysteria; that they are frequently malingerers and that, in summary, the regiment is a handicap to the United Nations war effort. The following excerpts from the testimony of white officers are typical:

(Former battalion commander): I don't believe that anyone could ever make a fighting outfit out of them that would be reliable and could be counted upon at any time. The weakness to rest dropped down below the standard of the skilled leader. There didn't seem to be any middle class. They were either very good or very poor. I would recommend integrating them on the basis of about 10 percent of the squad being black and the other 90 percent being white. I think he would fight very well. I don't visualize many of the colored men being noncommissioned officers because I don't think they are of that caliber but I believe that they would fight under a leader and when you have a bad colored outfit you don't have competent squad leaders. If we are going to have all-colored units, I would suggest they be assault troops and not defense troops. In defense they have to sit still day or night and the darkness finally gets them. They get to thinking too much and imagining too much and they're apt to get panicky so my idea is to use them as assault troops and when the attack is over take them out of the line. They can't or don't stand pressure.

(Lieutenant): When one man starts they all seem to follow. The men are led very easily in the things they want to do. When the going gets rough, they're hard to keep organized. You can stop some of the men from going off to the rear but when you are out of sight they will slip off again. They have no feeling of group cooperation, but every man for himself. There's a definite lack of squad leaders. It's damn tough for an officer to lead them in a position knowing what they have done when the going gets tough.

(Medical officer): There are more wounds of the feet than would be expected in normal battle conditions.

(Major): Why has the officer casualty rate been so high in this regiment? Because the officer is forced to expose himself unnecessarily in order to try and direct his men, control their erratic fire and do the duties that are normally taken care of by an NCO. . . . Time after time we heard this story: "I woke up and there they were right on top of me." Instance after instance we have found these men asleep under 'awake and alert.' They can sleep any time and any place. The only way we have been able to keep them awake is to keep them standing.

In the letter mentioned above it is made clear that criticisms are directed at the Negro unit rather than the Negro soldier. In the case of integrated units it states:

Little difficulty was experienced in using colored replacements. Teamed with whites in combat they performed ably. They seemed to feel the need to measure up and compete on an equal basis. In many instances close friendships developed and unselfish courageous acts by colored troops became quite common. The group emotional instability also disappeared. Of course, the percentage of officers and noncommissioned officers was not as high as in colored units, but those who were promoted were excellent leaders and respected, even when leading white troops. The white troops at first resented the idea of integration, but this resentment quickly disappeared. At present there appears to be no evidence of impairment of unit morale where Negroes have been completely integrated.

In conclusion the same letter states:

The 24th Infantry Regiment has demonstrated in combat that it is untrustworthy and incapable of carrying out the mission of an infantry regiment. Its operations have been a constant threat to the effectiveness of the division; and its continued use jeopardizes the United Nations war effort.

Following the receipt of the above letter, the Eighth Army prepared its own study of the 24th Regt. In this extended and elaborate investigation, officers and a few senior noncommissioned officers were interrogated in the 24th Regt and in all-Negro battalions in other regiments. Their testimony follows, in considerably more tempered form, the general lines indicated by the earlier letter.

The testimony indicates, for example, that there is much straggling; that each wounded man is taken out by four or five others; that men withdraw without being ordered to do so; that they bolt at the slightest rumor; that officers have to stand out and lead their men rather than direct them. However, a dissenting viewpoint is also presented: "In my traveling around at night I have not found a sleeping guard or an unarmed weapon."

Something of the subjective attitudes of the Negro troops is provided by the testimony of three Negro war correspondents. One of them says:

Something basic was lacking (in the 24th Regt). I am inclined to think that it was largely concerned with leadership or rather an esprit de corps, the closeness that is necessary between officers and men in a combat team. . . .

I think that Colonel ____ who is a brave man and a good soldier got off to a bad start when he made a statement that the __d Division had a reputation for running and that his observations had proved that colored people do not make good combat soldiers and that his job was to change the frightened 24th to the fighting 24th. The men were angry and insulted. Colonel ____ said he did not intend to insult any race; he was trying to make the men so mad that they would get mad enough to fight and I believe his intentions were good.

The report is careful to distinguish between the performance of the 24th Regt as a whole and the performance of its component units. For example, the report summarizes the testimony of officers of the _d Battalion of the 24th Inf Regt:

Their views are unanimous that in the first action near Pohang in Korea the battalion was ambushed and surprised, but there was no panic and the troops performed satisfactorily. In the action on Hill 201, key to the Naktong defense . . . all officers with the two assault companies had been evacuated, but the battalion held its ground although exposed to heavy automatic small arms and mortar fire. The performance of the battalion was so creditable that the Regimental Commander expressed his intention of recommending it for a unit citation. . . . The Battalion Commander, who commanded a white battalion during World War II, said its combat effectiveness was equal to and comparable in every respect to any other unit he had commanded. There was no indication of excessive straggling nor loss of equipment within the battalion.

In discussing the evidence, it was concluded that:

The present policy of assigning all-Negro replacements to units designated for Negro personnel until those units reach the current authorized strength level and thereafter assigning any surplus Negro personnel to other units requiring replacements is a sound personnel policy and should be continued. . . . Although the inactivation of all-Negro combat units may ultimately be preferable, this is neither the time nor the place to arrange such a plan.

It was further urged that additional officer personnel be provided for organizations in which a preponderance of personnel was in the lowest AGCT classes.

Statements of a Senior Combat Commander

The following verbatim comments of a senior combat commander are based solely on personal observations and experiences with the 24th Inf Regt and other Negroes within the 25th Div during combat operations in Korea.

It is the writer's conviction that a Negro unit, whether it be a squad, platoon, company or battalion, is incapable of producing satisfactory results during periods of sustained combat. Despite the selection of the best available officers and, in the early phases, noncommissioned (white) officers, Negro units of the 24th Inf Regt repeatedly demonstrated their inability to either secure an objective against determined resistance or to defend, particularly at night, against an enemy attack of any size. Repeated examples exist of successful North Korean attacks against Negro companies and battalions for the sole purpose of securing American weapons and ammunition—the North Korean attack being unsupported by the heavier weapons, and the Koreans themselves armed only with grenades. Under ideal conditions, during daylight, with excessive assistance from supporting army, the Negro unit can secure a limited objective.

To summarize, Negro units, regardless of size, in combat are not successful and are, in fact, a liability to adjacent units.

During the bitter holding action of last August on the Pusan perimeter, the repeated failures of the 24th Inf became so critical, the division commander, Maj Gen W. B. Kean, in order to bolster this regiment, placed approximately 250 Negro enlisted men with each white regiment, and in turn, from the pipeline placed volunteer white noncommissioned officers with the 24th Inf. This 250 amounted to approximately 10 percent of the then existing strength of the white regiments. These Negroes were integrated down to the lowest tactical unit, the squad, and in this capacity have proven satisfactory. Some have been promoted, others have been decorated. I mention this to point out that there is NO color line in a foxhole. Apparently the white soldier has no objection of serving under a Negro NCO, if the NCO has proved himself in battle. Specifically, although nine white battalions cannot hold one Negro battalion on a hill, nine white soldiers can hold one Negro soldier on a hill. It appears to me that this incapability of a Negro unit to fight is founded primarily in the Negro's lack of self-respect and in his lack of respect for his fellow Negro. He does not trust the Negro in the adjacent foxhole, whereas he does have confidence in the white soldier in this adjacent foxhole.

In my opinion, intellectual attainment and stamina on the battlefield are directly related. I believe that some 5 percent of the Negro population of the 24th Inf Regt made outstanding and valorous leaders, and that another 20 percent were excellent followers. The percentages in white regiments are considerably higher. I believe these percentages are closely related to the higher

intellectual levels attained by any given group of Negroes. In other words, the reasonably intelligent Negro will make an effective Infantryman.

Because national welfare demands proportionate losses of its varied manpower, I am convinced that controlled integration of Negro personnel into white *combat* units, in proportion to the Negro population of the Army, is mandatory. This percentage, around 11 or 12 percent, does not materially reduce the combat effectiveness of the white *combat* unit and if maintained at this level, and no higher, will insure effective utilization of Negro manpower.

If complete integration is not acceptable to higher authority, immediate steps should be taken to insure that each Negro infantry platoon is assigned two officers. Experience has shown that Negro units must be physically led, and to preclude straggling, an officer must bring up the rear of the battle formation.

In time it is conceivable that Negro officers can and will be developed who will achieve the respect of the Negro soldier. From within the 5 percent group of high intellectual achievement, many Negro officers can be selected without lowering Army-wide standards. Some exist today, but many commissioned Negro officers do not measure up to their contemporaries among white officers, and accordingly the reputation of Negro officer personnel has suffered. The most meticulous selection of the most highly qualified, battlewise, Negro noncommissioned officers for appointment as officers will do much to offset the present low regard the Negro officer now enjoys.

The following are extracts from this officer's remarks at a briefing on 15 May 1951:

Colored soldiers—24th RCT—In limited attack does job, *barely*. There on out, no good. Will not defend. Will not stay up on line. Pull out at night; next morning job of cleaning up after them, a mess. Not a matter of leadership as they have been purposely given the best. Colored man does not respect other blacks as fighting men, *but does white* and if *mixed with whites will stay and fight*. Should be mixed in white units in about 15 percent proportion. Must use Negro manpower in all-out war. Some colored make good leaders. Where demonstrated capable, should be no discrimination in command responsibilities on color, *but they must be proven*. Can use Negro officers with white troops, but they must be good, on basis of ability only.

Other Official Reports

Other memoranda prepared by Army officers agree that Negro troops perform more adequately in combat when mixed into white units than in segregated organizations. One report recommends a specific solution for integrating and dispersing the personnel of the__th Regt.

Another report, based on a three-day field visit to Korea and interviews with a number of officers charged with the command of Negro troops, recommends "that all colored combat units should be eliminated, and that the usual percentage of integration should be 10 percent of the unit strength with 15 percent an absolute maximum." It reports that "all division commanders and subordinate commanders of combat units with Negro personnel consider complete integration of Negro personnel to be the answer to their effective utilization."

A third report recommends that: (a) immediate steps be authorized to remove from combat units now in Korea or intended to be sent to Korea with the troop list designation of "all-colored"; (b) the Far East Command be given authority to direct into all-colored combat units of the infantry and engineers, white replacements to fill expected vacancies incident to rotation; (c) the intent of SR 600-629-1 be thereafter extended, as soon as possible, to artillery and other combat and forward area "all-colored" units.

While the last two reports, limited as they are to the Far East Command, only recommend a policy of full-scale integration in that theater, another report recommends that this policy be carried on within the US as well. It states:

While it is apparent that integration is efficient and successful in a theater of operation, the question immediately arises as to whether it will work within the Continental limits of the United

States. This is a problem we must face squarely and without hedging. Integration in combat units is an accomplished fact. We cannot wait until the economic, social and educational background of the Negro develops the character and leadership required of a soldier. Integration in this Army within the United States will create problems but it will be effective.

It is specifically recommended by this report:

that the policy of integration down to squad level on a basis of aptitudes, physical profiles and skills, should be continued in FECOM and instituted within the United States. Such integration should be not greater than the nation-wide percentage of the Negro population. Promotion must be on a merit basis. No fanfare [should] be given to the solution of this problem.

It is apparent that these reports agree that Negro manpower is best employed in integrated units.

VIEWS OF SENIOR WHITE OFFICERS ON UTILIZATION OF NEGRO MANPOWER

The interviews conducted in the course of the present study make it clear that the conclusions reached in the official reports represent the consensus of senior officer opinion in Korea. Exceptions to the viewpoint that integration is both desirable and feasible in the Far East are rare, and are almost invariably found in units in which integration is not in effect. The prevailing agreement on conclusions does not, however, proceed in all cases from the same line of reasoning. The varied character of the arguments presented both for and against integration is illustrated in the following discussion.

Opinion on Performance and Integration

The fundamental assumption underlying all arguments, either favorable or unfavorable, is that there is no acceptable alternative to the use of Negro manpower. No one questions the Army's need of men. There are occasional expressions that make this point in very specific terms:

(Divisional staff officer): It's a problem, because if we're going into a war with Russia we'll need to make use of all our manpower.

(Staff officer, infantry division): Everybody knows that in the next war you've got to be able to use all available manpower, and we have some 13 million Negroes. That's a vast pool. You must train those people and integrate them into units.

There is virtually complete agreement on the inferiority of all-Negro fighting units, particularly combat infantry units. This criticism extends through the whole range of performance, with special emphasis on the excessive demands on leadership in Negro units, the unpredictability of Negroes in combat situations, their propensity to panic under pressure, and their losses in abandoned equipment and supplies; in short, the charges made in the official reports:

(General officer): The __th (an all-Negro organization in World War II) had more training than any other unit before we went overseas. They had more equipment, and more officers. But the experience in combat was completely different from that of training. One of the things I concentrated on in training was dispersion. We got into Italy and I came upon one squad all huddled together under a tree. I asked the sergeant, "Why don't you disperse your men?" He said, "Sir, if we're going to die we might as well all die together." They are just less reliable than white troops. The key point is reliability. Negroes are notoriously careless. In their own squads in combat especially so. From that point of view they may get less scared if you put one or two of them in with a squad of white men whom they can look up to for leadership. Remember I'm speaking of the mass now, not of the individual who's proved himself in combat; if he's proved himself he should be reassigned in accordance with his capabilities; that's why we have MOS numbers, military occupational specialties. If he's proved himself in one place he'll do well in another type of organization.

(General officer): There's no question in my mind that integration—a few to a squad, is the only solution. In large units they simply do not function well. The __th Regt as a unit we would all like to see broken up. They are simply not as reliable and effective as our other regiments.

(Army staff officer): When the Negro is on the attack and he *knows* he is on the winning side, he is the greatest soldier there is. A "cannibal." But when he is checked and the tide begins to turn the other way, he disappears. Completely unreliable. Especially at night.

(Infantry officer): The __rd of the __th is an average battalion. They're pretty good on the offensive, but on the defensive they give. They don't like the idea of being cut off and enveloped. Of course they think they're hot stuff. They think they're a lot better than they are.

(CO, infantry company): One of the platoons in the __d Bn at one point became panicky near Hungnam. They received some fire and someone in the group became excited and apparently got the idea they were being overwhelmed and several of them took off. It took quite a while to round them up.

This kind of appraisal concludes that the retention of Negro soldiers in all-Negro units is unsound from a military viewpoint. There is a divergence of opinion, however, in the specific solutions proposed. Some arguments are encountered to the effect that because of their inferior combat capacity, Negro soldiers should be used exclusively in service units. (Occasionally there is a proviso that exceptional Negroes who have demonstrated their ability could be given combat assignments.)

(General officer): You can't get around the fact that they have different characteristics than the white man and that their effectiveness is less in combat. They should be in service units and if they prove themselves as outstanding individuals then they should be reassigned. Let them prove themselves in battle first. If a man is outstanding as a telephone operator, or a gunner, or a mechanic, then and only then should he be reassigned (to an infantry unit.)

In opposition, it is pointed out that this would be contrary to past and present Army directives on the use of Negro soldiers; and that it would result in an inequality of sacrifice, since only white soldiers would sustain the serious battle losses.

(Commanding general, integrated infantry division): I believe that they should be exposed to the same hardships, sacrifices and casualties that the rest of the population faces.

(Battalion commander, integrated infantry unit): If I'm going to be up there and be shot at by small arms fire they should be up there too, and they should be in white units because it's been proved many times that a nigger unit ain't worth a damn.

In at least one instance, this reasoning is rejected:

(General officer): I've heard it said that they're 10 percent of the population and they ought to do 10 percent of the dying. I don't send men into battle to die, whether they're regimental commanders or infantrymen. I send them out to do a job. I want them to do it efficiently and I want the most reliable and efficient units to do it. I don't send them out to die.

Feasibility of Integration

However, the difference of opinion focuses chiefly on the feasibility of integrating white and Negro troops. The possibility of racial friction in mixed units seems primarily a fear of white enlisted men who have not experienced integration; it plays little or no part in the calculations of officers, within the context of the Korean Theater. The most frequently stated argument against integration on the part of officers is that the introduction of Negroes would lower the efficiency of adequately performing white units.

(General officer): I said, "How's the morale in your squad?" He said, "Morale's fine. We've got two niggers in our squad and they keep us laughing all the time." I said, "What do you mean, laughing?" He said, "Oh, one day we were laying a mine field and suddenly we were fired upon, and we piled into the jeep. But that colored boy wouldn't get into the jeep. He just ran on ahead of us down the road, then he sat down and took off his shoes, and said, 'I can't go on because my feet are tired.'" Well, if I assign a squad to do a job I want to be able to count on the whole squad to do that job, whether it's laying a mine field or jumping into a jeep and taking off. A Negro in that squad will lower its efficiency.

(Staff officer, white infantry unit): The efficiency of the whole unit goes down when Negroes come in. Granted, Negroes fight better when they are integrated and are competing than when they

are in an all-Negro outfit, but they still lower the effectiveness of the unit. It's like adding ink to milk. The whole thing would taste better than plain ink, but not anywhere as good as plain milk. This would be the case in the ___rd because the companies, especially King Company, have within them a brotherly love one man for another that is almost touching. This contributes greatly to their effectiveness as a combat unit. This factor would be seriously compromised if Negroes were introduced into the unit.

This position is countered with a series of arguments: It is asserted that the poor performance of the Negro soldiers is at least partly attributable to their segregation, and that, as a result of emulation and competition, their performance is greatly improved in mixed units.

(White general officer): There's no question that if you take the average colored soldier he may be used a lot more effectively if he's not put with others of his own race.

(Staff officer, integrated infantry unit): The consensus of opinion in the command is that they perform most satisfactorily in mixed units so long as they are integrated in the squads. They have to be kept to a low percentage so that unpleasant episodes are avoided.

(White CofS, integrated infantry unit): The only feasible solution is to mix them in with the whites. They perform better because they have pride and they try to do as well as the white man. They look up to him for leadership. The Koreans, the Puerto Ricans, and the Negroes are all the same in that respect. They perform much better when they're not put in together.

Second, even if it be assumed that this improvement does not entirely bring them up to the level of the average white soldier, it is still better to have all units operating at about the same efficiency level, so as to facilitate their disposition in all kinds of situations.

(Commanding officer, integrated infantry division): That's another thing in favor of mixing them. You ought to have all of your battalions at approximately the same level that you needn't take into account that one is white and one is colored. You never know when you have to use them.

Finally, it is held that even if no positive benefit can be discerned, integration will minimize the conspicuousness and the concentration of inferior troops and will spread the burden of supervising them.

(CofS, integrated infantry division): I prefer not to have any. However, if we have got to have them let's spread them around thin enough so that they can be controlled. Otherwise, you just add another problem to a multitude of problems.

The division of opinion is less one-sided on the question of integration in the Zone of the Interior. There are more frequent expressions of misgivings as to how it will work out there, with the chief source of difficulty stemming from unfavorable racial attitudes in the communities near which Army posts are located. The main problems envisioned are those in social life after working hours, particularly where women are involved. The argument is summed up in this observation:

(Commanding officer, integrated infantry regiment): In training situations, segregation would be better. Back in the States, if you have mixed units, the local populace will be unfriendly. Suppose you're at a stateside post, and run an enlisted men's dance at the service club with girls brought out from town. The first time a Negro soldier asks a white girl to dance, the local civilians will rise in wrath against the Army.

Others, however, feel that even the social problem can be met successfully, the usual solution being either the separation or the elimination of the activities most likely to cause conflict.

(Commanding general, integrated division): I see no reason why integration cannot succeed in the United States just as it has succeeded here. I think that they should be stationed in parts of the country where they have access to their own communities and to social facilities of their own. In the last war, the Army put large numbers of Negro troops near Oswego, New York, a town of 25,000 with about 15 Negroes. Naturally there were problems there.

At Camp ____ I commanded a training division, and we trained them all together without any difficulties or problems. They were together in the same companies, but the problems arise in social affairs, in after hours. We took care of that by keeping them strictly separate in after-hour facilities, service clubs, movies and so on.

(CofS, integrated infantry division): But with the enlisted man the problem can be solved. Just abolish the dances. There's no more than 5 percent who go to them anyway.

There are occasional suggestions that, at least in the case of soldiers integrated in Korea, the "comrade-in-arms" sentiment would help to ease otherwise tense situations in garrison.

(White commanding officer, integrated infantry battalion): Will it work in the States? Of course it will. If it works in South Carolina, at Fort Jackson, it will work anywhere. I think men who have been through the same experiences together do develop a sense of kinship and comradeship that would carry over into garrison. How it would be with others I don't know.

Whatever the obstacles to the success of integration in the US, it is noted that a strong argument in its favor is the consideration that it is impractical to carry out integration on a large scale in a combat zone if segregated units are maintained in training.

(White commanding officer, divisional engineering group): Obviously, it would work more easily overseas but any unit that goes overseas has to be formed in garrison. You'll probably run into some difficulties back in the States. People lose their sensitivity sleeping out in the field over here, but you have to start it in the States if you are going to use it at all.

This section in large part recapitulates evidence already covered in previous Army reports on the utilization of Negro manpower. It must be emphasized that these reports have been based primarily on the testimony of white officer personnel. The attitudes of white enlisted men have been neglected, and almost no consideration has been given to the important factor of the Negro's own subjective feelings and of his motivations under varying conditions of service. In the remaining sections of this report these critical subjects are covered in detail.

OPINIONS ON THE USE OF NEGRO TROOPS

EVALUATION OF NEGROES AS FIGHTERS

The primary military consideration in determining the use of Negro soldiers is their capacity for combat. It has already been emphasized that this study does not undertake to make firm judgments on the combat performance of Negroes, either as individuals or in units. It is relevant, however, to report on the variety of opinion in 1951 among both white and Negro officers and men with regard to this performance.

Opinion is fairly evenly divided among 1084 white combat infantrymen on the question of how Negroes rate as fighters in comparison with whites. As shown in the tabulation below, slightly more than half consider them "just about as good," while slightly less than half rate them "not as good fighters." The respondents were men from integrated units in all but three regiments in Korea.

Question: "How would you rate U.S. colored soldiers as fighters, compared with white U.S. soldiers?"

Opinion	*Total responses, %*
Colored soldiers are better fighters.	1
Colored soldiers are just about as good.	51
Colored soldiers are not as good fighters.	47
No answer	1

Opinions on this question are related to, and not always consistent with, opinions on the kinds of assignments which should be given to Negro troops. This point is discussed later with reference to the kinds of jobs Negro soldiers should receive.

Unfavorable opinions of Negroes in combat

Unfavorable appraisals by white officers and men, as expressed in the personal interviews, cover a wide range of combat situations. The bulk of the comments are directed at the functioning of all-Negro or predominantly Negro infantry units. The criticism parallels that which has been described in preceding sections. It notes that these units fail to take or to hold ground as directed, endanger the flanks of adjoining units by pulling out suddenly and without notice, waste and abandon large quantities of equipment and supplies. The adjectives "unpredictable" and "unreliable" occur with great frequency in these comments.

(CO of a Negro infantry company): When I was in the __RCT, you could outline a mission for me, and I could tell you whether or not my boys could do it without help. Here I never know. Sometimes they do very well, sometimes they even stand on the defense, but other times they straggle badly on the attack, and bug like hell on the defense. You just don't know what they can and will do.

(Battalion CO whose troops have been posted alongside all-Negro units): Every man in the division is bitter about the experience we have had with the __th. They've pulled out on us too many times. The first thing one of our units wants to know when it goes into the line is whether

the __th is on the flanks. The company commanders automatically turn their flanks when they're being covered by the __th, just as though they were open. There's no question in anyone's mind that they're a detriment rather than an aid.

(Divisional deputy commander): They're just not as reliable as a corresponding white unit in any situation. They're somewhat unpredictable. I don't think there's any question of that. You don't have the evidence that they will do the mission that they should.

(Company commander whose troops had relieved an all-Negro unit): This last deal we had with the __th—we relieved them on the hill and they had equipment strewed all over the place. It must cost the government twice as much to keep that outfit equipped as it does any other outfit. One company left two BARs, 8 rifles, about 25-30 ponchos, 30 shelter halves. . . . We picked up 15 rifles that had been stripped down, and sent them to supply for salvage. When we relieved them they said they had to withdraw because of no ammo. They had never had a shot fired at them. We found enough ammo up there to supply our company for two days.

Reports of poor performance by Negro units are usually accompanied by citations of the individual faults: failure to maintain an alert watch, especially at night; the tendency to fall asleep when watchfulness is essential; seizure by panic under enemy onslaught; mutual lack of confidence; straggling; malingering:

(Regimental staff officer): Oh, lord. It was on the 18th, in the early evening, when K Company of the __th started coming down the road from their positions. All you could hear was "They're comin', boy, they're comin'." I went down finally and we started kicking them back into their positions. Then about midnight, back they come again. I went down and spoke to the company commander and called the BC, and he said, "Oh, no—not again!"

(Regimental executive officer): Of course we do have more trouble with them, coming around complaining their back aches or their feet are sore. Col ____ certainly knows how to handle them; they never come to see him with those complaints again, after he tells them, "I thought I told you not to come around any more."

(Divisional staff officer): I think when you group them they don't trust their own people in tight situations. I think as a group they have a habit: they scare one another. They generally sweat out a little more the position they're in.

The reports of white enlisted men in this regard parallel those of white officers:

(Three white enlisted men): They're no damn good. They're lousy. They run into the Chinks, they drop their packs and all their equipment. We relieved them on the hill the other day and they left three BARs and a lot of equipment.

(2): One of their white officers told us that we would find a lot of equipment lying around; just to bury it so that the Chinks wouldn't get it. I believe that's what the Chinks are using against us, too: a lot of our own stuff. It makes us mad. We go into reserve every so often and because one outfit can't hold their own ground the rest of us have to put in overtime. We don't get enough rest that way.

(3): I found out about it when we first came here. You come on the line. They pull out, don't leave no contacts. First thing you know the Chinks are behind you.

(2): Lot of times one of our companies takes a hill where it takes a battalion of them to take it.

(1): We turn a hill over to them and they lose it.

(2): I've been told by the older men that they lost a hill 11 times. Every time they lost it somebody else would have to go over and take it.

Criticism of the combat action of Negro units is sometimes accompanied by qualifications which attribute poor performance in part to the lower average educational attainment of Negroes, or to possible deficiencies of leadership. Occasionally, the view is expressed that there are good soldiers in the Negro units, but that the behavior of the unit as a whole is determined by the poor performance of the majority. In general, the first of these qualifications is more characteristic of officer comments, while the last two are heard more often from enlisted men.

(Divisional CofS): Believe you me, there's a difficult, difficult task. There are several reasons, the greatest being that the individual himself in that unit—some 70 percent with an AGCT less than

70, class IV — they just didn't have the capacity to understand. We had no one to teach it but the officers. I had them for nine months. I found out that where you have a group with that profile you are of necessity going to have a lot of undesirables who, to a really large extent, affect others.

(CO of a Negro unit): The main thing that's wrong with colored troops is the lack of education. They have a lower AGCT score. Something has to be done to raise their AGCT average.

(White enlisted man): They haven't gotten the right NCOs. They bug out, too. It's all disorganized. The officers, too. They bug out. We haven't heard too much about it lately, but when we first got over, every day you heard something. Maybe they've got better officers now.

White enlisted men occasionally express the belief that the __th Regt, one of the main targets of criticism, was more often than most units the object of enemy assault.

(Group of white enlisted men): (1): Whenever they hit our division, they usually hit the __th, so they catch most of the hell.

(2): But the Commies play on that. It's been known that they hit them harder than any of the other regiments.

Negro Defense of Combat Performance

Whatever the objective validity of the considerable volume of criticism of Negro combat units, it is not, naturally, reflected in the self-appraisals of Negroes in these units.

When asked to "rate U.S. colored soldiers as fighters, compared with white U.S soldiers," almost no Negroes say "colored soldiers are not as good." Forty-two percent of the Negroes in all-Negro infantry units actually say they are better fighters, while 53 percent say they are "just as good." By contrast, Negroes in mixed infantry units are far less apt to claim that they are better soldiers than whites. Only 23 percent say this, while 69 percent say the two groups are the same. However, Negroes in the Quartermaster Corps, who have had no contact with combat situations, express similar opinions in both integrated and all-Negro units. About one in four says "colored soldiers are better fighters" while the remaining three say they are "just about as good" (Tables A91 and A92 in the section headed "Questionnaire and Further Tabulation of Responses"). Negro comments on the combat performance of all-Negro units show an awareness of the criticism to which they are subjected and are often sharply defensive in tone. They are almost uniformly disparaging in the references to their leadership. It is charged that unfavorable evaluations are inspired by racial prejudice.

(Group of Negro enlisted men in all-Negro unit): (1): I don't think they actually get the credit for what they do — they don't get write-ups in the States. I know boys here who made history and nothing ever came of it . . . and another thing, I don't think they should all the time be telling us it's up to us as Negroes, we should stand up and fight — we're soldiers, we're supposed to fight; that's why we're in the Army; don't always come telling us, as Negroes, we got to do this and that.

If we get surrounded and have to pull out and lose a lot of things, we get a bad name. I remember the __RCT — they lost a whole battery and ten tanks and a hell of a lot of stuff; never heard anything about it. Happen to us, it's all over Korea that we bugged out.

(2): I'll tell you all this here about the Negro soldier will bug out is just baloney. They'll all get their hats when that stuff gets hot. I've even seen them tanks turn around and get out when that got too much. The colored soldier won't bug out like the white soldier.

Shucks, I never saw the Chinks break through the __th regiment since I've been here. Sometimes the other groups is gone and we still be there. We don't even know that they is gone. We got trapped like that once and Capt ____ led us out of the trap.

(3): We take a hill and then they put the __th and __th on it and move us on to take another hill. That kind of thing ain't right. Let us stay on our hill and send them white bastards to take their own hill. We do the dirty work and the __th, __th and __Cav get credit for what we do.

The colored soldiers don't do much of this bugging out. We leave only when ordered. The __th is the bugging out outfit. The __Cav bugged out so fast in North Korea that they left all their equipment. I don't blame the boys who bug when the leader leaves the men. They don't know what to do.

Sure, I'm in the __th and I'm proud of it—but I say break it up. We've had no leadership. Leader gets out there, we following him, he gets out a map, says, "let's go this way,"—can't make up his mind, the men know he don't know what he's doing, how the hell can they have any confidence in him. I'll tell you, the leadership stinks.

Criticism on Non-Infantry Negro Units

The burden of criticism of all-Negro units in combat is borne by Negro infantry units. Individual artillery and tank units with all-Negro personnel receive similar unfavorable notice, but a large proportion of comment by white officers and men is distinctly favorable. On occasion, however, the same unit is referred to by different observers in exactly opposite terms.

(Divisional artillery staff officer): At Kuna-ri, the ___ (all-Negro artillery battalion) fought like tigers. I wasn't with Divarty then, I was in ___ Corps, but I watched the scrap from a Cub. They grabbed all the small arms available, mounted machine guns on trucks, and did a great job. They lost most of the Battalion—90 EM came out of it—but they were magnificent.

(Artillery staff officer): Now the ___ is supposed to be pretty good, but from what I've seen they're careless and you just can't be careless in the artillery. I know for a fact that they have shot their own FO on one occasion.

(White artilleryman): That's right. By themselves, they're not worth a damn. The ___ left everything they had at Hongchong.

Those who compare Negro infantry units unfavorably with other types of Negro ground combat units often point out that the infantryman is more exposed to enemy fire and hence requires more courage and ability; they also suggest that Negroes are more mechanically inclined, that guns and tanks, for instance, have a strong appeal for them.

(CO, integrated engineer company): They surprise me the way they can handle equipment. They've got mechanics who are better than white mechanics. If they're mechanically inclined, they're brilliant.

However, there is a dissenting viewpoint on this, too:

(Divisional CofS): The tank battalion is good operationally but not technically. They can operate their vehicles, but they don't know how to maintain them. They just don't have the technical skills. You don't find a Negro mechanic. But they've been doing all right until they ran into anti-tank fire the other day and lost three of their tanks. I don't know how they're going to be from this point on.

Criticism of Negroes in Integrated Units

With the exceptions noted previously, the overwhelming consensus among the white personnel is critical of the combat performance of all-Negro units. In the case of Negro soldiers in integrated units, the general impression is different. Criticism is found in these cases, too, but it is by no means the unanimous response. There are frequent references to outstanding performances by Negro soldiers, as well as to their failures.

(White EM): I have three in my squad. One is yellow and is always the first man to lose contact. But the other two are damn fine men and they're as good as any other man in my squad. This yellow one, we're trying to get rid of him, but maybe the Chinks'll do it first if they can ever get close enough to him. He just doesn't have any responsibility. In our squad perimeter of nine men, every man's important, but he don't understand that. He'd as soon bug out, and that means every other man is in danger.

(White EM): If you treat them as if they're just as good as us, they'll live up to it. I know. We have four in this platoon and every one of them has been right up to pitch because the men here have treated them just as they treat anyone else. I bet these same boys, if they were in the __th, would bug out just like their friends do.

(Regimental CO): We have very few, thank God. And you can have the ones we have. Those niggers are no damn good. They can't perform as fighters.

A favorable evaluation of the performance of Negroes observed in integrated units does not necessarily affect the prevailing unfavorable view of Negro units.

OPINIONS ON ASSIGNMENT OF NEGROES TO SERVICE BRANCHES AND JOBS

There is almost complete agreement among both whites and Negroes that all branches of service and all types of jobs should be open to Negroes. Opinions of whites on the job assignment of Negroes are not greatly affected by their appraisal of Negroes as fighters. The questionnaire findings show that a sizable proportion of white soldiers feel that Negroes are not as good fighters as whites; very few of these, however, are in favor of excluding Negroes from combat assignments.

This can be seen from the responses to the question on the kinds of jobs Negro soldiers should be given. The respondents are 1084 white infantrymen.

Question: "What kinds of jobs should colored soldiers be given in the Army?"

Opinions	*Total responses, %*
They should be given mostly service jobs.	6
They should be given mostly combat jobs.	7
They should be given combat and service jobs the same as whites.	85
No answer	2

A very high proportion of the white soldiers (85 percent) and practically all of the Negro soldiers (93 percent) were in favor of similar assignments for Negroes and whites, and only 6 percent of the white soldiers would restrict Negroes to service positions.

The responses obtained in the personal interviews cast some light on this apparent paradox, in which some of the same individuals believe both that Negroes are poor fighters and that they should be assigned to combat jobs.

It may be that different individuals may have different things in mind, in answering this question. In some cases, the distinction is seen as one between combat infantry assignments and all others; in other cases, the harder, more dangerous jobs are distinguished from the relatively easier, less dangerous jobs within the infantry unit itself. There is no indication that any white soldiers believe Negroes should not be in combat jobs. Opinion differs on the question of how Negroes should be distributed between front-line and rear-echelon assignments.

(White EM): The only thing I don't like about it is you see all those GIs getting killed on the line and you look back and see all the rear echelon jobs are held down by niggers.

(White EM): That's one of the bitches. The niggers do get the ratings and the easiest jobs. Everyone's so damned pussyfooting about them.

(CO, engineer battalion): In the last war and as a matter of fact up to the time I got these birds, I think it made more sense to make separate units of them. But now I have made a 180 degree turn. I think it's the best way to use them myself. I think they get an infernally large percentage of them in the Engineers. I think it would be much better if they were evenly distributed in all branches and if then they were distributed on the basis we get them — 15 percent as a normal replacement. I remember when the policy first came out — Department policy to integrate colored people as individuals rather than as units, I remember I was violently against that, but I have changed my mind. I think it's a good way to use them.

There are expressions of the opinion that it would be preferable to keep Negroes out of front-line combat jobs, given their alleged lack of fighting capacity. In the main, these

views come from white combat soldiers; they were almost completely lacking in the responses of white soldiers in other branches of service.

(Two white EM): (1): I think they all ought to be in Truck Companies. They're good at that. They can really drive. They're no good in combat. We had to retreat through their positions many a time because they bugged out.

(2): Hell, no, they're good fighters.

(Divisional deputy commander): In my opinion they serve better, they perform better, in service type units where they're not in physical contact with the enemy . . . They've been very successful as artillerymen, and I believe in antiaircraft. If I were just looking for efficiency, I would just put them in those types of units.

The belief that Negroes should be mostly in noncombat jobs often seems to be expressed with an ideal situation in mind. Under present circumstances, the qualification usually goes, such a use of Negro manpower is inadvisable. A major theme here is "equality of sacrifice." Expressions range from those which anticipate that failure to use Negroes in the line might provide propaganda material to the enemy to those which fear decimation of the country's white population through combat casualties and consequent domination by the Negroes.

(Divisional staff officer): I think the thing to do is just what we are doing. We have certain units designated by the Department of the Army as all-colored units, and if we have any manpower available we use them elsewhere.

(Regimental executive officer): There's no reason why the white boys should be fighting and the others not doing their share. I believe in an all-out fight on world communism, and every man, woman and child should do his part.

(Battalion CO): I think they should take more of them in there and let more of them get killed. They ought to put the niggers where they can fight. I don't know what the Army policy is. The white man can be taught to drive a truck as well as a colored man. I don't think they're worth a damn but I can get along with them. Otherwise they'll be back driving trucks. They'll have all the white boys killed and you'll have more colored left than white. In the town I come from we've got 50-50 niggers and whites. My idea is to have 25-75.

Often the question of the best way to make assignments of Negro soldiers met the observation that they, like anyone else, should be placed where they are "best qualified." This phrase, however, on exploration turned out to be an anomalous one, since of itself it gives no indication of the variation in opinion as to what Negroes are "best qualified" for. Not infrequently it turned out that the speaker shared the same reservations expressed by others. (Divisional staff officer): "I believe they should be used where they're best qualified. If I had an Indian in my squad I would use him as a scout."

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION

Both official reports and "grass-roots" military opinion concur in the observation that the quality of performance shown by Negro troops is intimately related to the nature of their employment in all-Negro or integrated units. It is important, therefore, to examine the reasoning of those who favor and oppose the practice of integration, and to see how opinion divides on this issue.

GENERAL ATTITUDES REVEALED BY WRITTEN QUESTIONNAIRE

In the questionnaire completed by the subjects, several aspects of soldiers' attitudes toward integration were examined. The questions covered a broad range, from general opinions on what the policy should be in assigning Negroes, to the feelings of men in specific situations of integration.

Job and Unit Assignments for Negro Soldiers

When asked what kinds of jobs both races should have in what sorts of units (integrated or segregated), a majority of the 1084 white infantrymen say that Negroes should have the same jobs as whites in the same units.

Question: "Should white and colored soldiers do the same kinds of Army jobs, or not?"

Opinions	*Total responses, %*
They should do the same kinds of jobs together in the same outfits.	51
They should do the same kinds of jobs, but in separate outfits.	40
They should not do the same kinds of jobs, but they should be together in the same outfits.	3
They should not do the same kinds of jobs, and they should be in separate outfits.	4
No answer	2

Practically all the Negroes (92 percent) think white and colored troops should be together in the same outfits, in answer to the same question.

A similar split in opinions of these same respondents is found again in another question on the assignment of Negro troops.

Question: "Which of the following comes closest to your idea of how colored troops should be assigned to outfits?"

Opinions	*Total responses, %*
In all-Negro battalions or regiments	43
As colored companies in white battalions	6
As colored platoons in white companies	1
As colored squads in white platoons	2
They should be assigned as individuals without regard to color	46
No answer	2

This difference of opinion is in line with, and perhaps related to, the split found when troops are asked what the policy actually *is* on the assignment of Negroes. On the latter question the white infantrymen disagree as to whether Army policy is to assign Negroes to all-Negro units or to assign them without regard to color. It appears that the answers to the previous question are partly biased in favor of what the policy is thought to be.

This may be inferred from the fact that, of those who think the Army policy is to assign Negroes to all-Negro battalions or regiments, 70 percent think they should be so assigned; of those who believe that the policy is to assign them without regard to color, 57 percent think this *should* be the method.

White Infantry Attitudes on Service in Integrated Units or with Negro Leadership

Question: "How would you feel about serving in a platoon containing both white and colored soldiers, all working and training together, sleeping in the same barracks, and eating in the same mess hall?"

Opinions	*Total responses, %*
I would object to it strongly.	24
I would rather not, but it would not matter too much.	32
It would make no difference to me.	34
I would like it.	7
No answer	3

While about one-fourth of the 1084 white soldiers express strong objections the remainder seem rather indifferent to the matter even though some of them would rather not be in such a unit. Practically none of the Negro soldiers expressed any objection to serving in an integrated unit.

This question, it will be noted, is much more specifically related to the individual's reactions in a real-life situation than is the previous one. He is asked here to report on his own feeling under circumstances of integration. However, the responses should not be taken as predictors of behavior. It would not be safe to assume, for instance, that those who objected strongly would be apt to take any hostile or aggressive action within the unit

against its Negro members. This point may be illustrated by reference to the following table, which shows the responses of 1084 white soldiers to a concrete example of integration.

Question: "Pfc Joe Doakes has always been in outfits which have only white soldiers in them. At a replacement center he is sent to an outfit in which there are colored as well as white soldiers. He is assigned to a squad which happens to have both a colored squad leader and a colored platoon sergeant. What *should* Joe do?"

Opinions	*Total responses, %*
He should act just as he would in any other outfit.	61
He should try to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him.	2
He should try to make things tough for the colored noncoms in any way he can.	1
He should speak to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit.	22
He should try in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit.	9
No answer	5

Here we find that only a handful of the soldiers think that any strong action within the company is the proper course. The objectors to integration in this case generally indicate that they would do no more than attempt a transfer and most of those would not go farther than to talk to the CO. (As indicated in the interview materials discussed later, very little friction is actually reported where integration has taken place, and there are no reports of requests for transfers.)

A similar pattern is found even for a situation where a white man is placed in a predominantly Negro unit; though in this case there is an even division as to whether a transfer is in order.

Question: "Now suppose Joe were assigned to a platoon in which not only the sergeant but most of the men were colored. What *should* Joe do then?"

Opinions	*Total responses, %*
He should act just as he would in any other outfit.	47
He should just try to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him.	2
He should try to make things tough for the colored noncoms in any way he can.	1
He should speak to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit.	30
He should try in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit.	16
No answer	4

Analysis of the arguments for and against integration of troops must deal separately with the attitudes of soldiers in different kinds of units. This is especially true of white soldiers: opinions in all-white units have a different basis, and hence a different character, from those advanced by white soldiers in mixed units. This is not to say that there is no overlapping of opinion; arguments pro and con appear in both instances.

Similarly, while Negroes in both segregated and mixed units preponderantly favor integration, those in mixed units have usually had a chance to experience both kinds of assignment and their opinions show some general differences. Negroes in all-Negro companies, particularly if they have never been in mixed organizations, refer primarily to the deficiencies of the segregated unit. Those in mixed organizations refer to the balance between expectation and reality in the mixed unit. The reactions of men in white units to the prospect of integration are of special interest because they exemplify the doubts and anxieties which the policy arouses before it is actually applied.

Opposition in All-White Units

The objections of white soldiers may be classified under three general headings. There are, first, the objections based on alleged traits of Negroes. These are sometimes supported with a reference to some previous experience, and sometimes with hearsay reports. The images encountered in civilian life are found here: Negroes are dirty, they have a characteristic smell, they are ignorant of elementary personal hygiene, they are loud and boisterous.

(White, Em, QM): Well, I don't like those jigs sleeping next to me They stink; they're messy and don't want to help clean. But I don't even think they can stand themselves, so putting them in their own outfit is not going to do much good. Get them out of the Army, or use them as scouts where they'll be alone. They stink and they're cowboys. All show and no go.

They use a particular variety of obscenity which, repeatedly, white soldiers report to be especially objectionable.

(White infantryman): One thing I have against them is their foul language. They wouldn't use it in a white outfit. I'd flatten one on his back if he came up to me and played that game they call "the dozens."

Fears are expressed regarding their lack of self-control, with apprehension expressed as to the likelihood of violence — the wielding of razors, knives, and so on.

(Infantryman in all-white unit): I was with them in basic training and we had some blacks who were plenty all right, but most of them just chased skirts and drank and talked all the time even when the rest of us wanted to sleep. A man was afraid to go to a bar alone, 'less he run into about 20 of them with their razors and long knives. They gang together over one white man, but not over two.

Objections take a military turn as well. Negroes are considered to be untrustworthy in combat, and, as such, a hazard to the survival of white soldiers.

(Infantryman in all-white unit): I would banzai any day with this company. I've done it twice in the last two weeks. We've got some good noncoms. We go right up firing. But I've seen the — Regt and I've seen the colored boys bug. We took their objective a couple of times when they wouldn't move. I'd banzai with these guys we've got now. I'd never do it if we had colored boys in the outfit. I wouldn't know what they'd do. I couldn't depend on them.

This unreliability, plus their alleged inability to learn quickly, are seen as detrimental to the over-all performance and reputation of a unit. If the unit is one which has a good performance record, this expression is likely to be even more intense.

(Officer in white regiment): At first, Col ____ was glad to get Negro replacements because they were bodies and could fill out the strength of his first two battalions as well as be replacements for the all-Negro third battalion. Then some of the units in the first two bats got up to 50 percent Negro. And as this percentage grew above 10 percent, each arithmetic addition effected a geometric decline in the efficiency of the unit. A half-and-half company would take a hill in the afternoon, stay up there during the night, and when dawn broke the CO would look around and find half his men still in position — the white half. The Negroes would all be back somewhere "getting ammo" or "looking for the company."

A second class of objections includes references to racial tension situations which are anticipated if Negroes are brought into an all-white unit. In many cases, these are no more specific than expressions of anxiety about the likelihood of "trouble." (EM in white regiment, Japan): "It would cause a riot. We've got a lot of fellows from the South in our outfit, and they aren't too crazy about them. There'd be trouble; there could be."

Specific references are made to the possibility that Negroes may come to outnumber the whites and thus to dominate them.

(White EM, rear echelon unit): As long as they put just a few in an outfit it's OK. But I'm definitely against any area having more colored than white because in Yokohama, there was more colored than white. A couple of white men would walk down the street sometimes, and then for no reason at all they'd be attacked and the one guy would have to drag the other back all beaten and battered up.

Social problems are envisioned, particularly those revolving around sex competition. While these are for the most part seen as garrison problems, they color the view of the immediate situation.

(White infantryman): I don't like it when they start fooling around with the same girls. I had a colored fellow tell me once that the white and colored races would unite and make a powerful new race. They're all right as long as they stay in their place. I think there should be a law that they shouldn't marry white women.

(White EM, rear echelon unit): You'd have trouble at social affairs. If a colored guy danced with a white girl you'd be insulted and you'd lower him one. In Australia the Negroes all kept saying they were either American Indians or night fighters, who took pills so they could fight at night. The women believe 'em, too. I haven't seen a Negro yet that wouldn't try to go out with a white woman.

There are forecasts of difficulty in the event Negroes should become noncommissioned officers or officers; it is interesting to note that these fears seem strongest among white officers.

(Adjutant, infantry company): My own view is that I hope it works out but I doubt it very much. And I know it would just be impossible for a company to be run by colored officers. It shouldn't be that way. We should be able to judge a man by his capabilities. In the Air Force they don't have to have that ironclad discipline that you need in the infantry. But we white people are not ready to look up to a colored officer. Among the senior noncoms and officers you don't have your choice with whom to associate.

Finally, there are the objections which may be classed as "projective" in character. These are generally either expressions of concern for the Negroes, who will not feel at home among white soldiers, or references to the prejudices of some white soldiers, who will go out of their way to make things difficult for the newcomers. The relatively poor educational background of the Negro soldiers appears here, also, with strong stress placed on their competitive disadvantage and the obstacles they will face on promotions and job assignments.

(Staff officer, all-white regiment): From time to time Negroes have come in with the other replacements we have had. There have only been a few of them and they have been sent back. I

talked with all of them personally before I sent them back and they were all eager to be returned. They said they would not feel at home in this division and preferred being with their own kind. This was how the division felt about it, too.

(Artilleryman in white unit): I don't think it's as good as when they're by themselves. Some people don't like to sleep or eat around the colored. 'Course it doesn't make me any difference.

(White infantryman): Well, we've got some in the motor pool. Seems to me like they're not used to being around white boys. I think they'd rather be by themselves. The white boys feel the same way. It would be a big issue on bivouac. Some guy would be assigned to a pup tent with a colored boy and he wouldn't want that and would pitch his tent somewhere else. The colored boys like to congregate together. They're no trouble at all. They're good workers. They're slow, but they do the job. I think they'd rather sleep together than with the white boys.

Integration Support in White Units

White soldiers in all-white units who favor or are indifferent to integration raise far fewer specific points than the critics in support of their stand. Some of their arguments specifically contradict many of the objections detailed previously, but for the most part these are discounted by implication and inference. The opinion most often voiced is that more manpower is needed in the front lines and that any additional soldiers are welcome. "We need bodies" is the essence of this point of view. (White noncom, infantry): "If you've got any green ones back there, send them over. We need bodies."

The inadequacies of Negroes as fighting men are either matched with examples of good performance by Negroes or are attributed to segregation. It is predicted that they will do well in combat, given the company of white soldiers.

(CO, Negro artillery battalion): I think they should be mixed. They have pride in their unit if they're not mixed, but they have a lot more individual pride if they're mixed.

(Artilleryman, white battery): I think they'd be better fighters if they were mixed in because when they're all together all they think about is horseplay. The white guys don't stand for that too much. They got a job to do and they want to get it done.

(Infantryman): They're scared of guns, but when they're mixed they don't show it, because they're more scared of what the white guys will think.

(Infantryman): I saw one colored boy in the line and the way they treated him. It's the only case I know of where the guy passed out before combat. [How come?] He was carrying a 57 recoilless rifle up a hill and instead of having an ammo bearer, he carried his own ammo because his sergeant figured out he was only a "nigger." Halfway up the hill he just gave out under the weight. Some of the whites thought he was faking. But I saw what he was carrying.

It is held that the racial prejudices of whites, as well as those held by the Negroes themselves, will be modified in the course of daily contact and increasing familiarity.

(Infantryman): If men would get used to each other as we do here, there'd be no trouble anywhere about race. It just makes familiarity. There's no doubt there's lots of uncomfortable differences, like the language they use, like the way they think about women, like their education and bringing-up. But it all goes away when all you're worried about is friends and your skin.

(Infantrymen): (1): The only way to do it is try it.
(2): Up here, you have to share and share alike, whether you like it or not.
(1): I think it would work in this outfit, too.
(2): It's like we said before. It's just getting used to them.

References are made to Negro soldiers as morale builders; they are said to possess a fund of jokes, antics, and so forth which will keep the unit amused.

(Infantryman): They're always good for laughs. They help a lot. Yeah, they keep the morale igh all right. I'll be down in the dumps, driving along, and I'll see those guys and they'll have been through the same thing I have and they'll be laughing and shooting the bull and I'll say, "What the hell am I down for?"

Finally there are expressions which are ideological in character, citing democratic principles and the common fight against a common enemy.

(Infantryman): The way we always put it when we're arguing is, "Who are we fighting, the Chinks or ourselves?"

(Infantryman): I think if you give a man a chance — whether he's a Polack or Jew or Catholic or what he is — they're all fighting for the same thing, and that's freedom — freedom of speech, freedom of press. I figure that's something everybody's entitled to.

If you boil the whole thing down, you'll find that when they're all together, there's not a man in the company that wouldn't give a colored man the same chance as anyone else.

I don't know anything about that. But from what I heard I think they should be with the whites. We belong to the same country, don't we? And we should have an equal chance to fight for it.

Objections by Whites in Integrated Units

The objections to integration made by white soldiers in mixed units follow very much the same pattern as those already described. All of the specific points are repeated: (Infantryman): "I didn't want to sleep with them. They can wash all day and they'll still smell."

There is somewhat more of the kind of expression referred to as "projective." And there is an additional element which is not introduced by whites who have not experienced integration. White soldiers in mixed units sometimes speak of a feeling of tension arising from the restraint they feel they must use with respect to racial epithets and jokes.

(Infantryman): During the conversation we have to watch "black boy," "nigger" and it keeps the boys pretty tense. Some of the best jokes you know are about colored people and while you're telling them one of these guys slip up.

(Staff officer, engineering group): One thing. The white man's under too much tension. He has to watch what he's saying. As soon as you say one thing the first thing that comes up is discrimination. I've seen it happen. I was a sergeant major over in a battalion with two companies of colored men. The white man likes to express himself.

My opinion is they should be separate. There's too much room for dissension. Because I have served with half white, half colored. It might go along good for a year, but there's going to be trouble.

"Integration works here, but . . ." typifies many of these responses; those who make reservations usually insist on maintaining a substantial white majority, or on carefully selecting the Negro soldiers to be integrated.

(Divisional provost marshal): At Fort Dix we had some outfits with about 40 percent integration. That didn't work so good — we ran into trouble in the service clubs and the theaters. Noisy, and things like that. I think if you have only 10 or 20 percent in an outfit it works all right, but when you get up around 40 or 50 percent there's trouble. A small minority is OK.

(Regimental CO): Negroes would be acceptable in this company only on the basis of "merit." They have to be the cream, better than the white men, to get along with the rest of the men. There has been trouble with the Mexicans because they form cliques and this would be disastrous with Negroes. But a few good men would be quite all right. Just give us the literate ones.

Support by Whites in Integrated Units

Favorable reactions to integration occur with considerably greater frequency than unfavorable ones among white soldiers in mixed units. They also covered a wider range of opinion than is the case among soldiers in all-white units who were in favor of integration. In general, the expressions are of three types — military arguments, political, and social.

The Military Argument. This holds that, given the poor performance record of all-Negro units, their existence is detrimental to the war effort, since it imposes administrative burdens and complicates the handling of otherwise comparable units in tactical situations. Along with this goes the argument that the performance of the individual Negro soldier is improved when he is in a unit together with whites.

(Divisional CofS): That's what makes it so much easier over here. You have two colored engineering battalions attached to Corps and I'll bet you don't get near enough as much work out of them as we get out of our Negro men who are integrated in division engineering companies. Numbers are all important and you've got to use minority groups, and with the bugs of Communism, we've got to get to them before somebody else does.

(CO, engineering battalion): That's another thing in favor of mixing them. You ought to have all your battalions at primarily the same performance level that you needn't take into account that one is white and one is colored. You never know when you have to use them.

(White infantrymen): (1): Put 'em where they're needed. That's the only efficient way.

(2): They should all work as a team.

(3): That's right, if you keep them separate, there's just twice as much paper work in the replacement depots and all.

(Adjutant, engineering battalion): In an outfit like this they perform better. In my opinion it originated a long time ago. I think it gives them an incentive that they can try and prove that they can do just as good a job as an average white man alongside them. They have the white people working right alongside them and I think they have pride enough to want to do just as good a job as the next man.

(Noncom, divisional HQ): My own personal viewpoint is that where they're integrated as a unit—where you have had a colored battalion and two white battalions the niggers tend to hold up a good deal better than they tend to do when they're all together in one regiment. They try to outdo the white soldiers. I think they make much better soldiers where they're put in at the man level in a squad than when they're all together.

This kind of sentiment is often accompanied by interpretations which show insight into the psychology of the segregated Negro soldier. It is suggested, for example, that the Negro in an all-Negro outfit is likely to feel mistreated because he is kept apart from other soldiers; that he is likely to suspect that there is favoritism in unit assignments and privileges; that he will have less moral commitment to the war effort because his situation does not accord with his concept of democracy.

(Divisional CofS): They have come in here and they have gotten the same processing, the same handling, no discrimination, down to the squad level. It's the very basis of what they desire and since they desire it they respond. You know there has been quite a bit of agitation among the colored people as to what are we fighting for—are we fighting for Jim Crow laws,—and I think to my humble opinion, that putting them down in the companies and battalions and in the squads, letting them eat the same chow and sleep together is their idea of what democracy is. And they function better.

(White infantryman): When Negroes get together, it's different. They somehow get a feeling of desperation because of their previous experiences. Here they have a chance to assimilate in a manner which could never have been provided at home. They forget their color, and the whites forget there's a difference in pigmentation. Common interests and physical abilities are the only bonds and barriers.

(White infantryman): I think they're better off with us instead of off by themselves. Maybe they'll fight and maybe not. Heard one say that he didn't have no country to fight for when he was in his Negro outfit. He didn't owe the US anything so why should he stick his neck out. But in this outfit the guys treat him like he feels and that's the first time the US meant anything to him. It's all personal.

(White infantryman): I don't think so. If a man is put off to himself that way, he feels he's not wanted and then he gets to feeling maybe he shouldn't be doing anything. What's the use. He's just second rate no matter what he does. And probably the officers are second rate too if they're white, because they're probably sore as hell at being assigned there.

(White infantry officer): I just said we were going to have some colored troops and that was all. They came up after chow one night. Not too much reaction either way. Just another replacement coming in. In my platoon they have worked out good. One fellow got hit in the hand. He changed BARs three times before he got ready to move out. From what I can observe they're always in a group with the rest of the men, standing around laughing and joking. I think it's better to mix them in. I don't know how to put my finger on it. I think if you put them all together they think people look down on them where if you mix them in they get the feeling that they're wanted, they're just the same as anyone else.

The factor of competition is also cited in the course of these opinions as being effective in raising the level of Negro performances in the mixed unit; it is believed that Negroes will feel themselves under the necessity of demonstrating that they can measure up to majority standards.

(Divisional staff officer): They lived with this group of the same stature and there was nothing for them to strive against, I formed this impression. There was a lack of noncoms and ability to observe and interpret. This old adage that a good leader can lead anybody is not true when it comes to Negroes. Take Negroes when they're assimilated and broken down among units and you have a lot better functioning. They profit by environment. They see an entirely different stratum. They see an entirely different level and they aspire to reach that level. And they function a hell of a lot better. Perhaps they feel that being utilized in that way they're being given an opportunity to clearly prove the worth of the race and they rise to prove that they are the equal of the white soldier. We in the division have had an outstanding number of Negro soldiers. One is a platoon sergeant, Sergeant ____, who won the DSC. I think the association with a better type of man has inspired him to do what he did whereas if he stayed with an all-Negro unit the challenge would not have been there. He's admired by one and all and the white soldiers follow him. We have found out that it works out very well. I highly recommend that we take this and assimilate them right down to squad level.

(Infantryman): They don't want to show you that they're scared, and vice versa. A lot of guys don't respect them. They know it. The only way to beat it is to do a good job.

(Infantryman): They're better as soldiers when they're mixed. They seem to want to show us they can do it.

(Infantryman): I think it's a better idea to mix them up like this. It seems like it works out all right. I believe that if they mix them with us they get along better. If they get along with us it keeps them on the move and they sort of learn our habits. In the other wars they talked about white guys being better fighters. I don't know now.

A few extend the benefit of interracial competition to the performance of white soldiers, as well.

(EM, engineers): They're a lot braver if you mix them up. If you put them in separate outfits it's not going to work. If you mix them up, if a colored guy's with a white guy and he sees the white guy stays there, he'll stay there, too. If there are two colored guys and one bugs out, then they both bug out.

(EM, infantry): I think they're better mixed than alone. The colored and white together make a better team.

It will be seen below that these expressions are amazingly parallel to the sentiments of Negro soldiers themselves.

The Political Argument. This includes simple references to aspects of the democratic American creed. It refers to the doctrine of equality, etc., and argues that the segregation of Negro soldiers handicaps the efforts of the US to assume real leadership on the world scene.

(Regimental CO): This war has had us working and fighting along with Dutchmen, Turks, Frenchmen, and all the others. We've been doing a good job of getting along with them, and they're not even Americans; why should we have any trouble mixing with colored soldiers?

(White M/Sgt, engineers): It takes in a great deal of territory. Our government is always preaching peace, and I don't see how we can learn to have peace work if we can't learn to live together in our own Army.

(White EM, engineers): The Negro troops have always been considered low, held down in our country and if the enemy knows they're fighting, they know that everybody in our country is fighting. I know that's a lot of baloney and patriotism but I think that that's a good thing against our enemies.

Social Arguments. These are observations on the part which integration can play in bringing about mutual respect and understanding between the races.

(White Sgt, infantry): I think it's a good idea in a way. It teaches people, other men like me, to get along with people of different races. Otherwise if you didn't have that there would be a war

between the racial peoples. Just like the communists and us are fighting there would be a war between the Negroes and the Whites.

(White EM): (1): There'd be less trouble if they were mixed.

(2): You put 'em together and they'd have trouble at first, but when they got to know each other, there'd be less trouble.

(3): They had a colored guy at an Air Force base and at first nobody would take any interest in him. Then some guys started talking to him and he was one of the gang inside of two weeks. I've seen the Air Force fly together, the Navy sail together — why the Army can't fight together is beyond me.

(Two white infantrymen): (1): When these troops are mixed in it's good for the men. It stops a little prejudice, too.

(2): When I came in the Army I was surprised there wasn't much more friction.

(1): They work better around us — with the white boys.

(2): You get 'em all together and they're bucking you all the time.

(White infantryman): I think they're trying to mix them, myself. I think it's the best idea anyway. It's not that I have any love for them. I'd rather not see them personally, but we've got to live together, I guess.

There are also expressions opposing the arguments which are directed against integration. These consist of: (a) denials that the difficulties are insurmountable; (b) predictions that prejudiced whites and Negroes will not be a serious problem, since they will keep to themselves; and (c) statements that through association with whites, Negro soldiers will come to modify objectionable behavior.

(Three white signalmen): (1): There are a few prejudiced guys in the company. They wouldn't say or do anything. They'd just keep out of their way, more or less.

(2): There wouldn't be any trouble with me. I'm more or less an individualist, I pick my own friends. I don't let anybody force themselves upon me.

(3): From what I've seen about it, I believe it would work out pretty good.

(White infantryman): Something I noticed, when you have some colored guys with the GIs. One is always a leader and he keeps the other guys in line, even if they do want to snarl things up a little. Two of the new men were plenty frisky at first and some of the guys started getting sore. But an old-hand Negro just took them aside for a little talk and they've been fine ever since. Now they're used to us and we're used to them.

(Commanding officer, infantry CO): If the 24th were broken up, I wouldn't mind taking some of the men into my company. I've handled them before. So long as they were split. I was CO of a disciplinary company in the States — 25 percent colored — they were interspersed with the others. We never had any trouble with the colored as far as this stuff goes of racial segregation. They didn't want segregation, nor did the whites mind it that way. You've got to keep the ratio 1:3 or 1:4. I think the ratio could be a hell of a lot less than 1:4 and it would work out fine and still get a hell of a lot out of them as citizens.

Opposition in All-Negro Units

Anti-integration sentiment among Negro soldiers, whether in separate or in mixed units, is infrequent. When it occurs, it is sometimes based on the feeling that the speaker will feel more comfortable in his own racial group. In some cases, there is a feeling that white people cannot be trusted, and that they will mistreat a minority group member. A few feel that to accept integration means an admission of the inadequacy of all-Negro outfits, and that this reflects upon their capacities.

(Negro EM): I would rather be in a colored unit for the simple reason that I don't like them (white people). I would rather be with colored people all of the time. You can't always trust a white man. I am from Arkansas and it's just part of my training.

(Two Negro EM): (1): I think I'd get along better with my own color; I'd feel happier, I think.

(2): When there's only a few in a mixed outfit, I don't think you'd have much social life — off to yourself and nobody to go around with.

(Negro EM, ordnance): Since I have never been in a unit with colored and white, I don't really know which kind that I prefer. I guess it would be all right though. But I am just used to being with colored people more than with white people. Of course I think that an all-colored unit can be just as good as any other kind if you can get the men to pull together. We get a lot of work done in this company because we have a bunch of good boys.

(Negro infantryman): If you keep the colored folks by theyself they will fight better. In the mixed outfits you might git some white boy calling you names like nigger and that burns me up. I'll git a son o'bitch like that on the line and shoot him.

Support in All-Negro Units

In contrast, the expressions favorable to integration are both varied and intense. They cover the views already encountered among some white soldiers and recounted previously — mixing of white and Negro soldiers serves basic democratic interests and strengthens the international position of the US.

(Negro EM, ordnance): I think that the mixed units are better than the all-colored ones. Units like ours made good propaganda for Seoul City Sue. She talked about all-colored units a lot. If we are really serious in our fight with the Communists, then we should stop giving them such good material for their propaganda.

(Negro EM, ordnance): The reason why I am for the mixing of white and colored troops is that in the all-Negro units there is the tendency for the colored soldiers to let down. In a mixed unit they would be more concerned and work hard and try to get ahead. The white soldiers would afford more competition for Negroes who are anxious to learn. This would increase their efficiency. They would have higher standards and stiffer competition.

It is said that military interests will be served by optimum use of skills and because both Negroes and whites will be reluctant to appear less capable than each other, the result will be better performance all around.

(Negro EM, ordnance): I am in favor of mixing the troops too. I know from experience that this is the more efficient. The Army loses by not using all skills. Take for example when we were in Japan there was a call for two skilled persons in the laundry. Two soldiers were sent up. They were a Negro Master Sgt and a Tech Sgt. Now they really need the skills these soldiers had but because they were colored they were sent back the next day. We are doing the same thing right here on this dump with the Koreans. You see all of these Koreans around here; we use them mainly for the moving of ammo. Some of them have skills which could be put to good use but because they are Koreans, the Army will not take advantage of their skills. By mixing units you can always be in a position to use all available skills. Take the example I just gave about Japan. They needed two skilled persons in this white outfit but had to be delayed or do without because they would not use the colored boys who had the skills. This is why I prefer the mixed to the all-colored units.

(Negro infantryman): I'll tell you one thing: the 27th and the 25th are getting Negro men in but we don't get any white soldiers in here . . . You get mixed you fight better. Negro and white in the same foxhole, both of 'em may be afraid, but they ain't going to show it to each other.

(Negro infantryman): I like the mixed units, too. In that kind of a outfit the colored boy will soldier better. Even in the mixed schools the Negro will do better. Now I went to an all-colored school for a while and then changed to a mixed school. I know that the work is different in the mixed schools. There you have got to do your work or they will flunk you without any regard to your color. You will feel embarrassed to flunk in the mixed school and you will work harder than in the all-colored school. Now it's the same way with the Army. You put Negro and white soldiers in the same units and the colored boy will try harder because he won't want to be embarrassed.

Some observations envision a modification of crudities of speech and behavior as a result of association with white soldiers.

(Negro EM): Maybe it would have a kind of effect on the way we do—I mean things like language. I ain't no angel myself, I got a pretty vulgar tongue; maybe if there was white boys around we wouldn't all the time be talking about—you know, M-F, and so on, and calling each other nigger around the place like we do. We wouldn't want them calling it to us, so maybe we wouldn't use it.

(Negro EM): If we had white soldiers in here, I think we'd get more helpfulness around. Like you take when those white drivers come in to unload and we shorthanded; you ask them to give you a hand, they most always get out and help. But the colored drivers will sit up on their rusties and let you work yourself to death and they won't do nothing at all. You ask them to give you a hand and they tell you, "Aw, man I got to get me some sleep." If they was some white soldiers here, they'd maybe be ashamed to do that and they'd help out once in a while.

It is believed that promotions will be based on merit alone, rather than on the personal favoritism of "buddies," which is reported in all-Negro units. A very large proportion of the comments speak of the value of integration in achieving better interracial understanding.

(Negro EM): If we had mixed outfits, it would help us to get to know each other better and we'd get along better.

(Negro EM): At ____, we had a run-in with the white soldiers. But this here mixing will work. It's better for the morale. By cooperation you gets to know and to find out one another. Some of the white soldiers we have met don't know the colored soldiers.

Charges of Discrimination in All-Negro Units

By all odds the largest and most explicitly directed body of sentiment derives from the conviction of most of the soldiers interviewed in all-Negro units that they do not receive treatment equal to that accorded men in white and mixed units. There seems to be almost no aspect of military life in which this belief does not find expression, no familiar GI gripe which is not given a racial twist. The all-Negro unit is alleged to receive discriminatory treatment in equipment, supplies, recreational opportunities, promotions, tough unit assignments, rest rotation, food, clothing, PX rations, medical care, leadership, and publicity. Calls by all-Negro units for airstrikes are ignored; they get more "short rounds" from our artillery; their wounded must be carried off hills by other men, since they are not given helicopter evacuations. They hear of movie stars performing for the troops, but they never come to the Negro outfits. It is either clearly stated or implied that these inequities would not exist in mixed units.

(Negro infantryman): We're up on the line for weeks . . . come back, you need a rest . . . come back in this outfit, you got to drill, stand inspection and all. Other outfits don't have to do that. They don't stay up in the line as long as we did.

(Negro infantryman): The only thing wrong with this regiment is that we stayed in the lines too long. This is the first rest that we have had in two months. They took us out for about one day which is no rest at all. No other unit in this whole war stayed on the line as long as we did, I'll bet. You take them boys in the __th and __th, they bring them back in reserve all the time. What I can't understand is that they can keep us there so long.

(Negro MP): In a mixed Army everybody gets an equal chance. Then you're on the same basis as the next guy. They won't have no up or down level. Now we know and you know that the Army is unbalanced. We do things and get the limit. They do things and it's overlooked. Right here in Yokohama when there is any doubt about the white boy's fault it will be dropped. In our case where they have some doubt, it will be pushed to the limit.

(Negro infantryman): There's plenty of heroes around this regiment, guys do things they ought to get a CMH for, but who the hell ever hears about it. We don't get awards like the others do.

(Negro infantryman): This unit ain't got the medals due it. Some of the boys have been put in for the DSC and we ain't heard nothing from them. We git damn tired of doing all of the dirty work and these white officers get all of the credit. Yesterday, they give out 42 awards and 12 went to the white guys and I know they ain't deserving. There is over 3000 colored in this regiment and about 100 white and they got many awards. They decorated that Colonel for bravery. All that bastard done was to come up on the hill after all the fight was over and leave some replacements. Then he hauled out of there. That ain't worth no award.

(Negro infantryman): And the guys hate to write home because they don't want to put in all this stuff about what's going on here with them. . . . I've seen guys write six pages about it—all the things we don't get and all, and then tear it up and throw it away. . . . They just wrote to get it out of their system.

(Negro infantryman): Another thing, most of our mens got kilt by their own planes and artillery. They order artillery on a hill and then send us up the hill before the artillery aid come. We take the hill and no sooner than we get on top and our own artillery open up and kill most of the boys. Then our own planes kill a lot of the boys. Even our Captain (white) was killed by a plane shooting up the hill after we had already took it. Now that's what you call poor leadership or a general snafu somewhere.

(Negro infantryman): And look how we had to beg for an airstrike. Other outfits need an airstrike, they get it anywhere they want it and when they want it.

(Negro infantry officer): A colored officer in this outfit can look forward to very little. I can name the Negro jobs in this regiment. A Negro can be the S–1 of a battalion; he may sometimes be the S–4, though that's a very rare thing. He can be like Lt ____ the HQ Commandant—he looks after the mess and so on—he's just a small-time hotel manager. But a Negro can't get the 2 or the 3 or the exec, or the battalion CO. Those are for white officers at all times. . . . There's too many southern white officers in top positions; sometimes it seems to me they make a point of sending southern white officers to this regiment.

(Negro infantryman): Another thing, in those white companies, when they get hit and the men get wounded, that's when you see all those helicopters taking them off. With us, some of the men die because they make us carry them down off the hill.

(Negro infantryman): What's wrong with this regiment is they snafu us at the aid stations. Even at the hospitals they send us back to the unit before you are in shape. We got boys with the unit right now who should be in the hospital or with some service outfit. I got wounded in the back and ain't completely got well but they sent me back too soon.

Several Negro soldiers make observations which indicate that, while these indictments might not be entirely justified, the Negro soldier has every reason to assume they are correct until he is shown differently. The point made by these men is that, as long as they are kept in their own units, they have no way of knowing whether white soldiers have similar complaints.

(Negro infantryman): I disagree with that. We talk all the time about discrimination. We shouldn't want to keep ourselves apart from the other groups. I find that when you get a bunch of Negroes together they will segregate themselves. When something happens, then they blame the white man as discrimination. We ought to have mixed units and that will cut out a lot of this.

(Negro infantryman): I think it would be a lot better mixed—the things we'd get that we don't get now. And then, we meet things we think are unjust; if we was mixed, we couldn't think they was imposing on us. . . . Hard spots come, we think we're getting the short end of the stick. If we was mixed we wouldn't have anything to say, because we'd all be together in it.

The circumstances of the interviewing provide at one point an excellent comparative situation illustrating the cogency of this argument. Within two or three days, Negro soldiers in a mixed unit and in an all-Negro unit of the same size and function were interviewed. Each group had just come down from the same period in the line—almost two months. The soldiers in both outfits complained bitterly about the experience, but the Negroes in the mixed unit spoke of it as an injustice to their *regiment*, while those in the all-Negro unit accused the high command of singling them out as *Negroes* for such an assignment.

Slight Anti-Integration Attitude by Negroes in Integrated Units

Among integrated Negroes, the extent of anti-integration sentiment is so slight that it cannot be said to have a pattern of any kind. In fact, with a few exceptions, the adverse comments on the integration experience coincide with opinions favoring it as a general policy. Even where difficult personal situations are reported, the observation is usually made that such episodes are expected. It is said that things will straighten out in time, and that those who come after the "pioneers" will find things much better.

(Negro infantryman): At least some of them who see a Negro soldier do well are gonna say at least they saw one Negro who was good. . . . I don't know if the good things they will see will make up for the bad things in their minds, but they help some, I guess.

(Negro infantryman): Now I think of it, I guess you wouldn't expect it to start off big; maybe it'll be better in three or four years. It'll probably be all right. I wouldn't doubt it. It takes time for anything.

The two most frequent references are to: (a) interpersonal tensions — the feeling that the Negro soldier's every move is under critical scrutiny and that he must be constantly on guard; and (b) uncertainty as to how long the favorable situation will last.

(Negro EM, infantryman): We're treated fairly nice, but the atmosphere, it's so strained. You feel like you're crimped or something. Sometimes I don't know just how to put it — it don't seem like you're talking to that man like two human beings should talk to each other; they're always watching you, it seems. . . . It's like you're on trial and you're listening to it go on.

(Negro infantryman): I think even if they put a larger number of Negroes in the outfit, the white men would still feel any mistake one of us makes, all of us are the same.

(Negro EM, infantryman): I reckon the reason these white boys is good now is because it is a Army regulation. Course some of them don't mind it. Others carry this on but they is a snake behind your back.

(Negro EM, engineers): But I can't say definitely that I would prefer the mixed unit because there are advantages of being in the all-colored companies. Now in the all-colored unit, the colored will not do anything to hurt you. But you can't always tell about these white people. I have found that the best way to get along with a white man is not to get too close to him. You know what I mean. If you don't let him get too close he will not kick you in the pants so quick. I have no objection of serving with *these* boys and have been getting along just fine.

(Negro EM): I think things are working out fine here — at least they are up to now. You know white people got active minds, they run one way now, next time they liable to be different.

The fear of language slips on the part of white soldiers is sometimes cited.

(Negro infantryman): Yesterday, I was running past a tent and one of the boys in it yelled out, "Run, nigger, run." I didn't say nothin' to him — I looked over it. That's the best way — look over it. . . . But I didn't like it.

(Two Negro infantrymen): (1): Some of the Southern boys, they liable to make a slip now and then. Then you feel like doing something to one of them.

(2): Sure do; when they do that, I just as soon shoot one of them as shoot a Chinaman. Mostly, though it's OK.

There are a certain number of individual complaints of continued discrimination in the mixed outfits in such matters as promotions and job assignments.

(Three Negro EM): (1): Seems to me the main thing is this: There's guys been over here a long time; they know what it's all about. Then a new man comes in and they might make him a squad leader. Well, he don't know what he's doing, and he's just as liable to put the squad in some spot where it's in danger. One new man, he's only been in the squad a couple of days and they make him assistant squad leader. I don't think that's right.

(2): I had a sergeant was from the north, he wanted me to be assistant squad leader in my squad; but the other sergeant was from Arkansas, and he said no. I don't think that should happen.

(3): It's the same thing all over — it's hard to make ratings here; new men come in and if they white they get ratings.

(Negro infantryman): I think I rather be in an all-colored outfit. I rather be with my own race. Well, see if you got a squad leader and he's white and you only got one or two Negroes in the squad, comes any hard detail or anything like that, they always try to put it on the colored guys, see. I think that's about true all over. They all right 'cept when it comes to details; that's over here, anyway.

(Negro EM): Another thing was that murder and rape case; you know about that one. One of the colored soldiers was put in a guardhouse . . . they said he raped and killed one of those Korean girls. Well, they won't put any but white soldiers on guard over him. I don't know why that's so, but it is. And all last winter, when nobody wanted guard duty out in the cold, seemed like they never put nothing but colored boys on guard duty. Made me real mad.

Finally, there are some nostalgic references to the freedom and ease of conversation experienced among other Negro soldiers.

(Negro infantryman): This is my first time serving in a mixed unit too. I ain't had no trouble. I like these white boys all right. But I just been used to my color. I like serving with the all-colored unit better. I feels more like home with colored folks. We talk alike. I can do conversation better with a group of colored boys. No, I can't think of any other reason.

(Negro infantryman): I guess it is OK with the colored group. I feels more like home with the colored. The colored can say words and I knows what he is saying. Now these white boys can say words and I don't know what he is saying. I just guess what he mean. That's why I feels more at home with the colored soldier.

Support of Integration by Negroes in Mixed Units

Negroes in mixed units who favor integration make fewer specific references than are offered by those in separate units. Their tone is predominantly positive. They focus on the way things are working out under integration rather than on the inadequacies of the segregated experience.

(Negro EM): I would rather be in the mixed units. I was in the __th, a all-colored unit in the States. It was very slow in getting things like equipment, clothing and helmets. The mixed units are getting things just like the others. At Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, we were the last to get things. This kind of a deal makes it better for the colored men.

(Negro EM): Well, you can get by easier in the all-colored unit than when you are working with the white boys. I think that both groups do less work when they are put in their own type of unit. When the two groups, Negroes and whites, are mixed, each one will try to outdo the other. That will cause them to get more work done. Neither one of the groups will want the other to think that they are lazy. I don't mind working with the white soldiers at all. You know what I mean. That is, when they are all right and don't cause you any trouble.

(Negro EM): It would be good if they would do it more — let the Negro know the white, let the white know the Negro. If they don't do that, they keep the Negro to himself, the Negro fellow don't have his heart in what he's fighting for; he can't go out halfway into it. . . . Sawing at a tree halfway don't cut it down. This way, the way we got it here, you feel you can go the whole way. That way they bound to have a fighting army.

Time and again, they call attention to the fact that they are receiving equal treatment, that they work, sleep, and play on the same basis as the white soldier; they are convinced of this because they are, so to speak, "right on the scene."

(Negro EM): As far as I am concerned it is working well. We get along very well. We sleep in the same tents to keep warm. We eat out of the same plates and drink out of the same canteens. We get equal treatment. There is no difference. Since we joined this unit a little more than one month ago three of the colored boys have been made assistant squad leaders. These are positions where there is a chance for promotions. I would say that it is working fine.

(Three Negro EM): (1): It's just about as good as I could expect — it really is.

(2): It's the same for me since I been in this company . . . they give you a chance here to make a rating.

(3): I've noticed since I come over here lots of colored soldiers had good positions, platoon sergeants, squad leaders and so on. And they don't hold a man down. Reason I say that is because you remember that boy—Gregory it was—he made SFC in about a year out of this company. I'm a squad leader — got eight men, all white . . . they take orders all right, don't give me no trouble at all.

(Negro EM): I think that it is OK. These are some good Joes. It might be because we have to get along in Korea if we are going to fight the Chinks. If you take my squad, I wouldn't want a better squad. It might not be any better treatment than you get in the all-Negro outfit, but we all get along with each other. We eat, sleep, and play together. We drink out of the same cup or eat out of the same spoon. We just like one big happy family.

More specifically, they assert that there is less friction in the mixed units — that they seem to have better organization and to run more smoothly; that there is a chance to learn

skills from the other men in the unit. Constantly recurring is the theme of mutual racial understanding through close contact and the exchange of ideas.

(Negro EM): In an all-colored outfit, it seems to me there ain't so much order about things. What I mean, in all-colored outfit, if they get in an argument, they got to get out and fight about it. In a mixed outfit, neither one wants to look bad in front of the other, so they don't fight about their arguments. . . . They get along better. . . . The day I got hit, was when I went up to get my squad leader. I'd do anything for him, and he'd do anything for me.

(Negro EM): In this company we try to work together. We teach each other things. Take the mess for example. There are some things I know about cooking the white boys don't know and they have things that I don't know. So what we do is to help each other and in that way everybody will learn something he didn't know. I don't know but in the white units the work is more better organized than we had in the all-colored outfits. Here we have a day off and in the all-colored units this never happened. We had to work all of the time.

(Negro EM): I would rather serve in the mixed unit. You can get more experience. It gives you a chance to learn more about the white man. You have a chance to find out what makes them act like they do. It is all in the way they are taught. If these white boys were not taught to be prejudiced, they would be all right from the beginning.

(Negro EM): I like this kind of a unit better because it teaches you something. You will learn how to hold your tongue. The white boys don't say anything about the colored race and we don't say anything about their race. It improves your speech. We get into arguments just like any group of fellows will do but it never gets out of place by bringing in the race angle.

(Negro EM): The mixed unit is the best. The white soldier gets a chance to learn about us and we can learn about them. Many of the white boys in this unit are from the South. They get boxes from home and look us up to share them with us. You wouldn't know that they are from the South. I fell out going up a hill and do you know who carried me to the top of the hill? It was two white boys, not a colored boy. The white boy who came and got me was from North Carolina.

In other words, while the values seen by the integrated Negro soldier as accruing from integration are substantially the same as those cited in all-Negro units, the present tense supplants the future.

In short, the evidence presented in this section indicates that Negroes enthusiastically favor integration, while white troops "go along" with it.

HOW INTEGRATION TAKES PLACE

POLICY EFFECTING INTEGRATION

It has been pointed out earlier that integration has been effected in Korea as the result of the interpretation made by Headquarters, Eighth Army, of SR 600-629-1.

EUSAK policy has, by and large, been executed by troop commanders in the field, though not without considerable doubts, debates, and misgivings at first. At the same time, integration took place within the context of previous integration of Korean soldiers at the man level in a number of US divisions. Moreover, small units of United Nations troops had been attached to these divisions. By contrast with the linguistic and cultural barriers which these foreign soldiers often presented, the integration of Negro troops was, in some respects, a simpler problem.

In the eyes of staff officers and lower-echelon commanders, the decision to integrate Negro and white troops often appears to have been reached by each divisional commander acting on his own accord. Actually it appears that the divisional commander arrived at his decision because of the pressure of forces set in motion by EUSAK policy. The most compelling reason for integration in the eyes of a divisional commander and his staff was undoubtedly the acute need for replacements, coupled with the fact that the replacements which were made available comprised a higher proportion of Negro troops than could be absorbed in the hitherto all-Negro units.

(SFC, assistant to division historian): Well, when this outfit was set up in the States it had one colored battalion in it, that was set up as a colored battalion by Army regulation. Over here, though, they've gotten replacements up to their T/O&E strength and then the others that have come in have been assigned right along with the other men regardless of color.

(Medical officer): Oh lord, we were down to almost no strength, we were getting plastered, and here were these soldiers being held in reserve. They couldn't get to the __d, for which they had been originally intended — it's a hell of a way to get replacements to an outfit by having them fight their way to it — and we needed them. So we got them. They just came in — they assigned them straight across the board, and it wasn't until a month or so later, when the __d got back, and had had some white replacements who were available — we looked up and we had an integrated regiment. And that's the way it's been ever since.

In some cases it seems that the decision by the divisional commander to integrate Negro troops into white units was made only after consultation and in some cases lengthy meetings with staff and subordinate officers. In other cases the decision appears to have

been made by the commander acting on his own initiative and without any special advice on the part of his subordinates. At the regimental and battalion levels, the decision as to how Negro troops should be utilized was sometimes predetermined by the explicit orders of the division commander or his G–1. In other instances, however, no explicit instructions were delivered at any point along the line as to how these troops were to be used, and lower-echelon commanders took it upon themselves either specifically to direct subordinates on the treatment of Negro personnel or to have Negro replacements handled without any special preparation or without any deviation from the normal replacement process.

(Regimental commander): I never saw it as a problem myself. I have felt that it was the only intelligent thing for the Army Department to do, and I felt that their policy in ending segregation was correct and necessary. There was some apprehension among senior officers, though not too much. There was some division of opinion, but I never had any doubts that it would work out. When we got them, I told my adjutant, and later I told all my battalion commanders, that they were to be treated like any other replacements, that they were to be assigned on the basis of their MOS numbers and their previous training, and that they were to be scattered throughout the regiment, with at least one in every company. That meant that the tank company was to have one even if there were none of them with a specialist's number that would put him in there. My idea was to get everyone in all the companies used to the fact that they were around. Within the companies I wanted them spread around rather than bunched together. And in fact, we now have them in every company except two battalion headquarters companies and I think that is just due to chance rather than anything else. We have had several killed or wounded in action, several recommended for combat infantry badges. To the best of my knowledge, they have received the same treatment as any other replacements, and there has been no comment or complaint about their being around. Of course this group has been specially selected, I guess, by the Army for integration. Whether it will work for the typical Negro soldier I do not know. They will gradually develop a greater feeling of self-respect and of acceptance than they could in an all-Negro organization.

(Regimental S–1): There was no formal preparation of the men already in the outfit before the colored boys came in. I think the company commanders briefed their men informally, but there was nothing official.

(Engineering company CO): I was a little apprehensive, to tell you the truth, because of the possibility of having friction between the men. We heard one afternoon that we were getting colored replacements and we got them the next day. We heard that the battalion was getting 130 colored replacements and that they would be assigned in strength according to the strength of the companies. I believe the companies got an equal share of them.

Under the latter circumstances, integration often seemed to have occurred almost by accident, with no one aware that new replacements were Negro until they actually arrived on the scene. As is evident, however, these "accidents" usually resulted from the replacement procedures that had been set in motion at higher headquarters.

The introduction of Negro troops into previously white companies was done in most cases without any special fanfare or notice. This may have been particularly true in cases where Negro replacements arrived as part of a larger group which included whites. Where it was known some days in advance that Negro replacements were about to arrive, there was usually some discussion of the subject between the unit commander and his subordinates, and news of this usually reached the troops themselves through the Army grapevine.

Special Briefing of White Troops

The method of briefing or informing the white troops that Negroes were about to arrive also varied from unit to unit. In some instances the company commander spoke to his platoon leaders who, in turn, would order their sergeants to speak to their squad leaders, so that information reached the men through channels.

(Regimental CO): There was briefing of the officers. I told them how it was going to be. Negroes were coming and they were to be treated like anyone else. And that's the way it was. I wouldn't stand for anything else.

(Signal officer, CO): We have 53 Negro soldiers, who came to us on about the 9th of May. We're a specialized kind of Army unit, so I think we got the cream. At least 60 percent of the men are high school graduates, a dozen have had some college, and there are four college graduates. Before they came, I knew we had some southern white boys in the outfit, so I called in my sergeants and told them we had some colored men coming to us and that I didn't anticipate that there would be any difficulties whatsoever. I said the new men were going to be assigned around generally and treated just like anybody else. There hasn't been any problem about it and I doubt now if there ever will be. Maybe some of the white men don't like it, but if they do, they don't show it. All of the new men were just basic MOS; in a way that was rather good, because it let me fill some vacancies that I had had trouble with because most everybody else had a specialty rating. Most of the assignments to signal corps work are specialists in some line of communications. So, I got a company mail clerk and one or two other hard-to-fill spots out of the new bunch. With only a basic MOS and no Form 20 I didn't know anything about their aptitudes or hobbies, so I offered to put them wherever they thought they would like to go. And they split up . . . some went into the motor pool, some went into the mess, some to the message center, some to the radio section, and so on. I explained what each of these jobs was. So far, I haven't had a single one come up to ask for a change of assignment. They work hard. I've got three of them down at radio school getting ready to take over jobs in radio. I've got two Negro photographers in the photographic unit. Funny, they came in late in the afternoon, and I had a big tent up where they could put their things down and rest for a while. I thought they'd have to stay in there together for that night, until they could get assigned the next day to tents with their work sections, but I looked up a while later, and there were the section sergeants rounding them up and taking them off to where they were going to be. I thought that was a good starter.

In other cases company meetings were called at which the commanding officer himself briefed the enlisted men on what their behavior should be.

The nature of the briefing process was almost invariably the same, despite the absence of any formal plan devised by higher headquarters. It was always stressed that the new men were to be treated like any other replacements, that no discrimination would be shown against them, and no favoritism shown toward them.

(CO, engineering company): We had a class scheduled for that evening. I just made a brief announcement that we were getting some 20-odd colored replacements. That they would be treated like any replacements we were going to get. An equal amount to each platoon, for the platoon leaders to give them a job that they would like, to make an effort to use them in the positions that they had been trained in if they could. I don't believe I brought out any definite point beyond that. I believe the general reaction was no particular reaction. We had some few men make the statements that they didn't like it. It was such a minority that it didn't bother me a bit. I don't remember, but one of the platoon leaders talked to one man and explained to him the fact that we were getting these men and he was off his beam feeling that way, and I think it got across because with that particular man there has been no trouble at all.

(EM, engineers): The CO put it pretty clear. He said "Treat them as you would any other person." He said he wanted complete impartiality shown them. He said if a man is up here fighting, treat him right. He gave us a lot of bunk. He said there would be no trouble, no fights, no calling them "Ace of Spades" or "Black Boys." What the captain says, they took it seriously as a man-to-man talk. It was mostly just talk before they came. "Grumble" is the Korean name for them. You couldn't expect much of these "heel-runners." They said that they wouldn't let a colored guy sleep next to them. They wouldn't sit with them in a foxhole. Hell, the first night they were drinking out of the same canteen cups. These "pants-blouses" we used to call them "nigger-blouses." We cut that out. One squad from every platoon had to go out of the squad tent and get into pup-tents and that was one of the things we griped about. They came right into the squads. That's what stopped the gripes. We were in the company area. At one side we had the white guys formation and that's when the captain talked to us. He took us down the river a bit, away from them. They were put in the platoons the first day. We didn't go out of our way to talk to them. We treated them like another guy. If someone asked "Where is this?" or "How do you get that?" or "How do you clean that?" — it's the same as with a white replacement — we don't go out of our way to show them.

This appears to be true even in the case of unit commanders who were themselves opposed to the introduction of Negroes into their companies and fearful of the consequences.

Special Briefing of Negroes

In a number of instances the incoming Negro replacements were also briefed by the company commander or his adjutant.

(Infantry officer): The battalion commander talked to them as he always does and he didn't come out and talk to them about it directly, but he told them that they were off the record. For the first time in his speech he cautioned about VD. He's never mentioned that before. He mentioned about messing around; about the Korean women. In fact, he went into detail about it. He also made some facetious remark about race.

In many cases this briefing followed the usual procedure with new replacements and was simply in the nature of a general orientation. However, many troop commanders definitely slanted their orientation talks to take account of what they believed to be the special problems or the special fears of the new arrivals.

(Negro EM): The colonel told us to joke and have fun when we first come, but I know how far to go.

(Battalion commander): One of the three field-grade officers, generally myself, try to talk to any replacements coming in, and I usually make it a particular point to talk to colored people. I usually try to avoid any reference to their being colored. I usually say that everyone in this battalion gets treated on his own merits.

(CO, infantry company): When they come in I tell them they'll be treated just like anybody else, no favors or anything just because they're colored. But I tell them that if they're picked on to come to me.

(CO, ordnance company): When they first came in, they were all together, of course. Until they got assigned to sections, I had to put them all in the two extra tents—our work is so strung out that everybody on the same assignment sleeps together in the same location. Well, I didn't want them starting off thinking they were going to be segregated, so I went over and gave them a talk, and let them know this was only temporary. They just sat there—didn't say anything; I guess it went over all right. The next day, I interviewed each one of them personally, or had my assistant do it. All the boys were basic MOS. I asked them what they thought they'd like to do, most of them wanted to drive trucks—a lot of them had fooled around driving some back home. But, hell, anybody can drive a damn truck; it seems to me a guy gets in the Army, he ought to get out of it knowing something more than he took into it. I've been in ordnance ever since I came into the Army, and it's the one place where a man can be sure of learning something useful. I told them that. Some of them got sent over to automotive repair, some of them on ammo supply, some of them to other assignments. Funny, none of them wanted tanks, I don't know why—of course, the work is very heavy, backbreak[illegible].

Negro Replacements Handled Like Any Other Replacements

In some instances lower-echelon commanders made no special effort to distinguish the handling of Negro troops from that of any other replacements, which in practice meant that if a number of them arrived at once, they were assigned together to the same companies, platoons, or squads. In other instances, however, commanding officers took it upon themselves to see to it either that Negro troops were assigned to certain types of jobs (combat or noncombat, depending on the particular assumptions made) or that they were diffused and spread throughout their units even when this involved a considerable reshuffling of personnel.

(CO, ambulance company): Then we got eight replacements, all colored. The adjutant got an idea that it wouldn't do to have mixed teams—there are two drivers per ambulance—and that he couldn't place a Negro and a white driver in the same ambulance. So he switched my whole set-up all around, and had the colored drivers all laced on ambulances together. When I got back and saw what had happened, I blew up! What an asinine stunt to pull. Here's eight new men, new to the job, never drove ambulances before, and he wants them to go out by themselves. Hell, they never would have been able to do it; you need an experienced man with a new man until he learns the ropes. I tore up his schedule and worked it over, so now every one of the new drivers is teamed up with a veteran. . . . Some of the boys are from the South, some from the North, and so on.

Maybe one of the white boys would pass some remark, but the colored boy would give it right back to him, and that ended it. Before long, there wasn't any sign of uneasiness—it's kind of hard to stage a fight in the front seat of an ambulance—and now they take each other in stride.

(White CO of integrated infantry company): They've just come into the company. We put two men in a squad at first so they'd have some company. But there was no briefing of the rest of the men. It's worked out splendidly. The colored men seem to be well adjusted. And I think they work better when they're integrated at 10 percent. And the white men have had a lot of laughs out of the colored boys. The morale is better for having had them. This man Cole that I'm promoting loves a machine gun. We had him in the mess hall for a while, but he begged to get back with the platoon. He'd just keep a machine gun around and every chance he'd get he'd pat it and say, "Now don't you go 'way, baby. You just stay right there." The colored boys keep up on the marches; they set an example for the other men. I guess I'm fortunate, though. I have an exceptional bunch.

(Infantry noncom): Our platoon leader split them up and decided that way they wouldn't be running around together and bunching up, acting smart.

It must be emphasized that many officers anticipated no problems and did not see the reason for any special measures to assure the acceptance of Negro troops without incident by the others.

(Divisional CofS): We got word that we were going to get some and that was just the way it was. The reaction was varied. There were a few "Oh my God's," but having been given the personnel, the solution of the problem was to use them as they were told. We sort of approached the problem that there wouldn't be any problem.

REACTIONS IN MIXED UNITS DURING INTEGRATION

White troops who learn that Negroes are about to enter their unit react according to their own special backgrounds and previous experiences. Men faced with the task of fighting a war are usually complacent when they hear the news. They are likely to assume that the new arrivals will be more or less the same as previous replacements. In the case of Negro arrivals, it has sometimes been assumed that they are the result of special selection by the high command.

(White EM): I think you're wrong there. It's the type of guy they send to the ___th that bugs out. The type they mix with us are something different. I bet the Army picks very carefully the guys they put with whites. Have to. It's a new thing and they don't want to louse up the experiment before it gets started. It's pretty obvious from the other colored guys I've seen in other outfits. They're the cream of the crop. The dumb, the men with the lowest IQs and backgrounds, they put in the all-colored units. I wouldn't be surprised if they all got rated by a psychologist as to who's fit to go into a white outfit.

In some cases, however, there is hostility and resentment, the feeling that there will be trouble, or even threats to make trouble.

(White EM, engineers): I didn't like it. No reasons. I've always been in a company with white guys. I thought that there would be a lot of fights in the outfit before they came in. The white guy and colored guy are always arguing. That's what I *thought*. I never monkey around with them much. A lot of the guys didn't like it. They didn't like colored guys coming in a white guy's outfit.

(White infantryman): We were sitting down in a valley and had just come off the line. We had been getting replacements regularly every few days. Our platoon leader, Sgt ____, said, "You're going to get the Smith boys. They are twins and they're black as the ace of spades." It struck me as comical at first. I thought, what are they giving us them for? Why not keep the white guys with the white guys. Most of the guys said that if they come into the platoon sure it would be all right but they would be gunners or ammo bearers. None of them would get to be leaders. Quite a few of them didn't like the idea.

More often the reaction appears to be of a humorous or bantering kind. Men joke about the changes that may come about in the unit when the new replacements arrive,

and laugh at the thought of their possible eccentricities of speech and manner. Discussion of what will happen when the replacements come appears to take place more often among officers than among enlisted men.

(White infantry officer): When they first came in I called in the company commanders and told them what they were going to have. More joking comments than anything else. Some of our officers are Southerners and they joked about it. "My God, me too!" However, no objection. I feel also that any reaction any of them had has since changed. I've heard comments since then from many of them that the use of them mixed through was working; that they were individually surprised that they had not had incidents.

Once the new men are actually present, the usual response appears to be one of mild curiosity rather than any overt expression of either friendly or unfriendly feeling. Instances of open hostility on the part of whites are rare. Conversely, instances in which white soldiers go out of their way to make the Negro soldiers feel at home are also infrequent. While some white troops follow a policy of carefully avoiding the newcomers, most merely adopt an attitude of "wait and see."

Friction and Absence of Friction

Subsequent to the achievement of integration, relations between Negro and white troops almost always proceed without the occurrence of conflict or incident. The following is a typical situation:

(White officers, engineering company): (1): It seemed like two hours after the men got here they were already an integral part of the company. I interviewed them. We filled out these data sheets on them and got their past experience and the types of work they had done before. We placed them in platoons according to their qualifications as far as possible. With the exception of one or two I had the feeling that it would probably work out better, because it seemed to be a higher average than what I had worked with before. They all seemed to know what they wanted to do, and they all seemed to have their minds made up as to what they preferred. After I had assigned them and notified them, I had them report to the platoon sergeants, and they took over from there and bedded them down and made their assignments in the platoons. In a very short time they were all milling around in the company, the general conversation that you get with new men: "Where are you from?" and "How long have you been in the Army?" and before very long they were all playing ball together. If there had been any doubt within the company it wasn't there very long.

(2): Any tension just dropped right away. I came in just after they had unloaded off the trucks, and I was a little bit surprised. The men were all there in a group, just before being interviewed. I spoke to them and got their attention and told them who I was and what kind of a unit they were getting into. I had the impression that they were just a little bit scared as to what was ahead of them. I thought I knew how they would feel, so I made a special effort to make them feel at ease. I actually think they were more worried than the company was about receiving them.

This does not mean that there is not friction between Negroes and whites in mixed units. Friction occasionally takes place. It may be considered under three headings: friction arising from the fact of racial difference; friction arising between individuals on the same personal basis as any conflict between members of the same race; and friction of the latter type in which racial overtones are clearly present, even though the conflict arises without any special reference to race.

In the interviews, reports of friction between Negroes and whites in mixed units almost always refer, not to episodes occurring in the units themselves, but rather to episodes occurring in garrison, either in Japan or in the US.

(White infantryman): There was a lot of talk, among guys from South Carolina and Florida, and states like that. They didn't like the idea. We took showers with them, and ate with them. Me, I didn't mind. I knew how to get along with them from my boxing days. Then it didn't make no difference. It was just another guy in the ring. I thought there'd be more trouble than there was, though. I guess there were just more of us.

(White engineer): Well, that was where the first group was. There is a lot of difference between being here and in being in the States. And there is a lot of difference between being here and being in Pusan or Taegu or Japan or the Hawaiian Islands, and we had a slight skirmish between the colored and white boys because of the colored boys making discrimination against the white boys. It didn't make any difference in the Islands to the natives between the colored boys and the white boys. They probably figured they had been pushed around for a long time and it was time for them to do some of the pushing. That made some of the white boys unhappy. And we had a fight on our hands.

(White signalman): You always have a couple of wise heads. We had an EM club in Osaka and one of the boys invited a friend of his from Sendai to see him on TDY, seven days. So the colored fellow came down from Sendai and the white boy tried to take him over to the EM club. Boy, they raised hell when they saw him walk in. Finally, they left. The controversy lasted for three or four days in the company. Most of the company felt that he was a soldier and was entitled to the same privileges, but there was a controversy.

(White artilleryman): If we got back to garrison we'd get along pretty good 'cause most of the guys that know about the trouble have gone and we've been getting along pretty good over here. At Nara you'd be walking down the street and pass a colored guy and he'd give you a dirty look. That's how it all starts. The town was divided then. They had part and we had part. Just some guys got in that trouble. I never did. What set a lot of fellows against the 159 is the general we had there. The 159 had the best camp, and the MPs picked on the white guys. One fellow told the general that had he said "No," he just thought the white guys were trying to overrun the colored fellows. That's when it started, from then on. On the train from Osaka back to Nara at night, there was always a fight. That was the last train and all the guys were on it, colored and white. For a while it got so bad the guys were wearing chains around their belts. There were some bloody battles. Finally the general put a stop to it. There was always trouble between the __th and the __th. The colored guys started acting pretty big, and most of the guys from the South didn't like it.

As might be expected, sexual rivalry is often the basis for the conflicts which do take place in this regard.

(Negro EM, ordnance): Well, there was something about some girls. Up on that little hill behind there, there's a little house, and another boy and myself was going by and we heard these girls in there. So we thought we'd look in; he went around to the back and I looked in the front window. Well, these three guys was in and one of them said "These are our property, you stay out!" (Did they say anything about your being Negroes?) No, sir, they didn't. But a couple of days later we went up there — we seen some other girls going up there, at least we thought they were different ones, so then we got near the place, one of these same guys came out and said: "You boys never give up, do you?" Well, we didn't want to start anything, being new to the company and all that. So I decided I just wouldn't go up there again.

The remarkable scarcity of reports of open conflict may be partly explained by the fact that Negroes often suppress their resentment to avoid trouble, and partly by the normal tendency of soldiers and officers to squelch disorder.

(Negro infantryman): One time there, they had a little game going; I was watching. One of the guys got an idea — I guess because he was losing — anyway, he wanted to do something to somebody — he said something and used the word "nigger" in it. Well, I just passed it off; I figured the guy was mad, he was used to talking like that — I didn't want to start nothing then. Well, later on that night I was on my post — one of the section leaders came up to me and asked me about it. He said that guy was just mad because he was losing, and he hoped I wouldn't take on about it. I said as far as I was concerned, I had forgotten about it.

(Negro infantryman): Only one time something happened — some old boy from Arkansas tried to pull his rank on me — he was a pfc and I was a plain private. Two white boys told him off; they told him we was all fighting this war and he don't know who'll save his life some day. He didn't try anything since then; but we don't have much to say.

(Southern white infantry officer): I don't think you'll find so much discrimination. It came to my attention only one time. Just a case where a fanatical Southerner in one of the squads began to abuse by language and acts one of the Negroes. I happened to pass by and hear it the first time. I checked in with the squad leader and found out that the white man involved was a fanatic, and very little or no intelligence. There was one man that he could cuss and damn and get away with.

The (colored) boy had done nothing. They had words back and forth. I made a particular point of speaking to the darkies when they came in and told them that they were going to be well treated and I wanted them to put forth their best efforts because everybody's eyes were going to be on them and they would have to do more than their even share, and I think they did it.

I transferred the white boy out of the squad; I got him completely in an all-white squad. I actually told him that he was taking advantage of this Negro, that I thought he was of such poor intelligence that he didn't know how to get along with people. He said that he had never gotten along with niggers and he didn't want any part of them.

The objections to Negro behavior and language (already discussed) arise in integrated units in Korea, but they seem to produce a feeling of distaste on the part of whites rather than any overt conflict.

(White infantryman): There's a lot of difference in the way they dress; that's one reason why they could never get along in garrison. They form cliques and maintain them. I know what they're like. I know how they live. They're clean, but their language — that's the part I don't like.

It is interesting to note that the arrival of Negroes in white units is often accompanied by a deliberate effort on the part of white soldiers to accommodate their language to the presence of the newcomers. The fact that this is done is recognized by some Negroes.

(Negro enlisted man): I don't know of any instance where any of the colored boys have had trouble. You know that there may be a few white soldiers who might not like our coming because this was a white company before we came. If there are any white boys who didn't want us to enter the unit, they have been smart enough to keep it hidden. Some of the white soldiers may not be so hot about our coming but I can say as far as I know, they are usually a swell bunch of fellows to be with. Now you take the boys in my tent, the ones I work with. We joke with each other and carry on all the time and nobody has been angry yet. We tell all kinds of jokes and call each other names but it is all in fun. None of our joking takes on a race angle. These boys have never mentioned race to me. If they know race jokes, they have not told them around me. Most white boys have a good supply of jokes about Negroes you know. Now when I am not around they may tell dirty jokes on Negroes but I don't know. I am sure they must do it sometimes.

As has been indicated earlier, this restraint of language may in some instances produce a kind of tension among the white soldiers, though reports of such tension are fairly unusual. Restraint on the part of whites may be induced by the orders of superiors; more likely it is part of a general effort to accommodate, which is evident among both whites and Negroes.

(Negro EM): Well, I come in contact with a white boy from one of them northern towns where there ain't no colored folks. He comes to me one day and ask me how should he approach me if he didn't know my name. He said he didn't want to use a name that would make me mad. You know some of these white boys will set down with us for a long time and ask a lot of questions about us trying to find out what they can.

This accommodation may extend to the point of a forced and insincere friendliness.

(Negro EM): Like the guy who just came by. [A white soldier had drifted over for a moment to offer a light to one of the group who had pulled out cigarettes, and had gone on after asking the time and not receiving any invitation to join in.] He's just like that. He's always coming over and doing things for you; feel like his heart isn't in it — like he's doing it just because you're colored and he thinks he ought to be nice to you.

Negro-White Friendships

Some soldiers, both white and Negro, deliberately restrict their relationships with members of the other social group. Obviously, in the mixed unit this is far easier for the white person than for the Negro. The hostile white individual seems to avoid Negroes rather than to make a direct show of his hostility.

On the other hand, genuinely harmonious relations arise naturally from the normal association of Negro and white individuals in common tasks and from their common

exposure to the stress of combat and the varied episodes of Army life. Warm and friendly relationships can often be traced back to some critical episode, arising in battle or through some noteworthy occasion.

(White medic, attached to all-Negro company): Man for man, the men in Love company are all right. I don't have any friends among them. I don't make friends in the Army, it hurts too much when they get knocked off—but I like all of them and they like me. They've saved my skin many times. I was never so scared as I was day before yesterday. I had to go out and get a lieutenant that got it. There was a machine gun nest about two hundred yards away. The boys in the company didn't have to do anything for me, but they kept that nest busy with fire until I could get out and get the lieutenant. They didn't have to do that. They're all right. One boy picked up an M1 and began firing that thing like I've never heard an M1 fired before. It sounded like a machine gun.

(White engineer): There was a lot of talk, "Oh, lord, we're going to have riots galore!" They passed the bottle to them. It was the guys who had been mouthing off about how they were not going to pass the booze along, they were the first to do it, and by God, they were insulted if they didn't drink.

These relationships often appear to be on a fairly superficial level; an exchange of banter or gossip, participation in common bull sessions, the sharing of food and drink.

(White infantryman): We can joke with them about their race. We call them niggers. They do the same with us, call us greens or pinks. They know we're joking with them. You can tell when a man is mad. Joke along. They're OK.

(White EM, engineers): We play poker together, eat together, sleep together, in fact, go everywhere together. In fact, I'm due for a big drunk together with one of them one of these days.

It must be remembered, however, that in units in which there is a steady rotation of personnel, relationships among all individuals, irrespective of race, are likely to have a superficial and transitory character. Nevertheless, there is statistical evidence of the development of friendships among whites and Negroes in mixed units. Sixty-four percent of the whites (including 60 percent of the Southerners) in mixed units report that they have had friends among the Negro soldiers. By contrast, 43 percent report having had little or no contact with Negroes in civilian life.

It is evident that the Army in Korea is acting as a major vehicle of contact between two groups of individuals whose contacts in civilian life were far less frequent. Undoubtedly this makes possible an interchange of ideas and habits, and a greater possibility of mutual understanding. As was observed earlier, the fact that Negroes and whites enter into close social relationships in groups which are predominantly white means that Negroes tend to conform to and take over the values, habits, practices, and standards prevailing in the dominant group. Negroes in mixed units associate not with other Negroes, but with the whites in their own squad, that is to say, with the individuals with whom they share crucial experiences in battle or work.

This is, of course, not everywhere the case. Some Negroes deliberately seek out the company of other Negroes. In certain instances that is done by choice and in other instances by reason of the unfriendly attitude of the white members of the squad. It must be emphasized that, on this point, as on others, the relationship between whites and Negroes is not necessarily a race relationship, but may be one between old-timers and newcomers.

The Negro who feels left out of his squad's social life may be actually experiencing the typical discomfiture of the replacement rather than an instance of racial discrimination. It has already been seen that there are Negroes who yearn wistfully for the company of other Negroes and who feel uncomfortable and unwanted in mixed units, either because they are really not wanted, or because their previous background disposes them to feel this way.

(Negro infantryman): I'm the onliest colored soldier in the HQ platoon; there's another one but he's alone like me, down in the motor pool. I hardly ever get to see him. I'd probably feel a little better if I had a buddy.

(Negro infantryman): I think I would feel a little easier in an all-colored unit because we would have more things in common. When I talk about my experiences, the others would have done many of the same things, would be able to understand better than the white boys. We would have a different sort of appreciation for each other. When we tell jokes they may not have as much meaning for the white boy as they would have for the colored man.

That's because we have come up in the same sort of society. But the white fellows act as though they enjoy my jokes and I am getting where I like theirs more each day. You see the longer we are together the more we come to speak the same language. Now aside from this problem, I think the mixed units are all right.

Discrimination

Although efforts are normally made on the part of white officers and NCOs to avoid any obvious discriminatory behavior toward Negro personnel, instances of such discrimination probably occur. It is certain that they occur in the eyes of some Negro members of white units. In fact, it is easy to see how they might arise out of the assumptions made by many white officers and men regarding the capabilities and traits of Negro troops.

It should be observed that the complaints of discrimination made by Negroes in mixed units are of a very different order from the allegations of discrimination made by Negroes in all-Negro units. In the mixed unit the gripes are less likely to be the traditional GI complaints phrased in racial terms than to be reports of specific assignments or incidents in which the individual considers that he has been personally unjustly treated.

(Negro enlisted man): In a mixed outfit with white and colored a soldier over here in Korea stands better. During basic training I was in with white and colored mixed and at the end of basic training period all of the whites got the breaks and the colored were sent to Korea to fight something that they didn't know what they were fighting about. This happen at Fort Jackson, S.C. We got only seven and six days home while other soldiers coming to Korea got 17 days or more. In other words, I think colored and white together over here would work out better. They would have better chances for ratings and would probably get the chance to do the kind of work they are experienced for.

It is of some interest that the allegations of discrimination on the part of Negroes have their counterpart in charges made by white personnel. White noncommissioned officers in mixed units allege, for example, that they must bend over backwards in their treatment of Negroes, that they must handle them with kid gloves, lest charges of discrimination be hurled at them. They say, in effect, that they must discriminate against the whites in order to avoid giving the appearance of discrimination against their Negro men. This situation is recognized by the Negro men. (Negro infantryman): "The white officers is much easier because he knows you might think he is prejudiced. I think he will come harder down on the white soldier."

Reverse Integration

While the process of integration normally took place through additions of Negroes to formerly white units, examples of the reverse process have also taken place, and by much the same processes. (It is an interesting sidelight that, while predominantly white units are usually referred to as "mixed," predominantly Negro units with some white personnel are generally referred to as "colored" outfits.)

Cases of reverse integration are of especial interest in view of the observation frequently made by both officers and men in predominantly white units that integration works fine so long as the proportion of Negroes is low — that is, so long as the proportion is at the level at which the units actually experienced it, normally lower than 10 or 15 percent. It is

therefore of great interest to see what has happened in cases where the proportions are reversed. The following case history describes how this took place in a corps engineering group.

(Two staff officers, corps engineering group): (1): I'm prejudiced. I'm a Southerner. . . . We had initially only one battalion which was all-colored, the __th. . . . At one time in January we started receiving white replacements only. So we transferred over 100 men, whites, and mixed them with the __th. [Who made the decision?] The group commander, even though it was approved by Army. For a long time we were short of personnel. We weren't getting any replacements. Then we started getting replacements. And they were all white. So we had filled one unit, the white unit, completely, and they were overfilled. So you might say we were forced to assign white men to the colored battalion, because it was short. It was authorized by Army, but I believe it was actually authorized in the group, and I believe it was a sound way of doing it, because we would have ended up with twice as many men in one battalion as in the other.

The __th at one time in November had white men in the battalion. They came to this group from ____ Corps. They must have had about 30 or 40 of them and they were scattered throughout the battalion. And the men didn't want to leave the battalion, that was the funny part of it.

All we could get were white replacements, and I called EUSAK, Col ____, and I got the OK to go ahead and stick these replacements in there. The CO, the Exec at the time, the adjutant, were in on the discussion. We surveyed it, talked to various individuals at that time and found that the white men there didn't want to leave the outfit. Nobody came to a decision until we had dug down and got the facts. We also asked the officers down at the unit to see what they thought of it. We asked how the white men were doing that were in the outfit now. They said it was working out very good. We was going to make one company white and the rest of the battalion colored. That was my suggestion because I didn't know how they were taking it back there. The thing was, they were short a company, and I suggested putting all the white men in that company. They said it was working fine the way it was by just mixing them in. And the white men that were in the outfit already said they were all satisfied. [Why did you want them all in one company at first?] What I was afraid of was that we might get some Southern white men in there. . . . I knew how some of these outfits are, and I was a little bit leery of mixing them in. This was in January. We were running like hell all the time. I talked to some of the white men who were under colored sergeants, and they felt no resentment at all. They said it was going to get the war over sooner and they liked their NCOs. And the colored men were obeying their white NCOs, those that were NCOs.

(2): (I also talked to some of the white men that had been assigned to colored units.) One felt that one of the reasons why the white men like it there was because the colored soldiers had a tendency to give them better jobs and to treat them nicer because they were white soldiers and because they wanted them to get along. When you look at it, it's a pretty sound way of looking at it, because you take it 20:1, where the colored troops are trying to be nice to the white men, I would say they would lean over backwards a little bit to be nice to them.

The misgivings and fears of white officers who assign white troops to Negro units are usually greater than those which arise in the more usual type of integration. Similarly, the initial anxieties of the white enlisted men involved may run quite high:

(White staff officer): We had an all-colored signal company, with white officers. They got one white replacement. The company commander came over and asked me what he should do about it, whether he should expect more white replacements or what. I told him I would look into it. A few days later he came around and said, "Say, that guy is doing fine. He wouldn't change for the world."

(White EM in predominantly Negro unit): The first night, mostly the idea was: Is this a colored outfit or isn't it? Most of us hoped it wouldn't be colored, including me. We thought maybe it was a mixed outfit. I don't think there was one of us felt any too good about it. A couple of guys were going to bitch and ask for a transfer right away. The Southern guys held it against them more than I did. At first they were a lot worse toward them. They were very stubborn. But they were so good to us that they gradually melted away their stubbornness. I remember how swell the fellows were to us. They thought there would be a problem racially, the colored boys did. So they tried to be as best as they could to us. No one of us like it at all. We were treated well, but it was just the way we felt, being in a colored platoon. One of the fellows said, "I wonder how I would feel if I went home in this outfit, marching down the street with them."

About ten days after we got into that outfit, four cans of beer were issued to us, and we had chicken for chow, and we were all sitting around having a good time when the warrant officer came around and asked if we would like a transfer. The fellows sort of left it up to me, and one of the fellows asked if we could talk it over a little while. I remember because I carried the message back to the warrant officer. We told him we wouldn't want him to feel that we didn't like the outfit, because of race or because we weren't being treated very well. We just thought we ought to be in a white outfit. We had a hard job explaining it to him. We all liked our jobs. The feeling was, if it had been half and half it would have been all right.

As can be seen in these quotations, it appears that after the initial shock of adjustment has worn off, white troops in this situation find themselves feeling as much at home as do the Negroes who are integrated into predominantly white units. In part this may be attributed to the fact that they are in units in which most or many of the officers are white, and further, to the unconscious realization that they are, after all, members of a predominantly white Army.

(White EM, engineers): If they sent me to an outfit like they did here I figure that they're a soldier just like I am and their job's got to be done. You've got to stick a lot of opinions in your pack and keep it there. Of course I've got a lot of little old sayings that I don't mean to say, but they come out. After I say them I apologize, because I don't mean it. But I want to keep on friendly terms with the boys, and I know they don't like that. Like "not having a nigger's chance."

At the same time, it must be recognized that the success of integration in predominantly Negro units is in no small part due to the effort of Negro troops and officers to make the white replacements feel at home.

(White artilleryman): Some of my best buddies in the Army are here. I guess a fellow's opinion changes after he really gets down to know them and work with them. I'd rather stay here than go to some other outfit. They never give me no unfair deals. I got as many breaks as anybody in the outfit. I made corporal in fifteen days after I come in. Maybe even got a better break.

(White EM, engineers): Right off the bat everything clicked. In fact, they were more concerned with getting us in out of the weather and getting us bedded down. Just everything in general. Myself, I didn't have a bedroll or a cot. My motor sergeant got me a cot. He didn't have to. He seemed very concerned about it. We're just another soldier just like they are. . . . I've been treated better in this colored outfit than among a lot of white ones. They've been real good to me.

In some cases, the new replacements are handed choice assignments. This may be because they are deliberately favored by the unit commanders, or in some cases, because the white replacements compare favorably in educational background with the Negroes, and are therefore in a superior competitive position.

In addition, where white replacements are to take the place of Negro specialists who are about to be rotated, there is an inevitable eagerness shown on the part of the "old men" to train the newcomers and make them feel at home.

Finally, perhaps the single most important reason why white troops in largely Negro units have adjusted as well as they have is the effect of sheer inertia. Once established in a given place, men develop human contacts, a sense of security, a feeling of participation in the work of the unit and of pride in its actions.

(White artilleryman): I hadn't been sorry about it. This is a good outfit. At Hwachon, when we got hit on the 22d of April, this battery defended its weapons all night long. There were a lot of outfits there that didn't do that.

(White artilleryman): We just got a lot of replacements in here and they're sort of that way—not settled down. But they'll settle down, and when they do, it'll be the same old outfit it was again. . . . Everybody that passed by used to give compliments about how good the outfit was at firing. We had real teamwork.

(White corporal, engineers): I believe from everything I can find out—I've been through ordnance and every kind of unit—and everywhere I get the story that the boys are doing a marvelous

job over here. They've been working themselves dead. . . . They're a clean bunch of boys. As far as I'm concerned they're good men.

Perhaps the most revealing remark uttered on the subject of "reverse integration" is made by a white private who had been in a predominantly Negro engineer company for several months. In the course of his interview he stops to say: "In fact this is the first time I've ever let a thought of it enter my head."

EFFECT OF INTEGRATION ON ATTITUDES

It has already been indicated in the preceding section that in units in which integration has taken place, there is little evidence of tension or conflict between Negroes and whites. In fact, there is considerable evidence of friendly personal relationships. This is in contrast to the frequently expressed fears of white officers and enlisted men in units which have not experienced integration. It therefore becomes pertinent to ask whether integration itself, involving as it does an exposure to members of a hitherto unfamiliar or only superficially familiar group, does not produce a change of attitudes and opinions.

This question is of vital importance. If the answer should be negative, it would imply that racial attitudes in the Army are more or less frozen at the state in which they exist in civilian life, and that any departure from local custom or tradition might encounter permanent obstacles.

On the other hand, an affirmative answer might suggest that soldiers would gradually accustom themselves to a change in traditional practice, and that this would be expressed not only by an accommodation in their overt behavior toward members of the other race, but in an inner change of opinion which might facilitate changes in behavior. The existance of such an "educational" effect would imply that an initial attitude of opposition or apathy toward integration might ultimately become one of acceptance or support, if the necessary conditions were established.

QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS

One way of answering this question is an examination of the statistical findings. Because of the circumstances of the study, it was obviously impossible to examine the attitudes of the same group of men before and after integration. However, by examining the attitudes of comparable individuals with different kinds and degrees of interracial experience, it is possible to draw inferences regarding the effects which such experience has had upon their opinions.

Quartermaster Troops

Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the effect of integration on the opinions of white troops occurs among the quartermaster troops studied. Here a direct comparison is possible between white men serving in an all-white unit and white men in a similar integrated unit.

The result of this comparison is clear: the whites who are serving side by side with Negroes are *far more favorable* to the idea of integration than are the whites who have not had this experience.

This is true whether the questions considered are impersonal — seeking attitudes on *policy* — or highly personal, asking each man how he himself feels about serving in a mixed unit.

Tables A80 and A81 exemplify the "educational" effect as it operated among white quartermaster troops in Pusan.

TABLE A80

WHITE QUARTERMASTER TROOPS WHO SAY NEGROES "SHOULD BE ASSIGNED AS INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT REGARD TO COLOR"

Respondents' units	Total responses	
	Number	%
All-white	68	15
Integrated	99	46

TABLE A81

WHITE QUARTERMASTER TROOPS WHO WOULD *NOT* OBJECT STRONGLY TO SERVING IN AN INTEGRATED PLATOON

Respondents' units	Total responses	
	Number	%
All-white	68	42
Integrated	99	86

Negro Troops

It is of interest that the pattern described here also appears to be true for a comparison of Negroes in mixed and all-Negro units, both in the quartermaster corps and in the infantry. Negroes in mixed units seem to be slightly more in favor of integration than are those in segregated companies. They are far less apt to rate the Negro soldier as a better fighter than the white man. Thus, under integration, the difference in attitudes between Negroes and whites tends to diminish.

National Guard Troops in Japan

Another organization in which comparisons may be made between white men in all-white units and men in integrated units is the 40th Div (California National Guard), stationed in Japan.

TABLE A82

WHITE INFANTRYMEN IN JAPAN WHO SAY NEGROES "SHOULD BE ASSIGNED AS INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT REGARD TO COLOR"

Respondents' units	Total responses	
	Number	%
All-white	181	50
Integrated	256	51

Here, however, the picture is not nearly as clearcut as in the case of the quartermaster units. Integration itself does not appear to have had any appreciable effect on the attitudes of the soldiers. The corresponding tables for these troops are Tables A82 and A83.

The differences here are negligible. It should be noted, however, that the white men in the California National Guard division are generally *more favorable initially* toward the idea of integration than the quartermaster troops. Thus, comparison between the National Guard tables and the quartermaster tables shows that the men sampled in the Guard Division, whether or not they served in units with Negroes, are nearly as favorable to integration as are the quartermaster troops who are serving in integrated units.

TABLE A83

WHITE INFANTRYMEN IN JAPAN WHO WOULD *NOT* OBJECT STRONGLY TO SERVING IN AN INTEGRATED UNIT

Respondents' units	Total responses	
	Number	%
All-white	181	75
Integrated	256	80

Effects of Combat

Association in combat probably represents the highest degree of personal interdependence which soldiers can experience. Therefore it is of interest to compare white soldiers, in integrated units, who have seen combat, with others in the same units, who have not had combat experience, Tables A84 and A85.

TABLE A84

INTEGRATED WHITE INFANTRYMEN WHO SAY NEGROES "SHOULD BE ASSIGNED AS INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT REGARD TO COLOR," ANALYZED ACCORDING TO EXTENT OF COMBAT EXPERIENCE

Respondents' area of origin and degree of combat experience	Total responses	
	Number	%
Southerners		
Without combat experience	62	27
With combat experience	322	41
Non-Southerners		
Without combat experience	125	44
With combat experience	575	52

TABLE A85

INTEGRATED WHITE INFANTRYMEN WHO WOULD *NOT* OBJECT STRONGLY TO SERVING IN AN INTEGRATED PLATOON

Respondents' area of origin and degree of combat experience	Total responses	
	Number	%
Southerners		
Without combat experience	62	58
With combat experience	322	68
Non-Southerners		
Without combat experience	125	82
With combat experience	575	80

Contact in Civilian Life

Another comparison which seems to demonstrate the effect of contact upon racial attitudes can be made among three groups of white men in integrated units: those who have had little or no contact with Negroes in civilian life; those who have had moderate contact; and those who have had a great deal of contact.

This comparison again reveals an educational effect. The greater his contact with Negroes, the more likely a white soldier is to have a favorable attitude toward integration. This is indicated in Tables A86 and A87.

TABLE A86

INTEGRATED WHITE INFANTRYMEN WHO SAY NEGROES "SHOULD BE ASSIGNED AS INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT REGARD TO COLOR," ANALYZED ACCORDING TO EXTENT OF CIVILIAN CONTACT WITH NEGROES

Respondents' contact with Negroes in civilian life	Total responses	
	Number	%
Little or no contact	435	36
Some contact	362	45
Much contact	287	61

TABLE A87

INTEGRATED WHITE INFANTRYMEN WHO WOULD NOT OBJECT STRONGLY TO SERVING IN AN INTEGRATED PLATOON

Respondents' contact with Negroes in civilian life	Total responses	
	Number	%
Little or no contact	435	68
Some contact	362	75
Much contact	287	88

INTERVIEW FINDINGS ON ATTITUDE CHANGES

The statistical evidence points to an affirmative answer to the question which was raised at the beginning of this section: Does exposure to integration make attitudes more favorable? Interviews with both officers and enlisted men provide strong additional support for this conclusion.

It must be recognized that even under conditions of segregation, the Army provides an environment in which each of the racial groups has contacts with the other, though these are not of the intimate and extended character that occurs in integrated units. The white man whose contact, either direct or indirect, is with Negroes in segregated units, may develop opinions of them where none existed before. This is evident in the criticism already reported of the 24th Regt and other all-Negro units.

Where opinion changes are based on this kind of secondary and impersonal contact, they are obviously determined by the performance record of the particular Negro unit with which contact has taken place. For instance, if this unit happens to have an excellent performance record and a good reputation, the change may be in a favorable direction:

(Infantry sergeant): Our first action with colored troops was with the Ranger outfit, and they showed us quite a bit. I'm from the South, and I wouldn't have anything to do with them before, but I've gotten over that. . . . We went on a mission with them and they showed quite a bit of aggressiveness. My first contact with them was with the ___ in the last war. I was in a division adjacent to them. Then as a unit I didn't think much of them. But here in this war, I changed my opinion quite a bit. It was the Rangers mostly.

Changes of Opinion in Mixed Units

The changes just mentioned are general changes in the feelings of whites toward Negroes. But we are interested specifically in the changes which occur within mixed units, and more directly on the subject of integration itself. There is ample evidence that such changes of opinion take place, and that with very few exceptions they are favorable in character. Repeatedly the reaction voiced is one of surprise that the Negro arrivals do not fit the expectations and stereotypes formerly held.

Officers who have formerly opposed integration, or been skeptical of its success find that their fears do not materialize, and their views often change accordingly. In some cases, a change in viewpoint is directly related to the capacity of Negroes to perform their jobs effectively, and to a general realization of their potential role in the national defense.

(Divisional CofS): We have run into very little of this sectionalism that was first raised that you couldn't have Negro officers because of the social difficulties. I think most people probably are getting indoctrinated to the idea that he's a body and in the next war bodies are going to mean an awful lot. I think the feelings of officers on this subject far outweighs sectional feelings. It raises its head a lot less than it used to.

(Regimental staff officer): I found that the more time I spent with them the less prejudice I had. . . . Keep in mind that I was brought up in the South. A lot of my ideas have gone by the board.

(Infantry battalion adjutant): Before this thing happened, only one officer in the battalion agreed that this would work. We had a discussion of this at Christmas. One officer said that it would work and it would have to work and he was called a radical. It happens to be the battalion surgeon. He was right and we were wrong.

(Regimental commander): When I first heard that they were here after I took over as commander, I kept looking at them as I passed them and I kept wondering how many of them I had. I was pretty worried about the whole thing and would have strongly preferred not having them. But there wasn't any trouble and some of them turned out to be damned fine soldiers. . . . I've lost all my prejudices now. Because I've seen what kind of men some of them are.

It may be guessed, however, that since officers are not themselves in intimate personal contact with Negro members of their units, they might think of the success of integration in more or less abstract terms. However, the changes of opinion already indicated on the part of officers have their counterpart in the case of white enlisted men. In instance after instance, men contrast their present attitude toward Negro members of their units with attitudes which they held earlier.

(Two white infantrymen): (1): One man's like another man to me. Only thing was, I didn't think a colored boy could put up much of a fight. They'd been pushed around so much, all the fight was taken out of them, 'cept when they was fifty together and had knives.

(2): Boy, you sure have learned different!

(1): I sure did.

(2): Well, I never liked the colored folks. Always thought they'd bug out on you as well as smile at you. But if these boys are an example, I know better now.

(White infantryman): This is the first time I've ever been in a mixed unit, and I found out a colored man is just as good as a white. . . . I figure this is a good deal to get them when we did. I figure this is where you learn to get along because you have to get along.

(White artilleryman): Back in the States, I don't like 'em as good as I do over here. Over here, everybody's here to do a job. Back in the States you don't see them as much. Over here you might sit down and shoot the bull with one of them for three or four hours.

(Infantryman): I changed my mind a couple of times. First I didn't like them in civvies. Not that, but I just didn't have nothing to do with them. Then I thought they were nice people when I met some of the Negro officers and noncoms. Then I saw what the __th did, and I was sore again. Then I have these men who work with me. And I think they're OK again. I guess it's just what kind you meet and know and what their background is.

On occasion, reports of opinion change are made only with qualifications. It is argued, for example, that the particular Negroes with whom the individual had come in contact are exceptional men, and that the change of heart which has taken place applies to them specifically rather than to the Negro group as a whole: (Infantryman): "I didn't like niggers nohow, but now I think there are some exceptions who are as good as white men."

Previous Hostility and Attitude Change

It is of interest that individuals who express the greatest amount of hostility at first may subsequently manifest the most dramatic conversion to a friendly attitude. This may be because the subject is more charged emotionally for them than for those who initially react with apathy. Once being influenced they may move more rapidly to a position of complete acceptance.

(Platoon leader, infantry): We had a very prejudiced chief of the w' section. We figured that would be the toughest place, but a (Negro) guy had the proper MOS, so we went in there under that sergeant. He turned out to be a hell of a good communications man. Now the sergeant swears by him.

In some instances, white soldiers refer directly to the friendships they have struck up with Negroes, and to the fact that these men do not fit their earlier notions of how Negroes act. The fear of difficulties or problems is dissipated as contacts between the two groups are placed on an individual personal basis rather than within the framework of preconceptions held by both parties. In this respect the relations between Negro and white troops in Korea are substantially different from those existing in previous wars, or in the peacetime Army.

Changes of opinion among soldiers in mixed units are not confined to individuals who start out with an attitude of indifference or an absence of fixed convictions. As the statistical findings show, soldiers from the Southern states, whose upbringing might in most cases make them opponents of integration, experience change along with the others. The following statement is typical of many:

(Infantryman): I'm from the South, and I was real cool to them when they came in last December. But I soon learned that they'd do anything they can for us. One of them stayed on a hill the Chinks were taking so that we'd all be sure to get off OK. We don't forget things like that. The other boy helped white boys off that were wounded.

Changes of Attitude among Negroes

Thus far the discussion has been confined to changes of opinion experienced by whites in integrated units. However, it has been noted that experience in such units affects the thinking of Negroes as well. Negroes, like whites, overcome their previous notions as to the motives, intentions, and behavior traits of the other group:

(Negro EM, QM company): Just as I said before, mixing is the best thing for the Army because there are many advantages. From my knowledge of white people at Fort Sill and back in Florida, I didn't have a very favorable opinion of them. If this is not to be quoted in my name [Of course not!] I hate white people. Now if all white people were like the white boys in this company it wouldn't take long before everybody would get along swell. Of course you know I can only speak from what I have seen in the past month. If the colored and white get along together the same way from now on, I'm all for mixed units.

(Negro infantryman): Well, I ain't never had much to do with white folks. I come from Florida. When I learned that I was coming to a white outfit, I thought sure that I wouldn't like it. But these 'fay (white) boys ain't so bad to get along with. I find them no different from other folks. They treat me all right. I sleep and eat with them. None have said anything out of the way about my race. This here mixed unit is OK with me.

In instances where Negroes have been integrated with whites, forming attachments and friendships, and have then been transferred into all-Negro units, the second move entails considerable reluctance, and even outright unhappiness:

(Battalion commander): The regimental commander decided that he would take all the colored soldiers out of the white battalions except the weapons companies. It was interesting that many of the soldiers who were being transferred didn't want to go. . . . I happened to witness a rather unusual incident. This battalion was leaving the demonstration area and the —th battalion (all-Negro) was marching into the area. And a number of our men started yelling "Hey Joe!" at one big colored man who had been in this battalion for a while. And this great big colored man was marching down the road with tears in his eyes. He was actually crying, he was so miserable.

In summary, the experience of integration makes both whites and Negroes more favorable toward each other, and more disposed to accept integration than they were previously.

ADJUSTMENT TO INTEGRATION

The previous section has discussed the effect of integration on certain attitudes related to integration. It is reasonable now to ask what effect integration has on the morale of troops. Is it true, as sometimes charged, that the presence of Negroes will lower the morale of whites in mixed units, weaken their personal adjustment to Army life and therefore presumably their combat effectiveness? Conversely, how does mixing affect the morale level of Negroes?

QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES

The answers to these questions depend rather heavily on the definition which is assigned to the elusive, loosely used, and variously interpreted word "morale." In the design of the questionnaire which provided tne quantitative data for this study, morale was defined as a set of related or unrelated attitudes which, from a military viewpoint, would be considered desirable in a soldier; morale was not regarded as a single element but as a series of qualitatively different elements each of which is an interest in itself.

These elements included men's general evaluation of the "morale" of their unit, men's reactions to unit leaders, reactions to military discipline, job satisfaction, personal adjustment, identification with the Army, and commitment to the Korean campaign effort.

Comparison of men in mixed and segregated units with respect to these various elements is possible between men in integrated units and men in segregated units, in the case of both Negro and white troops.

In the case of Negroes morale items may be compared in integrated and segregated units both in the infantry and in the quartermaster units. For the white troops, comparisons are possible in the quartermaster and the National Guard units.

The results of the questionnaire study, on the various elements of morale, mentioned previously, are as follows:

Evaluation of Unit Morale

The troops were asked to evaluate the morale of their own units. Among the white troops there is a tendency for those in integrated units to report a slightly higher morale than those in all-white units.

For the Negro troops there are no marked differences between integrated and segregated units. Slightly higher morale is reported among the segregated Negro infantry units; among the quartermaster groups higher morale is reported in the integrated units. On the whole, Negroes report higher morale than white soldiers.

Reactions to Unit Leaders

Among the white soldiers in the National Guard there is a slight tendency to rate officers more highly in the integrated units; the reverse tendency is found among the white soldiers in quartermaster units.

Among the Negroes a slight tendency to rate officers higher prevails in the integrated units. In over-all terms, there is little difference between Negroes and whites in this respect.

Reaction to Military Discipline

On the whole there are no important differences between reactions in integrated and segregated units, for either white or Negro troops. Comparing the two racial groups, there seems to be a tendency for the Negroes to be less bothered by the demands of military discipline than the whites.

Job Satisfaction

Questions were asked concerning the preference for jobs (the soldier's present job as opposed to other possible jobs) and the feeling of importance in the job being done. In this sphere there seems to be little difference between segregated and integrated units among either whites or Negroes. The only exception is a tendency for Negroes in integrated quartermaster units to be more satisfied than are those in comparable segregated units. Few differences are found between Negroes and whites in respect to these questions.

Identification with the Army

Pretty much the same picture as reported previously is found in respect to the soldier's feeling that what he is doing, as a soldier in the Army, is important. When a comparison is made of answers to a question in which the troops are asked to compare the relative importance of being in the Army, working in a civilian job, and going to school or college, no differences are found except in the quartermaster units. Also, there is a marked tendency for the men in the integrated units to show a closer identification with the Army.

Commitment to the Korean War Effort

Among the white troops there is not a clear picture. The integrated white quartermaster troops are more apt to say that the war is worth fighting than are the segregated whites. The reverse is true in the National Guard units. Among the Negro troops, there is little difference in the infantry units and a tendency for the integrated Negro quartermaster soldiers to be more committed than the segregated soldiers.

Summary of Questionnaire Findings

The adjustment variables studied in the questionnaires show slight and somewhat inconsistent differences, if any, between men in integrated units and men in segregated units — whether the men considered are white or Negro. It is safe to say that, insofar as these comparisons can be taken as a measurement of change, *there is no evidence of any striking effect of integration on the adjustment level of either whites or Negroes.*

INTERVIEW EVIDENCE ON NEGRO MORALE

As has been pointed out, the questionnaire study dealt with morale in terms of what appear to be attitudes desirable from a military viewpoint. In the intensive interviews no predetermined definition was assigned to the word "morale"; men were permitted to speak of it in whatever terms or context they liked; each man could use his own definition. The result is that, in all probability, the results of the qualitative interviews are closer to the men's own feelings on the subject of morale, as defined by the men themselves.

Seen in this light, the interview materials indicate that Negro morale in all-Negro units is decidedly lower than it is in mixed units. It has already been stressed that among Negroes in segregated units many of the gripes common to all soldiers are frequently viewed

in racial terms, while this is not true of Negroes in mixed units. Both Negro and white soldiers assert that there is higher morale among Negroes in the mixed units.

(White infantryman): Seems like the colored have better morale if they're stuck with white troops. They keep their morale higher. Seems like they feel better — more stuck up than when they're with the colored troops.

(Negro infantry officer): About this unit; it's a good unit, and it has a lot of good men in it; but as long as it's an all-colored outfit, the performance of the bad ones is going to make the reputation of the whole outfit. I say, break it up, redistribute the men in other units. If they would integrate white soldiers in it, that would be the best thing; but they aren't going to do that, ever.

The questions asked at the start of this chapter may now be answered as follows: integration has no noticeable effect on the morale or adjustment of white troops. It appears to raise that of the Negroes.

REACTIONS TO NEGRO AND WHITE LEADERSHIP

NEGRO LEADERSHIP UNDER INTEGRATION

One of the most sensitive aspects of the problem of integration concerns the achievement of ratings and rank by Negroes in mixed units. The ideas expressed on this subject by men of both races may be grouped under two main questions: What chance will Negro soldiers have to achieve positions of leadership in mixed units? What will be the reactions of white soldiers under such leadership?

Chances for Leadership

There is an interesting divergence between the opinions of whites and Negroes with regard to Negro opportunities for leadership. The Negro soldier sees the chief obstacle to his advancement in the possibility of discrimination against him by his superior officers. His whole attitude toward integration itself may be determined by his uncertainty that he will get a fair deal. A Negro corporal in a mixed hospital unit expresses such doubts:

> I think that the chances for securing a rating are best in the all-colored units. [Why?] Then it is not a question of whether to rate a colored or a white soldier. If the Negro is just as good as the white he is not likely to get a rating. To be a Negro and get rated you have to be twice as good as the next white boy to get the job.

Whites, on the other hand, envision the difficulty as a consequence of the Negro's lower capacity to compete for positions of leadership. The statements of some whites, usually officers, suggest that under full-scale integration, Negro soldiers as a group will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage. A general officer opposed to integration observes: "When you put a Negro in with a white man, he doesn't have the same chance for ratings and promotions as he has when he is competing with his own kind, and that is something they ought to consider." A staff officer in an all-white division feels that the educational deficiency of Negroes is too great for integration to work:

> They've come up a long way since 1863. When you look back on it, it's been one of the most remarkable achievements of all time, what that race has done. But before they can do what would be required of them in a job in this division, they have a long way to go yet. I think we ought to build schools for them and just wait.

This argument is plausible in the light of what is known regarding the lower average level of education in the Negro population as a whole. Until the disparity is appreciably lowered in civilian life, it might be expected that, for an indeterminate period after full-scale integration, Negroes would have a smaller share of ranks and grades than their proportion of total Army strength might seem to warrant.

There is little evidence of apprehension on this score among Negro soldiers. Although the possibility of such a development was repeatedly raised in the interviews, the customary response is that the crucial factor would be the disposition of the commanding officer: if he based promotions on merit, Negroes say they would be content to take their individual chances along with other soldiers.

Closely related to this attitude is the feeling that the most important objective is to insure the best possible leadership, and that, accordingly, the most qualified man should have the job, regardless of race. Where the competitive disadvantage is clearly recognized, it is often referred to as part of the price to be paid for integration.

(Negro enlisted man, integrated engineer unit): In the mixed unit the Negro would suffer for promotion as you know. He is with a poor education and ain't had many opportunities. But there can't be achievement until people are willing to accept each other.

(Negro infantryman, integrated regiment): I think that we are not going to have much trouble in getting ratings. Rotation will make ratings possible. Pretty soon we will be the oldest guys in the outfit and they will have to make us squad leaders and sergeants. The platoon leader is not going to put a green man as leader in battle.

(Two Negro enlisted men, integrated QM company): (1): The CO told us that we have the same chance as anybody else to get ratings if we prove to be good soldiers. Take G____ over there, he's just been raised to corporal.

(2): I think that this will work. I was told by an old Army man that all you have to do is know the right people and do your work. If you know the right people in anything you do you will get your promotions.

(1): The important thing as I see it is that the man knows the job. If the man knows his job it don't make no difference if he is white or Negro.

There is little or no express recognition on the part of Negroes of the problem that lies uppermost in the minds of many white soldiers when they consider the possibility of serving under Negro leaders. These white reactions to the idea of Negro leadership are discussed in the remainder of this section.

White Opposition to Negro Leaders

It is of interest to compare the fears and doubts expressed on this subject in situations where the question is academic, with the behavior and opinions of men who have actually faced the problem. Since Negro leadership of whites is rare in American society, many white soldiers view its possibility with reluctance. Frequently, the fear is expressed that to place a Negro officer or noncom over white troops will cause trouble, especially a nong those hostile to Negroes. As one officer comments:

(Battalion executive officer): The primary thing of course was the problem of rank. Which to my mind is one of the biggest problems in dealing with the colored soldier. I think you'd have difficulty with a colored noncom, particularly one in a command where 80 percent of the command was white. There are so many individuals who are prejudiced, whether we like it or not.

This kind of feeling is not confined to the individual who is himself hostile to the idea of Negro leadership; it is often expressed by white officers and men who are favorable toward integration.

Some white soldiers express apprehension that Negro leaders would show favoritism and abuse authority.

(Infantry private): You gotta be careful though to stay one step ahead of them. If they were running this company things would be different. Then they'd show favorites and soon we'd really get it.

(Infantry private): Some of them (the Negro noncoms) would be all right, others wouldn't. It seems to go to their head a little, authority and all. I wouldn't like it too much. The rest of the company would feel the same way.

(Infantry private): I think if a white soldier is in a mixed outfit, he should do the best he can to get along with the colored. However at times it's hard to do because they themselves don't do this. If you give them an inch they will take a mile.

The thought of such a serious departure from familiar customs raises real fears.

(Infantry lieutenant): There is a horror of the possibility that we might get colored officers. And many people have expressed a reluctance to serve under or with colored officers. One officer

has gone so far as to say he would resign. Not because of prejudice, but because he doesn't think it would be militarily possible. . . . One company commander said, "It's bad enough to have to serve in the Army and make everybody 'sir' you — the white personnel would not go for that."

White Acceptance of Negro Leaders

A large proportion of the white soldiers express a willingness to accept Negroes in positions of authority. This has already been demonstrated in the section on attitudes toward integration. Although men indicate that they would accept Negro leaders, this does not necessarily mean that they would welcome them. It is quite customary for soldiers to accept distasteful and unusual experiences within the framework of military discipline and the habits of army life.

It is noticeable that objections to Negro officers in positions of leadership over whites are usually emotional reactions based on stereotyped images of what Negroes are like. On the other hand, the acceptance of Negro leadership is based on military logic.

(Infantry private): The Negro will go as far as a white with the same character. It's just the old Southern fear that the "neegahs" will overrun the white man if they're given a chance. I've seen Negro noncoms in basic and in garrison; they do their job just like anyone else. I never heard any complaints from men under them, except for the same bitches they would have with a white man.

(Divisional commander): At Camp ____ I had a Negro officer commanding both white and Negro troops, and it worked. It will work if the man is a capable leader. It will work in this division if the time comes.

This argument holds, in short, that the competence of the individual is more important than his membership in a certain group. Expression of this viewpoint is often coupled with a statement of faith in the Army's capacity to select leaders on the basis of merit:

(Infantryman): If a man's a louse as a noncom, he's soon out. If not, then he's the kind of man you'd like to have around. Kinda useful if he saves your neck. It doesn't make any difference if he's colored. A man that saves your neck is a man that saves your neck.

Some white soldiers hold a purely pragmatic attitude in regard to Negro leadership. Their view is that, since nothing can be done about it, one simply must go along with the new situation.

(Infantryman): Myself, I wouldn't want to, but there'd be nothing you could do about it, so you just adjust yourself, that's all.

(Infantryman): Well, if he's in the Army, you take orders from him. You do the work and it gets along OK. You can't do anything about it. It would probably be a little hard at first, but you'd get along.

Another expression of the pragmatic attitude is the argument that rank must be respected no matter who bears it:

(Infantry sergeant): I figure if he gave me an order I would just have to do the job because I would know it would come down from higher headquarters. I know there would be someone over him all the while. . . . If he has a rank he has a right to it. If he didn't have it I don't believe he would have got it. If he worked his way up to it, I believe he deserves it.

(Infantry private): Out here a sergeant's a sergeant and you take orders black or white. He's got the Army behind him and can have your neck any time.

In integrated units, in which Negro soldiers have won acceptance, white men are usually aware of the possibility that Negroes may win ratings. Since they see the problem in terms of individuals whom they know, rather than in terms of an abstract image, it is easy for them to accept this possibility. In this type of situation there can be no doubt as to whether the white soldiers will follow Negro leadership:

(White private in mixed unit): P____ (Negro assistant squad leader) is sure to make platoon sergeant as soon as Sgt ____ is rotated. All the boys want him, and will follow him more than any

other man. The captain will go along. I don't think the captain likes colored too much. Shows it in lots of ways, like the details he gives out. But he respects them too and knows what's best for his company.

Result of Experiences with Negro Leadership

It is possible that, in some cases, experience with Negro leaders reenforces anxieties, or creates them, where none had previously existed. However, experience seems to have a favorable influence on attitudes. This is illustrated by the comment of a white infantryman from Alabama, serving in a predominantly Negro company: "These nigger officers are all right. They're different from any other niggers I've met. They're good men."

Negroes in positions of leadership seem to experience few of the difficulties projected in the apprehensions of white soldiers. All the instances of Negro leadership cited by white soldiers lend support to this proposition. A white master sergeant from Texas had this to say:

I was first sergeant of an outfit that was completely mixed, back in the States, and we never had any trouble. We had colored noncoms, and none of the white boys would object or say anything if a colored noncom chewed him out. . . . You live with them, same as everybody else. I've invited them home for dinner when I was stationed in Kansas, and they've had to remind me that people around there might not like it. I just say, "Hell, it makes no difference."

And others say:

(White military policeman): So far there are no complaints. They're noncommissioned officers, whether they're colored or white. They've still got the responsibility. I've never seen a noncom yet that was colored and wasn't a good man. They're tops around here. I never saw an average in a colored man. They're either really on the ball or not at all.

(Infantry private): We have a section sergeant here that's colored and I think he's the best sergeant we've got, myself. There's not a better man in the company. Everybody likes him. And we have a corporal in the company that lays wire. Everybody likes him.

(Infantry private): I knew a colored lieutenant back in Camp ____. I never met a finer man. He knew the personnel business. All the men in his section looked up to him.

These statements are typical of many statements made by white soldiers who have undergone this experience. They coincide with numerous reports by white officers. A personnel officer who had questioned white soldiers in a mixed unit with Negro noncoms reports that: "I talked to some of the white men who were under colored sergeants, and they felt no resentment at all. They said it was going to get the war over sooner and they liked their noncoms."

The other side of the story is illustrated in a Negro officer's description of his experience in a predominantly white platoon.

I never have been able to tell the difference. There was no apparent resentment at my taking over the platoon. The men obey the orders without kicks and all get along very fine. My platoon sergeant is from South Carolina and you would not want to find a better guy anywhere. He takes his orders and handles the men well. We sleep and eat together. I sleep in the middle and my two sergeants sleep on either side. I have not slept with the colored medic but once since joining the unit and that was simply because we were the last to reach the top of the hill and the others had already pitched tents.

Of his experiences in the ZI, he reports:

I was in mixed outfits in the States for a long time. I never had any difficulties whatever. At one time I was in command of a platoon with all white soldiers. I didn't know how it was going to work out, because a lot of them were Southern boys. But everything went along smoothly and they were sorry to see me go. We had the best platoon on the post, the CO told me that.

It is interesting to compare this Negro officer's comments with those of three white enlisted men in his platoon, who were interviewed at the same time by another interviewer:

(1): He's a fine man. He stays right with us. He never has let us down. I don't think there's a man in the company don't think he's the best platoon leader they've ever had. No one ever said a word about his being colored.

(2): I never cared for them [Negroes] before, and I guess I still don't. But this lieutenant, he's OK.

(3): The thing about the lieutenant is that he treats us like men, not servants. He doesn't ask us to do anything for him, personally, and goes up those hills like the rest of us. And when we think he's wrong about something, we tell the sergeant and he comes down to talk to us. Sometimes he sees it our way, sometimes no. But at least he thought about it.

The significance of these three statements lies in the fact that the Negro lieutenant was judged as an officer, not as a Negro. His ability as an officer dominates even the reaction of a soldier who continues to dislike Negroes in general.

It is evident that in the case of Negro leadership of whites, as in the case of integration itself, the anticipated difficulties fail to materialize in practice.

NEGRO ATTITUDES TOWARD WHITE LEADERSHIP

It is common to find among white officers and men the belief that the Negro prefers white leadership and the companion view that the Negro soldier performs better under white leadership, particularly Southern white leadership. In the words of one white colonel:

They don't respect their own leaders. They respect a white man more. The Southern officers know them and understand them best, and they prefer those. A company commander in one of those outfits has to be in two places at once. He has to be leading them and booting them from behind at the same time.

This point of view is expressed often by white soldiers, but it is contrary to the evidence. Surveys made in World War II show that Negro troops in all-Negro units prefer Negro officers to whites, and that they prefer Northern whites to Southerners. (These findings are true of both Northern and Southern Negroes.*) The present study shows a similar pattern. Only a minority of Negro soldiers agree that Negroes more readily follow white leaders than they follow Negroes.

(Negro infantryman): It seem like to me that Negro soldiers will perform better for white officers. That's Mr. Charlie speaking. Now if one of us seem to be getting ahead, the other one will reach up and try to pull you down. We just can't let one of our kind stay there long.

However, the majority of the opinions of Negro soldiers interviewed in Korea assume one or the other of two positions: that "color does not matter if the man is a good officer"; or that they prefer Negro officers. The latter preference acquires its significance chiefly insofar as there is fear that white officers may be prejudiced. Two quotations from Negro soldiers will illustrate this point.

(Infantryman, mixed company): If the men like any officer they will follow him. There is greater chance that you will like a Negro officer. If the white man is a prejudiced son of a bitch, he is likely to get a shot in the back. I have heard that it has happened.

(Infantryman, all-Negro unit): I think it all depend on the officer. If the guy is a good officer, you'll fight. The officer can't treat you like a dog and then tell you to go ahead.

These two statements emphasize, incidentally, the Negro's desire for white officers who exhibit no prejudice. One difficulty in meeting this desire is the fact that the Negro's

* Stouffer, S. A., *et al.*, *The American Soldier*, Vol. 1, p. 581.

interpretation of prejudiced behavior on the part of a white officer may exist without awareness on the part of the white officer. (Negro MP): "Most of the white officers will show some prejudice. Our present CO is no good; he's prejudiced. That man done court-martialed all but 40 of the men."

Objections to White Officers by Negroes

Negro soldiers voice many objections to white officers. There is a widespread belief that many of the white officers sent to Negro units are not well trained, although senior commanders often report that they select their best officers for these assignments. (It is pertinent to point out that most white officers interviewed regard assignment to a Negro unit as an onerous task. Because it appears less desirable than another type of assignment, it may provoke resentment in some individuals, and this may be unconsciously expressed in the handling of the men.)

(Negro infantryman, all-Negro unit): In this unit they put a lot of white lieutenants in charge who have not had much experience and I ain't going to let them get me loused up. Personally, I think that the officers coming to us now don't have enough training.

A related objection of some Negro troops to white officers appears in the following statement:

(Infantryman, all-Negro unit): The white officers failed to lead the attack. They wanted to stay in the rear and send the men on up the hill. The men did not like this very much for they thought that their officers should stay with them.

Another objection of Negro troops to white officers is the use of abusive language which is usually viewed by the Negro soldier as having racial implications. A Negro sergeant in an all-Negro unit speaks on the point as follows:

I think that you find they (Negro soldiers) do not like the CO. He is the kind of fellow that you have to know well before you can like him. He has a lot of temper and will frequently curse and holler at the men. He don't know how to handle colored men.

Preferences for Negro Officers

Many Negroes express an outright preference for Negro officers. Two reasons emerge as explanations for this preference. There is the feeling that the Negro officer has a better understanding than the white man of the Negro soldier and his problems:

(Negro infantryman, mixed unit): Well, the Negro officers would be more understanding of some of our problems. The white officers may be good but does not have the understanding of what the Negro face. I have had one white officer to ask me on many times about the Negro and what he would say or think if he should do certain things.

(Negro infantryman, mixed unit): Personally, I prefer the colored officer. You don't have any trouble with the colored officer. You might be lucky and get a good white officer. But the colored officer seem to me to be more friendly; they seem to take more time and tell you more things. The white officer don't take as much time as the colored officer to tell and explain things to you. 'Course other than this there ain't no difference.

Occasionally, Negro soldiers claim that the Negro officer is a better officer.

(Infantryman, all-Negro unit): I think that I would move farther for the Negro officer. He will mean what he tell you. You get the white officer and he will tell you to do things that he won't do hisself. The colored officer will expect more of you. He is a Army book officer. He will follow the book. I think that he is a better officer. He will have more experience than the white officer before they give him the job.

(Negro military policeman): I want a colored officer. When I was in Korea, we had a colored lieutenant who knowed so much more than the white captain that he just made a fool out of the captain.

Favorable Comments on White Officers

Favorable comments of Negro troops with regard to their white officers frequently show the same pattern that applies to their expression of preference for Negro officers:

(Infantryman, all-Negro unit): These officers are a lot easier than Negro officers. Negro officers stick to the book. These officers don't.

(Infantryman, all-Negro unit): I think that the white officer is more free with the giving of ratings.

While the view that Negroes respond better to white leadership finds some support in the comments of Negro soldiers, the focus of most comments heard in all-Negro units is either that color does not matter if the officer is competent, that, if a choice is indicated, the preference is for a Negro officer who is expected to have more understanding of the Negro soldiers' problems.

INTEGRATION IN ZONE OF THE INTERIOR

While this study was confined to the Far East Command, a great deal of the data collected bears on the wider problem of the Army-wide use of Negro manpower and on the subject of integration in the Zone of the Interior.

INTERVIEW FINDINGS ON ZI INTEGRATION ATTITUDES

In some cases, the interview material reflects pre-Korean experiences with integration. More often, it consists of opinions, assumptions, and inferences, whose core is the persistent question: What does the success of integration in Korea forecast for the US? By implication, certain of the statistical findings reported in earlier sections are also pertinent to the discussion.

Almost all persons who express opinions on the matter agree that integration among units in the ZI involves considerations of a different kind than are encountered in a theater of war.

Problems Anticipated by White Soldiers

Very often, the kinds of problems which are mentioned are similar to those met in integrated units in Korea, but attention is repeatedly called to the fact that the demands of the combat situation mitigate many of these problems. It is pointed out that the mitigating elements — the common danger, the need for manpower, the immediate demands of military action — will no longer function when troops are back home. Thus, the same arguments which are advanced in favor of integration in the fighting Army are used as the basis for predicting its failure in the peacetime Army. In essence, this point of view holds that integration is accepted only under the pressure of necessity and that it will not work when the necessity has disappeared.

Comments on the feasibility of integration in the States are usually directed at one or both of two phases of the question: problems occurring or assumed to be likely within the confines of the Army post; and difficulties to be encountered in neighboring communities. Often persons who feel that obstacles in the former area can be successfully dealt with are dubious about what, if anything, can be accomplished in the latter; post problems are military problems and presumably amenable to military solution. White officers and men specify these problems along the following lines:

Negro Soldiers Will Raise Problems. Removed from the war situation, where lives are interdependent, it is feared that Negro soldiers will become "uppity" and will attempt to dominate the whites with whom they are in contact.

(Infantryman): It might be a different thing there. He's colored and he might try to get sassy ideas when he's back where things count. Try to show off for the people back home and show off his power. The Army's different back in the States.

(Infantryman): Well, I didn't think much of the idea, first, but I guess it works OK. It's different out here than back in the States. Here they're mostly nice guys doing a lousy job. Back

there, they get sassy and smart and first thing you know they're cutting some white boy up and then there's a big f ght in the service clubs or PX.

This may be due not to any inherent fault in Negro soldiers who have been found acceptable in Korea, but simply to the company of undesirable Negro civilians. Under these influences, the vicious and immoral behavior attributed to some Negro garrison troops will become the pattern for all or most of them.

(Infantryman): Well, the colored fellas will start running around with the whooping nigguhs who have no responsibility, and then they become the same way and they embarrass you when you go out with them, the wild way they act and what they talk about.

(Staff officer): Then down at Polk the morals were terrible among the colored. There was a lot of dope used — we picked up an awful lot of niggers who were using dope — and, some of the stories that actually happened you wouldn't believe. . . .

Negro soldiers are said to have a tendency to clique, to bunch together and to gang up against white soldiers. They cannot do this in Korea, but in the States they would be able to do so. Many of these observations refer to past experiences with Negro troops in segregated units based at the same post. (Infantryman): "I don't think they ought to put too many of 'em in a squad. Not more than two. You get too many in a squad and they try to argue with the whites."

Another anticipated source of trouble is that Negro soldiers will feel that they are denied equal treatment and will insist on making use of the same post facilities as the whites.

(Infantry sergeant): Well, one particular place where I had other contact with them was at Fort Warren. I transferred there to the quartermaster replacement training center. We had both colored and whites there. I guess a good deal of the quartermaster bath companies, trucking companies, salvage companies were all-colored and there was a good deal of trouble up there over the service club and theater. They were both using the same ones, at least they were trying to. And there was coke bottles flying there. There was women on the post — WACs. One of these colored boys would walk in there and try and buy a ticket for the theater there, and brother! there was trouble. General ____ was pretty lenient with them. In fact we called him a "nigger lover" because we figured that he favored the Negroes. He put out an order saying that the service clubs would be available to all soldiers regardless of color. But I think that the biggest share of the Negroes stayed in their own areas rather than cause flare-ups. And we almost had a near race riot when a colored soldier kicked a white officer right in the groin over some argument. In the technical training, there they were all integrated but they were separated in their own units and they slept separate and went on training together.

Social and Recreational Activities Will Cause Conflict. It is in this area that the majority of the doubts about ZI integration are raised. The potential areas of friction are fairly sharply defined: they center around: (a) the prospect of Negro participation in social affairs at which women are present, and (b) the sex competition between white and Negro soldiers, chiefly off the post.

Officers' comments center on the first point; this is especially true of regular Army career officers for whom the Army post is "home" in the fullest sense. (It may be assumed that this would be less true of officers and men in a wartime "civilian Army.")

Enlisted men are more concerned with the second potential area of friction. Frequent reference is made to location of many Army posts in the Southern states; this is seen as a cause of basic difficulty.

(General officer): The trouble arises when you get mixing on social occasions at dances back in the States and then the family element enters and you get tension. I was in the division, the training division, back in the States. We mixed them up as they came into it and we had trouble — not because of the Army, but from the local population.

(CO, engineer battalion): In garrison, frankly, I believe there would be some trouble. Women would be the big thing. You know yourself, he's a soldier. Maybe a colored boy and white boy are

good buddies. They go to somewheres, get drinking and run up against some girl, that's where trouble begins.

(Infantry captain): I suppose we'll have to accept them as equals sooner or later, but I don't look forward to sitting at the same table with them and when I'm entertaining at the officer club, I certainly don't want one to dance with my wife. Maybe in another generation . . .

(Private, police): They're always propositioning the white girls. Especially in the hospitals. I know on the boat we had eight Red Cross girls and the colored guys were propositioning them. . . . In the hospitals, too. They'll offer her a drink, and then they'll proposition her. That happened at the station hospital.

(Staff officer): We had an engineering construction section with Negro enlisted men and white officers. EUCOM sent down a couple of Negro company officers to that battalion. We objected to that because of the after-hours aspect. They were giving a party for the colonel and one of the men got drunk and asked the colonel's wife to dance. Immediately half the officers walked out. When they start this amalgamation that's one of the things they have to watch out.

Occasionally, there is a reference to the difficulties which Negro soldiers may encounter in finding female company and to the problem which the community mores may pose for them.

(General officer): At Fort Riley, Kansas, a Negro officer could not find a place to eat, but that wasn't the Army. It was the local population. When you get into the realm of social activities you have got friction.

(EM, engineers): I spent two years in Walter Reed Hospital and there were a lot of colored boys out there and we got along fine. I did hear that they didn't have dances there because they couldn't get enough colored hostesses that was clean enough.

(White officer): Integrating them is the only solution. It has to be done at home as well as over here. There are only two major problems involved and both of them I think could be solved. One of them is the problem of promotions and the other is the after-hours problem, the social problem. That can be licked too. What you have to do is eliminate dances on the posts. Or establish separate service clubs for them. At Benning we used to have a problem with the colored officers. They had some sort of the fanatics from the Society for the Protection of the Colored Race, and they wanted to be members of the Officers' Club. We let them come in, but we also had a special club for them. Some of the fanatics would come to our club and they were just ignored. Nobody bothered with them. They just didn't have a good time and there were fewer and fewer coming. The local police there in Georgia used to be real hard on the colored officers' wives. They would rake them in on all kinds of charges — search their houses without a warrant. They were really rough on these people.

And those who have noted the development of friendships among white and Negro soldiers sometimes feel that these cannot survive the stress of local home community sentiment. (It is interesting, however, that this point is usually made in abstract terms rather than in terms of particular Negro "buddies.")

(Infantryman): Then there's the folks and the way they feel about it. They'd think I'd gone off my rocker. And how about the girls. No girl'd go out with me if I hung around with the black boys.

[But how about the colored guys you know right here?] That's different. I owe them something for sticking with me. They're swell guys and I wouldn't let them down. I'd do anything for them. . . . But even so, maybe, I'd have to be careful.

(Infantryman): It would never work in garrison due to the way of living of the colored people. In their off duty time, if you wanted to buddy with one, you'd want to go some place and he couldn't go there.

(White EM, divisional HQ): I'm not going to have a colored guy up to my house to meet my sister any more than I would have before the war, just because the guy was in the damned Army. Of course if he's wearing a ____ Div shoulder patch I'd consider him my buddy, same as any other guy from the ____ Div.

[How about this colored boy in the tent here?] Oh, that's different. He's just like any of the other boys. I'd take him home. I wouldn't think of treating him any different. He's a buddy of mine.

Finally, there are the expressions of those who, while they can put up with the close personal contact imposed by integration in the combat situation, feel that they would not be able to tolerate the same experience in the States. (Infantryman): "As far as serving with 'em, that's OK, but as far as living with them in garrison, that's no good. The group as a whole has different ways than white guys."

White Support of ZI Integration

White soldiers who are in favor of integration in the ZI seldom deny that there will be problems. They argue that the possibilities of conflict are less serious than is anticipated, and say that with the proper efforts the problems can be successfully overcome. Some advocate that Negro soldiers remain a modest minority of the troops stationed in any one location. Others urge that Army posts be placed near communities which can provide separate social outlets for Negro soldiers. It is suggested that northern communities would be preferable to southern towns as a setting for Army camps. It is suggested that there be separate dances or dance floors at Army posts, with other facilities being mixed.

It is also pointed out that the problem of off-duty conflict will be minimized through conventional social patterns, since white and Negro soldiers will observe the separation in social activities which ordinarily prevails in the civilian community. There is the belief that some of the comradeship developed in the combat theater will carry over and will help to minimize friction. There are expressions of confidence that Army policy may have an effect on the attitudes of the civilian population.

(Infantry Pfc): I believe it would work out all right if they were split up. So long as they're not in a majority. The white guys give the colored guys less bull than they give the white guys. My opinion around here — they're all right. A bunch of good guys. They're just like anybody else.

(Infantryman): I imagine it would work out all right. After you fight with 'em you respect 'em. It would work in the States if you had the same percentage as now. It would be no good half of each. It would split things in half. There'd be a lot of friction half and half.

(Second infantryman): I don't see how you could judge on a percentage basis. It's the individual that makes the difference. If we had the same type of guy we've got now, it would be OK. It would even work half and half.

(Infantry lieutenant): Back in the States, I move in my circles. However, here it's a melting pot. . . . However, there we have a choice of our circles.

(Infantry lieutenant): There's going to be a certain amount of comradeship developed here that will take care of the duties in the daytime. The men will have shared experiences. At night they're just going to form their own social levels, white or colored.

(Staff officer): I don't see why it shouldn't work in the States like it does here. If you tell the men that's the way it's going to be — that's the way it'll be. The civilians in the area will follow.

(Staff officer, engineers): Sure, I see no reason why it wouldn't work in the States. You get back to the same thing that does exist in the States. After duty hours, why then they would split. The colored people would go to their activities and the whites to theirs. When they leave the post they wouldn't mingle. They couldn't mingle.

(EM, infantry HQ): Sure it'll work. It worked in the outfit I was in. Of course in the South you're not going to change the people outside of the Army. On the Army post I'd do everything with them; go to the beer hall, movies, and everything. When we leave the post we each go our own way. I couldn't do it, because I'd be purged.

Attitudes of Negro Soldiers toward ZI Integration

There are almost no Negro soldiers who do not favor integration in the training and garrison sphere as well as in combat. Negroes' views on the subject cannot be classified as pro and con: they differ chiefly in being either pessimistic or optimistic as to the probability of success. They show full awareness of all the potential sources of tension and conflict which have already been detailed. If anything, their observations are even more pointed

than those of the whites. The few outright objections to "stateside" integration consist of the familiar references to the congenial atmosphere in all-Negro units.

On the pessimistic side, comments such as these are heard: (Negro Infantryman): "Too many of the boys is losing their life for nothing. I don't see nothing over here to gain. When we git back to the States it will be the same. We want a change."

Even the optimists are restrained:

(Artilleryman): If we mix the troop now when we get back to the States things will have to change at home. A man won't forget another man who saved his life. 'Course when we are in the States I don't know about mixing. You see a soldier like to have a buddy. If you have a white buddy what can you do when it come to going out with the women. I know you can't do it in Louisiana and you can't do it in most places in the North.

(Infantryman): When they're in the Army anytime and mixed, even back in the States, they change. Well sir, it'd be a mighty ungrateful man who wouldn't remember what went on over here—how other men fight along with him and help him and maybe save his life for him.

Some of them going back on rotation, why they tell me to be sure and look them up when I get back—even some of them boys from down South.

(Negro medical officer): We are getting a considerable amount of integration going on now. I think it is coming very fast far as I see it, integration is the best way to operate the Army. I had a chance to see it beginning before leaving the States. I was at a camp in South Carolina when we got our first mixing. Colored and white trained together but stayed apart. It was a rather cumbersome way of doing things. Negroes stayed on one part of the post and whites stayed on the other. We did not use their recreational facilities. There were many events on the main post of a cultural and social nature that we did not attend. One day we spoke to the CO about it and he was willing to carry out the Army policy in full. He told us that he could make the changes on the post but that he did not have anything to do with the local community which practiced segregation. I think that he did a very wise thing in his efforts to effect the change. He called the white officers and told them that Negroes were going to be permitted to use all of the facilities and that he did not want any trouble because it was the policy of the Army. He also talked to the colored soldiers, and he told them that with all the post's facilities opened to them, he hoped they would conduct themselves in such a way as not to participate in the creation of any situations. As a result of this move Negroes moved about freely at the camp without the least bit of trouble.

Yes, in the Army you will get very little trouble if the top echelon favors integration because the men by and large are going to reflect the attitude of the top command. It has been my experience that whenever the top command hands down a policy it is usually put into effect. Of course, sometimes there may be an officer somewhere who attempts to avoid coming around but in time he has to fall in line with policy.

I had this experience in the States before coming to Korea. I was traveling with my wife and mother-in-law and wanted to spend the night at Ft. Meade. I didn't know whether there would be difficulty in securing accommodations or not. So I went to the Officer of the Day and asked him if there were any other Negro officers around that I might know. He said: "I don't know, but here let me fix you up for the night and then you can walk around and find out for yourself." Really, the Army can move even faster than it is and there would be no trouble or very little trouble in getting all units integrated.

The only source of friction involves women. I have seen it work many times in Europe, at home and over here. As long as there are enough women, there seems to be little difficulty. In England, Negro and white soldiers associated with the same women without too much trouble as long as they were in places where there were enough women for all. As soon as there is some competition for the available women, then you get trouble. In Paris there were plenty of women and the men of both races got along all right. It does not seem to matter about the color of women so much as it does about the supply Beyond the problem of women, integration works well because the men usually accept Army policy and it is the most effective way of getting the most effectiveness out of all the men.

(Infantryman): I think that we get along all right in mixed groups but we are likely to get loused in the all-Negro group. When the white boys get back and tell of their experience with the colored over here, I think that it will help some. Maybe they are just beginning to understand that a man is a man. Then too it may be just because they want to get a chance to get home on rotation. With only six months before rotation some may feel that they can put up with anything for six months.

(Infantryman): It will work in the States 'cording to the intelligence of the colored and the white people. It might work better in the North where the people is more intelligent. Them white southern people is ignorant. When I lose my blood over here, it look just like the blood of the white men. I loves my life just like he loves his.

(Infantryman): I believe they will straighten out more as it goes on. I think a lot of 'em won't forgit it — how there was times when they had to depend on some colored soldier for they lives. And I think it depend on the man and the kind of people he's around afterward. If he's with one kind, he'll probably be all right; if he's with those dichards, it'll be different.

(Negro MP): It might work in Korea. White man is your friend as long as you're protecting him. In the states and over here it's different. When the white man think he out of danger then he will act different.

(Hospital Pfc, Negro): I trained in a mixed unit. There was lot of prejudice in the nearby town. We were told that there would be no segregation on the post but that they could not change the town. But the boys found ways of getting around it. We worked together wonderfully.

(Negro enlisted man): Well, one thing, they used to have dances there. Well, the white soldiers they had more places they could get girls — all those little towns around there. We colored soldiers could only get the girls from ____. So we didn't have as many dances. One time one of the colored boys decided he was going to one of the white dances and he went. Well he was going to dance with one of the white girls there — he knew her from somewhere and she didn't mind dancing with him. Boy they sure turned out the dance that night.

The next day the post commander — General ———, I think it was, or some representative of his — came over and made a speech. He said if there wasn't mixed dancing, there wouldn't be no dancing at all. Well, that stopped all the dances then. . . . But pretty soon they got around that; they made all the dances by invitation only. So that was that; course no colored soldiers ever got invited. They most always find a way to get around you.

And for some, the problem is resolved with the statement that integration applies only in the military sphere. (Sergeant, engineers): "The mixed unit will work out in the States. The average person thinks of the after-duty hours. I think about duty hours. I don't care about after-duty hours. Give me equality on the duty."

QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS

No firm conclusions can be drawn from the differences of opinion between advocates and opponents of integration in the ZI. However, many of the questionnaire findings have important implications for the likelihood of success if integration is carried out in the US.

This is especially true of those items which deal with the evaluations and expectations held regarding race relations in garrison and civilian life. Pertinent inferences can be drawn from some of the relationships between military attitudes and attitudes toward Negroes.

Joint Use of Facilities

A series of questions was asked on the joint use by Negroes and whites of facilities in the Army and in civilian life. In most cases the white troops think common use works out about the same or better than other (segregated) arrangements. When asked about joint use of the PX, for instance, about 22 percent of the white troops say that joint use does *not* work out as well. Sixty-six percent say it works out about the same and 10 percent say it was a better arrangement (see Tables A103 and A104).

On a similar question dealing with Army rest camps the proportions are approximately the same; here 29 percent think that an integrated arrangement did not work out as well as separation (Tables A105 and A106).

A similar picture is found in connection with the joint use of stores in civilian life (Tables A109 and A110).

The only place where there is any marked sentiment against joint use of facilities is with respect to transportation. Here the *Southern* whites, in keeping with regional custom,

are predominantly opposed to joint use of buses and sections of trains (Tables A125 and A126), while soldiers from other parts of the country think joint use is an acceptable practice.

On all of the previous questions, very few of the Negro soldiers express the view that joint use of facilities does not work out as well as segregated facilities (Tables A103–A110, A125, and A126).

Attitudes on Other Race Contact Situations

White soldiers (1084) indicate that they accept personal contact with Negroes in a military situation like the following:

> Question: "Pfc Joe Doakes goes to the hospital with a bad toothache. There are two dentists on duty, both first lieutenants, one colored and one white. When Joe's turn comes up he sees that the colored dentist is waiting for him. The white dentist is just finishing up with a patient, and it seems that he too will be free in a few minutes. What *should* Joe do?"

Behavior recommended	*Total responses, %*
He should go over to the colored dentist.	68
He should walk out to get a drink of water so that when he comes back the white dentist can take care of him.	14
He should stand and wait until the white dentist is finished.	4
No answer	14

The 1084 white soldiers even assert that a white soldier should come to the active defense of a Negro's rights to enjoy Army recreational facilities.

> Question: "Joe has been sent back to Japan on pass. He is sitting in a Service Club in Tokyo looking at a magazine. At the next table there is a colored soldier, also reading a magazine. Three white soldiers enter the Club. They stare at the colored man and one of them says in a loud voice, 'Don't you know this place is for white men only?' What *should* Joe do?"

Behavior recommended	*Total responses, %*
He should say, "This place is for any GI who wants to use it."	61
He should watch to see if there will be a fight.	5
He should put down his book and walk out of the club.	4
He should just keep on reading and pay no attention.	20
He should say, "We ought to make sure this place is kept for white men."	6
No answer	4

It is of interest that 52 percent of the Southern white troops say that Joe should speak out on the Negro's behalf, while only 20 percent think he should pay no attention.

The attitudes of white soldiers on the previous question are consistent with their views of how the Negro soldier would behave in the same situation. In the following table, Southerners reply as the others do:

> Question: "If you were the colored soldier in this situation, what do you think you would do?"

Behavior recommended	*Total responses, %*
I'd say, "This place is for anybody who wants to use it."	42
I'd call in whoever was in charge.	14
I'd just keep on reading and pay no attention.	19
I'd put down my book and walk out of the club.	7
I'd apologize first and then leave the club.	11
No answer	7

Expectations of Race Relations Trends

Another series of questions asks about expectations on future race relations trends. Slightly more than half of the white troops, and over three-fourths of the Negroes, expect an improvement in race relations and closer contact between the races both in Army and in civilian life. As the following table indicates, for instance, a majority of the 1084 white infantry troops expect integration will occur in the future Army.

> Question: "As time goes on, do you think that most colored soldiers will be found living and working with white soldiers in the Army, or do you think they will be mostly in outfits of their own?"

Anticipated situation	*Total responses, %*
They will be living and working with white soldiers.	52
They will be mostly in outfits of their own.	45
No answer	3

On the same question, approximately 78 percent of the Negro infantrymen say that they expect integration in the future.

When asked how colored and white people will get along in the future, most of the southern white infantrymen and practically all the white infantrymen from other parts of the country say they expect either that race relations will improve or that they will remain about the same. Very few whites and practically no Negroes think that relations will deteriorate (see Tables A123 and A124.)

This expectation might seem to encourage acceptance of such steps as may be taken toward Army-wide integration. The very fact that a majority of individuals expect changes

TABLE A88

ATTITUDES OF PUSAN QUARTERMASTER UNITS ON WHETHER, AS TIME PASSES, WHITE AND COLORED PEOPLE WILL GET ALONG BETTER TOGETHER THAN THEY DO TODAY, NOT AS WELL, OR ABOUT THE SAME

Expected race relations	Responses from men in different units			
	68 in all-white units, %	99 whites in integrated units, %	73 Negroes in integrated units, %	144 in all-Negro units, %
They will get along better together.	13	68	85	82
They will get along about the same as now.	65	23	13	15
They will not get along as well as now.	22	7	1	2
No answer	0	2	1	1

to take place in a given direction suggests that they may more readily accommodate themselves to these changes.

In this connection it is important to consider the evidence already presented on increase of favorable attitudes toward Negroes. Exposure to integration also increases the expectation that relations will improve in the future. The "test case" of the Pusan quartermaster units shows in Table A8S the dramatic fashion in which this change may take place.

The difference between the 13 percent in the all-white units who expect improvement and the 68 percent among the whites in integrated units who expect improvement may well be due to the experience of integration itself.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATION

The evidence presented in this section is purely inferential with respect to the problems of integration in the ZI, since the present study was not designed with these problems in mind. However, a concluding observation may appropriately be made. Unquestionably the anxieties expressed by white personnel do reflect potential problems of real life, particularly since so large a proportion of Army installations in the US are for climatic reasons located in the Southern states. It is true that if there were no Negroes in training at Southern installations, the introduction of Negroes into those installations would probably create some tension. But Negroes have, in fact, been continually present in such installations, though in segregated units. It is precisely when large aggregates of individuals are assembled with an obvious distinction made between them, that race conflict is likely to arise. The Negro in a segregated unit is not merely a Negro to the whites in nearby segregated units; he is also an outsider. When he is brought into the unit he ceases to be distinguishable as someone set apart. A white first sergeant, a Texan, makes the following pertinent observation in discussing a garrison experience:

> We've never had any fights in our outfit, and it was completely mixed. I'll tell you where you get the trouble. Up the way there was an all-white and across the street was a segregated colored outfit, and they were always in conflict. But in our mixed outfit there was never any confliction.

ARMY INTEGRATION POLICY AND THE LEADERSHIP ROLE

It has been pointed out that the military environment in which integration takes place makes possible its acceptance by men for whom it is an unusual and unwelcome experience.

The individual soldier's readiness to accept his changed situation and to acquire attitudes consistent with it may be greatly influenced not only by the nature of Army policy, but also by the way in which his commanders apply and interpret that policy — by the way in which they make it a reality for him.

It has already been made clear that the procedures followed in establishing integration in the Eighth Army show a considerable amount of variation. The methods of distributing and assigning Negro replacements, the methods of preparing units for the change — these fall within the discretion of individual troop commanders. The way in which such officers carry out official directives has a powerful influence on the attitudes of their men.

This is dramatically demonstrated in the responses to two items on the questionnaire, the first of which presents a hypothetical situation where the company commander takes a hostile position with respect to integration, and in the second of which he adopts a benign attitude. Compare the responses of 1084 white troops in the following tables:

Question: "Suppose Pfc Joe Doakes is again in an outfit in which there are only white soldiers. One day Captain Blake, the company commander, calls a company meeting. Captain Blake announces that the outfit is getting ten colored replacements. He says, 'I didn't want them and I know you don't want them. I want you men to make it so tough for them that they'll know they're not wanted.' What does Joe do?"

Expected behavior	*Total responses, %*
He tries to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive.	16
He doesn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he doesn't go out of his way to make things tough for them.	25
He treats the colored men just like any other replacements.	35
He tries to be especially nice to the colored men, and tries to get his buddies to do the same.	6
He reports Captain Blake to the inspector general.	14
No answer	5

Question: "Now suppose Captain Blake announced that the colored replacements were coming and went on to say, 'We want these men to be good soldiers and a real part of our outfit. I want you all to go out of your way to help them and be nice to them.' What does Joe do in that case?"

Expected behavior	*Total responses, %*
He reports Captain Blake to the inspector general.	3
He tries to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive.	5
He doesn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he doesn't go out of his way to make things tough for them.	23
He treats the colored men just like any other replacements.	53
He tries to be especially nice to the colored men, and tries to get his buddies to do the same.	13
No answer	4

Actually, no officers were found in this study who made as hostile a pronouncement to their men as did the imaginary Captain Blake in the first of these situations. But Army policy may be impeded in other ways than by the directly expressed hostility of unit commanders. The lack of a clear and consistent understanding of what the policy actually is can constitute an obstacle to its successful execution.

One of the most persistent findings of this study is that considerable uncertainty exists as to the interpretation of present Army policy on the use of Negro troops.

This uncertainty and confusion is reflected in the responses of 1084 enlisted men to the following question:

> "As far as you know, what is the Army Far East Command trying to do in dealing with colored soldiers (that is, what is the official Army policy)? Is the official policy to keep them in separate outfits, or to put them in with white outfits?"

Policy concepts	*Total responses, %*
The main policy is to keep them in completely separate battalions or regiments.	25
The policy is to put colored companies in white battalions.	8
The policy is to put colored platoons in white companies.	2
The policy is to put colored squads in white platoons.	4
The policy is to assign soldiers to outfits without regard to color.	59
No answer	3

The ambiguity of present policy directives is further reflected in the variations in practice which have already been mentioned. These variations exist at every echelon, from the corps level to the smallest unit. Here is the story which one staff officer tells:

> Lieutenant General ____ (corps commander) told Major General ____ (division commander) that the Negro troops would be kept separate. When the __ Div moved into [another] corps, General ____ (corps commander) directed him to place them, to integrate them throughout the division. The corps commander normally has nothing to do with personnel administration, but when a lieutenant general tells a major general that he thinks it would be nice to have things done a certain way, that's the way it's usually done.
>
> (A battalion commander, not in the division just mentioned): For the same reason which anybody can explain, the __ Div got colored replacements far and above the number that could go to the __ Inf and (other all-Negro units). It was evidently a decision of some higher commander that the colored overstrength would be distributed among the noncombat units. The general called a meeting of all the service chiefs and announced that he had a certain number of colored troops and they were going to be distributed among the service units. He portioned out the available replacements. Generally speaking, they were just infantry, basic-trained soldiers. [Note: this was at a time of shortages in infantry replacements.] Those that *we* got were almost all infantry trained basics. The general didn't say whether we should put them in all-colored units or not. There was

some discussion as to whether they should be in all-colored units or not. The reaction was that most people didn't want them, primarily I think, because most people hadn't had them before and because the colored soldiers as a rule are a little slower in catching on to technical subjects than the white people. The general said that they could be used in any capacity at all, as drivers, or cooks, and then if they had any special technical capacities they could be absorbed.

The last sentence of this quotation tells a story in itself.

Quite apart from the existing variation in interpreting policy, it is apparent that many officers are simply unaware of what the policy is. This is illustrated in the personal interviews. In an engineering group, a staff officer relates the story of how the group received its first Negroes. The group commander felt they should be put into what had hitherto been all-white units. This is what happened:

We didn't know how the Army felt about it, so I was told to contact Army HQ and find out how Army felt about it and get authority. I contacted ____ and he said "Hell yes, the Department of the Army is in favor of it." The CO and the executive were sitting right there when I made the call and I said "The Department of the Army says 'Hell yes.'"

Although there is no unanimity of opinion as to what the Army's policy is toward Negro personnel, there is far wider belief that the policy is one of integration at the man level than that the policy is to keep Negroes in separate units. It is of interest that the percentage who believe the policy is one of segregation rises considerably among both whites and Negroes in segregated units. There is a natural tendency for people to believe that Army policy is whatever the practice happens to be in their particular unit, integrated or not integrated.

(Company CO, engineers): Another personal opinion: *This may be going against the Army,* but I think it would work — integrating them into a unit — don't have any all-colored units any more.

(Two artillerymen): (1): I'd say they put them in groups by themselves, as an outfit.
(2): They're a lot of them put in special service, truck outfits, noncombat troops. They use 'em in the rear echelons.

Some soldiers refer to the trend toward integration as something generally known and talked about, as something in the wind of public discussion and debate.

(Sergeant, integrated engineers): From what I see in the paper I think they're working toward nonsegregation. [Are they achieving it?] Yes. Of course, there's nothing an outfit can do about it. If they're assigned, you've got to take them.
(White adjutant, infantry company): We never had any colored troops before. There was general talk in the Army that there would be no more segregation of the troops. We didn't receive any advance notification that we were getting any.
(White officer): Sure, I've heard it through the Army for the last few years, that they were planning to use all the Negro manpower, that they were going to put them in white units. But this is the first case that I have first hand knowledge of.

Most however, fall back on their own personal experience and observation as grounds for the belief that integration is taking place: (Negro EM, integrated QM Co): "I don't think I know. I haven't read up on it. Do they have a new policy? I see 'em mixing a lot of colored and white now, so I guess that must be the policy."

Regardless of what their experience has been however, many officers and men are unable to arrive at any conclusion as to what the Army's policy is. This is not necessarily due to a lack of interest or concern with the subject, but rather to the fact that they can simultaneously see evidence of both types of treatment. This inconsistency fosters the existing wide latitude of interpretation by responsible officers.

It should be observed that the confusion existing among officers in lower echelons is not altogether shared in higher circles, particularly insofar as personnel administrators are

concerned. However, even among them there is question as to whether SR 600-629-1 is applicable to Negro units as well as to others. By and large, the tendency is to interpret existing rules as implying that Negro replacements will be integrated into white units only after designated Negro units have been filled up to and beyond their official strength. With respect to the desiguated Negro units the prevailing impression in 1951 is that they are not to be altered in their composition without direct authorization of the Department of the Army.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Integration of Negro and white personnel in Korea has been successful to the extent that it has been put into effect. In units where Negroes have been mixed with whites, whether in a minority or in a majority, integration has proceeded smoothly and without friction or conflict. No major problems have arisen and each group accepts the presence of the other.

While there is a division of opinion on the qualities of Negroes as combat troops, there is overwhelming agreement on the part of both white and Negro personnel that Negro soldiers should be spread throughout the arms and services, performing the same types of work as whites.

It is the consensus of opinion among senior and staff officers throughout the Far East Command that Negro troops have been utilized best when integrated into units with whites.

Integration is supported by Negro soldiers in both all-Negro and mixed units. White enlisted men are divided in their attitudes toward integration when this is presented as an abstract issue. Only a small minority, however, declare themselves to be strongly opposed to it. Attitudes on the question move in a favorable direction under circumstances in which contact between the two races has actually taken place. In instances in which white troops have served under Negro officers and noncommissioned officers, there are no reports of unfavorable incidents or problems.

2. The present concentration of Negro troops in certain types of service units makes for an inequality of assignment and effort. This may stand in the way of most effective use of all available manpower. It is a cause of resentment on the part of some white soldiers.

3. Present Army statements on the utilization of Negro manpower permit widely varying interpretations by troop commanders in the field. There is a lack of agreement among both officers and men as to what Army policy actually is, and particularly as to how it applies to units now designated as all-Negro.

4. There is a completely mistaken impression on the part of many white officers and men that Negro troops both prefer and respond better to white officers than to Negro officers, and to Southerners better than to other white leaders.

5. Integration in the Zone of the Interior would bring with it problems which have not arisen in the Korean war. Most of these problems involve off-duty activities and contacts between Negro troops and the civilian population. Fear of such problems is chiefly responsible for the skepticism still voiced in those units which have not yet had experience with it. The evidence strongly suggests that, within the framework set by American traditions and military discipline, the problems incidental to full-scale integration can be adequately met in the US and in other parts of the world.

6. It is likely that educational background differences will for a time leave Negro soldiers at a disadvantage in competition for promotions under full integration. They may achieve a smaller share of ratings and commissions than their proportional strength would seem to warrant. The impact of this development might be considerably eased if the Army's position is understood in the Negro community.

7. Other long- and short-term problems may be expected to arise as full integration proceeds. The Army can be aided in anticipating and solving these problems by having available day-to-day counsel on its human relations problems from a permanent social science research unit.

QUESTIONNAIRE AND FURTHER TABULATION OF RESPONSES

REPRODUCTION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Following is a sample of the questionnaire administered to over 3000 enlisted personnel (and a few company-grade officers) in Korea and Japan. The bulk of the questionnaires were administered to men in infantry companies on the Korean front.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

INSTRUCTIONS

1. READ EVERY QUESTION OR STATEMENT CAREFULLY TO MAKE SURE YOU UNDERSTAND IT BEFORE MAKING YOUR ANSWER.
2. MARK SOME ANSWER TO EVERY QUESTION THAT APPLIES TO YOU. IF YOU HAVE MORE TO SAY, ADD IT, BUT FIRST MARK ONE OF THE SUGGESTED ANSWERS.
3. CHECK *ONE* AND *ONLY ONE* ANSWER TO EACH QUESTION.
4. IF THERE IS ANYTHING THAT YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND AND ASK ABOUT IT.
5. CHECK AND MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED EVERY QUESTION BEFORE YOU TURN IN YOUR PAPER.

BE SURE YOU DO *NOT* WRITE YOUR NAME OR SERIAL NUMBER ANYWHERE ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

MAY 1951

NOTE: For each of the following questions, put a check mark ___√___ on the line in front of your answer.

1. How old were you on your last birthday? (Check one)

1 _____ 17 years or less	6 _____ 22–25 years
2 _____ 18 years	7 _____ 26–30 years
3 _____ 19 years	8 _____ 31–35 years
4 _____ 20 years	9 _____ 36–45 years
5 _____ 21 years	0 _____ over 45 years

2. Are you: (Check one)

1 _____ Married

2 _____ Single

3 _____ Divorced, separated or widowed

3. How many children do you have? (Check one)

0 _____ None

1 _____ One

2 _____ Two

3 _____ Three

4 _____ More than three

4. What is your home state in the United States? (Write your answer on the line below)

_____

5. How far did you go in school? (Check *only* one answer, showing the highest grade you finished)

1 _____ Did not finish grade school

2 _____ Graduated from 8th grade

3 _____ Some high school but did not finish

4 _____ Graduated from high school

5 _____ Some college but did not finish

6 _____ Graduated from college

7 _____ Post graduate study

6. Are you: (Check one)

1 _____ White

2 _____ Colored

3 _____ Oriental

7. What is your present Army rank or grade? (Check one)

01 _____ Private E-1 or E-2

03 _____ Pfc E-3

04 _____ Corporal E-4

05 _____ Sergeant E-5

06 _____ Sergeant First Class E-6

07 _____ Master Sergeant E-7

08 _____ First Sergeant E-7

11 _____ Warrant Officer JG

12 _____ Warrant Officer SG

13 _____ Second Lieutenant

14 _____ First Lieutenant

15 _____ Captain

16 _____ Field Grade Officer

8. Are you: (Check one)

1 _____ A draftee

2 _____ A member of the Regular Army

3 _____ A member of the Reserve or National Guard who volunteered for active duty

4 _____ A member of the Reserve or National Guard who was called to active duty without asking for it

9. How long altogether have you served in the Armed Forces on *active duty?* (Check one)

1 _____ 6 months or less

2 _____ More than 6 months up to a year

3 _____ More than one up to two years

4 _____ More than two up to three years

5 _____ More than three up to five years

6 _____ More than five up to ten years

7 _____ More than ten years

10. Were you ever in actual combat during World War II? (Check one)

1 _____ I was not in the service in World War II

2 _____ I was in the service in World War II, but never under enemy fire

3 _____ I was under enemy fire in World War II, but never in actual combat

4 _____ Yes, I was in actual combat in World War II

11. About how long have you been in the Far East Command (Japan and Korea) on this tour of overseas duty? (Check one)

1 _____ Less than one month

2 _____ More than one month up to three months

3 _____ More than three months up to six months

4 _____ More than six months up to a year

5 _____ More than a year

12. Have you ever been in actual combat against the enemy in the Korean War? (Check one)

1 _____ No, I have never been under enemy fire

2 _____ I have been under enemy fire, but not in actual combat against the enemy

3 _____ I have been in actual combat against the enemy, for about a month or less

4 _____ I have been in actual combat against the enemy, between one and three months

5 _____ I have been in actual combat against the enemy, between four and six months

6 _____ I have been in actual combat for more than six months

13. How long have you been in your present outfit? (Check one)

1 _____ One month or less

2 _____ More than one month up to three months

3 _____ More than three months up to six months

4 _____ More than six months up to a year

5 _____ Over a year

14. In general, how do you feel about being in an outfit that has the kind of duty that your outfit has assigned to it? (Check one)

1 _____ I like being in an outfit that has this kind of duty assigned to it

2 _____ It makes no difference whether I'm in this kind of outfit or some other kind

3 _____ I would rather be in an outfit that has some other kind of duty assigned to it

4 _____ I am not in a regular outfit now, and can't answer this question

15. Compared to other outfits of the same kind, how well would you say your present outfit does the job it's supposed to do? (Check one)

1 _____ I am not in a regular outfit now

2 _____ It does its job very well

3 _____ It does its job fairly well

4 _____ It does its job not too well

5 _____ It does its job very poorly

16. Do you like to work with the other men in your outfit? (Check one)

1 _____ Yes, with practically all of them

2 _____ Yes, with most of them

3 _____ With only a few of them

4 _____ With hardly any of them

17. How would you rate the equipment and supplies that your outfit has in comparison with the equipment of an enemy unit with the same kind of job to do? (Check one)

1 _____ Our equipment is much better

2 _____ Our equipment is somewhat better

3 _____ Our equipment is no better and no worse

4 _____ Our equipment is not as good

5 _____ Our equipment is much worse

6 _____ I haven't any idea

18. How well do you think the training you have been given compares with the training of most enemy soldiers in the same kind of job you have? (Check one)

1 _____ They are better trained than I am

2 _____ They are about as well trained as I am

3 _____ They are *not* as well trained as I am

4 _____ I haven't any idea

19. How good a job do you think your outfit does in looking out for the welfare of the enlisted men? (Check one)

1 _____ Very good job

2 _____ Fairly good job

3 _____ Not so good job

4 _____ Poor job

20. When the officers in your outfit want something done, can they count on the willing and wholehearted cooperation of the soldiers? (Check one)

1 _____ Yes, practically all the time

2 _____ Yes, most of the time

3 _____ Seldom get cooperation

4 _____ Practically never get cooperation

21. In general, how is the morale of the men in your outfit? (Check one)

1 _____ Very high

2 _____ High

3 _____ Just so-so

4 _____ Low

5 _____ Very low

22. If it were up to you to choose, where do you think you could do most for your country? (Check one)

1 _____ Being in the Army

2 _____ Working in a civilian job

3 _____ Going to school or college as a civilian

23. Would you say your present Army job is mostly a combat job or mostly not a combat job? (Check one)

1 _____ Mostly a combat job

2 _____ Mostly *not* a combat job

24. What is your present Army job or assignment? (Give the name of your job and tell briefly what you do)

_____

_____

25. If you had your choice, which of the following Army jobs would you prefer to have? (Check one)

1 _____ My present job in my present outfit

2 _____ The same kind of job I have now, but in some other outfit

3 _____ A different kind of job in my present outfit

4 _____ A different kind of job in some other outfit

26. Does your present Army job give you a chance to use your skill and experience? (Check one)

1 _____ A very good chance

2 _____ A fairly good chance

3 _____ Not much of a chance

4 _____ No chance at all

27. How do you feel about the importance of the work you are doing now as compared with other jobs you might be doing in the Army? (Check one)

1 _____ It is as important as any other job I could do

2 _____ It is fairly important, but I could do more important work

3 _____ It hardly seems important at all

28. When you are given new things to do in your job are you told *enough* about them so that you can do a good job? (Check one)

1 _____ Almost always told enough

2 _____ Usually told enough

3 _____ Seldom told enough

4 _____ Almost never told enough

29. How do you feel about your present chances for promotion? (Check one)

1 _____ Very well satisfied

2 _____ Fairly well satisfied

3 _____ Somewhat dissatisfied

4 _____ Very dissatisfied

30. Compared with the other men in your outfit, do you think you have been getting a deal that's better than average, a fair deal, or a poor deal? (Check one)

1 _____ Better than average deal

2 _____ A fair deal

3 _____ A poor deal

31. Compared with other U.S. troops in the Far East Command (Korea and Japan), do you think you have been getting a deal that's better than average, a fair deal, or a poor deal? (Check one)

1 _____ Better than average deal

2 _____ Fair deal

3 _____ Poor deal

32. Compared with the average man in the U.S. Army (anywhere in the world, including the U.S.), do you think you have been getting a deal that's better than average, a fair deal, or a poor deal? (Check one)

1 _____ Better than average deal

2 _____ Fair deal

3 _____ Poor deal

33. How much does it bother you when you are ordered to do things that you do not see a good reason for doing? (Check one)

1 _____ It bothers me a great deal

2 _____ It bothers me quite a bit

3 _____ It does not bother me much

4 _____ It does not bother me at all

34. Are you ever bothered by nervousness? (Check one)

1 _____ Yes, often

2 _____ Yes, sometimes

3 _____ No, never

35. Are you ever worried and upset? (Check one)

1 _____ I am hardly ever worried and upset

2 _____ I am sometimes worried and upset

3 _____ I am often worried and upset

36. In general, how would you say you feel most of the time, in good spirits or in low spirits? (Check one)

1 _____ I am usually in good spirits

2 _____ I am in good spirits some of the time and in low spirits some of the time

3 _____ I am usually in low spirits

37. In general, what sort of physical condition would you say you are in at the present time? (Check one)

1 _____ Very good physical condition

2 _____ Good physical condition

3 _____ Fair physical condition

4 _____ Poor physical condition

5 _____ Very poor physical condition

38. Do you ever get the feeling that this war in Korea is not worth fighting? (Check one)

1 _____ Very often

2 _____ Sometimes

3 _____ Only once in a great while

4 _____ Never get the feeling that it's not worth fighting

39. Do you think it was wise for the United States to help the South Koreans or do you think we would have been smarter to stay out of this war in the first place? (Check one)

1 _____ Wise to help them

2 _____ Smarter to stay out

3 _____ Undecided

40. (a) How do you feel about the idea of working and living closely together with soldiers of other races and nationalities? (Check one)

1 _____ I dislike the whole idea

2 _____ I don't care one way or the other

3 _____ I like the idea

(b) How strongly do you feel about this? (Check one)

1 _____ Not at all strongly

2 _____ Not so strongly

3 _____ Fairly strongly

4 _____ Very strongly

41. Some people have said that, although the Communists should not have started this war, there is something to be said for their side of the argument. How do you feel about this? (Check one)

1 _____ There is a great deal to be said in favor of the Communists

2 _____ The Communists should not have gone to war, but there is something to be said in their favor

3 _____ The Communists are completely wrong and there is nothing to be said in their favor

42. If the Communists were to offer to stop fighting now on condition that we let them keep control over Northern Korea (North of the 38th Parallel) what do you think we should do? (Check one)

1 ___ We should accept the offer and stop fighting now

2 ___ We should consider the offer and try to work out some peace terms with them

3 ___ We should turn down the offer and keep on fighting until they give up completely

43. If the United States had to choose between getting out of Korea entirely or fighting an *all-out war* (at least as big as World War II) against the *Chinese* Communists, what do you think we should do? (Check one)

1 ___ Get out of Korea entirely

2 ___ Fight an all-out war against the Chinese Communists

44. What do you think the policy of the United States should be toward the United Nations (the UN)? (Check one)

1 ___ The United States should rely very fully on the UN

2 ___ The United States should work within the UN, but not rely too much on them

3 ___ The United States should leave the UN and have nothing more to do with them

45. Would you say that, man for man, South Korean soldiers are doing their full share in the war, more than their share, or less than their share? (Check one)

1 ___ More than their share

2 ___ Just about their share

3 ___ Less than their share

46. Would you say that, man for man, the British soldiers in Korea are doing their full share in the war, more than their share, or less than their share? (Check one)

1 ___ More than their share

2 ___ Just about their share

3 ___ Less than their share

47. Would you say that, man for man, the Turkish soldiers in Korea are doing their full share in the war, more than their share, or less than their share? (Check one)

1 ___ More than their share

2 ___ Just about their share

3 ___ Less than their share

48. Would you say that, man for man, the U.S. colored soldiers in Korea are doing their full share in the war, more than their share, or less than their share? (Check one)

1 ___ More than their share

2 _____ Just about their share

3 _____ Less than their share

49. Would you say that, man for man, the U.S. white soldiers in Korea are doing their full share in the war, more than their share, or less than their share? (Check one)

1 _____ More than their share

2 _____ Just about their share

3 _____ Less than their share

50. From what you know about them, how do you personally feel about South Korean soldiers as a group? (Check one)

1 _____ I like them very much

2 _____ I like them fairly well

3 _____ I don't like them

4 _____ I hate them

5 _____ I don't know anything about them

WHITE SOLDIERS: Answer the questions on this page
(Negro soldiers: Answer the question on the next page)

51. From what you know about them, how do you personally feel about U.S. colored soldiers? (Check one)

1 _____ I like them very much

2 _____ I like them fairly well

3 _____ I don't like them

4 _____ I hate them

52. How much personal contact have you had with colored soldiers in the Army? (Check YES or NO for each statement)

a. I have been stationed near enough to them to see them occasionally

1 _____ YES 2 _____ NO

b. I have had occasional contact with them in connection with my job

1 _____ YES 2 _____ NO

c. I have been in the same training unit or Army school with them

1 _____ YES 2 _____ NO

d. I have been in the same regular outfit with them

1 _____ YES 2 _____ NO

e. I have had friends among them

1 _____ YES 2 _____ NO

53. How much personal contact have you, yourself, had with colored people in civilian life, before you entered the Army? (Check one)

1 _____ I hardly ever saw any

2 _____ I saw them but never had anything to do with them

3 _____ I have only had occasional contact at work, or just living in the same community with them

4 _____ I have worked with them over a period of time, but never had friends among them

5 _____ I have had friends among them

NEGRO SOLDIERS: Answer the questions on this page
(White soldiers: Answer the questions on the previous page)

54. From what you know about them, how do you personally feel about U.S. white soldiers? (Check one)

1 _____ I like them very much

2 _____ I like them fairly well

3 _____ I don't like them

4 _____ I hate them

55. How much personal contact have you had with white soldiers in the Army? (Check YES or NO for each statement)

a. I have been stationed near enough to them to see them occasionally

1 _____ YES 2 _____ NO

b. I have had occasional contact with them in connection with my job

1 _____ YES 2 _____ NO

c. I have been in the same training unit or Army school with them

1 _____ YES 2 _____ NO

d. I have been in the same regular outfit with them

1 _____ YES 2 _____ NO

e. I have had friends among them

1 _____ YES 2 _____ NO

56. How much personal contact have you, yourself, had with white people in civilian life, before you entered the Army? (Check one)

1 _____ I hardly ever saw any

2 _____ I saw them, but never had anything to do with them

3 _____ I have only had occasional contact at work, or just living in the same community with them

4 _____ I have worked with them over a period of time, but never had friends among them

5 _____ I have had friends among them

57. As time goes on, do you think that white and colored people in the United States will get along better together than they do today, not as well as they do now, or about the same as now? (Check one)

7 _____ They will get along better together

8 _____ They will get along about the same as now

9 _____ They will not get along as well as now

58. (a) As time goes on, do you think that colored people in the United States will have more opportunities than they have today, fewer opportunities, or about the same as now? (Check one)

7 _____ They will have more opportunities

8 _____ It will be about the same as now

9 _____ They will have fewer opportunities

(b) What would you personally like to see happen? (Check one)

7 _____ I'd like to see them have more opportunities

8 _____ I'd like it to be about the same as now

9 _____ I'd like to see them have fewer opportunities

59. In civilian life in the U.S., how do you think it works out when white and colored people use the same stores? (Check one)

7 _____ It works out better than any other arrangement

8 _____ It works out about the same as any other arrangement

9 _____ It does not work as well as some other arrangement

60. In civilian life in the U.S., how do you think it works out when white and colored people sit together in the same sections on buses and trains? (Check one)

7 _____ It works out better than any other arrangement

8 _____ It works out about the same as any other arrangement

9 _____ It does not work as well as some other arrangement

61. How do you think white and colored soldiers get along with each other in the Army as compared with civilian life in the U.S.? (Check one)

7 _____ They get along better with each other in the Army

8 _____ They get along about the same in the Army as in civilian life

9 _____ They get along better with each other in civilian life

62. (a) As time goes on, do you think that colored soldiers will hold more good jobs and good ratings than they do today in the Army, fewer good jobs and ratings than today, or about the same as now? (Check one)

7 _____ They will have more good jobs and ratings

8 _____ They will have the same jobs and ratings as now

9 _____ They will have fewer good jobs and ratings

(b) What would you personally like to see happen? (Check one)

7 _____ I'd like to see them have more good jobs and ratings than now

8 _____ I'd like to see them have about the same jobs and ratings as now

9 _____ I'd like to see them have fewer good jobs and ratings than now

63. (a) As time goes on, do you think that most colored soldiers will be found living and working with the white soldiers in the Army, or do you think they will be mostly in outfits of their own? (Check one)

8 _____ They will be living and working with the white soldiers

9 _____ They will be mostly in outfits of their own

(b) What would you personally like to see happen? (Check one)

8 _____ I'd like to see them live and work with the white soldiers

9 _____ I'd like to see them in outfits of their own

64. As far as you know, what is the Army Far East Command trying to do in dealing with colored soldiers (that is, what is the official Army policy)? Is the official policy to keep them in separate outfits, or to put them in with white outfits? (Check one)

5 _____ The main policy is to keep them in completely separate battalions or regiments

6 _____ The policy is to put colored companies in white battalions

7 _____ The policy is to put colored platoons in white companies

8 _____ The policy is to put colored squads in white platoons

9 _____ The policy is to assign soldiers to outfits without regard to color

65. How do you think colored soldiers get along in the Army? (Check one)

7 _____ They have it easier in the Army than the white soldiers do

8 _____ They get along about the same as the white soldiers do

9 _____ They have it harder than the white soldiers do

66. If a white soldier and a colored soldier had the same ability and training, and had been in the Army the same length of time, would they have the same chances of promotion, or not? (Check one)

7 _____ The white soldier would have a better chance

8 _____ They would have about the same chance

9 _____ The colored soldier would have a better chance

67. Under what conditions do you think colored soldiers have the best chance of promotion? (Check one)

7 _____ In an outfit with both white and colored soldiers in it

8 _____ In an outfit with only colored soldiers in it

9 _____ They have about the same chance either way

68. If you were in an outfit that had both white and colored soldiers in it, do you think your chance for promotion would be better, worse, or about the same as now? (Check one)

6 _____ I am in a mixed outfit now

7 _____ My chances for promotion would be better

8 _____ My chances would be about the same

9 _____ My chances would be worse

69. Should white and colored soldiers do the same kinds of Army jobs, or not? (Check one)

6 _____ They should do the same kinds of jobs together in the same outfits

7 _____ They should do the same kinds of jobs, but in separate outfits

8 _____ They should not do the same kinds of jobs, but they should be together in the same outfits

9 _____ They should not do the same kinds of jobs, and they should be in separate outfits

70. What kinds of jobs should colored soldiers be given in the Army? (Check one)

7 _____ They should be given mostly service jobs

8 _____ They should be given mostly combat jobs

9 _____ They should be given combat and service jobs the same as whites

71. How would you rate U.S. colored soldiers as fighters, compared with white U.S. soldiers? (Check one)

7 _____ Colored soldiers are better fighters

8 _____ Colored soldiers are just about as good

9 _____ Colored soldiers are not as good fighters

72. In actual combat, do you think it works out better when white and colored soldiers are together in the same outfits, or in separate outfits? (Check one)

7 _____ It works out better when they're in the same outfits

8 _____ It works out about the same either way

9 _____ It works out better when they're in separate outfits

73. Which of the following comes closest to your idea of how colored troops should be assigned to outfits? (Check one)

5 _____ In all-Negro battalions or regiments

6 _____ As colored companies in white battalions

7 _____ As colored platoons in white companies

8 _____ As colored squads in white platoons

9 _____ They should be assigned as individuals without regard to color

74. Suppose a company has four platoons. Two platoons have white soldiers only and two platoons have colored soldiers only. All the platoons *work* together but do *not* sleep in the same barracks or eat in the same mess halls. How would you feel personally about being assigned to one of the units in such a company? (Check one)

6 _____ I would object to it strongly

7 _____ I would rather not, but it would not matter too much

8 _____ It would make no difference to me

9 _____ I would like it

75. How would you feel about serving in a platoon containing both white and colored soldiers, all working and training together, sleeping in the same barracks and eating in the same mess hall? (Check one)

6 _____ I would object to it strongly

7 _____ I would rather not, but it would not matter too much

8 _____ It would make no difference to me

9 _____ I would like it

76. How do you think it works out when white and colored soldiers use the same barber shops in the Army? (Check one)

7 _____ It works out better than any other arrangement

8 _____ It works out about the same as any other arrangement

9 _____ It does not work as well as some other arrangement

77. How do you think it works out when white and colored soldiers use the same Army PX? (Check one)

7 _____ It works out better than any other arrangement

8 _____ It works out about the same as any other arrangement

9 _____ It does not work as well as some other arrangement

78. How do you think it works out when white and colored soldiers use the same Service Clubs? (Check one)

7 _____ It works out better than any other arrangement

8 _____ It works out about the same as any other arrangement

9 _____ It does not work as well as some other arrangement

79. How do you think it works out when white and colored soldiers are in the same Army rest camps? (Check one)

7 _____ It works out better than any other arrangement

8 _____ It works out about the same as any other arrangement

9 _____ It does not work as well as some other arrangement

The rest of this questionnaire concerns Pfc Joe Doakes, a white soldier in the U.S. Army in Korea. Here are a number of situations in which he as a white man might find himself in contact with colored soldiers. First tell us what you think he is *most likely* to do in each of these situations. Next tell us what you think he *should* do.

80. Pfc Joe Doakes has always been in outfits which have only white soldiers in them. At a replacement center he is sent to an outfit in which there are colored as well as white soldiers. He is assigned to a squad which happens to have both a colored squad leader and a colored platoon sergeant.

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

5 _____ He acts just as he would in any other outfit

6 _____ He just tries to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him

7 _____ He tries to make things tough for the colored noncoms in any way he can

8 _____ He speaks to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit

9 _____ He tries in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

5 _____ He should act just as he would in any other outfit

6 _____ He should just try to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him

7 _____ He should try to make things tough for the colored noncoms in any way he can

8 _____ He should speak to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit

9 _____ He should try in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit

81. Now suppose Joe were assigned to a platoon in which not only the sergeant but most of the men were colored.

(a) What *does* he do then? (Check one)

5 _____ He acts just as he would in any other outfit

6 _____ He just tries to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him

7 _____ He tries to make things tough for the colored noncoms in any way he can

8 _____ He speaks to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit

9 _____ He tries in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit

(b) What *should* Joe do then? (Check one)

5 _____ He should act just as he would in any other outfit

6 _____ He should just try to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him

7 _____ He should try to make things tough for the colored noncoms in any way he can

8 _____ He should speak to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit

9 _____ He should try in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit

82. Suppose Pfc Joe Doakes is again in an outfit in which there are only white soldiers. One day Captain Blake, the Company Commander, calls a Company meeting. Captain Blake announces that the outfit is getting ten colored replacements. He says, "I didn't want them and I know you don't want them. I want you men to make it so tough for them that they'll know they're not wanted."

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

5 _____ He tries to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive

6 _____ He doesn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he doesn't go out of his way to make things tough for them

7 _____ He treats the colored men just like any other replacements

8 _____ He tries to be especially nice to the colored men and tries to get his buddies to do the same

9 _____ He reports Captain Blake to the Inspector General

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

5 _____ He should try to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive

6 _____ He shouldn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he shouldn't go out of his way to make things tough for them

7 _____ He should treat the colored men just like any other replacements

8 _____ He should try to be especially nice to the colored men and should try to get his buddies to do the same

9 _____ He should report Captain Blake to the Inspector General

83. Now suppose Captain Blake announced that the colored replacements were coming and then went on to say: "We want these men to be good soldiers and a real part of our outfit. I want you all to go out of your way to help them and be nice to them."

(a) What *does* Joe do in that case? (Check one)

5 _____ He reports Captain Blake to the Inspector General

6 _____ He tries to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive

7 _____ He doesn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he doesn't go out of his way to make things tough for them

8 _____ He treats the colored men just like any other replacements

9 _____ He tries to be especially nice to the colored men and tries to get his buddies to do the same

(b) What *should* Joe do in this case? (Check one)

5 _____ He should report Captain Blake to the Inspector General

6 _____ He should try to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive

7 _____ He shouldn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he shouldn't go out of his way to make things tough for them

8 _____ He should treat the colored men just like any other replacements

9 _____ He should try to be especially nice to the colored men and should try to get his buddies to do the same

84. Pfc Joe Doakes has been going with a pretty Korean girl who speaks some English. One day he comes to see her and finds her on the street in front of her house talking to a colored soldier.

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

5 _____ He says, "Hello," waits until they're through talking and then goes ahead as usual

6 _____ He waits until they're through talking, but later tells her to stay away from *all* other soldiers, white or colored

7 _____ He waits until they're through talking, but later tells her to stay away from colored soldiers

8 _____ He tells the colored soldier to move along and keep away from his girl friend

9 _____ He walks away and has nothing more to do with her

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

5 _____ He should say, "Hello," wait until they're through talking and then go ahead as usual

6 _____ He should wait until they're through talking, but later tell her to stay away from *all* other soldiers, white or colored

7 _____ He should wait until they're through talking, but later tell her to stay away from colored soldiers

8 _____ He should tell the colored soldier to move along and keep away from his girl friend

9 _____ He should walk away and have nothing more to do with her

85. Pfc Joe Doakes goes to the hospital with a bad toothache. There are two dentists on duty, both first lieutenants, one colored and one white. When Joe's turn comes up he sees that the colored dentist is waiting for him. The white dentist is just finishing up with a patient, and it seems that he too will be free in a few minutes.

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

7 _____ He goes over to the colored dentist

8 _____ He walks out to get a drink of water, so that when he comes back the white dentist can take care of him

9 _____ He just stands and waits until the white dentist is finished

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

7 _____ He should go over to the colored dentist

8 _____ He should walk out to get a drink of water so that when he comes back the white dentist can take care of him

9 _____ He should stand and wait until the white dentist is finished

86. Pfc Joe Doakes is walking down a street in a Korean town. Suddenly he hears the sound of an argument, and comes upon two soldiers, one white and one colored, down on the ground, fighting hard. Both men are wearing trench knives in their belts. Joe is unarmed.

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

5 _____ He joins in the fight on the side of the white soldier

6 _____ He joins in the fight, but only to take the colored soldier's knife away from him

7 _____ He tries to separate the two men and stop the fight

8 _____ He runs off to get help in stopping the fight

9 _____ He just keeps on going, minding his own business

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

5 _____ He should join in the fight on the side of the white soldier

6 _____ He should join in the fight, but only to take the colored soldier's knife away from him

7 _____ He should try to separate the two men and stop the fight

8 _____ He should run off to get help in stopping the fight

9 _____ He should just keep on going, minding his own business

87. Joe is in a rear area on temporary duty. One night he goes to the movies by himself. He comes early and sits down in the middle of a row of empty seats. Several colored

soldiers come in and sit down next to him on one side. Then two more colored soldiers come in and sit down next to him on the other side.

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

6 _____ He tells the colored men to sit somewhere else

7 _____ He gets up and sits somewhere else himself

8 _____ He gets up only if the colored men near him act differently than the white troops in the theater

9 _____ He just stays where he is

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

6 _____ He should tell the colored men to sit somewhere else

7 _____ He should get up and sit somewhere else himself

8 _____ He should get up only if the colored men near him act any differently than the white troops in the theater

9 _____ He should just stay where he is

88. Joe has been sent back to Japan on pass. He is sitting in a Service Club in Tokyo looking at a magazine. At the next table there is a colored soldier, also reading a magazine. Three white soldiers enter the Club. They stare at the colored man and one of them says in a loud voice, "Don't you know this place is for white men only?"

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

5 _____ He says, "This place is for any G.I., who wants to use it."

6 _____ He watches to see if there will be a fight

7 _____ He puts down his book and walks out of the Club

8 _____ He just keeps on reading and pays no attention

9 _____ He says, "We ought to make sure this place is kept for white men."

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

5 _____ He should say, "This place is for any G.I. who wants to use it."

6 _____ He should watch to see if there will be a fight

7 _____ He should put down his book and walk out of the Club

8 _____ He should just keep on reading and pay no attention

9 _____ He should say, "We ought to make sure this place is kept for white men."

(c) If you were the colored soldier in this situation, what do you think you would do? (Check one)

5 _____ I'd say, "This place is for anybody who wants to use it."

6 _____ I'd call in whoever was in charge

7 _____ I'd just keep on reading and pay no attention

8 _____ I'd put down my book and walk out of the Club

9 _____ I'd apologize first and then leave the Club

89. Use the space below to make any additional comments on the subjects covered in this questionnaire or on any other subjects.

FURTHER TABULATIONS

The following tables represent a small portion of the total number of tabulations on which the report is based. Space limitations made it impossible to reproduce all the tables.

TABLE A89

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON KINDS OF JOBS NEGRO SOLDIERS SHOULD BE GIVEN

Response category	Responses of infantry combat veterans				Responses of precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
They should be given mostly service jobs.	5	6	8	4	3	5	8	6
They should be given mostly combat jobs.	7	5	0	1	11	8	3	0
They should be given combat and service jobs the same as whites.	86	88	92	94	86	86	89	91
No answer	2	1	0	1	0	1	0	2

TABLE A90

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON KINDS OF JOBS NEGRO SOLDIERS SHOULD BE GIVEN

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
They should be given mostly service jobs.	15	6	2	6
They should be given mostly combat jobs.	7	0	0	2
They should be given combat and service jobs the same as whites.	78	94	93	91
No answer	0	0	5	1

TABLE A91

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON NEGRO SOLDIERS AS FIGHTERS, COMPARED WITH WHITE SOLDIERS

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
Colored soldiers are better fighters.	1	1	18	42	0	2	28	43
Colored soldiers are just about as good.	47	52	74	54	56	48	67	51
Colored soldiers are not as good fighters.	51	45	3	1	44	46	3	1
No answer	1	2	5	3	0	4	2	5

TABLE A92

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON NEGRO SOLDIERS AS FIGHTERS, COMPARED WITH WHITE SOLDIERS

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
Colored soldiers are better fighters.	0	1	23	25
Colored soldiers are just about as good.	34	62	72	75
Colored soldiers are not as good fighters.	65	31	0	0
No answer	1	6	5	0

TABLE A93

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON WHETHER WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS SHOULD DO SAME KINDS OF JOBS

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
They should do the same kinds of jobs together in the same outfit.	43	58	97	89	37	48	92	88
They should do the same kinds of jobs, but in separate outfits.	50	33	3	6	58	39	6	5
They should not do the same kinds of jobs, but they should be together in the same outfits.	2	3	0	2	0	5	0	5
They should not do the same kinds of jobs, and they should be in separate outfits.	4	4	0	1	5	5	0	0
No answer	1	2	0	2	0	3	2	2

TABLE A94

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON WHETHER WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS SHOULD DO SAME KINDS OF JOBS

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		90 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
They should do the same kinds of jobs in the same outfits.	15	60	95	90
They should do the same kinds of jobs, but in separate outfits.	76	35	2	6
They should not do the same kinds of jobs, but they should be together in the same outfits.	2	0	0	3
They should not do the same kinds of jobs and they should be in separate outfits.	7	5	0	1
No answer	0	0	3	0

TABLE A95

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON ASSIGNMENT OF NEGRO TROOPS

Assignments for Negro troops	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			225 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
In all-Negro battalions or regiments	48	38	5	7	55	44	6	12
As colored companies in white battalions	7	5	8	3	8	6	11	6
As colored platoons in white companies	2	1	0	1	3	2	0	4
As colored squads in white platoons	1	2	3	0	5	3	3	1
As individuals without regard to color	41	52	82	87	27	44	78	73
No answer	1	2	2	2	2	1	2	4

TABLE A96

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON ASSIGNMENT OF NEGRO TROOPS

Assignments for Negro troops	Responses of troops			
	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
In all-Negro battalions or regiments	75	35	0	6
As colored companies in white battalions	9	15	5	6
As colored platoons in white companies	0	2	1	1
As colored squads in white platoons	0	0	0	1
As individuals without regard to color	15	46	89	86
No answer	1	2	5	0

TABLE A97

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON SERVING IN PLATOON CONTAINING BOTH WHITES AND NEGROES, WORKING AND TRAINING TOGETHER, SLEEPING IN SAME BARRACKS, AND EATING IN SAME MESS HALL

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		30 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
I would object to it strongly.	32	20	3	4	42	18	6	5
I would rather not, but it would not matter too much.	38	28	6	3	36	35	3	6
It would make no difference to me.	25	40	46	39	18	38	53	45
I would like it.	5	10	45	52	2	6	36	41
No answer	0	2	0	2	2	3	2	3

TABLE A98

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON SERVING IN PLATOON CONTAINING BOTH WHITES AND NEGROES, WORKING AND TRAINING TOGETHER, SLEEPING IN SAME BARRACKS, AND EATING IN SAME MESS HALL

Response category	Responses of quartermaster troops			
	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		90 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
I would object to it strongly.	57	14	3	5
I would rather not, but it would not matter too much.	26	39	3	6
It would make no difference to me.	15	37	37	13
I would like it.	1	10	55	46
No answer	1	0	2	0

TABLE A99

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION VERSUS SEGREGATION IN ACTUAL COMBAT

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
It works out better when they're in the same outfit.	32	37	51	51	26	35	53	39
It works out about the same either way.	31	33	46	39	26	32	47	44
It works out better when they're in separate units.	35	28	0	7	48	31	0	12
No answer	2	2	3	3	0	2	0	5

TABLE A100

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION VERSUS SEGREGATION IN ACTUAL COMBAT

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
It works out better when they're in the same outfits.	15	21	62	60
It works out about the same either way.	16	40	36	35
It works out better when they're in separate outfits.	65	33	0	3
No answer	4	6	2	2

TABLE A101

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON GENERAL MORALE IN INDIVIDUAL OUTFITS

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
Very high	18	20	33	28	26	23	28	45
High	30	30	33	28	29	43	39	26
Just so-so	33	36	26	31	32	25	28	21
Low	11	6	0	6	6	4	5	3
Very low	8	8	8	6	5	4	0	3
No answer	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	2

TABLE A102

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON GENERAL MORALE IN INDIVIDUAL OUTFITS

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
Very high	10	17	27	16
High	35	41	23	27
Just so-so	41	31	27	42
Low	6	6	10	8
Very low	7	5	8	6
No answer	1	0	5	1

TABLE A103

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON INTEGRATED USE OF ARMY PX

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
It works out better than any other arrangement.	7	10	31	41	8	18	30	42
It works out about the same as any other arrangement.	61	71	62	55	48	62	64	52
It does not work as well as some other arrangement.	30	17	7	2	40	18	3	2
No answer	3	2	0	2	4	2	3	4

TABLE A104

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON INTEGRATED USE OF ARMY PX

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
It works out better than any other arrangement.	4	10	46	29
It works out about the same as any other arrangement.	63	64	52	61
It does not work as well as some other arrangement.	32	17	0	10
No answer	1	0	2	0

TABLE A105
INFANTRY OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION IN ARMY REST CAMPS

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
It works out better than any other arrangement.	4	9	23	39	2	14	34	34
It works out about the same as any other arrangement.	57	64	67	55	52	62	60	58
It does not work as well as some other arrangement.	37	24	10	3	42	21	3	4
No answer	2	3	0	3	4	3	3	4

TABLE A106
QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION IN ARMY REST CAMPS

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
It works out better than any other arrangement.	3	15	43	37
It works out about the same as any other arrangement.	54	65	55	56
It does not work as well as some other arrangement.	43	19	0	6
No answer	0	1	2	1

TABLE A107
INFANTRY OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION IN SERVICE CLUBS

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
It works out better than any other arrangement.	5	7	13	31	2	15	25	36
It works out about the same as any other arrangement.	37	51	72	53	40	52	50	50
It does not work as well as some other arrangement.	57	40	15	13	53	30	22	10
No answer	1	2	0	3	5	3	3	4

TABLE A108

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION IN SERVICE CLUBS

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
It works out better than any other arrangement.	2	15	45	31
It works out about the same as any other arrangement.	52	49	52	51
It does not work as well as some other arrangement.	46	36	0	17
No answer	0	0	3	1

TABLE A109

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION IN STORES IN CIVILIAN LIFE

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
It works out better than any other arrangement.	13	14	38	47	5	16	39	51
It works out about the same as any other arrangement.	57	61	59	46	65	49	47	40
It does not work as well as some other arrangement.	29	23	3	6	30	33	8	8
No answer	1	2	0	1	0	2	6	1

TABLE A110

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION IN STORES IN CIVILIAN LIFE

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
It works out better than any other arrangement.	4	18	49	45
It works out about the same as any other arrangement.	51	56	48	48
It does not work as well as some other arrangement.	43	24	0	6
No answer	2	2	3	1

TABLE A111

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION VERSUS SEGREGATION IN THE FUTURE

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
They will be living and working with the white soldiers.	52	54	85	80	49	48	78	75
They will be mostly in outfits of their own.	47	43	13	17	51	48	17	21
No answer	1	3	2	3	0	4	5	4

TABLE A112

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION VERSUS SEGREGATION IN THE FUTURE

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
They will be living and working with the white soldiers.	34	67	85	80
They will be mostly in outfits of their own.	65	32	12	19
No answer	1	1	3	1

TABLE A113

PERSONAL PREFERENCES OF INFANTRYMEN REGARDING UNIT ASSIGNMENTS

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
I'd like to see them live and work with the white soldiers.	26	42	87	89	19	34	80	82
I'd like to see them in outfits of their own.	69	50	8	6	78	60	6	10
No answer	5	8	5	5	3	6	14	8

TABLE A114

PERSONAL PREFERENCES OF QUARTERMASTER TROOPS REGARDING UNIT ASSIGNMENTS

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
I'd like to see them live and work with the white soldiers.	9	41	93	85
I'd like to see them in outfits of their own.	88	54	4	8
No answer	3	5	3	7

TABLE A115

PERSONAL PREFERENCES OF INFANTRYMEN REGARDING JOB ASSIGNMENTS

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
I'd like to see them have more good jobs and ratings than now.	27	34	87	95	23	33	86	93
I'd like to see them have about the same jobs and ratings as now.	58	54	10	2	58	56	8	4
I'd like to see them have fewer good jobs and ratings than now.	12	9	3	1	19	7	0	2
No answer	3	3	0	2	0	4	6	1

TABLE A116

PERSONAL PREFERENCES OF QUARTERMASTER TROOPS REGARDING JOB ASSIGNMENTS

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
I'd like to see them have more good jobs and ratings than now.	9	47	93	95
I'd like to see them have about the same jobs and ratings as now.	71	49	4	4
I'd like to see them have fewer good jobs and ratings than now.	19	3	1	0
No answer	1	1	2	1

TABLE A117

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON FUTURE STATUS OF NEGROES IN ARMY

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
They will have more good jobs and ratings.	45	43	72	78	52	44	67	74
They will have the same jobs and ratings as now.	52	52	23	17	42	50	22	19
They will have fewer good jobs and ratings.	3	3	5	3	6	4	6	5
No answer	0	2	0	2	0	2	5	2

TABLE A118

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON FUTURE STATUS OF NEGROES IN ARMY

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
They will have more good jobs and ratings.	37	56	89	79
They will have the same jobs and ratings as now.	53	44	5	15
They will have fewer good jobs and ratings.	10	0	1	5
No answer	0	0	4	1

TABLE A119

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON FUTURE STATUS OF CIVILIAN NEGROES IN US

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
They will have more opportunities.	59	63	90	82	61	63	64	74
It will be about the same as now.	37	35	5	15	35	34	30	22
They will have fewer opportunities.	2	2	5	2	3	2	3	3
No answer	2	0	0	1	1	1	3	1

TABLE A120

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON FUTURE STATUS OF CIVILIAN NEGROES IN US

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
They will have more opportunities.	50	79	92	87
It will be about the same as now.	43	19	7	12
They will have fewer opportunities.	7	1	0	0
No answer	0	1	1	1

TABLE A121

PERSONAL PREFERENCES OF INFANTRYMEN REGARDING NEGRO OPPORTUNITIES

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
I'd like to see them have more opportunities.	39	51	90	97	29	45	64	94
I'd like it to be about the same as now.	47	43	5	1	58	46	30	3
I'd like to see them have fewer opportunities.	12	5	5	1	13	7	3	3
No answer	2	2	0	1	0	2	3	0

TABLE A122

PERSONAL PREFERENCES OF QUARTERMASTER TROOPS REGARDING NEGRO OPPORTUNITIES

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
I'd like to see them have more opportunities.	31	67	98	98
I'd like it to be about the same as now.	53	29	0	1
I'd like to see them have fewer opportunities.	15	2	0	1
No answer	1	2	2	0

TABLE A123
INFANTRY OPINIONS ON FUTURE COMPATIBILITY OF NEGROES AND WHITES IN US

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
They will get along better together.	28	45	77	79	27	38	67	68
They will get along about the same as now.	51	46	23	18	48	53	30	28
They will not get along as well as now.	20	8	0	3	24	8	0	3
No answer	1	1	0	0	1	1	3	1

TABLE A124
QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON FUTURE COMPATIBILITY OF NEGROES AND WHITES IN US

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
They will get along better together.	13	68	85	82
They will get along about the same as now.	65	23	13	15
They will not get along as well as now.	22	7	1	2
No answer	0	2	1	1

TABLE A125
INFANTRY OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION ON BUSES AND TRAINS IN CIVILIAN LIFE

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
It works out better than any other arrangement.	7	13	26	47	3	15	44	44
It works out about the same as any other arrangement.	25	55	64	39	24	54	36	38
It does not work as well as some other arrangement.	66	30	10	13	73	28	17	16
No answer	2	2	0	1	0	3	3	2

TABLE A126

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON INTEGRATION ON BUSES AND TRAINS IN CIVILIAN LIFE

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
It works out better than any other arrangement.	1	19	62	30
It works out about the same as any other arrangement.	31	43	27	51
It does not work as well as some other arrangement.	68	37	10	17
No answer	0	1	1	2

TABLE A127

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON COOPERATION OF SOLDIERS

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		26 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
Yes, practically all the time	72	65	77	76	79	66	69	66
Yes, most of the time	26	32	23	21	18	32	30	28
Seldom get cooperation	1	2	0	2	3	1	0	2
Practically never get cooperation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
No answer	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	3

TABLE A128

QUARTERMASTER OPINIONS ON COOPERATION OF SOLDIERS

Response category	68 in all-white units, %	Integrated units		144 in all-Negro units, %
		99 whites, %	73 Negroes, %	
Yes, practically all the time	74	63	75	65
Yes, most of the time	22	32	19	31
Seldom get cooperation	4	5	0	3
Practically never get cooperation	0	0	3	1
No answer	0	0	3	0

TABLE A129

CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION OPINIONS ON MORALE IN OUTFIT

States of morale	Responses in different units			
	All-white		Integrated whites	
	80 Nat'l Guard, %	103 others,[a] %	90 Nat'l Guard, %	166 others, %
Very high	15	5	13	8
High	17	18	44	27
Just so-so	44	50	33	50
Low	16	11	9	11
Very low	8	15	0	4
No answer	0	1	1	0

[a] Includes Regular Army, draftees, and enlisted reserve.

TABLE A130

CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION OPINIONS ON WHETHER OFFICERS IN OUTFIT CAN COUNT ON WILLING AND WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION OF SOLDIERS

Extent to which men are cooperative	Responses in different units			
	All-white		Integrated	
	80 Nat'l Guard, %	103 others,[a] %	90 Nat'l Guard, %	166 others,[a] %
Yes, practically all the time	60	46	70	40
Yes, most of the time	35	47	30	55
Seldom get cooperation	4	6	0	4
Practically never get cooperation	1	1	0	1
No answer	0	0	0	0

[a] Includes Regular Army, draftees, and enlisted reserve.

TABLE A131

OPINIONS ON KINDS OF JOBS NEGROES SHOULD BE GIVEN IN ARMY, ANALYZED ACCORDING TO RESPONDENTS' ENLISTMENT TYPES

Response category	All-white units		Integrated units	
	80 Nat'l Guard, %	103 others,[a] %	90 Nat'l Guard, %	166 others,[a] %
They should be given mostly service jobs.	4	2	8	4
They should be given mostly combat jobs.	1	3	3	17
They should be given combat and service jobs the same as whites.	95	94	88	79
No answer	0	1	1	0

[a] Includes Regular Army, draftees, and enlisted reserve.

TABLE A132

CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION OPINIONS OF NEGRO SOLDIERS AS FIGHTERS COMPARED WITH WHITE SOLDIERS

Response category	Responses in different units			
	All-white		Integrated	
	80 Nat'l Guard, %	103 others,[a] %	90 Nat'l Guard, %	166 others,[a] %
Colored soldiers are better fighters.	11	3	3	10
Colored soldiers are just about as good.	73	78	65	61
Colored soldiers are not as good fighters.	15	18	28	27
No answer	1	1	4	2

[a] Includes Regular Army, draftees, and enlisted reserve.

TABLE A133

CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION OPINIONS ON WHETHER, IN ACTUAL COMBAT, INTEGRATED OR SEGREGATED OUTFITS ARE BETTER

Response category	Responses in different units			
	All-white		Integrated	
	80 Nat'l Guard, %	103 others,[a] %	90 Nat'l Guard, %	166 others,[a] %
It works out better when they're in the same outfits.	28	21	20	17
It works out about the same either way.	36	45	44	42
It works out better when they're in separate outfits.	29	31	33	36
No answer	7	3	3	5

[a] Includes Regular Army, draftees, and enlisted reserve.

TABLE A134

CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD OPINIONS ON HOW NEGRO TROOPS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO OUTFITS

Response category	Responses in different units			
	All-white		Integrated	
	80 Nat'l Guard, %	103 others,[a] %	90 Nat'l Guard, %	166 others[a] %
In all-Negro battalions or regiments	39	42	34	41
As colored companies in white battalions	10	3	4	8
As colored platoons in white companies	1	2	3	0
As colored squads in white platoons	1	0	2	0
They should be assigned as individuals without regard to color.	47	50	54	49
No answer	2	3	2	2

[a] Includes Regular Army, draftees, and enlisted reserve.

TABLE A135

CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION OPINIONS ON COMPLETE INTEGRATION

Response category	Responses in different units			
	All-white		Integrated	
	80 Nat'l Guard, %	103 others,[a] %	90 Nat'l Guard, %	166 others,[a] %
I would object to it strongly.	22	26	20	20
I would rather not, but it would not matter much.	28	34	21	28
It would make no difference to me.	44	32	45	43
I would like it.	5	6	13	7
No answer	1	2	1	2

[a]Includes Regular Army, draftees, and enlisted reserve.

TABLE A136

CALIFORNIA NATIONAL GUARD DIVISION OPINIONS ON INTEGRATED USE OF ARMY PX

Response category	Responses in different units			
	All-white		Integrated	
	80 Nat'l Guard, %	103 others,[a] %	90 Nat'l Guard, %	166 others,[a] %
It works out better than any other arrangement.	14	26	26	15
It works out about the same as any other arrangement.	80	61	63	70
It does not work as well as some other arrangement.	5	10	11	14
No answer	1	3	0	1

[a]Includes Regular Army, draftees, and enlisted reserve.

TABLE A137

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON WHAT JOE DOAKES DOES WHEN SENT TO INTEGRATED OUTFIT IN SQUAD WITH BOTH NEGRO SQUAD LEADER AND PLATOON SERGEANT AFTER HAVING BEEN IN ALL-WHITE OUTFITS

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
He acts just as he would in any other outfit.	38	46	61	48	40	45	56	48
He just tries to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him.	7	6	13	4	3	6	6	7
He tries to make things tough for the colored noncoms in any way he can.	4	5	3	5	2	4	6	6
He speaks to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit.	23	22	5	15	26	25	8	10
He tries in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit.	19	15	3	18	24	14	6	15
No answer	9	6	15	10	5	6	18	14

TABLE A138

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON WHAT JOE DOAKES *SHOULD* DO IN SITUATION OUTLINED IN TABLE A137

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
He should act just as he would in any other outfit.	52	67	85	89	47	67	75	83
He should try to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him.	2	2	0	1	5	0	8	3
He should speak to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit.	27	19	3	2	26	22	0	1
He should try to make things tough for the colored noncoms in any way he can.	0	1	0	2	2	2	0	2
He should try in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit.	13	7	0	0	18	3	0	1
No answer	6	4	12	6	2	6	17	10

TABLE A139

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON WHAT JOE DOAKES DOES IF ASSIGNED TO PLATOON IN WHICH THE SERGEANT AND MOST MEN ARE COLORED

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
He acts just as he would in any other outfit.	30	34	77	55	24	36	44	50
He just tries to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him.	6	5	10	5	5	6	8	6
He tries to make things tough for the colored noncoms in any way he can.	2	2	3	4	3	2	6	5
He speaks to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit.	31	33	0	14	27	29	17	16
He tries in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit.	25	24	0	13	36	22	8	14
No answer	6	2	10	9	5	5	17	9

TABLE A140

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON WHAT JOE DOAKES *SHOULD* DO IN SITUATION OUTLINED IN TABLE A139

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
He should act just as he would in any other outfit.	43	50	79	87	39	47	75	81
He should just try to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him.	2	1	4	1	2	3	3	3
He should try to make things tough for the colored noncoms in any way he can.	0	0	3	1	2	2	6	2
He should speak to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit.	29	30	3	4	31	30	3	3
He should try in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit.	19	15	3	1	24	10	0	1
No answer	7	4	8	6	2	8	13	10

TABLE A141

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON WHAT JOE DOAKES WOULD DO WHEN COMPANY COMMANDER OF ALL-WHITE OUTFIT ANNOUNCES ARRIVAL OF TEN COLORED REPLACEMENTS SAYING, "I DIDN'T WANT THEM, AND I KNOW YOU DON'T WANT THEM. I WANT YOU MEN TO MAKE IT SO TOUGH FOR THEM THAT THEY'LL KNOW THEY'RE NOT WANTED."

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
He tries to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive.	17	14	13	22	21	18	25	29
He doesn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he doesn't go out of his way to make things tough for them.	24	25	8	22	29	22	19	17
He treats the colored men just like any other replacements.	32	38	38	23	29	34	19	23
He tries to be especially nice to the colored men and tries to get his buddies to do the same.	5	6	10	12	8	6	14	10
He reports the Captain to the Inspector General.	15	12	23	14	8	13	8	11
No answer	7	5	8	7	5	7	15	10

TABLE A142

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON WHAT JOE DOAKES *SHOULD* DO IN SITUATION OUTLINED IN TABLE A141

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
He should try to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive.	5	2	3	2	16	5	8	5
He shouldn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he shouldn't go out of his way to make things tough for them.	18	14	3	2	26	11	3	4
He should treat the colored men just like any other replacements.	43	47	41	45	42	46	56	41
He should try to be especially nice to the colored men and should try to get his buddies to do the same.	6	8	23	16	6	9	6	16
He should report the Captain to the Inspector General.	21	26	23	26	6	24	14	24
No answer	7	3	7	9	4	5	13	10

TABLE A143

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON WHAT JOE DOAKES DOES WHEN CAPTAIN ANNOUNCES ARRIVAL OF COLORED REPLACEMENTS SAYING, "WE WANT THESE MEN TO BE GOOD SOLDIERS AND A REAL PART OF OUR OUTFIT. I WANT YOU ALL TO GO OUT OF YOUR WAY TO HELP THEM AND BE NICE TO THEM."

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
He reports the Captain to the Inspector General.	4	3	8	5	3	3	6	7
He tries to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive.	4	5	10	6	8	2	14	7
He doesn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he doesn't go out of his way to make things tough for them.	22	22	3	17	32	22	14	15
He treats the colored men just like any other replacements.	53	53	33	48	44	57	33	40
He tries to be especially nice to the colored men and tries to get his buddies to do the same.	11	14	31	18	10	11	19	22
No answer	6	3	15	6	3	5	14	9

TABLE A144

INFANTRY OPINIONS ON WHAT JOE DOAKES *SHOULD* DO IN SITUATION OUTLINED IN TABLE A143

Response category	Combat veterans				Precombat infantrymen			
	Integrated units			285 in all-Negro units, %	Integrated units			220 in all-Negro units, %
	Whites		39 Negroes, %		Whites		36 Negroes, %	
	322 Southerners, %	575 others, %			62 Southerners, %	125 others, %		
He should report the Captain to the Inspector General.	4	4	10	4	2	2	6	6
He should try to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive.	2	3	5	2	8	2	8	4
He shouldn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he shouldn't go out of his way to make things tough for them.	18	12	0	4	30	10	3	3
He should treat the colored men just like any other replacements.	57	63	54	62	47	69	61	54
He should try to be especially nice to the colored men and should try to get his buddies to do the same.	14	15	18	22	11	13	8	24
No answer	5	3	13	6	2	4	14	9

Appendix B

UNITED STATES SURVEYS

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*Now, International Research Associates, Inc.

Appendix B, Part I

UTILIZATION OF NEGRO TROOPS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, JUL-AUG 1951

by

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*A research study conducted for ORO under a subcontract.

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DIGEST OF THE STUDY

This study is addressed to the question of how Negro troops in the continental US can best be utilized. Most specifically, it focuses on the problem of integration, as seen in the opinions of men in both segregated and mixed units, and as reported in actual practice. The data presented are derived from: (a) questionnaires administered to over 8000 troops at ten major installations; (b) intensive personal interviews with some hundreds of officers and enlisted men; and (c) over 700 questionnaires administered to officers. The principal findings of the study may be summarized as follows:

1. Integration works without problems or conflicts, in the cases where it has been tried. This is true for regular organizations as well as for training units, and for posts in the South as well as for those in the North.

2. There is no real evidence that integration adversely affects unit performance or morale when it is carried out under the normal circumstances in which Negroes are a minority.

3. Negroes overwhelmingly prefer integration, and their efficiency as soldiers (as reported by them and by white commanders) is far greater in mixed than in Negro units.

4. Although there are strong apprehensions about integration among a sizable minority of Northerners and among most Southerners in all-white units, these proportions dwindle appreciably when experience with integration actually takes place. White soldiers in integrated units are uniformly more favorable to integration than are comparable men in segregated units. Experience with integration makes officers clearly favorable to it in their military judgment. Contact with Negroes as individuals in mixed units appears to make enlisted men more favorable in their personal opinions of integration.

5. Opinion among trainees experiencing integration is influenced by regional customs in the areas where camps are located. In units where Negroes constitute a large visible majority, white soldiers react less favorably than under normal integration, but strong objections are encountered only among a minority. There is no indication that these objections constitute acute problems of command, or that military functions are seriously impaired.

6. Most men, including many of those who voice personal objections to integration, predict that they would accept Negro soldiers into their units "like any other replacements." When integration actually takes place, soldiers who dislike Negroes generally avoid contact with them, instead of expressing their hostility openly.

7. Integration of recreational facilities on Army posts has not brought major problems, even in the South. In cases where social mingling of Negroes and whites is frowned on by local custom, soldiers of both groups will often conform to these customs informally (at dances in particular), even under a policy of full-scale integration.

8. Negro leaders of white troops are accepted by their subordinates, within the framework of military discipline.

9. Problems concerning Negro soldiers which arise in the relations between Army posts and nearby communities exist independent of whether integration is practiced on the post.

10. There is no clear-cut, consistent understanding of Army policy on the use of Negro troops, either on the part of enlisted men or of officers. Instead there is a wide diversity of interpretations and practices, many resulting from arbitrary decisions by local commanders.

PROBLEM AND SCOPE

PROBLEM

How can Negro troops best be utilized? In the continental US, the Army is today assigning Negro troops in several different ways. Throughout the Army most regular units are designated as either Negro or white and assignments of personnel to those units are made accordingly. However, Negroes and whites are assigned to reception centers and training divisions as individuals (without regard to race). They serve together as students in specialist schools and in numerous service units and special detachments.

Which system of using Negro troops works best? The answer to this question cannot be given easily, because it is hard to find similar organizations, segregated and mixed, with identical missions. Men in the mixed training divisions are not directly comparable to men in segregated regular units. They are younger and new to the Army; they are not in a "regular outfit," but in a transient and impermanent status. These differences mean that simple comparisons of *all* men in integrated and racially separate units cannot be made. More careful and qualified comparisons are necessary. Within these limits, the following nine problems suggest themselves:

(a) What are the prevalent assumptions and opinions regarding Negro soldiers — the opinions held by their commanders, by other officers, by white enlisted men, and by the Negro soldiers themselves? How are they judged as individuals and as a group, in different types of military situations? What special problems of performance, discipline or morale are they reported to present?

(b) How are the assumptions regarding Negro soldiers, and opinions on the use of Negro soldiers, related to the actual experience of the individuals who hold them? Does actual contact with Negro troops result in the US, as it does in Korea, in a more favorable outlook toward the integration of Negroes and whites? What considerations, other than personal contact, appear to govern these attitudes?

(c) National Guard units originating in states with a historical tradition of segregation might seem to present a special problem for any Army policy of assigning troops without regard to color. How do attitudes in such units compare with attitudes in other parts of the Army? Under conditions of integration, how is the actual behavior of men in these units likely to differ from behavior elsewhere in the Army?

(d) Do Negroes perform more effectively in mixed or in all-Negro units? Is the performance of whites adversely affected by the introduction of Negroes into previously white units? How, if at all, does integration affect the morale and personal adjustment of Negroes and whites? As far as the evidence indicates, what might be the over-all effect of integration upon the efficiency of the Army as a whole?

(e) Is there an optimum proportion of Negroes to whites in a mixed unit? Does the level of unit performance show evidence of decline beyond a certain ratio? Is there a point at which the presence of Negroes creates disciplinary or morale problems which make integration ineffective?

(f) What actually happens in units where Negroes and whites are mixed? What kinds of relations do they have to each other and to their leaders? Do they get along, or is the presence of the two groups in the same unit marked by tension and conflict? How does integration work on the level of day-to-day Army life? What does it mean in terms of the actual contact of Negroes and whites? What problems face the white commander of Negro troops (in both mixed and all-Negro units) and the Negro commander of whites under integration?

(g) What questions arise in the use of post facilities on installations which contain both Negro and white troops — where those troops are mixed and where they are separated? What happens when facilities are shared completely by both groups — and when they are separated? Most particularly, what problems have been encountered in the handling of intimate social events like dances -- and how have these problems been met?

(h) What effect, if any, does integration have on the relations between soldiers and residents of the towns near military posts? Under what circumstances does the presence of Negro troops become a problem for troop commanders in their contacts with the community?

(i) How clearly is present Army policy on the use of Negro manpower understood by officers and enlisted men? What kinds of interpretations of policy are made by local unit commanders, and with what results in practice? What bearing does the parallel existence of diverse interpretations and practices have on the success of Army policy as a whole?

In the present research, over 9000 officers and enlisted men have been contacted, either through personal interviews or through written questionnaires, at ten different military installations in the continental United States.* They include members of Regular Army units, federalized National Guard units, and training divisions. All-white, all-Negro, and racially mixed units are included in the study. Camps located in different parts of the country have been covered. Since practices in the use of Negro troops differ widely according to the type of unit and the type of installation, the emphasis throughout the research is not on artificial "average" findings, but rather on the comparison of experiences from one situation to the other.

METHOD OF THE STUDY

The field study on which this report is based was conducted 8 Jul-31 Aug 1951. A team of social scientists studied intensively each of ten military installations in the continental US. They contacted about 9200 officers and enlisted men at all ranks either with questionnaires or through face-to-face interviews.

The evidence collected consists of two major bodies of data. To provide a comprehensive picture of the opinions, attitudes, and experiences of large numbers of men in different types of Army units, a prepared questionnaire was administered to 8035 men and company officers. These troops were assembled in company-size units, with each individual filling out his own questionnaire. The results of this survey have been subjected to a detailed statistical analysis.

At the same time, intensive personal interviews were conducted with about 550 other officers and men on the same posts. Essentially, these interviews covered the same subject matter as the questionnaires. Since they were informal and unstructured, they made it possible to probe into the subjective feelings of soldiers more thoroughly than a prepared questionnaire could do. They were a source of case histories and illustrative material. They

* The major sources of data are pencil-and-paper questionnaires completed by troops in company-size units; and intensive personal interviews with officers, enlisted men, and civilians in towns adjacent to Army posts. A special officer questionnaire was also employed.

are the basis for observations and conclusions based on concrete situations and on actual behavior as well as opinions. The interview material thus provides background and depth essential to a full understanding of the statistical data, as well as evidence on matters which the statistics do not cover.

In addition to these two major sources of data, the research team collected other information which has been used in the writing of this report. They interviewed residents of the communities adjacent to Army posts. On the posts themselves, performance, crime, and other records were obtained and studied where available. A special questionnaire was used in connection with many of the officer interviews, in order to permit measurement of opinion on some of the points raised in those interviews. In three of the camps visited, this questionnaire was distributed to nearly all the officers on the post (including those not directly interviewed). Altogether, 705 of these special officer questionnaires were completed.

Troop Questionnaire

The main troop questionnaire, which is appended in the final section of this part, is in two parts. The first deals with the individual's background, morale, and contact with soldiers of the other race. The second part focuses directly on the subject — the use of Negro troops. The questionnaire is so designed that it can be administered both to segregated and to mixed units, and to Negroes as well as whites. Since it is based on the questionnaire employed in the Korean study, a direct comparison of Korean and US findings is possible on a number of questions. The subjects listed below are among those covered in the questionnaire.

1. Morale and performance: (a) General evaluation by the respondent of the morale and performance of his unit; (b) Opinion concerning leadership in the unit; (c) Job satisfaction; (d) Personal adjustment; (e) Opinion on the Korean campaign; (f) Reaction toward military punishment; (g) Opinion of the nearby communities.

2. Individual background characteristics: (a) Personal characteristics unrelated to Army service: age, education, etc.; (b) Personal characteristics related to Army service: length of service, type of enlistment, etc.

3. Opinions concerning the utilization of Negro manpower: (a) The effect of integration on unit performance; (b) Types of jobs to which Negroes should be assigned; (c) Quality of performance of Negro soldiers; (d) Types of units — segregated or integrated — to which Negroes should be assigned; (e) Types of post facilities preferred — integrated or segregated.

4. Race relations: (a) Predictions of, and attitudes toward, changing trends in race relations in the Army and in civilian life; (b) Predictions of behavior and standards of behavior in typical Army situations involving interracial contact; (c) Reports of the amount and kinds of personal contacts between Negroes and whites in the Army and in civilian life.

The sampling procedure employed in this study is planned to provide comparisons among certain important types of units or situations in the Army. It was anticipated that attitudes on Negro-white integration and on Negro performance would vary considerably, depending on the particular character and experience of the units in which the attitudes were measured.

In selecting the sample certain distinct groups immediately suggested themselves as special subjects for study: TO&E units; elements of the training divisions and of federalized National Guard units; miscellaneous units. It was clearly necessary to distinguish among units which were all-white, units which were all-Negro, and units which contained both whites and Negroes, but in varying proportions. In the case of the training divisions, it was also important to consider recruits at different stages of the training cycle, to see whether

their opinions changed through time. It was also important to note the location of the unit, North or South, since the prevailing regional customs could obviously influence many of the reactions and opinions on the subject of race relations. To simplify the comparison of troops in these categories, it was decided to focus on combat-type troops — wherever possible, the infantry. In each case, the companies selected for inclusion in the study were selected at random on each post from among the units which met the specifications called for by the sampling plan. Detailed composition of the sample is given at the end of this part of App B.

By comparing units alike in all respects but the one under study, it is possible to discover how the characteristics of a unit are related to attitudes. For example, by comparing Southerners in all-white units in the North with Southerners in similar all-white units in the South, it is possible to infer how the regional location of the unit affects opinions. By comparing similar training companies at the same point in the training cycle, but with different percentages of Negro trainees, it is possible to make inferences concerning the effect of varying Negro-white proportions.

It should be noted, however, that this sample was designed *only* for comparisons among groups. It was not intended to provide results accurately representative of all troops stationed in the continental US at the present time. A "cross-sectional" study would not have permitted a detailed comparison and analysis of the findings for different units (because of the small number of cases which would have fallen into some of the most important categories). Had such a sample been used, attention would have focused on opinion at one point in time in a situation which is actually constantly changing as the Army's composition and practices change. It would have produced an artificial and misleading "average" set of statistics in answer to each question. Such an "average" would have obscured the enormous differences of opinion, between groups in different situations, which are apparent to the reader of this report. The most effective argument against a national study, however, was the fact that it would have forced the analysts to deal with respondents as individuals and as isolatees, rather than as members of units which could be seen as a whole.

The purpose of the sampling design (which was set up in detail at each post visited) was to select units which provided the opportunity for critical comparisons which would illuminate the study problem — the use of Negro troops.

The procedure employed in analyzing the statistical data was as follows: for each company-size unit in the sample, the respondents were separated by race and according to whether they came from the South or from other parts of the country.*

For each company in the training division sample, broken down separately by Northern whites, Southern whites, Northern Negroes, and Southern Negroes, a detailed comparison was made of age and educational background, and of attitude toward integration. This laborious compilation made it possible to see whether or not the *logical* combinations of units were also *permissible* combinations; that is to say — whether groups which appeared to be similar in type actually contained men who were similar in their background characteristics and who felt similarly on the crucial subject of the survey. The responses of members of these groups were compared carefully, question by question. Those questions producing the most important and suggestive findings were subjected to even more careful and detailed analysis. Thus the categories of comparison used throughout this report were not superimposed on the data but arose in large part from the data themselves.

* All states in which some degree of Negro-white segregation is maintained by law were classified as Southern in this study. These included (in 1951) Alabama, Delware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.

The field work covered five training divisions, two National Guard divisions and several other National Guard units, and two Regular Army divisions, one armored and one airborne, as well as a number of miscellaneous units. Both intensive interview and questionnaire data were obtained at all posts except Camp Breckenridge, Ky., where only intensive interviews were gathered. The camps covered and their locations are: Fort Devens, Mass., miscellaneous units; Indian Town Gap Military Reservation, Pa., training division; Fort Jackson, S. C., training division and National Guard division; Fort Bragg, N. C., airborne division and miscellaneous units; Camp Rucker, Ala., National Guard division and miscellaneous units; Camp Hood, Texas, armored division, Fort Hood; Camp Campbell, Ky., armored division, Fort Campbell; Camp Breckenridge, Ky., training division; Fort Ord, Calif., training division; and Camp Roberts, Calif., training division.

Intensive Interview Analysis

The intensive interview, an outline of which is appended,* was planned primarily to get information on the performance of Negroes under varying circumstances (both segregated and mixed), to gather opinions on the subject of Negro performance and Negro-white integration, to get a picture of the problems and conflicts which might arise in the relationship between white and Negro troops, and to obtain descriptions of Negro-white relations under different conditions.

Interviews with officers were generally held with individual men, whereas interviews with enlisted men were for the most part conducted with groups of three or four individuals. (It had been discovered in Korea that this was the most efficient method of gathering this type of data.) Intensive interviews were conducted as far as possible in the organizations covered by the questionnaires (not in the actual companies in which questionnaires were administered but in identical adjacent companies).

The research team took detailed notes during all interviews. Many interviews were recorded verbatim in shorthand. Guarantees of strict anonymity were given at the outset of each interview. Negroes were contacted only by Negro interviewers; whites only by whites.

The study of the intensive interview material involved a set of procedures quite different from those employed in the statistical analysis. Since it was not the intent of the interview material to provide a mass of data which could be translated into numerical percentages, a rigid content analysis was neither necessary nor desirable. The analysis made no attempt to assign a quantitative value to each remark made. It sought primarily to understand each remark in the context of the problem as a whole. Each interview was first read by one of the field staff (not the person who had made the interview in the first place), and all passages and items of potential interest were marked and numbered. These passages were then indexed in terms of a comprehensive scheme of categories abstracted from the interview material itself.

* At the end of Part I, App B.

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION IN SEGREGATED UNITS

The attitudes of segregated troops on the subject of integration are of interest at the outset of this report, insofar as they furnish a contrast to what actually occurs in the mixed organizations.

These opinions are largely based on assumptions as to what integration is like, and predictions as to what it implies. When these opinions are compared with similar findings among integrated troops, it becomes possible to see whether or not the assumptions are borne out by experience.

This section considers the attitudes of about 2000 white and 1400 Negro troops in segregated TO&E, TD, and National Guard units, stationed at six major installations. It considers these attitudes in relation to the differences which exist among soldiers in respect to individual background and military experience. With the exception of illustrative quotations drawn from the intensive interviews, all data reported in this section are drawn from the troop questionnaires.

Although men belong to segregated units, they may and do have contact with troops of the other race. Soldiers in all-white units often share post facilities with Negro soldiers. Whites and Negroes in separate units may have some contact on their jobs. Some men have had previous service in integrated units.

The three groups studied are fairly comparable in their background characteristics.* Men from the Southern states are somewhat younger, and less well educated, than men from other sections of the country (who are referred to as Northerners throughout this report. The distinction between men from the South and those from other sections is made in all the statistical analyses, because of the important differences in their traditional outlook on Negro-white relations).

Personal Feelings about Negro Soldiers as Individuals. Most white soldiers in all-white units steer clear of expressions of extreme feeling, one way or the other, about Negro soldiers. They tend rather to indicate the kind of mild tolerance which is demonstrated in Table B1.

To be sure, white soldiers from the South are more apt than Northerners to say that they don't like Negroes, or that they hate them. But only among men in National Guard units (some of which have traditions rooted in the Deep South) does a majority show genuine hostility.

It is of interest in this connection that National Guard soldiers report the least job contact with Negro soldiers, whereas the most favorable attitudes are found among men in a TD unit which has more daily job contact with Negroes than any of the other units. It would appear that where contact with individual Negroes is greatest, attitudes toward them are most favorable. The implications of this are developed at length in succeeding sections.

*See appendix Tables B62 through B71 and B78 and B79 for the age, marital status, type of enlistment, and educational levels of these three groups of men. Tables B69 and B70 (p. B-I-103) give their responses to questions on morale.

TABLE B1

PERSONAL FEELINGS IN ALL-WHITE UNITS TOWARD NEGRO SOLDIERS

Answers	TO&E units		TD units		National Guard units	
	752 Northerners, %	348 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	549 Northerners, %	224 Southerners, %
I like them very much or fairly well.	80	62	89	83	73	47
I don't like them.	18	29	6	17	23	43
I hate them.	1	7	1	0	2	8
No answer	1	2	4	0	2	2

TABLE B2

AMOUNT OF WORK CONTACT WITH NEGRO SOLDIERS REPORTED IN ALL-WHITE UNITS

Answers	TO&E units		TD units		National Guard units	
	752 Northerners, %	348 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	549 Northerners, %	224 Southerners, %
A great deal or some contact	47	52	80	88	17	11
Not very much contact	35	26	16	10	29	29
No contact at all	18	21	2	2	53	60
No answer	0	1	2	0	1	0

Opinions on the Kinds of Army Jobs Negroes Should Have. Whatever they may feel about Negroes as persons, and whatever their opinions on other matters concerning Negro soldiers, there is overwhelming agreement among white troops that Negroes should be given both combat and service jobs in the Army, just like whites.

TABLE B3

ATTITUDES IN ALL-WHITE UNITS ON KINDS OF JOBS NEGROES SHOULD BE GIVEN

Answers	TO&E units		TD units		National Guard units	
	752 Northerners, %	348 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	549 Northerners, %	224 Southerners, %
Mostly service jobs	5	7	1	8	5	11
Mostly combat jobs	6	10	1	4	4	8
Combat and service jobs same as whites	89	82	94	86	89	76
No answer	0	1	4	2	2	5

Opinions on How Negroes Should Be Assigned to Their Jobs. As will be more fully discussed in a later section, white soldiers are greatly divided in their opinions as to what Army policy on assignment of Negroes actually is. When they are asked about their preferences in the matter, there is much more agreement.

TABLE B4

PREFERENCES OF SOLDIERS IN ALL-WHITE UNITS ON ASSIGNMENT OF NEGRO TROOPS

Answers	TO&E units		TD units		National Guard units	
	752 Northerners, %	348 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	549 Northerners, %	224 Southerners, %
In all-colored battalions or regiments	56	79	47	69	57	76
As colored companies in white battalions	14	8	10	10	7	8
As colored platoons in white companies	3	3	3	0	0	0
As colored squads in white platoons	0	2	2	2	1	0
They should be assigned as individuals without regard to color	25	7	31	15	31	11
No answer	2	0	7	4	4	5

Opinion Clusters at the Extremes of Possible Assignment Policy. Most men favor the assignment of Negroes to separate regiments or battalions, with the largest minority favoring assignment on an individual basis. Relatively few men select the other alternatives.

Opinion on Serving in the Same Platoon with Negroes. When the question of assignment of Negro soldiers is brought down to the personal level, differences in region of origin are more marked than they appear when this question is viewed as a matter of abstract policy. In all types of units, Southerners express considerably more disapproval of the idea of being in a platoon which contains Negro soldiers.

TABLE B5

ATTITUDES IN ALL-WHITE UNITS TOWARD PLATOON INTEGRATION

Answers	TO&E units		TD units		National Guard units	
	752 Northerners, %	348 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	549 Northerners, %	224 Southerners, %
I object to it strongly.	35	70	35	61	29	69
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	34	20	30	25	39	19
It makes no difference to me.	26	10	30	10	27	9
I like it.	4	0	2	4	3	0
No answer	1	0	3	0	2	3

Among Northerners in segregated units about a third say either that it would make no difference to them to be in the same platoon with Negroes or that they would like it; another third say they would prefer not to be in an integrated platoon but that it wouldn't make much difference; and a third say they object strongly to the idea. Among Southerners, 60-70 percent say they object strongly, and about 20 percent would rather not, but

don't feel that it would matter too much. The remainder say it would make no difference or that they would like it.

Predictions of Behavior under Integration. When the same men, however, are asked how they would actually behave if Negro replacements were brought into their units, most of them indicate that they would simply accept integration if it came. The great majority of the Northerners and nearly 40 percent of the Southerners say that they would treat the Negroes just like any other replacements or be especially nice to them.

TABLE B6

PREDICTIONS OF SOLDIERS IN ALL-WHITE UNITS ON HOW THEY WOULD BEHAVE TOWARD NEGRO REPLACEMENTS

Q. 85: Now suppose Captain Blake announced that the colored replacements were coming and then went on to say, "We want these men to be good soldiers and a real part of our outfit. I want you all to go out of your way to help them and be nice to them." What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place?

Answers	TO&E units		TD units		National Guard units	
	752 Northerners, %	348 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	549 Northerners, %	224 Southerners, %
Report Captain Blake to the inspector general	3	7	1	2	2	4
Try to make things tough for the colored soldiers	4	9	3	2	2	4
Wouldn't have anything to do with the colored men, but I wouldn't go out of my way to make things tough for them	22	39	25	36	24	54
Would treat the colored men just like any other replacements	56	36	58	48	60	29
Would try to be especially nice to the colored men and would try to get my buddies to do the same	13	8	13	8	10	7
No answer	2	1	0	4	2	2

Even Southern National Guardsmen (most of whom say they dislike Negroes) do not indicate that, if Negroes came into their units, they would take any aggressive action. The structure of the Army creates a setting in which such behavior becomes most improbable, and the attitude of the fictitious captain represents authority in the question presented here.

Avoidance of contact with the Negro replacements is the second most frequently chosen alternative. Fewer men choose it, however, than say they "object strongly" to being in a mixed platoon. Thus, among even the extreme objectors to integration there are many who would accept it, if it actually came, without any show of hostility.

HOW ATTITUDES ARE RELATED

Attitudes toward various aspects of integration are explored in eight questions of the troop questionnaire. Four of these are concerned essentially with the same subject matter,

feelings about integration in military units, but they formulate the problem differently, in terms which range from the abstract to the immediate. The other four questions involve the integration of social activities and facilities on Army posts.

A special analysis of the patterns of response to these eight questions shows that they can be ranked in order from the "easiest" question (i.e., the one to which a favorable-to-integration response is most frequently made) to the "hardest" (the one least likely to evoke a favorable response).*

The rank order of the items, with the prointegration response to each, is as shown below, from the "easiest" to the "hardest".†

1. (Q. 76:) "White soldiers and colored soldiers should use the same PXs together" or "It doesn't make much difference to me either way."
2. (Q. 75:) "White soldiers should play together on the same teams" or "It doesn't make much difference to me either way."
3. (Q. 77:) "White soldiers and colored soldiers should use the same Service Clubs together" or "It doesn't make much difference to me either way."
4. (Q. 73:) "They should be assigned as individuals without regard to color."
5. (Q. 65:) "I'd like to see them live and work with the white soldiers."
6. (Q. 78:) "White soldiers and colored soldiers should go to the same dances" or "It doesn't make much difference to me either way."
7. (Q. 37:) "I like the idea." (Living with other races.)
8. (Q. 74:) "I like it." (Platoon-level integration.)

It can be seen from this scale that the prospect of the two races living and working together arouses more resistance, the more concretely it is worded, and the closer it is brought to the respondent personally. This is to be expected. More people are willing to say that soldiers should be assigned "without regard to color" or that Negro and white soldiers should live and work together "as time goes on" than express willingness to be in an integrated platoon themselves, here and now.

The ranking of attitudes toward various *kinds* of integration is also clear from the scale. It is particularly interesting that integrated dances turn out to be a less sensitive problem than that of platoon integration, although dances might appear to represent the more delicate problem. Integrated PXs, athletics, and service clubs are more easily accepted by white soldiers than either of these. This rank order suggests that, if integration at the platoon level can be successfully carried out, integration of post facilities and social activities can be expected to create relatively little difficulty.

Factors Underlying Attitude: Quantitative Findings

The attitudes of Northerners toward integration are closely related to the way they feel, personally, about Negroes. Among Southerners this is less true. Table B7 shows how white soldiers' personal liking or dislike of Negroes is related to their feeling about serving in the same platoon with them.

* This type of rank order is known as a Guttman scale. Guttman scales have the special characteristic that a person who gives a favorable response to any given question is extremely likely to give a favorable response to all of the "easier" questions. In the case of this particular scale the probability occurs in 92 cases out of 100. This makes it possible to give each respondent a scale score corresponding to the rank of the "hardest" question to which he responds favorably. From the score, it can be seen immediately which questions he has answered favorably and which unfavorably. The score provides an accurate method of ranking respondents according to their degree of favorableness to integration. Further analysis can be greatly simplified by using the scale scores rather than the individual questions.

† Although every question had equal possible responses it was found that they "scaled" best if dichotomized into prointegration and "anti-integration" responses in the way indicated.

TABLE B7

FEELINGS TOWARD NEGRO SOLDIERS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG MEN IN ALL-WHITE TO&E UNITS[a]

Attitude groups	Strong objectors to integration in each attitude group	
	752 Northerners, %	348 Southerners, %
Like Negro soldiers very much or fairly well	24	58
Don't like Negro soldiers	76	84
Hate Negro soldiers	90	96

[a] See Table B72 for responses of all men.

Even among Southerners who say they like Negroes fairly well, a majority object strongly to platoon integration. Among Northerners, on the other hand, it is only in the group which says it dislikes Negroes that a majority object strongly to being in the same platoon with them.

Evaluations of Performance. Similarly, when evaluations of the performance of Negro soldiers are examined, it is only the Northerners for whom poor performance constitutes a basis for objecting to integration. Among white soldiers from the South, even those who think colored soldiers work just as hard as white soldiers do are mostly opposed to integration (see Table B8).

TABLE B8

ESTIMATES OF HOW HARD NEGRO SOLDIERS WORK AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG MEN IN ALL-WHITE UNITS[a]

Attitude groups	Strong objectors to integration in each attitude group					
	TO&E units		TD units		National Guard units	
	North, %	South, %	North, %	South, %	North, %	South, %
Colored soldiers do not work as hard as white soldiers.	56	88	39	80	39	90
Colored soldiers work just as hard or harder than white soldiers.	24	62	37	46	19	55

[a] See Table B73 for responses of all men.

Type of Enlistment. Regular Army men and draftees in TO&E units do not differ in their feelings about integration. In the National Guard, however, National Guardsmen are more opposed to integration than are non-Guardsmen (see Table B9).

Length of Service. The attitudes of Southerners do not change as length of service increases. Among Northerners in TO&E and National Guard units, however, objections to integration are stronger, the longer a man has been in the Army and presumably the longer he has been exposed to the traditional practice of segregated units (see Table B10).

Rank. Northern noncoms in the TO&E National Guard units object to integration more strongly than lower three graders from the North. This is related to their longer period of Army service (see Table B11).

TABLE B9

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION IN ALL-WHITE UNITS ON BASIS OF ENLISTMENT AND UNIT TYPES[a]

Enlistment and unit types	Strong objectors to integration	
	Northerners or Northern units, %	Southerners or Southern units, %
TO&E units		
Regular Army men	35	65
Draftees	37	73
National Guard units		
Guardsmen	33	78
Others	26	56

[a] See Table B79 for complete answers on platoon question of Regular Army men and draftees.

TABLE B10

LENGTH OF TIME IN ARMY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION IN ALL-WHITE UNITS[a]

Unit type	Strong objectors to integration according to time in service			
	Up to 1 year		More than 1 year	
	North, %	South, %	North, %	South, %
TO&E	33	69	49	72
National Guard	27	69	35	70

[a] See Table B80 for complete responses in platoon integration question of men in the Army up to a year, up to three years, and more than three years.

TABLE B11

RANK AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG MEN IN ALL-WHITE UNITS[a]

Units	Strong objectors to integration according to rank			
	Northerners		Southerners	
	Lower three graders, %	Non-coms, %	Lower three graders, %	Non-coms, %
TO&E	34	55	70	72
National Guard	27	43	72	60

[a] See Table B81 for complete responses on platoon integration questions of lower three graders and noncoms.

Attitudes of Negro Soldiers in Segregated Units. Negro soldiers overwhelmingly agree that they should be assigned to combat and service jobs the same as whites (Table B12).

There is no more consensus among Negro soldiers concerning what Army assignment policy actually is than there is among white soldiers. Perhaps because the wish is father to the thought, more of them than of the whites believe that the policy is one of assignment on an individual basis (Table B13). Because integration is a more important question to them, Negroes are apt to be much more aware of the existence of Presidential and other

directives which they interpret as calling for Army-wide integration. Their present segregated status is seen as an example of administrative delay.

TABLE B12

ATTITUDES OF SOLDIERS IN ALL-NEGRO TO&E UNITS CONCERNING JOB ASSIGNMENTS FOR NEGROES

Job assignments recommended for Negro soldiers	TO&E respondents	
	488 Northerners, %	876 Southerners, %
Mostly service jobs	6	10
Mostly combat jobs	2	1
Combat and service jobs, the same as whites	89	87
No answer	3	2

TABLE B13

BELIEFS IN ALL-NEGRO UNITS CONCERNING ASSIGNMENT POLICY

Concepts of what official policy specifies	Respondents in TO&E units	
	488 Northerners, %	876 Southerners, %
Segregated battalions or regiments	37	34
Colored companies in white battalions	15	15
Colored platoons in white companies	2	3
Colored squads in white platoons	1	1
Soldiers assigned without regard to color	37	42
No answer	8	5

Whatever they deem to be present Army policy, the great majority of Negroes in segregated units expect that Negroes and whites will be together eventually (Table B14).

TABLE B14

EXPECTATIONS OF SEGREGATED NEGRO SOLDIERS CONCERNING FUTURE ARMY POLICY

Expectations of Negro soldiers' future condition	Respondents in TO&E units	
	488 Northerners, %	876 Southerners, %
They will be living and working with the white soldiers.	75	78
They will be mostly in outfits of their own.	19	19
No answer	6	3

Asked about their preferences with respect to Army assignment policy, the great majority of Negroes say that Negro soldiers should be assigned without regard to color. There is no difference between Northern and Southern Negroes on this matter, as there is between Northern and Southern whites.

On the question of platoon integration, virtually none of the Negroes object strongly, or say they would rather not be in an integrated platoon. Their answers are split between "It makes no difference to me" and "I like it." The significance of saying, "It makes no

difference" is not the same for Negroes as it is for whites. For a white soldier the response implies a willingness to tolerate Negroes on intimate and equal terms. For the Negro soldier, the same response may have an element of pride masquerading as indifference as well as an element of inference for the comfort of being with one's customary associates (see Table B15).

TABLE B15

PREFERENCES IN ALL-NEGRO UNITS ON ASSIGNMENT OF NEGRO TROOPS

Unit assignments recommended for Negro troops	TO&E units	
	488 Northerners, %	876 Southerners, %
In all-colored battalions or regiments	6	11
As colored companies in white battalions	5	6
As colored platoons in white companies	2	3
As colored squads in white platoons	0	1
As individuals without regard to color	83	76
No answer	4	3

TABLE B16

ATTITUDES IN ALL-NEGRO UNITS TOWARD PLATOON INTEGRATION

Attitudes	TO&E units	
	488 Northerners, %	876 Southerners, %
Object strongly	2	4
Rather not	6	6
Makes no difference	41	53
Like it	48	35
No answer	3	2

Table B16 indicates that Southern Negroes are less likely than Northern Negroes to be strongly in favor of integrated platoons. This is not surprising, since they are less accustomed to association with whites.

It is often argued that integration might mean fewer opportunities for Negroes who would be competing with whites of superior educational background. However, most Negroes feel their promotion chances would be as good or better in a mixed unit than in a segregated one. Although a substantial minority feel their promotion chances are better in

TABLE B17

ESTIMATES BY SOLDIERS IN ALL-NEGRO UNITS OF PROMOTION CHANCES IN MIXED AND SEGREGATED UNITS

Conditions under which Negro soldiers have best promotion chances	TO&E units	
	488 Northerners, %	876 Southerners, %
In an outfit with both white and colored soldiers in it	28	30
In an outfit with only colored soldiers in it	41	34
They have about the same chance either way	26	33
No answer	5	3

segregated organizations, this belief does not evidently detract from their preference for integration (Table B17).

Differences in education, in type of enlistment, in rank and in length of Army service are not related to attitudes toward integration among Negro soldiers. High school graduates and less-educated men, draftees and regular Army men, lower three graders and noncoms, men with less than one year, and men with more than three years in the Army are all equally in favor of integration.

Factors Underlying Attitudes toward Integration: Qualitative Findings

The statistical evidence has shown that while Negroes are strongly for integration, a large proportion of white troops in segregated units (especially Southern whites) are opposed to it. It has supplied information about "how many" men have favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward integration, and about the kinds of men who are most likely to favor or oppose it. But questionnaire responses may summarize many diverse opinions, emotions, and desires. They may reveal important information about the direction in which a group gravitates, but to evaluate this information, there is also need for a description of the kinds of attitudes and feelings involved, and of the diversity of the reasons behind them.

In interviews with officers and enlisted men in segregated units, three types of attitudes toward integration are encountered: favorable, qualified, and unfavorable.

Favorable Attitudes of Whites. Favorable attitudes of white soldiers are, to a large extent, based upon judgments of the military advantages of integration. The problem is viewed in terms of the inadequacy of segregated Negro units and in terms of the personnel improvement in Negro performance in integrated units.

First, it is generally agreed that segregated Negro units are inefficient.

(Battalion executive officer): Looked at coldly it is a pure matter of dollars and cents. The colored unit is a sink hole. More equipment is wasted in them than any other two outfits. It is a waste of manpower. Why we have 200 men overstrength falling over each other, and over in the white battalion they don't have enough men. At this level we are very much aware of the need to integrate. We were very happy when the Far East Command decided to abolish all-Negro units.

(Assistant division commander): Yes we have segregation here and it is frankly not as efficient as mixed units would be. . . . From the fighting standpoint I would say that in all except the old traditional Negro units which have distinguished themselves in the past, the Negro separate fighting unit is inferior to the white. . . . We must use the Negro to the fullest advantage. This is strictly a problem of efficient use of manpower, and I am taking the most realistic view I can. . . . If I were a Negro mother I certainly would not want my son to go into action as part of an all-Negro unit.

On the other hand, it is believed that Negroes will perform well in integrated units.

(Divisional staff officer): On hearsay and just my opinion I'd say that to get the most out of the Negro soldier you need to have across-the-board integration. Now if you can get the Negro away from the group and among white soldiers he will go toward the white level. But by keeping him in the Negro group he will drop to the general Negro level which is lower.

(Southern white staff officer): It is my opinion that the Negro will perform better when he is a member of a unit which is made up predominantly of white soldiers: (A) he is apt to feel that he is at last achieving true equality and (B) he will almost certainly turn in a better performance to prove that he is as good or better than his associates.

The conviction that it is advisable, from a military point of view, to integrate, gives rise to an attitude of *passive acquiescence* among officers and men who, by their background and personal inclinations, might have been inclined to oppose integration.

(Enlisted man): Now to tell the truth, I'll be frank with you. I'm from Alabama, and I have a natural prejudice. But looking at this whole business from a broadminded point of view I'll put it

this way. If nigger troops could be as efficient by themselves, leave segregation. Otherwise put them together. I am prejudiced myself. I am prejudiced as all hell.

(Deputy post commander): I have no enthusiasm for integration. But I won't discuss personal feelings. Integration is coming. It's inevitable. When I see that a thing is inevitable, I don't spit against the wind.

Qualified Attitudes of Whites. The most frequently encountered compromise in attitude is one which accepts the "work" phases of integration, but rejects its "social" phases.

(Enlisted man): At jump school I learned to get along with them and I know that they can be good soldiers. But I still don't want to live with them. I don't mind fighting, training, and working with them but I sure wouldn't want them eating and sleeping with me.

(Divisional staff officer): As for integration — we know we have got to do it, sooner or later. It is my personal opinion that if we keep the percentage small and the Negroes well mixed in we can solve the problem of their best use. . . . Being born a true rebel, the off-duty aspects of integration are a touchy spot for me. I think that when you are off duty, there should be no prejudice but that they should keep to their own group. I'm against mixing after duty hours.

It may be proposed that integration be limited to certain phases of military operations. Some favor segregated training and integrated TO&E units, while others favor integrated training and segregated TO&E units.

(Divisional staff officer): We have here the problem of different situations, namely combat and garrison. It would seem to me that the optimal situation would be one in which we could train the troops separately and then send them into TO&E units spread as thinly as possible . . . so they could least affect the troops.

(Lieutenant colonel): I don't think that most of the Negroes want to mix with the whites. For training, it's OK. I think it's OK, but for housekeeping that's another thing. Not to sleep together and take a bath in the same tub or use the same toilet seat. Especially I don't think the whites want to do that. And the Negroes aren't comfortable.

Unfavorable Attitudes of Whites. There are four kinds of unfavorable attitudes toward integration frequently encountered in segregated TO&E units.

First, there are expressions of personal hostility toward Negroes. These are often based on conceptions about the "nature" of Negroes:

(Battery commander): They are better in segregated units than in mixed ones. That is purely my own guess. I don't feel they should be mixed. My men don't feel they should be either. I wouldn't like to sleep next to a Negro and have to associate with him. From what I've seen they're not reliable. . . . You shouldn't mix them. From what I've seen all these attempts to pull the Negro up are all wrong. The Negro don't want to be pulled up. They are happy this way.

Second, there are predictions of "trouble." It is suggested that even if it were desirable to have integration, such attempts would have to be abandoned because they simply "would never work."

(Five enlisted men): (How do you feel about integration?) (1): In a lot of cases it won't work. A lot of boys if they have to take it there'll be trouble. Run ins. You can't start with complete segregation, and then just throw them together.

(2): One thing about a nigger. I never ate with one, and I won't start. They'll never get me to sit down next to one. If one came and sat down next to me, one of us would have to move, and he would have to lick me first before it was me. They get something mighty big when you take them in.

(3): I don't like it here in the division, but that's one thing I do like. They don't have any niggers here.

(4): I can tell you one thing for sure. It would be better for them if you don't put them in here. They wouldn't last long. There'd just be a fight and a lot of brawling and a lot of people would get hurt.

(5): If they'd be sent in one at a time, they might as well send in the coffin with them.

(Lieutenant colonel): The main basis I have for not having any is that they just won't get along with the whites. If you need colored MPs, then you should have a separate all-colored unit. The old man has asked me several times if I wanted any, and I always tell him, not unless I have to take them. Still I would keep them separate.

Third, there is opposition to integration on the ground that Negroes would lower the efficiency of the white units.

(Lieutenant colonel, regimental commander): If I were a battalion commander with 200 Negroes I'd put them all in one company rather than mixing them up. If you put Negroes in with white troops you're sure to impair the efficiency of the company. I'm not saying that Negroes, some Negroes, aren't good soldiers as individuals but they aren't as good as white maybe because they haven't had as good opportunities. In any case if you put Negroes in with whites there's sure to be friction.

Fourth, it may be argued that Negroes don't like integration themselves.

(Enlisted man): If I were a nigger I would rather not be in an all-white unit. You know, it's like the old saying, birds of a feather flock together. Any minority group would take a beating. This way we go to movies together, and so on. Yes, if I were a nigger I would like the idea of segregation.

Finally, integration is objected to because it might lead to more intimate associations beyond the sphere of Army life itself.

(Division commander): You integrate units and pretty soon it will lead to intermarriage, and I don't know how you feel, but I'm sure you are proud of your race just like I am. We must build up our race, not run it down. A man goes fishing, he sees a bunch of striped bass — he doesn't see cat fish mixed in — they are all striped bass. It's God's law of the fish in the sea, the birds in the air, the animals on the land. You don't mix them.

Attitudes of Negroes. There are only a few instances of Negroes expressing preference for segregated units. The reason given generally is a preference for being among their own group.

(Negro enlisted man): I prefer a separate unit. You can't talk personal business with someone who don't know you good. I wouldn't mind being in a mixed unit for some things, but not completely integrated.

Negroes in segregated TO&E units are predominantly favorable toward integration. As might be expected, however, their favorable attitudes have a somewhat different basis than those of the whites. Though the argument of military expediency may be cited, Negroes emphasize the absence of motivation to work and fight, the prevalence of poor leadership, and the discrimination in work assignments, punishments, and rewards in segregated units.

(Negro enlisted man): The mixed unit is the right thing to do. The physical differences of men make no difference to me. We are all Americans and should all be treated the same. Morale is lifted in the mixed unit for the colored soldiers. You feel more like fighting. In the all-colored units, the fellows say, what have I got to fight for. The boys don't want to fight for keeping segregation.

(Negro enlisted man): We get the bad end of everything. We get the details. Our battalion gets guard duty two and three times a month when it should be only once a month. We get the worst of clothing. The B Company do nothing but detail and don't get on the field for training like they should. They dig the ditches and do the KP. Some of the fellows have volunteered to go overseas to get out of the battalion. They won't get you in school or nothing.

SUMMARY

This section has discussed the attitudes and expectations of soldiers in segregated units as a preface to our discussion of what actually happens under integration.

A large proportion of soldiers now in all-white units say that they have strong objections to serving in mixed units with Negro soldiers. The proportion ranges from about one-third

among Northerners to about two-thirds of Southerners. As statements of present feeling, however, these expressions do not coincide with forecasts by the same men about their probable behavior in the actual event of integration. In the opinion of a majority of both Northern and Southern white soldiers, if Negroes are introduced into their units, given a clear and favorable attitude on the part of the command, they would be treated like other replacements.

Integration is accepted more readily in some situations than in others. White soldiers are likely to accept racial mixing in post facilities and social activities more readily than integration in their platoons.

Negro soldiers in segregated units are overwhelmingly in favor of assignment "without regard to color." Almost all of them also express willingness to serve in mixed platoons, although many refrain from expressing particular eagerness for this situation. Whatever they believe Army policy is at present, the great majority of Negro soldiers think that as time goes on Negro and white soldiers will be living and working together in mixed outfits.

White attitudes favorable to integration are generally justified in terms of military efficiency. Unfavorable attitudes are explained both in terms of military judgment and of personal preferences.

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION IN INTEGRATED UNITS*

When men in segregated Army units express their feelings about integration, they are either anticipating their own reactions to an experience they have never had, or their feelings about an experience which is past. The responses of men in mixed units, on the other hand, are based on an experience which they are living through at the time when they answer the questions. Their responses are considered separately in this section, and are compared in the next section with those of men in segregated units. The integrated soldiers with whom this section is concerned are trainees and cadremen in integrated training divisions. Three of these divisions are in Northern locations; one is in the South.

White Trainees and Cadremen in Integrated Training Divisions

Thus far the attitudes of men in regular units have been examined. However, integration has been carried out on the largest scale in the training divisions in which new soldiers receive their first experiences with army life. The soldiers with whom this section deals are all in integrated training companies in which the ratio of Negroes to whites is typical of the most usual range — less than one-third Negro.† The discussion also includes the attitudes of cadremen in these units, whose status, as seasoned soldiers in regular assignments, most closely resembles that of men in the units already discussed.

Attitudes toward Negro Soldiers among White Trainees. Attitudes of trainees are similar in some respects to those we have encountered among other groups of men. Like these others, they are agreed that Negro soldiers should do the same kinds of jobs as white soldiers (Table B18). Their personal feelings toward Negro soldiers show the same pattern found among the soldiers in the TO&E units discussed previously.

There is greater division of opinion among them with respect to the way in which they think Negro soldiers should be assigned to units. More than half of them feel that it should be done on an individual basis without regard to color (Table B19).

* The data in this section are derived primarily from the troop questionnaire, except where the intensive interviews are used for illustrative purposes.

† Some units having a higher proportion of Negroes were purposely included in the sample in order to make special comparisons. These units are discussed in the next section.

TABLE B18

RESPONSES OF TRAINEES AND CADREMEN IN INTEGRATED TRAINING DIVISIONS ON JOBS FOR NEGRO SOLDIERS AND PERSONAL FEELINGS TOWARD THEM

Answers	Trainees		Cadremen	
	998 Northerners, %	405 Southerners, %	176 Northerners, %	91 Southerners, %
On Q. 72, proportions who believe Negro soldiers should be given combat and service jobs the same as whites	91	87	83	90
On Q. 47, proportions who say, "I like them fairly well."[a]	67	61	65	61

[a] Tables B83 and B84.

TABLE B19

ATTITUDE AMONG WHITE SOLDIERS IN TRAINING DIVISIONS ON HOW NEGROES SHOULD BE ASSIGNED

Assignments preferred for Negro soldiers	Trainees		Cadremen	
	998 Northerners, %	405 Southerners, %	176 Northerners, %	91 Southerners, %
In all-colored battalions or regiments	30	47	31	56
As colored companies in white battalions	6	8	5	11
As colored platoons in white companies	2	4	2	7
As colored squads in white platoons	2	2	1	1
They should be assigned as individuals without regard to color.	56	36	56	25
No answer	4	3	5	0

As in the case of other groups of soldiers, this divergence of views becomes more varied as the question becomes more immediate and personal. Table B20 shows how these trainees and cadremen feel about serving in an integrated platoon — the situation in which they presently find themselves. It is apparent that only a fraction of these soldiers object strongly to this situation.

TABLE B20

ATTITUDE TOWARD PLATOON INTEGRATION AMONG WHITE SOLDIERS IN TRAINING UNITS

Attitudes	Trainees		Cadremen	
	998 Northerners, %	405 Southerners, %	176 Northerners, %	91 Southerners, %
Object strongly	9	31	16	36
Rather not	33	36	28	42
Makes no difference	48	27	47	21
Like it	8	4	7	1
No answer	2	2	2	0

The experience of these trainees with integration is of fixed duration, the length of the training cycle. Under present Army practice (except in the Far East Command), it is likely that most of them will serve next in racially separate units. The great majority, however, believe that the Army will be integrated. Seventy percent of Northern and 65 percent of Southern trainees believe that, "as time goes on, most colored soldiers will be found living and working with the white soldiers."

This is a natural assumption for them to make in the light of the only kind of Army experience they know. It is also possible that their acceptance of present integration is enhanced by the belief that this pattern will prevail in their future Army lives. Even the prospect that this might involve assignment to units in which, as whites, they would be in an unaccustomed minority does not evoke special resentment. Nearly half of them, faced with the possibility of reverse integration, say they would act the same as they would in any other unit (Table B21).

TABLE B21

PREDICTION OF BEHAVIOR UNDER CONDITIONS OF REVERSE INTEGRATION BY WHITE TRAINEES IN TRAINING UNITS

Answers	Trainees	
	998 Northerners, %	405 Southerners, %
I would act just as I would in any other outfit.	49	45
I would just try to goof off as much as I could, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of me.	1	1
I would try to make things tough for the colored noncoms in any way I could.	1	1
I would speak to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit.	33	32
I would try in every way I could think of to get a transfer out of the outfit.	12	18
No answer	4	3

It is significant that in this case the Southern trainees, whose attitudes are ordinarily very different from those of Northerners, make much the same response. Men react to such situations in the framework of military authority, whatever their private feelings about them may be.

White trainees' opinions on integration are probably related directly to their adjustment to interracial contact, and vice versa. The opinions with which they begin condition their appraisal and acceptance of Negro soldiers, and their contact with Negroes affects their feelings about the experience. (This aspect of integration is discussed more fully in the succeeding section.) In the opinion of most white trainees, the presence of Negroes in their units does not harm unit effectiveness. Only a minority of Northerners and Southerners feel that their units would perform better if there were no Negroes in them (Table B22).

The adjustment to Negroes as fellow soldiers is paralleled by adjustment to them as companions in the relatively scarce off-duty time which is allotted to men in training. Roughly half of the white trainees report having spent off-duty time with Negro soldiers — Southerners somewhat less frequently than Northerners. Cadremen are quite similar to trainees in this respect (Table B23).

TABLE B22

WHITE TRAINEE OPINIONS ON HOW UNIT WOULD DO ITS JOB IF THERE WERE NO NEGROES IN IT

Answers	Trainees	
	998 Northerners, %	405 Southerners, %
Outfit would do its job better if there were no colored soldiers in it.	23	36
Outfit would do its job about the same if there were no colored soldiers in it.	64	54
Outfit would not do its job as well if there were no colored soldiers in it.	8	8
No answer	5	2

TABLE B23

REPORTS BY WHITE SOLDIERS IN TRAINING DIVISIONS ON OFF-DUTY TIME SPENT WITH NEGRO SOLDIERS

Answers	Trainees		Cadremen	
	998 Northerners, %	405 Southerners, %	176 Northerners, %	91 Southerners, %
Both on the post and in town	21	14	22	13
Only on the post	36	31	35	32
Never spent off-duty time with them	42	55	42	53
No answer	1	[a]	1	2

[a] Less than one-half of one percent.

Factors Underlying Attitudes: Quantitative Findings. Among the white trainees and cadremen, as among white soldiers in other types of units, such personal characteristics as education and type of enlistment show no significant relationship with the way men feel about integration.

Factors Underlying Attitudes: Qualitative Findings. There is considerable similarity between the attitudes toward integration in segregated TO&E units and in integrated training units. While the views expressed in the TO&E units are largely anticipations and predictions, the officers and men in the training units speak from personal experience with integration.

Favorable Attitudes of Whites. Beyond the assertions of the military desirability of integration (these are much the same as those already seen), there are also obtained expressions that integration definitely works and reactions of surprise at how well it works.

(Divisional staff officer): You want a general statement, all right here it is. The nigger problem has been handled beyond anyone's possible expectations, anyone's hopes. We don't discuss it around here anymore because there's nothing to discuss. We aren't having any trouble. Why should we waste time talking about it. Most of my officers are from the South and there isn't an officer in the division — not a single one — that won't back up our program.

(Divisional staff officer): Let me put it this way, we've been integrated for about a year. Now there's my desk calendar. Never once have I had a note on it in those 365 days about a color problem. Never once have I come to work in the morning with a color problem worrying me.

References are made to the broader social or political aspects of integration.

(Battery commander): There's no trouble. I am a Southerner. I expected trouble. But I always wanted to see us get along better. We have to live together, work together. We're all citizens. I am glad to see this. It'll bring about better understanding.

(Enlisted man): I think it is a better idea to have them together with everybody because in ten or twelve years we will cut down this racial business to a minimum. It would be all right with me if I had a colored man, a lieutenant to lead me into combat if he was qualified.

(Enlisted man): I certainly think they ought to be together. Especially since we may have a war we try to prove to the world that we're a democracy. It would be a selling point against us if we didn't put them together.

Unfavorable Attitudes of Whites. An important difference appears between the unfavorable attitudes expressed in TO&E units and those expressed in training units. While there were frequent predictions in the TO&E units that integration would lead to "trouble" and would not "work," these are entirely absent in integrated units. It is generally agreed that there is no "trouble" and that integration does "work." The unfavorable attitudes are confined, rather, to expressions of personal hostility, to "projective" statements about the desires of the Negroes themselves, and to anxiety over the possibility of intermarriage.

(Enlisted man): I don't think it is such a good idea myself. I never had anything to do with the colored people before I came back into the Army, but I don't want anything to do with them any more. It is one of the reasons I'm getting out of the Army. If they foul up they always get some excuses. And they are the biggest liars. . . . I think it is better to have them in separate units. I know that for anyone I have ever talked to, that has been in the training company, never thought it was a good idea.

(Enlisted man): I believe it would be better to keep them separated. I figured one of the colored boys would rather take orders from one of his own race than from one of the white boys. If I was going into combat I would rather have one of my own race give me details.

(Enlisted man): I hate to see them thrown together more. The more you throw them together, the more friends are made, the more marriages. I don't know whether it would be good for the country.

Attitudes of Negro Trainees.

Negro trainees are like all other soldiers in their opinion that they should have the same kinds of Army jobs as white soldiers. They are in agreement with all other Negro soldiers that they should be assigned to jobs as individuals without regard to color. This is true regardless of the individual's educational level, or of how he enlisted. Northern and Southern Negroes, alike, preponderantly favor service in a mixed platoon.

The most clearly defined aspect of the attitudes of the Negro trainees is the relatively high degree of personal satisfaction with their situation which their responses indicate. A majority say that they like the white soldiers with whom they are serving "very well." Few of them appear to feel that they are being discriminated against in the Army: three-fourths of them say that Negro soldiers have neither an easier nor a harder time getting along than white soldiers do. More than three-fourths of them feel that they are getting a fair deal, compared with the other men in their units.

TABLE B24

OPINIONS OF NEGRO TRAINEES ON THE "DEAL" THEY GET

Answers	124 Northerners, %	183 Southerners, %
Better than average deal	11	16
A fair deal	64	67
A poor deal	23	14
No answer	2	3

The nature of this satisfaction becomes clear in the interviews with Negro soldiers.

(Negro enlisted man): It is something else I could add, it seems to me that mixing like this is going to make a great Army. If we ever have to go to war and get into fighting then we all know each other in front. That way we can fight better because we don't have no suspicions of each other.

(Negro sergeant): This is the best thing that the Army could have done. It is making a better army. When you mix the troops there is less trouble and less expense. The soldiers get along well together. . . . These white fellows have had it trained in them so long that the Negro is inferior that many of them will try all kinds of things to get around carrying out the directive. Once they work with the Negro awhile and get to know him they find that it is all right. That is one thing that integration does. It gives both the Negro and the white a chance to find out that they can work together without friction.

(Negro enlisted man): I think that the policy is ideal. That is the way it should be in a country which professes to be a democratic country. All people must have the same rights. I am from New York and am not accustomed to the many forms of segregation that we run into down here in Texas. This policy is great. The only trouble is that they are not putting it into effect fast enough for me — We work together, pull patrol together, eat and sleep together, and it is working just fine.

Summary

The attitudes of white soldiers (trainees and cadremen) in integrated training units are apparently unaffected by differences in individual background, except that of their region of origin. The bulk of them report that the performance of their unit is not affected by the presence of Negro soldiers.

Negro trainees, like other Negro soldiers, are strongly in favor of integration. Their responses indicate a high degree of personal satisfaction with the circumstances under which they are being trained.

EFFECTS OF CONTACT ON ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION*

In the study of US troops in Korea, it was found that the racial attitudes of white troops were modified by direct contact with Negroes, both in combat and in rear-echelon areas. Contact on a man-to-man basis in integrated units was found to produce favorable changes of opinion. Where the contact was with large, highly visible bodies of Negro troops, unfavorable changes occurred. Negroes seen as "members of the team" were accepted; in their own units they were highly vulnerable to criticism. To what extent do these findings hold true for troops in the continental United States? In the past two sections, the attitudes of segregated and integrated troops have been considered separately. In the present section they are compared, and considered further.

WHITE SOLDIERS IN INTEGRATED AND IN ALL-WHITE UNITS

As Table B25 shows, attitudes toward integration vary enormously among a wide range of situations and types of units. The patterning of these attitudes, however, clearly supports the major finding of the Korean study: *Among white soldiers serving in mixed units, opinion is far more favorable to integration than it is among those in all-white units.*

TABLE B25

ATTITUDES OF WHITE TROOPS TOWARD INTEGRATION

Troops who object strongly	Northerners, %	Southerners, %
Trainees in integrated units (3-31% Negro)	9	31
Trainees in integrated units (49% plus Negro)	25	5
Trainees in National Guard units	22	62
Cadremen in integrated training units	15	37
Soldiers in TO&E units in North	33	0
Soldiers in TO&E units in South	36	70
Soldiers in all-white TD units	34	61
Soldiers in integrated TD units	20	47
National Guardsmen in Northern NG Div in South	33	0
National Guardsmen in Southern NG Div in South	0	77
National Guardsmen in Southern NG unit in North	0	69

In the discussion that follows, this general finding is examined in greater detail for various kinds of units.

* The data reported here derive from the troop questionnaire, except where the process of attitude change is discussed and illustrated from evidence in the intensive interviews.

Soldiers in Regular Units

Comparisons between soldiers in integrated and in all-white companies cannot be made for TO&E units, since there are no integrated TO&E units in the continental United States. Among soldiers in miscellaneous regular TD units, however, this comparison *can* be made. The results are shown in Table B26. Opposition to integration is less among soldiers in integrated TD units than among those in all-white organizations. This is true of both Northerners and Southerners.




Fig. B1—Attitudes of White EM toward Integration




Fig. B2—Attitudes of White Basic Trainees toward Integration

TABLE B26

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION OF MEN IN ALL-WHITE AND IN INTEGRATED TD UNITS

Troops who object strongly	Northerners		Southerners	
	Number	%	Number	%
In integrated units	156	20	180	47
In all-white units	93	34	48	61

Cadremen serving in integrated training units are trained soldiers in regular Army assignments and, as such, comparable to men in TO&E units. Their opinions reflect the influence of actual experience with integration and are distinctly more favorable than are those of segregated TO&E units.

TABLE B27

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION OF CADREMEN AND TO&E SOLDIERS

Troops who object strongly	Northerners		Southerners	
	Number	%	Number	%
Cadremen	176	15	90	37
TO&E soldiers	752	35	352	70

Soldiers in Training

Because trainees in the integrated training divisions are new in the Army, because they are undergoing a rigorous work schedule, and because they have only a casual and transient status in their units, they cannot be compared directly with more seasoned soldiers in all-white regular units. They may, however, be compared with a group similar in background,* equally new to the Army, and undergoing the same early military experiences — men taking their basic training as fillers in National Guard units. Here again, the attitudes of men in integrated units are more favorable than those of men in all-white units. (The training division units compared here are those in which Negroes are present in their usual proportions for such units within a range from 3–31 percent of the total strength.)

TABLE B28

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION OF TRAINEES IN ALL-WHITE (NATIONAL GUARD) AND IN INTEGRATED TRAINING UNITS

Percentage who say, "I object strongly"	Northerners		Southerners	
	Number	%	Number	%
Trainees in National Guard units	165	22	49	59
Trainees in Training Div	998	9	405	31

In both of the instances in which a direct comparison can be made between white soldiers in integrated and in segregated units, the former, as in Korea, are more favorable to integration.

* See Table B99.

White soldiers in mixed units are for the most part experiencing close and intimate association with Negroes for the first time in their lives. It would be wrong to conclude that this experience necessarily and inevitably leads to greater liking for Negroes or for the experience of serving with them.

In the main, the evidence from both questionnaires and interviews leads to the conclusion that contact induces favorable attitude changes. There are, however, instances in which this pattern is reversed.

At this point, a clear distinction must be made between changes in military judgment and changes in personal feelings. The former are referred to repeatedly in interviews with officers, particularly senior officers; the latter are most evident in the case of enlisted men and junior officers. The present concern is with changes in personal feelings; changes in military judgment will be discussed separately, in the following section.

Changes of Personal Feelings

Officers and men who initially oppose integration on purely personal grounds generally express themselves to this effect: We don't like or accept Negroes. We don't want to live and work with them. And we are opposed to integration because it will force us to do so.

What kinds of changes, if any, occur among these men as a consequence of their experience with integration? The initial opposition to integration stems primarily from a general and often stereotyped conception of what Negroes are like. This conception may be acquired with or without prior personal contact with Negroes, but in either case, it implies a pat and sweeping characterization of the group as a whole.

Such a conception becomes increasingly difficult to maintain when whites are thrown into close contact with a relatively large number of individual Negroes, especially if these Negroes come from different parts of the country and from different social and educational levels. Inevitably, the idea begins to form that it is impossible to describe *all* Negroes by a single set of traits. It becomes necessary to make exceptions and to modify the original outlook.

(Second lieutenant from North Carolina): After all, I was born in the South. I wouldn't care to go to a social function with them. I can treat them just as nice as anybody. But everybody has the right to pick his own friends. [Do you feel the same about the man you said you liked?] No. Not for him. I'd go anywhere for him. Yes, I do feel different about him. I guess I got to know him better. I grew to like him a lot. Maybe if I got to know more, I would like them more. I never dealt with too many except for work. This guy slept next to me in school. I got to know him real well. [Do you feel the same toward him as toward a white fellow?] Yes. [But there is still a difference?] I don't know. Not with him. As I said before, I never dealt with any. He's an all around nice fellow. Just the same as an ordinary guy you get to like. [Do you think of him as of a colored man?] No, I don't think so. I feel the same about him as about a white man anywhere.

In this manner, personal contact begins to break down stereotypes and to change the personal feelings connected with them.

In general, this change of attitude follows two parallel processes. In some cases changes occur as the cumulative result of a large number of relatively casual favorable contacts.

(Trainee): When I first came in, most of the men in our outfit were from Oregon, and a lot of them didn't like being with colored boys. But once they got with them it was all right. A lot of us never lived around them in Oregon. Where I lived they didn't even allow them in the city. They wouldn't be here if they didn't have to be, same way with us. I have changed my thinking. I've never lived around them. What I've heard wasn't so good. But I didn't see anything. They're just the same as we are.

(RA sergeant from Virginia): When I came here colored and white were separated still. They had their barracks about three blocks from here. About one and a half years ago they moved the colored in here. Many guys didn't like it. I was one of them. They didn't like the idea of going to the same mess hall with them. There was a little objection and a lot of talk about what would happen. Nothing actually happened. In about two weeks it wore in. They got used to having them, and it didn't seem to make any difference. Now there are no reservations at all. Oh, there's a couple of black sheep in any group, either colored or white. See that fellow at the last table? I think as much of him as of any man in the outfit. He is only supposed to drive. He gets out and does as much work as any man in the outfit. I was in Navy boot camp with Negroes. I slept with one right beside me. I resented it at first. It is all in your mind. Once you get it out you're o.k. Some whites are worse than any colored. If you can live with whites you can live with most colored.

(Division staff officer): I served in Hawaii with a colored antiaircraft battalion, and I was company commander of a white battery assigned to this battalion of all-colored troops. Well, I almost died when I found out about it. I'm from Baltimore, and I was filled with all kinds of prejudices from the time I was old enough to listen. So you can imagine how I felt. And I was under a colored colonel, I discovered. But he turned out to be one of the finest gentlemen I have ever known. Chiefly because of him and the other officers I met I changed my feeling about the colored troops. I think the best thing to do with colored troops is to do just about what we are doing here. You couldn't want it to work out better. The principal reason I feel the way I do about colored troops is Col H——. He was the Commanding Officer of the battalion to which I was attached. He is a real gentleman in every way, and I'd serve under him at any time.

Cultural Factors Related to Contact

Contact between people of different social and educational levels, and from different sections of the country, is, in any case, likely to be accompanied by some initial stresses and reservations. A northern white in a Southern National Guard division, for instance, discussing his NCOs, complains that "those rebels are dumb as hell." The better-educated men also resent the language patterns and manners of the less educated. This is true quite generally, irrespective of race. A Negro lieutenant, speaking about the background of Negro soldiers under him, remarks:

Lots of our kids have not taken advantage of all the opportunities they had to go to school. They come into the Army with a lot of bad language.... You know, the one thing in particular they say so much.... I hate it.

And a divisional staff officer comments:

They bunk together, eat together, work together, so there is nothing surprising about their going to a ball game together. This buddying business ... people pay too much attention to color on that score. There are many factors in how a man makes friends. I once ran a CCC camp where I had well-educated colored boys and ignorant whites. Those colored boys didn't want anything to do with the whites. It's more than race.

Enlisted men, too, reflect a sensitivity to background factors:

[How would you feel about having a colored officer?] (Draftee from Tennessee): A lieutenant would probably be different. He'd have education. He would know how to treat a guy.

A Southern white captain, for instance, company commander of an all-Negro company with an average AGCT score of 75 (which does however contain several educated men), remarks:

This has been the most interesting experience of my life. I was reared with Negroes. It's nothing new for me to have them around. But I've been surprised by the findings. And I have gained new respect for the race as a whole by serving with them. I don't mind associating with colored provided they are educated.

(Trainee): I confess that when I came into this outfit which is 50 percent Negro, I was greatly disturbed, but now some of my best friends are of the Negro race. I can see no reason at all why colored and white cannot get along together in the Army. We are all human and thrown into this thing together. The Army is just another word for a "mixing bowl" of ideas, religions and races.

In other cases the changes occur as a consequence of relatively close contacts with particular individuals.

(Captain, former Special Services Officer): Hell, to show you *my* change of attitude, at Thanksgiving I invited an officer to dinner — an officer who had no particular place to eat Thanksgiving except at the officer's mess. And I invited a Negro officer. I think perhaps my folks were a little shocked at first, but they were well impressed by the time dinner was over. He was certainly as well behaved an individual as you could want. Better than most. Yet two years ago, I was probably as anti-Negro as any rabid Southerner could be. Guess I just didn't see them as human beings. But they are as human as you and I, just as human.

(Captain): I had all the reason in the world to be against the nigger, and my being from Tennessee didn't help any. But you are listening to a man who has had a complete change of mind. It all began with my being thrown in the same job in Germany with a Negro captain, who in civilian life had been a professor of history in a southern university. I started out being pretty cool with him, but we were together over two years, and during that time, I am proud to say, that man gave me an education in race relations. I can truthfully say that there is one of the finest men I have ever met.

The proportion of well-educated Negroes in a unit, accordingly, might be expected to modify the proposition that contact induces favorable change. Where, as is generally the case, most of the Negroes in a unit are of appreciably lower social class, and have appreciably less education than most of the white, the favorable changes in personal feelings may not occur as readily as where the two groups meet on an equal cultural plane.

Whether through the cumulative effect of a large number of casual contacts, or through the direct impact of one or two close contacts, experience with integration generally tends to break down unfavorable stereotyped impressions of what Negroes are like. In some circumstances, however, experience may not have this effect. One such instance is discussed in the following section.

ATTITUDE CHANGES IN BASIC TRAINING

Favorable changes of attitude take place under integration because unfavorable preconceptions of Negro traits and behavior fail to hold up under the test of favorable experience. But although many soldiers have such unfavorable preconceptions; others may be equally unrealistic. A man from a Northern community, for example, may have had little contact with Negroes, although his education may have created strong sympathies for them. Such an individual might minimize in his mind the educational and cultural differences which exist between the Negro and white groups. Since he expects to find Negroes behaving exactly like white men, he may be disappointed if the ones he meets do not live up to his expectations, and his disappointment may be reflected in a decline of favorable attitudes.

[Have you changed your opinions about them?]

(Trainee): By golly, I have. I wasn't prejudiced toward them back in Oregon, but now I've gotten to dislike them a lot since I came down here.

(Trainee from California): I hadn't ever been around any colored troops, and I have never had any prejudice, but I think I have developed a little bit. Not because of their color, because there are some I like a little bit. But there are some that I don't get along with too good.

I was disappointed. It's a little petty: things like cutting the chow line. Those are the little things that bother me. There are no big things.

(Cadreman from Ohio): This is hard to explain. I went to school with them, to high school and to college. We played sports together, and always got along together. But this last cycle has cooled my relations with them. They think they are always picked on. You can't try to teach them, or correct them. One boy cussed me out and called me a . . . . They think they have the upper hand. There is always good and bad in every race. But not as much good on the whole in the colored.

On the other hand, a man whose initial tendency is to look unfavorably upon Negroes, unconsciously selects aspects of his experiences under integration which reenforce the

opinions he originally held. If he decides to "wait and see," he may see only his worst expectations.

In both of the cases just described, it may be expected that the judgments about Negroes as a group will be less favorable *after* a period of contact with them than before such contact began. This is apt to be particularly true in the case of men in basic training, whose attitudes and values are undergoing change in innumerable respects as they are oriented to Army ways.

Becoming a Soldier

Dropping the husk of civilian life is a process which frequently brings confusion and personal distress. The sudden absence of old friends and familiar surroundings is seldom accepted without some emotional repercussions. Men during the first days following induction feel remote from the life that had meaning to them.

This is mirrored in exasperated general comments (written on questionnaires) during early training experiences:

It isn't a decent place for a dog on this post. They keep telling us we are human, but with the treatment we get, it makes you feel like deserting.

The man that runs this Army thinks you're nothing but damned dogs.

I am sorry to say that I can't express myself on how much I hate the Army. . . . So what's the use to waste my breath.

No man with initiative likes the uncertainty which at present prevails.

As the trainee finishes basic training and is assigned to a regularly established Army unit, his disorientation and personal confusion subside. In the process of adjustment he acquires a new conception of himself. His general exasperation gives way to specific criticisms:

Not enough time for leave before going overseas.

Ratings in this outfit move awfully slow.

I wish to hell we would jump more. The outfit goes to hell when we don't get a jump in four months.

What are we, TO&E units or a training division?

Griping is no longer occasioned by the values and goals of Army life, but by the things which conflict with those values. Thus the recruit becomes a soldier.

Changes of Opinion on Southern and Northern Posts

The young recruit, alive to all his new experiences, is apt to be particularly sensitive to the racial atmosphere in which his training takes place, and to show the effects of exposure, not only to Negro soldiers, but to the civilian customs and patterns of behavior in the area where his training camp is located. Where local practices support an originally favorable disposition, opinions become more favorable; where these practices are unfavorable, opinion is influenced accordingly.

As Table B29 shows, the attitudes on integration of Northern-born white trainees in Northern camps are more favorable in the latter part of the training cycle (from the 8th week on) than in the early stages (1st to 7th weeks). Among both Northern and Southern trainees at a Southern location, the opposite is true.* This Southern post houses an all-white Southern National Guard Division. The influence of customs in the region in which

* The Northern inductees were contacted at a Northern reception center, the Southern inductees at a center located in the same camp as the Southern trainees. In each case, the number of soldiers being processed outside of their region of origin was negligible.

training takes place may be demonstrated by comparing the responses of men early in the basic training cycle with those of inductees to whom the basic training questionnaire was administered on the day after their arrival at two reception centers.*

TABLE B29

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG WHITE INDUCTEES AND TRAINEES AT EARLY AND LATE STAGES OF THE TRAINING CYCLE

Troops who object strongly	Northerners		Southerners	
	Number	%	Number	%
Recruits	193	5	115	36
Early trainees at southern camp	98	7	92	39
Early trainees at 3 northern camps	245	10	188	22
Late trainees at southern camp	224	14	38	55
Late trainees at 3 northern camps	430	5	86	26

Groups versus Individuals as the Center of Attention

Just as the expressed attitudes toward Negro soldiers *as a group* become more or less favorable in time, depending on the location of the training camp, so actual behavior toward Negro soldiers *as individuals* takes a similar course.

On Northern posts, the longer white soldiers have served in mixed training units, the more likely they are to report that they have spent off-duty time with Negro soldiers and that they have friends among them. In the South, however, local customs discourage off-duty contact as time passes (Table B30).

TABLE B30

SOCIAL CONTACTS OF WHITES AND NEGROES EARLY AND LATE IN TRAINING CYCLE (REPORTED BY WHITES)

Answers	3 Northern camps				1 Southern camp			
	Early trainees		Late trainees		Early trainees		Late trainees	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Yes, I have had friends among them.	433	70	516	74	194	65	262	66
Yes, I have spent off-duty time with them, both on the post and in town.	433	19	516	25	194	51	262	36

When white soldiers answer questions about their personal relations with individual Negroes, they give fairly realistic answers. Their responses to questions about Negroes in general (as in the matter of serving in a platoon with "colored soldiers") represent a group judgment in which stereotypes play a large part. The Negro soldier who becomes a friend or off-duty companion may be considered "different" from Negroes in the aggregate.

Thus the development of tolerant or friendly relationships on an individual basis may have greater meaning for the success of integration than do verbal expressions of opinion

* The responses of the Southern inductees are almost identical with those of Southerners in early stages of training in the Southern camp. They are less favorable, however, than those of Southern trainees, in both early and late stages of training, at camps situated in the North

made by men who are experiencing it during a transient period in which their lives are undergoing enormous changes, or by men whose relatively short experience with it has been followed by assignment to all-white organizations.




Fig. B3—Attitudes of White Basic Trainees toward Integration as Related to Stage of Training Cycle and Location of Training Camps

The evidence suggests that when integration has been experienced in an atmosphere of permanency over substantial periods of time, the verbal expressions denote more stable attitudes and are better indicators of the behavior which actually takes place. This was seen to be the case among white soldiers in Korea and in the US, among training-division cadremen and men in miscellaneous regular (TD) units.

A comparison among returned white veterans of the Korean fighting, some of whom have served in mixed units, shows that the effects of experience with integration have persisted after removal from the theater of war and the ensuing furlough period.*

TABLE B31

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG VETERANS OF KOREAN WAR

Attitudes	77 served previously in mixed units, %	65 never served in mixed units, %
I object strongly.	15	21
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	26	31
It makes no difference to me.	51	37
I like it.	7	9
No answer	1	2

* The questionnaire was administered to these men at a reception center where they were being processed for reassignment. As the center is located in the North, all but a handful of these veterans are Northerners.

"REVERSE INTEGRATION" AND ITS EFFECT ON ATTITUDES

It has been noted that white soldiers' reactions to individual Negroes are likely to be more favorable than might be expected from their expressions of opinion on Negroes as a group. Where (as demonstrated in the Korean study) Negroes are visible in large numbers and identified as a separate group, the possibility of judging them as individuals is lessened, and attitudes toward them become less favorable.

A similar phenomenon may be recognized in those mixed units where Negroes are present in such numbers that the white soldier comes to think of them as a group, and their identity to him as individuals is obscured.

This section has considered only those trainees, in integrated training divisions, whose units contain Negro soldiers within the range of proportions most commonly encountered (3–31 percent). To study the effect of abnormally high concentrations of Negroes upon the attitudes of white trainees, the sample purposely includes some units in which Negroes constitute half, or a majority, of the total strength. When the white soldiers in these units are compared with those in the normal mixed situation, they are found to be significantly less favorable to integration (Table B32).

TABLE B32

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION IN UNITS AT NORMAL AND HIGH LEVELS OF INTEGRATION

Respondents who object strongly	Northerners		Southerners	
	Number	%	Number	%
In units 3–31% Negro	998	9	405	31
In units 49–76% Negro	160	25	167	51

The probable reasons for this finding may be as important as the finding itself. Where Negroes are present in numbers the same as, or not greatly in excess of, their usual proportion in the civilian population, customary majority-minority relationship is maintained. Since trainees are generally assigned at random to quarters and units, it is likely that Negroes will be interspersed — in a barracks, for example — among white soldiers. Personal attachments and relationships will therefore form across racial lines.

Where very large proportions of Negroes are present, however, this is not the case. Many of the Negro soldiers will be concentrated together solely by force of their numbers, despite a random procedure in assignment. This means that the men in a company will tend to cluster into two separate groups, defined in racial terms. The contact between these groups is the very type which we have found produces unfavorable rather than favorable reactions.

There is supporting evidence on this point. Simply on a numerical basis, it might be assumed that the presence of a greater number of Negroes means a greater number of opportunities for individual contacts between white and Negro soldiers. In actuality, however, this is not the case. White soldiers in units with high proportions of Negroes report no more informal, friendly contact than is reported in units with more normal levels. In fact, there is a tendency for *less* contact to be reported by white soldiers in units with "reverse integration." The responses of the Negro soldiers in these units show a similar but more pronounced pattern of response.

These responses result from the intense scrutiny applied to a conspicuous aggregation of "others," and are not directly the effect of the educational disparity between Negroes and whites. This is shown by the fact that both Northern and Southern whites are divided

TABLE B33

ATTITUDES OF TRAINEES IN UNITS WITH NORMAL AND REVERSE INTEGRATION AS TO HOW HARD NEGRO SOLDIERS WORK AT THEIR JOBS

Respondents who say, "They do not work as hard"	Northerners		Southerners	
	Number	%	Number	%
In units 3–31% Negro	998	37	405	24
In units 49–76% Negro	160	51	167	58

in much the same way on the subject. It is also possible that, when Negroes constitute a majority in a unit, the motivation to compete is weakened, and that their performance may, in fact, be less creditable than when the more usual integration ratios prevail.

DIFFERENCES OF NEGRO-WHITE RATIO WITHIN THE NORMAL RANGE

Contrary to what might be imagined, the attitudes of white soldiers *do not become progressively less favorable with each successive increase in the proportion of Negroes.* When units within the normal range of Negro-white ratios are divided into those with less than 15 percent Negro and those with 15–31 percent Negro, the difference in the proportions of white soldiers with unfavorable attitudes is relatively slight. The significant changes appear when *Negroes are present in numbers sufficient to stand out by themselves as a racially* identified group. Perhaps the critical point is when Negroes approach majority status in the unit. Resentment may be much increased among white soldiers when Negroes appear to set the dominant tone of the unit by power of numbers.

Integration represents an achievement to most Negroes. Most whites do not consider it this way. The comparatively high percentages of Negroes reporting off-duty association is consistent with the generally more favorable reaction of Negroes to all aspects of integration. A similar response is found to a question regarding the incidence of friendships with soldiers of the other race. The frequency of interracial friendships does not increase when the proportion of Negro troops is 50 percent or more.

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF NEGROES IN NORMAL AND REVERSE INTEGRATION

Still other comparisons support the interpretation that the white soldier's dislike of integration rises with the increased conspicuousness of the Negroes in his unit as a group. It has been seen that cultural differences (which may be inferred from differences in education) may raise a barrier between white and Negro soldiers. But white soldiers' attitudes are more unfavorable when Negroes are present in large proportions, even though the educational difference between Negroes and whites is the same in units with normal and high proportions of Negroes.

Southern whites tend to react somewhat more unfavorably than Northerners to reverse integration; yet, the educational disparity between the races is less in the case of Southern whites than in the case of Northern white soldiers.

The lower average education of the Negro soldiers is also a source of opinion changes among whites at different levels of integration, to the extent that it is reflected in differences in performance. Soldiers deficient in education will, in general, be somewhat slower to learn and somewhat less capable of efficient response to the military demands made of them.

The large, racially identified Negro group in units with heavy Negro concentrations tends to invite critical observation. Thus, while the average educational attainment of

Negroes is the same in units with normal and high ratios of integration, white soldiers' ratings of their performance differ sharply in the two situations.

It must be remembered, however, that even under the inauspicious circumstances of reverse integration, white trainees are no less favorable than are trainees in all-white units, who know of integration only through rumor and conjecture.

INFLUENCE OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH INTEGRATION

Among men now serving in TO&E units, a large proportion report previous experience with integration, in basic training, in schools, or in regular units.

Nothing is known, however, about the nature of this prior integrated experience — where it was, in what kinds of units, under what circumstances, with what kinds of Negro soldiers.

Variation in the kinds of prior experience, as well as in the present situation of the troops studied, results in an inconsistent pattern of responses, when one compares the attitudes of men who have and who have not formerly served in integrated units. This is seen in Table B34, which compares the findings for men at two Southern posts and one Northern post.

TABLE B34

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG TO&E MEN WITH AND WITHOUT PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN MIXED UNITS

Percentage who say, "I object strongly"	Previous mixed experience				No previous mixed experience			
	Southerners		Northerners		Southerners		Northerners	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Camp A (Southern)	84	74	104	36	103	61	132	39
Camp B (Southern)	96	76	217	38	35	65	158	29
Camp C (Northern)[a]	—	—	121	32	—	—	20	35

[a] The number of Southern soldiers in these units was negligible.

Among Northern soldiers, prior experience seems to be evaluated in terms of the present environment, Northern or Southern. It does not appear to exercise any uniform influence on attitudes.

These men may feel more unfavorable to integration in retrospect, since they are comparing it with the kind of unit in which they are now and which they prefer. Continued service in an integrated unit might have had other consequences.

It is of interest that both Northerners and Southerners who have had previous service in integrated units report more friendships with Negro soldiers, even though the Southerners, at least, are in retrospect less favorable to integration than men who lack experience with integration (Table B35).

It appears that attitudes are more closely related to an individual's present situation than to his having or not having had previous experience with integration.

ATTITUDE CHANGE AMONG NEGRO SOLDIERS

By and large, sentiment favoring integration is so preponderant among Negro soldiers that relatively little difference appears, whatever the status of the units in which they are

TABLE B35

FRIENDSHIPS WITH NEGRO SOLDIERS REPORTED BY WHITE TO&E MEN WITH AND WITHOUT INTEGRATION EXPERIENCE

Percentage who say, "I have had friends among them"	Served previously in mixed units		Never served in mixed units	
	Number	%	Number	%
Northerners	104	52	132	39
Southerners	84	46	103	32

serving. The results here are in complete agreement with the findings of the Korean study. Such differences as do occur appear, for the most part, to reflect differences in region of origin. Northern Negroes are likely to express more wholehearted personal approval of integration than is shown by Southern Negroes (Table B36).

TABLE B36

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN NEGROES IN TO&E SEGREGATED UNITS

Attitudes	488 Northerners, %	876 Southerners, %
I object to it strongly.	2	4
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	6	6
It makes no difference to me.	41	53
I like it.	48	35
No answer	3	2

It is evident that the difference does not affect the proportions opposed to integration, which remain negligible. Southern Negroes less frequently say that they "like" the idea, and more often say that it "makes no difference" to them, although they are no less committed than Northerners to the opinion that Negroes should be assigned to units as individuals. The personal aspect of integration is obviously more familiar to Northern than to Southern Negroes, because of their more frequent association with whites in civilian life.

It may be noted that problems of adjustment to intimate association with members of the other race exist for Negroes as well as for whites. The need to make such adjustments may in fact modify the enthusiasm with which integration was originally anticipated. Thus, Southern Negroes who have previously served in integrated units are less favorable toward integration than are Southern Negroes without this experience. Among Northern Negroes previous experience with integration leaves the response pattern unchanged (Table B37).

TABLE B37

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG SEGREGATED NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN NEGROES WITH AND WITHOUT PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN INTEGRATED UNITS

Respondents who say, "I like it"	Northerners		Southerners	
	Number	%	Number	%
Served previously in mixed units	331	48	554	32
Never served in mixed units	142	47	295	65

Southerners shift from a majority who "like" the idea before integration to a minority who "like" it after integration. As in the case of similar comparisons shown earlier among white soldiers, Table B38 reflects a situation seen in retrospect and strongly influenced by more recent experience.

The same pattern appears among a small group of Southern Negroes who are now serving in miscellaneous regular (TD) units.* The men in integrated units are *less* likely than those in the all-Negro units to say that they "like" the idea. Integration is preferred, as a policy, regardless of how satisfactory the experience may be personally.

TABLE B38

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG SOUTHERN NEGROES IN TD UNITS

Attitudes	Present assignment	
	51 in all-Negro units, %	53 in integrated units, %
I object to it strongly.	4	2
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	2	2
It makes no difference to me.	39	64
I like it.	55	32
No answer	0	0

It is important to point out that since the basic opinions of Negroes are almost wholly favorable to integration, their opinions can scarcely change in any but a less favorable direction. The opinions of white soldiers, on the other hand, can swing in either direction.

SUMMARY

Contact with Negroes in mixed units in the continental United States leads white troops to more favorable attitudes toward integration, although the pattern of this relationship is more complex than was found to be the case in Korea.

Favorable changes are quite clear in all cases in which men presently in integrated units are compared with men in all-white units. Wherever Negroes are present in their normal status as a minority, the opinions of white soldiers are more favorable than where there are no Negroes present at all. Where the proportion of Negroes is so great as to set them apart, white soldiers react to them as an aggregate, with correspondingly unfavorable results. Other instances of unfavorable attitude change occur as the result of an incongruity between prior expectation and actual experience or because of the effect of regional practices in the places where Army posts are located.

Experience with integration does not change the overwhelming proportions of Negroes favoring it.

* The number of Northern Negroes in these units is too small to be tabulated.

PERFORMANCE*

It may be less important to know what opinions men express about integration than to know how it works out in practice, how it actually affects the efficiency of the Army as a whole. For some time, attempts have been made to find some objective, consistent means of measuring the military performance of individuals and units. As yet no acceptable set of standards has been devised. This is particularly true for units in garrison, who must be judged by characteristics which may have little relation to the final test of combat.

Most ratings of performance are, in essence, judgments made by individuals; they are not independent of the preconceptions and assumptions which the rater holds about the group or person who is being judged. In the case of a combat unit, performance cannot be seen only as a matter of casualties, materiel losses, or objectives taken. These objective facts must be considered in relation to the quality of the enemy, the nature of the terrain, and a host of other conditions which are as much a part of the picture as the efficiency of the unit involved. Ratings become even more subjective when, as among units in garrison, there is no reference point in statistics on casualties, materiel losses, or the like.

In reporting on assessments of performance it is therefore essential to know the relationship between the rater and the group rated. A senior officer of broad experience can make a comparative statement which covers a wide variety of situations, while an enlisted man rating the performance of other enlisted men may speak in terms of only the one situation which he knows. He may, however, know that one situation more intimately and see it more clearly than the officer with the wider view.

It is also important to differentiate between ratings of individual performance and ratings of group performance. Individual performance is not an absolute. A man who does poorly as a cook may do well as a rifleman. A poor truck driver may make an excellent first sergeant. Moreover, even if a man performs poorly the full gamut of military occupations he may not appreciably lower the performance of his unit, if other members of his group are not dependent upon him in a teamwork situation.

Accordingly, there is a need to know not only what effect integration has on the performance of individual Negroes and individual whites, but what effect it has on the performance of whole units, or of the Army as a whole. If integration *does* improve the performance of Negroes and create, as has been alleged, a decline in the performance of whites, it is essential to know whether or not the gain offsets the loss.

THE NEGRO SOLDIER IN SEGREGATED UNITS

Ratings of Negro job performance made by officers and enlisted men reflect primarily the position of the Negro soldier in the all-Negro unit, which has traditionally been his place in the Army. Judgments of Negro performance reflect prevailing civilian conceptions of Negro capabilities. Thus, Negroes may be described as lazy, stupid, inept, unambitious,

* The data cited in this section are drawn from intensive interviews with officers, officer questionnaires, and from official reports.

malingering, vulgar, and brutal. Occasionally, these characteristics may be explained in terms of hereditary inferiority:

(Divisional staff officer): You can't compare white and colored. They are on a different level — they're different things. It's not even fair. You can't compare them with whites. Negroes are careless, unreliable, and they lack initiative. They need extremely close supervision. With supervision equal to the whites they won't stand up. They are sluggish, they lack incentive and they lack what I call training in intelligent obedience. The answer is the Negro mentality. It is always harder to sell them on the *why*. Since they are naturally and by inclination lazy and indifferent it's going to be harder to sell them. This runs back to their slave background. Now I'm going to tell you something — I've never had command of a Negro unit but I had experience with them in other connections. I know colored people from childhood. I happen to have had a nigger mammy, and I loved her like a mother.

Usually, however, charges of inferior performance are coupled with an explanation in terms of the educational and other environmental disadvantages which tend to make Negroes different from whites.

(Division commander): On the average, the Negro soldier is not as good as the white soldier. Environmental differences and lack of education among the Negroes result in their comparative inability to exercise leadership. They are, therefore, less valuable as soldiers.

(Divisional CofS): A midwestern boy naturally takes care of equipment. A nigger will run a wagon till the axle goes through, but he won't grease it even if the axle grease is standing there, unless you make him do it. We shouldn't use the same mental standards for the two races. They need more training and character guidance. The big difference is education.

(Division commander): As I see it, the colored man simply is not up to white standards. Now in view of a manpower shortage, we have two alternatives. Either we see to it that the civilian environment, the education, the surroundings in which these people grow up is changed so as to lift the caliber of men, or else, we must take them as they are, and try to improve them in the Army. Our problem is upon us.

(Divisional staff officer): 90 percent of the officers were fine fellows and I got along very well with them. But they could not master the intricate calculations that are needed in antiaircraft gunnery. And the men weren't very good either. Calculations were just too tough for them. They just couldn't compare with whites at their jobs. But as people I learned to forget my prejudices. I don't know just why they had so much trouble. I spent a lot of time trying to teach them the use of circular slide rules and the procedures for plotting the movement of antiaircraft guns. Now in any other branch of service I think they would be equal to whites. But in antiaircraft they just didn't seem to be able to learn these techniques. It was in part their education but exactly why I wouldn't know for sure.

(Division commander): Recently we have had an inspection by Corps. Out of 159 inspections across the post, we had 8 unsatisfactory ratings. Six of these were in colored units. You know our set-up with regard to the colored: two of these units are not our own. The Negro unit came from Ft ——— and the —th FA is a left-over unit. It has repeated its basic training twice yet it is barely satisfactory. The NCOs are colored and the officers are mixed. The same for the ——— and the ——— Differentials between the white and colored are otherwise striking. In the upper three categories of aptitude the white soldiers average about 85 percent. In the ——— (Negro) the figure is 14 percent. And we have a problem of sending men to Army schools. A basic AGCT of 90 is needed. But it's hard to meet this when in a colored unit you have two-thirds below an AGCT of 70.

(EM, tank battalion): Well, we had an Army inspection a while back and the ———th (Negro unit) really fouled up. We had to send up our maintenance crew, their stuff was a mess. Hell, they don't take care of their equipment worth a damn. We found tanks with fenders missing. They'd say "Oh, it dropped off somewhere." We worked for a week up there getting them in shape for their inspection.

The all-Negro unit is regarded as unreliable in combat as well as inferior in garrison. Assertions in this connection are usually supported by reports of failures by Negro units in the last World War:

(Divisional staff officer): In combat, for the first 18 hours they may do well. If they are moving and winning they aren't bad at all. But in a static position they get jittery. One man looks around and doesn't see anyone. Right away he thinks — my buddies may have run off. So he gets up and

runs. Maybe nobody has run until then. Then they *all* run. After 15–18 hours the lines evaporate. The artillery and mortar fire scare them. Gets their nerves.

(White captain, formerly CO of all-Negro battalion): You ought to see some of the Korean returnees to find out more about the action of Negro troops in combat. There is an officer here, a classmate of mine from the Point. He was wounded in Korea and was in charge of an all-Negro unit. When he was wounded, his troops saw him go down and every one of them got up and ran.

(Divisional officer: The big trouble with colored troops is that they won't fight. They run. I was in the 92d. ———— told me himself that his colored unit wouldn't fight. Hasn't been a colored unit with morale since the 24th hung a man for mutiny.

(Divisional staff officer): Their combat record is terrible: In Europe I watched them. Take the ———th (QM — a truck outfit). Know what name they were given — the ———th Truck Destroyer! I saw what they did to those trucks. They ruined them. Why in equipment the 92d drew 4 times as much as any other division in the theatre — why — because they sold it or destroyed it wantonly.

(Divisional commander): The 92d in Italy was one example of the performance of the colored troops. That outfit was put together with the finest staff of officers, with extra training and the best equipment. When a very small group of Germans hit them, they disintegrated.

To what extent can these prevailing assertions and notions with respect to the Negro soldier be substantiated? Throughout the Army, VD and offense rates for Negro troops are substantially higher than those for whites. Traffic violations are as frequent among whites as among Negroes (if not actually greater). According to the provost marshal of one post, whites are more likely than Negroes to commit serious crimes, while Negroes account for larger numbers of petty offenses (see Table B39).

TABLE B39

AVERAGE MONTHLY VD AND OFFENSE RATE PER 1000 MEN, JAN–JUL 1951

Post	Venereal disease		Offenses			
			Traffic violations		Other offenses	
	Negro	White	Negro	White	Negro	White
A	233.3	5.2	2.1	6.4	27.2	8.4
B[a]	247.0	5.1	7.4	2.9	18.9	2.9
C	127.6	5.9	4.2	4.6	11.5	4.8

[a] Figures are for February to July.

While these statistics illuminate the problems which accompany the presence of large bodies of Negro troops, they cannot in themselves be regarded as measures of performance.

UNIT AND INDIVIDUAL EFFICIENCY

Better evidence for the assertion that Negro units are not up to the over-all standards of the Army is seen in the records of one segregated post housing a regular Army division. At the quarterly training inspection of all general reserve units (containing about 15 percent of Negro personnel) 23 of the 159 units observed were rated as superior. Only two of them were Negro. Of the eight units rated as unsatisfactory, six were Negro. These differences in unit efficiency reflect also the differential in individual performance between Negro and whites on this post, as Table B40 shows.

Where the performance of the Negro soldier is judged in the context of the integrated unit, the critical attitude of white observers is strongly modified. This may be seen by

TABLE B40

RESULTS OF ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING PROFICIENCY TESTS IN DIVISION ARTILLERY

Average grade on:	White battalions			Negro battalion, %
	1st, %	2d, %	3d, %	
Duties of cannoneers	91	86	82	78
Motor vehicle drivers and ammunition handlers	88	82	84	79
Fire direction	59	34	38	24
Survey	90	83	76	65
Liaison and forward observers	85	53	46	65
Signal communication	86	78	74	72

comparing the views of officers in a mixed training division with those of officers on two segregated posts.*

In both situations, most officers agree in describing the physical stamina of Negroes as being as good as that of whites. Officers in the integrated division are far more apt to say that Negroes are as good as whites in matters of personal cleanliness, in the way they obey the orders of officers and noncoms, in the way they take care of Army equipment, and in the way they work at their jobs (Tables B41–B44).

TABLE B41

OFFICER RATINGS OF NEGROES ON PERSONAL CLEANLINESS

Ratings of Negro soldiers	Officers on post with:	
	Segregated units (233), %	Integrated units (385), %
Negroes better than whites	0	2
Negroes as good as whites	29	55
Negroes worse than whites	62	41
No answer	9	2

TABLE B42

OFFICER RATINGS OF NEGROES ON CARE OF EQUIPMENT

Ratings of Negro soldiers	Officers on post with:	
	Segregated units (233), %	Integrated units (385), %
Negroes better than whites	0	1
Negroes as good as whites	34	55
Negroes worse than whites	65	40
No answer	1	4

* A special questionnaire was completed by all officers on the integrated post, and by all unit commanders and staff officers on the segregated posts.

TABLE B43

OFFICER RATINGS ON HOW NEGROES OBEY ORDERS

Ratings of Negro soldiers	Officers on post with:	
	Segregated units (233), %	Integrated units (385), %
Negroes better than whites	3	4
Negroes as good as whites	43	63
Negroes worse than whites	53	31
No answer	1	2

TABLE B44

OFFICER RATINGS OF NEGRO JOB PERFORMANCE

Ratings of Negro soldiers	Officers on post with:	
	Segregated units[a] (233), %	Integrated units[b] (385), %
Negroes better than whites	3	4
Negroes as good as whites	17	61
Negroes worse than whites	79	28
No answer	1	7

[a] Asked about "all-around job performance."
[b] Asked about "garrison job performance."

CHANGES OF MILITARY JUDGMENT UNDER INTEGRATION

Unfavorable assessments of Negro performance offered by officers and men in integrated units are frequently expressed as judgments of all-Negro units rather than as judgments of Negroes in integrated units. When opinions are expressed on the basis of experience with integration, however, they are of a vastly different sort. As might be anticipated, senior officers react to the subject of integration in terms of *military judgment* more frequently than do junior officers and enlisted men, who are more apt to think of it in terms of *personal feelings* and less likely to think of it as a problem for the Army as a whole. Opinions on the military aspect of integration inevitably, however, involve evaluations both of its effect on personal relationships and of its significance for improved military efficiency.

Intensive personal interviews with senior officers in integrated units yield a consistent pattern: those who believed in the military feasibility of integration before its introduction now reaffirm their belief on the basis of their experience; those who did not believe in the feasibility of integration before its introduction, now report a change of judgment on the basis of their experience. Typically, a lieutenant colonel (G-1), when asked whether his attitude toward integration has changed in the recent past, replies:

> Yes, it has changed and it has definitely changed. I remember when I first heard integration proposed in 1948. My initial reaction was that it would never work. I had visions of bitter scenes in mess halls, in the barracks and in social affairs, after duty hours, and I must say that I have been pleasantly surprised to find that all of these fears I had have not been realized. . . . It is my opinion that in tactical outfits it is absolutely necessary not to have any segregated unit. Integration must go forward in combat at the integrated level. At home, integration is a necessity in training.
>
> (General officer): I didn't expect integration to be quite so harmonious. It surprised me. It changed my opinion in particular because I thought it would work, but I thought there would be a little more difficulty than appears to have come.

(Colonel, regimental commander): Yes, my feeling about Negroes has changed since I've been in command of the ———. I don't have the fear of trouble that I used to have. As for integration, from my experience with the ———, I would say that whites and Negroes get along best if they're put in integrated units.

(Colonel, regimental commander): I was frankly on the fence when I came in. It was an experiment and a successful one. I wouldn't hesitate to use the same policy wherever I go. I don't care where it is, or what the geographical location is.

As is evident from the findings of the officer questionnaire, these judgments are as common among officers from the Southern states as among those from other parts of the country, and the former often spontaneously announce their home state to emphasize the extent to which their views have changed:

(Lieutenant colonel, regimental commander): Well I'm a Texan and I suppose I was as anti-Negro as the next Texan before I got acquainted with integration a few years back, but I can truthfully say I'm sold on it now.

(Divisional staff officer): I think there was a change of mind. Being from the South, I'd never considered integration as a possibility. But last year I ran the 10th day of the 11-day ERC program. I ran the colored with the white and was surprised to see how they could stand up with the white. And I had no trouble with the colored *whatsoever*. There were no indications of racial discrimination among the white ERC. They all worked together, ate together and slept together. I think now that integration — as complete as possible — is the answer.

(Lieutenant colonel, CO, leadership school): I've been raised in the South, and taught that you can't mix blood and water. And down there you can't. When I came to Fort ——— I was a little bit skeptical. The change was due to the efficiency of the units. To see how the colored men conducted themselves in those units, as compared with the colored units I've seen.

Expressions of surprise at how well integration works constitute a continuous thread through all the comments.

(Captain, former special services officer): I must admit now, it has worked out very satisfactorily. There has been (in Special Services) persistently good feeling between the colored and white. The relations have been very fine. I can't think of a single instance of trouble. It has worked out *very* well. Frankly, I was very surprised — especially in the Southern States! I would have bet my last dollar that it wouldn't work.

(Lieutenant colonel, assistant post adjutant): I never expected to see non segregation in the South. I never thought it could work. And it does work.

Perhaps the most favorable kind of comment offered with respect to mixed units is that which merely cites the disappearance of group differences between Negroes and whites under integration.

(Regimental commander): It has worked beautifully. I have never heard of any instance of friction between the races. They are used here, as far as I am concerned I have used them exactly as I have white troops. They have done a very outstanding job. I have observed them. I have a lot of them cooking and they have done an outstanding job. The outstanding officer who has ever been in this regiment was a Negro Second Lieutenant. We have never had any problem and I think the reason we haven't is because we have let things go without ever even thinking of segregation.

Experience with integration is thus generally sufficient to induce favorable changes in military judgments of Negro performance.

INTEGRATION EFFECTS ON UNIT EFFICIENCY

There still remains the question whether integration improves the performance of the Negro only at the cost of a decline in white efficiency. In the words of the individuals interviewed, the affirmative point of view may be expressed as follows:

(Division commander): General ——— understands it. He says you put a Medal of Honor soldier on the front with a nigger on both sides of him, and when the going gets rough they'll all three

run. Anyway, the white soldier will be infected with the feeling to run. It's just like putting all the apples in a barrel just because you have them. You don't do that. You put the good ones in a barrel.

It may be argued that any infusion of poorly educated personnel reduces the level of a unit's performance. The counter argument runs like this:

(Negro lieutenant): We know that the Negro on the whole does not have the same educational advantages as the average white soldier and as a result they will usually have lower intelligence scores. But this is not always a good indication of the soldier's ability to learn to be a good soldier. The Army has worked out the details of every function so completely that individuality has little room.

(Negro EM in mixed unit): I think that the mixed unit is more efficient. In the all-colored units the colored soldiers got something to talk about but in the mixed units there is less talk and more work.

Opinions on the superior performance of Negroes in mixed units may coexist with personal feelings of reluctance to serve with them:

(White trainee): Some fellows told me that in the last war overseas, the colored were more easy to get scared when by themselves. If whites are in with them, he'll say to himself, if he goes, I go. If one was man enough the other would be. For myself, I'd like it better separate. But for protecting the US, it is better together.

Some observers start with the premise that integration merely makes the best of a bad situation, and that even under the most favorable conditions, Negro performance remains below the average level of the white man:

(Divisional CofS): Don't get me wrong, colored troops are inferior. Look out that window. Just see two white soldiers and one colored soldier working on the ground. They work along side by side. But the colored man isn't the equal of either of those other boys, chances are. He isn't the equal mentally and he isn't the equal of either in physical stamina. That's because of a lot of things — bad food, bad sanitation, low education. But a human being is a human being. We've just got them in the population and why not use them the way to get the most good out of them?

(White EM): I do not think the average colored man is as good as the average white man. This is due to their inferior training and opportunities. They have been told they are inferior, so that after a while only the strong of heart and will won't believe it. All the Negro outfits have the same feeling of inferiority. If colored troops are dispersed with white troops the better colored boys would be better utilized rather than held back with the average Negro. Their whole trouble is a feeling of inferiority which can only be removed by being given the same responsibility.

(Divisional staff officer): The Negroes' performance is below the average of the whites. Of course this is related to the lower educational background. In the Army, the Negroes are at their lowest level when kept in segregated groups.

(Commanding officer): The Negro is basically an exhibitionist, and if you put him off by himself he just seems to lose all incentive. Here's a typical example: We had an engineering unit down in the area, they had some Negroes working just as hard as the white men. Just down the street there was a detail of Negroes cutting grass, supposedly, but actually sitting around. I'll bet if you put two or three white men in there they would do a lot more work.

Further, although Negro performance under integration is praised when compared with performance under segregation, it may at the same time be condemned for failing to reach the standards of the white group:

(White mess sergeant): When they were on KP, they didn't seem to try, they didn't do as much work as the white KPs. They'd slow down. A couple of them worked out OK, but not most of them were no good. Most of them didn't seem to care, they were working because they had to. They'd talk back to you, they'd use dirty language all the time, even more of it than GIs usually do. I hear that one of them even talked back to the Captain, and said something like, "what the . . . you think." They were a headache in the kitchen. Most of them were lazy and didn't give a damn. I don't care what color they are, I just expect them to do their job.

The results of the officer questionnaire indicate a sharp difference in opinion on this subject between the officers in the training division who have firsthand experience with

integration, and those in the segregated divisions, who are operating on conjecture. The latter are evenly divided as to whether integration lowers unit performance or leaves it about the same. Officers who have had experience with integration believe, three to one, either that it makes no difference to unit performance, or that it actually raises it (Table B45).

TABLE B45

OFFICER OPINIONS ON THE EFFECTS OF INTEGRATION ON UNIT PERFORMANCE

Effects on performance	Officers on post with:	
	Segregated units (233), %	Integrated units (385), %
Raises performance	7	6
Lowers performance	44	24
Makes no difference	45	65
No answer	4	5

It may be guessed that answers to the preceding question are based on the assumption that the presence of Negroes in a unit will be in a strength proportionate to their average numbers in the Army. Only a minority of officers believe that the ratio at which Negroes are added makes no difference. However, whereas officers in the segregated units believe that the presence of even a few Negroes lower performance (in one division the proportion typically mentioned lies between 1–10 percent; in the other, between 11–20 percent), officers in the integrated division are most apt to say that efficiency is not affected until a unit is 21–30 percent Negro.

DIFFERENCES IN NEGRO PERFORMANCE UNDER INTEGRATION

The striking difference between mixed and segregated white personnel in opinions of Negro performance leads to an inescapable conclusion: Negroes in all-Negro organizations *do* often exhibit the failings which are charged to them. In the integrated unit they tend to approach the average performance level; they no longer represent a problem. The reasons for this remarkable transformation are brought forth repeatedly in interviews with both white and Negro troops.

In the mixed unit, it is pointed out, the Negro soldier acquires a new sense of pride and self-respect. He can no longer see himself, as he may under segregation, as a second-class citizen and a Class II soldier. He knows that the opportunities and treatment he receives are no different from those accorded to white troops. His ambitions may be stirred by the challenge of competing with white soldiers. Moreover, the standards of accomplishment in a preponderantly white unit are generally higher than those in its Negro equivalent, and it is to the standards of his group — mixed or Negro, that the Negro soldier, like any other, will try to conform.

(Negro corporal): In the mixed unit, the Negro will improve his intellect. You are in competition with the white soldiers who have better educational advantages and it will keep you on the ball. When your level of competition is low you will tend to lose interest and forget what you know. You have a chance to advance yourself. You meet some white guys that you'll never forget. And it will give the white soldier a chance to learn too. There are many smart Negroes, too.

(Artillery staff officer): One advantage I see is this. Take a man who is a miner from West Virginia and put him beside a white man who is better educated. He is going to learn a lot of things. He will make a good or better soldier than he would if he is only put beside other men like him. There

are a lot of things that happen. One is competition. In an all-colored unit if he has a little ability, he will get rated, but put him in competition with white men for jobs and ratings and he will do better.

(Commandant, food service school): We get more out of them at the school by having them mixed and for this reason: Things that they don't understand, and they don't want to ask questions, they don't like to ask questions in the class, but after class, they'll go to one of the white boys or to the




Fig. B4—Officer Opinions on Effects of Integration on Unit Performance

instructor. Afterwards when they're in the mess or in the field you get more work out of them, because they don't want to be worse than anyone else.

(Negro lieutenant): We are all human beings and it improves the Negro soldier to be in competition with the white soldier. It also improves the white soldier and neither group will want the other to get too far ahead.

(White EM): I think it works this way. Most of the whites are more eager than the colored. But when you get white and colored together the whites resent the Negroes and the Negroes resent the whites. But if they were all together they wouldn't care. I think it makes a difference when they are mixed you don't want a bunch of guys getting sore at you. That makes the difference.




Fig. B5—Officer Judgments on Ratio of Integration

(Major, staff officer, armored division): I have swung around to the realization that if you want to get the most out of Negroes you will have to bring them into a situation where his standard of whole daily living is raised. To this I think complete integration is the answer. Otherwise they won't carry the load if they are separated. On hearsay and just my opinion I'd say that to get the most out of the Negro soldier you need to have across the board integration. Now if you can get the Negro away from the group and among white soldiers he will go toward the white level. But by keeping him in the Negro group he will drop to the general Negro level which is lower.

The same forces of competition which cause the Negro in a mixed unit to improve his performance may also spur the efforts of the white soldiers.

(White lieutenant): I believe that the colored soldier in a mixed unit adds something new and valuable to the experience of every man. Each race benefits to the advantage of both and that of the nation.

(Negro lieutenant): It's funny about this South and North business. I've found the white sergeants, say from the South particularly, will do more for me than the Negro sergeants. They don't usually have a very good education and they'll work harder just to convince me that they've got what they haven't got. There was a sergeant from Alabama, who was like that, when I was with the other unit. It seems like a white soldier with a Negro officer feels he's got to work his head off to show he has guts, if not education.

The consensus of these judgments is that the performance of Negroes is substantially higher in mixed than in separate units. This is supported by responses to the officer questionnaire. In spite of the sharp difference in ratings of Negro performance, Table B46 shows that officers in *both* segregated and integrated divisions agree that Negroes do a better job in mixed units than in units of their own. (Both Northern and Southern officers are agreed on this point.)

(Negro lieutenant): In the long run, I feel that my chances of promotion would be much greater because I work harder than I did in the all-Negro outfit. There if most of the men felt like goofing off, well, we just goofed off that day.

TABLE B46

OFFICER RATINGS OF NEGRO PERFORMANCE IN ALL-NEGRO AND MIXED UNITS

Answer	Officers on post with:	
	Segregated units (233), %	Integrated units (385), %
Better in units of their own	27	19
Better in mixed units	62	67
Makes no difference	8	7
No answer	3	7

TABLE B47

OFFICER RATINGS ON HOW HARD NEGROES WORK

Ratings of Negro soldiers	Officers on post with:	
	Segregated units (233), %	Integrated units (385), %
Negroes better than whites	1	2
Negroes as good as whites	32	53
Negroes worse than whites	62	42
No answer	5	3

It is of great interest that the regional origins of the officers (that is, whether they come from the North or South) appear to be of little importance in determining their attitudes, while their actual experience with integration is most important.

Although officers in segregated divisions preponderantly rate the all-around job performance of Negroes lower than that of whites, *a majority of officers in the integrated division say the performance of Negroes in garrison is equal to that of whites* (Table B48).

TABLE B48

INTEGRATED DIVISION OFFICER RATINGS OF NEGRO GARRISON AND COMBAT PERFORMANCE

Ratings of Negro soldiers	In garrison (385), %	In combat (385), %
Negroes better than whites	4	0
Negroes as good as whites	61	23
Negroes worse than whites	28	46
No answer	7	31

As administered in the integrated division, the question asked for separate ratings on garrison and combat performance. Not surprisingly, on the issue of combat performance (which is for most of them a situation in which they have *not* observed Negroes at first-hand) the officers in the integrated division are distinctly less favorable in their judgments than they are in rating Negroes on garrison performance (Table B49).

TABLE B49

OFFICER JUDGMENTS ON RATIO OF INTEGRATION[a]

Answers	Officers on post with:		
	Segregated units		Integrated units (241), %
	95 on Post A, %	79 on Post B, %	
Percentage who say adding Negroes makes no difference	13	18	21
Percentage who say adding any Negroes (1–10%) lowers performance	36	18	15
Most frequently stated proportion at which Negroes lower performance	1–10	11–20	21–30
Percentage who give most frequently stated proportion	36	28	22

[a] Percentages based on those responding to the questions.

Estimates of the practical limits of integration range the full length of the ratio scale:

(Divisional commander): I think you might integrate at a ratio of one to ten but don't dilute the good soldier and make mediocre some fine units merely to utilize some colored troops.

(White major in all-Negro unit): On the efficiency of performance it would make no difference, if you put no more than 50 percent colored into a white unit. Oh, at first it would hit the bottom, but then the over-all picture would go even higher, in my opinion. That is, if no more than 50 percent were introduced. I don't think it makes any difference what ratio. I don't believe there would be any trouble. In the service schools they are completely integrated. There might be a little trouble but most of these people are just talking to hear themselves. If you put Negro and white together, there wouldn't be any difficulty that I can see.

(Lieutenant colonel, staff officer): The percentage must be kept below 10 percent, if the non-Negroes are to be kept from resenting the situation. A greater percentage increases the chances that the unit will have too many of that type of Negro who makes an issue of race.

(Battalion executive officer): In my present assignment, I welcome up to 50 percent Negroes. They are good soldiers with a fine sense of humor up to 50 percent, and aid over-all morale materially. Being from Missouri, I'm a bit prejudiced, but I feel that I understand Negroes.

Are there any data in support of one of the other of these extremes? There is some evidence in the regimental commander's ratings of training companies in the end-of-cycle inspections conducted in the same integrated training division at which officers were polled. By comparing companies with varying proportions of Negroes it is possible to see whether the ratio of Negroes to whites is related to the performance level (Table B50).

TABLE B50

PERFORMANCE AND NEGRO-WHITE RATIO

	End-of-cycle rating of training companies		
Proportion of Negroes, %	Above average	Average	Below average
1–5	2	4	0
6–9	5	5	0
10–35	4	2	2[a]
63–92	2	2	0

[a] These two units, one 34 percent and one 35 percent Negro, were reported by division officers to have had a high proportion of physically classified "C" profile personnel, both Negro and white, which limits their assignments.

The data in Table B50 indicate no relationship at all between the proportion of Negroes in a company and the rating assigned by the regimental commanders. Unfortunately, such data were not available for other units or for other posts. What is available, however, are ratings of unit performance made by enlisted men on the troop questionnaire. Answers to the question of how well the unit does its job are remarkably homogeneous. The ratings of company officers and noncoms agree with the ratings assigned by the enlisted men in the units involved.

Comparison of the ratings made by white soldiers in integrated and all-white units shows no differences which can be attributed to the effects of integration. This is shown in Table B51

TABLE B51

PERFORMANCE OF OWN UNIT COMPARED AMONG WHITE SOLDIERS TO PERFORMANCE OF OTHER UNITS OF SAME KIND

Answers	Segregated units				Integrated units		
	294 National Guardsmen in NG, %	479 trainees in NG, %	1104 in TO&E, %	141 in TD, %	336 in TD, %	1402 trainees in TD, %	365 cadremen in TD, %
Own unit does job very well	64	40	42	46	68	57	52
Own unit does job fairly well	28	41	37	40	21	34	34
Own unit does job not too well	5	9	9	9	4	4	6
Own unit does job very poorly	2	10	11	4	5	1	6
No answer	1	0	1	1	2	4	2

In units where half or more of the men are Negroes, white trainees assign slightly lower ratings of performance than they do under normal integration. But their ratings are still higher than those of comparable trainees in segregated National Guard units.




Fig. B6—Ratings of Unit Performance by White Soldiers

SUMMARY

The conclusion which clearly emerges from the data presented in this section is that the performance of Negroes cannot be regarded as an absolute, but only in relation to the situation in which Negroes are required to perform. The average Negro soldier starts out with a cultural disadvantage acquired in his civilian background. He may not match all the capacities of the average white, but his efforts are stimulated when he feels that he and the white are equal members of the same team. While integration improves the Negro's performance, it does not normally appear to harm that of the white soldier. Officers who have had experience with integration do not believe that it harms unit efficiency so long as Negroes are in the minority. (This is, of course, their usual status, in the Army as in civilian life.) There is no real evidence to support the assertion that integration, under normal circumstances, impedes performance.

MORALE AND PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT*

The previous section refers to the difficulties involved in any objective assessment of performance. Morale, like performance, is a difficult thing to define, and a still more difficult thing to measure. It is of importance to military planners chiefly as one of the crucial determinants of performance. Since morale is a matter of individual, subjective feeling rather than of actions, it lends itself to investigation by means of a questionnaire technique. The problem in this section, analogous to that of the preceding one, is to determine whether or not integration affects the morale of whites adversely.

What makes this problem particularly difficult is the fact that there are a multitude of conditions other than the fact of integration which may affect morale. Thus morale in large part reflects individual personality traits, experience and adaptability to Army life. It is related to the characteristics of the unit itself, to those of the men in the unit, and to the conditions under which the unit serves.

MORALE IN WHITE AND NEGRO UNITS

The question of race is not one of these conditions insofar as the white soldier in an all-white unit is concerned. Since he comes from a preponderantly white civilian background, the absence of Negroes is something of which he is normally only dimly conscious.

In the all-Negro unit, on the other hand, there is a constant and high awareness of the fact of segregation. As a member of a minority group, the Negro soldier is sensitive to any hint of discriminatory treatment. In the all-Negro unit, this sensitivity is reinforced and heightened. Lacking objective standards of comparison, he tends to see in racial terms all the traditional complaints which every soldier has to make about the Army:

> (Master sergeant in Negro engineering battalion): We're the only colored unit on the Post and that means that we furnish the worst details. This is the poorest post I have ever been on. We furnished brigade guard 19 out of 31 days in addition to pulling chase guard and PX guard. I feel that they are pressing us too much. I don't believe that whites are given the same heavy schedule as we have been given. I know because I have seen the roster. When the white engineers were here, they had approximately the same number of men as we have. We did most of the labor, but they were given the credit. All of that work we did down in the Lake Area was credited to the white engineers in the post paper.

Observations of this kind are so persistent in all the interviews that a comparison of unit morale between all-white and all-Negro companies might be expected to show the Negro organizations at a decided disadvantage. As Table B52 indicates, this is not the case.

The explanation for this apparent discrepancy is not difficult to find. The Negro in a segregated unit may develop, with his fellows, a high degree of defensive solidarity, precisely because he feels he is being discriminated against. His morale may be high as a Negro pitted against white authority, rather than as a soldier who is part of the Army team. (The tendency for morale to be high when a group faces a collective obstacle is exhibited in the

* The data presented in this section are derived both from the intensive interviews and troop questionnaires.

TABLE B52

MORALE IN SEGREGATED TO&E UNITS

Answers	1104 whites, %	1354 Negroes, %
Very high	11	22
High	28	30
So-so	40	28
Low	11	9
Very low	9	9
No answer	1	2

fact that men in combat show higher morale than rear-echelon troops.)* That this is so is suggested by a comparison of Negroes in segregated and integrated TD units (Table B53).

TABLE B53

MORALE OF NEGROES IN MIXED AND SEGREGATED TD UNITS

Answers	60 segregated, %	55 integrated, %
Very high	44	39
High	31	33
So-so	19	15
Low	2	5
Very low	4	8
No answer	0	0

Although morale appears to be no lower among the segregated than among the mixed Negro troops, it may have a completely different significance from the Army's point of view. The morale of the all-Negro unit may reflect the same group values which arouse the concern of white observers. The morale of integrated Negroes reflects their sense of participation in values which they share with whites.

EFFECTS OF INTEGRATION ON MORALE OF WHITE SOLDIERS

Interviews with both white and Negro officers and enlisted men point to the change which integration brings about in the Negro soldier's conception of himself, and in the way in which he sees his place in the Army and in society. The gripes and disappointments which seethe to the surface in an all-Negro unit are not apparent when integration takes place.

But, as in the case of performance, it is of less interest to know whether or not integration has a measurable effect on Negro morale than to know whether or not it affects the morale of white soldiers. It is revealing that while white soldiers in mixed units are not loath to discuss the habits and characteristics of their Negro associates, or to offer their own opinions of integration, they rarely mention the effects of integration on their own sense of well-being. One might infer from this that their own adjustment to the Army has not been markedly affected in one way or another by the presence of Negroes. Remarks like the following are singular for their rarity:

(Trainee from Tennessee): It's bad enough to be in the Army, not to have to live with them in the bargain. I'll never get used to it. We're doing it. But we're not used to it. The class we left

*This is documented in volumes on *The American Soldier* by S. A. Stouffer *et al.*, published by Princeton University Press in 1949.

just now had a colored instructor. I didn't pay much attention, not that he didn't know as much as the white instructor.

In most instances where the subject of morale is spontaneously raised, they confirm the impression that the presence of Negroes is not especially damaging:

(Three white Southern trainees):
(1): I'm sure not against the way we're housed here, because the way I figure, we've all got the same job to do.
(2): Just so long as everybody keeps clean and does their part of the work. They all do that in our platoon. I don't know about the rest.
(3): The ones in my platoon, they're all right. In fact they're all right, just all over. I don't believe you can get a better bunch of boys.
(1): In the barracks we talk and go on with one another as far as that's concerned and all the rest of the guys does. In the barracks and out there on the training field too.
(2): We're just together.

It is not difficult to understand why this should be so. In the normal integrated Army situation, the white soldier finds himself in a situation where whites are the dominant majority, as they are in civilian life. There is no special reason for him to be conscious of race as a special problem. Even the white soldier who experiences reverse integration knows himself to be part of a preponderantly white Army, and his immediate position may not lower his morale at all.

(Trainee in company with reverse integration): In our platoon when we were all split up and we found out that most of the guys were colored fellows, most of the fellows didn't like that too much. Then as soon as they got to know them pretty well we all started to mix and everybody got over the prejudiced feeling. If you don't mix you wouldn't have a good platoon. That is why I figured that they did mix. We had two colored squad leaders and two white squad leaders. The fellows didn't even care about color. I think that if there is any discontent that it is due to the personality of the individual, not to the color.

Although soldiers in most individual units tend to agree in their ratings of unit morale, there is a wide range among the ratings assigned in different kinds of organizations (Table B54).

TABLE B54

MORALE AMONG WHITE SOLDIERS

Answer	Segregated Units				Integrated Units		
	294 National Guardsmen in NG, %	479 trainees in NG, %	1101 in TO&E, %	181 in TD, %	336 in TD, %	1402 trainees in TD, %	375 cadremen in Eng. Div., %
Very high	17	8	11	7	22	24	15
High	35	26	28	20	37	40	32
So-so	26	36	40	53	31	28	22
Low	11	16	11	16	5	5	23
Very low	10	14	9	4	4	3	8
No answer	1	0	1	0	1	0	0

It is of interest to note that morale in the preceding training units shows the anticipated rise in the course of the training cycle as men are transformed from raw recruits into soldiers with a sense of mission and of group loyalty (Table B55).

TABLE B55

MORALE AT BEGINNING AND END OF BASIC TRAINING CYCLE

Morale rated	741 trainees at start of cycle	987 trainees at end of cycle, %
Very high	18	27
High	40	38
So-so	33	26
Low	6	6
Very low	3	3
No answer	0	0

Comparisons of the answers given on the morale and personal adjustment questions by white soldiers in all-white and mixed units fail to show any differences which can be ascribed to the presence of Negroes. It is apparent in Table B54 that morale is uniformly higher among whites in the integrated organizations than among those in the segregated ones. This may be attributed to differences in the individual circumstances of these units. Although in the unusual situation of reverse integration, the morale of the white soldier in training units is slightly lower than it is under normal circumstances of integration, it is interesting to note that it closely resembles that in the other units (Table B56).

TABLE B56

COMPARISON OF UNIT MORALE RATINGS BY WHITE TRAINEES IN NORMAL AND REVERSE INTEGRATION

Morale rated	1402 in normal integration, %	326 in reverse integration, %
Very high	24	19
High	40	32
So-so	28	34
Low	5	10
Very low	3	5
No answer	0	0

To summarize, there are numerous indications in interviews with Negro soldiers that integration raises their feelings of self-esteem and their capacity to cope with the vicissitudes of Army life, although there is no indication from questionnaire responses that Negroes in integrated units have a higher level of morale than those in segregated units. There is no evidence either in the interviews or questionnaires that the presence of Negroes is damaging to white morale, even in cases where Negroes are in the majority.

RELATIONS WITHIN THE MILITARY UNIT*

The efficiency of any organization, military or otherwise, is in large measure dependent upon the harmony and teamwork among its members. Thus far in the report, opinions have been considered about integration and the actual effects of integration on performance and morale. But there is a need to know not only how integration is regarded and what it means in terms of military efficiency but also how it works in terms of human relations. What actually happens in an Army unit when Negroes and whites are brought together? How do they get along? What problems, if any, arise in their relations with each other, and how are these problems met?

THE ALL-WHITE UNIT AS A MODEL

A report on how men get along within Army units might best start with the all-white organization. The ideal company might be one in which differences in cultural background were kept at a minimum. The men in such a unit would get along well because they would share a common set of values. Their relationships with each other would be easy and spontaneous. Each individual soldier would feel strongly that he was a full-fledged member of the group. Teamwork would be a natural thing, and military commands would merely give form to a group spirit which already existed. In the words of the soldier, "the outfit would really function."

Obviously, such a unit does not exist, and probably never will. Americans, perhaps more than other people, exhibit great differences in background experience, race, and national origin. Through a combination of drill, discipline, and indoctrination, the background differences that are important in civilian life eventually lose much of their significance for the recruit. He comes to see himself in relation to *Army* groups and to *Army* values. His outlook is shaped by his associations with new friends in his platoon or barracks.

THE ALL-NEGRO UNIT

In the Negro unit, as in the white, there are no racial differences which might disrupt teamwork. Yet the relations of men in the all-Negro organization are often laden with tension and conflict:

> (Negro enlisted man from Negro platoon): Hell, we fight all the time in the first platoon. A lot of time when two guys are fighting in the platoon and the sergeant comes around, they act like they are playing.
>
> (Negro enlisted man from integrated platoon in the same battery): We have arguments in the third platoon but we don't ever have any fights. . . . Hell, you guys in the first platoon fight too much between yourselves to get anything done. We all stick together in the third platoon white and colored.

* The evidence reported in this section has its source in the intensive interviews.

(Negro major in Negro airborne battalion): Frankly, I hate to say it, but it has been my experience, that, by and large, there is a bit more fighting and things like that — between Negroes in all-colored units than when you have mixed units.

(Infantryman in Negro unit): If you mean do colored soldiers fight more when colored soldiers are stuck off to themselves in a segregated unit, the answer is, hell yes, period.

(Infantryman in Negro unit): I believe they fight more amongst themselves in a segregated unit; but I think that wouldn't be if they got maybe the same treatment and everything that they get in a white outfit.

(Negro EM dental technician): I don't like an all-colored unit; with whites you have a lot to gain. There will be harmony among the fellows. That was my primary reason for wanting to get out of the ———st. Being colored in an all-colored outfit is very rough. There is more beneficial association with the mixed group than with the all-Negro group.

(White battalion adjutant): The other day for instance we had a case. One of our instructors, a colored boy, he is a college graduate, went to the service club. They stop serving there at 9:30. He came there at 9:27 and when he sat down the waitress refused to serve him. He raised his voice and an argument started. It was said that he used abusive language; the MPs were called and the matter referred to me. I was pretty sure he used abusive language, but he was standing right in front of me and he denied he had. I did not know what to do. Here he was expecting to be punished; expecting to be discriminated against. I decided to give him the benefit of the doubt and take his word for it. He was not punished.

The counterpart of this is shown in the following comment by a Negro infantryman: "I just don't take nothing off of them, and I always let them know it. They know I'd pop one in a minute, so they don't fool with me."

Just because he is "on edge," the Negro in the all-Negro unit is defensive and hostile in his relations with white superiors. He is apt to see himself, not like every other soldier in the Army as a "poor persecuted enlisted man," but rather as a "poor persecuted Negro."*

The following statement by a Negro infantryman shows acute perception of the process through which the resentment and frustration which pervades the all-Negro unit is channeled into conflict among its members:

I hate to say it, but I know my people. Get a bunch all together, off to themselves, and you got to admit they ain't gonna act right. They just won't. Here, they fight, goof off, go AWOL, and catch VD. It's this way: Now take yourself, you're colored and you've been to school. You want to be able to do the things you learned to do, same as everybody else. All right, suppose you're in the Army. You don't want to be in there in the first place. Then all the time you think you're getting the short end of the stick. So watcha gonna do? You fight the guy that you don't get in trouble for fighting. Just like if you're a civilian. Two colored guys fight. One gets killed. What happens? Maybe two or three years; maybe nothing. See what I mean?

The state of tension which prevails in the all-Negro unit may be explained in terms of the confusion which Negroes feel about their place in American society. This confusion stems from the disparity which the Negro soldier often feels between his experience and his aspirations as an American citizen.

Because he expects equality of treatment as a soldier and has often experienced inequality in civilian life, the Negro is highly sensitive to any action on the part of whites which might suggest discrimination. He is continually on the defensive, expecting trouble. This is usually the basis for the "chip-on-the-shoulder attitude" which is often described by white officers and cadremen who lead Negro troops.

(Major, infantry): Negro resentment is apparent in matters involving ordinary discipline. A "you're picking on me" attitude is noticeable.

(Negro noncom, segregated): No, the officers here feel that they are way upstairs and you're downstairs. Always, they use such statements as "you people," or "if I was one of you fellows."

* The problems which this raises for white leadership are dealt with at length in the next section.

(Negro infantryman, segregated): According to the white officer, the Negro is not a soldier, he is here just because he's supposed to be. The Negro soldier, therefore, does not feel proud of being a soldier because no one makes him feel that way.

(Negro infantryman): We did have one white officer to spit on a colored soldier in the C Company. That's not right.

(Negro infantryman): Officers refer to us as "you people" and I hate to hear my people referred to like that, just like we ain't Americans. The Army book says for them to say "soldier" and I tell them so.

(Negro infantryman, segregated): If the Army is going to be like it is now the morale of my race is very low, so I think, and also some of my pals feel that we are in a different Army than the white troops by the way we are treated.

(Negro infantryman): I think that the officers have a lot to do with race hatred, for example our battalion CO, a major in the Army, always has something smart to say about my race, always trying to get a Negro troop to say something against his will about our race. He also pulls rank when he says that; one day I was reading my home town paper, which is colored, and he look at it and said it was not fit for me to read.

(Negro infantryman): Our relations with the white officers are very poor unless you go with a big grin and let him tell you a big joke and to tell you how to mistreat your people.

A situation in which such sentiments are current fosters the formation of informal cliques, whose goals and values may run counter to those of the Army.* These groups satisfy the cravings of the men for secure good fellowship. At the same time, they may impede or destroy the formal lines of authority in the unit.

(Divisional CofS): You don't know what we get in colored units. In the ———th Tank Battalion we had to smash a dope ring. The only time they work efficiently is when they gang up to protect their friends. I had colored CIC men. Half of them refused to go into colored units. Or if they went in they would inevitably blow their cover and destroy the mission. They just won't do undercover work on their own people.

(Divisional staff officer): The average Negro responds emotionally to a command. The emotional response of the Negro is the first response. Now if the officer has the respect of the Negro, he can get him to do anything, but if he doesn't and the Negro turns sullen — well you better resign your command or get a new bunch because you are sunk. . . . Once you get passive resistance among the Negroes, brother, you have a job on your hands. The white officer's hands are tied in a colored unit. Sometimes they deliberately appear stupid and they can break the white officer's heart by deliberately appearing stupid.

It is evident that the typical Negro response to segregation is not one which furthers the aims of the Army. At best, it represents an accommodation to those aims. At worst, it takes the form of a hidden or open conflict with authority. Where discipline is sternly applied, the result may be an attitude of passive resistance which is shared by the entire Negro group. It is in the light of this process that the military shortcomings of the Negro soldier must be viewed.

THE INTEGRATED UNIT

In integrated units, the atmosphere of interpersonal relations among Negroes, and between Negroes and whites, is markedly different from that in Negro organizations. The patterns which appear most significant will be examined from the standpoint of the cultural background of the men involved, the way they see themselves, and the way they get along together.

* It was pointed out in the preceding section that this might be the basis of "high morale" in the Negro unit.

Cultural Background

The Negro enters the Army from a society in which, for reasons beyond his choice, he belongs to a recognized minority. The Army way of life places a premium on leveling differences in background. However, it is not easy for the Negro soldier to slough off his habits and attitudes. In the segregated unit these habits are reinforced by the presence of others who share them. Even complete equality of privilege and opportunity is meaningless as long as the Negro soldier considers segregation itself as evidence of discrimination, inequality, and exploitation. In the mixed unit, habits and attitudes change.

(Negro infantryman, who has had experience with integration, now in segregated unit): It is 100 percent better being in a mixed outfit. A guy feels that he is somehow letting the race down if he is thrown in with a bunch of whites and he proves to be bottom of everything that goes on. So he concentrates on being a good soldier and a regular fellow. Then if you begin to see the fellows getting along in the Army like that you begin to say to yourself it would be so damn nice if it was like that all over. So then, you begin to forget about being colored and you want to make your company or your battalion, etc. the best damned unit of the post.

(Negro EM in integrated unit): I think this is best. One thing that it will do and that is the colored and white soldiers will get a chance to become familiar with each other. A lot of white boys never had any dealings with colored people. This is a chance for them to see the Negro in a different way from what he is taught.

(Negro cadreman, training division): It is a very good thing [the policy of mixing soldiers]. It shows that the Army is getting on the ball. This should have been done a long time ago. [Why do you make this statement?] Well, Negroes and white have been segregated so long in this country that the two groups don't get to know each other well. By mixing the troops it will make for better understanding among the men.

(White lieutenant, infantry training): Negroes in all colored units feel like second class citizens and second class soldiers. Southern Negroes feel the same as before entering the army and the more educated and generally better off Negroes from elsewhere feel degraded.

These statements show that Negro troops themselves feel that integration tends to reduce the differences in treatment which Negroes in civilian life are given little chance to forget. New goals, values, and purposes are substituted for old.

The first response of the Negro in a mixed unit is in terms of his race pride — he doesn't want to "let the race down." Later, reaction is to forget the "race" aspect and begin thinking about the "good of the unit."

The Way They See Themselves

It has been seen that Negroes in segregated units are apt to feel that they are treated as inferiors. What happens to their self-esteem in integrated units?

(Negro infantryman, integrated): I think that the biggest thing is that the white soldier is getting to know the Negro and see him more as a person and not as Negro. He now has a chance to get to understand the Negro better. I consider myself a first class soldier and want to be treated like one. It makes me mad to be pushed around like a second class citizen.

(Negro trainee): It's real nice. In fact it is surprising how we got along. You know we come from the south. We have a little hate toward these folks. But in the Army so far I have found it very nice. I found we got along like friends.

(Negro trainee): I remember one time we had a group of us—there was four colored soldiers and one white soldier — and we got to sitting around together one night. The white boys said, "You know, not meaning any offense, but I wanted to ask you this question and to tell you something. Before I came into the Army I didn't know how you all were. I didn't know how it would be. But now I can see that you're just like anybody else and I'm glad that we all got together this way. So far there hasn't been any fights or arguments and somehow I thought that before with the way you all are treated back home and all you probably might not like being with us." I explained it to him how we understands lots of things about this before he does, because we have to come up from the bottom so we see how it is all the way up. It's funny, he thought we would be embarrassed by him saying that.

(Negro first sergeant): Men get a new respect for each other when they come to know each other. For example, we now have an Interracial Board. We all feel that the meetings of this board where we discuss common problems is already beginning to show good results. When we can talk over things as frankly as they are I think we come to a better understanding. We can't do this 'til we're thrown into contact with each other.

It is interesting that the opposite process operates when Negroes trained in an integrated division are transferred into a segregated unit. The shock of being segregated sometimes has serious effects on their self-respect and on their attitude toward the Army. As one Negro puts it:

There is just as much difference between the two as there is in night and day. In the mixed outfit you always feel that you are being judged on the basis of how you stack up as a man and as a soldier. This makes you feel that you are really something, and the Army is worth being in. This damned camp has really turned me around. When I was in charge of a mixed platoon it was so much different. There, you didn't feel that you were thrown into an outfit of misfits, eight-balls, queers, dopes and just plain low mentally people. The men and officers too, that you'll find in this outfit could never put a foot in Fort ———. Let's start with the officers. The company commander tries to prove that he has no prejudices against Negroes by being real easy on them. Actually he's fooling nobody in the whole company. The answer is he just don't give a damn.

The Way They Get Along

Integration decreases the differences in behavior between Negroes and whites; it increases the Negro's self-respect. What does it mean in terms of the friendships and cliques which govern social relations within the formal structure of a military organization?

(Negro trainee): I find that here the average Negro boy got a white friend and the white boy got a Negro friend. In the barracks you all sleep together everybody alike. No special business about who's sleeping where.

(White sergeant): Now in this HQ company, we're all mixed up. About one colored to five white. You'll find one in the lower bunk, and the other above him. We're good friends. You never see the colored boys off by themselves. They play cards and joke and all like that mixed up. You know there are sorry colored and sorry whites — sorry ones in any kind of people. But I'll say our outfit has about as nice a bunch of fellows as you'd find anywhere.

(White captain): I'd say that 99 percent of the officers get along fine with other Negro officers. We decided in the Special Services to have a weekly poker session. Since we had a colored captain in the unit we naturally wanted to include him. But one warrant officer was dead set against including him. So, we had our poker game anyway, and left the warrant officer out.

(Negro EM): I think that the mixed units are the best. I have several white friends who you might call buddies. I can get what they got and they can come to me and get what I got. We exchange things. We eat and sleep together. We train and work together. There ain't no difference.

(Negro EM): At Breckenridge we had many good friends among the white soldiers and when they separated us to send some overseas the boys actually cried and asked why did they have to be separated.

Thus friendships can, and do, exist among Negro and white soldiers in integrated units. It is possible for Negro and white soldiers to accept each other as individuals, informally and socially.

Where outside social pressures for segregation are strong, Negroes and whites will accommodate to these pressures, not necessarily at the expense of their friendship.

(Negro platoon sergeant): You can have a white friend on the post but as soon as you go to town together then you have to split up. I was riding on the bus one day and the bus was pretty crowded. Somebody got off and the bus driver got up to tell me to move farther to the back. A white soldier saw what he was going to do and got up and sat down beside me. When the driver came and asked me to move, this white soldier told him that we fought together and he did not see why we could not ride together. The driver turned around and went on back and never said anything more. Something should be done so that we could go off duty together when we want to. I don't want to go around with

anybody on off-duty hours who don't want me around; but if we want to, then they have no right to stop us.

[Questions to two soldiers, one Negro, one white, in enlisted men's club, Southern camp: What happens when you go to ——— (nearby town)?]

(White trainee): We ride together in the bus until the gate. Then he moves back.

(Negro trainee): When we get to town we're buddies again.

[What happens in town?]

(White trainee): We do all the things together that they'll let us.

[Like what?]

(White trainee): We can't eat together or go to the USO together, but we buy things, and window shop, maybe get a bottle and drink in the park — you know.

(Negro trainee): They don't care if you *walk* together.

[You said you're from Georgia, but I'm curious how come you have this friendship?]

(White trainee): I don't go for that Jim Crow stuff. Course I don't think they should marry one another (looks at Negro friend who nods vigorous assent) but that's all. Everybody is born free and equal, ain't that what the Constitution says?

(Negro EM): Three whites and myself play tennis every Monday and Friday afternoon, then we go to drink beer together in the beer hall on the post. We go to the movies together every Tuesday night.

[Do you eat and sleep together in the same unit?]

No we are not in the same units; we met riding together in the station wagon, one fellow asked me if I wanted to play tennis that afternoon. We discovered that we came from the same neighborhood.

[Do you go together very much with other colored on the post?]

No, we don't have as much in common.

HOW INTEGRATION WORKS

In an integrated unit, the informal relations between Negroes and whites are more than the private concern of those involved. Personal relationships may have a great deal to do with the way soldiers perform their military duties. The evidence suggests that personal relationships in integrated units tend to support the aims of the Army. In Negro units, the opposite is often true. The evidence for this may be briefly reviewed:

The Negro soldier tends to pattern his behavior after that of his white associates (this point has been related earlier to the quality of performance).

(Negro noncom): You take and mix in the colored and they're gonna try and do their best cause they see the white boy looking at him.

(White infantry lieutenant): Colored troops mixed indiscriminately with whites tend to try to outdo others to prove their equality. They feel watched, perhaps insecure, yet they have equal opportunity. So they try harder on the average than whites do. Result: they are equal or superior fighters not inferior ones. And this is objective aside from humanitarian or democratic impulses. In short I do not wish to lead a colored unit but I believe Negroes in mixed units to be in no way inferior in soldierly efficiency.

(White executive officer): Negro soldiers should be mixed with whites. In this way the Negro is made to feel he is treated as an equal. A better understanding for both will result. It is my opinion from what I have observed at this post that a Negro in a mixed unit will make every effort to come up to the standard of other soldiers.

(White battalion executive officer): Once they know you not only accept them but will go to bat for them they respond enthusiastically. Complete acceptance as to men, and complete indifference as to color — that's your answer to motivation. Maybe you've heard this in the CCI before: "The only color we see is the color of the uniform."

(Colonel, Quartermaster Group): I think they performed as well as they did in their jobs because of being in with whites. It was competition that did it. They didn't want to be outdone by the whites in the outfit.

The Negro soldier finds personal satisfaction in the fact that he is accepted in a mixed unit. As one Negro infantryman stated: "For myself, I haven't found no social problems.

I haven't found anything wrong racially. They treat me fine, most of the time I couldn't tell if I was colored or white."

The Negro soldier in a mixed unit is stimulated to do a better job.

(Negro trainee in integrated unit): In the mixed units the colored soldier has a chance to show what he can do. The colored soldier is just as good as the white soldier but you can't show it in the all-colored unit.

(Assistant post adjutant): Speaking of the performance of Negroes in integrated units. . . . He likes to take care of his equipment better than anyone else: They thrive on compliments; they eat it up. You can walk around here and I'll lay you odds that the finest soldier is a Negro boy, because he takes pride.

PROBLEMS IN NEGRO-WHITE RELATIONS

Habits of thought and action established through the years of civilian life do not disappear as a Negro is assigned a bunk in an integrated barracks. Neither do the habits of thought and action of the white troops change immediately. Thus even where relations between the two groups are apparently harmonious, there may remain an undertone of tension and suspicion on the part of both whites and Negroes.

The differences already noted, between the educational and social backgrounds of Negroes and whites may show themselves in vocabulary learning rate, table manners, personal hygiene, and other characteristics of behavior. Such differences call for adjustment, which many white men resent. This is particularly true in the case of reverse integration where traits come to be identified as those of the group rather than as those of individuals.

(White trainee): They always break the chow line and try to get in front of everybody, and they're always so loud.

(White trainee): They keep the latrines pretty dirty. They stop up the sinks and things like that.

The Negro who is accustomed to discrimination in civilian life may move on to "test" the equality he finds in an integrated unit by being overly aggressive.

(White trainee): They always go overboard when they find they can get away with something.

(White trainee): One day in chow line, we were going through and the colored boy was serving cake and he gave a white boy a small piece and the colored boys big pieces. They are so used to this racial discrimination that they are trying to get even with us. I know that they are trying to get even with us. I know I would probably feel the same way if I was brought up in the South the way they are.

(White trainee): We were standing in the chow line and there was this colored man in front of me. They always let their friends in in front of them. He got three of them ahead of me and we had a fight.

In this instance, the "fight" reported was a verbal argument, but it indicates that interracial frictions exist. But in spite of a persistent search for evidences of overt conflict the number of such instances is extremely low.

Such tensions and incidents as are found in integrated units are, with rare exceptions, of mild intensity and of minor consequence to the over-all functioning of the unit. Reports of conflict between Negroes and whites generally stress the fact that individual personality differences are involved, rather than differences of race.

(Divisional staff officer): Trouble here has been relatively minor in nature. There have been a very few incidents, very few indeed. Those which have occurred have been personal conflicts, not conflicts between racial groups. I think possibly around service clubs, where many men come into contact the possibility of clashes between individuals is almost certain. Now I heard stories of some trouble on the buses — rumors of pushing and jostling and occasional fights. However, I put a CID man on the buses for several days and he reported nothing to it.

(Divisional CofS): [Was there any skepticism when you first introduced integration?] Oh lord, yes — my officers told me we'd have riots, murder, low standards of training, they said we'd con-

flict with state laws, we'd have trouble with the townspeople, etc. But we didn't. We haven't had any trouble and we won't have.

SUMMARY

In segregated units, relations among men are fraught with tensions which lower the effectiveness of the units. Segregation itself is in large measure responsible for these tensions. In mixed units, on the other hand, Negroes accommodate themselves to the standards of the white majority. They become members of the team. Accordingly they are accepted by the white soldiers, and leave the efficiency of the units unimpaired. They not only get along with the whites but also develop friendships and mutual loyalties Instances of racial conflict are rare under normal circumstances of integration.

LEADERSHIP IN NEGRO AND INTEGRATED UNITS*

It has already been pointed out that the all-Negro unit presents distinct problems for its leaders — problems which exist for Negro officers and noncoms as well as for white commanders. This section considers not only these problems, but those which arise in integrated units in which white leaders command Negroes and Negroes command whites.

White Leadership in Negro Units

It is apparent from the evidence presented in earlier sections that an officer who commands an all-Negro unit shoulders special and perplexing leadership problems. It is not surprising to find that most white officers regard the possibilities of assignment to a Negro unit with apprehension:

(Staff officer): If I was assigned to command a straight colored battalion with a few white officers, I would consider myself lucky to come out with a satisfactory or average efficiency report. Put it this way . . . I'd have concern for my career.

(Post commander): I would say a majority of white officers in colored units apply for transfer. Some get letters from their Congressmen.

(Field-grade officer): I have just gotten in seven officers — we are trying to bring in excellent officers to try to bring the - -th up to standard. . . . It is difficult to interest white officers in leading colored units. They have too much to lose and too little to gain.

(Commander of Negro battalion): Well, education comes first. You can't assume average intelligence. And responsibility — no matter what it is the colored soldier has, he doesn't know how to take care of it. They don't respond to discipline or punishment. Court martials are not important to them. Loss of pay is not important to them. Clothing! There's a thorn in my side. They are given a clothing allowance but I have a hell of a time turning out a fully clothed battalion. They won't take care of their clothes — hell, they'll even sell their boots.

(White captain in Negro unit): They're not as efficient. Most white men, regardless of their station in life, have personal pride in them. They can be as low as can be, but they have one point of pride. Colored troops have no sense of pride. Their only idea is to get what they can. Everything is OK as long as they get away with it. They steal from one another. They snitch on one another. They lie. They swear before God it's the truth. I've never been able to find a point I can appeal to. I tried punishment - -administrative, not physical. I'm sorely tried to cut myself a club and work it over.

Bitterness and discouragement may be coupled with a firm resolution to make the best of a bad situation:

(Commander of Negro battalion): If battalion commander doesn't want to lead his troops into combat wouldn't you say he has failed and doesn't belong at the head of his troops? If I do take this battalion into combat, well, personally, I wouldn't have the faith. But if I'm given the job, damn it, I *would* take them into combat.

Negro Leadership in Negro Units

Leadership in segregated Negro units does not create problems for white officers only. Negro soldiers are well aware of the Negro officer's tenuous status in the Army hierarchy. So is the Negro officer. A Negro chaplain stated: "We don't have a Negro officer on the

* The data on which this section is based are derived from the intensive interviews.

post who has influence enough to assure a Negro soldier who has been treated unfairly that his grievance will be looked into without prejudice."

Undoubtedly, many Negro officers can understand Negro soldiers and be understood by them, better than white officers. This mutual background is highly valued by many Negro soldiers. But many Negro soldiers also believe that Negro officers owe their position, at least in part, to docility in their relationships with whites.

A Negro leader must be highly skillful to get good performance from his unit, retain the approval of white commanders, and at the same time avoid the role of a turncoat stooge in the eyes of his troops. Negro officers and noncoms who acquire the reputation of toadying to white superiors are labeled "cheese-eaters" by their troops, a term of high contempt: "They always grin in the white man's face."

White Leadership in Integrated Units

It has already been noted that there is a pronounced difference in general outlook between white officers commanding Negro troops in Negro units and those commanding Negroes in integrated units. Officers commanding integrated units are concerned with their training mission, and not with race relations.

(Divisional staff officer): We don't claim to be solving social problems. Our problem is to produce fighting men, and color isn't bothering us in accomplishing that mission.

(Regimental commander): As far as I am concerned, I have used them exactly as I have white troops. They have done a very outstanding job.

(Battalion commander): As far as training is concerned, I don't know whether the colored troops are taking it up any better or worse than the other troops. It is just like they weren't there. There is no difference in color or anything. . . . Actually there is not much I can say about it except it just seems to be working out all right.

The commander of an integrated battalion speaks of special problems with large numbers of Negro soldiers. But he speaks of a problem that has been tackled and solved, not of permanent handicaps:

We have a problem with the low AGCT scores on the part of Negroes. We try to see that the colored get the education they need. The ——— Battalion, 14 weeks ago, had about 60 percent colored in one of its companies. That company had more trouble at the start in learning to train and to develop its soldiers into efficient fighting men. But in the last week of their training, as of this last week, in their final testing, they got a superior rating. I'm very pleased to get that rating.

The large majority of company officers in integrated units seem to second the company commander who says, "I don't give a damn if a man's got stripes on him, as long as he can soldier."

Negro Leadership in Integrated Units

An argument frequently made by opponents of integration is that white soldiers will be reluctant, or will actually refuse, to take orders from Negro leaders, and that the efficiency and morale of the Army will suffer accordingly. The evidence from integrated units produces no support for this assertion.

A white infantry battalion commander relates this experience:

I remember a Southern officer who was told that his company commander would be a Negro. And he said, "Sir, I won't report to that colored officer, I won't work under him, and I don't care what happens." Well, he was told that he would report to that officer and he would work under him. And he did, but before he met him he made all sorts of dire predictions about how it would never work out. Then I saw this fellow after he had worked under this colored officer a few months, and he said, "By God, I really had my eyes opened and I wouldn't trade this company commander for any other in the Army."

Negro leaders in integrated units are regarded as officers and noncoms first, and only secondarily as Negroes. Thus comments about them tend, with few exceptions, to be on the quality of their performance.

(Staff officer): Yes, we have colored in our cadre and in some of the units. They do very well.
(White company commander): The ones I have are just up to the level of the white men on the average. I have got at least six.

A white cadreman from South Carolina, speaking of the Negro officers in his unit, remarks: "They're good, all good." And three privates comment:

(1): We have a Negro officer in our company. We get along with him fine.
(2): Yeah, he's stricter than hell. But he's a pretty nice fellow. We get along with him. At least he's fair.
(3): Yeah, I think I'd follow Lt ——— to hell and back.
(2): I guess I would take all-white officers and cadre if I had a choice, but otherwise I don't mind too much with colored officers and some colored cadre.
(3): Yes, I guess in the end we all like to be among those of our own race.
[Note that Private 3, who would follow the Negro Lieutenant "to hell and back," agrees that "in the end," he would prefer to be with whites.]

Opinions about Negro noncoms and officers appear to be no more and no less varied than are soldier opinions of white officers: "The best," "No good," "He plays favorites," "He's really on the ball," etc., etc. However, secondary references to leaders *as* Negroes are sometimes appended to these judgments. Two other trainees comment:

(1): We've had two. The other one is like a lot of them. He's got a little up on the white people and he seems to be a little bit bossy.
(2): I think if they get officer's rank they get to be too bossy.

By and large, Negro leadership in integrated units appears to present no special problems. Negro leaders are judged, and responded to, primarily in terms of their performance. But this appears to be true only provided that the Negro's status as leader is firmly buttressed by military discipline.

Summary

In general, the problems of leadership in Negro units appear to be numerous, perplexing, and chronic. The same problems, on the other hand, which stump so many officers in Negro units, seem to lose their importance in integrated units. If and when they occur, they become the responsibility of individual noncoms, and do not become problems for troop commanders at higher echelons.

Negro leaders, both officers and noncoms, are, in general, accepted within the framework of military discipline and are judged in terms of their performance as leaders, regardless of the private attitudes of the men they lead.

SOCIAL RELATIONS AND POST FACILITIES*

The preceding section considered the personal relations of Negroes and whites within the military unit. But important social relationships take place among Negro and white troops outside of the unit, in situations where military discipline is relaxed. These occur both in the use of recreational facilities on the post and off-post activities (discussed in the following section). The present section considers Negro-white relations in social situations on the post, that is, situations in which military discipline is less important than it is during training, but more important than it is outside the boundaries of the military reservation.

Off-duty activities on the post may be listed in approximate order of increasing sensitivity as a contact point for Negroes and whites, beginning with those activities which involve little possibility of tension and progressing to those which, in some places, are viewed as so hazardous that integration is rarely attempted.

The common use of PXs and post theaters is generally accepted. However, where Negro units are clustered together there may in effect be a "colored area," with its own PX and service club. In such cases, procedure which starts out as one of simple expediency may take on overtones of strict segregation and Negroes may be forbidden, or cautioned against, the use of other theaters.

In athletic activities racial problems do not appear to arise. Segregated teams from segregated units are often found. But if a regimental team can improve its competitive showing by including one or more players from its Negro battalion, integration often takes place and is easily accepted.

On the other end of the scale, social eating and drinking together, swimming, and dancing, in that order, are often felt to be potentially dangerous. Policies and practices regarding these activities vary greatly.

Before considering them in detail, however, one important finding may be reported. Military integration tends to lead spontaneously to integration of social activities. It has been shown that experience with military integration moves white soldiers toward greater acceptance of it. It is evident that those who accept military integration are more favorable to the idea of sharing post facilities with Negroes than are those unfavorable to military integration (Table B57).

This point is of interest because the importance of military discipline for the success of integration during duty hours has been emphasized elsewhere in the report. One might, therefore, have assumed that suppressed interracial resentment would show itself outside of duty hours in the use of post recreational facilities. The evidence indicates that this is not the case. Troops who are integrated during duty tend to accept integration in social activities on the post, although they do not embrace it without reservation.

The customs of the region in which the post is located exercise an important influence. In general, Northern posts have moved farther toward integration of social activities than have those in the South.

* The data in this section are drawn both from the intensive interviews and from the troop questionnaire.

TABLE B57

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATED POST FACILITIES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY INTEGRATION[a]

Answers	I object strongly and I would rather not						It makes no difference and I like it					
	In TC&E		In TD		In NG		In TO&E		In TD		In NG	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Percentage who say: "White soldiers should have their own Service Clubs and colored soldiers should have their own."	812	74	330	81	564	66	257	16	140	31	192	29
Percentage who say: "White soldiers should have their own dances and colored soldiers should have theirs."	818	86	327	96	570	84	260	39	142	57	186	37

[a] "No answer" responses are not included.

CLUBS: ENLISTED MEN'S, NONCOMS', OFFICERS'

Practice with respect to service clubs, NCO clubs, and officers' clubs varies from complete segregation to complete integration. A Negro sergeant reports a case of segregation by post policy:

> At first, colored could become members of the Club #1, because there were so few noncoms here that they did not have but the one club. Later, when the post began to fill up, they opened Club #2. After that, one of the colored NCOs went to Club #1, but was refused. They asked him to return his card and he would be given membership in Club #2. The club advisor told him, "You will be insulted by going to the white club. We think you would have more fun by going to the colored club." Some of us took it up with the board of governors of the club, but they said it is the policy of the post for colored NCOs to go to Club #2, but not Club #1. The funny thing to me is they never bothered to ask the noncoms themselves about colored and white going to the same club. I know a lot of whites who have come to me and asked to go to Club #2 with me, since I cannot go to their club with them. But we always wind up deciding that there's no need to risk getting into trouble.

Here policy changed to segregation as Negro troops began to arrive.

The operation of informal pressure is well illustrated in the statement of a Negro captain:

> I wasn't exactly told not to come there, but the attitude of this club officer was so unfriendly that I didn't bother to go back. It was shortly after I got here, back in December, and I went into the club and over to the bar. You know, as soon as an officer comes on a post he automatically becomes a member of the officers' club . . . least that's the way it's always been wherever I've gone. The fellow behind the bar told me if I wanted a drink I'd have to have a chit book; so I said OK, where do I get one. Well, this captain was standing right beside me at the bar and he could hear everything that we were saying. But he didn't turn around, in fact, he turned farther away so that his back was to me. The bartender pointed to him and then tried to get his attention but for a long time he wouldn't pay any attention. And I was getting hotter by the second. Finally he turned around and said, "What do you want?" I told him I'd like to buy a chit book for use at the bar. "Well, you have to be a member of the club," he said. I told him, "I am a member. I am an officer, and an officer is automatically a member." "Well, yes," he said, "but I don't mean that; I mean you have to be a member of

the bar club" or some such nonsense as that. I wanted more of an explanation, because I never heard of anything like that. Finally he walked over toward a desk and said, "Well, all right, I'll sell you a chit book this time." "This time," I said, "that's all right, I won't bother," and started away. He came after me and said, "Here, I said I would sell you a chit book, and here it is." But I just walked out. I know he was scared I was going to make some kind of report about it. But, hell, if I did something like that, I could kiss all promotions goodbye for as long as I was on this post, anyhow. And I haven't been back since.

The implications of such experiences for the morale and efficiency of Negro officers are apparent. But segregation is also self-imposed at times. A Negro warrant officer says:

I get real sore when I hear colored soldiers say: "You can't do this; they won't let you do that; I don't want to be embarrassed by trying to go to this place or that place." The lazy bastards don't have enough get up about them to take advantage of what there is for them. Colored officers are required to pay their monthly dues to support the officers' club, just the same as the white officers. I go anywhere on this post that my rank permits me to go. Before my wife took sick, she used to go along with me. Sometimes we would take our friends. Not a damn soul ever made any trouble or questioned my right to be there. No, I don't think that was just a special privilege because of my record and rank. I know of some officers who have gone to these places one or two times but they don't keep it up. A lot of them's afraid that they maybe won't be able to drink and keep themselves straight. They don't want to run the risk of having their CO seeing them with their hair down, so to speak. So they just lay over there in the area and turn themselves loose. That's why they don't say anything about unequal treatment they receive there.

The attempt to combine equal access to facilities with segregation is understood completely differently by white and Negro personnel:

(White lieutenant colonel, CO of segregated Negro battalion): It's funny but the more we try to arrange recreation here at ——— ——— the less they seem to appreciate it. If we have parties or dances at the service clubs very few attend. Most don't show up. I don't understand it.

(Colonel, commander of CCR which includes this Negro battalion): The colored soldiers don't participate in or attend the social functions we have for them. This is something of a problem to us.

(Negro EM): We can't have no dances in the service club either. When the white soldiers have a dance there we get sent to the woods. They done this to us twice. They can't fool nobody with a lot of reasons why we should go to the woods. We know the whole battalion don't need to be sent to the woods just like that just when the white boys want to have a dance. Now Wednesday night is fight night. We didn't go to them at first but now they make us go. The whole company have to go. If you don't want to go you have to go anyway. I don't like fights and I want some free time, for myself like other soldiers. With all this kind of bull going on you can't expect us to click as a unit.

A different pattern appears to emerge when official policy is clearly one of integration. In this case, there is usually a moderate amount of mixing, but some clubs become known as "white," and some as "colored." Members of either race can and do attend the clubs of the other race, but personal preference operates to keep mixing at a moderate level. A Negro sergeant in charge of an integrated club (which is known as a "colored club") reports two incidents illustrating this point:

Some funny things happen. I remember one time there was a white boy and he had probably had a few drinks of hard liquor before he came into the club. Well, he was standing up at the bar drinking beer and getting higher and higher all the time and feeling better all the time and all of a sudden he turned around to some folks who were sitting at tables near the bar and said, "Honest to God, I like to be here with you Niggers." Well, my bartender was around the end of the bar before he could practically get his mouth shut and took him in tow and signaled to me so I went over there and between us we sort of walked him out as quickly as we could so that there wouldn't be any trouble. We had to move real fast, because there was no telling what might happen. He didn't mean any harm at all, he was just high and not careful of his language, but sometimes the fellows don't think of that so we sent him back to his unit with one of the soldiers, who went off with him.

There was another occasion when some group of Negro soldiers came over here from Texas to be on the post for a while. I think it was the ———th AAA Battalion. Of, of course they weren't

used to the way things were done over here and a bunch of them came into the club. One fellow looked around and said, "What are all these crackers doing in here? Let's get them all out of here." Well, one of the white boys who was sitting nearby got up and went over to him and said, "Look fellow, if you don't shut your mouth we'll just send all of you right on back to Texas. We don't do things like that here."

(Negro private in an integrated unit): Integration on the post is wonderful. I have no knowledge of any instances of segregation on the post. We are authorized to go to any of the service clubs. I don't care to go myself. But some of the colored fellows say that they go to the same club. There are five service clubs on the post. Most of the colored soldiers go to Service Club #3. They don't try to go to the other clubs for fear of being embarrassed. But I think that you can go to any club on the post according to policy. I don't know of any trouble that has come up in connection with the clubs.

One reason that Negroes tend to congregate in a particular club, even if they are in an integrated division, is that many posts provide a Negro hostess in one club. A second reason given by both white and Negro men is that, "I just prefer to be with my own people."

SWIMMING

Especially in the South, there is a tradition against having Negroes and whites use the same swimming pool. This tradition is sometimes sustained at considerable cost.

(Commanding general): Since the post was reactivated a year ago, we have spent an enormous amount of money to fix up a really nice colored beach. It is not as large as the white beach, but in many ways it is much nicer.

This tradition is closely connected with the idea of avoiding contacts between men and women of the two races. A deputy post commander says, speaking of swimming, "wherever women are concerned in social events, there is friction." A staff officer at another post echoes this feeling when he says, "Wherever women are involved, the races do not mix."

A special services officer reports this solution to the problem:

They swim together. I would say at least 50 percent of the people using the pools are colored. When we set up the policy of letting colored swim, about two years ago, we specified no dependents. That way there would be no girls around in bathing suits, so there would be no trouble.

Another special services officer who has limited swimming facilities on his post reports that careful scheduling is necessary to maintain segregated swimming. The pool or beach is assigned to units at specified times. This accomplishes segregation except in the case of an occasional integrated headquarters unit or a special school class. In these instances, informal pressures are applied.

But practical problems sometimes outweigh traditional fears. A major on a post in the Deep South reports:

They [the Negroes] have one swimming pool which is exclusive to them and their families. It's the most desirable, in fact the *only pool* in the post with shade. But up at ——— there is only one pool and there they have no separation at all.

(Post executive officer, Southern post): We've been completely integrated here. It used to be that we took the boys to town for swimming, but they had to be separated. Now we have our own pool, and they go swimming together, and don't give it a thought.

The cycle of transition is completed with the following statement made by a general on a Southern post:

I stopped at a swimming pool. I observed that there were about 60 percent white swimming with about 40 percent colored. The surprising thing was that among the white there were about 40 white girls. I said to myself, "Now I've seen everything."

DANCING

The dance on an Army post, though under military supervision and control, is not essentially a military affair. It involves civilians in a number of capacities. Civilians, usually leaders of local churches, clubs, and other organizations participate in making arrangements for recruiting and transporting girls. Members of these organizations accompany the girls as chaperons. And the girls themselves, the most important participants in the dance, are civilians not subject to military discipline. Accordingly there are two special characteristics of dancing which make it unique among on-post social activities: (a) the presence of women, which raises emotionally charged issues of possible contacts between men and women of the two races; and (b) the need for cooperation from civilians in the communities adjoining the post.

Many officers and men think that these factors make integrated dances a practical impossibility. Again and again the comment is heard that integrated dances simply will not work, the civilians won't cooperate, and the whole pattern of peaceful relations between Negroes and whites necessarily breaks down the moment women are involved.*

Since there is no Army-wide policy in connection with dances local decisions lead to a variety of practices which range from complete segregation to complete integration. These practices, moreover, do not always accord with the prevailing post policy for integration, or segregation, of other activities.

In the South, no integrated dances for enlisted men were encountered in this study even on posts which are integrated in all other respects, though there are instances of joint dancing at officer's functions.

Integration of enlisted men's dances is considered a separate problem, and is explicitly given separate consideration. The G-1 of one post for instance, remarks: "The Army policy is integration and we are carrying out that policy. This applies to everything except dancing." On the other hand, one Northern post which houses segregated TO&E units holds integrated dances.

Separate Dancing

Post A is an integrated post located in the South. Partial, semivoluntary segregation appears in the service clubs. Service club #1 is generally referred to as the "colored" club, while clubs #2 and #3 are referred to as the "white" service clubs. Ordinarily, white soldiers are admitted to, and attend, the colored club, and colored soldiers are admitted to, and attend, the white clubs. The one explicit exception to this rule, and the one activity with respect to which segregation is rigidly enforced, is dancing. This may probably be traced to a precedent-setting incident in which the former commanding general of the post expressed his attitude, and to subsequent policy decision by the special services officer. Several reports of this incident give the following story:

> A white officer and his wife and a Negro officer and his wife together attended a function at the officer's club. During the course of the evening, the couples exchanged dance partners and entered the dance floor, whereupon the general sent a senior officer to tap one or both of the couples on the shoulder and ask them to be seated. Shortly thereafter the white officer was transferred to a different regiment on the same post, and the Negro officer was shipped overseas. The incident was widely discussed on the post and its handling was criticized even by officers who disapproved of mixed dancing.

Since then Negro officers have refrained from making more than perfunctory appearances at social functions.

* For purposes of clarity in describing what actually happens, the following distinctions are made: (a) *joint dancing* will refer to dancing of white couples and Negro couples on the same dance floor; (b) *mixed dancing* will refer to dancing of biracial couples; (c) *integrated dancing* will be retained as a generic term, and will refer to joint and/or mixed dancing.

(Negro lieutenant): Since that time the colored officers don't go to the officers' club for hardly anything, and certainly not for social affairs. When General ——— left, a cocktail party was given at the club, and all officers were required to attend. I went. My wife was not here at the time, but I don't believe I would have taken her if she had been here. I don't believe that any of the colored officers stayed for the dance which they had afterwards.

(Negro lieutenant): Yes, I pay dues at the officers' club, $3 per month, but I never go there. Well, there are two reasons. One is because I find it inconvenient, since you have to dress so formally to go there. The other is because of the incident which happened over there.

To at least one Southern white officer, there is a contradiction in the policy of integrating troops and segregating social arrangements. Asked how he would feel if a Negro officer asked his wife for a dance, he answers:

How can you see anything wrong with it. If the Army told you to accept him during the day. You are told that all through your work you are not supposed to show any prejudice. Well, how can you not show prejudice during the day, and then turn around and show prejudice at the social function. That just doesn't seem right. It leaves you in the middle. It is like so many stupid commands: Be sure to do this, but don't go any further. You simply can't tell me not to show any prejudice, and then turn right around and show the prejudice.

As far as the enlisted men are concerned, dances are wholly segregated. As already indicated, all three service clubs are ordinarily open to all soldiers, irrespective of color. On dance nights, however, Negro soldiers are barred from the white clubs and white soldiers are barred from the Negro clubs. Officers explain this practice as a necessary conformity to local custom:

(CofS): There has never been any resistance to integration by men on the post. However, for social affairs, we have to honor the customs of the State.

(Regimental commander): As far as the dances are concerned, that is what I must explain. The Army can order us to do all sorts of things but the Army can't tell the local belles to dance with colored troops.

(Negro lieutenant): Yes, we have to draw the line at dances. That's where the line is drawn. We accept the state law on that.

The particulars of the practice stem from a decision of the special services officer. The new post commander originally directed that Negroes and whites be permitted to watch at each other's dances. Apparently, the general believes this to be the prevailing practice for he remarks: "Negroes and whites can stand around and watch, but they cannot dance on the same floor." The special services officer, however, has modified this directive, and justifies this modification as follows:

The general's policy was complete integration but he didn't expect integration in dancing. He said that if the colored want to stand around and watch white dancing, or white want to watch colored dancing, they should go ahead, but I have given orders that, to avoid any trouble, whites be kept out of the colored service clubs on dance night, and vice versa. Some day, I may be called to task for that: But in the meantime it guarantees that we have no trouble whatsoever.

Accordingly, Negroes and whites are not permitted to enter each other's dances and MPs are posted on dance nights to keep them from doing so. In one instance, according to one report, two couples, one white, one Negro, on a double date, were successively refused admission first to the white and then to the Negro dance because they insisted on remaining together. Their complaints were of no avail. According to rumor, the two soldiers were shipped out shortly thereafter. It is immaterial whether the facts, and the interpretation put upon them, are correct. The circulation of the story itself is significant.

The policy of keeping dances segregated need not be as formal as it is on Post A. Post B, a segregated TO&E post in the South, retains effective segregation of dances in a

more informal manner. The technique is to tell the unwanted persons that they will enjoy themselves better at their own clubs.

(Special services officer): We have very little trouble in the use of the facilities by Negroes and whites. There was one case where the people were rather bitter: In a division area, where Negro and white were in the same area. There was no real trouble, but a few colored did go into one of the clubs. A Negro asked a girl to dance. After it happened we more or less pointed out that they had a place to go and we would appreciate it if they would go there.

On still another post in the South (an integrated one), segregation of dances is unofficially but effectively maintained:

(Former special services officer): A colored bandleader, playing at a white dance, had brought his wife or girl friend as a guest. During one number, he came off the band-stand to dance. The couple was asked immediately not to dance. The next day he went to the IG and complained. I reported to the IG that there was no official policy of segregation but that it had worked out that an all or none policy was actually in effect. That is, if the dance was for colored, it was for colored and the whites were expected to stay away, and vice versa.

While enlisted men's dances are segregated in the South, Negro officers may dance at officers' dances on integrated posts, but they dance only with each other's escorts, and maintain an informal but definite ban on mixed (biracial) dancing.

Integrated Dancing

So far, the discussion has been confined to dances on posts where the guiding policy has been to keep dances segregated. At Northern installations integration at dances is the general rule. The policy has been, generally, to invite white and Negro girls, and to encourage joint rather than mixed dancing. This policy, however, has operated through guidance rather than rules. The decision on whom to dance with is left to the personal preferences of girls themselves.

(Special services officer): Well, the girls were simply told that no one is required to dance with any individual with whom they don't want to dance. To the best of my knowledge, nothing specific was said and no reference was made to the color of the skin of the individuals. That is, they were not told: you don't have to dance with the colored boys if you don't want to, to the best of my knowledge.

Under these circumstances, mixed couples occur only on occasion.

Predictions of conflict and trouble fail to materialize at these dances.

(Special services officer): Frankly, I just don't believe it. But it is happening. There hasn't been the least bit of trouble. Not one bit. If there have been any hot words, it hasn't been reported to me and my directors and I just don't know about it.

(Sergeant major): Black and white don't usually mingle socially, but we had a company dance at which there were colored couples and everybody had a wonderful time. There was no mixed dancing. None of the colored boys would have tried that. Everybody enjoyed it, and they wanted to have another soon.

(Negro cadreman): Well, I haven't had much time to get around to those places. The few dances I went to, they had both kinds of girls there and they all seemed to get along very good. From what I've observed on this post so far, it seems to be a real good relationship. Nobody seems to have prejudice or, at least, if they have, they don't seem to show it.

Mixed dancing, where it occurs, is received with a certain amount of resentment by whites, and especially by Southern whites, but fails to produce the disruptive effects which have been predicted. This is demonstrated by the responses to questions (on the troop questionnaire) which describe hypothetical dance situations and ask what soldiers think they would do in the circumstances described. The findings are shown in Table B58.

Insofar as men can accurately project themselves into an imaginary situation, these results indicate very strongly that they foresee no conflicts or problems in instances in which

TABLE B58

PREDICTIONS BY WHITE SOLDIERS ON BEHAVIOR IN SITUATIONS OF JOINT AND MIXED DANCING

Answers	1100 in TO&E, %	471 in TD, %	781 in NG, %
Q. 90:			
Pfc. Joe Doakes goes to an enlisted men's dance on the post where he is stationed. He notices that among the couples on the dance floor there is a colored soldier dancing with a *colored* girl. What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place?			
Pay no special attention to them	73	69	75
Watch closely to see what happens	3	4	3
Leave the place when I saw them	7	15	9
Complain to the people in charge of the dance	9	9	5
Go over to the colored soldier and tell him to stay away from the dance	3	1	4
Try to get some friends to beat up the colored soldier	2	0	1
No answer	3	2	3
Q. 91:			
Suppose that at an enlisted men's dance, Joe notices that a colored soldier is dancing with a *white* girl. What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place?			
Pay no special attention to them	30	28	30
Watch closely to see if the girl wants somebody to cut in	27	24	28
Cut in without asking, just to take the girl away from the colored soldier	9	7	8
Leave the place when I saw them	6	14	8
Complain to the people in charge of the dance	11	13	9
Go over to the colored soldier and tell him to stay away from the dance	6	6	6
Try to get some friends to beat up the colored soldier	6	4	6
No answer	5	4	5

white and Negro soldiers participate in the same dances. Where this participation is "joint," an overwhelming majority say they would pay no attention whatever. Only a small minority say they would leave or complain to those in charge.

Where the dancing is "mixed," there is much less disposition to treat it as a matter of course. Substantial proportions say they would watch carefully to see if they should "cut in." The proportions who say they would leave the dance or complain to those in charge are about the same as in the case of "joint" dancing. Most significant, in the light of the frequent predictions of open conflict in such situations, is the almost negligible proportion of white soldiers who say they would resort to openly hostile behavior. This accords with the reports in interviews that hostile behavior does not occur in actual practice.

(Captain): The sergeant reported to me that he saw a colored boy and a white girl dancing at one of the service clubs, but nothing happened over it. I don't believe in that myself. I'd stop it if I saw it, but nothing appears to have happened when they were seen together.

(Lieutenant colonel): I did see one colored soldier dancing with a good looking white girl and that kind of annoyed the officers from my unit. They're all from Texas, you know. And my wife just couldn't stand it. But otherwise, as far as the other Negro couples were concerned, that just didn't matter.

(Negro EM): They do a little mixed dancing but not much. Anyway, whenever there is, there isn't no trouble.

(Negro EM): Well, the last dance I went to I met a white soldier I knew, and he had his wife and his wife's sister. I danced with his wife and her sister and I didn't really notice anybody eyeing me or anything. But then, the floor was so crowded maybe they didn't even notice.

(Divisional staff officer): In fact, one of the service clubs hostesses was telling me, just the other day, about a couple of white girls who were approached by two colored boys and asked to dance, and they did. And what happened there was this: there were no colored hostesses, or there weren't enough colored hostesses at this particular dance. I don't know. So the colored boys had no one to dance with. So they approached these two white girls, asked them to dance, and the white girls agreed. Then what happened was this: Because they had danced with the two colored boys, none of the white boys would come over to the two white girls and ask them to dance, and so, for the rest of the evening, the two white girls continued to dance with colored boys. The point is that nothing happened. Now apparently there was talk. I don't know too much about the details of this, but there were no incidents. There were no fights, no frictions; these two girls were simply left alone and they danced with the colored boys.

Not only are there few difficulties with the men but there is also a striking absence of objections from the civilian communities (in the North), and from the girls themselves.

(Divisional staff officer): We did a study in the community here. We discovered that the people in this community didn't feel that there was any colored problem, particularly. We said, in effect, that we would ignore the fact that there is any evidence of a race problem. We did find in town a group of colored folks who said they wouldn't attend the dances unless they were mixed. So the feeling came from the colored rather than from the white. We did find one person who was squeamish: her girls wouldn't come out if there were colored girls at the dances. But they did come out anyway under another duenna. We did have the names of certain attractive and personable ladies of high character.

(Special services officer): They have the same nonsegregated set-up at the dances which are held at the USO clubs in town. Incidentally, the girls who come there are from some of the best families in town. They come to the dances and they all know that the dances are mixed. That was made clear to them from the beginning. But, so far as I know, none of them would make any sort of comment or criticism of it.

The only instance reported of friction with the community over dances occurred in a case where there was a scarcity of Negro girls.

(Major, special services officer): It would have been necessary to send over two hundred miles away for colored partners. One night, when there was a dance attended by white girls from the vicinity, Negro soldiers asked the white girls to dance and they were embarrassed and told their parents. Then the townspeople rebelled and told the special service officer they would send no girls out to the camp so long as the Negroes could ask them for dances.

Since then, there have been no dances on that post. The major, however, goes on to say that there ought to be dances anyway, even if girls have to be transported two hundred miles.

In several instances where initial objections were voiced, they were quickly overcome by the action of the authorities.

(Post commander): Some of the white girls weren't too happy about it when they learned there were going to be colored girls coming to the dances. Some of them said they would stop coming if that happened. They came to me and I said that I didn't ask anybody to do anything at my dances that they wouldn't at any other dances. As long as they behaved themselves, I hoped they would continue to come and enjoy themselves; but if they couldn't, well, we were sorry to lose them. Well, they're still coming.

SUMMARY

Nearly every conceivable variation in policy and practice may be observed in the use by Negro and white soldiers of recreational facilities on Army posts. With the single excep-

tion of dancing, integration appears to work successfully for all of these facilities. In the case of dancing, the presence of civilian girls, and the cooperation of the community, is required. Therefore, civilian customs and restrictions may rule out integrated dancing, particularly in the South. Segregated dancing may be enforced informally even where all soldiers are permitted access to the buildings in which dances are held. Where integrated dancing is practiced, in the North, it has generally proceeded without special problems.

INTEGRATION AND POST-COMMUNITY RELATIONS*

What effect, if any, does integration have upon the relations between the Army post and the local community, especially the Southern community whose traditions frown on the mingling of Negroes and whites? To state the task of this chapter directly: Does integration raise new problems between Army posts and nearby communities, problems which are not apparent on segregated installations?

The following discussion falls under five major headings: (a) General problems of post-community relations, which exist apart from the presence or absence of Negro troops; (b) Post-community problems relating specifically to the presence of Negro troops; (c) Post-community problems characteristic of the North (including both integrated and segregated situations); (d) Post-community problems characteristic of the South (including both integrated and segregated situations); (e) Reactions to integration among civilians in Southern communities.

To ascertain what impact integration has on post-community relations, one must first consider what is involved in those relations, aside from the presence or absence of integration, or even of Negro troops.

General Problems

The problems which arise in the day-to-day relations of the Army post and the nearby community are strongly influenced by four important factors, namely: (a) the population of the post in relation to that of the adjacent communities; (b) the proximity of these communities; (c) the social and economic structure of the community; and (d) the proximity of the post to large, metropolitan centers.

The relative size of the town and the post largely determines the ability of the town population to provide adequate recreational facilities for soldiers on pass.

Army installations located near large cities are not so heavily dependent upon the resources of the small towns nearby as are those posts which are distant from metropolitan centers. A soldier on weekend leave is more likely to bypass the smaller towns just outside the gate, with their usually inadequate recreational facilities, and seek the less constricted atmosphere and the greater opportunities for amusement and companionship which are afforded by the large city.

Where there are no large cities within weekend commuting distance from the post, the routine problems of the small post town and the large Army post become additionally aggravated. Small, and especially small isolated, communities characteristically often present a picture of provincial loyalties and solidarity against the stranger.

Particularly when the number of soldiers is very great, the residents of a small community may withdraw more tightly than ever into their own circles. Soldiers, seen as

* The data used as the basis for this discussion are drawn mainly from interviews with enlisted men and officers on the ten posts studied, as well as from the troop questionnaire. In addition, interviews were conducted with officials and opinion leaders in towns near Army camps. In all cases both Negroes and whites were interviewed.

outsiders, may be viewed with distrust and suspicion, while at the same time the community may grudgingly accept and recognize its economic dependency upon these outsiders. This attitude accounts in no small measure for the feeling on the part of many soldiers, that while their money is accepted in the post town, they, as individuals are not. As one white enlisted man said: "Small towns in the vicinity of Army posts always have hard feelings toward the Army. They can't accept the service man."

Other soldier gripes appear to center around the inadequate recreational facilities, the difficulty of finding housing for dependents, and the disturbing experience of not "belonging":

> (Two white EM) (1): It's a damn poor community — no place for recreation, that's for sure!
> (2): And ——— (name of town), they give the GIs a bum deal. What traffic fines!

It is apparent that any relationship between an Army post and a small or medium-sized community must involve problems which arise simply from the town's limited ability to absorb suddenly large numbers of young men in search of a good time. These problems continue to have overwhelming importance regardless of the complicating factors which may arise from the presence of Negroes.

Problems Relating Specifically to Negro Troops

For Negro troops as for Negro civilians, difficulties with the white community arise in relation to the degree of access that Negroes have to places of entertainment and to contacts with whites. As in civilian life, these problems are related to the numerical strength of the Negroes in the population as well as to the size, social structure, and racial etiquette of the community.

The Army often concentrates large numbers of Negro troops in areas where, under normal circumstances, there are few Negro civilians; the Negro soldier is automatically apart as an obvious outsider. Thus the visibility of the Negro is an important factor in his reception by the community.

Negroes in different communities have, over a period of years, evolved different ways of getting along with the whites. The introduction of a large number of strange Negroes may bring with it some disruptions of the established formula for "how Negroes act in this town." The existence or absence of a sizable Negro population determines to a large extent the degree to which the Negro soldier feels comfortable in a new town.

He is left with a relatively large amount of freedom in Northern towns, and he has greater access to public facilities, but he often fails to find any place where he can actually feel at home.

The problems which have been briefly outlined arise in the relations of the Negro soldier and the community regardless of whether or not the Army installations involved are segregated or integrated. This point is discussed in detail in the remainder of this section.

Problems Characteristic of the North

The Northern posts surveyed do not appear to suffer as acutely from the routine problems of post-community relations as do those located in the South.* These posts are all located near large metropolitan areas. Thus, nearby small towns are not required to "absorb" the entire personnel of the post. On the other hand, the number of post towns without established Negro communities is far greater in the North than in the South.

Despite the fact that the Northern posts studied are located near metropolitan centers, there are always some soldiers who for lack of time or money cannot get to the city.

* This is not accidental, since most of the nation's large cities are located outside the South.

The absence of Negro communities in Northern post towns constitutes a source of real difficulty for the Negro soldier, and poses special problems of which both town and post officials are aware. Chiefly, these problems consist of securing a sufficient number of Negro girls for dances and of opening up recreational facilities which may not have admitted Negroes in the past. These problems have not proven insurmountable, and in some cases workable solutions have been achieved. This may be illustrated by two cases in which potentially explosive situations were met with decisive and successful action by town and post officials with a minimum of friction, and within the framework of local customs and laws.

One instance involved the refusal of a local bar to serve a Negro soldier, although local custom allowed Negroes access to the premises:

(Lieutenant colonel, division staff officer): I do recall one off-post incident that might interest you. It took place in a restaurant or bar down in ——— (town). I believe the bartender refused to serve a Negro or several Negroes. The Negroes did not kick up a fuss, but reported the incident to the MPs and the MPs reported the incident to the provost marshal. The provost marshal went down to ——— and suggested that the bartender either serve soldiers regardless of color or his establishment would be put out of bounds. I believe the issue has been settled there, and the man in the future will be served.

Another instance involved the problem of maintaining the balance between Negroes and whites in social dancing at the town USO. There were only a small number of Negro girls in the community available as hostesses for Negro servicemen:

(Manager, USO): The only difficulty in terms of our situation is in social dances. We don't have colored girls as part of the group in our USO. At our dances we have the colored boys who bring their own girls, same with post dances. For the boys on basic training, we operate what we call caravans. We had started dancing there, until we had a few colored fellows who insisted dancing with white girls, and they were better dancers than the white boys and the white girls preferred dancing with them. And the word got around until the proportion of Negroes increased to 50 percent. We just stopped the dancing and started afternoon socials, singing around the piano, that sort of thing. The girls took them on tours. After a couple of weeks the proportion of colored boys dropped down again. I think it normalized the thing.

In town, as on the post, dancing is the activity which requires the most adjustments. Most often these take the form of individual accommodation; they may require direct cooperative action taken by post and town officials. A white EM stated: "Only a few of the colored fellows go to the USO. They don't have colored hostesses there. Some of the colored fellows would go to the dance if they just had colored partners."

A special service officer on a Northern post reports on the problems he encounters trying to get young girls from the community to serve as hostesses for integrated dancing on the post:

We have dances twice a month. We bring in girls from surrounding communities. We have a hostess in charge of every unit that comes in from every town. A lady in charge of our Negro girls comes with our Negro girls. Four to ten of them. We had a little trouble with that, with the civilians. The lady who was in charge of the girls and connected with no organization whatsoever, didn't want her girls to ride with the colored on the same bus. So we told the driver to pick up the Negro girls and not the white girls. We got another hostess.

Such problems as these appear to plague all of the Northern posts surveyed. But they do not seem to impair seriously the over-all relations between the community and the post. In general, post officials feel that post-community relations are good.

(Commanding general): I have received no complaints from the community, and I hope I don't receive any. We have an Army Advisory Committee in ——— (town). We have on that committee a Negro civilian. He's well thought of in the community, and he was purposely put on the committee to take care of these problems in the community.

This favorable relationship is no different in the case of the one Northern post surveyed which houses segregated units than in those which house integrated divisions.

*Relations Characteristic of the South**

All but one of the Southern post towns surveyed are economically dependent on the post. Services to the soldier are secondary to the income that his presence in the community represents. Open dissatisfaction with conditions in these towns is expressed by both white and Negro soldiers:

(White EM): There are places in ——— (town) which don't let soldiers in. No servicemen are allowed in there. Their swimming pool, for instance.

(White EM): ——— (town) is a helluva place for a serviceman's wife. My wife couldn't get a job because she was a soldier's wife.

(Negro EM): What is the relationship of soldiers to the community? It ain't so good. The soldiers have to pay prices that is too high. . . . They (white soldiers) have to pay high prices too, I guess.

That these reactions are widespread may be seen by the answers given on the troop questionnaire by soldiers on three Southern posts (Table B59).

TABLE B59

WHITE AND COLORED SOLDIERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POST-TOWNS OF THREE SOUTHERN POSTS

Answers	Installations			
	A and C[a]		B	
	423 white, %	245 Negro, %	459 white, %	576 Negro, %
The towns around this post are good places to have fun.	33	14	32	33
The towns around this post are not good places to have fun.	60	83	67	65
No answer	1	3	1	2

[a] Responses in the case of installations A and C are practically the same.

The findings are clear: Less than a third of all the soldiers questioned consider the Southern post towns as good places to have fun. At two of the posts, four out of five Negro soldiers, compared with two-thirds of the whites, say that the nearby towns are not good places to have fun.

Special Problems in Recreational Facilities for Negroes. Although there is a dearth of recreational facilities for *all* soldiers, in the Southern post towns the Negro soldier is in addition confronted with a strict regional pattern of separate, but not always equal, facilities.

The Negro is used to the fact that he is expected to go to the depressed Negro section for his purely civilian recreational activities. But the quasi-official status of USO clubs or service men's clubs gives rise to special protest when Negroes find that these facilities are also inadequate.

* Because small, isolated, post towns are found most often in the South and because they present special problems, intensive interviews with town officials and prominent citizens of both races were conducted in the adjoining towns of all but one of the six Southern posts studied.

(Negro post sergeant-major): Community relations are very poor. There is no decent place for the Negro soldier to go in town. The NCO club is the only decent place and it is nothing to shout about. . . . The white soldiers have a very nice USO.

(Negro EM): . . . Now I think the approach to the problem would be to break down segregation in the USOs in town. They have a nice little place for the white soldiers.

(Negro director of the Negro community center): I have had a lot of experience in the Army and out of the Army in recreation work, but you can't do anything with nothing. The white community house has a swimming pool, a library, a writing room, a skating rink and hot meals. We don't have any of that here.

(Negro sponsor of the Negro community center): The colored center doesn't have anything but some folding chairs, three lounge chairs, and three card tables. They sell soft drinks for ten cents and that griped a lot of soldiers. They have a juke box, but they have to pay to play that. So the only time that soldiers go there in any numbers is on Wednesday nights when they have a weekly dance. The white center has a swimming pool, a library, and everything.

Reports from post officials and enlisted men attest to the undesirable character of those few private recreational outlets that are available for Negro soldiers. Although it is reported that these places serve as focal points for the spread of venereal disease and crime, there is reluctance to declare them "off limits," since the Negro soldier has no other place to go.

(Provost marshal): There is one spot for colored ——— which is pretty bad. It should be put off bounds, but then there is no other place for the colored to go, so we keep it open.

(Negro first sergeant): There isn't much on the post to do, so the fellows go to town. There isn't much to do there either, and what few places there are to go to are well-known sources of VD contacts. The community seems sort of lax about these places, and the camp is slow in declaring them "off-limits."

The disproportionately high venereal disease rates for Negro troops (reported earlier in Table B39) must be seen in the light of these conditions in the community.*

(It may be noted that existing stereotypes of Negroes held by whites, particularly those referring to the lack of self-control and personal hygiene, are given substance to the extent that white soldiers are able to cite the abnormally high rate of VD among Negro troops.)

The Army appears to be faced by three alternatives: (a) placing the entertainment facilities that serve as contact points for VD off-limits, thereby reducing the already inadequate number of recreational outlets for the Negro soldier; (b) by not doing so, continuing to tolerate an important source of VD; or (c) initiating more vigorous cooperative efforts directed toward improving and increasing the number of medical and recreational facilities for Negroes in post towns.

Relations with Police and Bus Drivers. While the situations which arouse tensions vary from one community to another, complaints on treatment by policemen and bus drivers are consistently prominent in the gripes of Negro Army personnel and Negro civilians in the South. This may be documented by the following breakdown of responses to the troop questionnaire (Table B60).

Post B (which, it will be noted, is more often cited by Negroes as "a good place to have fun") is located near a fair-sized town, while both Posts A and C are not. It is not surprising that more difficulties are reported by soldiers and civilians located at posts with only small towns nearby, where customs are less flexible and soldier-community tension greater than in larger towns.

* While Negro VD rates in the country as a whole are higher than that for whites, the differential in the South is even greater. These differentials are more comprehensible when consideration is given to the low educational status of the Negro (which results in an ignorance of, or reluctance in using, preventative measures), and to the wide gap that exists between available health services for Negroes and whites, especially in the South.

TABLE B60

TROOP REACTIONS AT TO&E INSTALLATIONS TO TREATMENT BY POLICEMEN AND BUS DRIVERS IN THREE SOUTHERN POST TOWNS

Answers	Post A.				Post B				Post C			
	White		Negro		White		Negro		White		Negro	
	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %
We are treated very well.	34	37	16	8	20	23	12	5	39	34	15	9
We are treated fairly well.	51	45	49	36	43	52	34	33	47	47	67	52
We are treated badly.	14	18	34	56	37	24	53	61	11	19	18	37
No answer	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	3	0	0	2

Northerners, both white and Negro, are consistently more critical on this point than are Southern whites and Negroes. Northern Negroes protest more frequently than do any of the other three groups. While Southern Negro soldiers are familiar with segregation on public conveyances and with comparatively rough treatment by policemen, these may represent new and shocking experiences for Northern Negro soldiers, particularly because they conflict with his desire to believe that "a soldier's a soldier."

(Negro officer): The buses are supposed to be unsegregated leaving and coming to the camp, but I have seen bus drivers make the colored soldiers move to the rear of the bus before leaving the camp. I think that is simply the bus driver exercising authority but no one seems to check on them.

Negro complaints of "police brutality" take the following form:

(Negro lawyer): Police brutality is a pattern in this town. About four months ago a Negro lieutenant came into town. A Negro cop hit him and almost put his eye out. He swore out a warrant and a white major came from the post and effected a compromise with the city commissioner. The Negro cop was put on probation.

(Negro lieutenant): Frankly I don't go to ——— town. They had some colored policemen, and I understand that they mess with colored soldiers quite a bit. Only recently, a policeman beat up a soldier and put him in the hospital.

Similarity of Problems on Integrated and Segregated Posts

The relations between the Negro soldier and the community, even in the South, involve the same kinds of problems in the case of integrated and segregated posts. However, integration in the South does have some problems of its own, though these are not as serious as those already discussed. Three examples will serve to illustrate the kinds of episodes which may arise under integration:

(Colonel, divisional CofS): Nothing serious, but we have had a little trouble with the townspeople. A local group called and said they were having a picnic and would like to have 100 soldiers as their guests. Well we just don't think about color any more, they are just soldiers to us. So we called a unit and told them to send a hundred men to this picnic. Damned if it didn't turn out that there were five or six colored men. Well we heard about that. But it was an oversight. Off the post we simply must comply with civilian regulations.

The existence of integration on the post sometimes leads officers to heightened awareness of unequal facilities in the post town:

(Special service officer): We have asked the post special service officer to do something about setting up some kind of recreation in ——— (name of town) for the colored. The townspeople there refused to recognize it as a problem. It seems the civil authorities for the colored communities have not done anything. The project to provide something in town was given to the post officer by the General.

A notable example of good handling of a delicate situation is reported by a high ranking officer on a Southern integrated post.

(Colonel, division staff officer): At present we have no post school for children of the families of Army men. We have in the unit a colored sergeant whose child was of school age. He was forced to send his child to the segregated grade school for Negro children. He came to me with the story that the school was in a deplorable state, so I decided to investigate myself. Well, when I got to this school, I was completely flabbergasted. The physical plant was not bad in itself, but the facilities had never been completed. For water the whole school relied upon an open spring across the road. It was located at the base of a large ravine. Up on the slopes were several Negro shacks with their outhouses so located that the drainage could only flow towards the spring. Now there was a good size well dug and cemented in near the school, yet for some time now this new well had not been put into operation, because the pipes had never been connected! A cafeteria was operating without water except for what could be carried from the spring . . . temporary latrines had been set up . . . indescribably filthy and

crude. I was shocked by it all. . . . But when I went to the superintendent of schools he gave me to understand that the Army was not running his school system! I had the post surgeon induce the county health officer to inspect the school. The health officer offered every conceivable excuse. Finally when he ran out, he accompanied the post surgeon on an inspection tour. . . . I heard that corrective measures were being taken, and I more or less forgot the matter till Christmas time. The school superintendent invited me out to dinner given on the last day before Christmas vacation. I was surprised at how much improvement had been made. The spring was closed, toilets in good order, well and well house operating, and there seemed to be a general sprucing up of the whole place.

One additional problem, unique to the integrated situation, has been reported earlier. It relates to the participation of white girls at post dances where Negroes may be present.

By and large, however, the existence of integration on the post presents no new problems of serious consequence in the community.

Awareness in the community of integration in the Army does not seem to affect the over-all relations between the post and nearby civilians.

(Negro EM): In these little towns the white people just don't want the colored soldier in some parts of the town. The cops are bad. They will arrest a soldier on any pretext.

(Negro EM): We have most of the trouble with white people on the buses and these old cracker police, who want to be always whipping on some Negro's head.

Civil authorities often welcome the services of Negro MPs, provided that these MPs are restricted to contact with Negroes.

(Provost marshal): We never had the colored work in the white area. They work in the colored area alone . . . with the colored civil police.

(Mayor of town): We have colored MP's. I told them at the camp, that if it ever would involve a colored MP and a white Southerner, there would be bloodshed. They did send some in. But they hang out with the white police. They go over if no white is involved. Otherwise they stay out. It has worked out fine, but the colored MP's have made no attempt to patrol the sidewalk. We wouldn't accept that at all. I told them at the post to rather leave them out of town altogether than to send them in. We are delighted to have colored MPs come in on a limited basis though.

The informal or formal rules of the Army may require a modification of customary patterns of civilian segregation:

(Negro noncom): We were on the bus the other day and the driver asked us to go to the rear. Since there were few of us, we moved, but as soon as the bus entered the gate, we moved back up front. I sat right behind the driver just to watch the cracker burn up. He couldn't say anything as long as we were on the post.

(Negro cadreman): I saw this happen not long ago. The bus was very crowded with soldiers standing in the aisles. The ——— division was on guard duty. They had to have all of the soldiers get off the bus in order to check them. When the checking was over they tried to keep the Negro soldiers back until all the white boys got on first. The Negro soldiers started raising a fuss. Many of the white boys joined in to help them. They would have had some trouble if an officer had not come along and noticed that trouble was about to start. He got out of his car to find out what was going on and ordered the guards to take the soldiers in their turn. The old dixiecrats were really burned up.

A marked contradiction between the demands of military courtesy and the concrete situation which the Negro officer faces in the community can be observed. On the post the Negro officer is expected, in his relations with enlisted men, to insist upon the respect due his rank. In the South, respect for his uniform as well as his person is often subordinate to the prevailing attitudes of the community towards Negroes. It is hard to assess whether the incongruous status of the Negro officer affects his relationships to white enlisted men and fellow officers.

(Negro dental officer): Well, I have my own car, but I know that the buses are supposed to leave the camp unsegregated. A captain who was formerly here as dental officer did have an incident

with a bus driver. There was a crowd of soldiers waiting for a bus and there was no line. But when the captain went to get on the bus, the driver told him that he would have to get in line. The soldiers formed a line and there were two in front of the captain. The bus driver looked over the bus and said he could only take two more passengers. He left the captain standing there. He came back to the house, and I drove him in to the camp.

As in the case of the Northern camps, efforts to avoid interracial conflict in town almost without exception involve limiting the opportunities for personal contact between Negroes and whites.* This limitation may be either self-imposed, or set by official policy on the post or in town. The Negro dental officer just quoted, when questioned if he ever got into town with white officers remarked: "No, I never have, but I have been asked several times. I know they can go some places in town where I can't go so I always decline in order to avoid any embarrassing situations."

A Negro owner of a popular night club, when asked if white soldiers frequent his club, replies, "I don't allow them to mix in my club."

Civilians recognize that Army rules are paramount in the Army's sphere; at the same time they expect military personnel while off the post to conform to local laws and customs.

Comments from white staff officers at a completely integrated Southern post point this up.

(Colonel): How do people feel about integrated units? They don't complain as long as the rules and customs in town are obeyed.

(Lieutenant colonel): So far as the town is concerned, there are two USOs, one for colored, one for white. The churches in town coordinate their programs, but that's all segregated. In town we do as the Romans do.

The white townspeople themselves bear this out.

(White mayor of the town): Everybody in town knows it (referring to post integration), of course, but that applies only to the camp. We have a state law here, and that law is adhered to strictly. The nigger soldiers just naturally drift to their own sections — they know what it's all about. As far as I know, they keep to themselves.

(White director of recreation): So far as what the Army does, the community doesn't care. Only the community won't stand tampering with its customary way of treating the colored.

(White city commissioner): The people figure it's the Army's business. Just as long as they adhere to the state laws of segregation.

Negro soldiers and civilians also indicate their awareness that integration on the post implies no change in the privileges accorded them by the community:

(Negro lieutenant): When you get into town, it is the same old pattern that most know about. We have complete mixing on the post, but when you go into the city, it's just the same old story.

(Negro lieutenant): We don't go into town together (white and Negro officers). When we go into town, we know what we are faced with. That's part of the problem. . . . Well, I can't see that the presence of the post will bring many changes to the community, although the community depends greatly on the trade from the camp.

(Negro college dean): The people, I think, generally know what's going on. They're not too much disturbed about it. I mean both Negro and white groups. That is the amazing thing about this business. There is great hesitation about putting such a policy into operation because of many grave and unfounded fears. But once it is put into operation, there is usually very little trouble.

Towns located near segregated posts, on the other hand, display reactions no different from those just cited:

(Mayor of the town): They (the townspeople) don't have much knowledge about what the Army is doing. . . . I don't think there should be any more mixing than there is at this time. We like the situation the way it is.

* It will be recalled that off-duty contact between white and Negro trainees in the South is actually less at the end of the training cycle than at the beginning.

(White civic leader): All of the facilities are separate. A separate place is given them in theaters. They have separate entrances in the bars. They are not allowed to eat in down-town places. . . . I can't see any change in this town since I have been here. None due to the presence of the Fort. When the colored come to town, they conform to the way we do things.

Summary

Problems met in post-community relations are those which stem from other factors than the presence of Negro troops or the practice of integration.

The evidence supports the belief that a segregated community and an integrated post can exist side by side without special problems. This may be attributed to the fact that the range of relationships between Negroes and whites in civilian life are so extensive that a remarkable degree of adaptability and accommodation has been achieved by both groups. The shift from an integrated post to a segregated community appears no more difficult for a Negro soldier than the adjustments required of a Southern white soldier who is assigned to a mixed unit for the first time.

POLICY INTERPRETATIONS AND PRACTICES IN THE USE OF NEGRO TROOPS

Repeated references have already been made to the varicty of practices in the Army's use of Negro troops. The present chapter considers how actual practice is related to the understanding, by troop commanders and their men, of Department of the Army policy. This policy is set forth in SR 600-629-1.

1. Policy. — The policy of the Department of the Army is that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Army without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. All manpower will be utilized to obtain maximum efficiency in the Army.

The very fact that the Army contains both mixed and segregated units means that policy on the use of Negro troops is seen and experienced in different ways. Thus there is




Fig. B7—Judgments on What Army Policy Is Regarding the Assignment of Negro Troops

a sharp cleavage of opinion, between men in integrated and segregated organizations, on the question of what official policy is. The existence of such divergent notions on so important a matter is indicative of the confusion which exists throughout the Army with respect to the use of Negro troops. This confusion is documented dramatically in Table B61. It should be noted that the divergent statements were made following announcement of the DA policy and during the progressive transition from all-Negro units to integrated units.

TABLE B61

TROOPS BELIEVING OFFICIAL ARMY POLICY IS TO ASSIGN SOLDIERS TO OUTFITS WITHOUT REGARD TO COLOR

Respondents by units	Northern origin, %	Southern origin, %
White troops		
Trainees in integrated units (3–31% Negro)	75	71
Trainees in National Guard units[a]	50	48
Soldiers in TO&E units in North	41	—
Soldiers in TO&E units in South	21	26
Soldiers in all-white TD units	23	23
Soldiers in integrated TD units	58	65
National Guardsmen in Northern NG division in South	19	—
National Guardsmen in Southern NG division in South[a]	—	75
National Guardsmen in Southern NG unit in North	—	36
Negro troops		
Trainees in integrated units (3–31% Negro)	57	63
Soldiers in TO&E units	37	42
Soldiers in all-Negro TD units	—	59
Soldiers in integrated TD units	—	76

[a] Many of the National Guard trainees are on a post where there is an integrated training division. This accounts for the fact that more National Guard trainees than TO&E men believe that the Army policy is one of integration. For the same reason, the Southern National Guardsmen on this post in the South believe integration is the Army policy, while the Northern National Guardsmen (on a post housing segregated units) do not believe this. For the Southern Guardsmen, moreover, this is an important issue on which they do not expect their own preferences to prevail.

It is apparent that men generally believe Department of the Army policy to be whatever they have experienced at first hand in their own unit — segregated or mixed.* Since soldiers might be expected to conform to policy — whatever they think it to be — this finding helps to explain the acceptance of integration where it has taken place, and at the same time, the opposition to it in segregated installations.

SR 600-629-1 has, in practice, numerous meanings which derive from the judgment, temperament and experience of local commanders, from the particular situations that they encounter, and from the latitude of interpretation offered by the policy statement itself. For practical purposes, these meanings can best be observed camp by camp.

In the present study, statements were obtained at each of the ten installations from the commanding officer or his immediate subordinates, and from GIs, regarding their understanding of DA policy. In addition, interviews were obtained with other officers directly concerned with the implementation of policy. The remainder of this section reports on what SR 600-629-1 is understood to mean in three major installations. The objective, in choosing these three, is to illustrate the *range* of understanding and practice found in the present study. All three installations are in the deep South. One of the posts

* It is to be noted that a higher proportion of Negroes than of white trainees consider segregation to be the main Army policy, even though they are now in mixed units. This finding reflects the attention paid in the Negro community to the subject of segregation in the Army.

houses two divisions, one of which occupies a separate sector, enjoys substantial autonomy, and has no Negro troops. For the purposes of the comparison, this division is excluded.

Interpretation of DA policy on the use of Negro manpower ranges from interpretations consistently favoring *segregation* in the first installation and *varied* interpretations of policy in the second, to interpretations consistently favoring *integration* in the case of the third. These labels typify the diversity of interpretation and practice in the ten posts visited. In a very general way the understanding of Department of the Army policy in these installations may be characterized as follows: (a) consistent segregation interpretations and practices, two installations; (b) varied policy interpretations and practices, three installations; and (c) consistent integration interpretations and practices, five installations.

POST A: CONSISTENT SEGREGATION INTERPRETATIONS AND PRACTICES

Interpretations of DA Policy

Post A has a total strength of approximately 20,000 officers and men, of whom approximately 16 percent are Negroes. The major unit on the post is a TO&E division.

Top level informants making statements on official policy are the commanding general, the chief of staff, the G-2, G-4, and G-1. Their statements follow, in scrambled order:

[Q: How do the colored troops come to be in separate units?]

By the organizational plan of the Department of the Army.

There was no choice — it was separate units.

The policy is one of separation. It is one of a unit of colored within a larger white unit.

These are all-colored units — by Department of Army policy. On this chart the colored units are started. The organizational plan was given us by the Department of Army.

The solution is coming from Washington — Integration is coming.

Officers commanding Negro troops were also asked about Army policy. Their answers follow:

(A white colonel commanding both white and Negro units): I have never seen a policy statement on the way men are distributed. What we have here is segregation by unit.

(White commander of a Negro company): They are going to integrate them.

(White lieutenant, Negro unit): Keep them separate in all-colored units.

(Commander of an all-Negro battalion, commenting on all-Negro units): It's not my policy. I believe it goes back to the Department of the Army.

Among the officers interviewed at this installation, only the two Negro officers mention integration as *present* DA policy:

The policy as stated publicly by the Department of the Army is that troops should be mixed into the same units.

The policy is to mix the troops of all races into the same units.

These officers, the lowest in ranking among those quoted, obviously have a special interest in public statement of policy relating to Negroes. Except for them, the statements reflect substantial unanimity on what DA policy is. It may be inferred that the commander of this installation has at one time or another clearly stated his understanding of DA policy on the utilization of Negro manpower, and that his officers have understood him. The commanding general does not interpret SR 600-629-1 as superseding other policies or arrangements. He is explicit on this point when he says: "I want integration because I've

seen it work in Europe and have had it work in my command, but an integrated division is the responsibility of the Department of the Army."

The feeling of several officers that "integration is coming" or that it will be the policy, therefore, is not inconsistent with the general understanding at Post A. Integration is seen as an experimental aspect of DA policy which, in the view of the commanding general, has proved successful. But segregation is recognized unequivocally as current operating policy.

Practices

Practices Relating to the Accomplishment of the Training Mission. Assignment of Negroes to separate units is in keeping with traditional Army policy. Its implications for the accomplishment of the training mission may be reported briefly:

(Post commander): My officers take a beating in the colored units. *No* officer wants to be assigned to a colored outfit. What can they gain? They can hope to bring a unit up to satisfactory — a low rating indeed.... I am removing seven from one battalion right this week. That is a drastic step and those I send in may do no better.

(CofS): We have to send our best officers there (to colored units) and they are lucky to come away with a satisfactory rating.

(Former CofS, about to leave for an assignment overseas): All I can say is, lord deliver me from an all-colored unit in combat.

Practices Relating to Housekeeping and Recreation. There is substantial unanimity on DA policy, insofar as TO&E units are concerned. Separation for duty, rations, and quarters follows automatically when Negroes are assigned to separate units. But this policy is not understood to extend to schools, or to the station complement. Small numbers of Negro troops are integrated in these units. In the use of post facilities, clubs, PXs, swimming pools, etc., informal segregation has been practiced in the past, but integration is being introduced.

(Post commander): Up until a little over a month ago, the post policy with regard to recreation facilities was to specify which would be white and which Negro. Without any fanfare and advance publicity, I put out a directive that cut that out completely. There is no official segregation in any recreational facilities. I didn't advertise it — just put out the order. The other day I stopped at the ——— swimming pool (formerly white); there were about 60 percent white swimming with about 40 percent colored.

In summary, the command of Post A follows what it understands as DA policy by keeping TO&E units segregated. The performance of colored units and the morale of their officers is low. In the use of post facilities, areas in which the post commander feels that he has autonomy in making policy, some integration is being introduced.

POST B: VARIED POLICY INTERPRETATIONS AND PRACTICES

Interpretations of DA Policy

Post B houses approximately 44,000 officers and men, of whom approximately 15 percent are Negroes. The major unit on the post is a TO&E division.

Top-level officers making statements on official policy are the deputy post commander, the post G-1, the chief of staff of a unit higher than regimental level, the assistant post G-1, the commanding officer of special troops, and an HQ artillery officer. Their statements follow in scrambled order:

The official policy is nonsegregation and integration to the extent that the colored are qualified in MOS. None of the station lists of units carry any race designation. But there are in fact separate colored units. We simply recognize that fact in making assignments.

We simply follow the designations of the Department of the Army. These units are designated by the Department of the Army as white or colored, and we conform by sending fillers in conforming with Department of the Army designations.

General Army policy is to integrate by units. There is an understanding that white units stay white. . . . The Army has issued no specific instructions on integration. I know Mr. Truman made a statement, but the Secretary of the Army didn't.

The Army policy is to assign by qualification, but the Department of the Army hasn't seen fit to follow it up. As recently as last month, Department of the Army was directing Negro units to be sent up.

The Army says put soldiers all on an equal basis, same as officers.

"No segregation" has been announced as official Army policy. It may be official, but it isn't being done.

Officers commanding Negro troops responded as follows:

(White officer, in a Negro artillery battalion): The Army's official policy is a unit type of organization.

(Negro company commander): The Army's official policy is that there is to be no discriminatory treatment given to any soldier. Each is supposed to get what is coming to him and what is due to him.

(Another Negro company commander): I read the Army circular relative to integration which came out December, 1950. But I don't think much has been done about it here.

(Negro chaplain): I think the Army desires to exhibit complete integration as far as the races are concerned, but this appears to be a policy only on paper.

There is no unanimity of opinion at Post B as to the meaning of DA policy on the utilization of Negro manpower. Thus, on this post, DA policy, interpreted either as one of integration or one of segregation, is not, for practical purposes, functioning as a unifying factor. The practices and procedures relating to Negro soldiers show a corresponding confusion.

Practices

Practices Relating to the Accomplishment of the Training Mission.

(Staff officer): The ——— Division is short on white ———. We have an average of 1800 colored ——— (same MOS), but we can't use them as fillers in white units. We have critical MOS shortages in a Signal outfit. We have colored men with those MOSs but we can't use them. We work pretty hard to run one Army. But the way things are, we have to try to run two, white and colored.

[Q.: Suppose the post had a substantial surplus of colored personnel in a critical MOS and a shortage of white personnel in that same MOS?] In such a case, there would be no alternative but to supply white units from colored availabilities.

(Major, artillery): Colonel ——— who has most of the colored under his command, asked Negroes to sign up where they qualify for special jobs. He wanted to put them in white units. Nothing came of it that I have seen. But HQ *did* make an effort to get the colored in.

(White battalion commander of Negro unit): We have units that are 100 percent overstrength. The men are falling all over themselves. This creates problems — the crowding, and the lack of enough to do. . . . The battalion commanders of both white and colored units discussed this problem of unequal strength. The white units agreed to take some of them if it could be arranged. . . . The battalion commanding officer of the ——— is from Florida. He is for integration. The CO of the ———, an all-white unit, was willing to take Negro troops, and he's from Mississippi. . . . This is a pure matter of dollars and cents, and efficiency. This is no social uplift . . . I don't know. All I know is that nothing came of it.

(White officer in Negro unit): To tell the truth, I'm terrified at the thought that I might have to take this outfit into battle.

It appears from the above sequence of statements that confusion on policy with respect to Negro manpower has a direct impact on the manner in which the training mission is being accomplished.

Practices Relating to Duty, Rations, and Quarters.

(BOQ orderly, to a member of the research team): There were two colored officers in here not long ago and the major said to go ahead and sign them in. They went over to eat and some colonel complained. It went clear to the general, and I got chewed out for about four hours. Now your two colored doctors are coming in and I have orders to sign them in. Can you figure that out, sir?

(Executive officer of a small specialized unit): We've been integrated for two years. We've had no trouble. One newspaper reported that we had separate barracks. That's true. But we didn't order them. It was optional. About a year and a half ago we gave our troops some orientation and allowed them to make a choice. They chose to sleep white with white and colored with colored, with a few exceptions.

An enlisted man in this last unit reports that white and Negro soldiers sleep at opposite ends of the same floor, but that they share a latrine. These men work, eat, and use the latrine together, but sleep separately.

In the hospital, the policy is one of complete integration. Practice appears to conform with policy. Informally, two Negro officers are assigned adjacent rooms with adjoining bath whenever possible "so that a white officer will not have to share a bathroom with a colored officer." These officers work, eat, and sleep together, but have separate latrines.

(Commandant of a specialist training school): In a year of completely integrated operation, we have had no problem. We put them in the barracks alphabetically. . . . I'm not interested in a man's color. I'm interested in whether he can produce. Black, white, Chinese, Indian, or anything else, if he don't produce he gets the hell out of here. We're busy. This unit appears to be completely integrated in duty, rations, and quarters.

(Negro MP): The colored MPs have their own sleeping quarters, mess and NCO mess . . . they don't work so much in the white area on the post. They cover the colored part of the camp. We have a (colored) first sergeant in there on the desk right now who has eight men working under his orders. He is good. Those white men respect him just like they would any other officers.

All MPs report to a Negro first sergeant at MP headquarters. But outside of MP headquarters, Negro MPs are separate for duty, rations, and quarters.

(Provost marshal): We couldn't work without the colored MPs. There are places where I couldn't send the white boys. There are about three zones we have to cover where I won't send the white boys. . . . You see this area: This is all where the ——— Negroes are located. In this other area are the ——— Negroes. This area in between is "no man's land," and we have to keep that heavily patroled or there will be trouble. This is trouble between troops themselves.

(Staff officer): We have some trouble between white and colored, but we have more trouble between colored and colored.

Statements to this effect are heard repeatedly. In one instance it is reported that Negro troops got transportation and traveled 30 miles for a gang fight with other Negro troops. No informant states that conflict between whites and Negroes equals or exceeds conflict among Negroes themselves.

Although Negro troops make up approximately 15 percent of the total strength, they constitute about 30 percent of the prisoners in the stockade, and they make up approximately 66 percent of the reported cases of venereal disease.

(White commander of a Negro company): Sure my VD rate is high. . . . But when they put a joint off limits, it doesn't stay off.

(Provost marshal): Oh, all of those places have definitely been closed. The rates are so low here that there is practically no problem. Those places where there is any prostitution or anything like that are not allowed to operate.

(Post VD-control officer, Negro): There aren't adequate facilities for recreation on the post; there are no decent places in town. To declare those places (outside of city limits) off limits would be to place a great hardship on the colored soldiers.

This officer adds that the VD is contracted, not in houses of prostitution, but in casual pickups. No informant maintains that Negro soldiers had adequate recreation facilities off the post.

Practices Relating to Post Recreation Facilities. Recreational facilities are not segregated by specific order. But since Negro troops are housed in a separate area, they are expected to use the theater and the clubs in that area. Occasionally, for big stage shows or comparable events, the audience approaches 50 percent Negro and 50 percent white. Segregation is enforced in dancing, but members of one race sometimes drift into a dance for the other race, and are permitted to stay as "nondancers." The few attempts of Negroes to dance at white dances have been handled by pointing out "that they had a place to go and we would appreciate it if they would go there." If this suggestion is not effective, special services representatives report the offending soldier to his company commander.

(Special services officer): When the West Point cadets were here about a year ago, there were only three Negroes who went to the dance. They danced and nobody seemed to mind. It seems that they feel that they are a higher type. When we set up the policy of letting colored swim, about two years ago, we specified no dependents. That way there would be no girls around in bathing suits, so there would be no trouble.

Informal pressure is successful, with minor exceptions, in keeping the officers' clubs segregated. Athletic teams have both Negro and white members. The post exchanges are used by both Negroes and whites.

(White infantryman): Hell, we swim with them, they're on our boxing and basketball teams . . . but we sleep in separate quarters and have separate dances. It's all mixed up to me, but I guess that's the Army's way.

(Negro MP): If we're integrated we're integrated; if we're separated, we're separated. Why all this messing around?

Practices Relating to Family Housing on the Post. The range in the quality of family housing is from excellent to very poor. This is true in the case of white housing as well as of Negro housing. Most Negro families are housed in a separate area. A few are integrated. Facilities appear to be approximately equal.

In summary, the absence of clear-cut, uniform policy at Post B results in a patchwork of contradictory opinions and practices.

POST C: CONSISTENT INTEGRATION INTERPRETATIONS AND PRACTICES

Interpretations of DA Policy

Post C houses a training division with a total strength of approximately 17,000 officers and men, of whom approximately 25 percent are Negroes.

Top-level informants making statements on official policy are the commanding general and the G-1. Their statements follow:

The Department of the Army says we will take men as they come without regard to color.

The Department of the Army says men are to be rated by mental aptitude and physical profile — those two things. Color is out.

Officers at unit level, none of whom commands only Negro troops at this installation, comment on official policy:

(Lieutenant): Integration of colored soldiers and white soldiers, so full use can be made of both.

(Lieutenant colonel recently arrived): I believe they are changing. At first the policy was to place them in separate units. Now I believe they're changing.

(Captain): Integration is political. President Truman is paying off political grudges.

(Lieutenant): I believe they see the need for mixing. They see it does make for a better unit.

(Negro officer): Brother, this is Army policy and whatever is stated as policy and is stated in a clear uncompromising fashion, it will be carried out.

Practices

Practices Relating to the Accomplishment of the Training Mission. The divisional chief of staff (from Georgia) amplifies the last statement when he says:

The nigger problem has been handled beyond anyone's possible expectations, anyone's hopes. We don't discuss it around here any more because there's nothing to discuss. We aren't having any trouble. Why should we waste time talking about it? Most of my officers are from the South, and there isn't an officer in this division — not a single one that won't back up our program.

The picture at Post C is quite clear. The policy is one of integration, and it is effective. In the words of the commanding general, "It works. It is working, and it will continue to work."

The unambiguous purpose at the command level lends an element of military discipline to the relations of Negroes and whites. This contributes substantially to the success of the policy in practice. There was resistance to the integration program at first.

(Divisional staff officer): Oh, hell, yes. Officers said it wouldn't work. My enlisted men and officers were sure there would be trouble. I heard predictions of bloody riots, killings, rape, and every damn thing else.

[Q.: What happened?] Not a damn thing. By and large the whole post has been without incidents which were anything more than individual affairs.

The objective of the command at Post C is to accomplish an assigned job within the limits of military directives. The enthusiasm expressed at staff level is tempered among those lower in rank who are closer to the process of actually living and working with Negroes. It is at the company level that the observer becomes conscious of the importance of firm policy to success in practice.

(A noncom from South Carolina): I don't think it's too bad a thing. Naturally white people would rather be to themselves, but this is the Army. If they have to fight together someday, they might as well get used to them right now.

(Another noncom): You know, sir, I'm from Tennessee and I don't approve of this mixing, but by God, it does seem to work.

Practices Relating to Housekeeping and Recreational Activities. Duty, rations, and quarters are, of course, integrated. Although there are occasional objections to integration among draftees, this dissatisfaction is effectively neutralized by military discipline. If there were any tensions between Negroes and whites, it might reasonably be expected to show itself in situations where direct military supervision is absent. There is no evidence of such a reaction. A moderate number of interracial friendships are reported, and fights between Negroes and white men occur no more often proportionately than quarrels within each group. In off-duty activities, there is an unregulated and flexible "self-segregation." Although no orders to this effect have been issued, each service club has become primarily white or primarily Negro. A few Negroes can usually be seen in "white" clubs. A few white men can usually be seen in "colored" clubs. The only clear understanding on segregation appears to be that men of one race shall not dance with women of the other race. All other post activities, including swimming, are integrated. Men are free to associate with, or to avoid members of the other race. They do so with a minimum of rancor or self-consciousness.

In summary, Post C demonstrates a firmly implemented policy of integration.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The reports which have just been presented illustrate the wide diversity of practices which are currently in force within the framework of the same Army policy. It is to be noted that all of the three posts which have been described in detail are in the deep South; the differences noted cannot be ascribed to regional customs.

Among the ten posts visited, even greater variations in procedure may be found. A few Negro clerks and drivers are integrated in the headquarters of a "segregated" post. Complete integration is found in a small special unit on a "confused" post. Vestiges of segregation are seen in the most thoroughly "integrated" post. These details illuminate the inconsistencies in DA policy as it is understood and implemented.

Neither of the two generals who understand DA policy to be one of segregation report any confidence in the caliber of all-Negro units. They have such units because they understand that they have been ordered to have them, not because they want them. Officers regard their assignment to Negro units as a "tough challenge." The utilization of Negro manpower in these situations may be characterized as a determined and soldierly attempt to fulfill an assigned mission for which no one holds high hopes.

In the installations which have been characterized as confused in their understanding of Army policy, all of the disadvantages cited are present, and contradictions, evasions, and false hopes are added. In these situations, there are flat contradictions in adjacent functions of command at the staff level. Important decisions on policy are made in terms of caprice and expediency, by personnel ranging from staff officers to noncoms.

(Negro EM): Last Saturday we could go swimming. It was part of our training too. We walked two miles in the hot sun to the swimming pool . . . and found it full of white kids. We were told that we could not come in. . . . We was all hot as hell from the heat and from not being allowed in swimming.

In the installations where DA policy is understood to be one of integration, opinion at staff and command levels is uniformly optimistic. The educational and cultural differences between white and Negro troops may call for some adjustments on the part of both groups, but this takes place without friction. There are no major problems.

In summary, it is evident that there is no general, clear-cut understanding of policy on the use of Negro troops, either on the part of enlisted men or of officers. Commanders of troops exercise wide latitude in making and enforcing interpretations of policy on a matter of great importance to the functioning of the Army.

REVIEW OF THE MAJOR FINDINGS

The principal findings of this research parallel those reported in the study of US troops in Korea:

1. There is virtually complete agreement throughout the Army that Negroes should be given the same kinds of jobs as white soldiers.

2. Integration of white and Negro troops has proceeded smoothly, without incidents or major problems, in those units where it is in effect.

3. It is the consensus of opinion among officers that Negroes perform most efficiently in mixed* units.

4. Negroes themselves almost unanimously favor integration.

5. While white enlisted men are more sharply divided in their opinions, only a minority of Northerners, and a minority of Southerners in mixed* units, say they object strongly to serving with Negro troops.

6. White officers and enlisted men who have experienced integration are more favorable to it than are those who have not. Thus the Army itself, through its decisions as to whether or not particular organizations shall be integrated, controls the conditions which make attitudes more or less favorable. Even the minority of objectors are not a source of difficulty in mixed* units, since they tend to withdraw from contact with individual Negroes, and to conform to military discipline.

7. Integration eliminates some of the strain on leadership which is present in the all-Negro unit, and distributes the rest of the burden. Within the framework of military courtesy and discipline, white enlisted men follow the directions of Negro leaders in mixed* units, without the appearance of any special problems.

Besides corroborating the findings of the Korean study for troops in the continental US, the present research has produced the following pertinent information:

8. Under conditions of integration, the attitudes of white soldiers are most favorable when Negroes are in a minority, as they normally are in the population. Where Negroes are actually in a majority, the attitudes of whites are least favorable. However, these men are still no more hostile to integration than are whites in segregated units. Even in these relatively unusual instances of "reverse integration," there is no indication of conflict or of a breakdown in functioning. Officers in mixed* units are much more liberal in estimating the ratio at which the presence of Negroes lowers efficiency or creates problems than are officers in segregated units.

9. White enlisted men's ratings of unit performance and morale are no lower in integrated units than in segregated ones. There is no indication from the available evidence that the proportion of Negroes in an integrated training unit is related to its performance as rated by regimental commanders.

10. Differences of opinion on racial questions are more pronounced between Northern and Southern white soldiers in the US than in the combat zone.

*Integrated.

11. The problems of integration in the activated National Guard units are not substantially different from those in TO&E organizations. While Southern Guardsmen are hostile to integration, their attitudes resemble those of Southerners in white TO&E units (and the opinions of Southerners as well as of Northerners are favorably influenced by the experience of integration). It must be noted that Guardsmen will soon form a dwindling minority of the personnel in the Guard units. The non-Guardsmen in these units are, in their origins and background, much like the trainees in training divisions, who show the least opposition to integration.

12. Attitudes on the sharing of post facilities by Negroes and whites vary according to the actual practices with which men are familiar. In instances where all post facilities are open both to Negro and white enlisted men, there is no evidence of any special problems arising, even in the Deep South. The one type of situation which is most often mentioned as likely to create tension — the case of mixed couples at social dancing in the South — is almost never encountered, even where free access is permitted to all facilities.

13. Problems involving the Negro soldier in the small community, Northern or Southern, are primarily problems of inadequate recreational facilities. Integration does not appear to create new problems in the relations between military authorities and the residents of Southern communities. There is not very much awareness or concern with the subject in these communities.

14. DA policy on the use of Negro personnel is not understood by troops, Negro and white, except insofar as they generalize from the practices on their particular posts. These practices differ widely, and reveal a high degree of confusion on the subject among troop commanders. The absence of a clearly understood policy results in inequity and efficiency.

15. Adoption by the Army of a policy of full-scale integration may be expected to produce problems during the transitional period, in certain kinds of situations (for example, where there is a heavy concentration of Negroes in specialized units, or where there is a local tradition of tension and conflicts). There is every reason to believe that these problems can be successfully met by careful planning.

REFERENCE TABLES

TABLE B62

AGE OF WHITE SOLDIERS IN TO&E AND TD UNITS

Ages of respondents	TO&E units		Segregated TD units		Integrated TD units	
	752 Northerners, %	321 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	156 Northerners, %	180 Southerners, %
17 years or less	4	2	0	2	3	2
18	8	11	6	4	7	4
19	9	11	4	25	8	7
20	13	17	0	4	12	7
21	23	24	10	10	14	6
22–25	38	26	56	17	39	29
26–30	4	4	17	20	6	17
31–35	1	3	4	10	7	13
36–45	0	2	3	8	3	13
Over 45	0	0	0	0	1	2

TABLE B63

AGE OF WHITE SOLDIERS IN NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

Ages of respondents	Northern National Guard units			Southern National Guard units		
	148 National Guardsmen, %	145 other Northerners, %	42 other Southerners, %	146 National Guardsmen, %	36 other Southerners, %	256 other Northerners, %
17 years or less	0	0	0	2	3	1
18	5	2	7	8	3	3
19	12	5	5	12	6	5
20	22	7	14	10	8	7
21	23	23	38	22	52	33
22–25	31	61	36	29	28	51
26–30	7	1	0	8	0	0
31–35	0	0	0	8	0	0
36–45	0	1	0	1	0	0
Over 45	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE B64

MARITAL STATUS OF WHITE SOLDIERS IN TO&E AND TD UNITS

Respondents' marital statuses	TO&E units		Segregated TD units		Integrated TD units	
	752 Northerners, %	321 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	156 Northerners, %	180 Southerners, %
Married	14	19	25	40	38	58
Single	84	77	74	58	60	38
Divorced, separated, or widowed	2	3	1	2	1	3
No answer	0	1	0	0	1	1

TABLE B65

MARITAL STATUS OF WHITE SOLDIERS IN NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

Respondents' marital statuses	Northern National Guard units			Southern National Guard units		
	148 National Guardsmen, %	145 other Northerners, %	42 other Southerners, %	146 National Guardsmen, %	36 other Southerners, %	256 other Northerners, %
Married	26	13	14	49	8	16
Single	74	85	84	49	92	83
Divorced, separated, or widowed	0	1	2	1	0	1
No answer	0	1	0	1	0	0

TABLE B66

TYPE OF ENLISTMENT OF WHITE SOLDIERS IN TO&E AND TD UNITS

Respondents' enlistment types	TO&E units		Segregated TD units		Integrated TD units	
	752 Northerners, %	321 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	156 Northerners, %	180 Southerners, %
Draftees	53	47	62	12	23	16
Regular Army men	40	42	37	84	65	61
Enlisted Reservists	7	11	1	4	12	23

TABLE B67

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF WHITE SOLDIERS IN TO&E AND TD UNITS

Extent of respondents' schooling	TO&E units		Segregated TD units		Integrated TD units	
	752 Northerners, %	321 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	156 Northerners, %	180 Southerners, %
Did not finish grade school	5	13	1	10	6	8
Graduated from 8th grade	12	21	10	36	13	18
Some high school, but did not finish	32	30	37	29	36	34
Graduated from high school	36	25	31	21	32	23
Some college, but did not finish	12	7	14	4	8	12
Graduated from college	2	2	6	0	2	1
Postgraduate study	0	2	1	0	3	3
No answer	1	0	0	0	0	1

TABLE B68

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF WHITE SOLDIERS IN NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

Extent of respondents' schooling	Northern National Guard units			Southern National Guard units		
	148 National Guardsmen, %	145 other Northerners, %	42 other Southerners, %	146 National Guardsmen, %	36 other Southerners, %	256 other Northerners, %
Did not finish grade school	3	4	12	3	6	4
Graduated from 8th grade	11	6	10	11	3	6
Some high school, but did not finish	15	22	24	31	30	27
Graduated from high school	58	51	42	38	36	50
Some college, but did not finish	11	14	10	15	17	11
Graduated from college	2	3	2	1	0	2
Postgraduate study	0	0	0	1	3	0
No answer	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE B69

ESTIMATES OF UNIT MORALE BY WHITE SOLDIERS IN TO&E AND TD UNITS

Quality of unit morale	TO&E units		Segregated TD units		Integrated TD units	
	752 Northerners, %	321 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	156 Northerners, %	180 Southerners, %
Very high	11	14	8	12	16	27
High	27	27	20	36	38	37
Just so-so	40	40	44	31	32	30
Low	13	8	18	4	10	2
Very low	9	11	10	17	4	4

TABLE B70

ESTIMATES OF UNIT MORALE BY WHITE SOLDIERS IN NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

Quality of unit morale	Northern National Guard units			Southern National Guard units		
	148 National Guardsmen, %	145 other Northerners, %	42 other Southerners, %	146 National Guardsmen, %	36 other Southerners, %	256 other Northerners, %
Very high	10	7	19	24	22	5
High	39	35	21	33	25	22
Just so-so	30	33	32	22	31	39
Low	12	17	7	10	11	17
Very low	9	8	21	11	11	17

TABLE B71

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG WHITE INDUCTEES AND TRAINEES AT EARLY AND LATE STAGES OF THE TRAINING CYCLE

Answers	Three Northern and Western camps						One Southern camp			
	Inductees		Early trainees		Late trainees		Early trainees		Late trainees	
	193 Northerners, %	115 Southerners, %	245 Northerners, %	188 Southerners, %	430 Northerners, %	86 Southerners, %	98 Northerners, %	92 Southerners, %	224 Northerners, %	38 Southerners, %
I object to it strongly.	5	36	10	22	5	26	7	39	14	55
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	25	37	33	36	26	38	20	33	47	34
It makes no difference to me.	54	23	46	35	59	29	58	21	36	11
I like it.	14	0	10	6	9	1	11	6	1	0
No answer	2	4	1	1	1	6	4	1	2	0

TABLE B72

FEELINGS TOWARD NEGROES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION IN ALL-WHITE UNITS[a]

Attitudes toward platoon integration	Like Negro soldiers very much		Like Negro soldiers fairly well		Don't like Negro soldiers		Hate Negro soldiers	
	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %
TO&E units								
(Number respondents)	(76)	(17)	(505)	(198)	(135)	(97)	(10)	(23)
I object to it strongly.	8	30	27	62	76	84	(9)	96
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	26	30	40	27	22	12	(1)	4
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	66	40	33	11	2	4	0	0
TD units								
(Number respondents)	(6)	(6)	(73)	(34)	(5)	(8)	(1)	(0)
I object to it strongly	(0)	(0)	32	62	(5)	(8)	(1)	(0)
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	(2)	(2)	34	30	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	(4)	(4)	34	8	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
National Guard units								
(Number respondents)	(46)	(9)	(344)	(97)	(123)	(93)	(11)	(17)
I object to it strongly.	4	(4)	17	52	67	86	91	88
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	16	(1)	49	32	30	12	9	0
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	80	(4)	34	16	3	2	0	12

[a] On all appendix tables with cross-tabulations the "no answer" responses have been omitted.

TABLE B73

ESTIMATES OF HOW HARD NEGRO SOLDIERS WORK AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG SOLDIERS IN ALL-WHITE UNITS

Attitudes toward platoon integration	Colored soldiers do not work as hard as white soldiers		Colored soldiers work just as hard as white soldiers		Colored soldiers work harder than white soldiers	
	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %
TO&E units						
(Number respondents)	(219)	(128)	(353)	(181)	(25)	(11)
I object to it strongly.	56	88	24	63	16	(4)
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	32	9	36	26	28	(4)
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	12	3	40	11	56	(3)
TD units						
(Number respondents)	(29)	(19)	(60)	(28)	(1)	(1)
I object to it strongly.	39	80	37	47	(0)	(1)
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	44	10	23	36	(1)	(0)
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	17	10	40	17	(0)	(0)
National Guard units						
(Number respondents)	(146)	(69)	(270)	(86)	(25)	(6)
I object to it strongly.	39	90	20	59	12	(0)
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	43	9	37	26	52	(0)
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	18	1	43	15	36	(6)

TABLE B74

SATISFACTION WITH "DEAL" IN THEIR UNITS AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG MEN IN ALL-WHITE UNITS

Attitudes toward platoon integration	"Better than average deal"		"A fair deal"		"A poor deal"	
	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %	Northerners, %	Southerners, %
			TO&E units			
(Number respondents)	(98)	(32)	(489)	(237)	(153)	(71)
I object to it strongly.	28	63	36	66	40	85
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	31	28	36	22	29	13
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	41	9	28	12	31	2
			TD units			
(Number respondents)	(21)	(9)	(53)	(30)	(13)	(8)
I object to it strongly.	34	(5)	34	63	54	(4)
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	33	(2)	32	27	23	(2)
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	33	(2)	34	10	23	(2)
			National Guard units			
(Number respondents)	(23)	(11)	(439)	(174)	(75)	(34)
I object to it strongly.	17	46	31	73	23	56
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	61	18	40	21	40	21
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	22	36	29	6	37	23

TABLE B75

LENGTH OF TIME IN UNIT: WHITE SOLDIERS ACCORDING TO UNIT TYPE AND REGION OF ORIGIN

Time in present outfit	TO&E units		Segregated TD units		Integrated TD units	
	752 Northerners, %	321 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	156 Northerners, %	180 Southerners, %
One month or less	8	8	0	0	30	14
1–3 months	12	18	38	8	11	17
3–6 months	54	55	21	29	18	12
6 months–1 year	23	15	32	40	28	44
Over a year	3	4	9	23	13	13
No answer	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE B76

LENGTH OF TIME IN UNIT: WHITE SOLDIERS IN NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

Time in National Guard unit	Northern National Guard units			Southern National Guard units		
	148 National Guardsmen, %	145 other Northerners, %	42 other Southerners, %	145 National Guardsmen, %	36 other Southerners, %	256 other Northerners, %
One month or less	0	0	0	1	0	9
1–3 months	1	0	0	1	0	2
3–6 months	2	37	48	6	94	70
6 months–1 year	58	61	52	40	6	19
Over a year	39	1	0	52	0	0
No answer	0	1	0	0	0	0

TABLE B77

INTERRACIAL CONTACT OFF DUTY AMONG TRAINEES IN INTEGRATED UNITS

Q. 45 (white soldiers):
Have you ever spent off-duty time with colored soldiers, talking or doing things together?

Q. 52 (Negro soldiers):
Have you ever spent off-duty time with white soldiers, talking or doing things together?

Answers	Units, 3–31% Negro		Units, 49–76% Negro	
	1403 whites, %	306 Negroes, %	327 whites, %	470 Negroes, %
Yes, I have spent off-duty time with them, both on the post and in town.	19	64	20	55
Yes, I have spent off-duty time with them, but only on the post.	35	26	29	31
No, I have never spent off-duty time with them.	45	6	50	12
No answer	1	4	1	2

TABLE B78

EDUCATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION IN ALL-WHITE UNITS

Attitudes toward integration	TO&E units				TD units				National Guard units			
	Northerners		Southerners		Northerners		Southerners		Northerners		Southerners	
	374 HS grads, %	378 not HS grads, %	126 HS grads, %	222 not HS grads, %	49 HS grads, %	44 not HS grads, %	12 HS grads, %	36 not HS grads, %	366 HS grads, %	183 not HS grads, %	119 HS grads, %	105 not HS grads, %
I object to it strongly.	33	37	66	71	41	31	61	59	27	31	73	66
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	33	35	26	18	32	29	30	8	42	39	18	22
It makes no difference to me, or I like it.	34	28	8	11	27	40	9	33	31	30	9	12

TABLE B79

TYPE OF ENLISTMENT AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION IN ALL-WHITE UNITS

Answers	TO&E units				TD units				National Guard units			
	Northerners		Southerners		Northerners		Southerners		Northern		Southern	
	403 Regular Army men, %	348 draftees, %	166 Regular Army men, %	121 draftees, %	34 Regular Army men, %	56 draftees, %	42 Regular Army men, %	6 draftees %	48 National Guardsmen, %	187 others %	146 National Guardsmen, %	242 others %
I object to it strongly.	35	37	66	74	38	34	69	(4)	35	26	78	56
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	34	38	24	16	33	30	19	(2)	45	42	18	22
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	31	25	10	10	29	36	12	(0)	20	25	4	22

TABLE B80

LENGTH OF TIME IN ARMY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION IN ALL-WHITE UNITS

Answers	Up to a year		1–3 years		More than 3 years	
	502 Northerners, %	172 Southerners, %	24 Northerners, %	27 Southerners, %	19 Northerners, %	26 Southerners, %
I object to it strongly.	27	69	25	67	48	73
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	43	19	54	22	31	23
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	30	12	21	11	21	4

TABLE B81

RANK AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION IN ALL-WHITE UNITS

Attitudes toward platoon integration	TO&E units				TD units				National Guard units			
	Northerners		Southerners		Northerners		Southerners		Northerners		Southerners	
	701 lower three graders, %	51 noncoms, %	308 lower three graders, %	40 noncoms, %	81 lower three graders, %	1 noncom, %	32 lower three graders, %	8 noncoms, %	495 lower three graders, %	35 noncoms, %	182 lower three graders, %	20 noncoms, %
Object strongly	24	55	70	72	37	(0)	56	(5)	27	43	72	60
Rather not	35	25	20	20	32	(1)	30	(2)	42	46	16	35
Makes no difference and like it	31	20	10	8	31	(0)	14	(1)	31	11	12	5

TABLE B82

EDUCATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD PLATOON INTEGRATION AMONG SEGREGATED NEGROES[a]

Extent of respondents' schooling	TO&E Northerners			TO&E Southerners			TD Southerners		
	Object strongly, %	Rather not, doesn't matter too much, %	No difference or like it, %	Object strongly, %	Rather not, doesn't matter too much, %	No difference or like it, %	Object strongly, %	Rather not, doesn't matter too much, %	No difference or like it, %
(Number respondents)	(10)	(32)	(432)	(39)	(51)	(769)	(2)	(1)	(48)
Some grade school	(0)	0	3	8	10	4	(0)	(1)	8
Grade school graduate	(4)	9	6	26	20	14	(0)	(0)	19
Some high school	(5)	31	44	43	32	42	(0)	(0)	31
High school graduate	(0)	45	31	18	26	22	(1)	(0)	32
Some college	(0)	0	11	0	4	11	(1)	(0)	4
College graduate	(0)	6	2	0	0	3	(0)	(0)	2
Post graduate college	(0)	3	1	2	4	3	(0)	(0)	2

[a] "No answer" category excluded.

TABLE B83

ATTITUDES OF WHITE SOLDIERS IN TRAINING UNITS ON TYPES OF JOBS TO WHICH NEGROES SHOULD BE ASSIGNED

Answers	Trainees		Cadremen	
	998 Northerners, %	405 Southerners, %	176 Northerners, %	91 Southerners, %
They should be given mostly service jobs.	2	4	3	4
They should be given mostly combat jobs.	4	6	11	6
They should be given combat and service jobs the same as whites.	91	87	83	90
No answer	3	3	3	0

TABLE B84

ATTITUDES TOWARD NEGRO SOLDIERS AMONG WHITE SOLDIERS IN TRAINING DIVISIONS

Answers	Trainees		Cadremen	
	998 Northerners, %	405 Southerners, %	176 Northerners, %	91 Southerners, %
I like them very much.	19	18	16	13
I like them fairly well.	67	61	65	63
I don't like them.	11	16	17	18
I hate them.	1	4	2	4
No answer	2	1	0	2

TABLE B85

EXPECTATIONS OF WHITE TRAINEES REGARDING FUTURE INTEGRATION

Expectations	998 Northerners, %	405 Southerners, %
Negro soldiers will be living and working with the white soldiers.	70	65
Negro soldiers will be mostly in outfits of their own.	26	31
No answer	4	4

TABLE B86

EDUCATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG WHITE TRAINEES AND CADREMEN

Attitudes toward platoon integration	Northern trainees		Southern trainees		Northern cadremen		Southern cadremen	
	573 HS graduates, %	424 not HS graduates, %	191 HS graduates, %	213 not HS graduates, %	98 HS graduates, %	78 not HS graduates, %	43 HS graduates, %	47 not HS graduates, %
Object strongly	9	10	28	32	11	20	40	34
Rather not	34	31	39	33	30	37	44	41
Makes no difference or like it	56	55	31	32	57	40	16	25
No answer	1	4	2	3	2	3	0	0

TABLE B87

TYPE OF ENLISTMENT AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG WHITE TRAINEES AND CADREMEN

Attitudes toward platoon integration	Northern trainees		Southern trainees		Northern cadremen		Southern cadremen	
	740 draftees, %	256 enlisted, %	301 draftees, %	101 enlisted, %	101 draftees, %	74 enlisted, %	54 draftees, %	37 enlisted, %
Object strongly	10	9	30	31	15	16	39	31
Rather not	35	26	38	30	28	29	35	52
Makes no difference or like it	53	61	29	39	53	55	26	17
No answer	2	4	3	0	4	0	0	0

TABLE B88

PROPORTIONS OF WHITE SOLDIERS IN ALL-WHITE UNITS AND MIXED TD UNITS WHO LIKE WORKING WITH OTHER MEN IN THEIR UNITS

Q. 14: Do you like to work with the other men in your outfit?

Answers	TO&E units		Segregated TD units		Integrated TD units	
	752 Northerners, %	321 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %	156 Northerners, %	180 Southerners, %
Yes, practically all	50	59	39	61	54	67
Yes, most of them	41	32	56	33	33	29
Only a few	8	7	4	6	9	3
Hardly any of them	1	2	1	0	4	1

TABLE B89

ATTITUDES OF NEGRO TRAINEES ON KINDS OF JOBS TO WHICH NEGRO SOLDIERS SHOULD BE ASSIGNED

Jobs for Negro soldiers	121 Northerners, %	186 Southerners, %
They should be given mostly service jobs.	7	10
They should be given mostly combat jobs.	2	3
They should be given combat and service jobs the same as whites.	86	82
No answer	5	5

TABLE B90
PREFERENCES OF NEGRO TRAINEES ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF NEGRO TROOPS

Negro assignment preferences	121 Northerners, %	186 Southerners, %
In all-colored battalions or regiments	8	11
As colored companies in white battalions	3	7
As colored platoons in white companies	2	4
As colored squads in white platoons	2	1
As individuals without regard to color	77	70
No answer	8	7

TABLE B91
ATTITUDES OF NEGRO TRAINEES TOWARD PLATOON INTEGRATION

Attitudes	121 Northerners, %	186 Southerners, %
I object to it strongly.	5	7
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	5	4
It makes no difference to me.	47	49
I like it.	36	36
No answer	7	4

TABLE B92
TYPE OF ENLISTMENT AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG NEGRO TRAINEES

Attitudes toward platoon integration	Northerners		Southerners	
	89 draftees, %	25 Regular Army, %	124 draftees, %	50 Regular Army, %
I would object to it strongly.	4	4	6	4
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	6	4	4	4
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	84	84	84	92
No answer	6	8	6	0

TABLE B93
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND ATTITUDE TOWARD PLATOON INTEGRATION AMONG NEGRO TRAINEES

Attitudes toward platoon integration	Northerners		Southerners	
	46 HS graduates, %	74 not HS graduates, %	70 HS graduates, %	113 not HS graduates, %
I object to it strongly.	2	7	1	10
I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much.	6	4	4	5
It makes no difference to me or I like it.	88	85	93	74
No answer	4	4	2	11

TABLE B94

PERSONAL FEELINGS OF NEGRO TRAINEES TOWARD WHITE SOLDIERS

Attitudes	124 Northerners, %	183 Southerners, %
I like them very much.	66	45
I like them fairly well.	31	48
I don't like them.	0	0
I hate them.	1	1
No answer	2	6

TABLE B95

PROPORTION OF NEGRO TRAINEES WHO LIKE TO WORK WITH OTHER MEN IN THEIR OUTFITS

Q. 14:
Do you like to work with the other men in your outfit?

Answers	124 Northerners, %	183 Southerners, %
Yes, with practically all of them	48	68
Yes, with most of them	35	25
With only a few of them	13	4
With hardly any of them	2	2
No answer	2	1

TABLE B96

EXPECTATIONS OF NEGRO TRAINEES ON ARMY INTEGRATION IN THE FUTURE

Q. 65a:
As time goes on, do you think that most colored soldiers will be found living and working with the white soldiers in the Army, or do you think they will be mostly in outfits of their own?

Answers	124 Northerners, %	183 Southerners, %
They will be living and working with the white soldiers.	80	84
They will be mostly in outfits of their own.	12	9
No answer	8	7

TABLE B97

ESTIMATES BY NEGRO TRAINEES OF HOW COLORED SOLDIERS GET ALONG IN THE ARMY COMPARED WITH WHITE

Estimates	124 Northerners, %	183 Southerners, %
They have it easier in the Army than the white soldiers do.	1	2
They get along about the same as the white soldiers do.	72	76
They have it harder than the white soldiers do.	22	19
No answer	5	3

TABLE B98

DEGREE OF SATISFACTION OF NEGRO TRAINEES WITH THE "DEAL" THEY ARE GETTING COMPARED TO OTHER MEN IN THE ARMY

Answers	124 Northerners, %	183 Southerners, %
Better than average deal	8	17
Fair deal	67	71
Poor deal	24	10
No answer	1	2

TABLE B99

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS OF TRAINEES IN NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

Background	214 trainees in National Guard units, %
Age	
Under 21 years	18
21 years	41
Over 21 years	41
Education	
Grade school only	9
Some high school	27
High school graduate	64
Region of origin	
North	75
South	25
Type of enlistment	
Draftees	83
Regular Army	15
Others	2
Time in present outfit	
3 months or less	7
3–6 months	93

TABLE B100

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG WHITE TRAINEES IN UNITS AT NORMAL AND HIGH LEVELS OF INTEGRATION

Attitudes	Normal levels of integration		High levels of integration	
	998 Northerners, %	405 Southerners, %	160 Northerners, %	167 Southerners, %
I object to it strongly.	9	30	25	51
I would rather not but it doesn't matter too much.	33	36	39	32
It makes no difference to me.	48	27	30	13
I like it.	8	5	4	2
No answer	2	2	2	2

TABLE B101

REPORTS OF FRIENDSHIP WITH NEGROES BY WHITE TRAINEES IN UNITS AT NORMAL AND HIGH LEVELS OF INTEGRATION

Answers	Normal levels of integration		High levels of integration	
	998 Northerners, %	405 Southerners, %	160 Northerners, %	167 Southerners, %
Yes, I have had friends among them.	73	65	76	63
No, I have not.	25	33	20	35
No answer	2	2	4	2

TABLE B102

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTEGRATION AMONG WHITE TRAINEES IN INTEGRATED TRAINING DIVISIONS

Attitudes	In Units 1–14% Negro		In Units 18–31% Negro		In Units 49%+Negro	
	614 Northerners, %	193 Southerners, %	384 Northerners, %	212 Southerners, %	160 Northerners, %	167 Southerners, %
Object strongly	7	28	12	32	25	51
Rather not, but doesn't matter too much	31	37	38	35	39	32
Makes no difference	52	28	39	27	30	13
I like it	7	4	9	4	4	2
No answer	3	3	2	2	2	2

TABLE B103

EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS IN UNITS WITH DIFFERENT PROPORTIONS OF NEGROES

Extent of schooling	Units 3–31% Negro		Units 49–76% Negro	
	1402 whites, %	307 Negroes, %	327 whites, %	470 Negroes, %
Less than high school graduation	45	61	44	63
High school graduation and higher	55	39	56	37

TABLE B104

EDUCATION OF WHITE TRAINEES

Extent of schooling	Normal level of integration		High level of integration	
	998 Northerners, %	404 Southerners, %	160 Northerners, %	167 Southerners, %
Grade school only	14	27	18	27
Some high school	29	26	21	24
High school graduation	32	25	38	22
Some college or more	25	22	23	27

TABLE B105

PREVIOUS SERVICE IN MIXED UNITS REPORTED IN ALL-WHITE TO&E UNITS

Previous service	749 Northerners, %	344 Southerners, %
Mixed training units only	42	33
Mixed regular units only	4	3
Both training and regular units	13	23
No previous mixed service	41	41

TABLE B106

COMPARISON OF WHITE AND NEGRO OFFENSES, JAN–JUL 1951, ON POST HOUSING SEGREGATED UNIT (POST A)

Month	Traffic violations per 1000 men		Military offenses per 1000 men	
	White	Negro	White	Negro
Jan	5.2	2.1	6.7	9.9
Feb	3.1	2.3	4.3	9.0
Mar	2.3	1.6	3.5	12.4
Apr	1.6	2.0	2.9	4.3
May	2.4	5.7	5.7	14.6
Jun	7.8	6.3	5.0	18.6
Jul	5.4	8.4	6.2	11.5
Average	4.0	4.2	4.9	11.5

TABLE B107

COMPARISON OF WHITE AND NEGRO OFFENSES, JAN–JUL 1951, ON POST HOUSING SEGREGATED UNIT (POST B)

Month	Traffic violations per 1000 men		Military offenses per 1000 men	
	White	Negro	White	Negro
Jan	1.1	2.0	2.7	18.8
Feb	1.8	5.1	3.2	25.3
Mar	1.2	4.9	4.6	26.0
Apr	2.7	1.8	2.3	21.2
May	3.9	4.6	1.3	12.1
Jun	5.1	8.1	3.7	6.4
Jul	3.6	2.7	2.6	21.3
Average	2.9	4.1	2.9	18.7

TABLE B108

COMPARISON OF WHITE AND NEGRO OFFENSES, JAN–JUL 1951, ON POST HOUSING AN ALL-WHITE AND AN INTEGRATED TRAINING DIVISION

Month	Traffic violations per 1000 men		Other offenses per 1000 men	
	White	Negro	White	Negro
Jan	6.4	2.1	8.4	27.2
Feb	12.4	10.0	12.0	19.9
Mar	3.0	2.3	14.9	37.1
Apr	6.9	12.3	9.9	31.0
May	6.4	5.9	16.0	48.0
Jun	11.2	7.0	18.1	67.0
Jul	16.9	2.0	18.7	68.0
Average	9.0	5.9	14.0	42.6

TABLE B109

BELIEFS IN ALL-WHITE UNITS CONCERNING OFFICIAL ARMY ASSIGNMENT POLICY

Policy beliefs	TO&E units		TD units	
	752 Northerners, %	348 Southerners, %	93 Northerners, %	48 Southerners, %
The *main* policy is to keep Negroes in completely separate battalions or regiments.	50	46	39	38
The policy is to put colored companies in white battalions.	19	17	12	21
The policy is to put colored platoons in white companies.	2	5	11	0
The policy is to put colored squads in white platoons.	1	2	1	2
The policy is to assign soldiers to outfits without regard to color.	25	30	33	33
No answer	3	0	4	6

TABLE B110

BELIEFS IN INTEGRATED UNITS CONCERNING OFFICIAL ARMY ASSIGNMENT POLICY

Policy beliefs	Integrated training divisions, white trainees						Integrated TD units	
	In units 1–14% Negro		In units 18–31% Negro		In units 49–76% Negro		Northerners, %	Southerners, %
	North, %	South, %	North, %	South, %	North, %	South, %		
(Number respondents)	(614)	(143)	(384)	(212)	(160)	(167)	(156)	(180)
The *main* policy is to keep Negroes in completely separate battalions or regiments.	10	11	11	19	15	7	26	16
The policy is to put colored companies in white battalions.	8	10	6	9	8	10	10	11
The policy is to put colored platoons in white companies.	2	2	2	2	1	3	3	3
The policy is to put colored squads in white platoons.	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	2
The policy is to assign soldiers to outfits without regard to color.	73	73	76	62	70	71	58	64
No answer	6	4	4	7	6	9	2	4

TABLE B111

BELIEFS OF WHITE TRAINEES IN NATIONAL GUARD UNITS CONCERNING OFFICIAL ARMY ASSIGNMENT POLICY

Policy beliefs	Units from Northern States located in the South		Units from Southern States			
			Located in the South		Located in the North	
	145 Northerners, %	42 Southerners, %	165 Northerners, %	36 Southerners, %	91 Northerners, %	4 Southerners, %[a]
The main policy is to keep Negroes in completely separate battalions or regiments.	65	38	14	10	68	–
The policy is to put colored companies in white battalions.	10	14	11	5	10	–
The policy is to put colored platoons in white companies.	1	5	2	3	0	–
The policy is to assign soldiers to outfits without regard to color.	18	38	71	74	21	–
No answer	6	5	2	8	1	–

[a] Tables not run because of small number of cases.

TABLE B112

EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF WHITE AND NEGRO SOLDIERS IN UNITS WITH DIFFERENT PROPORTIONS OF NEGROES

Extent of schooling	Units 3–31% Negro		Units 49–76% Negro	
	1403 whites, %	307 Negroes, %	327 whites, %	470 Negroes, %
Less than HS graduation	45	61	44	63
HS graduation and higher	55	39	56	37

COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE

	Total cases
National Guard Units: EM	
Northern National Guard in South—NG men (Minn., Dak.)	148
Northern National Guard in South—Other men from North	145
Northern National Guard in South—Other men from South	42
Southern National Guard in South—NG men (Ala., Miss.)	101
Southern National Guard in South—Other men from North	165
Southern National Guard in South—Other men from South	36
Southern National Guard in North—NG men (Tenn.)	45
Southern National Guard in North—Other men from North	91
Southern National Guard in North—Other men from South	4
Northern National Guard in North—NG men (Conn.)	30
Northern National Guard in North—Other men from North	13
Northern National Guard in North—Other men from South	8
Training Units: EM	
Lowest proportion of Negroes to whites (3–14 percent)	
White Northern trainees—drafted	473
White Northern trainees—others	154
White Southern trainees—drafted	165
White Southern trainees—others	30
White Northern cadremen	93
White Southern cadremen	49
Negro Northern trainees	52
Negro Southern trainees	53

	Total cases
Medium proportion of Negroes (18–31 percent)	
White Northern trainees—drafted	268
White Northern trainees—others	119
White Southern trainees—drafted	136
White Southern trainees—others	87
White Northern cadremen	86
White Southern cadremen	42
Negro Northern trainees	72
Negro Southern trainees	130

High proportion of Negroes (49-76 percent)	
White Northern trainees—drafted	124
White Northern trainees—others	39
White Southern trainees—drafted	114
White Southern trainees—others	66
White Northern cadremen	81
White Southern cadremen	53
Negro Northern trainees	85
Negro Southern trainees	385
	Total cases
TO&E Units: EM	
White EM in South from North	611
White EM in South from South	321
White EM in North from North	141
White EM in North from South	27
Negro EM in South from North	419
Negro EM in South from South	817
Negro EM in North from North	69
Negro EM in North from South	59
TD Units: EM	
White EM in South from North (in all-white unit)	93
White EM in South from South (in all-white unit)	48
White EM in South from North (in mixed unit)	156
White EM in South from South (in mixed unit)	180
Negro EM in South from North (in all-Negro unit)	9
Negro EM in South from South (in all-Negro unit)	51
Negro EM in South from North (in mixed unit)	32
Negro EM in South from South (in mixed unit)	53

REPRODUCTION OF THE CHECK LISTS, INTERVIEW GUIDE, AND QUESTIONNAIRE

CHECK LIST FOR STAFF, FIELD GRADE, AND SENIOR OFFICERS

INTERVIEWER: This is a check list only; it is *not* an interview.
(Obtain for each officer interviewed)

Type of Unit_____ Position_____

Length of time in Unit_____ Length of time in Army_____

Rank_____ Length of time in Rank_____

Most recent overseas service:

Place_____ Length of Time_____

Home State _____

1. Would you rate most colored soldiers as better, worse, or about the same as most white soldiers in the way they take care of Army equipment?

——Colored soldiers do not take as good care of their equipment
——Colored and white soldiers take about the same care of their equipment
——Colored soldiers take better care of their equipment

2. Would you rate most colored soldiers as better, worse, or about the same as most white soldiers in the way they obey the orders of officers and noncoms?

——Colored soldiers do not obey orders as well as white soldiers do
——Colored and white soldiers obey orders about the same way
——Colored soldiers obey orders better than white soldiers do

3. Do you think most colored soldiers work harder at their jobs than white soldiers, just as hard, or not as hard?

——Colored soldiers do not work as hard at their jobs as white soldiers do
——Colored soldiers work just as hard at their jobs as white soldiers do
——Colored soldiers work harder at their jobs than white soldiers do

4. Would you rate most colored soldiers as better, worse, or about the same as most white soldiers in matters of personal cleanliness?

——Colored soldiers are worse than white soldiers in matters of personal cleanliness
——Colored soldiers are about the same as white soldiers in matters of personal cleanliness
——Colored soldiers are better than white soldiers in matters of personal cleanliness

5. Would you rate the physical stamina of most colored soldiers as higher, lower or about the same as that of most white soldiers?

——Colored soldiers have higher physical stamina than white soldiers

——Colored soldiers have about the same physical stamina as white soldiers
——Colored soldiers have lower physical stamina than white soldiers

6. How would you rate the all-round quality of job performance of most colored soldiers as compared with that of most white soldiers — better, worse, or about the same?

——The all-round performance of colored soldiers is better than that of white soldiers
——The all-round performance of colored soldiers is about the same as that of white soldiers
——The all-round performance of colored soldiers is worse than that of white soldiers

7. Do you think that, on the whole, colored soldiers do their jobs better in units of their own or in mixed units?

——Colored soldiers do their jobs better in units of their own
——Colored soldiers do their jobs better in mixed units
——Whether colored soldiers are in their own units or in mixed units makes no difference in the way they do their jobs

8. Do you think that adding some colored soldiers to a white unit raises or lowers the performance level of the unit, or does it leave it just about the same?

——Adding colored soldiers raises the performance level of the unit
——Adding colored soldiers lowers the performance level of the unit
——Adding colored soldiers makes no difference in the performance level of the unit

If officer thinks adding colored soldiers *lowers* the performance level, ask:

9. At what ratio do you think adding colored soldiers to a white outfit *materially* lowers the performance level of that unit *as a whole?* (Free answer)

If officer thinks adding colored soldiers *does not lower* the performance level, ask:

10. Do you think the *ratio* in which colored soldiers are added makes any difference in the performance level of the unit *as a whole?*

——No
—— Yes: At what ratio do you think adding colored soldiers to a white outfit *materially* lowers the performance level of the unit *as a whole?*

11. At what ratio do you think adding colored soldiers to a white unit makes for conflicts or problems in the unit as a whole, or doesn't it make any difference at all in this respect:

——It doesn't make any difference at all
——It makes for conflict and problems if the ratio exceeds————

UNIT PROFILE CHECK LIST

Full name and designation of the unit_____

_____

Type of duty currently performed_____

_____

Location and circumstances of questionnaire administration_____

_____

	White	Colored
Commanding Officer (Check)	____	____
First Sergeant (Check)	____	____
Total number of officers	____	____
Total number of corporals and sergeants	____	____
Total number of privates E-1	____	____
Total number of Pfc's and privates E-2	____	____

Approximate time and place unit was activated _____

_____

Unit commendations or awards _____

_____

How does CO rate unit (compared with other similar units) on:

Aptitudes and intelligence of enlisted men _____

Combat _____

Casualties (try to get a numerical estimate for time periods of two and six months)

_____

Non-combat casualties _____

Replacement of casualties (in what volume? How recently? With what effects?) _____

Unit morale _____

Court-martials _____

Unit performance and efficiency _____

_____

Any interesting or unusual experiences in the unit's history _____

_____

_____

_____

How does CO feel about integration of white and colored troops? _____

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

How does CO rate men's feelings about integration of white and colored troops?

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

What experiences has the unit had with colored or white troops? _____

_____

If unit contains both white and colored personnel, answer the following:

At what level has integration occurred? _____

Under what circumstances did integration take place? _____

What type of briefing or preparation was there for integration? _____

How does CO evaluate the success of integration? What problems, if any, did it create? How have these problems been met? What additional observations does he have?

What problems has integration brought about in dealings with civilians? _____

Instances of racial friction or tension? How handled? _____

INTENSIVE INTERVIEW OUTLINE GUIDE

(Appropriate modifications to be made for use with officers and Negro troops)

Introduction: I've been sent by the Department of the Army, and I'm working on a study of how the men here in Camp ——— are getting along together. We're trying to talk to as many people as we can, at all ranks, to get all the ideas and help we can. I'd like to hear what you have to say. All of this is completely anonymous. We're not interested in writing down the names of the men or their units — unless you want to put something down on record. (Pause and wait for comments to start. Let the respondent continue for a while. Then interrupt.) (Ascertain at outset whether respondent is trainee, HG, RA, ER, draftee.)

1. One thing we're especially interested in finding out more about is how the colored soldiers are getting along here. Do you have any colored soldiers in this outfit? (If yes) How many?

(If no) Well how about the ones on this post, do you have any contacts with them at all? How? Where? Have you ever been in the same outfit with colored soldiers? How did you get along with them? (Pursue the same general line of questioning as in points 2, 3, and 4, referring back to previous integrated experience, where it has occurred.) How would you feel about having some in your present outfit? How would the rest of the men feel about it? How do you think the officers and noncoms would feel about it? How do you think it would work out? Why?

2. (If trainee) Were there colored men in the outfit when you first came in? (If not) When did they first come? How did the men feel when they first heard about it? Was anything said or done when they first showed up? What happened then? (If yes) How did the men feel when they first came in and found out there were colored soldiers in the outfit? Did anybody say anything about it? What sort of things did they say? Did anything happen?

(If not trainee) How long is it since there have been colored men in this outfit? Were you with the outfit when they first came? How did the men feel when they first heard about it? Was anything said or done when they first showed up? What happened then?

(Everyone) How do you think the officers (men) feel about having them here?

3. How do they get along with the rest of the men? (Probe intensively, searching for illustrations, incidents, explanations, etc.) Do they get along about the way you first expected, or is it any different? What did you first expect? (If different) How is it different?

a. Have you noticed any bad feelings between the colored and white soldiers — any trouble or fighting? How do you think trouble starts? Can you give me any examples? (If yes) How do you think that kind of trouble can be avoided?

b. Do the colored fellows here mingle with the rest of the men? How do they all get along?

c. Is everybody friendly together, or do the colored mostly stick together and the whites together? For instance, would you ever find colored men with white men as their buddies?

d. How about after duty hours? Would you say the colored and white men buddy together after hours, or do they mostly stay by themselves? How about on the post here, in the service clubs and PXs and places like that? How about in town? Do you think the colored fellows get the same breaks from the people in the towns around here that the white soldiers get? (If not) In what way don't they get the same breaks? Do you think the civilians around here know about white and colored soldiers being together in the same Army outfits? Why do you think so? How do you think they feel about it? Why do you think so? How do you think the colored soldiers get along with the civilians around here? Have you ever noticed any bad feelings between the colored soldiers and civilians, and trouble or fighting? What was it about? How did it come up? Whose fault is it usually? How do you think that kind of trouble can be avoided?

e. Do you think there's more likely to be trouble between colored and white troops if they're in the same outfit together, or in different outfits? Why?

4. Speaking frankly, how well would you say the colored fellows in this outfit (on this post) are doing their jobs? Why?

5. Are there any colored noncoms or officers in this outfit? (If yes) How do the white soldiers feel about taking orders from them? (If no) How would you feel if you had a colored noncom or officer over you? Have you ever had any?

6. Do you think it's a good idea for them to be in the same outfit with the other men, or do you think it's better to have them in outfits of their own? How do you think it would work out in combat overseas, — for instance in the Korean war?

7. As far as you can judge, what's the official Army policy in dealing with colored troops? Why do you think that's the policy? Do you think the official policy is being carried out? If not, why not? Where does it bog down? Do you think the official policy is a good one, or could it be improved? How about the policy on this post — do you think it's what the Army as a whole is trying to do, or not? (If not) Why not? How does it compare with the policy on the other posts?

8. Have you yourself changed your opinion about colored soldiers in any way? In what way? How do you think it's going to carry over when you go back home to civilian life? How does your experience with colored soldiers in the Army compare with your experience with colored people before you entered the Army?

9. I asked you before about colored soldiers using the same PXs and service clubs and theaters on this post. What happens at the dances? Do the colored soldiers go to the dances along with the other men? How do they get along there? Have you ever noticed any trouble over that? Do you usually go to the dances yourself?

Is there anything else about this whole subject that you might want to tell me?

QUESTIONNAIRE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

INSTRUCTIONS

1. READ EVERY QUESTION OR STATEMENT CAREFULLY TO MAKE SURE YOU UNDERSTAND IT BEFORE MAKING YOUR ANSWER.

2. MARK SOME ANSWER TO EVERY QUESTION THAT APPLIES TO YOU. IF YOU HAVE MORE TO SAY, ADD IT, BUT FIRST MARK ONE OF THE SUGGESTED ANSWERS.

3. CHECK *ONE* AND *ONLY ONE* ANSWER TO EACH QUESTION.

4. IF THERE IS ANYTHING THAT YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND AND ASK ABOUT IT.

5. CHECK AND MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED EVERY QUESTION BEFORE YOU TURN IN YOUR PAPER.

BE SURE YOU DO *NOT* WRITE YOUR NAME OR SERIAL NUMBER ANYWHERE ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

JULY, 1951
ZI

NOTE: For each of the following questions, put a check mark ✓ on the line in front of your answer.

1. How old were you on your last birthday? (Check one)

1.....17 years or less	6.....22–25 years
2.....18 years	7.....26–30 years
3.....19 years	8.....31–35 years
4.....20 years	9.....36–45 years
5.....21 years	0.....over 45 years

2. Are you: (Check one)

1.....Married
2.....Single
3.....Divorced, separated or widowed

3. How many children do you have? (Check one)

0.....None
1.....One
2.....Two
3.....Three
4.....More than three

4. What is your home state in the United States?

62.....Alabama	11.....Maine	41.....Ohio
74.....Arizona	31.....Maryland	71.....Oklahoma
61.....Arkansas	16.....Massachusetts	92.....Oregon
93.....California	45.....Michigan	24.....Pennsylvania
85.....Colorado	51.....Minnesota	14.....Rhode Island
15.....Connecticut	64.....Mississippi	36.....South Carolina
23.....Delaware	65.....Missouri	54.....South Dakota
38.....Florida	81.....Montana	34.....Tennessee
37.....Georgia	55.....Nebraska	72.....Texas
82.....Idaho	84.....Nevada	83.....Utah
43.....Illinois	13.....New Hampshire	12.....Vermont
42.....Indiana	22.....New Jersey	32.....Virginia
52.....Iowa	73.....New Mexico	91.....Washington
56.....Kansas	21.....New York	33.....West Virginia
30.....Kentucky	35.....North Carolina	44.....Wisconsin
63.....Louisiana	53.....North Dakota	86.....Wyoming

39.....District of Columbia	04.....Philippines
01.....Puerto Rico	05.....Other U. S.
02.....Alaska	YY.....Foreign
03.....Hawaii	

5. How far did you go in school? (Check only one answer, showing the highest grade you finished)

1.....Did not finish grade school
2.....Graduated from 8th grade
3.....Some high school but did not finish
4.....Graduated from high school

5.....Some college but did not finish
6.....Graduated from college
7.....Post graduate study

6. Are you: (Check one)
   1.....White
   2.....Colored
   3.....Other

7. What is your present Army rank or grade? (Check one)
   01.....Private E-1 or E-2
   03.....Pfc E-3
   04.....Corporal E-4
   05.....Sergeant E-5
   06.....Sergeant First Class E-6
   07.....Master Sergeant E-7
   08.....First Sergeant E-7
   11.....Warrant Officer JG
   12.....Warrant Officer SG
   13.....Second Lieutenant
   14.....First Lieutenant
   15.....Captain
   16.....Field Grade Officer

8. Are you: (Check one)
   1.....A draftee
   2.....A member of the Regular Army
   3.....A member of the Reserve or National Guard who volunteered for active duty
   4.....A member of the Reserve or National Guard who was called to active duty without asking for it

9. How long altogether have you served in the Armed Forces on *Active Duty*? (Check one)
   1.....3 months or less
   2.....6 months or less
   3.....More than 6 months up to a year
   4.....More than one up to two years
   5.....More than two up to three years
   6.....More than three up to five years
   7.....More than five up to ten years
   8.....More than ten years

10. Were you ever in actual combat during World War II? (Check one)
   1.....I was not in the service in World War II
   2.....I was in the service in World War II, but never under enemy fire
   3.....I was under enemy fire in World War II, but never in actual combat
   4.....Yes. I was in actual combat in World War II

11. Have you been stationed overseas at any time since 1946? (Check one)
   1.....No, I have not been stationed overseas since 1946.
   2..... I was stationed overseas for less than 3 months since 1946.
   3.....I was stationed overseas for more than 3 months up to 6 months.
   4.....I was stationed overseas for more than 6 months up to a year.
   5.....I was stationed overseas for more than a year.

12. How long have you been in your present outfit? (Check one)
   1.....One month or less
   2.....More than one month up to three months
   3.....More than three months up to six months

4.....More than six months up to a year
5.....Over a year

13. Compared to other outfits of the same kind, how well would you say your present outfit does the job it's supposed to do? (Check one)
1.....It does its job very well
2.....It does its job fairly well
3.....It does its job not too well
4.....It does its job very poorly

14. Do you like to work with the other men in your outfit? (Check one)
1.....Yes, with practically all of them
2.....Yes, with most of them
3.....With only a few of them
4.....With hardly any of them

15. How good a job do you think your outfit does in looking out for the welfare of the enlisted men? (Check one)
1.....Very good job
2.....Fairly good job
3.....Not so good job
4.....Poor job

16. When the officers in your outfit want something done, can they count on the willing and wholehearted cooperation of the soldiers? (Check one)
1.....Yes, practically all the time
2.....Yes, most of the time
3.....Seldom get cooperation
4.....Practically never get cooperation

17. In general, how is the morale of the men in your outfit? (Check one)
1.....Very high
2.....High
3.....Just so-so
4.....Low
5.....Very low

18. If it were up to you to choose, where do you think you could do most for your country? (Check one)
1.....Being in the Army
2.....Working in a civilian job
3.....Going to school or college as a civilian

19. What is your present Army job or assignment? (Give the name of your job and tell briefly what you do)

.....

.....

20. If you had your choice, which of the following Army jobs would you prefer to have? (Check one)
1.....I am taking basic training now, so I cannot answer this question

2.....My present job in my present outfit
3.....The same kind of job I have now, but in some other outfit
4.....A different kind of job in my present outfit
5.....A different kind of job in some other outfit

21. Does your present Army job give you a chance to use your skill and experience? (Check one)
1.....I am taking basic training now, so I cannot answer this question
2.....A very good chance
3.....A fairly good chance
4.....Not much of a chance
5..... No chance at all

22. How do you feel about the importance of the work you are doing now as compared with other jobs you might be doing in the Army? (Check one)
1.....I am taking basic training now, so I cannot answer this question
2.....It is as important as any other job I could do
3.....It is fairly important, but I could do more important work
4.....It hardly seems important at all

23. When you are given new things to do in your job are you told *enough* about them so that you can do a good job? (Check one)
1.....Almost always told enough
2.....Usually told enough
3.....Seldom told enough
4.....Almost never told enough

24. How do you feel about your present chances for promotion? (Check one)
1.....Very well satisfied
2.....Fairly well satisfied
3.....Somewhat dissatisfied
4.....Very dissatisfied

25. Compared with the other men in your outfit, do you think you have been getting a deal that's better than average, a fair deal, or a poor deal? (Check one)
1.....Better than average deal
2.....A fair deal
3.....A poor deal

26. Compared with the average men in the U.S. Army, do you think you have been getting a deal that's better than average, a fair deal, or a poor deal? (Check one)
1..... Better than average deal
2.....Fair deal
3.....Poor deal

27. How much does it bother you when you are ordered to do things that you do not see a good reason for doing? (Check one)
1.....It bothers me a great deal
2.....It bothers me quite a bit
3.....It does not bother me much
4.....It does not bother me at all

28. Are you ever worried or upset? (Check one)
    1.....I am hardly ever worried and upset
    2. .....I am sometimes worried and upset
    3.....I am often worried and upset

29. In general, how would you say you feel most of the time, in good spirits or in low spirits? (Check one)
    1.....I am usually in good spirits
    2.....I am in good spirits some of the time and in low spirits some of the time
    3.....I am usually in low spirits

30. How do you feel about the discipline on this post? (Check one)
    1.....The discipline is stricter here than on other posts
    2.....The discipline here is about the same as on other posts
    3.....The discipline here is not as strict as on other posts
    4.....I can't really compare it with discipline on other posts

31. Generally speaking, how do you feel about the treatment given the men who are court-martialled on this post? (Check one)
    1..... .....They are not judged fairly
    2.....They are judged fairly, but the punishment is too hard
    3.....They get just about what they deserve
    4..... ..They are let off easy

32. Have you yourself received an unfair punishment since you came to this post? (Check one)
    1.....I have never received any punishment while on this post
    2.....I have received punishment, but I was treated fairly
    3..... .....I have been unfairly punished

33. As far as you're concerned, are the towns around this post good places to have fun or not? (Check one)
    1.....Yes, they are good places to have fun
    2.....No, they are not

34. How do you feel about the way you and your buddies are treated by bus drivers and policemen in the towns around here? (Check one)
    1.....We are treated very well
    2.....We are treated fairly well
    3.....We are treated badly

35. When soldiers from this post live in town with their families, can they usually get a place to stay at a fair rent, or not? (Check one)
    1.....Yes, they can usually get a place to stay at a fair rent
    2.....No, they usually can't

36. Do you think it was wise for the United States to help the South Koreans or do you think we would have been smarter to stay out of the Korean war in the first place? (Check one)
    1.....Wise to help them
    2.....Smarter to stay out
    3... .....Undecided

37. (a) How do you feel about the idea of working and living closely together with soldiers of other races and nationalities? (Check one)

1.....I dislike the whole idea
2.....I don't care one way or the other
3.....I like the idea

(b) How strongly do you feel about this? (Check one)

1.....Not at all strongly
2..... Not so strongly
3.....Fairly strongly
4.....Very strongly

38. Some people have said that although the Communists should not have started the Korean war, there is something to be said for their side of the argument. How do you feel about this? (Check one)

1.....There is a great deal to be said in favor of the Communists
2.....The Communists should not have gone to war, but there is something to be said in their favor
3.....The Communists are completely wrong and there is nothing to be said in their favor

39. What do you think the policy of the United States should be toward the United Nations (the UN)? (Check one)

1.....The United States should rely very fully on the UN
2.....The United States should work within the UN, but not rely too much on them
3.....The United States should leave the UN and have nothing more to do with them

WHITE SOLDIERS: Answer the questions on this page (Negro soldiers: answer the questions on the next page)

40. From what you know about them, how do you personally feel about U. S. colored soldiers? (Check one)

1..... I like them very much
2.....I like them fairly well
3.....I don't like them
4.....I hate them

41. Has your job in the Army brought you into contact with colored soldiers? (Check one)

1.....Yes, a great deal of contact
2.....Yes, some contact
3.....Yes, but not very much contact
4.....No, no contact at all

42. Have you ever been in the same training outfit or Army school with colored soldiers? (Check one)

1.....Yes, I have been in the same training outfit or Army school
2.....No, I have not

43. Have you ever been in the same regular outfit with colored soldiers? (Check one)

1.....Yes, I have been in the same regular outfit
2.....No, I have not

44. Have you ever had friends among colored soldiers? (Check one)
1.....Yes, I have had friends among them
2..... No, I have not

45. Have you ever spent off-duty time with colored soldiers, talking or doing things together? (Check one)
1.....Yes, I have spent off-duty time with them, both on the post and in town.
2.....Yes, I have spent off-duty time with them, but only on the post.
3.....No, I have never spent off-duty time with them.

46. How much personal contact have you, yourself, had with colored people in civilian life, before you entered the Army? (Check one)
1.....I hardly ever saw any
2.....I saw them but never had anything to do with them
3.....I have only had occasional contact at work, or just living in the same community with them
4.....I have worked with them over a period of time, but never had friends among them
5.....I have had friends among them

NEGRO SOLDIERS: Answer the questions on this page (White soldiers: answer the questions on the previous page)

47. From what you know about them, how do you personally feel about U.S. white soldiers? (Check one)
1.....I like them very much
2.....I like them fairly well
3.....I don't like them
4.....I hate them

48. Has your job in the Army brought you into contact with white soldiers? (Check one)
1.....Yes, a great deal of contact
2.....Yes, some contact
3.....Yes, but not very much contact
4.....No, no contact at all

49. Have you ever been in the same training outfit or Army school with white soldiers? (Check one)
1.....Yes, I have been in the same training outfit or Army school
2.....No, I have not

50. Have you ever been in the same regular outfit with white soldiers? (Check one)
1.....Yes, I have been in the same regular outfit
2.....No, I have not

51. Have you ever had friends among white soldiers? (Check one)
1.....Yes, I have had friends among them
2.....No, I have not

52. Have you ever spent time off-duty with white soldiers, talking or doing things together?
1.....Yes, I have spent off-duty time with them, both on the post and in town

2.....Yes, I have spent off-duty time with them, but only on the post
3.....No, I have never spent off-duty time with them

53. How much personal contact have you, yourself, had with white people in civilian life, before you entered the Army? (Check one)
1.....I hardly ever saw any
2.....I saw them, but never had anything to do with them
3.....I have only had occasional contact at work, or just living in the same community with them
4.....I have worked with them over a period of time, but never had friends among them
5.....I have had friends among them

WHITE SOLDIERS: Answer the questions on this page
(Negro soldiers: Answer the questions on the next page)

If there are *both white and colored soldiers* in your outfit, answer this:

54. In your opinion, would your outfit do its job better, worse, or about the same, if there were no colored soldiers in it?
1.....My outfit would do its job better if there were no colored soldiers in it
2.....My outfit would do its job about the same if there were no colored soldiers in it
3.....My outfit would not do its job as well if there were no colored soldiers in it

If there are *only white soldiers* in your outfit, answer this:

55. In your opinion, would your outfit do its job better, worse, or about the same, if there were some colored soldiers in it?
1.....My outfit would do its job better if there were some colored soldiers in it
2.....My outfit would do its job about the same if there were some colored soldiers in it
3.....My outfit would not do its job as well if there were some colored soldiers in it

COLORED SOLDIERS: Answer the questions on this page
(White soldiers: Answer the questions on the previous page)

If there are *both white and colored soldiers* in your outfit, answer this:

56. In your opinion, would your outfit do its job better, worse, or about the same, if there were no white soldiers in it?
1.....My outfit would do its job better if there were no white soldiers in it
2.....My outfit would do its job about the same if there were no white soldiers in it
3.....My outfit would not do its job as well if there were no white soldiers in it

If there are *only colored soldiers* in your outfit, answer this:

57. In your opinion, would your outfit do its job better, worse, or about the same, if there were some white soldiers in it?
1.....My outfit would do its job better if there were some white soldiers in it
2.....My outfit would do its job about the same if there were some white soldiers in it
3.....My outfit would not do its job as well if there were some white soldiers in it

58. As time goes on, do you think that white and colored people in the United States will get along better together than they do today, not as well as they do now, or about the same as now? (Check one)

7.....They will get along better together
8.....They will get along about the same as now
9.....They will not get along as well as now

59. (a) As time goes on, do you think that colored people in the United States will have more opportunities than they have today, fewer opportunities, or about the same as now? (Check one)

7.....They will have more opportunities
8.....It will be about the same as now
9.....They will have fewer opportunities

(b) What would you personally like to see happen? (Check one)

7.....I'd like to see them have more opportunities
8.....I'd like it to be about the same as now
9.....I'd like to see them have fewer opportunities

60. In civilian baseball and football teams, which of these ideas is best? (Check one)

7.....White players and colored players should be on the same teams together
8.....White players should have their own teams and colored players should have their own teams
9.....It doesn't make much difference to me either way

61. In civilian buses and trains, which of these ideas is best? (Check one)

7.....White people and colored people should be allowed to sit wherever they want
8.....There should be a special section for white people and a special section for colored people
9.....It doesn't make much difference to me either way

62. In civilian stores, which of these ideas is best? (Check one)

7.....White people and colored people should be allowed to shop wherever they want
8.....There should be special stores for white people and special stores for colored people
9.....It doesn't make much difference to me either way

63. How do you think white and colored soldiers get along with each other in the Army as compared with civilian life in the U.S.? (Check one)

7.....They get along better with each other in the Army
8.....They get along about the same in the Army as in civilian life
9.....They get along better with each other in civilian life

64. (a) As time goes on, do you think that colored soldiers will hold more good jobs and good ratings than they do today in the Army, fewer good jobs and ratings than today, or about the same as now? (Check one)

7.....They will have more good jobs and ratings
8.....They will have the same jobs and ratings as now
9.....They will have fewer good jobs and ratings

(b) What would you personally like to see happen? (Check one)

7.....I'd like to see them have more good jobs and ratings than now

8.....I'd like to see them have about the same jobs and ratings as now
9.....I'd like to see them have fewer good jobs and ratings than now

65. (a) As time goes on, do you think that most colored soldiers will be found living and working with the white soldiers in the Army, or do you think they will be mostly in outfits of their own? (Check one)

8.....They will be living and working with the white soldiers
9.....They will be mostly in outfits of their own

(b) What would you personally like to see happen? (Check one)

8.....I'd like to see them live and work with the white soldiers
9.....I'd like to see them in outfits of their own

66. As far as you know, what is the Army trying to do in dealing with colored soldiers (that is, what is the official Army policy)? Is the official policy to keep them in separate outfits, or to put them in with white outfits? (Check one)

5.....The *main* policy is to keep them in completely separate battalions or regiments
6.....The policy is to put colored companies in white battalions
7.....The policy is to put colored platoons in white companies
8.....The policy is to put colored squads in white platoons
9.....The policy is to assign soldiers to outfits without regard to color

67. How do you think colored soldiers get along in the Army? (Check one)

7.....They have it easier in the Army than the white soldiers do
8.....They get along about the same as the white soldiers do
9.....They have it harder than the white soldiers do

68. If a white soldier and a colored soldier had the same ability and training, and had been in the Army the same length of time, would they have the same chances of promotion, or not? (Check one)

7.....The white soldier would have a better chance
8.....They would have about the same chance
9.....The colored soldier would have a better chance

69. Under what conditions do you think colored soldiers have the best chance of promotion? (Check one)

7.....In an outfit with both white and colored soldiers in it
8.....In an outfit with only colored soldiers in it
9.....They have about the same chance either way

70. If you were in an outfit that had both white and colored soldiers in it, do you think your own chance for promotion would be better, worse, or about the same as now? (Check one)

6.....I am in a mixed outfit now
7.....My chances for promotion would be better
8.....My chances would be about the same
9.....My chances would be worse

71. Should white and colored soldiers do the same kinds of Army jobs, or not? (Check one)

6.....They should do the same kinds of jobs together in the same outfits
7.....They should do the same kinds of jobs, but in separate outfits

8.....They should not do the same kinds of jobs, but they should be together in the same outfits

9.....They should not do the same kinds of jobs, and they should be in separate outfits

72. What kinds of jobs should colored soldiers be given in the Army? (Check one)

7.....They should be given mostly service jobs

8.....They should be given mostly combat jobs

9.....They should be given combat and service jobs the same as whites

73. Which of the following comes closest to your idea of how colored troops should be assigned to outfits? (Check one)

5.....In all-colored battalions or regiments

6.....As colored companies in white battalions

7.....As colored platoons in white companies

8.....As colored squads in white platoons

9.....They should be assigned as individuals without regard to color

74. What is your feeling about serving in a platoon containing both white and colored soldiers, all working and training together, sleeping in the same barracks and eating in the same mess hall? (Check one)

6.....I object to it strongly

7.....I would rather not, but it doesn't matter too much

8.....It makes no difference to me

9.....I like it

75. In baseball and football teams in the Army, which of these ideas is best? (Check one)

7.....White soldiers and colored soldiers should play together on the same teams

8.....White soldiers should have their own teams and colored soldiers should have their own teams

9.....It doesn't make much difference to me either way

76. In Army PXs, which of these ideas is best? (Check one)

7.....White soldiers and colored soldiers should use the same PXs together

8.....White soldiers should have their own PXs and colored soldiers should have their own PXs

9.....It doesn't make much difference to me either way

77. In Army Service Clubs, which one of these ideas is best? (Check one)

7.....White soldiers and colored soldiers should use the same Service Clubs together

8.....White soldiers should have their own Service Clubs and colored soldiers should have their own Service Clubs

9 .....It doesn't make much difference to me either way

78. In running dances on an Army post, which of these ideas is best? (Check one)

7.....White soldiers and colored soldiers should go to the same dances

8.....White soldiers should have their own dances and colored soldiers should have their own dances

9.....It doesn't make much difference to me either way

79. How do you think most colored soldiers compare with most white soldiers in the way they take care of Army equipment?

7.....Colored soldiers do not take as good care of their equipment
8.....Colored and white soldiers take about the same care of their equipment
9.....Colored soldiers take better care of their equipment

80. How do you think most colored soldiers compare with most white soldiers in the way they obey the orders of officers and non-coms?

7.....Colored soldiers do not obey orders as well as white soldiers do
8.....Colored and white soldiers obey orders about the same way
9.....Colored soldiers obey orders better than white soldiers do

81. Do you think colored soldiers work harder at their jobs than most white soldiers, just as hard, or not as hard?

7.....Colored soldiers do not work as hard at their jobs as white soldiers do
8.....Colored soldiers work just as hard at their jobs as white soldiers do
9.....Colored soldiers work harder at their jobs than white soldiers do.

(*ALL* SOLDIERS ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS)

The rest of this questionnaire concerns Pfc Joe Doakes, a white soldier in the U.S. Army. Here are a number of situations in which he, as a white man, might find himself in contact with colored soldiers. First tell us what you think he is *most likely* to do in each of these situations. Next tell us what you think he *should* do.

82. Pfc Joe Doakes has always been in outfits which have only white soldiers in them. One day, he is sent to an outfit in which there are colored as well as white soldiers. He is assigned to a squad which happens to have both a colored squad leader and a colored platoon sergeant.

(a) What does Joe do? (Check one)

5.....He acts just as he would in any other outfit
6.....He just tries to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him
7.....He tries to make things tough for the colored non-coms in any way he can
8.....He speaks to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit
9.....He tries in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

5.....He should act just as he would in any other outfit
6.....He should just try to goof off as much as he can, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of him
7.....He should try to make things tough for the colored non-coms in any way he can
8.....He should speak to the CO about a transfer to one of the other platoons in the outfit
9.....He should try in every way he can think of to get a transfer out of the outfit

(c) What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place? (Check one)

5.....I would act just as I would in any other outfit
6.....I would just try to goof off as much as I could, to show that nobody is going to take advantage of me

7.....He should complain to the people in charge of the dance
8..... .....He should go over to the colored soldier and tell him to stay away from the dance
9.....He should try to get some friends to beat up the colored soldier

(c) What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place? (Check one)
3.....I would pay no special attention to them
4..... ....I would watch closely to see if the girl wants somebody to cut in
5.....I would cut in without asking, just to take the girl away from the colored soldier
6..... I would leave the place when I saw them
7.....I would complain to the people in charge of the dance
8.....I would go over to the colored soldier and tell him to stay away from the dance
9.....I would try to get some friends to beat up the colored soldier

92. Use the space below to make any additional comments on the subjects covered in this questionnaire or on any other subjects.

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

5.....He should try to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive
6.....He shouldn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he shouldn't go out of his way to make things tough for them
7.....He should treat the colored men just like any other replacements
8.....He should try to be especially nice to the colored men and should try to get his buddies to do the same
9.....He should report Captain Blake to the Inspector General

(c) What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place? (Check one)

5.....I would try to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive
6.....I wouldn't have anything to do with the colored men, but I wouldn't go out of my way to make things tough for them
7.....I would treat the colored men just like any other replacements
8.....I would try to be especially nice to the colored men and would try to get my buddies to do the same
9.....I would report Captain Blake to the Inspector General

85. Now suppose Captain Blake announced that the colored replacements were coming and then went on to say, "We want these men to be good soldiers and a real part of our outfit. I want you all to go out of your way to help them and be nice to them."

(a) What *does* Joe do in that case? (Check one)

5.....He reports Captain Blake to the Inspector General
6.....He tries to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive
7.....He doesn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he doesn't go out of his way to make things tough for them
8.....He treats the colored men just like any other replacements
9.....He tries to be especially nice to the colored men and tries to get his buddies to do the same

(b) What *should* Joe do in this case? (Check one)

5.....He should report Captain Blake to the Inspector General
6.....He should try to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive
7.....He shouldn't have anything to do with the colored men, but he shouldn't go out of his way to make things tough for them
8.....He should treat the colored men just like any other replacements
9.....He should try to be especially nice to the colored men and should try to get his buddies to do the same

(c) What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place? (Check one)

5.....I would report Captain Blake to the Inspector General
6.....I would try to make things tough for the colored soldiers when they arrive
7.....I wouldn't have anything to do with the colored men, but I wouldn't go out of my way to make things tough for them
8.....I would treat the colored men just like any other replacements
9.....I would try to be especially nice to the colored men and would try to get my buddies to do the same

86. Pfc Joe Doakes goes to the hospital with a bad toothache. There are two dentists on duty, both first lieutenants, one colored and one white. When Joe's turn comes up he

sees that the colored dentist is waiting for him. The white dentist is just finishing up with a patient, and it seems that he too will be free in a few minutes.

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

7.....He goes over to the colored dentist
8.....He walks out to get a drink of water, so that when he comes back the white dentist can take care of him
9.....He just stands and waits until the white dentist is finished

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

7.....He should go over to the colored dentist
8.....He should walk out to get a drink of water, so that when he comes back the white dentist can take care of him
9.....He should stand and wait until the white dentist is finished

(c) What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place? (Check one)

7.....I would go over to the colored dentist
8.....I would walk out to get a drink of water, so that when I came back the white dentist could take care of me
9.....I would stand and wait until the white dentist is finished

87. Pfc Joe Doakes is walking down a street in town. Suddenly he hears the sound of an argument, and comes upon two soldiers, one white and one colored, down on the ground, fighting hard.

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

6.....He joins in the fight on the side of the white soldier
7.....He tries to separate the two men and stop the fight
8.....He runs off to get help in stopping the fight
9.....He just keeps on going, minding his own business

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

6.....He should join in the fight on the side of the white soldier
7.....He should try to separate the two men and stop the fight
8.....He should run off to get help in stopping the fight
9.....He should just keep on going, minding his own business

(c) What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place? (Check one)

6.....I would join in the fight on the side of the white soldier
7.....I would try to separate the two men and stop the fight
8.....I would run off to get help in stopping the fight
9.....I would just keep on going, minding my own business

88. One night Joe goes to the movies on his post by himself. He comes early and sits down in the middle of a row of empty seats. Several colored soldiers come in and sit down next to him on one side. Then two more colored soldiers come in and sit down next to him on the other side.

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

6.....He tells the colored men to sit somewhere else
7.....He gets up and sits somewhere else himself
8.....He gets up only if the colored men near him act differently than the white troops in the theater

9.....He just stays where he is

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

6.....He should tell the colored men to sit somewhere else
7.....He should get up and sit somewhere else himself
8.....He should get up only if the colored men near him act any differently than the white troops in the theater
9.....He should just stay where he is

(c) What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place? (Check one)

6.....I would tell the colored men to sit somewhere else
7.....I would get up and sit somewhere else myself
8.....I would get up only if the colored men near me acted any differently than the white troops in the theater
9.....I would just stay where I am

89. Joe is sitting in a Service Club on his post looking at a magazine. At the next table there is a colored soldier, also reading a magazine. Three white soldiers enter the Club. They stare at the colored man and one of them says in a loud voice, "Don't you know this place is for white men only?"

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

5.....He says, "This place is for any G.I. who wants to use it."
6.....He watches to see if there will be a fight
7.....He puts down his book and walks out of the Club
8.....He just keeps on reading and pays no attention
9.....He says, "We ought to make sure this place is kept for white men."

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

5.....He should say, "This place is for any G.I. who wants to use it."
6.....He should watch to see if there will be a fight
7.....He should put down his book and walk out of the Club
8.....He should just keep on reading and pay no attention
9.....He should say, "We ought to make sure this place is kept for white men."

(c) What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place? (Check one)

5.....I would say, "This place is for any G.I. who wants to use it."
6.....I would watch to see if there will be a fight
7.....I would put down my book and walk out of the Club
8.....I would just keep on reading and pay no attention
9.....I would say, "We ought to make sure this place is kept for white men."

(d) If you were the colored soldier in this situation, what do you think you would do? (Check one)

5.....I'd say, "This place is for anybody who wants to use it."
6.....I'd call in whoever was in charge
7.....I'd just keep on reading and pay no attention
8.....I'd put down my book and walk out of the Club
9.....I'd apologize first and then leave the Club

90. Pfc. Joe Doakes goes to an enlisted men's dance on the post where he is stationed. He notices that among the couples on the dance floor there is a colored soldier dancing with a *colored* girl.

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

4.....He pays no special attention to them
5.....He watches closely to see what happens
6.....He leaves the place when he sees them
7.....He complains to the people in charge of the dance
8.....He goes over to the colored soldier and tells him to stay away from the dance
9.....He tries to get some friends to beat up the colored soldier

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

4.....He should pay no special attention to them
5.....He should watch closely to see what happens
6.....He should leave the place when he sees them
7.....He should complain to the people in charge of the dance
8.....He should go over to the colored soldier and tell him to stay away from the dance
9.....He should try to get some friends to beat up the colored soldier

(c) What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place? (Check one)

4.....I would pay no special attention to them
5.....I would watch closely to see what happens
6.....I would leave the place when I saw them
7.....I would complain to the people in charge of the dance
8.....I would go over to the colored soldier and tell him to stay away from the dance
9.....I would try to get some friends to beat up the colored soldier

91. Suppose that at an enlisted men's dance, Joe notices that a colored soldier is dancing with a *white* girl.

(a) What *does* Joe do? (Check one)

3.....He pays no special attention to them
4.....He watches closely to see if the girl wants somebody to cut in
5.....He cuts in without asking, just to take the girl away from the colored soldier
6.....He leaves the place when he sees them
7.....He complains to the people in charge of the dance
8.....He goes over to the colored soldier and tells him to stay away from the dance
9.....He tries to get some friends to beat up the colored soldier

(b) What *should* Joe do? (Check one)

3.....He should pay no special attention to them
4.....He should watch closely to see if the girl wants somebody to cut in
5.....He should cut in without asking, just to take the girl away from the colored soldier
6.....He should leave the place when he sees them

7.....He should complain to the people in charge of the dance
8..... .....He should go over to the colored soldier and tell him to stay away from the dance
9.....He should try to get some friends to beat up the colored soldier

(c) What would *you* yourself do in Joe's place? (Check one)

3.....I would pay no special attention to them
4..... ....I would watch closely to see if the girl wants somebody to cut in
5.....I would cut in without asking, just to take the girl away from the colored soldier
6..... I would leave the place when I saw them
7.....I would complain to the people in charge of the dance
8.....I would go over to the colored soldier and tell him to stay away from the dance
9.....I would try to get some friends to beat up the colored soldier

92. Use the space below to make any additional comments on the subjects covered in this questionnaire or on any other subjects.

Appendix B, Part II

A STUDY OF INTERACTIONS OF NEGROES AND WHITES IN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COMMUNITIES, SEP-OCT 1951

by

A Research team of the
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*A research study conducted for ORO under a subcontract.

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SUMMARY

Problem

In a period of national crisis such as would be occasioned by a global war, every segment of the nation's manpower reserve would have to be utilized as fully and efficiently as possible. The utilization of Negro personnel poses a particular problem inasmuch as many civilian communities do not accept Negroes on an equal basis with whites. It was felt that a very real need exists for specific information on the sources of friction and the extent of acceptance of Negro personnel by civilian communities.

Procedure

The present research is a study of interactions between Negro and white members of civilian and military communities. The critical incident technique was used to obtain detailed information on types of interactions that lead to especially favorable or especially unfavorable military-community relations. In addition to these descriptions of actual incidents, information was obtained on characteristics of the civilian communities relevant to Negro-white interpersonal relations.

Findings

A total of 824 incidents was obtained from 595 respondents in five military bases and their adjacent civilian communities. These incidents were analyzed to determine the specific behavior identified by the respondent as favorable or unfavorable. Similar behaviors were grouped, and descriptive statements were written for each group. This process resulted in a list of 255 behavior statements which were categorized under five main headings, as follows: (a) Engaging in Formalized Social Relationships with Civilians; (b) Engaging in Informal Social Relationships with Civilians; (c) Traveling to and from Camp; (d) Carrying out Duty Assignments Involving Contact with Civilians; and (e) Obtaining Housing and Establishing Neighborhood Relationships.

Conclusions

1. Incidents which most frequently result in racial friction between white civilians and Negro military personnel were found to occur in informal social relationships. Two types of informal relationships were commonly associated with difficulty; these were: attempts by Negroes to obtain entrance to or service in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment; and casual or "street" contacts. On the basis of actual incidents reported, a list of specific behaviors leading to conflict situations or to improved military-community relations was prepared (see Table B118).

2. It is believed that in each installation where integration is likely to present problems, the commanding officer should take steps to establish an active program to handle these problems. This program could well make use of specific procedures and practices which have been found to be effective at other installations. Some of these procedures are reviewed in this part of App B.

3. It was found through examination of written incidents and through individual interviews that civilians expressed little concern over integration on the post or its implications for military-community relations. Only one of the incidents reported by civilians expressed dissatisfaction with the military integration program. In general, civilians voiced the opinion that integration on the post was in the province of the Army and bore little relation to community affairs.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that an immediate program be instituted to insure that all officers become aware of the facts of the integration program and its implications for military-community relations. Data currently available from all research sources should be used for this purpose. In addition, specific training materials should be prepared, utilizing the list of critical behaviors contained in this section. These training materials should be directed toward familiarizing officers with the types of situations which most often lead to difficulty, and should incorporate methods for dealing with these problems.

2. Additional tools should be made available to commanding officers through research. It is recommended that the data obtained in the course of this investigation be subjected to further analysis to provide information on methods of avoiding conflicts and undesirable incidents. Research should also be carried out to identify reliable and quantifiable indices of racial tension in the community.

General information on the integration program which is disseminated to officers should be supplemented with community information collected locally. The method of summarizing community information given in this section could be utilized for this purpose.

PROBLEM

The study is exploratory in nature. It was recognized that the primary need was for a definition of the problem that arises when Negro soldiers are assigned to duty in locations where they have ample opportunity to make contact with civilian populations predominantly white. The report which follows attempts a definition in terms of actual observed behaviors. The report then relates these patterns of behaviors to the larger social framework in which they occur, presents suggestions on ways of dealing effectively with the major problem areas, and finally, offers hypotheses for future study.

A real need existed for factual, definitive information on the interactions between Negro troops and civilians. This report describes a study carried out by personnel of the American Institute for Research, under the sponsorship of the Operations Research Office and the Department of the Army. The study was intended to provide an organized body of facts representing actual incidents occurring between military personnel and civilians in adjacent communities. This body of facts provides information on *what* kinds of interactions lead to either hostility or cooperation, *where* these interactions occur, and *in what situations* they occur. The study includes also descriptions of the communities visited, in terms of their populations, their economic and political structures, their laws and their customs.

PROCEDURES

The chief method of investigation used was the critical incident technique. This technique, as described by Flanagan,* consists essentially in gathering detailed accounts of behavior judged as especially effective or ineffective according to a set of specific criteria. Incidents are obtained from persons in the best positions to observe the behavior being

* Flanagan, J. C., "Job Requirements," *Current Trends in Industrial Psychology*, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1949.

studied. The technique has been used to advantage in the study of job requirements, and variations of it have been used to investigate other practical problems, as, for example, the use made of it by the Committee on Ethical Standards of the American Psychological Association in defining and clarifying ethical and unethical practices among psychologists.

In the present study, incidents were obtained from both civilians and military personnel. The latter were interviewed in groups, following the procedure described by Wagner.* For the reader's benefit, the steps taken in analyzing incidents are set forth in a later subsection titled "Formulation of Categories."

In addition to the collection of incidents, members of the research team trained as sociologists compiled detailed information on each of the communities visited.

Collection of Incidents

At each post visited, arrangements were made with military authorities for group interviews with officers and enlisted men. Officers and enlisted men were interviewed separately, in groups of 20. Request was made through the officer in charge of arrangements for each group to be composed of half Negro and half white persons; with minor variations, groups interviewed were so proportioned, with one exception. At Fort Benning, Ga., one group of all Negro EM was interviewed. This was done deliberately to assess reactions of respondents to the interviewing process in an all-Negro group as well as in mixed groups. The one group handled in this way proved difficult to manage, and it was decided to interview all future groups on a mixed basis.

Officers were asked to provide EM from as many different units as possible, and within a unit, from various squads or sections. It was further requested that respondents be limited to those who had served on that particular post for at least three months.

Each interviewer was provided with a standard orientation statement to be delivered to each group verbally. The interviewer memorized this statement and then couched it in his own terms, for ease of delivery. A copy of this statement is contained in the section headed "Questionnaire on Military-Community Relations." The interviewer then provided each respondent with a copy of the form for writing favorable incidents and read instructions to the group. Extra forms were provided as required. Forms for unfavorable incidents were then given each respondent. When all forms were completed, including cover or identification sheet, each respondent sealed his papers in the blank envelope provided.

Civilians in the communities were also asked to write incidents. In general, civilians solicited were of two classes: (a) community leaders or persons of authority, and (b) persons who, by reason of occupation, are located at places where incidents, favorable or unfavorable, are likely to occur.

It was recognized that, in the time available for the study, some desirable procedures would of necessity be sacrificed. Since the primary objective of the research was to explore the ramifications of a problem in human behavior, it was felt that emphasis should be placed on interviewing individuals most likely to observe this behavior, rather than on a stratified sample of the population.

Civilians were interviewed on an individual basis after experimentation showed that attempts to elicit incidents from groups of civilians were unproductive. In these early attempts, contacts were made with such groups as Kiwanis, Rotary, or Exchange clubs. It was found that in these groups, usually numbering from 50 to 100, the time allotted was too short, the motivation of the group insufficient, to attain the desired results. One member of such a club in Georgia used his blank to inform the interviewer that in his opinion a

* Wagner, R. F., "A Group Situation Compared with Individual Interviews for Securing Personnel Information," *Personnel Psychology*, 1: No. 1 (1948).

study of this nature was a waste of taxpayers' time and money, and that his Congressman would be interested in hearing of it.

The procedure followed in interviewing civilians was the same as that followed with military groups, except that the identification sheet, for obvious reasons, contained different questions.

As the next section will show, many more persons were contacted than the number who wrote incidents. This is accounted for in part by the contacts of large, unproductive groups; in part by the fact that some civilians were solicited for information only; partly because many persons — both military and civilian — had not observed appropriate incidents; and partly because the incidents written described interactions which failed to meet one or more of the criteria for acceptable incidents. Thus, incidents detailing interactions between whites only, or soldiers only, were rejected as unsuitable.

Community Information

Research personnel responsible for obtaining information on the communities were asked to survey community characteristics relevant to patterns of racial interaction. Accordingly, their efforts were concentrated on obtaining, through personal interview and examination of official records, a "picture" of the community's mores. Access to civic authorities was gained through the post public information officer or comparable military official. Chamber of Commerce executives, business leaders, directors of USO, YMCA, or other social agencies, attorneys, housing-authority officials, religious and educational leaders, and police officers were among the individuals who proved to be most helpful in this aspect of the study.

SOURCES OF DATA

Six army bases were selected for visitation. These bases were chosen by ORO personnel to provide representation of geographic areas in the North and the South, and to sample populations in those areas where previous information had indicated relatively good or bad community-military relationships.

A try-out of the procedures was conducted at Fort Lee, Virginia. This try-out resulted in some revision of techniques prior to their use at the following installations: Fort Dix, N. J.; Fort Benning, Ga.; Fort Sam Houston, Texas; Camp McCoy, Wis.; and Fort Riley, Kan.

TABLE B113

NUMBER OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED, BY INSTALLATION

Installation	Military	Civilian	Totals
Dix	120	200	320
Benning	175	170	345
Sam Houston	180	61	241
McCoy	660	200	860
Riley	373	140	513
Total persons	1508	771	2279

Table B113 shows the breakdown of persons contacted at each installation. The civilian group includes persons interviewed in the communities and civilian employees on the posts.

The total number of persons interviewed, 2279, includes both those who were asked to write incidents and those interviewed for the purpose of getting community information.

A total of 595 individuals wrote 824 incidents deemed suitable for analysis. These 595 persons comprise 421 military and 174 civilian respondents. Table B114 shows the distribution of these respondents by sex.

TABLE B114

DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RESPONDENTS, BY SEX

Status of Respondents	Male		Female	
	Number	%	Number	%
Military	399	75.3	22	33.8
Civilian	131	24.7	43	66.2
Totals	530	100.0	65	100.0

TABLE B115

DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RESPONDENTS, BY RACE

Race	Military		Civilian		Totals	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
White	249	59.1	166	95.4	415	69.7
Negro	172	40.9	8	4.6	180	30.3
Totals	421	100.0	174	100.0	595	100.0

TABLE B116

DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN RESPONDENTS, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

Education	Military	Civilian	Totals
8th grade or less	32	23	55
Some high school	83	17	100
High school graduate	142	60	202
Some college	83	32	115
College graduate	81	39	120
No answer	0	3	3
Totals	421	174	595

In accordance with the plan of the study, the military group far outnumbered the civilian. It was expected, too, that the number of white respondents, both military and civilian, would exceed the number of Negroes. In the case of the military, the excess of whites over Negroes is accounted for by the fact that it was desirable to include special groups which were predominantly white. These groups included the post chaplains, provost marshal's representatives, and various headquarters personnel. Table B115 gives the distribution of respondents by race.

Military respondents were chosen from all ranks, from private to colonel. Classed into four groups, they were distributed as follows:

Private or private first class	99
Noncommissioned officer	197
Company grade officer	102
Field grade officer	23
Totals	421

Information was also obtained on the educational level of all respondents. Table B116 presents this distribution for both military and civilian groups.

Each civilian respondent was asked to state his job title or occupation. This information is presented in Table B117. It was thought that the list of job titles would be more meaningful to the reader than a listing classified according to level of occupation, such as the US census classification.

The total number of incidents collected numbered 1439. Of these, 615, or 42.7 percent, were rejected as not meeting the criteria established for suitable incidents. These criteria required that incidents be: (a) reports of specific behavior; (b) reports of events occurring near the appropriate installation; (c) reports of interactions between Negroes and whites; (d) reports of interactions where the Negroes and whites were a mixture of civilians and military personnel.

TABLE B117

LIST OF OCCUPATIONS OF 174 CIVILIAN RESPONDENTS

Occupations	Number	Occupations	Number
Accountant	2	Laundry worker	7
Attorney	2	Librarian	2
Barber	1	Managerial assistant	10
Bartender	6	Mechanical engineer	1
Cab or truck driver	6	Minister	2
Clerk or secretary	51	Musician	1
Construction inspector	1	Newspaper editor	1
Contractor	1	Owner or manager small store	23
Cook	2	Pharmacist	1
Corporation executive	7	Physician	1
Dispatcher	1	Porter	1
Draftsman	1	Real estate and insurance broker	2
Electrician	1	Seamstress	1
Executive social agency	14	Sheriff or police	3
Farmer	1	Social worker	4
Gas station attendant	1	Teacher	1
High school principal	1	Tourist camp owner	2
Hotel owner or manager	5	Waitress	2
Housewife	3	Unknown	2

It was found that 824 incidents met the above criteria. These incidents are reports of human interactions; as such, they must be considered from the standpoint of their occurrence in a larger pattern of social relationships, a social matrix, so to speak. This larger pattern of relationships may be viewed in terms of: (a) the personal, social, and cultural conditions of the immediate space and time; (b) the institutional and/or sectional focus in which the incidents occur; (c) the regional culture which allows still broader focus.

The influence of cultural factors on behavior is not easily identified by direct means. Some indirect indices of cultural influence may be identified through examination of the composition and mobility of population, housing, economic foundations, political and legal foundations, and established patterns of interpersonal behavior.

The detailed descriptions of the communities visited during the investigation here reported contain full information on the influences of the above factors. For the reader's convenience, this information has been summarized for each of the several communities. It will be seen that these communities range in size from the small farming community to the urban metropolis. Populations vary from those which normally contain almost no Negroes to those which contain a large proportion of Negroes. Economic functions vary from the one-industry towns to the large centers where industry is diversified; political backgrounds vary from the city where law and custom regarding interpersonal behavior has been rigidly defined to the community which is just awakening to the need for such delineation.

In all, ten communities were studied; five of these form the cluster that serves Camp McCoy. Two communities serve Fort Riley, and one each Fort Dix, Fort Benning, and Fort Sam Houston.

Population

Philadelphia, Pa. Total population is 2,064,794. Negro population is 16 percent of total. Foreign-born white is 15 percent. Population increase is 7 percent since 1940. Negro population is growing faster than white. Laboring classes are migrating into the community.

San Antonio, Texas. Total population is 406,811. Negro population is 7 percent of total. Latin-Americans represent 45 percent. Population increase is 60.3 percent since 1940. Negro population is decreasing. Mexican labor is migrating into the area.

Columbus, Ga. Total population is 79,510. Negro population is 33 percent of total. Foreign-born white is less than 1 percent. Population increase is 49.2 percent since 1940. Negro population is increasing.

Junction City, Kan. Total population is 13,370. Negro population represents 5 percent of total Native white is 95 percent. Population increase is 57.2 percent since 1940. Negro population is stable.

Manhattan, Kan. Total population is 18,996. Negro population is 2.1 percent of total. Native white is 97.4 percent. Population increase is 62.9 percent since 1940. Negro population is stable.

La Crosse, Wis. Total population is 47,396. Negro population is limited to three families. 95 percent of population is native white. Population increase is 11 percent since 1940. Negro population increase is almost nonexistent.

Sparta, Wis. Total population is 5,873. Negro population is limited to one family. 95 percent of population is native white. Population increase is 1 percent since 1940. Negro population increase is almost nonexistent.

Tomah, Wis. Total population is 4,771. There is no Negro population. 95 percent of population is native white. Population increase is 25 percent since 1940.

Wisconsin Dells, Wis. Total population is 2,000. There is no Negro population. Over 90 percent of population is native white. Population increase is 12 percent since 1940.

Black River Falls, Wis. Total population is 2,806. Negro population is limited to one family. 13 percent of population is American Indian. Population increase is 10.5 percent since 1940. Negro population increase is almost nonexistent.

Economic Base

Philadelphia. The nation's second largest port, third largest city, third largest wholesale center, fourth city in manufacturing, retailing, and buying income. Has a diversified industrial base, is a market center of the adjacent agricultural areas.

San Antonio. Not an industrial center. Primary sources of revenue are: military installations, retail trade, agricultural products, tourist trade, manufacturing. Has particular need for large group of unskilled, migratory labor.

Columbus. An industrial, agricultural, and military center.

Junction City. Primary economic base is military trade, small diversified industries.

Manhattan. College town, serves as distribution center for surrounding agricultural area.

La Crosse. Agricultural service area. Diversified manufacturing; largest plant employs 3000.

Sparta. Primary economic base is military trade. Serves as a farm trading center.

Tomah. Farming community.

Wisconsin Dells. Resort area.

Black River Falls. Farm trading area.

Housing

Philadelphia. Negro population is concentrated in overcrowded areas. Restrictive covenants are common. At least one housing project is integrated.

San Antonio. Numerous slum areas are overcrowded; housing projects are segregated.

Columbus. Housing is segregated by custom; housing projects are segregated.

Junction City. Negroes are scattered in community but one section is Negro.

Manhattan. Negro housing is segregated.

La Crosse. Housing is difficult for Negro soldiers. (This is true for all communities studied in Wisconsin.)

Customary Patterns of Interpersonal Behavior

Philadelphia. Considerable evidence exists of informal antagonism to legal codes which regulate interpersonal behavior.

San Antonio. Interpersonal contact between races is rigidly defined, but there are informal protests concerning the rigid definitions.

Columbus. Interpersonal contact between races is rigidly defined.

Kansas Communities. Rigid pattern of control of interpersonal relations shows signs of "cracking."

Wisconsin Communities. There is no history of rigid control of interpersonal relations. However, laws enforcing nondiscrimination are an effective control.

*Political Base and Legal Background**

Philadelphia. Act No. 72 Session of 1887 — Civil Rights for all people regardless of race or color. Act No. 375 Session of 1939 provides for equal accommodations. Criticism of police by Negroes is that they are unfair in treatment of Negroes. Negro population lives in areas with high rates of criminality.

San Antonio. Segregation is by law in schools, institutions for deaf, dumb, and blind; juvenile delinquent institutions, agricultural and trade schools, county libraries, colleges,

*School segregation situations are presented as of 1951, which was prior to the US Supreme Court decision of 17 May 1954 barring segregation in the District of Columbia schools.

teacher training schools; transportation, boxing, and labor. Intermarriage is prohibited. Negro concentration in arrests is not heavy.

Columbus. Segregation is by law in schools (separate but equal concept), teacher-training schools, transportation, billiard and pool rooms, hospitals, penal institutions, and welfare institutions. Negro minister may marry Negro couple only. Violations of law leading to arrest are distributed in direct proportion to their number in the population. Rumors abound of police brutality to Negroes.

Kansas Communities. Segregation of schools is permitted by law in first-class cities. Discrimination is prohibited in labor unions, colleges, hotels, boarding houses, places of entertainment or amusement, transportation, and civil service. In fact, discrimination is practiced in hotels, places of amusement, labor unions, and civil service.

Wisconsin Communities. Segregation or discrimination is prohibited in public schools, employment, housing, inns, restaurants, saloons, barber shops, transportation, public accommodations, and amusements. Ordinances are observed.

GENERAL RESULTS

Formulation of Categories

Study of the 824 incidents used in the analysis revealed that they could be classified under five major headings or areas of behavior. These were:

Area I. Engaging in Formalized Social Relationships with Civilians
Area II. Engaging in Informal Social Relationships with Civilians
Area III. Traveling to and from Camp
Area IV. Carrying out Duty Assignments Involving Contact with Civilians
Area V. Obtaining Housing and Establishing Neighborhood Relationships

These headings were developed by means of a process which has been labeled "category formulation."* This process is one of reducing the total number of incidents to a smaller number capable of efficient and economical description. This is accomplished by grouping similar behaviors and writing descriptive phrases which reflect the common behavioral elements.

Incidents can, of course, be classified in many different ways. In the present study, it was thought advisable to adopt a classification framework oriented around the soldier-in-action.† Since the major purpose of the study is to describe *what* occurs, *where* it occurs, and in *what context* it occurs, an activity-centered frame of reference was selected as the one most useful for DA needs. The attempt here is to discover what situations, what areas of the soldier's interactions with civilians, are critical areas for military-community relations.

Incidents were first grouped into piles according to the similarity of their behavioral contents. Examination of these separate groups of similar behaviors led to the formulation of the five major areas. Within these major areas, the classification procedure was continued, resulting in the establishment of several subareas for each of the major areas. These smaller groups of behaviors were then examined and descriptive statements written for each group. The final grouping represents an optimal compromise between establishing a large, unwieldy number of specific statements and a small number of too general statements.

* Flanagan, J. C., "Critical Requirements for Research Personnel," American Institute for Research, Pittsburgh, Mar 1949.

† The term soldier-in-action, as used here, is *not* meant to denote combat performance.

Time limitations prevented the desirable practice of an independent analysis of all the separate incidents. Two members of the research team, working together, developed the classification framework, the major areas, and the subareas. The writing of descriptive statements was done by the chief investigator, who also wrote definitions of the major areas and subareas.

The classification structure of major areas and subareas follows.

I. Engaging in Formalized Social Relationships with Civilians
   - A. Participating in organizational dances
   - B. Participating in organizational functions where dancing is not a factor

II. Engaging in Informal Social Relationships with Civilians
   - A. Obtaining entrance to or service in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment
   - B. Interacting with civilian patrons in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment
   - C. Approaching or dating civilian women
   - D. Entertaining friends or acquaintances
   - E. Interacting with civilians in casual or "street" contacts

III. Traveling to and from Camp
   - A. Contacts with civilian passengers in a public conveyance
   - B. Contacts with civilian authorities in a public conveyance
   - C. Offering and accepting rides in private autos
   - D. Contacts with civilians through auto accidents, mishaps, or traffic violations
   - E. Contacts with civilians at stops en route

IV. Carrying out Duty Assignments Involving Contact with Civilians
   - A. Office contacts with civilians in military employ
   - B. Contacts with civilians arising out of duty in times of crisis
   - C. Line of duty contacts with civilian authorities
   - D. Special duty assignments involving contacts with civilians

V. Obtaining Housing and Establishing Neighborhood Relationships
   - A. Obtaining housing for self or family
   - B. Establishing relationships with neighbors

Definitions of Behavior Areas

To clarify the classification structure as well as to aid in the process of assigning incidents to categories, definitions of each major area and each subarea were written as the classification proceeded. Some shifting of incidents among areas was necessary, after which the definitions were revised to reflect the essential characteristics of the behaviors grouped under a single rubric.

Definitions for the major areas and subareas are given later. Following the definition of each subarea, there appears an example of a favorable and an unfavorable incident classed in that subarea. In the case of the favorable incident, respondents were required to state: (1) just what happened; (2) where the event took place; (3) how long ago the event occurred; (4) what it was that most impressed the respondent. In the case of the unfavorable incident, respondents were required to state: (1) just what happened; (2) where the event took place; (3) how long ago the event occurred; (4) why this was a bad thing to have happen; (5) the simplest way this incident could have been avoided or prevented.

I. Engaging in Formalized Social Relationships with Civilians. This area includes those incidents occurring between Negroes and whites in structured social situations. Organizational dances and parties, invitations springing from attendance at group meetings (e.g., church), either in groups or individually, are assigned to this area. The intent here is to

cover interactions occasioned through purposeful, planned attendance at a social, social-religious, or social-educational meeting, on post or in the community.

Participating in organizational dances: Social contacts where opportunity exists for physical contact between white females and Negro males have long been a focal point of discussion. Incidents in this subarea are descriptive of behaviors exhibited at a dance sponsored by an organization. The dance may be held in the post service club or in the community. It is a planned, organized social affair.

Favorable incident, written by white civilian:

(1) At a formal dance given by the Mid-City YWCA-USO group, both Negro and white civilian and military personnel were guests on May 26, 1951. There was general good fellowship but I did not observe any Negro-white combinations for dancing.
(2) At a YWCA
(3) 3 months ago
(4) The lack of restraint and self-consciousness

Unfavorable incident, written by white officer:

(1) At a social affair in a service club a Negro soldier asked a white girl to dance — she refused and instead of his just going on he insisted on calling attention to her refusal and created a scene.
(2) Service Club
(3) One month
(4) Young ladies volunteered to come to the dance and this incident tends to discourage cooperation with the military.
(5) Soldier should have not created a scene.

Participating in organizational functions where dancing is not a factor: Included here are incidents which take place when Negroes and whites participate in organized social functions such as athletic events, church affairs, educational meetings, or formal group parties.

Favorable incident, written by white officer:

(1) Delaware River Cruise, sponsored by USO, it was made up of whites and Negroes, it was coordinated by a colored soldier, white civilians, and the whole thing was a big success. It was a huge affair consisting of about 2000 people, and the whole thing ran very smooth, without any incidents happening. Everything ran just as planned, police escort, music, schedule and etc.
(2) Philadelphia — Boat cruise
(3) 2 months
(4) That such a large amount of people could get together, regardless of race without any trouble

Unfavorable incident, written by white private:

(1) A graduating class made reservations for a class party. Two Negro men in the class were refused admittance. This was not known at time of reservation.
(2) Tourist Club
(3) 5 Sep
(4) Unjust to Negro soldiers and resulted in hurt feeling
(5) By manager making it clear at time of reservation that those fellows would not be admitted

II. Engaging in Informal Social Relationships with Civilians. This area is meant to include incidents occurring during free-time activities, without formalized structure. These may occur on post as the soldier patronizes the PX, the post barber shop, or the movie; they may occur in town as he searches for recreation, or entertainment, or as he "loafs" on the street corner.

Obtaining entrance to or service in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment: This subarea deals with interactions of the soldier and the person(s) of authority who implement

the laws and customs of the state or community, or who enforce their own attitudes toward Negroes seeking service in their places of business.

Favorable incident, written by Negro private:

(1) In a restaurant I saw a mixed group which consisted of [included] few Negroes. They seemed to have been made very much welcome, as they were all mingled together talking etc., in what seemed to have been in a friendly manner.
(2) Restaurant
(3) Approximately 2 weeks
(4) It made me feel that I was equal to the others, that I had something to fight for, that I too, was an American. Also I could appreciate my home land

Unfavorable incident, written by Negro private:

(1) In Junction City I walked into a restaurant on one of the downtown streets. I was with two white friends. We all sat down in an empty booth. A waitress came over and without batting an eye said, "We don't serve colored here." We left without a single word although one of the fellas wanted to speak to the manager.
(2) Restaurant
(3) 1 month (the same day of the Manhattan incident)
(4) This sort of thing definitely lowers a Negro soldier's morale. Those are the type of incidents that make Paul Robeson's arguments weighty.
(5) The people of this country actually practicing democracy — the way it is intended

Interacting with civilian patrons in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment: Incidents included here are those arising out of the behavior of soldiers and civilian patrons in such meeting-places as bars, restaurants, private clubs, drug stores, bowling alleys, barber shops, etc. The activity is not a highly organized group function, nor is the civilian a representative of authority as in II A (the situation involving entrance to or service in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment).

Favorable incident, written by Negro private:

(1) Myself and a friend met a white couple who invited us to have a few drinks with them. Afterwards they brought us back to camp and invited us to their house anytime we were in town.
(2) In a night club
(3) About 2 months ago
(4) The white couple didn't seem to be the least bit color conscious, which made my friend and I feel very good.

Unfavorable incident, written by white officer:

(1) Two white civilians came into a restaurant with two white girls, sat down, ordered and were talking. Four Negro "soldiers" were in the establishment, drunk, loud, disorderly and out of uniform. They proceeded to make loud, obscene remarks about the girls and call the civilians several names. The civilians left and one of them went to his car and tried to re-enter the place with a bumper jack but his companion restrained him and he left.
(2) Restaurant
(3) 2 days
(4) Yes
(5) Keep Negroes out of the Army

Approaching or dating civilian women: This subarea is comprised of incidents springing from the actions of the soldier in dating or attempting to make dates with local girls. The situation may be one where the soldier is Negro and the girl white, or where the soldier is white and the girl Negro.

No favorable incidents were reported for this subarea.

Unfavorable incident, written by white private:

(1) A Negro soldier tried to date a clerk in one of the PXs and threatened her when she refused.

(2) Post Exchange Number Two
(3) Three days ago
(4) Although whites and Negroes should be on a friendly and equal plane, it should end without being over friendly.
(5) It could not have been avoided, it was undoubtedly the individual, acting on impulse.

Entertaining friends or acquaintances: Some incidents relate happenings, judged good or bad, as small groups of soldiers have gathered for entertainment or recreation. The activity is not formalized as are Area I incidents, "Engaging in Formalized Social Relationships with Civilians."

Favorable incident, written by Negro officer:

(1) A colored soldier was invited by the parents of another soldier [white] to visit them at their home. He excepted [accepted] and spent an enjoyable week end.
(2) On post
(3) 2 weeks
(4) The fact that individuals can live together and enjoy the company of each other regardless of race, creed, etc.

Unfavorable incident, written by Negro NCO:

(1) While in town (Columbus, Ga.) a riot broke out where police beat soldiers who were walking down the street, shot people that did not know anything of the riot. They [police] broke in people's houses without warrants. I was in one of the fellow soldier's home and did not know anything of the riot and they broke in and searched us and called us dirty names.
(2) On the street and in a private home
(3) 2 months
(4) This not only broke the morale of military personnel, but gives the city a bad name.
(5) By checking the police force, the mayor, governor and the whole crew

Interacting with civilians in casual or "street" contacts: Common in this subarea are incidents occurring as the soldier conducts himself on liberty in the community. Whistling at girls, using obscene language, getting into difficulties with the local police, getting drunk and/or getting into street fights are examples. Also included are reports of abuse of authority on the part of local police. On the favorable side are incidents of cooperation such as aiding a motorist fix a flat tire, helping an aged or ill person, giving directions, and preventing or stopping a fight.

Favorable incident, written by Negro private:

(1) While walking in a large city I saw a white soldier staggering as though drunk. A colored woman approached him, gave him a funny look and started by. The soldier fell and did not move, the woman stopped, took another closer look and immediately went into a drug store. Being a soldier I wanted to get him out of the street, as I bent over him, I couldn't smell alcohol and I immediately made the statement he is not drunk. The colored woman returned and said "No he isn't drunk he's sick." The soldier was taken to the hospital by the ambulance the woman had called from the drug store.
(2) On the street
(3) 2 months
(4) Although both white and colored were quick to condemn the soldier for apparent drunkenness, they both, white and colored, were just as quick to sympathize.

Unfavorable incident, written by white officer:

(1) A white civilian law officer asked a Negro Sgt what he was doing standing on a corner in Columbus and when the Sgt informed him that he was waiting for his girl friend to finish work the policeman told him to move on. The Sgt started to move and the policeman suddenly slapped him in the face with sufficient force to knock him down. The policeman accused him of saying something as he started to move away, and I immediately stepped in and was told by the policeman to "Mind your own dammed business or I'll run you in."

(2) Street corner by a drugstore, at about 2000 hours
(3) 2½-3 mos
(4) Caused further degeneration of the already poor and questionable relationship between the police and Negro soldier
(5) By having a properly trained adequate law enforcement agency selected on a merit basis

III. Traveling to and from Camp. This area consists of those incidents which occur as the soldier interacts with civilians while en route to or from camp. He may be traveling by public conveyance or private auto. Obviously, the line of demarcation of this area shades into Area II, "Engaging in Informal Social Relationships with Civilians," as, for example, when there is an incident occurring *in* a filling station, or *in* the bus depot or train station. Such an incident is classed in "Traveling to and from Camp" when the report indicates that the soldier's presence in the station was incidental to his travel.

Contacts with civilian passengers in a public conveyance: Incidents here are concerned with giving up or refusing to give up seats when requested, difficulty between white and Negro passengers regarding seating arrangements, causing disturbances on the conveyance, or making adjustments for the convenience of fellow passengers.

Favorable incident, written by Negro private:

(1) One case is I was on a bus returning back to camp and all the seats were taken and me and some other soldiers were standing and were told to get on the next bus. When a couple of white ladies put their children in their laps and gave up the seat to us. Another case is here at camp going to town the bus was very crowded and didn't stop and a white man took me into town.
(2) Nebraska bus station
(3) 3 weeks
(4) That a white person would go out of his way to try to do something good for a Negro without thinking about getting some money out of the deal

Unfavorable, written by white NCO:

(1) A Negro soldier was sitting in rear of a bus, the bus was quite crowded, white civilian came up and told the Negro to move, he did not comply with the demand. The white civilian repeated the question and the Negro told him to mind his own business whereupon the white slapped him. Two other whites jumped up and stopped the white man from going any further and no doubt stopped a serious situation.
(2) A bus
(3) About 6 or 7 months ago
(4) In my opinion that Negro could have been a returned Korean Vet or a WWII Vet who had been fighting for his country and this very man, for rights and liberty to live a life of freedom from such tyranny.
(5) By the white man to have minded his own business, as many others on the bus were doing

Contacts with civilian authorities in a public conveyance: This subarea is similar to Area III A, "Contacts with civilian passengers in a public conveyance," but in this case the civilian represents authority. He decides when and under what conditions the vehicle moves; he admits or refuses entrance to individual passengers. The interaction therefore concerns the passenger and the driver, conductor, or attendant.

Favorable incident, written by Negro officer:

(1) The law of Georgia requires that Negroes who ride street cars or buses take seats from rear toward front and that whites take seats from front to rear. On one particular day more Negroes than white boarded the bus and in taking seats some of the Negroes skipped a vacant seat and took several nearer the front. At the next stop more white people got on the bus than the vacant seats would accommodate. The bus driver told the Negroes who were sitting forward to move to the rear and occupy the seats that had been left vacant. Very reluctantly, they complied with the request. Shortly after this happened several of the white people got off the bus and left vacant seats in the front between whites who were sitting farther to the rear. When more Negroes, than the vacant seats

in the rear would accommodate, got on the bus at the next stop, the bus driver told the whites to move to the front. They moved and the Negroes had seats.

(2) This took place on a bus.

(3) Six months ago

(4) The fairness and justice with which the bus driver carried out the letter of the written law. (While I consider it to be a bad law, since it is the law it should be obeyed.)

Unfavorable incident, written by white NCO:

(1) I was taking a cab to camp and I asked a Negro if he wanted to ride with me and he started to get into the cab but the cab driver told him he couldn't take Negroes in his cab but since he is in the service he is doing his job for the government why can't they have the rights of a white person.

(2) On the street

(3) 6 mos.

(4) It makes the Negro look little and why should he fight for his country if he can't live under the constitution of the U.S. like the other people.

(5) To have the cab company change their rules against Negroes in the Armed Service.

Offering and accepting rides in private autos: Sharing or pooling cars, picking up hitchhikers, or behaviors arising out of these situations make up this subarea.

Favorable incident, written by Negro NCO:

(1) I saw a Negro soldier on the post waiting for a bus. A white officer picked up a white lady who was also waiting for the bus, but would not allow the Negro soldier to ride. The lady refused the ride for the sake of the soldier.

(2) At a bus stop. Fort Riley, Kansas.

(3) 8 or 9 months.

(4) The fact that neither the white lady or the Negro soldier knew each other and had not spoken to each other.

Unfavorable incident, written by white officer:

(1) Negro soldiers waiting in the rain, hitch-hiking, passed up by many cars driven by whites who did pick up white soldiers

(2) Street in Columbus

(3) Week

(4) Negro soldiers could see cars passing them up and picking up white soldiers.

(5) Give the Negro soldier a ride.

Contacts with civilians through auto accidents, mishaps, or traffic violations: Stopping to aid motorists in trouble, assisting at the scene of an accident, being arrested for traffic violations or for driving under the influence of liquor, are all classed in this subarea. Some of these incidents are similar to some of those in II E, "Interacting with civilians in casual or 'street' contacts," but here the activity took place along the road or highway, while the persons involved were en route to a destination.

Favorable incident, written by Negro NCO:

(1) A white civilian stopped on the highway at about 2 AM to help a Negro soldier repair a minor engine defect and then pushed the soldier with his car for a distance of approximately 3 miles in an attempt to start the car.

(2) On Highway 40 between Manhattan and Topeka

(3) About one month ago

(4) The lateness of the hour; the fact that the civilian had his family with him, and the fact that there was a steady downpour of rain during the entire period. Also surprising was the fact that the man was quite obviously a Southerner.

Unfavorable incident, written by Negro NCO:

(1) A Negro sergeant was driving a Lincoln auto and ran over a white line in the street. A white state trooper immediately gave the Negro sergeant a ticket and said that "N———" stay

in their place where he came from. I noticed several other drivers cross the line and nothing was said.
(2) Street — Wrightstown, N.J.
(3) Jul 1951
(4) It was bad because the average Negro does not realize that race prejudice rears its ugly head even in New Jersey.
(5) By keeping all race-baiting Southerners down south where they belong

Contacts with civilians at stops en route: Included in this subarea are incidents occurring as the soldier makes contact with civilians in the bus or train station or the filling station. The behaviors in this area may be similar to those in other areas, such as in II A or II B (obtaining entrance to, service in, or interacting with civilian patrons in, places of trade, recreation, or refreshment), but are classed here because the soldier is traveling to or from camp.

Favorable incident, written by Negro civilian:

(1) About 2 months ago I witnessed an incident of 2 Negro soldiers trying to work out a destination on a Philadelphia Transit Co. map. A white woman went up to them and asked if she could help. She gave them directions and then left. Although the car was crowded no one paid much attention as this sort of thing is commonplace in Philadelphia.
(2) PTC elevated train
(3) 2 months
(4) The fact that the whole car took the incident for granted

Unfavorable incident, written by white NCO:

(1) A colored soldier came into the bus station to ask about the time of the next bus to Ft. Benning. There was a white lady standing next to the Negro soldier while the soldier was asking for the bus departure time. The lady made the statement that she wished that they would keep damn Negroes in their places and out of white people's places. There was a small argument but, of course, everyone took the white lady's place and the Negro soldier left the station.
(2) Bus station
(3) 3 months
(4) It showed very bad relations between the white population and our Negro soldiers.
(5) By the white lady keeping her mouth shut

IV. Carrying Out Duty Assignments Involving Contact with Civilians. This area consists of incidents arising out of the context of the soldier performing a duty assignment. These include interactions with civilians in normal on-post office situations, MP duty, emergency duty, and "special" assignments.

Office contacts with civilians in military employ: This area is comprised of those incidents occurring between soldiers and civilians working side by side in offices on the post, or who have occasion by reason of duty to make contact frequently.

Favorable incident, written by white civilian:

(1) When employed, I was to take a Negro clerk-ty[illegible]st's job. He had to show and explain everything to me. He never minded showing and telling me anything I asked him, and cooperated with me any way he could.
(2) Fort Riley, main post
(3) 2 weeks
(4) Willingness to answer questions and help

Unfavorable incident, written by white civilian:

(1) This Negro soldier became angry with a white civilian employee because she had asked him to put his papers in a different place. He used abusive language and went close to her as if he were going to strike her. Other Negro soldiers called him away and the girl was too frightened to say anything.
(2) At work — Ft. Riley
(3) 4 months

(4) This soldier had never been made to do anything that he didn't want to — that is during his duty hours.

(5) This particular soldier should have been removed from the section long before. He had always done things to annoy the civilian employees, but it had never been reported to higher authorities.

Contacts with civilians while on duty in times of crisis: Almost all of the incidents in this subarea spring from the July 1951 flood in the Kansas area. Soldiers detailed to duty during such an emergency work in close cooperation with civilians.

Favorable incident, written by white civilian:

(1) Negro military personnel helping to evacuate white people during the recent flood in Manhattan, Kansas. One Negro in particular swam and helped to guide a boat in swift water to rescue or evacuate a white woman and her husband.

(2) Street of Manhattan, Kansas

(3) 3 months

(4) Doing something that was not required of him

Unfavorable incident, written by Negro officer:

(1) A soldier being part of a detail sent to town from this post to aid in the evacuation of families during the flood, worked all during the night. The next morning he stopped into a restaurant to obtain breakfast and was told that they would not serve him in any manner, regardless of the prevailing emergency.

(2) Restaurant

(3) Jun 1951

(4) Poor community spirit, undemocratic and instances of this type spreads and breeds discontent

(5) To have fed this soldier, even though it was contrary to the community rules

Line-of-duty contacts with civil authorities: Interactions with local police, legal authorities, city managers, and other civic officials are included here. In each case the person or persons involved are carrying out duty assignments.

Favorable incident, written by Negro officer:

(1) A Negro soldier was confined to the post stockade for going AWOL. Two weeks after he was confined his wife was involved in a fight with another Negro woman, in Columbus, Georgia. The EM and his wife had a four year old child who was with her mother. The mother was sentenced to pay a fine of $26.00 or serve 26 days at the work camp. She was unable to pay the fine. The Chaplain of the soldiers' unit, who was also a Negro, was called in on the case. He went to the city hall and requested a conference with the Judge who tried the case. The first police sergeant who was contacted was very arrogant in his attitude toward the Chaplain. The Chaplain saw this apparent hostility and said, "thank you very much." Later he contacted another policeman, who was a Captain, and told him what he wanted. This policeman got in touch with the Judge and made an appointment for the Chaplain. During the conference, the Judge, when told that the child was left alone, became very concerned about the case. He requested that the Chaplain contact relatives of the woman and see if it was possible for any of them to care for the child. He further stated that if this was not possible he would either suspend the sentence or see that the appropriate welfare agency cared for the child until one or both of the parents was free from confinement. The Judge was very cordial in his reception of the Chaplain and showed a keen sense of human understanding.

(2) The conference took place in the office of the Judge.

(3) Two weeks ago

(4) The desire of the Judge to protect the innocent child yet carry out his responsibility to the community

Unfavorable incident, written by white officer:

(1) I accompanied a Negro soldier to the city court at his request to testify in his behalf. The charge was driving under the influence of alcohol. We seated ourselves in the court to wait calling of the case. The bailiff (I presume — but a court official, in any case) informed us, in a contemptuous

tone, that we could not sit together. I told the bailiff that I was representing the man and was told, "That don't make a bit of difference — you can't sit with those bastards in this court." When the case was called, the fine administered was $156.00 and costs. Three cases tried while we waited, the participants all white, and charges were all the same, resulted in fines of $25 and $35 — all first offenders as was the Negro. However, the judge had remarked that the soldier drove a Buick and that "all you nigger soldiers got lots of money."

(2) City court
(3) 3 months
(4) If nothing else, it proved to me and to the soldier that he was not equal in the law of the area.
(5) Education of the court and law enforcement agencies to equal treatment

Special duty assignments involving contact with civilians The special duties included in this subarea include MP duty, chauffeuring officers or visiting officials, putting on special service shows, conducting burial detail, working in a hospital serving soldiers and civilians, or being assigned to the hospital as a patient.

Favorable incident, written by white officer:

(1) We had a civilian patient in the hospital who was seriously ill and died. A Negro Sgt medical technician took care of him during the day time and that care was so excellent that the patient's family and friends and his fraternal brothers often commented about it.
(2) In Brooke Army Hospital
(3) 2 months
(4) How completely at ease the whole group were

Unfavorable incident, written by white civilian:

(1) A Negro M.P. came in looking for a man. He stormed into the bar and very aggressively demanded that he be shown around. I explained that he should have rung the service bell and asked nicely for help. He swelled up and called a couple of other M.P.'s in and said "get your sticks boys we have to take this place over." They went through the building, didn't find their man and left.
(2) Restaurant-bar
(3) Sometime this year — indefinite on exact time
(4) It caused bad feeling between the white soldiers in the building and the M.P.s
(5) The M.P. need not have been so aggressive. He could have rung the service bell and we would have been glad to have helped him.

V. Obtaining Housing and Establishing Neighborhood Relationships. This area is comprised of incidents that arise as a result of the soldier's seeking temporary or permanent residence for himself and/or his family, or as a result of the interactions between his family unit and other family units residing nearby.

Obtaining housing for self or family: The title of this subarea reveals the nature of the incidents which make it up. These incidents for the most part represent attempts by the soldier to obtain family housing off-post, but also include his attempts to get temporary quarters on the post, or housing for himself in a private home or hotel.

Favorable incident, written by white civilian:

(1) In my locality an old lady took two Negro couples in her upstairs apt. Before this they could not find a place to live. They all shared her kitchen in every way and they were all perfectly satisfied.
(2) Sparta
(3) Winter and spring 1951
(4) The Negroes were very kind to this elderly lady and in lots of ways they looked out for her good.

Unfavorable incident, written by Negro officer:

(1) My wife and I have been looking for a place to live in the vicinity of the post. We have been to several places that are advertised for rent. We have been turned down because we are

Negroes. The people have been honest about it and have told us why they cannot let us have the places in question. If we were to tell them that we are Portuguese, as another family we know told them, we would probably find a place as they have.

(2) Several private homes

(3) August, 1951

(4) It happened in Wisconsin, a Northern state. It has changed my opinion of people in Wisconsin. I do not have the same faith in the people of this area.

(5) My not bringing my family to this area

Establishing neighborhood relationships: This area is concerned with the ways in which Negroes and whites, military and civilian get along when living in close proximity, either as tenants in the same building, or as neighbors in the community. Many of the incidents pertain to interactions between the soldier's family and other families. The soldier's family is classed here as "military personnel."

Favorable incident, written by white private:

(1) I was home on a three day pass one week ago and the first day I was home, my car broke down; one of my neighbors, a Negro, gave me his car for the period I was home, even though he had to ride a bus to work.

(2) At my home town, at my home, Joplin, Mo.

(3) Sep 2, 1951

(4) The point that impressed me most, was the fact that a person would ask another to use his car, even though the person would need it himself. Doing without himself to help another

Unfavorable incident, written by white officer:

(1) I was returning home for dinner in my automobile (quartered on the Post) when I noticed a group of young children (3–8) throwing stones at a young Negro boy (about 3–4 yrs. old). My boy, almost 4 yrs. old was one of the participants. I had a short talk with the youngsters about how wrong they were. One of the older boys said — "He's a 'Neger.'" I was very perturbed about this and that evening I had a chat with his father. I also had a long talk with my boy. My boy has never had dealings with colored children as we resided in a strictly white district. I tried to point out that there was no difference between him and that little boy except color. I assured him that he would be given a spanking the next time.

(2) On the street

(3) Week ago

(4) There should be no race discrimination.

(5) Parents are not teaching their children properly about no race discrimination.

Findings

By combining those incidents which in the judgment of the analyst seemed similar, the total number of incidents, 824, was reduced to 255 separate statements of behavior, classified as described above. These behavior statements constitute a body of specific interactions descriptive of actual occurrences involving civilians and soldiers of both races. They provide detailed information on those situations which, in the eyes of the respondents, led to the betterment or to the worsening of racial relations between military and civilian communities.

The list of behavior statements is presented in Table B118. Those behaviors identified by the respondent as *favorable* are given first, for each subarea, followed by those identified by respondents as *unfavorable.*

It will be noted that, in several instances, essentially the same behavior is reported as both favorable and unfavorable. Thus, three white respondents report as favorable the observation that a soldier danced with a girl of the opposite race. One white respondent reported as unfavorable the observation that a Negro soldier danced with a white hostess. One Negro respondent reports as favorable the fact that a bus driver required whites to move to the front and Negroes to move to the rear; another Negro respondent reports as

unfavorable the fact that a bus driver required the Negro's white companion to move to the front, in effect separating two friends. In the latter example, the two situations cannot be considered exactly parallel. The first reporter commends the impartial execution of the law; the second disapproves such execution in the special case which forces his friend and himself to be separated.

Because the subtleties of human behavior pose complex problems for interpretation, the behavior statements here reported have been kept in rather specific form. To generalize them at a higher level would mean sacrificing many meaningful details.

For each statement there appears under "frequency" the number of incidents of this type reported by Negro and by white respondents.

TABLE B118

LIST OF BEHAVIOR STATEMENTS

I A. Participating in organizational dances

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
1	5	1. Negro and white soldiers participated in organizational dance.
0	3	2. Soldier danced with girl of opposite race.
0	1	3. Negro hostess was present at organizational dance.
1	0	4. White civilian instructed Negro soldiers and civilians in square dance.
0	1	5. Officers of OCS class tactfully handled embarrassing biracial problem at organizational dance.
2	10	

		Unfavorable
3	1	1. Negro soldiers were denied entrance to organizational dance.
5	0	2. Negro soldiers were prohibited from dancing with white hostesses.
0	1	3. Negro soldier danced with white hostess.
0	2	4. Group of whites protested presence of Negro soldiers or urged their exclusion from dance.
4	1	5. No Negro hostesses, or insufficient number, present at dance.
0	1	6. Negro soldier attended dance at "white" service club and asked white hostess to dance.
0	5	7. Negro soldier caused disturbance when white hostess refused to dance with him.
0	1	8. White soldier caused disturbance when Negro soldier asked white hostess to dance.
12	12	

I B. Participating in organizational functions where dancing is not a factor

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
3	11	1. Negro soldier and/or family participated in church service or social function.
0	4	2. Negro soldiers participated in organized community athletic events.
3	11	3. Negro soldiers and/or families participated in community-military recreational or educational gathering.
0	2	4. Soldiers arranged benefits for children and underprivileged of the community, regardless of race.
1	1	5. Soldiers and civilians of both races cooperated in arranging formal party or exhibit.
7	29	

TABLE B118 (continued)

		Unfavorable
0	1	1. Church members objected to Negro singing in choir.
1	0	2. Civilian in charge of entertainment for troops refused to allow white civilians into camp to entertain Negro troops.
0	2	3. Civilian refused to admit Negro members of OCS class to class party.
0	1	4. Church members organized recreation center for Negro troops but unit officers failed to notify their troops.
1	4	

II A. Obtaining entrance to or service in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
4	4	1. White storekeeper or restaurateur served Negro soldiers.
0	5	2. Negro soldier was especially courteous in dealing with clerk or waiter.
3	0	3. White soldier refused to be served when Negro companion was denied service.
1	0	4. White theater usher moved Negro soldier to the head of a line waiting for tickets.
1	0	5. Night club manager expelled white soldiers for molesting Negro soldier patrons.
0	1	6. Negro bellboy voluntarily returned money found in white soldier's clothing.
9	10	

		Unfavorable
44	32	1. Negro military personnel were refused admittance or service or were served reluctantly.
4	2	2. Negro soldiers were given service in "special" section or served outside the establishment.
0	12	3. Negro soldier created disturbance when refused service.
6	1	4. White PX or NCO club clerks ignored or gave poor service to Negro soldiers.
0	3	5. Negro soldiers were disorderly or discourteous to clerk or waiter.
0	7	6. White civilian expressed resentment at Negroes being served on equal basis with whites.
0	1	7. Negro military personnel insisted on being admitted to public dance.
0	2	8. White soldier led Negro soldiers into a club where Negroes were not accepted.
0	2	9. Negro and white soldiers were permitted to eat in same establishment.
1	0	10. Store owner charged Negro soldier higher price than white.
0	1	11. Civil police intervened in minor disturbance on post, using obscene language and force against Negro soldiers.
0	1	12. White cafe manager refused service to Negro soldier, then held him while two soldiers beat him.
0	1	13. Negro soldier misinterpreted waitress' slowness in serving him as discrimination.
55	65	

II B. Interacting with civilian patrons in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
6	4	1. Soldiers and civilians of both races socialized freely in tavern or cafe.
0	9	2. Negro soldiers were especially courteous in contacts with other patrons.
1	4	3. Soldiers and civilians of both races played in competitive sports without friction.
0	1	4. Negro soldier displayed unexpected degree of honesty in dealing with laundry workers.
0	1	5. White woman asked waiter to serve Negro soldier first.
0	1	6. Negro soldiers gave up seats in cafe to white women.
0	1	7. Negro soldier chatted amiably with white children.

TABLE B118 (continued)

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
0	2	8. Negro and white military and civilian acted courteously toward one another while entering restaurant.
0	1	9. Negro civilian was courteous to white soldier after soldier had been very rude in cafeteria line.
0	2	10. Negro soldiers put on spontaneous "show" for civilian patrons.
0	1	11. White civilians defended Negro soldier against threats and abuse of white soldiers.
1	0	12. Negro soldier intervened and stopped fight between white civilians.
0	1	13. White civilians supported Negro soldier who chided white civilian for "crashing the line."
8	28	

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Unfavorable
1	9	1. Negro soldier was disorderly or rude to civilian patrons, causing disturbance.
0	1	2. Negro prostitutes entered cafe and created disturbance among mixed military and civilian patrons.
0	2	3. White civilian was discourteous to wife of Negro serviceman.
3	6	4. Negro soldiers obtained service, causing resentment or withdrawal of white patrons.
0	1	5. Negro soldier committed minor sex offense in public library.
0	1	6. Negro soldier "talked too much" at bar, causing friction between military and civilian patrons.
0	1	7. Negro soldiers crowded around white civilian who had bought drinks for a few of them.
1	2	8. White civilian caused disturbance by insulting or treating Negro soldier unjustly.
1	0	9. White civilian told Negro soldier to remove his hat while talking to a white woman.
1	2	10. White soldiers created disturbance over Negro soldier talking with white girl.
0	2	11. White girls danced with Negro soldiers in a bar.
0	1	12. White soldier asked patrons in "colored" bar about possibility of a Negro "pick-up."
0	1	13. White soldier rebuked Negro woman for preceding him in line.
1	0	14. Civil police broke up informal dance because soldiers of both races were present.
8	29	

II C. Approaching or dating civilian women

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
		No incidents in this area were reported as favorable

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Unfavorable
0	18	1. Negro soldier tried to date, "pick up," or flirt with white girl.
0	2	2. Negro soldier was involved in intercourse with Indian girl.
0	1	3. White soldier was involved in intercourse with Negro girl.
0	1	4. Negro soldier tried to "pick up" Negro girl in public.
1	1	5. White soldier socialized with Negro girl in public.
0	4	6. Negro soldier socialized with white girl in public.
0	1	7. Negro soldier entered bar with white prostitute.
0	1	8. White soldier "picked up" Negro prostitute in bar.
1	0	9. White soldier fondled Negro woman, resulting in argument with Negro woman's escort.
0	1	10. White soldiers urged Negro soldier to "make a play" for white girl.
0	1	11. Negro soldier invited white soldier to have intercourse with Negro girl.
0	1	12. Negro soldier chased woman onto stranger's porch.
0	1	13. Negro soldiers told white civilians about their dating white girls, resulting in fight between soldiers and civilians.

TABLE B118 (continued)

		Unfavorable
0	1	14. Negro soldiers stopped at swimming pool and made comments to women swimming themselves.
—	—	
2	34	

II D. Entertaining friends or acquaintances

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
2	5	1. Biracial group of soldiers and civilians held joint party, dinner, or picnic.
1	1	2. Soldier's family invited soldier of opposite race to their home on weekend or holiday.
2	1	3. White civilian invited Negro soldier to dinner.
1	2	4. White civilian entertained Negro at home or in town.
1	1	5. Negro soldiers socialized with civilians visiting white soldiers on the post.
—	—	
7	10	

		Unfavorable
1	0	1. Police interrupted party in Negro's home after a riot, searched and slandered innocent soldiers and civilians.
0	1	2. Negro civilians showed resentment at white soldiers sitting on porches of Negro homes.
1	0	3. Negro WAC was prohibited from walking on street with group of white friends.
1	0	4. White soldier insulted Negro soldier's "date" and started a fight; police took Negro soldier into custody.
0	1	5. Negro soldiers held noisy private party in tavern late at night, disturbed townspeople.
—	—	
3	2	

II E. Interacting with civilians in casual or "street" contacts

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
1	0	1. White civilian aided Negro soldier in minor street mishap.
0	3	2. Negro soldier gave aid to aged or infirm white civilian.
0	2	3. White civilian was helpful to Negro soldier in giving directions.
0	2	4. Negro soldier was helpful to white civilian in giving directions.
0	2	5. Negro soldier stopped street fight involving white civilians.
1	0	6. White civilian asked Negro soldier to help stop a biracial fight.
1	0	7. White civilian intervened in fight between Negro soldier and Negro civilians.
1	4	8. Negro soldier was especially thoughtful or friendly toward white civilian.
2	2	9. Negro civilian inconvenienced himself to aid white soldier.
1	0	10. White civilian police cooperated with Negro officer in releasing Negro soldier who had committed minor traffic violation.
1	4	11. White civilian storekeeper chatted amiably and at length with Negro soldier.
0	2	12. Negro civilian mechanic took personal interest in servicing white soldier's car.
—	—	
8	21	

		Unfavorable
10	7	1. White police used physical force on Negro soldier with little or no provocation.
9	3	2. White civilian accused Negro soldier falsely, was unjustifiably rude, or used opprobrious name in addressing him.

TABLE B118 (continued)

		Unfavorable
0	16	3. Negro soldiers whistled at white girls, "cat called," or otherwise annoyed them.
0	4	4. Negro soldiers threw hand grenades at local police car.
1	2	5. White soldiers cursed or assaulted Negro civilians on street.
4	4	6. White police arrested or threatened to arrest Negro soldier for very minor offense, or for no offense.
0	1	7. White soldiers ridiculed a Negro civil policeman.
0	1	8. Negro civilians robbed white soldiers.
1	0	9. Negro civilian took unfair advantage or tried to cheat white soldier.
0	11	10. Negro soldier created disturbance, started a fight, or otherwise annoyed white civilians.
2	3	11. Street fight developed between white civilian and Negro soldier, making "bad impression" on other civilians.
0	1	12. Negro civilians threatened white soldier who was walking with Negro friends.
0	1	13. White soldiers "cat called" Negro women.
1	0	14. White police forbade white soldier to walk on street with Negroes.
0	1	15. Negro soldier frightened white woman by walking up to her porch while she was alone.
28	55	

III A. Contacts with civilian passengers in a public conveyance

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
1	16	1. Negro soldier gave up seat on bus or helped white woman with burdens.
1	2	2. White soldier gave up seat on bus to Negro woman.
1	0	3. White civilian gave up bus seat to injured Negro soldier.
1	0	4. White women inconvenienced themselves on a bus to make room for Negro soldiers.
2	3	5. White civilian befriended or conversed in friendly manner with Negro soldier.
0	1	6. Negro girl and white soldier conversed in friendly manner on a bus.
0	1	7. Negro soldier aided white girl traveling on bus.
6	23	

		Unfavorable
0	1	1. White civilian asked Negro soldier to move farther to rear of bus rather than sit beside him.
1	1	2. White civilian assaulted Negro soldier who refused to move to rear of bus as requested.
0	1	3. Negro soldier refused to move to rear of bus as required by law.
0	1	4. Negro soldier and white girl sat together on bus and conversed in friendly manner.
4	2	5. White civilians complained about Negroes' presence on bus, or about having to sit beside them.
0	11	6. Negro soldiers annoyed white civilians, used obscene language, or made nuisances of themselves on public conveyance.
0	1	7. Negro soldier tried to sit with white civilian on a bus.
1	0	8. Negro soldier precipitated a fight by asking white civilian to give up his seat to white woman.
6	18	

III B. Contacts with civilian authorities in a public conveyance

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
1	0	1. White bus driver made special stop to pick up Negro soldier.

TABLE B118 (continued)

		Favorable
1	0	2. White bus driver required whites to move to front as well as Negroes to move to rear.
0	1	3. White bus driver explained to Negro soldier in friendly way the Southern custom in seating arrangements.
1	0	4. White bus driver evicted white soldiers who complained about riding with Negroes.
0	1	5. Negro soldiers conducted themselves as gentlemen in dealing with white cab driver.
0	1	6. White bus driver was tolerant of drunken Negro soldier; allowed him to remain on bus.
3	3	

		Unfavorable
3	1	1. White bus driver demanded that Negro soldier leave bus or that he stand, rather than occupy a "white" seat.
3	1	2. White bus driver required Negro soldier to move to rear when custom allowed indiscriminate seating, or when other seats were available.
2	0	3. White bus driver filled bus with whites and told Negro soldiers there were no "colored" seats.
0	7	4. Negro soldier refused to sit in rear of bus, resulting in disturbance.
1	2	5. White bus driver ordered Negro soldier to rear of bus in gruff, discourteous manner.
0	2	6. White bus driver cursed or ignored questions of Negro soldier.
1	0	7. White bus driver required Negro soldier to give his seat to white civilian.
1	0	8. White bus driver made white soldier move to front, leaving his Negro companion.
1	0	9. Negro soldier cursed or threatened bus driver.
0	2	10. White driver refused to allow Negro soldier to board conveyance.
0	1	11. White soldier cursed Negro train attendant.
0	1	12. Negro soldiers became disorderly while boarding a train, causing great confusion.
0	1	13. Injured Negro soldier was refused a seat on public bus, and cursed for being "drunken damned nigger."
1	0	14. Bus driver enforced segregation laws on his bus.
0	1	15. Negro soldiers were argumentative in taxicab.
13	19	

III C. Offering and accepting rides

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
7	20	1. White civilian gave Negro soldier ride to or from camp.
1	0	2. Negro civilian gave white soldier ride to or from camp.
0	2	3. White soldier gave Negro civilian ride to or from camp.
1	0	4. Negro soldier gave white civilian ride to or from camp.
1	1	5. Negro and white civilians and soldiers established car pool.
1	0	6. White civilian paid bus fare for Negro hitch-hiker when white's wife objected to Negro riding with them.
1	0	7. White civilian refused ride when Negro soldier, also waiting at bus stop, was not invited to ride.
12	23	

		Unfavorable
0	1	1. White civilian picked up white soldiers and passed by Negro soldiers.
0	1	

TABLE B118 (continued)

III D. Contacts with civilians through auto accidents, mishaps, or traffic violations

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
0	10	1. Negro soldier helped white civilian motorist who was having car trouble.
0	1	2. White soldier helped Negro civilian motorist who was having car trouble.
0	2	3. Negro civilian helped white soldier who was having car trouble.
7	2	4. White civilian helped Negro soldier who was having car trouble.
2	0	5. Negro soldier stopped at scene of accident and aided in getting civilians to hospital.
1	0	6. White civilian who witnessed auto crash between Negro soldier and white civilian, told Negro he would testify for him in court.
10	15	

		Unfavorable
2	2	1. Negro soldier was arrested for very minor traffic violation and jailed or fined.
1	0	2. Negro soldier was arrested for speeding although other cars were proceeding at even greater speed.
0	1	3. Negro soldier drove at excessive speed, forcing other motorists to run into curb.
3	3	

III E. Contacts with civilians at stops en route

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
0	1	1. Negro soldier carried baggage for white woman at bus station.
0	1	2. Negro soldier was very courteous to white ticket agent.
0	1	3. Negro soldiers offered assistance to white civilian who appeared in difficulty at way-station.
0	3	

		Unfavorable
6	0	1. Negro soldier was refused food or service at way-station while en route.
1	1	2. Negro soldier was given ticket in class of transportation lower than that to which he was entitled.
0	2	3. Negro soldier created disturbance by demanding service from white civilians not authorized to give it.
0	1	4. Negro soldier disobeyed segregation law and caused disturbance in bus station.
0	1	5. White woman objected to Negro's being in "white" bus station.
0	1	6. Intoxicated Negro soldier was permitted to "sleep it off" in train depot, later assaulted civilian watchman who tried to rouse him.
0	1	7. White policeman forced Negro soldier to get out of white's car.
7	7	

IV A. Office contacts with civilians in military employ

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
1	8	1. Negro officer or NCO gained respect and cooperation from white civilians working under his supervision.
0	4	2. Negro soldier was cooperative in carrying out requests of white civilian supervisor.
8	14	3. Soldiers and civilians of both races worked harmoniously in same office.
1	0	4. Negro officer used his lunch hour to teach white civilian to read and write.
0	1	5. Negro PX manager gave special consideration to serviceman's wife in his employ.

TABLE B118 (continued)

Frequency		
Negro	White	Favorable
0	1	6. Negro hostess at post guest house demonstrated tact in dealing with situations that could have caused racial trouble.
5	28	

		Unfavorable
1	0	1. White officer in charge of office failed to take action when white civilian called Negro an uncomplimentary name.
0	1	2. White civilian showed resentment at working under supervision of Negro NCO.
0	3	3. Negro soldiers, under supervision of white civilian, did work inefficiently and haphazardly.
1	0	4. White civilian put up sign prohibiting Negro soldiers from using post washroom.
0	1	5. White military supervisor turned down Negro civilian job applicant because of color.
0	2	6. Negro soldier was defiant, disrespectful, or used abusive language toward white civilian supervisor.
0	1	7. White civilian pushed Negro soldier out of line and took his place.
0	1	8. Negro cook, promoted to mess sergeant, treated employees with partiality.
2	9	

IV B. Contacts with civilians arising out of duty in times of crisis

Frequency		
Negro	White	Favorable
6	9	1. Military personnel and civilians worked together during flood or other emergency, without regard to race.
0	1	2. Negro soldier performed act of unusual bravery to rescue white civilian during emergency.
6	10	

		Unfavorable
1	0	1. Negro soldier, after working all night on flood detail, was refused service in restaurant.

IV C. Line-of-duty contacts with civilian authorities

Frequency		
Negro	White	Favorable
0	1	1. White policeman brought intoxicated Negro soldiers to MP station without pressing charges.
1	0	2. White judge cooperated with Negro chaplain to aid Negro child whose parents were in jail.
1	1	

		Unfavorable
0	1	1. Negro soldier threatened white policeman with knife.
0	1	2. White officer, conducting Negro troop movement, argued with white police over segregation.
1	0	3. White policeman called Negro soldiers "niggers" while enforcing segregation.
3	1	4. White civilian authorities refused to cooperate with Negro soldiers, give them information, or give information to whites representing Negro soldiers.

TABLE B118 (continued)

		Unfavorable
0	1	5. White judge imposed excessive fine on Negro soldier because of color.
2	0	6. White civil police abused or annoyed Negro military police.
6	4	

IV D. Special duty assignments involving contacts with civilians

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
1	0	1. White civilian instructor treated Negro and white soldiers as equals in a military class.
0	4	2. Negro MP on duty in town was courteous and helpful to white civilians.
0	2	3. Negro and white MPs on duty together worked effectively in dealing with civilians.
0	1	4. White civilian was equally courteous to Negro and white MPs on duty.
0	5	5. Negro soldiers participated in military shows and were well received by white civilians.
0	4	6. Civilians and soldiers worked together without regard to race in carrying out medical assignments or caring for patients.
0	2	7. Negro soldier did especially good job when assigned to temporary duty with white civilian.
0	1	8. Negro NCO dealt effectively with white businessmen in buying items for unit mess.
0	1	9. White civilian took special pains to safeguard Negro tenants from intrusion by white troops on bivouac.
1	20	

		Unfavorable
1	0	1. White civilian tried to prevent Negro MP from arresting white soldier.
0	1	2. Negro MP was unnecessarily discourteous and aggressive while carrying out search in a civilian bar.
0	1	3. Negro MP attempted to peek into window of ladies room in civilian office he was assigned to guard.
1	3	4. White civilian made derisive comments or acted discourteously toward Negro soldier on duty.
0	1	5. White doctor showed reluctance and resentment in treating Negro wife of serviceman.
1	0	6. White police prevented Negro MP from taking charge of intoxicated Negro soldier.
0	1	7. Negro soldier, after race riot, was afraid to carry out duty assignment in town; was given white escort.
2	1	8. Negro soldiers on duty in town were refused restaurant service or required to eat in special section.
0	1	9. Negro civilian was sarcastic and discourteous to white officer in charge of burial detail.
5	9	

V A. Obtaining housing for self and family

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
6	10	1. White civilian rented private room, apartment, or house to Negro soldier.
1	4	2. White hotel or motel manager rented room to Negro soldier.
0	1	3. Negro soldier and white soldier shared room in hotel or private home.
3	0	4. White civilian assisted Negro soldier in finding a room, or took him into his own home.

TABLE B118 (continued)

		Favorable
1	0	5. Negro social agency made special arrangements to accommodate white officers overnight.
11	15	

		Unfavorable
8	5	1. White landlord refused to rent room or apartment to Negro soldier because of color.
2	4	2. White hotel manager refused to rent room to Negro soldier.
0	2	3. White civilians moved or voiced resentment when apartment in same building was rented to Negro soldier.
1	0	4. White civilian in service agency refused to give Negro soldier addresses for prospective housing.
0	1	5. Civilian police beat Negro soldier trying to find housing in an apartment building.
0	1	6. Negro soldier cursed hotel manager and charged discrimination when he refused room for legitimate reason.
0	1	7. Negro soldier left hotel room in extremely untidy condition.
11	14	

V B. Establishing relationships with neighbors

Frequency Negro	Frequency White	Favorable
1	7	1. Families of Negro and white civilians and soldiers gave mutual assistance during illness or common disaster.
0	2	2. Children of both races and of both civilian and military families attended same school and associated freely.
1	5	3. Negro and white neighbors, military and civilian, extended courtesies to one another, at some inconvenience to themselves.
0	1	4. Wife of Negro serviceman was active and prominent member of village social clubs.
0	1	5. White service wife gained acceptance for Negro service wife by introducing her to neighbors.
0	1	6. White farmer rented his car to Negro soldier at very reasonable rate.
0	1	7. Negro service family and white civilian family formed friendship through their children's acquaintanceship.
0	1	8. White woman became friendly with Negro service family after having complained about living next to them.
0	2	9. Negro tenants were especially tidy or considerate to white civilian landlord.
2	21	

		Unfavorable
0	1	1. Negro soldier, married to white woman, was excluded from both white and Negro social gatherings.
1	0	2. Landlord asked soldier tenant to move when he discovered soldier was Negro.
0	1	3. White civilian attempted to force Negro soldier to move from neighborhood.
0	1	4. Negro serviceman's wife left job under false pretenses and failed to return as promised.
0	1	5. Group of white children, including son of an officer, threw stones at Negro child because of his color.
0	1	6. Negro soldier left hotel without paying his bill.
0	1	7. Negro soldier and wife got into fight in hotel, resulting in their eviction.
1	6	

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

The major findings of the present study have been summarized and are presented in graphic form in Figs. B8–B11. More detailed breakdowns of the information shown in these figures are available in tabular form at the conclusion of this part of App B. The interpretation of the graphs in Figs. B8–B11 may be illustrated in Fig. B8. Here the top bar on the right is read as "6.4 percent of the total unfavorable incidents fall in the area of 'Engaging in Formalized Social Relationships with Civilians.' "




Fig. B8—Percent of Total Favorable and Unfavorable Incidents in Each Critical Behavior Area

From Fig. B8 it is evident that the area "Informal Social Relationships" is clearly the most frequent source of unfavorable incidents. For the favorable incidents, no striking differences among the areas are seen, although "Informal Social Relationships" is one of the two largest areas, the other being "Traveling to and from Camp."

Figure B9 shows the distribution of favorable incidents according to the subareas in which they fall. None of the subareas accounts for more than 10 percent of the total favorable incidents. There were no favorable incidents reported in the subarea covering "Approaching or dating civilian women."

Figure B10, showing the distribution of unfavorable incidents by subarea, contrasts with Fig. B9 in that two of the subareas are much larger than the others. These two are "Obtaining entrance to or service in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment," and "Interacting with civilians in casual or 'street' contacts," both of which fall under the major area of "Engaging in Informal Social Relationships." Together, these two subareas account for close to half of all the unfavorable incidents and for nearly three-fourths of the unfavorable incidents in "Informal Social Relationships."




Fig. B9—Percent of Favorable Incidents in Each Subarea of Critical Behavior




Fig. B10—Percent of Unfavorable Incidents in Each Subarea of Critical Behavior




Fig. B11—Percent of Total Incidents Reported by Negroes and Whites in Each Subarea of Critical Behavior

From Fig. B11 it is clear that the emphasis on obtaining entrance or service and casual or "street" contacts is similar for both Negro and white respondents. In general, there is a basic similarity in the distribution of incidents among subareas for both groups. Such differences as are found are not striking, though the Negro group reports a somewhat larger proportion of its incidents in the area of obtaining entrance or service. Reference to Tables B121 and B122 will reveal that the bulk of these incidents are unfavorable rather than favorable. Examination of the behavior statements shows clearly that the Negro respondents tend to identify as unfavorable the denial of entrance or service. White respondents, on the other hand, vary in the behavior identified as unfavorable, often reporting attempt by the Negro to obtain entrance or service as unfavorable. Such differences in the specific behaviors identified as favorable or unfavorable by Negroes compared with whites are found in other subareas as well.

In examining the figures shown here, it is important to recognize that the type of incident reported may be a function of the military or civilian status of the person reporting, the specific occupation of the civilian, or the particular community in which the incident occurred. However, the predominance of informal social activities as an area of difficulty holds for all of the group comparisons made. It has already been pointed out that it is true for both Negro and white respondents. The tables of distribution appearing later in App B (p. B-II-68) show that it is also true for both military and civilian groups and for all of the installations studied.

The data contained in the behavior statements themselves provide a wealth of information useful in the interpretation of the graphic material. For example, it is noted from a reading of the statements concerned with traveling to and from camp that conflict situations frequently develop as a result of the Negro soldier's patronizing bus lines operating between town and camp. Troublesome situations arise through his interactions with either the bus driver or white civilian patrons. In many of these situations, the Negro objects not only to the segregation policy but also to the way the bus driver enforces it. For example, giving "colored" seats to whites is often noted by Negroes as a particularly undesirable practice.

This example was presented to emphasize the kinds of information contained in the behavior statements. They serve to define in concrete terms the specific situations in which conflict has been found to occur. These situations could be used to good advantage in the training of officers who deal with Negro troops. It would seem desirable that all officers become familiar with the situations which do produce conflict, so that they may better anticipate these situations and be prepared to deal effectively with them when they arise. In addition to familiarizing all officers with the most important sources of difficulty, specific training devices could be formulated on the basis of the behavior statements. These devices might best be developed for the training of selected officers, and be directed toward the special problems found at individual installations. Those problems which are especially acute at a certain installation could be developed into problem situations to be considered in training sessions. For example, a training problem might be developed around the movement of a group of Negro and white troops through a Southern community. Officer trainees could be confronted with a specific situation requiring the location of an appropriate eating place for the troops in a community where segregation practices are rigidly enforced. The training situation would require each officer to formulate an effective solution to this problem.

Similarly, many more specific situations well suited to training needs may be found in the behavior statements. The list of statements is also available to commanders for use in developing local policy as well as in developing training procedures. Careful study of the statements would undoubtedly reveal many situations where specific action could be taken at a local level.

The investigators had opportunities to discuss with commanding officers specific techniques which they had found to be particularly effective in the handling of racial problems. It was found at Fort Lee, Va., for example, that ranking military personnel and civilian leaders speak with enthusiasm of the achievements of the local Law Enforcement Council. Membership of the Council includes representatives of both civil and military communities. Members ascribe much of the effectiveness of this council to the efforts and personality of a "strong" provost marshal who organized it. This technique, with its many possible variations, may be used to good advantage by other commanders.

At another installation it was found that courtesy patrols have been utilized in an attempt to prevent serious trouble between civilians and military personnel. Courtesy patrolmen have no official authority but in unofficial capacity try to ward off potentially dangerous situations by persuading soldiers in trouble to return to camp before the situation develops further. This practice, admittedly a "paternalistic" one, may be found effective in other installations also.

It has been suggested in earlier sections of this report that behavioral interactions must be viewed in the light of the environmental setting in which they occur. A striking example of this point is to be found in the results of this study. The flood conditions in Kansas during the summer of 1951 provided circumstances for the writing of many incidents describing cooperation between Negroes and whites in the Fort Riley area. A large proportion of the favorable incidents reported in the area dealing with duty assignments in times of crisis were written by Fort Riley respondents and are concerned with the flood conditions.

To aid in the description of the several communities studied, a list of hypotheses regarding the relationship between cultural factors and racial tensions was selected from several current sociological studies. The list is offered as one set of hypotheses which may be taken as leads for further research effort. It should be pointed out that this list is not intended as an exhaustive set of hypotheses, nor as a means by which cultural factors can be evaluated. The observation that one or more of the conditions noted exists in a given community cannot be accepted as an index of tension in that community, but merely as an indication that conditions exist which could give rise to racial conflict.

The hypotheses are presented below. An "X" in the installation column denotes that the condition stated in the hypothesis was found in that community.

The probability of racial tension in the community is increased when:

Condition	Fort Dix	Fort Benning	Fort Sam Houston	Fort Riley	Camp McCoy
1. Birth rate of minority group greatly exceeds death rate	x				
2. Minority group is large and easily identified by color or language	x	x	x		
3. Minority group is migrating into the community			x		
4. Minority group is concentrated in small area of the community	x	x	x	x	x
5. Minority group makes up large proportion of the population	x	x	x		
6. Community economy is based on a single industry				x	x
7. A large migratory labor group is imported into the community	x		x		
8. Minority group's economic position is rapidly improving or deteriorating	x		x		
9. Job quotas are imposed on minority group		x	x		

Condition	Fort Dix	Fort Benning	Fort Sam Houston	Fort Riley	Camp McCoy
10. Restrictive covenants are imposed on minority group	x	x	x	x	
11. Inadequate housing leads to moving of minority group into new sections	x	x	x	x	
12. Housing "projects" are segregated rather than integrated		x	x		
13. Custom does not dictate clear-cut, detailed, widely recognized patterns of interpersonal relations	x			x	
14. Minority group believes police force acts illegally, unfairly, or brutally	x	x	x		
15. Schools are segregated		x	x	x	
16. Antidiscrimination laws are explicit but ignored				x	
17. Segregated facilities are equal in name but not in fact		x	x	x	

If experimentation should support any of these hypotheses, their use in a scale of measurement might be possible, although there would still remain the problems of determining the influence one condition has upon another, and of assigning differential weights to the various conditions.

It is held to be significant that, of the 242 incidents reported by civilian respondents, only one incident expressed dissatisfaction with the integration program on the post. Some of these civilian respondents had little occasion to observe the integration program directly, but many of them were either employed on the post or visited the post frequently on social occasions. Furthermore, most of the civilian respondents were interviewed individually, affording ample opportunity for the investigator to learn their attitudes toward the integration program. Many of them volunteered their views and discussed integration at some length. The attitudes expressed revealed no alarm over integration on the post or its implications for military-community relations. In general, the civilians interviewed voiced the opinion that integration on the post was in the province of the Army and bore little or no relation to the affairs of the community.

1951 SURVEY OF THE FORT DIX COMMUNITY*

Although Trenton is the nearest large city to Fort Dix, Philadelphia is the community to which most military personnel go for recreational purposes. There are two reasons for this preference. One is that Philadelphia has made more planned activities possible for the military, either for Fort Dix or for those of the three nearer military installations. The other is that Trenton is a "bad" soldiers' town especially for Negroes because public opinion in general and the attitude of the police in particular have not been cordial.

Philadelphia is the larger of the two communities and possibly the attractions of a metropolis appeal more to soldiers in their spare time. The city of Philadelphia has a population of 2,064,794; within its metropolitan limits there are nearly three million (2,913,516).† It is 35 miles from Fort Dix.

*Sources of information for the community descriptions include: (a) Chamber of Commerce published booklets; (b) descriptive booklets published by city governments; (c) newspapers; (d) published and unpublished reports of community agencies; (e) interviews with citizens of the communities; and (f) records of police and other community agencies.

†Census figures used are 1950 provisional. They were especially compiled and provided to this study by the Bureau of the Census upon request.

This population is mainly native-born white. It is a slowly growing population, its growth during the last decade being seven percent. The Negro population, at present 16 percent of the total population, is a rapidly growing group and since 1910 has far exceeded the white rate of increase. This increase is now four times that of the white population. In 1949 the Negro birth rate was the highest in the history of the city (24.7 percent of the city's total births). The number of Negroes is estimated at 329,000.

With the exception of the Negro element, the population of Philadelphia is fairly homogeneous. A little more than 15 percent of the total is foreign-born. The most numerous foreign-born groups are Russians (22.9 percent), Italians (20.3 percent), Germans (9.4 percent), Irish (8.6 percent), Poles (8.2 percent), and English (5.9 percent). The percentages are 1940 census data and represent each group's proportion of the total foreign-born. Colored groups other than Negroes are negligible. There has been no rapid in- or out-migration, except possibly the suburban movement which is typical of most large cities. There are a small number of Puerto Ricans who have settled in Philadelphia since 1940.

Other communities nearer to Fort Dix which serve military personnel are Wrightstown, Browns Mills, and Mt. Holly.

Industry and Trade

Philadelphia is the center of the largest concentration of population and business in the United States. There are 21 million people within a 100-mile radius with a total buying power of 34 billion dollars. In addition, this area accounts for 15 percent of the nation's retail trade, 27 percent of wholesale business, 23 percent of service trades, and 20 percent of national manufacturing.

Two industrial developments about to be introduced are the steel industry and chemical and oil refining industries.

In a summary of its outstanding characteristics, Philadelphia is the nation's second largest port, third largest city, and third largest wholesaling center, and fourth largest in manufacturing, retailing, and buying income.

Philadelphia has a diversified industrial base. There is no one outstanding industry. A total of 366,020 workers are employed in 5584 manufacturing establishments. About 78 percent of these plants are small, employing fewer than 50 workers. Of the total 7801 establishments in the Philadelphia-South Jersey area, Philadelphia supplies about 57 percent of the employment.

Raw Materials and Transportation

Philadelphia, served by more than 100 steamship lines, is the second largest seaport in this country. It is the world's largest fresh water port, 88 nautical miles from the Atlantic Ocean. It is navigable the year round, thus having access to raw materials from any part of the world, as well as to such nearer raw materials as coal, coal tar, pig iron, ferroalloys, sand cement, coke, slate and refractories. The chief raw materials entering the port of Philadelphia are ore, crude petroleum, cork, wool, sugar, and gypsum.

Philadelphia is also the marketing center of the adjacent agricultural areas in New Jersey, Delaware, and Central Pennsylvania.

There are three railroad systems: the Pennsylvania, Baltimore and Ohio, and the Reading. In addition motor truck lines furnish direct service to all parts of the country.

There are three transcontinental and two North-South air lines. Two Transatlantic airlines operate directly from Philadelphia for Europe and Asia. The Philadelphia International airport is 7 miles southwest of City Hall. The Northeast airport is 15 miles from City Hall.

Segregation

Both under the Civil Rights Act of the state and the nondiscrimination provision of the recently adopted city charter, there is no legal segregation or discrimination in Philadelphia. This policy holds officially for housing, education, vocations, unions, theaters, hotels, bars, restaurants, or other places where Negroes and whites meet.

Also in Philadelphia there are powerful biracial pressure groups which take vigorous legal action wherever possible and which have a continuous educational program toward racial understanding and cooperation. These groups are united under the Philadelphia Fellowship Commission and include nine organizations: Citizens Council on Democratic Rights, Council for Equal Job Opportunity, International House, Philadelphia Jewish Community Relations Council, Fellowship House, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, National Conference of Christians and Jews, Philadelphia Council of Churches: Race Relations Department, and the Society of Friends: Race Relations Department.

The goals which are being publicized by this commission indicate the primary areas of current discrimination. These include equal opportunities in colleges and professional schools, a free city college, democratic hospital practices, employment on merit, elimination of quotas in employment and in higher education, nondiscriminatory public and private housing, and the elimination of an imputed hostility against Negroes on the part of the police.

These goals indicate the current areas and problems of tension within the city.

The new city charter which will become effective in Jan 1952 provides for a permanent commission on human relations. This commission, in addition to its educational and investigative functions, is charged with the enforcement of fair employment practices, nondiscrimination in all city services and in all city contracts involving $2000 or more, and equal opportunity and equal treatment in civil service; also, it may be called upon to enforce the State Civil Rights Law.*

There has been no violence because of racial issues in Philadelphia since 1941. There is, however, a widespread and more or less open hostility to the program of the Philadelphia Fellowship Commission on all of its policies. Their problems and policies are stated in the 10-year review, "Philadelphia Fellowship Commission, Tenth Anniversary, October 11, 1951."

In summary, there is considerable evidence both oral and documentary that a formal and informal policy of segregation and of associated discriminatory practices occur in all the agencies and institutions where Negroes and whites meet. These agencies include industry, employment agencies, and unions; hospitals and clinics; hotels, theaters, restaurants; schools and colleges; and both public and private housing.

Discrimination is most pronounced in private housing and in hotels and restaurants which cater exclusively to a white clientele. Although a policy of integration occurs in a few unions, the more common practice is to have parallel unions. There are no Negro lawyers in the Legal Aid Society, although there are now three third-year Negro law students who serve the society in a voluntary capacity. Negro physicians have the same difficulty in becoming staff members of hospitals as they do in other Northern cities.

There are two local Negro newspapers, the *Independent* (circ. 24,192) and the *Philadelphia Tribune* (circ. Tues. 8,573; Sat. 12,343) and two out-of-town newspapers with special Philadelphia editions, the *Pittsburgh Courier* (circ. 20,000) and the *Afro-American* (circ. 16,532).

* For particular problems and policies, consult pamphlet by the Philadelphia Fellowship Commission: "Report to the Community," 3: No. 8, Jun 1951.

Housing

The Negro population of Philadelphia is concentrated in four wards. These wards (20, 24, 32, and 52) are in reality one segregated area, and all but one have had marked increases in inhabitants since the 1940 census.* This area, being in, or adjacent to, the central area of the city, has a high density of population per square mile, a long history of inadequate housing, and a high incidence of overcrowding.†

Since the beginning of the Philadelphia Housing Authority in 1937, 9572 housing units have been constructed, of which 3000 were intended as low-rent projects. In addition four temporary housing projects containing 2149 units were constructed as a war measure, and six more were erected to meet the needs of returning veterans, making an additional 1775 units.

Under the revised Housing Act of 1950, there are now eight permanent projects, ten temporary projects, and nine proposed low-rent projects. Three of the eight permanent projects are available to Negroes, as well as one of the 10 temporary projects.

These four housing projects available to Negroes are:

	Buildings	Housing units
James Weldon Johnson Homes	62	589
Tasker Homes	0	1077
Richard Allen Homes	58	1324
Lehigh Homes	0	92
Total	120	3082

In addition, six of the nine proposed low-rent projects are located in districts now predominantly inhabited by Negroes. They will include eventually 3124 dwelling units.

Originally there was considerable public opposition to the opening of any of these projects on an integrated basis. However, in the project where integration is being experienced most completely, namely, Tasker Homes, there are reports of steady improvement in tenant relations without friction of an intergroup nature.

There is as yet as much resistance to Negroes in districts predominantly white as elsewhere in the North. Restricted covenants are common, and open opposition of real estate interests have made both of these problems a matter of considerable concern to the Philadelphia Fellowship Commission.

Law Observance and Enforcement

Police statistics do not record race. Accordingly there is no objective record of the frequency of Negroes among the criminals, or among the misdemeanants, or of persons committing offenses known to the police.

There are, however, two categories in the police record which do separate white and colored and which may indicate partly the frequency of criminal behavior of both groups.

In 1950 there were 124 homicides, the victims of which were 39 whites (31.5 percent) and 85 Negroes (68.5 percent). Also in the reports of missing persons, among the total of 4465 in 1950, there were 2912 whites (65.2 percent) and 1553 Negroes (34.8 percent).

The bulk of the Negro population lives in areas with high rates of criminality. However, there is no evidence that Negro criminality approximates 90 percent of the total, as

* For historical backgrounds of Negro housing in Philadelphia, consult: "Real Property and Low Income Housing Surveys," U. S. Works Projects Administration, Philadelphia, 1939, p. 32; Muller, H. M., "Urban Home Ownership: A Socio-Economic Analysis with Emphasis on Philadelphia," University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1947, pp. 78, 83, 87, 125, 129.

† Sources: "Report of the Philadelphia Housing Authority for the Period 1943 to June 1950," Philadelphia Housing Authority, Aug 1950; "The Veteran Housing Program," Philadelphia Housing Authority, Aug 1951.

a representative of the chief of police stated in his conversation about local crime conditions.

About 3 percent of the Philadelphia Police Force is Negro.

The most frequently met criticism of the police, especially so among Negroes, is that they are unfair in their treatment of Negroes and are prone to arrest them when whites would not be so treated. This note was made previously in the discussion of the objectives and problems of the Philadelphia Fellowship Commission.

Philadelphia is not a "wide-open" town but vice is readily available in the Race Street districts and is equally available to all races.

Wholesome recreation is also as readily available. It is a definite part of the city's program and is exceptionally well organized under the combined public recreation programs and the Philadelphia Service Organization. There is no discrimination in these recreational opportunities.

Employment and Other Economic Opportunities

Negroes are accepted as patrons in all stores and are accorded credit facilities on the same basis as whites.

The Fair Employment Practices Act, adopted in 1948, is the culmination of a 10-year program to gain equal economic rights for all citizens.

Under this act, individuals have immediate means of complaint against any presumed discrimination; employers are definitely limited in what they may and may not do in employee selection.

A brief review indicates the following results of the work of the Fellowship Commission:

Employment policies and patterns reflect a lessening of discrimination. The Commission's experience indicates the growth of a basic idea in the minds of Philadelphians, the idea that every individual is to be considered on the basis of his qualifications alone.

Many Philadelphia industrialists are finding that it is good business to hire the best-qualified applicant regardless of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry. Employment on merit and ability is a sound basis for profitable business operation.

It is sound economics to employ and upgrade persons of experience and ability without discrimination. Employment of "minority" group members results in expanded markets for products and services and reduces the burden on society caused by unequal job opportunities.

Employers are recognizing that the withholding of jobs and business opportunities from "minority" groups limits jobs and opportunities for others. Any person whose buying power is limited by employment in a job which is not commensurate with his ability is not being utilized to his economic capacity. More and more businessmen are accepting responsibility for assisting in the improvement of opportunity for all as part of their civic and international leadership.

All of the larger department stores in Philadelphia now have Negro sales persons. Prior to the Ordinance only two of these stores used Negroes in sales positions. During the Christmas season an increased number of colored sales persons were employed on a temporary basis by department stores. Two midcity chain stores have added colored sales persons. Specialty shops in the center of the city have likewise broadened their employment policies.

A public utility is using Negro men and women in positions formerly barred to them. A national insurance company has several Negro men and women in white-collar positions in its Philadelphia home office. A large milk company has several Negro driver-salesmen; these men were upgraded from the ranks.

The records of the Division of Pupil Personnel and Counseling of the Board of Public Education show that, despite declining job opportunities, Negro young people are now getting a fairer share of available jobs than they did prior to the passage of the Ordinance. Individual members of minority groups are showing more initiative in applying for jobs that they formerly assumed were barred to them.

The integration of Negroes has been stimulated in a number of labor unions that formerly maintained strict racial barriers. The Commission is aware of a number of Negroes who have been recently admitted to such unions.

The Commission feels that the contacts of its staff with employers, labor union officials, and other community leaders have been of such character as to gain increased support for the letter and spirit of the Ordinance. The Commission believes that complainants have received satisfying service from the staff. Persons of "minority" status have an increasing sense of participation in citizenship.

According to the findings of the Commission, a number of employers have changed their policies toward greater liberality in both hiring and upgrading workers regardless of their color, creed, or ancestry. Positions which have been opened in this period, mostly to colored workers, and the kinds of business in which these positions have been filled are listed as follows:

Fields of employment	Occupations
Manufacturing and construction	Skilled and semiskilled workers
	Production workers
Processing	Salesmen
Production	Foremen
	Bookkeepers
Wholesale and retail trade	Driver-salesmen
	Checkers, clerks, wrappers
Tobacco companies	Salespersons, cashiers
Food chain stores	Department heads
Drug stores	Managers, inspectors
Department stores	Secretaries, bookkeepers
Specialty shops	Stock clerks
Brewery and liquor distributors	Pharmacists
Automobile distributors	Mechanics
Milk companies	Tailors
Appliance stores	Seamstresses
Transportation, communications, and public utilities	Secretaries, clerks
	Telephone operators
	Salesmen, servicemen
Newspapers	Foremen, drivers, starters
Publishing companies	Motormen, mechanics
Public service	Nurses
	Physicians, surgeons
Hospitals	Internes
Laboratories	Technicians
Social welfare agencies	Pharmacists
Schools and colleges	Engineers
Government agencies	Teachers, professors
	Clerical workers
	Secretaries
	Public officials

Fields of employment	Occupations
Finance, insurance, real estate	Managers
	Messengers
Banks	Secretaries
Insurance companies	Clerks
	Bookkeepers
	Salesmen

Equal Rights Laws in Pennsylvania

Act No. 72 Session of 1887. An Act to provide civil rights for all people regardless of race or color.

Act No. 132 Session of 1935. Previous act amended and penalties are increased.

Act No. 375 Session of 1939. This revision is made a part of the Penal Code.

Section 654. Discrimination on Account of Race and Color:

(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of this Commonwealth shall be entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any places of public accommodation, resort or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons. Whoever, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any such place, directly or indirectly refuses, withholds from, or denies to, any person, any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof, or directly or indirectly publishes, circulates, issues, displays, posts or mails any written or printed communication, notice or advertisement to the effect that any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such places, shall be refused, withheld from, or denied to, any person on account of race, creed, or color, or that the patronage or custom thereat of any person belonging to, or purporting to be of, any particular race, creed or color is unwelcome, objectionable or not acceptable, desired or solicited, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not more than one hundred ($100), or shall undergo imprisonment for not more than ninety (90) days, or both.

(b) The production of any such written or printed communication, notice or advertisement, purporting to relate to any such place and to be made by any person being the owner, lessee, proprietor, superintendent or manager thereof, shall be presumptive evidence in any civil or criminal action that the same was authorized by such person.

(c) A place of public accommodation, resort or amusement, within the meaning of this section shall be deemed to include inns, taverns, roadhouses, hotels, whether conducted for the entertainment of transient guests, or for the accommodation of those seeking health, recreation or rest, or restaurants or eating houses, or any place where food is sold for consumption on the premises, buffets, saloons, bar-rooms, or any store, park, or inclosure where spirituous or malt liquors are sold, ice cream parlors, confectionaries, soda fountains, and all stores where ice cream, ice and fruit preparations, or their derivatives, or where beverages of any kind, are retailed for consumption on the premises, drug stores, dispensaries, clinics, hospitals, bath houses, theatres, motion picture houses, airdromes, roof gardens, music halls, race courses, skating rinks, amusement and recreation parks, fairs, bowling alleys, gymnasiums, shooting galleries, billiard and pool parlors, public libraries, kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, high schools, academies, colleges and universities, extension courses and all educational institutions under the supervision of the Commonwealth, garages and all public conveyances operated on land or water, as well as the stations and terminals thereof.

(d) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to include any institution, club or place or places of public accommodation, resort or amusement, which is or are in

its or their nature distinctly private, or to prohibit the mailing of a private communication in writing sent in response to a specific written inquiry.

1951 SURVEY OF THE FORT SAM HOUSTON COMMUNITY

San Antonio is the chief city of South Central and South West Texas. Its corporate area is 69.4 square miles. It is the center of a metropolitan region of 1247 square miles which has a population of 447,365. In both areas, population has increased during the last decade — specifically for the city itself population has increased from 253,854 in 1940 to 406,811 in 1950, a growth of 60.3 percent.

Fort Sam Houston is located within the city limits. The population of San Antonio differs from that of most Southern communities in two major ways. Its Negro population is small and it has a large element of Mexican and mixed Mexican and Indian people. It is a local custom to call native Americans Anglo-Americans and those of Mexican and/or mixed Mexican and Indian ancestry Latin-Americans. There is a small and negligible fraction of "other colored," which includes Chinese and Japanese, and of Czechs, Germans, Poles, French, Italians, and Syrians. However, these minorities altogether constitute less than 1 percent of the total population.

Estimates of the current racial distribution have placed the Negro total at about 28,000, or 7 percent, the Latin-American total at about 183,000, or 45 percent. These estimates are provisional, since 1950 US Census breakdowns are unavailable. The Mexican Chamber of Commerce estimates that there is a total of 266,000 Spanish-speaking people in San Antonio, which is larger than previous US Census reports would support. This uncertainty is explained in part by intermarriage, the difficulty of separating Latins from Anglos, and by the migratory Mexican elements.

Ethnic divisions of the population at two census periods, 1900 and 1940, are as follows:

Year	Anglo-American		Latin-American		Negro	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
1900	32,000	60.01	13,722	25.73	7,538	14.14
1940	131,221	51.62	103,000	40.57	19,832[a]	7.81

[a]Includes "and other colored."

Industry

Unlike most urban communities, San Antonio is not an industrial city. It is primarily an urban center of a vast area of agricultural production and of the livestock market, of the regional petroleum industry, and of transportation. In the latter connection San Antonio is called the gateway to Mexico. As a source of revenue, manufacturing industries are relatively insignificant. They are estimated to contribute only about 5 percent of total income and they are largely of the service variety.

The primary industries or sources of revenue of San Antonio, as indicated in part by the following evidence, are the military installations, retail trade, agricultural products, tourist trade, and manufacturing.

To summarize, because of its geographical location and the nature of its population and economy, San Antonio has two significant socioeconomic conditions which are important factors in all of its social problems. These conditions are its need for, and large proportion of, unskilled labor, and its need for, and relatively high incidence of, migratory labor.

In some measure yet to be determined, these conditions are related to local problems of housing, zoning, crime, employment and unemployment, education, social service, public health, segregation, and discrimination.

The laws of Texas have always enforced a rigid form of compulsory segregation which has aimed to keep the intermingling of the races at a minimum. These laws are practically identical with those of Georgia. Both states indicate the vigor of their intentions in the passage of registration laws which would compel all Negroes to be registered as such permanently. However such legislation has been ruled unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court.

Local ordinances and court decisions reenforce a strict observance of total segregation, and in many cases social policies of segregation are more drastic than the letter or spirit of the law.

Segregation and discrimination in San Antonio, especially as these conditions have developed toward Negroes, vary from the experiences of other Southern communities because of the large Latin population. Although no law suggests the segregation of the Latin- or Mexican-Americans, social segregation and discrimination are widespread. School children of Latin or Mexican backgrounds are segregated for instruction, lunch and play periods, and transportation. There is also some discrimination in hotels, cafes, restaurants, barbershops, and places of amusements. There is considerable evidence of economic discrimination in housing and employment and there are numerous indications of discrimination in voting and jury service. These assertions, however, must be tempered by the observation that such discrimination is primarily against the darker colored Mexican-Indian interbreeds or against Latin-Americans in the lower social and economic classes or against the migratory elements of this population. In the upper classes of the Latin-Americans there are many leading citizens among whom *no questions of segregation or discrimination occur.**

As a whole the population of San Antonio is distributed regionally more as a result of historical growth than of zoning as follows: Negroes reside in the southeastern section of the city, Latins in the southwest, and Anglos in the north.

Negroes are not permitted to join with white workers in unions. In a few limited instances there have been separate locals, but as a rule most Negro labor is unorganized.

It is the consensus of both white and Negro observers that the Negro is limited to unskilled and service occupations both in civilian employments and in the civilian occupations in the military installations. As a rule this employment policy complies with the tradition of no intermingling of the races. On the whole Negroes are not employed as clerks in any retail establishment with the possible exception of gas station attendants. Their only employment in an executive or professional capacity is in the social agencies which are organized specifically to serve Negroes or as independent, self-employed, professional and business men.

It is the opinion of the Latin-American observers that employment among the Latin-American workers is on a quota basis. This point of view was corroborated by social agencies that deal with employment problems. They indicate considerable discrimination against Latin-American high school graduates in both industry and retail trade — a condition which affects the wage scale, and which results in putting many Latin-American workers in a wage bracket that is lower than the wage scale of Negro workers. In the opinion of one Negro social worker, local prejudice against the Negro as a worker is lessened by the greater numbers of Latin-American workers and by the tensions which arise to keep them in their places.

* Woods, Frances J., *Mexican Ethnic Leadership in San Antonio, Texas*, Catholic University Press, Washington, D. C., 1949, pp. 28 ff. A review of incidents of discrimination against Latin or Mexican Americans is presented in: Perales, Alonso S., "Are We Good Neighbors?," Artes Graficas, San Antonio, Texas, 1948.

Hospitals offer their services to Negroes in separate wards or wings. White physicians and dentists will treat Negro patients but Negro physicians and dentists are restricted to Negro patients and to the segregated wards.

Negroes subscribe to or read white newspapers to an estimated extent of about two-thirds of their numbers. There is one weekly Negro newspaper, the *San Antonio Register*, which has a circulation of 5500 in San Antonio and nearly as much in surrounding areas. There are two newspapers printed in Spanish, *El Sol de Texas* (a weekly) and *La Prensa* (a daily).

The USO units are integrated. All services are offered to white and Negro soldiers on the same basis. An exception is dancing wherein the policy is to hold separate dances for whites and Negroes on different evenings. Occasionally there will be dances at which both white and Negro soldiers will be present and sometimes there will be mixed dancing on these occasions. However, this practice is "mildly" discouraged by USO executives largely because of the difficulty of getting hostesses under these circumstances and also because of the numerous complaints of the parents of these girls. An exception among the USO units is the National Catholic Community Service which operates all its activities, including dancing, on a mixed basis, and has experienced no incidents.

Both Negroes and Latin Americans have their own theaters. In white theaters, Negroes are admitted only to balconies. The municipal auditoriums are segregated. There is one for whites (which includes Latin-Americans) and another for Negroes.

Negroes are segregated in all forms of transportation which are operated within the city or state and in all stations, waiting rooms, and terminals.

All hotels, restaurants, bars, pool rooms, dance halls, and other places of entertainment or recreation are segregated except the skating rink. This rule operates with few or no exceptions against Negroes and occasionally as already noted against lower-class Mexicans, but it does not operate among these establishments in the Negro section. Whenever incidents occur, they usually take place when white military or civilian personnel go to a Negro place or when some white proprietor tries to accommodate both whites and Negroes by partitioning his establishment.

Most stores accept Negro patronage with a few exclusive exceptions.

Credit is extended by stores in terms of individual rating, not according to racial classification. Loans are available on a different basis and Latin-Americans claim considerable difficulty in getting loans because of prejudice.

The San Antonio Legal Aid organization is not segregated. It serves Negroes and has the cooperation of one Negro lawyer among its voluntary staff.

Most zoning, as noted in the distribution of population, is by custom and is informal. In the case of housing, zoning is conducted according to a city ordinance passed in 1938.

At the moment San Antonio is not an "open" town. In previous years it has been known as one of the most "wide-open" cities in the country. Recent changes in policy are explained by two conditions. The first is a rigid enforcement of the laws against racial intermingling which are part of the political plans of the city manager proposal. This proposal is now being reconsidered after it was defeated a year ago. The second is a tightening of law enforcement as indicated by the law passed (1950) to make slot machines illegal, by the closing of houses of prostitution, and by regular and consistent raids on night clubs or other recreational establishments which cater to the vices on a mixed racial basis.

Two Negro night clubs mentioned in newspaper articles are under further suspicion as the meeting places of homosexuals as well as being responsible for the intermingling of races.

There is no Sunday law against places of amusement.

Recent drives against prostitution and especially against streetwalkers in the Mexican section have given the city a considerably improved record in the incidence of venereal disease (as rated by the American Social Hygiene Association).

Neither civilian nor military police could recall any incident involving the races during the last 18 months.

From current evidence the conclusion is that whatever vice is available occurs largely on a segregated basis.

There is no curfew for the city as a whole, but there is a curfew or an "off limits" rule from midnight to 6 A.M. for the River Walk area -- a walk extending on both sides of the San Antonio river which bisects the city. This rule was adopted because of a number of crimes that occurred on this walk some years ago and has no connection with recent events or racial incidents.

Housing

Slum areas have been a local blight in San Antonio for many years. In spite of several housing projects, there are numerous slum areas and a large percentage of substandard houses both within and outside the city limits. One reason already noted for the persistence of this condition is the great increase in the city's population and the large transient population.

To meet these needs a Housing Authority was established in 1937 under a commission appointed by the mayor. An indication of the scope of the housing problem was revealed in a survey in 1938 which showed that of the 75,677 families in the metropolitan area, 39,515, or 52.2 percent, were occupying substandard residences.

By 1942, four projects were completed and in operation including:

Tenant races	Building	Units
Two projects for Latin-Americans	306	1,180
Two projects for Negroes	82	578
One project for whites	135	796

Although the Housing Authority continued to remove slum dwellings and construct new projects during the 1940's, a resurvey in 1950 of an area which was observed to be substandard in 1940 furnished the following results:

Tenant races	Units enumerated	Units found to be substandard	Percent substandard
White	17,701	15,881	89.7
Non-white	3,928	2,964	75.5
Total	21,629	18,845	87.1 (avg.)

This sample is representative of Negro and Latin-American housing, since few Anglo-Americans lived in the area surveyed.

Under the revised Housing Act of 1949, there were four projects in operation on the low-rent basis.

Developments	Dwellings	Average rent per family, 1950
Alazan-Apache Courts 1011 S. Brazos Street	1180	$23.57
Victoria Courts 400 Labor Street	796	24.65

Developments	Dwellings	Average rent per family, 1950
Lincoln Heights Courts 1315 N. Elmendorf Street	342	23.48
Wheatley Courts 906 N. Mittman Street	236	24.04
Total	2554	$23.93

With the average rent for all tenants during 1950 under $21.00 per month, utilities included, it is evident that the Authority is housing only low-income families. Rents are based entirely on income and number of minor dependents. Families with two or less minors pay approximately 20 percent of income for rent. Families with three or more minor dependents pay approximately 17 percent of income for rent.

More than 80 percent of the 2549 families living in the four low-rent projects, or a total of 2061 families, pay a monthly rent less than $29. Thirty-four percent of 867 families pay less than $19.

In 1950 a two-year planning program was started to construct 2600 more units of low-rent housing. Of this total, 477 units now under construction are for Negroes and 704 are for whites, most of whom are Latin-Americans. Of this total of 1081 units 604 are being constructed on slum sites or partially vacant sites on the west side of the city and 477 on similar sites on the east side.

Sites under consideration for the 1019 additional dwelling units are Columbia Heights, South San Antonio, Culebra Road area, West Commerce Street area, Mission Road area, Burbank School area, and others in the vicinity of present projects.

These projects are expected to be completed by 1955.

All Negro housing projects are segregated. Whites, both Anglo and Latin, are integrated in the white projects with no evidence of friction or tension.*

Law Observance and Enforcement

In recent years there has been no evidence of racial tension in the San Antonio area or in adjacent counties. No incidents are recorded or recalled with the two exceptions of the Negro soldiers who voted at Fort Sam Houston in 1918 (see file of the *Express*, Mar 10, 1918, p. 17) and the Brownsville incident, which also involved Negro troops (see Public Library file number rT/308). There is also a more recent incident of a high school Latin-American girl who tried to organize pecan workers in 1939 and was opposed by the American Legion on the assumption that she was a Communist.

The explanation for this comparative absence of friction is considered to be the close observation of segregation laws, the constant supervision of places where racial intermingling is apt to occur, and the fewer opportunities for a two-way clash as between whites and Negroes because of the large Latin-American population which acts as a cushion.

The city police do not classify arrests by race on the police blotter, but the opinion of the statistician is that the Latin-Americans appear more frequently than either Anglo-whites or Negroes. In the "Annual Report" of the police department for 1947–48 and 1948–49, the incidence and percentage frequency of offenses by racial classification are:†

* Consult: "Texas' Forgotten People," *Look*, Vol. 15, pp. 29 ff (Mar 27, 1951).

† These offenses do not include parking violations or other minor traffic offenses because they are not shown by racial distribution.

Race	1947–48		1948–49	
	Number of offenses	Percentage	Number of offenses	Percentage
Anglo-American	12,411	45.7	12,477	42.9
Latin-American	10,560	38.9	11,903	40.9
Negro	4,186	15.4	4,720	16.2
Total	27,157	100.0	29,100	100.0

The Board of Public Education Reports on truants and other children subject to school supervision in 1950 are similarly indicative of no heavy concentration of disturbance within any one racial group:

School	White			Negro		
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total
Elementary	1,010	803	1,813	89	69	158
Junior high	455	374	829	29	17	46
Senior high	92	103	195	12	12	24
Total	1,557	1,280	2,837	130	98	228

Following are the reports of visiting teachers in the elementary schools in 1950:

Race	Boys	Girls	Total
Latin-American	869	693	1,562
Anglo-American	141	110	251
Negro	89	69	158
Total	1,099	872	1,971

Although neither the military nor civilian police were able to report or recall any incidents of disorder involving military and civilian personnel, they agree with the comments of leaders in all groups, Negro, Latin, and Anglo, that there have been noticeable trends toward racial hostility, intolerance, and suspicion and prejudice since 1940.

Confirmation of this sentiment is noted heretofore in the newspaper report on the tightening of police action against two Negro night clubs and of the closing of bars or clubs where intermingling has been permitted. In the petition of a Negro group to have their children admitted to the public high schools there is another evidence of restlessness against the present segregated school system.

Other evidence of this trend is contained in a study of voting behavior by the Municipal Bureau of Governmental Research. Therein it was demonstrated that Negroes, Mexicans, and citizens generally in the southwestern and southeastern sections of the city voted in sufficient numbers to defeat the city manager plan when it was first presented to the voters for approval. (This report is unpublished and is regarded as confidential, so no copy could be obtained.)

In the opinion of Mexican leaders, this resentment is bound up with the local practice in real estate of "restricted covenants" which prevent Latins, both civilian and military, from purchasing or renting property that is limited by such covenants. ("Restricted covenants" have been ruled unconstitutional but they exist nevertheless in Cicero, Ill., and

Pittsburgh, Pa., as well as in San Antonio and Columbus.) Latins, moreover, resent the segregation of the children in the lower schools. This segregation is on the grounds that Latin children, being bilingual, retard the learning of Anglo children. Other Latin leaders account for this prejudice by the increasing number of darker people because of Mexican-Indian intermarriages.

Social workers were consistently of the opinion that the Anglo or white element of the population has been alerted to a new high level of suspiciousness by the national publicity which has been accorded the city because of bad reports on housing, vice, labor conditions, and especially the pitiable condition of the "wetbacks" as the transient labor group from Mexico is called.

Negro leaders are similarly inclined to report a trend toward greater anti-Negro feeling. One of them, the lawyer who represented the parents in the previously mentioned petition to break the segregation law in the high schools, is of the opinion that one source of this increased prejudice is the presence of Negro personnel in the various local military installations who have come from the North and of Negro civilian residents who have migrated to San Antonio from regions where the rules of segregation are enforced more drastically. Other Negro leaders deplore the practice of military authorities in following local customs of quota employment and of limited job opportunities as these practices are applied to Negro civilian personnel.

Community-Military Relations

At Fort Sam Houston there is a Military Advisory Committee, the membership of which is both military and civilian. Its primary function is to deal with all complaints that may occur involving military personnel or civilian employees. Problems associated with liquor fell under the jurisdiction of the Texas Liquor Control Board. Problems involving credit and other business problems of either military or civilian personnel are referred to the Vigilance Committee which is the local better business bureau. This committee is in contact with military authorities and is operating in an area which neither it nor military authorities can handle properly, namely, the problems of excessive installment buying and of disputes that arise between local purchasers and national sales organizations.

All local USO groups operate under joint boards of military and civilian personnel. At Fort Sam Houston the chaplains and special service officers serve on these boards.

Under the direction of the provost marshal there is a Character-Guidance Council. This council deals with personal problems of enlisted men, introduces programs to improve discipline, and also aims to foster healthy community relations.

Evidence contrary to the heretofore noted impressions of growing tension is also available. One is the policy of integration in the USO units which has been in force for two years without any indication of difficult race relations. In the segregated YMCA, a mixed meeting of college students was held a year ago without incurring bad report.

Many of the social agencies within the Community Chest group have biracial boards. Negroes cooperate in the Chest campaign. They attend meetings in hotels which is a real concession on the part of hotel management under the current nonintermingling policies. Negroes are admitted to the Graduate School of Social Service in Our Lady of the Lake College on the same basis as are white students. Among the civilian police there are both Negroes and Latins, although it is the general rule that Negro police will operate only in the Negro district. Among the military police, Negro and white MPs work together and Negro military police have the authority to arrest white soldiers. Although the San Antonio public library has a special Negro branch library, the main library is also open to Negroes.

Segregation Laws in Texas

The essential legal basis for segregation in Texas is found in the State Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 7, which provides:

"Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored children, and impartial provision shall be made for both."

Segregation or separation is also compulsory in the following instances:*

Institutions for the deaf, dumb, and blind	Vernon's Annot. Art. 3221
Institutions for juvenile delinquents	Vernon's Annot. Art. 3259 a & b
Agricultural and trade schools	Vernon's Annot. Title 49. Art. 2638 ff
County libraries	Vernon's Annot. Art. 1688
Colleges	1945 Supp. Title 49, Sec. 2642
Teacher-training schools	Vernon's Annot. Title 49, Sec. 2638, 1945 Supp. Title 49, Sec. 2643 a
Transportation Title 71, Art. 4477 (71–72)	Vernon's Annot. Title 112, Art. 6417, Penal Code, Art. 19, Sec. 1659
Separation in buses	Vernon's Annot. Title 112, Art. 6417, Penal Code, 1661.1
Separation in street cars	Vernon's Annot. Title 112, Art. 6417, Penal Code, 1659
Tuberculosis patients	Vernon's Annot. Title 51, Art. 3254a
Boxing	Vernon's Annot. Title 11, Art. 614–11
Labor	Vernon's Annot. Title 95, Art. 5920
Intermarriage prohibited	Vernon's Annot. Art. 4607

1951 SURVEY OF THE FORT BENNING COMMUNITY

Columbus is the community most closely associated with Fort Benning. It is 9 miles to the north of the fort. Its population (1950) was 79,510, an increase of 33 percent since 1940. In the metropolitan area which includes parts of two counties in Georgia (Muscogee and Chattahoochee) and part of Russell County, Alabama, there is a total of 169,921 persons. Military areas are Fort Benning and Lawson Field. Phenix City, Alabama (population, 23,285), which is across the Chattahoochee River, is a suburb of Columbus and serves Columbus as the "wide-open" playground for military personnel. The incorporated area of Columbus is 12.6 square miles; the metropolitan area is 216 square miles.

The proportion of Negroes to whites in Columbus is about one-third. In the 1940 US Census, 29.2 percent were colored, 70.7 percent, white. There is a small, practically negligible percent of "other colored" and of the foreign-born who constitute less than one percent of the total population. There has been no marked migration except of military personnel.

Fort Benning covers 182,000 acres in three counties — two in Georgia and one in Alabama.

Segregation Policy

In Columbus, Negroes are segregated by law and social policy. This law includes most public agencies and institutions as specified below, and, with few exceptions, private agencies, industry, and the professions.

In unions Negroes are admitted to membership in the CIO, but in the AFL separate locals are established.

Hospitals provide separate wings for Negro patients and physicians. White physicians and dentists will occasionally accept Negro patients, but as a rule professional services are separate racially.

* "Vernon's Texas Statutes," Vernon Law Book Co., Kansas City, Nev., 1948 and Supp. 1950, Vols. I and II.

There are two daily newspapers which include about two-thirds of the Negro population as subscribers or readers. There is one weekly Negro newspaper with a circulation of 3500.

USO is operated in separate buildings and areas for white and Negro military personnel. The National Catholic Community Service is not officially segregated. However, few Negroes come to this center and those who do enter the building rarely buy anything and never fraternize.

There are two theaters which have galleries for Negroes. This separation is required by a municipal law forbidding white and Negroes to be seated on the same floor. There are separate movies for Negroes (owned by a white corporation but managed by Negroes).

Transportation in the community operates on the Jim Crow basis.

Restaurants, bars, and similar establishments are totally separate.

Most retail stores accept Negroes as patrons with the exception of a few specialized women's wear stores which cater to white trade only. As a rule and by local custom most Negro trading in the white area is on Saturdays (the rest of their purchasing is in their own stores in the Negro section). This policy in retail trade is relatively recent and is one of the evidences of improvement cited by local Negroes. Credit is extended to Negroes on the same basis as it is to whites.

It is the intent of the Georgia laws of segregation that these acts should operate on the separate but equal basis. Although most citizens may claim that this goal is achieved, it does not occur in the case of (a) library facilities — there is no library for Negroes and the local library in its deed specifically forbids Negroes access to its resources; (b) other private social services, including legal aid; and (c) recreation. There is no Legal Aid Society and only one Negro lawyer in Columbus.

Housing areas are segregated by custom. There is one exclusive Negro section but because of the nature of the population's growth there are a few small areas of Negro residences outside of this area and a public housing project adjacent to it. Columbus operates under a city plan and has no zoning system as yet.

Housing

In general, housing is adequate and temporary shortages or congestion are explained by sudden increases in the population of Fort Benning. Housing needs are currently explained by the rapid growth of population during the last decade (an increase of 49.2 percent) and the recent increase of personnel at Fort Benning. During World War II when Fort Benning had a total of 85,000, adequate housing was furnished by Columbus. A continuous problem for the community, therefore, is its inability to foresee the future needs of military personnel.

Since 1948, approximately 5000 additional housing units, most of which are rental, have been constructed. Many of these units are specifically designed for military personnel. Since the Korean situation, there have been housing shortages partly because of deficiencies in building materials and partly because of the termination of FHA financing.

The following summary is a current survey of recent private construction, most of which represents rental units: Camellia Apartments, 400 units completed and 250 under construction; Buena Vista Estates, 156 units; Victory Apartments, 164 units; Pine Terrace Apartments, 100 units; Battle Park Homes, 200 units; Grady Apartments, 32 units; Custer Road Terrace, 600 units; and Wynnton Road Apartments, 52 units. These total 1704 units.

Public housing is operated by the Housing Authority of the City of Columbus. It is a nonprofit, quasi-public corporation. This Authority was established in 1938 and is for all

practical purposes a part of the city government. It is operated by a Board of Commissioners which is made up of five citizens who are appointed by the mayor and approved by the state director of housing.

Under this plan there are five projects now in operation; these projects contain a total of 1754 units which accommodate about 6500 people.

Three additional projects are under construction with a total of 558 units.

Two of the five completed projects are for Negroes. These projects have 552 or nearly 31.5 percent of the total 1754 units.

One of the three projects under construction will have 150 more units for Negroes (about 27.0 percent of the total).

Many of these projects are used to supply the housing needs of the families of white and Negro military families and, varying with the size of the population at Fort Benning, it is estimated that 20–30 percent of the units are occupied by the families of soldiers.

Rentals in the Negro projects especially are based on the family's income, and in many instances are considerably below cost.

Actual slum conditions or gross housing inadequacies still are noticeable in the Negro section. However, provisions are already being made or are in the blueprint stage to remove this deficiency.

There are complaints by both whites and Negroes that rents are too high but these complaints never indicated any differential renting that is unfavorable to white military personnel or to Negro civilian and military personnel.

Law Observance and Enforcement

Columbus is, comparatively, a blue-law city. Only service stores are permitted to be open on Sunday. There are Sunday movies but they are closed during the period of evening religious services. No mixed drinks are sold in bars (the number of which is noticeably small) and there is little or no mixture of Negro and white civilian or military personnel except at bus stops and stations.

The "wide-open" area patronized by military personnel is located in Phenix City, which is actually an integral part of Columbus. In that community there are provisions for liquor, gambling, and prostitution on a segregated basis for both white and Negro soldiers. For this reason there is little intermingling of the races, although Negro soldiers do come in contact with white proprietors.

Violations of the law leading to arrest and detention are distributed racially in direct proportion to their numbers in the population. Since the factor of race is not recorded in the police-blotter record, the following summary of the Recorder's Court Docket for Jan–Aug 1951 is given to show the distribution of 9339 offenses by race and sex:

Months during 1951	6237 Whites (66.8%)		3102 Negroes (33.2%)	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
January	724	81	264	85
February	783	97	273	68
March	883	134	326	121
April	800	113	414	148
May	792	102	376	94
June	755	98	343	89
July	757	118	410	91
Total	5494	743	2406	696

According to the estimates of the police officials, Negro civilian personnel tend to exceed the rates for white in drunkenness. disorderly conduct, and assault involving cutting.

Because of numerous suggestions that the Negro section should have its own police, provision has now been made to add about three Negro policemen to the force (which will be nearly 3 percent of the total force).

Rumors of police brutality particularly toward Negroes may also have been instrumental in this changed policy.

Complaints frequently voiced by both white and Negro citizens include police brutality, incompetence, and of attempting to enforce a curfew which is not a city ordinance, and of excessive fines in the courts.

Suggestions to remedy this situation which were made by citizens include, in addition to the employment of Negro police, the appointment of Negro representatives to the Community-Military Relations Council, the use of military police in the Columbus area, and making the Negro section off limits to white soldiers.

Employment Policy

Occupations that are open to the Negro population of Columbus are mostly those involving common labor. White-collar employment is generally limited to Negro proprietors of their own business establishments (which are comparatively few) or to the managers and staff of Negro service societies such as YMCA and USO.

In recent years, a few Negro clerks have been employed by white establishments to wait on Negro customers. It is rarely that such clerks would be called upon to serve white customers. In the opinion of the observers who reported these recent vocational trends, unpleasant incidents in retail stores are caused by agitators who deliberately try to violate local custom.

During the labor shortages in World War II, Negroes were employed by the local manufacturing plants. They were, however, limited to certain jobs. Though Negroes are not permitted to work on the same floors as white workers, they are employed in the same type of work.

Organizations

In the community organizations which are directly related to military affairs, there are a Community-Military Relations Council, a Liquor Control Council and a coordination between the USO units and Fort Benning personnel through military representation on the Board of Directors of these units.

As noted previously, one repeated suggestion from Negroes in Columbus is the desirability of Negro representation on these boards and councils.

Other social service organizations or societies of Columbus which were interviewed for background materials were the American Red Cross, the Family Service Association, Army Billeting Office, National Catholic Community Service, USO (Negro), YMCA (Negro), YMCA (White), and the Travelers Aid Association.

These organizations and societies, unless otherwise indicated, serve both white and Negro civilian and military personnel and their families.

Travelers Aid, which is designed primarily for nonresident, migrant groups, deals with three classes of problems: transients, newcomers to the community who require temporary services, and residents of Columbus who are stranded elsewhere. In the last annual report of this society, 528 cases were handled, of which 57 (10.8 percent) were Negroes, 102 (19.3 percent) were veterans, and 65 (12.3 percent) were current members of the armed forces.

Problems peculiar to the Negro transient or newcomers are: (a) the unusual needs of Negro military personnel who require more travel assistance than whites because they cannot hitchhike; (b) the services required by Negro girls who follow their boy friends to Columbus and must be returned to their legal residence; (c) services (generally financial assistance) for families of Negro soldiers; and (d) the maintenance of a Negro housing division for both civilian and military personnel.

No Negro worker is employed by this association, but there is no policy against such employment if the needs of Negro applicants should require the hiring of a Negro social worker.

The Family Service Association reports increases in the operation of all local service agencies which are concerned with the families of military personnel. The most usual problems are (a) dependency either because the family is left without adequate funds or the soldier left too quickly to make allowances for future needs; (b) parental neglect and increasing juvenile delinquency in families of soldiers who have gone overseas; (c) camp followers, some of whom bring children with them; (d) increasing family desertion; and (e) unmarried mothers.

In the latter problem, the Association reports an increasing number of cases of unmarried mothers in the local Negro population which involve Negro soldiers. It also reports that one-third of its cases (in 1950, 31.0 percent) are in average years those of Negro families. A further observation is that Negroes as a whole are reluctant to accept the services of community agencies, preferring either to handle their own problems by their own devices or to ignore such problems.

Other contacts, both Negro and white, indicate the need for more recreational provisions for Negroes.

The only biracial board is that of the YMCA (Negro).

Segregation

Georgia's legal and social policy aims to prevent the intermingling of Negroes and whites.

The basic law of segregation is in Article 8, Section 1 of the State Constitution.

"There shall be a thorough system of common schools for the education of the children, as nearly uniform as practical, the expense of which shall be provided for by taxation, or otherwise. The schools shall be free to all children of the state but separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored races."

Revision of 1945 Article 8, Section 1.

"The provision of an adequate education for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia, the expense of which shall be provided for by taxation. Separate schools shall be provided for the white and colored races."

See also General Public Laws Part I Title II Paragraph 32-937.

Segregation or separation is also provided:

In the care of juvenile delinquents	Code (1933) Annot. Secs. 77-613
Separate colleges	Annot. 32-101, 103, 123, and Laws of Georgia 1943, p. 628
Teacher-training schools	Code (1933) Annot. Secs. 32-909
Transportation	Annot. 18-206 ff.
Buses	Annot. 68-113; 616
Billiard and poolrooms	Annot. 84-1603
Hospitals	Annot. 35-225
Mental patients	Annot. 35-225

Penal institutions Code-Art. 1201	Annot. 77-317 148-43 Penal
Welfare institutions	Annot. 35-225
Clergy	Annot. 53-212 (Negro minister may marry only Negro couples)

1951 SURVEY OF THE FORT RILEY COMMUNITY

The political units which serve as a community for Fort Riley include the adjacent towns of Junction City and Manhattan and the more remote areas of Topeka and Kansas City. Investigation was made in Junction City and Manhattan but time militated against the inclusion of Topeka and Kansas City.

Civil Rights Acts in Kansas

The commercial and social leadership in Junction City and Manhattan is not aware, or at least does not admit to an awareness, of the Civil Rights Acts in Kansas. On the contrary at least one commercial figure uses a fictitious municipal ordinance as an excuse for not serving Negroes.

The following acts are quite specific but are flagrantly violated (signs in bars and restaurants specifically forbid service to Negroes, Mexicans, and Indians).

Chapter 21, "Crimes and Punishments," Sec. 21-2424: *Denying civil rights on account of race or color: penalty.*

That if any of the regents or trustees of any state university, college, or other school of public instruction or the state supervisor, or the owner or owners, agents, trustees, or managers in charge of any inn, hotel or boarding house, or any place of entertainment or amusement, for which a license is required by any of the municipal authorities of this state, or the owners or owner or person or persons in charge of any steamboat, railroad, stage coach, omnibus, streetcar, or any other means of public carriage for persons or freight within the state, shall make any discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, the person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction, shall be fined in any sum not less than ten nor more than one thousand dollars, and shall also be liable to damages in any court of competent jurisdiction to the person or persons injured thereby. (General Statutes of Kansas — 1949 p 887 L, 1874, ch. 49 1; April 25; RS 1923, 21-24-24.)

Employment Statutes

21-2461: *Denying public work employment on account of race or color.*

No person a citizen of the United States shall be refused or denied employment in any capacity on the ground of race or color, nor be discriminated against in any manner by reason thereof, in connection with any public work, or with the contracting for or the performance of any work, labor or service of any kind on any public work by or on behalf of the state of Kansas, or of any department, bureau, commission, board, or official thereof, or by or on behalf of any county, city, township, school district or other municipality of said state.

21-2462 provides that the provision in 21-2461 shall become a part of contracts made by the state, or a department or municipality thereof and shall apply to contractors, subcontractors or other persons doing or contracting to do the whole or a part of any public work contemplated by said contract.

21-2463 provides a penalty for violation of 21-2462 section, the fine being not less than $50 nor more than $1000, or by imprisonment of not more than six months or by both fine and imprisonment. (Supp. to Kans. Gen. Stats., 1941 ch. 21, p. 239.)

75-2941: *Discrimination forbidden.*

No discrimination shall be exercised, threatened or promised, by any person in the Civil Service against or in favor of any applicant, eligible, or employee in the Civil Service because of his political

or religious opinions or affiliations, except that no person affiliated with a political movement advocating overthrow of government by force or violence shall be eligible to any appointment or employment under this act. Ibid. ch. 75, p 561.

44-801: *Certain Labor organizations prohibited from being representative unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.*

No labor organization of any kind, agency or representative committee or plan, in which employees participate and which sits for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or any other conditions of work, shall be the representative unit for the purpose of collective bargaining in the state of Kansas in any of the trades, crafts, schooled and unschooled, work, labor or employment of any kind of capacity, which in any manner discriminates against, or bars, or excludes from its membership any person because of his race or color; provided that the provisions of this act shall not apply to labor organizations within the provisions of 48 U. S. Sts. 1186 and 49 U. S. Sts. 1189.

In summary, the pattern of segregation and discrimination in Kansas appears to be breaking at certain points. The "Bible tradition" of Kansas appears to be working against discrimination. Kansas State College is now housing Negroes. Theaters in Junction City and Manhattan have broken the separate seating arrangement. Garden City, Kansas has opened its swimming pool to white and Negro alike. In at least one restaurant in Topeka mixed groups are served. Bowling alleys in Junction City are about to break the pattern of segregation.

In spite of the preceding statements, the traditional pattern is still manifest. Many white residents of Junction City and Manhattan are not aware of any problem existing. To them the Negroes wish to remain segregated and complete isolation is the approved way of living.

The Negro (soldier and civilian) is in a peculiar situation. The old way of life appears to be breaking in some areas but the Negro is confused as to what is expected of him. Not having the old to rely upon and not having the new as an established way of life, he is often embarrassed and angry when he gets into difficulty.

Junction City, Kansas

Junction City, the county seat of Geary County, is the "soldier town" for Fort Riley. It is three miles southwest from main post. Its population, 1950, was 13,370. Twelve hundred military families and six hundred Army civilian employees live in Junction City. This community is primarily composed of white native stock. In 1940, native white made up 95.2 percent of the total population of the county. Local community leaders estimate that Negroes currently compose 5 percent of the population of Junction City.

Industry. Junction City depends upon Fort Riley for its economic welfare. There exists some industry, including processing of sawed native limestone, dehydrating alfalfa meal, railroad-car repair shops, ice cream and cheese manufacturing, and chemical agricultural fertilizer. Geary County is a soil conservation district. Kansas' new state 4H club camp and leadership training center is located 13 miles south of Junction City. In spite of these facts, Junction City is primarily a service community for military personnel.*

Segregation Policy. Junction City, like the rest of Kansas, is in a state of flux regarding segregation policy. No white person in the community admitted knowledge of legislation concerning civil rights. The prevailing "white" attitude expressed was that segregation is practiced but that it is voluntary, depending on custom. Whites, for the most part,

*Sources: US Census for 1940, and interviews with local editor and with the Chamber of Commerce.

ascribed to the Negro a desire to maintain custom because they wanted to stay in their own circle. This ascribed desire is denied by all strata of the Negro community.

There are very few Negro professional people in Junction City. Negroes in the community maintained that professional Negro nurses were living in the community but were unable to practice their profession. One group of informants was very indignant because of the death of a local Negro woman. The story passed around the Negro associations was that this particular death could have been avoided if Negro nurses had been permitted to practice. There are no Negro doctors or lawyers in the area. The only Negro professional persons are a USO director and a small group of clergymen.

Employers are willing to admit that they do not hire Negroes or that they hire them only for limited types of work. In an unpublished paper, the statement is made that one of the nation's two great labor unions admitted in a hearing that some of the locals did restrict membership to whites. Representatives of the Kansas State Employment Service stated that their county representatives received and complied with discriminatory requests from employers. Newspaper advertisements openly specify white or Negro help.

The unpublished study referred to has ample evidence of discrimination by both employers and labor unions.

USO is operated in separate building and areas for white and Negro military personnel. When the USO of World War II ceased to operate, the community asked the Salvation Army to take over the operation of the building. At that time there was no center for Negro troops. The director of the Salvation Army USO stated that Negroes were welcome but that few came. He further stated that he was a target of antagonism from colored preachers at meetings of the Ministers Alliance because of his support of a separate Negro USO. In Oct 1950, the "white" USO expanded its program and many Negro soldiers attended. Shortly thereafter, the colored USO was opened and Negro soldiers frequented the "white" USO in fewer numbers.

The Municipal Park has refused use of the park for Negro USO functions and Negroes are denied the use of the city swimming pool. The local Red Cross advertised a life saving course for the general public. A local Negro presented himself for instruction and was denied admission.

The local bowling alleys, following the lead of The American Bowling Congress, announced that they would accept Negroes when they opened in the fall of 1951.

The local skating rink set aside Tuesday night for Negroes, but Negroes are denied admission any other night of the week.

Theaters do not have a policy of segregation. In 1950, a Negro took a seat on the ground floor of one of the theaters. When he refused to follow custom and go to the balcony, he was arrested. As a result of the trial, civil rights statutes were enforced. One of the theater managers expressed himself as being perfectly content with the new policy and maintained that his business had not been affected by the change of policy. Local resentment was high at first but currently there are no occasions when whites complain.

There are two taxi companies in the community; one run for and by Negroes, the other for and by whites.

Restaurants, bars, and similar establishments are separate. Such establishments, in addition to barbershops, display signs which affirm the right of the management to refuse service to anyone. Bars use the device of closing the bar as soon as a Negro walks in the door, and reopening as soon as the Negro leaves.

East Ninth Street is the Negro "wide-open" area. Bars and restaurants in this area cater to both Negro and white military trade. Prostitution is relatively open. Some establishments have been closed to military personnel in this area but the point of view of

local authority is to keep the area open and thus relatively under control. Negro soldiers are permitted in this area. White soldiers also are permitted but are discouraged verbally by local citizens and authorities.

Most retail stores accept Negroes as patrons. Some cleaning establishments discourage Negro trade by demanding a long period of time in which to clean clothing.

There are no separate schools. Last year's outstanding athlete at the high school was a Negro who achieved acceptance among local business men as an athlete, but was refused acceptance to restaurants.

Negroes use the local library. Civilian Negroes use it very little, but Negro officers in training at Fort Riley make considerable use of its facilities.

In summary, segregation in Junction City is bound by custom, but the "cake of custom" is cracking. Negroes have resentments seldom expressed to whites. Negroes who come into the area from the Northeastern states are at first thoroughly confused and disgusted, but in the words of the Negro USO desk clerk, "They get used to it."

Housing. Housing is a major problem in Junction City. Seventy-one new houses were built and 33 remodeled in 1950. Four new apartments were built and three remodeled in the same year.

The problem is particularly acute for Negroes. Negro families are scattered generally throughout the community with the exception of the south side of town, which has kept Negro families out. From 12th to 18th Streets, and from Webster to the west, are areas where there is a mixture of Negro and white residences. East Ninth Street is a solid Negro area. A few Negro families own their own homes. These are for the most part retired Army personnel formerly of units stationed at Fort Riley. White families will not accept Negroes as roomers. The Negro USO can get rooms for Negroes with Negro families but have been unable to get homes for Negro service men. One local housing project, financed by private capital, was constructed with the expressed idea of selling to Negroes. However, no Negro families could afford the $1500 down payment and the homes were sold to white families.

Law Observance and Enforcement. Junction City is more "wide-open" than the surrounding communities. MPs and policemen work in teams and the chief of police stated that he received a great deal of cooperation from Fort Riley authorities. The chief's attitude toward Negro MPs is negative. He maintains that colored soldiers and colored MPs stick together and that it is impossible to trust the colored MPs. He also stated that although he had no proof, he suspected colored MPs of accepting money from Negro prostitutes. When the girls refused or discontinued payment they were then reported by the MPs.

Police department cases for 1950 are summarized as follows:*

Classification of violation	Number
Criminal homicide	1
Aggravated assault	14
Crimes involving property	46
Weapons, carrying or possessing	12
Commercialized vice	22
Sex offenses	33
Drunk and/or disorderly	552
Vagrancy	60
Picked up on suspicion	61
Gambling	10
Violations of traffic and motor vehicle laws	1,319
Parking meter violations	15,950

* Source: "Annual Report of Your City Government, City of Junction City, Kansas, for the Year of 1950," published by Office of City Manager.

A check of the police blotter for Jun–Aug 1951 revealed the following military cases listed by the police department:

Offenses	Negro	White	Total
Reckless driving	0	11	11
Parking violation	1	0	1
Drunken driving	0	5	5
No driver's license	0	1	1
Traffic violation	0	1	1
Disturbing the peace	1	12	13
Drunk	1	7	8
Assault and disturbing peace	0	2	2
Window peeping	0	1	1
Breaking and entering	1	1	2
Trespassing	1	0	1
Petty larceny	1	0	1
Illegal cohabitation	0	1	1
Rape	0	1	1
Totals	6	43	49

The sheriff's office acts only when a warrant is issued; it turns all drunks over to the police department. Sheriff-office offenses include, for Jun–Aug 1951:

Offenses	Negro	White	Total
Breaking and entering	0	2	2
Rape	0	4	4
Assault	0	1	1
Indecent exposure	0	1	1
Totals	0	8	8

The sheriff stated that the type of offense appears in cycles. Rape is frequent at one time, passing of bad checks at some other time.

Employment Policy. Employment policy is comparable to that of Columbus, Ga. Occupations that are open to the Negro population are mostly those involving common labor. White-collar employment is limited to Negro proprietors of their own business establishments, which are limited to bars and restaurants and the staff of the Negro USO.

Organizations. In the community organizations which are directly related to military affairs there is a committee for Civilian Military Affairs and a USO operating committee. The white officers of these organizations deplore the lack of Negro leadership in the community. However, the director of the Negro USO has had considerable experience in USO. He is a college graduate and has considerable insight into the problems of Junction City.

Manhattan, Kansas

Manhattan, the county seat of Riley County, is located 12 miles from Fort Riley. Its population is 18,996 (1950) augmented by 7500 college students and 500 or more residents of suburban areas. The population is 97.4 percent white, 3.2 percent foreign-born white, and 2.1 percent Negro and other.

Manhattan's assessed valuation is $18,598,222. The local industrial concerns are engaged in packing, processing, and shipping products of the farms. Manhattan is the home of the Manhattan Mutual Life Insurance Co. and the Farm Bureau Mutual Life Insurance Co. The community is a distribution center for the surrounding farm area. Bank deposits total $17,116,179.

Segregation Policy. Segregation in Manhattan is a matter of tradition and the tradition is strong. Negroes are restricted to one area of the community where they have their own elementary school, their own churches, and their own recreational center.

During the recent flood, the Kansas State College Field House was used as a refugee center and the pattern was broken for a time. Negro and white slept side by side and local Negro residents had some hope that the segregation pattern might be broken permanently. Such was not the case and the pattern was reaffirmed.

Elementary schools are segregated; the high schools and the college are not segregated. In 1950 Kansas State accepted its first Negro males who lived in dormitories; 1951 marked the first year in which Negro co-eds were admitted to women's dormitories.

The Negro Service Center is financed by the city. However, the director, a Negress, stated that it was little used because events were not well publicized.

In about 1950 the churches in Manhattan began a program of sermons on equal rights. One of the theater managers went to a church meeting and made a public statement that Negroes could sit anywhere and as a consequence they do. The manager of the other major theater made no such statement so that most of his Negro patrons still sit in the balcony. Some Negroes have sat downstairs in this particular theater and nothing has been said or done about it. However, the manager stated that the number sitting downstairs is negligible.

Negroes in Manhattan, except for Negro College students, do not frequent the white areas very much. One Negro informant stated that a Negro could not even get a haircut in Manhattan. Negroes are refused service in bars and restaurants. They may buy goods in such establishments as drug stores, but are not permitted to eat or drink on the premises. It was intimated by owners of such establishments that the police department encouraged them in this policy.

The YWCA made an informal, unpublished study of restaurants during 1950, and it was reported that 90 percent of the owners said that they would serve Negroes. This is directly contrary to what is practiced and to what managers and owners said to the writer.

The pattern of segregation is breaking at the college. Negroes play on the football team and as stated above, are housed in college dormitories.

The Chamber of Commerce stated that it is almost impossible to find housing for Negro soldiers in Manhattan because the colored area is crowded.

The pattern also shows signs of cracking at the restaurant in the local bus station. Apparently policy changes from time to time. Negroes are currently served in this restaurant but are urged to sit at back tables.

Law Observance. Manhattan is a college town and farm service center. As such it does not have the "wide-open" character of other cities.

A review of the Riley County sheriff's files produced only two cases of military violations: two white soldiers arrested for drunken driving.

Military Civilian Relations. At the level of interaction between officials of the community and Fort Riley officials, relations are very good. This relationship is regarded as being due to the Public Relations program at Fort Riley. The mayor's Soldier Committee welcomes soldiers to all aspects of community life. Providing girls for dances is difficult because of the sex ratio of the community. The college ratio is 4 to 1 and the Soldier's Committee feels that it works better to mingle soldiers in the activities of the community rather than provide specific events for soldiers.

The Chamber of Commerce has provided sightseeing tours for soldiers, but now feels that this activity should be a part of the duty of the mayor's committee. The Chamber of Commerce also encourages parishioners of local churches to open their homes to soldiers for holiday periods. This organization sends complimentary tickets to football games and

other events to Fort Riley. The commanding general of Fort Riley is to be presented a complimentary membership to the Chamber of Commerce in the near future. It also keeps a listing on housing available for soldiers. Normally, during a week-end period, 25 apartments are provided for soldiers.

The spirit of friendliness towards white military is exemplified by the conduct of the manager of one of the hotels. He makes a hobby of giving aid to service men. On Sunday mornings he drives down the streets of Manhattan inviting soldiers to go to church. He has had as many as 80 in his home for Sunday night suppers. This particular individual turns civilians away from the hotel in order to provide rooms for military personnel.

On the surface, and between white leaders of the community and white military personnel, there exists a very friendly relationship. Between the white community and the Negro community and Negro servicemen there is little or no contact. "Out of sight, out of mind" is particularly applicable in this respect.

1951 SURVEY OF THE CAMP McCOY COMMUNITY

The political units which serve as a community for Camp McCoy include: Sparta, Tomah, La Crosse, Black River Falls, and Wisconsin Dells.

Sparta is the "soldier's town," Tomah and Black River Falls are the areas of family living, and Wisconsin Dells is attractive as a national tourist center.

There is a total of only seven Negro civilian families in the five communities which serve Camp McCoy. The population is 95 percent native white, with few migrants from other regions.

These facts make the Negro soldier-white civilian relations different than in the other areas in this study. The lack of a Negro population means that there is no racial threat to economic welfare. There is no Negro housing section, no Negro employment policy, no history of either conflict or cooperation.

The general cultural stereotypes play a part in the relations between Negro soldiers and white civilians. However, the most decisive element in the relationship is the existence of a Civil Rights Statute which is respected. The law reads:

> Any person who shall deny to any other person, in whole or in part, the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, restaurants, saloons, barber shops, eating houses, public conveyances on land or water, or any other place of public accommodation or amusement, except for reasons applicable alike to all persons of every race or color, or who shall aid or incite such denial, or require any person to pay a larger sum than the regular rate charged other persons for such accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges or any of them, or shall refuse to sell or furnish any type of automobile insurance or charge a higher rate for such insurance because of race or color, shall be liable to the person aggrieved thereby in damages not less than twenty-five dollars with costs, and shall be punished for every such offense by fine of not more than one hundred dollars or be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment; provided, that a judgement in favor of the party aggrieved or the imposition of a fine or imprisonment shall bar any other proceeding.

White civilians generally felt that Negro soldiers were disadvantaged by being stationed in an area where there were no Negro girls or Negro communities. However, Army Advisory Committees have had an opportunity to create in large measure the kind of social climate they desire.

La Crosse

La Crosse is 35 miles to the southwest of Camp McCoy. It has a population of 47,396 and an area of 12.3 square miles. It is the county seat of La Crosse County, which has a population of 67,595. Its retail trading area of 50 miles, including sections of Minnesota

and Iowa, has a population of 300,000. Ninety-five percent of the population is native white. There are but three Negro families in La Crosse. Two are barbers, one owning his own shop. The other Negro is employed as a custodian.

Industry. La Crosse is an agricultural service center. The estimated farm income from the county is $10 million. The principal products are dairying, tobacco, small grains, and vegetables for canning.

Manufacturing plants total 235 and employ 12,000 workers; accumulated sales total almost $12 million. Manufactured products include agricultural implements, beer, brick, tile; stone, sheet metal products, ice mill work, canning and auto parts.

La Crosse is a railroad center for two transcontinental lines. The Mississippi River provides a deep waterway and river terminal, and three major motor truck lines operate to and throughout the city.

The city has two national and two state banks and one trust company with bank clearings of $384,555,127 and deposits of $42,344,632. Four locally owned building and saving corporations have accumulated assets of $9,816,356. During 1950 there was $2,390,000 of industrial and commercial construction, and $3,047,100 of residential and repair construction.

Its 649 stores employ 3724 people and total $69,333,000 in retail sales. Eighty-eight wholesale establishments employ 879 employees, and sales total $40,030,000.

Segregation Policy. La Crosse, like the other areas serving Camp McCoy, has had no history of segregation because of the complete lack of Negroes in the community.

The community was apprehensive at first concerning the quartering of Negro troops at Camp McCoy. Speculation ran high concerning possible race riots. Meetings were held by business leaders and by the Community-Military Relations Council. None of the wild fears was ever realized.

Housing is very poor for both white and Negro military personnel. There are 14,000 dwelling units in the community and 750 hotel rooms. No Negro area exists and the problem of the Negro soldier seeking a home for his family is intensified by this condition. Hotels located in First, Second, and Third Streets do accommodate Negro soldiers. Some of the proprietors of hotels in this area (not a very desirable one) expressed a very favorable attitude toward Negro soldiers.

One church attempted to provide a Negro USO but the attempt failed because of the small number of Negro soldiers attending. The rooms provided by the church were then opened to all military personnel, but again proved to be a failure for lack of attendance. The new USO is to be housed in the YMCA. Officials at the YMCA stated that few Negro soldiers ever used their facilities.

The citizens of the community give credit to the military for the good conduct of the Negro soldiers. The treasurer of one of the large brewing companies said that he felt that the Negroes must have been briefed at the post because they conducted themselves so well.

No segregation was practiced in bars, hotels, retail stores, movies, etc. Negroes, however, did not frequent the better hotels, bars, restaurants and movies, probably because of cost factors and self-imposed restrictions. The barkeepers and restaurant owners did not as a rule welcome Negro trade. The universal reason given was that it was bad for business.

Civil rights acts in Wisconsin are well understood by owners of hotels, restaurants, bars, and other public accommodations. When Kansas and Wisconsin are compared, the fact of awareness and compliance with civil rights acts in Wisconsin is outstanding. Community leaders in La Crosse felt that it was unfair to Negro soldiers to station them in areas where there were no Negro communities. However, an observer can see some advantages in the situation. There is no historical tradition of custom to which the Negro soldier must

adjust. Rather the military and the community can create, within limits, their own pattern of relationships.

Law Observance and Enforcement. La Crosse is a comparatively quiet, law-abiding city. The police chief said that he had very little trouble with Army personnel and that no discrimination was practiced. The police blotter showed nine Negro military arrests during Jun–Aug 1951. Four were for lewd and lascivious conduct, three were drunk and disorderly, one for larceny of a bicycle, and one for disorderly conduct. During Aug 1951, 28 white soldiers were arrested. This number compares with two Negro soldiers arrested during the same period. The major violation of civilian personnel were motor violations. There are more than 400 tickets a day for parking and speeding but no descriptive records are kept of these offenses.

Prostitution is of the pickup variety. Girls work out of cars but there is a minimum of this kind of behavior. The arrest book at the County Jail was examined and the following data on military arrests were procured during Jun–Aug 1951:

Offenses	Negro	White	Total
Drunken driving	0	11	11
Hit and run	0	1	1
Speeding	0	2	2
Car theft	0	3	3
Reckless driving	0	1	1
Larceny	2	3	5
Bike theft	1	0	1
L and L	1	4	5
Drunk and/or disorderly	5	1	6
Attempt to rape	0	1	1
Stolen property	0	2	2
Total	9	29	38

A total of 38 soldiers were confined in the county jail sometime during the period Jun–Aug 1951. Nine were Negroes and 29 whites. During the same period 143 civilians were confined in the jail, 140 being white, 3 being Negro women.

Organizations. The PIO Office at Camp McCoy employs a civilian, native to La Crosse, who acts as liaison between the community and the camp.

Private citizens have organized groups of hostesses for camp dances.

An Army Advisory Committee exists which works in close cooperation with the camp.

Recreation rooms for soldiers have been provided by church groups, and the YMCA is preparing to reorganize the USO.

Sparta

Sparta is the "soldier's town" for Camp McCoy. It is located six miles to the southwest of the camp and has a population of 5873 (1950).

There is only one Negro civilian family in Sparta, the head of which is employed as a barber at Camp McCoy. Ninety-five percent of the population is native white.

Industry. The community is dependent upon Camp McCoy and upon its position as a farm trading area for its economic life. A state school for dependent children employs a number of local residents.

The industrial life of the community is limited. The major business establishments include a small condensed-milk plant, a truck-body company, a cement-block company, and a transportation company.

Segregation. Having only one native Negro family, Sparta does not have a segregation tradition. Rather, the Wisconsin Civil Rights Act serves as the determinant for the control

of Negro-white relations. This specific determinant is influenced by some of the traditional stereotypes. For example, the fear of Negro sex aggression hovers in the background.

All owners of public places were well aware of the law regarding discrimination. Negroes mixed with white in buses, taxis, restaurants, bars, bowling alleys, theaters, USO, and retail stores.

Restaurant and bar owners said that they did not want to be typed as catering specifically to Negroes. They claimed that it was bad for business. One bar, which informers declared to be popular with Negroes, has had some conflict situations. This particular bar refused to cooperate in the study, but evidence of difficulty was secured from the Brewers Association in La Crosse and the provost marshal at McCoy.

The proprietors of restaurants, bars, hotels, and stores said that they could handle a small number of Negroes, but were apprehensive about large numbers of Negroes being stationed at Camp McCoy. For example, the owner of the hotel which most of the Negro military patronized has a policy of restricting the number of Negroes to 20 percent of the whites living in the hotel.

The more expensive hotel and the more expensive bars had little or no Negro military trade. More subtle forms of discrimination were used in these places. They are then typed by Negro soldiers as places not to go.

Taxi drivers confirmed the opinion of one of their number that white soldiers did not like to ride with Negro soldiers. The drivers confessed that they did not like to drive Negro soldiers. The reason given was that Negro soldiers were too argumentative among themselves.

Numbers of informants reported on the general politeness and good conduct of the Negro soldiers. Considerable sympathy was expressed at their being stationed in an area where there were no Negro families.

The USO is used by both Negro and white soldiers. The new director of this establishment plans to hold no dances at the USO because of the fear of race difficulties.

Housing. Housing is a major problem. Negroes in particular have difficulty in finding rooms. One hotel is available to Negroes and some farm communities in the county do rent rooms to Negroes. Some families in Sparta rent rooms to Negroes, but it is under duress. The hotel owner mentioned previously has a business agreement with certain families in town when he has an overflow of guests. The housing bureau at the USO affirmed the difficulty of finding rooms for Negro families.

The editor of the local paper said that there had been some reports of rent gouging, but that investigation by his paper had not confirmed the reports. About a year ago the Negro paper, *The Pittsburgh Courier*, ran a story on rent gouging of Negro troops at Sparta. The editor of the local paper felt that this article had overplayed the facts.

Law Observance. Police records were on card files listed alphabetically and it was impossible to get summary data or even to separate the soldier's cards from the civilian.

The desk sergeant estimated that the ratio of civilian-military arrests was 50-50, but that there was little difficulty with Negro soldiers. Speeding is the major offense of the military. However, many comments were made on the favorable relations with the camp in an attempt to cut down speeding offenses.

There exists one house of prostitution. Other prostitution is conducted on a pickup basis.

Tomah

Tomah is a family center for military personnel from Camp McCoy. Located 10 miles to the east of camp, it has a population of 4771. The community is largely native white and has no Negro civilian families.

Tomah is a farming community. It has a few lumberyards and creameries. The Milwaukee Railroad has a maintenance-of-way shop and a repair shop employing 200 men. There is a veterans hospital in the community which employs some local residents.

Hotel reservations made by Negroes are honored; without a reservation Negroes are refused accommodations. However, Negroes are served in hotel restaurants.

Bars discourage Negro trade in that Negroes are asked to go to the rear of the bar; but they are served. One bar caters to Negro soldiers in the sense that the proprietor makes no effort to make a distinction in serving Negro or white.

No discrimination exists in retail stores or restaurants.

Local leaders have attempted to organize dances for Negro soldiers. Bus loads of Negro girls have been brought from Minneapolis and Milwaukee. This was successful in one instance. In other cases, transportation difficulties proved too great and the project was abandoned.

Housing for Negro soldiers is the major problem in Negro-white relations. There are no homes rented to Negroes. Several rooming houses have had Negro couples. In each of the rooming houses contacted, the experience was favorable and has been repeated. One owner advertised that she had rooms available for military personnel, white or colored. She was criticized by her neighbors for this action.

Wisconsin Dells

Wisconsin Dells, 60 miles southeast of Camp McCoy, is a nationally famous resort town. It has a population of approximately 2000 and has no Negro families in the community.

The economic life of the community rests on the tourist trade. Other than this trade there is a milk-machine manufacturing company; the Center State Industries, a woodworking company; a Specialty Battery Company; and a cooperative creamery exchange.

The owners of hotels, rooming houses, and recreation units such as boat companies are well aware of the antidiscrimination law and conform to it.

Numerous statements were made to the effect that colored visitors caused less difficulty than whites. The owner of a large boat company and the chief of police both affirmed that the law was a very effective device in determining behavior relating to accommodations.

Local leaders would like to develop a housing area for colored visitors. These people are conscious of the fact that large numbers of Southern white tourists come to Wisconsin Dells. A rumor existed that a local leader had contracted to build a housing project for Negro tourists. The leader in question denied the existence of such a contract.

Black River Falls

Black River Falls has a population of 2806, with 500 more located in the east side, which is not in the incorporated area. The area has about 400 Indians who live in one section of the community and in a reservation some miles out of town. There are three Negro families in the whole area, but only one of the Negro families lives within the municipal limits.

Black River Falls is a farming-trading area. It has a muffler factory, a box factory, and some local repair shops, but its primary business is as a trading area.

The community is some distance from Camp McCoy, and few troops visit there. There is no bus line from camp to town.

Negroes are served in the bars and movies and recreation halls. Hotels were evasive, but from other contacts, it was determined that they use traditional devices such as having no rooms available in order to discourage Negro trade.

There is no discrimination in retail stores. Universally there was a friendly attitude towards servicemen in general and the Negro in particular.

Local leaders are concerned about developing some kind of recreation area for both civilians and military, as little exists.

There is no housing available for Negro personnel in the community. Some of the nearby rural areas house Negro soldiers and there were some rumors of rent gouging.

There is a general feeling of disrespect for Indian girls. Rumors of Indian girls picking up soldiers on the street were circulating about the town. There were two cases on record of Negro soldiers having illegal sex relations with Indian girls.

TABLES OF DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS, BY AREA OF BEHAVIOR, TYPE OF RESPONDENT, AND INSTALLATION

Tables B119 to B124 detail the military-civil status, racial origin, and location of the respondents in the behavior-incident study. The classification structure given earlier in this part of App B is repeated here for the convenience of the reader.

I. Engaging in Formalized Social Relationships with Civilians
   - A. Participating in organizational dances
   - B. Participating in organizational functions where dancing is not a factor

II. Engaging in Informal Social Relationships with Civilians
   - A. Obtaining entrance to or service in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment
   - B. Interacting with civilian patrons in places of trade, recreation, or refreshment
   - C. Approaching or dating civilian women
   - D. Entertaining friends or acquaintances
   - E. Interacting with civilians in casual or "street" contacts

III. Traveling to and from Camp
   - A. Contacts with civilian passengers in a public conveyance
   - B. Contacts with civilian authorities in a public conveyance
   - C. Offering and accepting rides in private autos
   - D. Contacts with civilians through auto accidents, mishaps, or traffic violations
   - E. Contacts with civilians at stops en route

IV. Carrying out Duty Assignments Involving Contact with Civilians
   - A. Office contacts with civilians in military employ
   - B. Contacts with civilians arising out of duty in times of crisis
   - C. Line of duty contacts with civilian authorities
   - D. Special duty assignments involving contacts with civilians

V. Obtaining Housing and Establishing Neighborhood Relationship
   - A. Obtaining housing for self or family
   - B. Establishing relationships with neighbors

TABLE B119

DISTRIBUTION OF FAVORABLE INCIDENTS, BY AREA OF BEHAVIOR AND MILITARY-CIVIL STATUS OF RESPONDENT

Area	Military		Civilian		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
I						
A	8	3.3	4	3.1	12	3.2
B	16	6.7	20	15.5	36	9.7
Subtotal	24	10.0	24	18.6	48	12.9
II						
A	15	6.2	4	3.1	19	5.1
B	15	6.2	21	16.3	36	9.7
C	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
D	14	5.8	3	2.3	17	4.6
E	17	7.1	12	9.3	29	7.8
Subtotal	61	25.3	40	31.0	101	27.2
III						
A	26	11.0	3	2.3	29	7.8
B	5	2.1	1	0.8	6	1.6
C	31	12.9	4	3.1	35	9.5
D	23	9.6	2	1.6	25	6.8
E	1	0.4	3	2.3	4	1.1
Subtotal	86	36.0	13	10.1	99	26.8
IV						
A	15	6.2	18	14.0	33	8.9
B	11	4.6	5	3.9	16	4.3
C	2	0.8	0	0.0	2	0.5
D	17	7.1	4	3.1	21	5.7
Subtotal	45	18.7	27	21.0	72	19.4
V						
A	16	6.7	10	7.8	26	7.0
B	8	3.3	15	11.6	23	6.2
Subtotal	24	10.0	25	19.4	49	13.2
Total	240	100.0	129	100.1	369	99.5

TABLE B120

DISTRIBUTION OF UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS, BY AREA OF BEHAVIOR AND MILITARY-CIVIL STATUS OF RESPONDENT

Area	Military		Civilian		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
I						
A	15	4.4	9	8.0	24	5.3
B	2	0.6	3	2.6	5	1.1
Subtotal	17	5.0	12	10.6	29	6.4
II						
A	89	26.0	31	27.4	120	26.4
B	27	7.9	10	8.8	37	8.1
C	21	6.1	15	13.3	36	7.9
D	3	0.9	2	1.8	5	1.1
E	71	20.8	12	10.6	83	18.2
Subtotal	211	61.7	70	61.9	281	61.7
III						
A	22	6.4	2	1.8	24	5.3
B	27	7.9	5	4.4	32	7.0
C	1	0.3	0	0.0	1	0.2
D	6	1.8	0	0.0	6	1.3
E	11	3.3	3	2.6	14	3.1
Subtotal	67	19.7	10	8.8	77	16.9
IV						
A	5	1.5	6	5.3	11	2.4
B	1	0.3	0	0.0	1	0.2
C	7	2.1	3	2.6	10	2.2
D	10	3.0	4	3.6	14	3.1
Subtotal	23	6.9	13	11.5	36	7.9
V						
A	20	5.8	5	4.4	25	5.5
B	4	1.2	3	2.6	7	1.5
Subtotal	24	7.0	8	7.0	32	7.0
Total	342	100.3	113	99.8	455	99.0

TABLE B121

DISTRIBUTION OF FAVORABLE INCIDENTS, BY AREA OF BEHAVIOR AND RACE OF RESPONDENT

Area	White		Negro		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
I						
A	10	3.7	2	2.0	12	3.2
B	29	10.7	7	7.1	36	9.8
Subtotal	39	14.4	9	9.1	48	13.0
II						
A	10	3.7	9	9.1	19	5.2
B	28	10.4	8	8.1	36	9.8
C	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
D	10	3.7	7	7.1	17	4.6
E	21	7.8	8	8.1	28	7.6
Subtotal	69	25.6	32	32.4	100	27.2
III						
A	23	8.5	6	6.1	29	7.9
B	3	1.1	3	3.0	6	1.6
C	23	8.5	12	12.1	35	9.5
D	15	5.6	10	10.1	25	6.8
E	3	1.1	1	1.0	4	1.1
Subtotal	67	24.8	32	32.3	99	26.9
IV						
A	28	10.4	5	5.0	33	8.9
B	10	3.7	6	6.1	16	4.3
C	1	0.4	1	1.0	2	0.5
D	20	7.4	1	1.0	21	5.7
Subtotal	59	21.9	13	13.1	72	19.4
V						
A	15	5.6	11	11.1	26	7.0
B	21	7.8	2	2.0	23	6.2
Subtotal	36	13.4	13	13.1	49	13.2
Total	270	100.1	99	100.0	368	99.7

TABLE B122

DISTRIBUTION OF UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS, BY AREA OF BEHAVIOR AND RACE OF RESPONDENT

Area	White		Negro		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
I						
A	15	5.1	9	5.6	24	5.3
B	4	1.4	1	0.6	5	1.0
Subtotal	19	6.5	10	6.2	29	6.3
II						
A	65	22.1	55	34.2	120	26.3
B	29	9.9	8	5.0	37	8.1
C	34	11.6	2	1.2	36	7.9
D	2	0.7	3	1.8	5	1.0
E	55	18.7	28	17.3	83	18.5
Subtotal	185	63.0	96	59.5	281	61.8
III						
A	18	6.1	6	3.7	24	5.3
B	19	6.5	13	8.1	32	7.0
C	1	0.3	0	0.0	1	0.2
D	3	1.0	3	1.8	6	1.3
E	7	2.4	7	4.3	14	3.1
Subtotal	48	16.3	29	17.9	77	16.9
IV						
A	9	3.1	2	1.2	11	2.4
B	0	0.0	1	0.6	1	0.2
C	4	1.4	6	3.7	10	2.2
D	9	3.1	5	3.1	14	3.1
Subtotal	22	7.6	14	8.6	36	7.9
V						
A	14	4.8	11	6.8	25	5.5
B	6	2.0	1	0.6	7	1.5
Subtotal	20	6.8	12	7.4	32	7.0
Total	294	100.2	161	99.6	455	99.9

TABLE B123

DISTRIBUTION OF FAVORABLE INCIDENTS, BY AREA OF BEHAVIOR AND INSTALLATION

Area	Dix		Benning		Houston		McCoy		Riley	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
I										
A	7	8.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	2.3	2	2.2
B	12	14.3	0	0.0	4	11.4	14	10.8	6	6.5
Subtotal	19	22.6	0	0.0	4	11.4	17	13.1	8	8.7
II										
A	2	2.4	3	10.3	2	5.7	5	3.9	7	7.6
B	3	3.6	1	3.4	3	8.6	23	17.8	6	6.5
C	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
D	5	6.0	0	0.0	4	11.4	5	3.9	3	3.3
E	8	9.5	2	6.9	3	8.6	11	8.5	5	5.4
Subtotal	18	21.5	6	20.6	12	34.3	44	34.1	21	22.8
III										
A	12	14.3	1	3.4	0	0.0	2	1.5	14	15.2
B	1	1.2	2	6.9	1	2.8	1	0.8	1	1.1
C	5	6.0	9	31.0	5	14.3	11	8.5	5	5.4
D	4	4.8	4	13.8	4	11.4	6	4.6	7	7.6
E	2	2.4	0	0.0	1	2.8	1	0.8	0	0.0
Subtotal	24	28.7	16	55.1	11	31.3	21	16.2	27	29.3
IV										
A	6	7.1	1	3.4	3	8.6	11	8.5	12	13.0
B	1	1.2	0	0.0	1	2.8	0	0.0	14	15.2
C	0	0.0	2	6.9	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
D	6	7.1	2	6.9	4	11.4	4	3.1	5	5.4
Subtotal	13	15.4	5	17.2	8	22.8	15	11.6	31	33.6
V										
A	4	4.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	20	15.5	2	2.2
B	6	7.1	2	6.9	0	0.0	12	9.3	3	3.3
Subtotal	10	11.9	2	6.9	0	0.0	32	24.8	5	5.5
Total	84	100.1	29	99.8	35	99.8	129	99.8	92	99.9

TABLE B124

DISTRIBUTION OF UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS, BY AREA OF BEHAVIOR AND INSTALLATION

Area	Dix		Benning		Houston		McCoy		Riley	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
I										
A	11	13.6	0	0.0	2	3.3	8	6.7	3	3.1
B	0	0.0	1	1.0	1	1.7	3	2.5	0	0.0
Subtotal	11	13.6	1	1.0	3	5.0	11	9.2	3	3.1
II										
A	23	28.4	12	12.1	16	26.7	18	15.2	51	52.6
B	5	6.2	3	3.0	1	1.7	24	20.3	4	4.1
C	10	12.3	2	2.0	1	1.7	20	16.9	3	3.1
D	0	0.0	3	3.0	0	0.0	1	0.8	1	1.0
E	9	11.1	39	39.4	7	11.7	16	13.6	12	12.4
Subtotal	47	58.0	59	59.5	25	41.8	79	66.8	71	73.2
III										
A	2	2.5	3	3.0	11	18.3	5	4.2	3	3.1
B	1	1.2	12	12.1	11	18.3	4	3.4	4	4.1
C	0	0.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
D	1	1.2	3	3.0	2	3.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
E	3	3.7	4	4.0	5	8.3	0	0.0	2	2.1
Subtotal	7	8.6	23	23.1	29	48.2	9	7.6	9	9.3
IV										
A	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	1.7	9	9.3
B	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0
C	1	1.2	8	8.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0
D	3	3.7	5	5.0	3	5.0	2	1.7	1	1.0
Subtotal	4	4.9	13	13.1	3	5.0	4	3.4	12	12.3
V										
A	10	12.3	2	2.0	0	0.0	13	11.0	0	0.0
B	2	2.5	1	1.0	0	0.0	2	1.7	2	2.1
Subtotal	12	14.8	3	3.0	0	0.0	15	12.7	2	2.1
Total	81	99.9	99	99.7	60	100.0	118	99.7	97	100.0

QUESTIONNAIRE ON MILITARY-COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Orientation Statement

You have been asked to take part in a Department of Army survey on how people on a military post get along with people in nearby towns. Studies are being made by army people in Washington on several aspects of military-community relations. One important aspect is how civilians in nearby towns get along with our Negro soldiers.

We are trying to find out just what it is that soldiers and civilians do that results in friendly cooperation, or, on the other hand, resentment, hurt feelings, or disturbance. You can help us by describing briefly, on these sheets of paper, some of the incidents *you have actually witnessed* in or around ——— —specific things that happened between Negroes and whites. Just the things you have seen, not read about or heard about. *Don't give us any names.* It might have been some little thing you observed, or maybe something big that attracted a lot of attention. Whatever it was, just write what you saw happen, and be as specific as you can. This information is to be regarded as personal and private; it will not be released for publication. Nobody will see what you write except the research people responsible for handling the papers.

As I pass out these papers, notice that the first page calls for you to answer some questions about yourself. Please fill these in *before* you turn the page. Let me know by raising your hand when you have done this.

(Pass out pads, check to make sure face sheet is completed.)

Now turn to the next page and read the top paragraph (pause). Think of the most recent incident you can recall, and write it out on this sheet. Be sure to answer all the questions on the page. Do you have any questions before we start?

(When respondents have finished writing these incidents, provide each with an envelope and have him place form in it, *but do not seal.*)

Now we would like you to think of the most recent cases you have seen where there was some difficulty between whites and Negroes in or around ————. It might have been something that resulted in hurt feelings or resentment, or it might have been something serious enough to result in some action by the MPs or local police. Whatever it was, just write what you saw happen, and be as specific as you can. Think of happenings which you felt were very bad for military-community relations, and write them on these forms. Just as with the others that you wrote, this information is personal and private, and your names will not be used. These papers will be seen by nobody except the research people responsible for handling them. Do you have any questions before we start?

(When respondents have finished writing these incidents, instruct them to seal *all* papers in the envelope provided.)

The Questionnaire

MILITARY IDENTIFICATION FORM

DO NOT SIGN YOUR NAME

1. How long have you been in the army?... .....
2. How long in your present unit?.....
3. How long at your present post? .....
4. Your rank..... .....
5. Your Branch (Inf., Engrs., QM, etc.) .....
6. Is your unit: all white....., all Negro ....., mixed.....
7. Are you: white ....., Negro ....., other .....

8. Circle *highest* school grade completed:

Grade school: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

High school: 1 2 3 4

College: 1 2 3 4

9. Your home state:.....

CIVILIAN IDENTIFICATION FORM
DO NOT SIGN YOUR NAME

How long have you lived in this community?.....

How long have you lived in this state?.....

Your occupation or job title.....

Are you: white....., Negro....., other.....

Circle *highest* school grade completed:

Grade school: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

High school: 1 2 3 4

College: 1 2 3 4

FORM FOR FAVORABLE INCIDENTS
DO NOT SIGN YOUR NAME

You have probably seen many cases of friendly cooperation between civilians and military personnel. Think of a recent case where you saw whites and Negroes cooperating in some way which you felt was especially good for military-community relations. Make it specific.

Do not give any names.

(1) Describe briefly just what happened.

(2) Where did this take place? (On the street, a bus, hotel, etc.)

.....

(3) About how long ago did this happen?.....

(4) What was it about this incident that impressed you most?

FORM FOR UNFAVORABLE INCIDENTS
DO NOT SIGN YOUR NAME

You have probably seen cases of difficulty between civilians and military personnel. Think of a recent case where you saw some difficulty between whites and Negroes which you felt was very bad for military-community relations.

Make it specific. *Do not give any names.*

(1) Describe briefly just what happened.

(2) Where did this take place? (On the street, a bus, hotel, etc.)

.....

(3) About how long ago did this happen?.....

(4) In your opinion, why was this a bad thing to have happen?

(5) What is the simplest way this incident could have been avoided or prevented?

Appendix B, Part III

PRESS REACTIONS TO FAR EAST INTEGRATION, JULY 1951

A special survey

by

International Press Clipping Bureau
arranged through the
International Public Opinion Research, Inc.*
for ORO under a subcontract.

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*Now International Research Associates, Inc.

Press Coverage of the End of Segregation in the Far East Command

This report is an analysis of the coverage given by American newspapers to the announcement of Negro-white integration in the Far East Command. The analysis is based on a careful search of 200 representative newspapers (including *all* principal newspapers) for references to the establishment of integration, and to the dissolution of the Negro 24th Inf Regt. The search was made for the period from Jul 27–Jui 31, 1951.*

The report covers the straight news treatment accorded this story, the reactions of the Negro press, and editorial comment in the general press. Of the 200 papers covered, 80 (or 40 percent) reported the story. In discussion of these reports, a distinction will be made between "large" papers (circulation over 100,000) and "small" papers (circulation under 100,000), and between Southern and Northern papers.†

The accompanying table lists the percentage of papers (in these categories) which carried the story.

Papers carrying the report	Northern		Southern	
	Total papers examined	Percent carrying story	Total papers examined	Percent carrying story
Large (circulation over 100,000)	40	50	16	50
Small (circulation under 100,000)	96	25	47	62

The table indicates clearly: (a) that there was no difference between the percentage of *large* Southern and the percentage of *large* Northern papers which carried the story; (b) that the story was carried by a substantially larger percentage of small Southern papers than small Northern papers.

It is not surprising that 62 percent of the small papers in the South (where racial issues are of greater interest) covered the story, as compared with 25 percent of the small papers in the North (where there are few Negroes and racial issues are relatively remote). Large city papers, with their greater size, gave space to the story both in the North and in the South.

The inquiry may well be extended to ask not merely "whether the story was covered," but also "how it was covered." In this connection these factors will be considered: (a) the prominence of the reports (that is the amount of space allotted to them, as measured in column inches); (b) the content of the reports (that is the particular items which were mentioned in them).

* This search was conducted by the International Press Clipping Bureau. Selected clippings are reproduced at the end of this section.

† The papers considered as Southern, for purposes of this report, are those published in Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma. All other newspapers canvassed are considered to be Northern.

The accompanying table gives the average number of column inches allotted to the story in the four types of papers discussed above.

Size of papers	Space in column inches	
	Northern papers	Southern papers
Large	6.1	7.2
Small	5.7	5.5

The table indicates three things: (a) Large papers generally allotted more space to the story than small papers in the North as well as in the South. This, then, reflects the greater amount of space available. (b) Large papers in the South allotted more space to the story than large papers in the North. (c) Small papers in the South allotted approximately as much space to the story as small papers in the North which carried the story.

In other words, the event was reported by more small papers in the South than in the North, and it was allotted more space by the large papers in the South than by those in the North. If the space allotted to the story by papers which did not carry it is considered to be zero, an average is obtained of 1.93 column inches for the North and 3.4 column inches for the Southern papers.* It is evident that the story received substantially wider coverage from Southern than from Northern papers.

Table B125 lists the mentions in the reports of a series of content items. Most of the reports (80 percent) were based on an Associated Press dispatch, while the bulk of the remainder (16 percent) were based on a United Press dispatch, with only a few (4 percent) based on special reports. (Press association reports were, of course, edited and sometimes rewritten by local papers.)

Both the AP and the UP dispatches reported the introduction of integration in the Far East Command, the dissolution of the 24th Regiment, the greater efficiency of Negroes in integrated as against segregated units, and the existence of a previous presidential directive on equality of treatment in the Armed Services.

There were, however, the following differences between the two reports:

The AP dispatch contained several items which did not appear in the UP report: (a) Integration would be confined to the Far Eastern Command. (b) Integration would proceed "more slowly at home." (c) An account of the history and past achievements of the 24th Regt. (d) Integration had been brought about by the need for "every man who could fire a gun." (e) The previous presidential order had ended a quota system in the Army.

The UP dispatch, on the other hand, contained these points which did not appear in the AP dispatch: (a) Integration would be applied in the whole Army soon. (b) The other Armed Services were already integrated. (c) The 24th Regt was credited with the first Korean victory. (d) The order had followed an on-the-spot study by "Johns Hopkins [University]." (e) Negro leaders were heralding integration as an expression of democracy.

Neither of the two dispatches contained any unfavorable reports about the performance of the 24th Regt or about Negro performance in the Army. No unfavorable reports appeared in any of the papers, Northern or Southern.

*These averages are obtained from the following table on the average coverage of the Army's action in Korea:

Region	Total papers	Carried story	Average inches of those carrying	Over-all average
North	136	43	6.0	1.9
South	63	27	5 8	3.4

Southern papers gave the report just as favorable a coverage as the Northern papers. This fact becomes evident if the major items of the reports are arranged in the frequency with which they appeared and these lists are compared for Northern and Southern papers.*

Table B125 clearly indicates that the Southern papers, on the whole, reported the achievements of the 24th Regt more frequently than did the Northern papers. (This result is not due to the greater use of AP dispatches by Southern papers, since UP dispatches were carried by 14 and 18 percent of the Southern and Northern papers, respectively.)

TABLE B125

NUMBER OF PAPERS MENTIONING KEY POINTS

Key points	AP		UP	
	36 North	30 South	8 North	5 South
End of segregation in Far East	27	28	8	5
In Far East only	21	18	0	0
Implication: apply to whole Army soon	0	0	6	4
Implication: proceeding "slowly" at home	6	8	0	0
Other services integrated	0	0	7	4
End of 24th Regt report only	12	5	1	0
Praise by MacArthur	3	2	0	0
Insignia	6	13	1	0
Indian campaign	24	25	1	0
San Juan Hill	22	25	1	0
World War II record	9	12	1	0
First Korean victory	0	0	6	4
Unfavorable past record	0	0	0	0
Source of Order				
President	0	0	3	0
Department of the Army	35	30	4	5
Reasons for order				
Negroes are more efficient integrated	8	4	7	4
Need for every man who can fire a gun	9	12	0	0
Johns Hopkins survey	0	0	6	4
Previous history of integration				
Equality policy by presidential order	12	10	5	3
End of quota system	12	10	0	0
Spread democracy	0	0	4	3

It therefore appears that the Southern papers were not only more interested in the story, as indicated by the wider coverage they gave it, but also more inclined to retain in it favorable accounts of the past achievements of the 24th Regt (Table B126).

The Negro Press

The Negro papers, in their reaction to full integration in the Far East, continue to be most vocal in their opposition to remaining segregation in the Armed Forces. This opposition, however, is tempered somewhat by a feeling of nostalgia and ambivalence, especially with regard to the present and past roles played by the Negro soldier in segregated units.

For example, in hailing the integration of Negro troops in Korea and the deactivation of the 24th Regt, the Negro press takes the opportunity to cite at length the achievements and historical highlights of the 24th Regt.

*Since both UP and AP were used by both Southern and Northern papers, the picture remains substantially the same if these are combined.

These feelings of nostalgia and ambivalence as evidenced in the space given to the historical achievements of the 24th Regt by all of the Negro newspapers are perhaps most graphically demonstrated in the following comments by two Negro soldiers, quoted in the *Chicago Defender*, 4 Aug 1951:

(Corp Walter Johnson of Chicago.) It's the best thing that could have happened. As it is, the regiment has done a pretty good job but we all would be better off in mixed units.

(Corp William Pickett of Wilmington, N. C.) A lot of us in this regiment would like to keep our record. The men have built up a fine reputation and they are proud of it. But, of course, I'm against segregation.

TABLE B126

RANK ORDER OF ITEMS MENTIONED

Northern papers		Southern papers	
Item mentioned	Percent mentioning	Item mentioned	Percent mentioning
"The Army reports"	85	"The Army reports"	95
End of segregation in Far Eastern Command	78	End of segregation in Far Eastern Command	92
24th Regt distinguished at San Juan	50	24th Regt distinguished at San Juan	70
24th Regt distinguished in Indian Wars	54	24th Regt distinguished in Indian Wars	68
Integration for Far East only	16	Integration for Far East only	49
"Equality" set by presidential order	39	Insignia of 24th Regt	38
Negroes are more efficient integrated	33	Follows "equality policy" set by presidential directive	38
Unaccompanied report of break up of 24th Regt	28	Distinction in World War II	32
Former breakdown of quota system by Presidential order	26	Need for every person who can fire gun	32
24th Regt participation in World War II	22	End of quota system by presidential order	30

The newspapers analyzed include papers serving four large Negro populations, namely, the *Chicago Defender*, the New York *Amsterdam News*, the *Houston Informer*, and the Washington *Afro-American*. All of these papers are national Negro weeklies, and it is likely that the stories carried in the local editions are also carried in their national editions, thereby receiving broader coverage than their names imply. As may be expected, the tone of the articles used in the analysis reflects and influences greatly the opinions and attitudes of their Negro subscribers.

An important limitation ought, perhaps, be mentioned. Only two original news sources appear as the basis for these articles written on integration in Korea: the Associated Negro Press and *Afro-American* correspondent Ralph Matthews' dispatches from Korea. This accounts in some measure for the similarity in the content and direction of the items found in the Negro press.

For example, almost without exception, the adoption of the integration policy is attributed to General Matthew Ridgway. (This is in distinction to reports in the general press, which attributes integration to a Department of the Army order.)

Chicago Defender, 11 Aug 1951: "We are happy that the Supreme Commander of the Far Eastern Theatre, General Matt Ridgway stepped forward and ordered an end to Jim Crowism in both combat and service units."

The Washington *Afro-American* on 4 Aug carries the following headline, "Pentagon Brass Yields to Ridgway on Integration."

The New York *Amsterdam News*, while not directly referring to General Ridgway as the person responsible for integration in Korea, attributes the change in policy to the recent change in command in the Far East.

Only the *Houston Informer* expresses the opinion that the Defense Department and the Department of the Army are responsible for the introduction of the new policy:

Houston Informer, 4 Aug 1951: "The Defense Department and the Army were congratulated last Friday by Senator Herbert H. Lehman, Democrat-Liberal, of New York, upon the decision to end racial segregation in combat units in the Far East."

Very few references are made to the political or ideological reasons for integrating Negro troops. In the main the comments focus upon the greater efficiency and more effective utilization of manpower that will result from integration.

General Ridgway, as quoted in the Washington *Afro-American* of 31 Jul 1951, states, "Korea has taught us that you can not make first-class soldiers out of second-class citizens (jim crow units)."

Robert Schakne, International News Service Staff correspondent, as quoted in the *Chicago Defender*, Aug 1951, reports "the Army junked its jim crow policy in the Far East because in the words of one combat officer, 'the Korean War has proven that segregation is a bar to military efficiency.' "

Chicago Defender, 11 Aug 1951:

> The announcement of abolition of segregation in the Far East command last week was no political nor propagandistic move. The experience of the Army in Korea dictated this action.
>
> Segregation has been shown to be impractical, inefficient, ineffective and injurious in building a modern, fighting force today. Jim Crowism simply will not work.

Washington *Afro-American*, 31 Jul 1951:

> The need for replacements in combat units fighting in Korea speeded integration in the Far East. When replacements became scarce, the color of a soldier was forgotten and men were sent to units without regard to race or color.

While, indeed, the Negro papers uniformly express high praise of the policy, cynicism and skepticism appear in certain of the items. In brief, while they consider the present action as an advance, they are very ready to concede that much more remains to be done:

Washington *Afro-American*, 31 Jul 1951: "Men of the famed regiment (24th Regiment) are jubilant but skeptical: . . . now that it has happened they are asking 'What happens Stateside?' "

The *Houston Informer* of 31 Jul, while favoring the adoption of the integration in Korea, calls attention to the need for a firmer integration policy here in the Continental United States, especially in housing, education, and recreational facilities for Negro troops:

> The Army is definitely moving toward racial integration in the organization of troops. Indicative of that is the decision to deactivate the 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea and assign its personnel as replacements in mixed units. This move is expected to have its impact throughout the Army, resulting in all Army units having mixed personnel.
>
> The Army may cling to its notion that it is not an organ of social reform, but sooner or later it will have to grapple with questions of racial segregation in housing, education, and recreational facilities.

Editorial Comment in the General Press

Editorially, the general press displays enthusiasm over the move to integrate Negro troops in Korea. Only the Communist *Daily Worker*'s comments reflect cynicism and disapproval. The *Worker* attacks the Army's action as anti-Negro:

> In a back-handed slap at Negro soldiers last week the Army Brass announced with quite some press fanfare that segregation in the armed forces was ended in Korea and throughout the Far East

Command. The order, on which the announcement was based, was a slick Army public relations job designed to answer cheaply the mass anti-jim-crow demands of the Negro people.

The emptiness of the Army's answer is evident from the first objective of the Army order — abolish the all-Negro 24th Regiment of the 25th Division. . . .

How about the Negro Army outfits who handle the GI's laundry and showers and graves registration? What about the 77th Engineer Combat Company which landed in Korea in July, 1950? Or the 73rd Engineer Combat Battalion? Or the trucking companies? or the ordnance companies and battalions? "Integration" or not Negro soldiers are going to be kept in the "housecleaning" and service units. . . .

No sincere fighter against jim crow is going to be fooled into thinking that jim crow is going to be killed by disbanding one all-Negro regiment.

Although the event received wide coverage in the general press only a few papers chose to comment editorially on the action. These few papers, however, include some of the country's leading newspapers. With one noncommittal exception these comments are highly favorable. In most cases, the press indicates that integration in Korea simply sets the stage for further action along similar lines in other units of the Army.

Although newspapers in the South give the same news coverage to the event as do newspapers in other parts of the country, only two editorials on the subject are noted in Southern newspapers. One of these, from the Charleston, S.C., *News and Courier*, 31 Jul 1951, is resigned rather than hostile in its attitude:

The decision of the Army to break up the last of the Negro outfits in Korea and scatter its members among white troops conforms with the political thought of the Truman government. It will be applauded also in many quarters that do not follow the Truman-FEPC line exclusively, but where understanding of the race question has been obscured by propaganda.

Through history, the right to bear arms and the prestige of the fighting man have been highly esteemed. In the United States, nobody has suggested that the Negro be regarded as a "second class citizen," not good enough to fight and to die for his country. But the mixing of the races in the armed forces, whatever may be the military consequence, may have far-reaching social effects. What these effects will be *The News and Courier* is not now prepared to say. As President Roosevelt once said about the country in general, "We are on our way."

The only other editorial comment from below the Mason-Dixon line comes from the Wilmington, Del., *Morning News*, and is clearly favorable:

In the U. S. Army's Far East Command it's going to be integration instead of segregation. . . . Could there be any more appropriate place than Asia for our fighting men to draw assignments on the basis of calibre rather than color. . . . The truth has been that segregation has existed in the U.S. armed forces supposed to be the defenders of freedom. Absence of the color line in the services will make our own propaganda of truth more effective. And it will be a matter of simple right and justice besides.

The most extensive editorial coverage noted appears in the Oakland *Tribune*. A featured column says that failure to carry out integration threatens the world reputation of the US as a democracy, and weakens its political effectiveness in combating communism:

Had that rule (integration policy) been executed promptly and faithfully by all of the armed services, the communists would have had less ammunition in their campaign to woo and organize dissident or dissatisfied minorities. The world's biggest democracy can secure its claim to allegiance best by demonstrating the purity of its principles and the justice of its practices.

The implications that the integration order has for the US are more often couched in moral terms than in any belief that the efficiency of the Army is the sole or most important issue at stake:

The *Star*, Lincoln, Neb., 31 Jul, 1951:

. . . segregation in the army has never served as an expression of American democracy, and its elimination is a step forward in the relations between races in a nation based upon justice and equality.

The *Daily Times*, Davenport, Iowa, 28 Jul 1951:

Americans serving their country should be assigned to places where their skills and qualifications can best be used. That is the intent of the army's action which is recognition, although belated, that race and color do not affect equality of sacrifice.

The editorial comments, although taking into account the accomplishments of the 24th Regt, also see the deactivation of the regiment as the beginning of a broad attack on segregation, not only in the Far East Command but elsewhere in the Army:

The *Post*, Denver, Col., 31 Jul 1951:

Though this army order applies only in the Far East, workers for fairer race relations will welcome it as a decisive step forward. . . . The most enlightened students of racial problems in America recognize the fact that no overnight miracle will ever end Jim Crowism. Its ending will follow a slow, slow process, but gains are steady year by year. This new order by the army chalks up another.

The *Star*, Lincoln, Neb., 31 Jul 1951:

Since the end of World War II, the army has been moving progressively to eliminate segregation among the troops. There have been the usual difficulties: the to-be-expected opposition and many unexpected troubles. But the plan has worked, is working more smoothly all the time, and will — in time — work even better.

While the Portland *Oregonian* appears a little less cautious in its statements that the "Army has finally come to the end of a long history of racial segregation," it warns against complacency:

The army has finally come to the end of a long history of racial segregation. The last all-Negro unit, an infantry regiment, will be disbanded in Korea, . . . But the Negro's long struggle for equality in the armed services is not yet won. . . . Now that the Negro has an opportunity to take his place in the line, he has, as well, a responsibility to prepare himself, by education and training, to make the best of his new freedom.

In sum, editorial reaction seems to be typified by the following quotation from one of America's most influential newspapers:

The *New York Times*, 30 Jun 1951:

Today's situation demands a new approach. The soldier should be first an American, not a member of any race or an adherent of any religion. He should be judged by what he does, not by any nonmilitary group to which he belongs. . . . Equality of treatment, which rules out segregation, has been for three years a policy in our armed forces. It has not been fully carried out. . . . The sooner they disappear — the sooner every soldier is rated solely according to his abilities, qualities and achievements — the better.

Summary

News of the end of segregation in Korea was reported in two-fifths of a sample of 200 representative newspapers, including half of the major papers with circulations of over 100,000. The Southern press ran the story more often than the Northern press, and gave it more space.

The press dispatches stressed favorably the achievements of the 24th Regt, and did not include critical references. Newspapers in the South mentioned the past successes of the regiment more often than Northern papers.

While the general press attributed the end of segregation to a DA order which carried out a presidential directive, the Negro press attributed the order to General Ridgway. Coverage of the story in the Negro press stressed the greater efficiency of integration. While the news was received favorably, it was tempered with some nostalgia over the ending of the 24th Regt. The move was regarded as only a first step to the end of segregation in the Army.

With the exception of the Communist *Daily Worker* (which attacked it) and of a South Carolina newspaper (which took a reserved position), the move was received enthusiastically in editorials. The Southern press for the most part avoided editorial comment, while the other newspapers called for integration on an Army-wide basis.

Conclusion

It is evident that news of integration was received enthusiastically in most of the country by the papers which chose to comment on it editorially. In the South, where opposition might have been expected, there was almost no comment except in one case where the move was seen as inevitable. The favorable reaction is a direct reflection of the manner in which the Army announced the change of policy in the Far East. There was neither praise nor blame for the Negro soldier: there was no element of "crusading" in the release. The Army made a straightforward announcement that military efficiency would be served by integration.

The past few years have produced a number of situations where the difference between the success and the failure of a change in racial policy has been the direct result of the handling of the public relations aspect. The Jackie Robinson case is probably the best known of the examples of good handling. The recent (1951) controversy over the integration of the Washington, D. C., fire department is an excellent example of poor handling.

The case of the fire department is worthy of some comment because of the close analogy, on a small scale, to the Army's present problem. The difficulty in the fire department case arose because news accounts stated that the white men in the department "favored" integration; a subsequent poll, conducted independently, reported that the firemen were opposed to integration. This led to open controversy, which became an embarrassment to the District of Columbia Commissioners.

The utilization of manpower is an operational problem, whether for the fire department or for the Army. As such, it is no more subject to favorable votes in an opinion poll than are a divisional commander's battle plans. Integration cannot logically be opposed on the ground of dislike; it can only be opposed on the ground that it is less efficient than some other system of utilization of manpower.

From
Morning News
Wilmington, Del.
July 30, 1951

Knocking the Props Out

In the U. S. Army's Far East Command it's going to be integration instead of segregation. For example, that means the end has come for an 82-year-old outfit called the 24th Infantry Regiment, the all-Negro team with a fine combat record in Korea. That special outfit's record need not impair the validity of an official Army statement: "It has been demonstrated that in combat in North Korea, Negro soldiers served more efficiently in integrated units."

Could there be any more appropriate place than Asia for our fighting men to draw assignments on the basis of calibre rather than color? The National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People says the Army action will "knock the props from under much of the anti-American propaganda in Korea." Very likely. The Soviet charge throughout Asia is that the western white imperialists want to subjugate the yellow and brown races as they have subjugated and enslaved the black.

Without doubt the most telling propaganda attacks on America are those describing abuse of Negroes. The savage anti-Negro mob that raged through Cicero, Ill., this month gave the Red press and radio a chunk of propaganda they didn't even need to lie about. Three-fourths of the world's people are non-white. The intent of Soviet Russia is to turn the non-white peoples against the western white world.

Communism, Russian-led, has done a pretty fair job of making villains out of Americans so far in Asiatic eyes. Nothing we can do will stop this drumfire as long as it suits the Soviet plan. But we can at least try to make sure that all anti-American propaganda will be based on lies —and never on truths. The truth has been that segregation has existed in the U. S. armed forces supposed to be the defenders of freedom. Absence of the color line in the services will make our own propaganda of truth more effective. And it will be a matter of simple right and justice besides

From
The Post
New York, N. Y.
July 27, 1951

There's Also Good News Today

Washington, July 26 (AP)—The Army announced today that it will disband its last all-Negro regiment, now serving in Korea. It said the decision was reached because the Korean campaign has demonstrated that Negro soldiers serve more effectively in non-segregated units.

From
The Daily Times
Davenport, Iowa
July 28, 1951

Army Segregation Comes to an End

Discrimination is dealt a blow in the army's decision to disband its only Negro regiment and to distribute its members throughout the service. The ending of segregation is in accordance with the result of studies begun at President Truman's order in 1948.

While the change is to be applauded it brings to a close 81 years of history for the 24th regiment, an organization formed in Texas with members who had fought in the Civil war.

Fame came to the 24th in the battle of San Juan hill in the Spanish-American war. It served in the Philippines on three occasions, chased Pancho Villa in Mexico and for 20 years was a demonstration unit for infantry training. The first Negro troops in the Pacific in World War II, the 24th fought in the island campaigns and eventually took up occupation duty in Japan.

The disbanding of the 24th is a part of a six-month program of integrating Negro troops into units in the Far East. It is a program which calls for tact, of course, but fighting men always develop a spirit of tolerance and comradeship that could well be emulated by those who remain at home.

Americans serving their country should be assigned to places where their skills and qualifications can best be used. That is the intent of the army's action which is recognition, although belated, that race and color do not affect equality of sacrifice.

From
The Oregonian
Portland, Ore.
July 31, 1951

Wraps Off Negro Soldier

The army has finally come to the end of a long history of racial segregation. The last all-Negro unit, an infantry regiment, will be disbanded in Korea, and, henceforth, inductees and volunteers will be assigned to service and combat organizations without regard to color.

The action is long overdue. President Truman soon after the end of World War II ordered integration of white and Negro soldiers. The navy and the air force were more prompt in carrying out the orders. The army waited to be convinced, by combat experience in Korea, that the Negro should have equal status with his white brother in arms.

All-Negro units fought with distinction in World War II. One, the 99th pursuit squadron, which was in the thick of the fighting against the German air force in Europe, included Portland pilots. But there was an overwhelming tendency, both in the Pacific and in the European theaters, to assign colored units—even when trained for combat—to menial service tasks. It was only on occasion that the Negro soldier was permitted to prove himself.

He has done that in Korea. Sorely pressed units of the 24th division east of Chinju were surprised a year ago when individual Negro riflemen reported as replacements. The replacements remained, and their performance convinced the most skeptical that the colored soldier could live and fight with the white soldier on an equal basis.

But the Negro's long struggle for equality in the armed services is not yet won. The navy has long integrated its personnel in theory, but only a few months ago a report from Korea disclosed that, of 150 Negroes assigned to one carrier in the 7th fleet, 120 were stewards.

Now that the Negro has an opportunity to take his place in the line, he has, as well, a responsibility to prepare himself, by education and training, to make the best of his new freedom

From
Daily Worker
New York, N. Y.
July 31, 1951

Press Roundup

THE HERALD TRIBUNE announces for the 10th—or is it the 100th?—time that Negro segregation has been ended in the Army. Or was it Cicero? We didn't read it too carefully.

THE WORLD-TELEGRAM contemplates the shocking situation wherein a divorced Army officer finds his son filled with "communistic tendencies . . . largely due to his mother's instruction." The Telly announces that "there should be a new law" to permit the father to seize the son "from a sinister Communist clutch." And after that, how about a law requiring all victims of anti-Negro violence to sign affidavits acknowledging that it was all a harmless prank, typifying the carefree joy of the American way of life?

From
Tribune
Oakland, Calif.
July 30, 1951

AT HOME —ABROAD

By RAYMOND LAWRENCE

Abolition of racial segregation in the Army's Far Eastern command puts an end to one of the most deplorable and undemocratic practices of this Republic.

As the result of lessons learned in actual warfare, the Army has finally disbanded the last Negro regiment, the famous 24th which is an infantry outfit in the 25th Division now in Korea. This unt, organized shortly after the Civil War, fought against the Indians and achieved its greatest fame as one of the units that stormed San Juan Hill at Santiago, Cuba. Its members now are to be distributed among other Army units in Japan, Korea and Okinawa during the next six months.

In Korea it was found that Negroes fought as bravely and as effectively as anyone else as long as they felt they were full citizens and not discriminated against. Their loyalty and competence never was in doubt.

OFFICERS TESTIFY

The testimony of the commanding officers on these points is unimpeachable.

One white lieutenant colonel in Korea commented: "I want you to know I have 80 Negroes in my own outfit, mixed with the white boys, and I'll tell you right now that the colored boys have just as much guts and just as much staying power as any other."

The battle proved the case but it is no credit to the Army that it has taken so long to come to a conclusion familiar to any freshman in anthropology. Individual differences there are among all peoples but superiority and inferiority based on race or color constitute a myth to any reputable social scientist.

OTHER ARMY UNITS

In this instance the Army, while taking a commendable step, has not acted on democratic principle but on empirical evidence from the field. This end to segregation applies only to the Far East command. There still are a number of all-Negro units smaller than regiments. Why they continue to exist remains a question that can only be answered in the Pentagon.

The experience of the Air Force and the Navy in abolishing racial segregation and discrimination are enlightening.

When, during the last war, the Navy was ordered to treat whites and colored on the basis of absolute equality, some of the more benighted admirals objected that this would be unfortunate, even impossible, because of cramped quarters aboard ship. However, Negroes were permitted to apply and study for rates outside of the stewards classification on the same basis as everyone else. Some of them proved the most intelligent, alert and efficient petty officers in the Navy. Others became commissioned officers.

OBJECTIONS DISPROVED

The original objections proved silly. Negroes were accepted on their individual merits and even aboard the smallest ships, and even among Southerners, there was not the slightest trouble or friction.

The Air Force, being newer, had fewer organizational problems in putting racial equality into effect. But in this service also there was never the resentment and antagonism that the believers in racial myths warned against.

In view of Navy and Air Force experience, it is astonishing that the Army has lagged so far behind. Although abolition of the 24th Regiment is a move in the right direction, there are no valid reasons why the action should not have been taken long ago.

POLICY STATED

These conclusions are based on the report of the Presidential Commission appointed in 1948 to study racial rules and practices in the armed services.

It acted on the basis of a policy stated as follows: "It is hereby declared to be the policy . . . that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin."

Had that rule been executed promptly and faithfully by all of the armed services, the communists would have had less ammunition in their campaign to woo and organize dissident or dissatisfied minorities. The world's biggest democracy can secure its claim to allegiance best by demonstrating the purity of its principles and the justice of its practices.

From
The Post
Denver, Colo.
July 31, 1951

A Color Line Dims

JIM CROW in the army is fading away a little more. Racial segregation in the far east command has been ordered out. The famed Twenty-fourth infantry regiment, oldest and last all-Negro regiment, is to be disbanded, and integration of white and Negro troops in Korea, Japan and Okinawa is to be completed in about six months.

Though this army order applies only in the far east, workers for fairer race relations will welcome it as a decisive step forward. The Negro, in the military, won a little break in World war I; a better one in World war II. Both West Point and Annapolis have, at last, opened their gates to a few exceptionally qualified Negroes. A number of Negro officers have achieved high rank.

The "buffalo soldiers" in the Indian wars of the American west, "pioneers," and riflemen, too, with the Union army in the Civil war, soldiers and sailors in the Spanish-American and World wars, the Negroes have proved their fighting ability—and the nation is beginning to give them better recognition.

The Twenty-fourth infantry regiment in the Twenty-fifth division has fought all through the Korean war. It has done itself proud. But it won its first battle honors in the western Indian wars after its formation at Fort McKavitt, Tex., in 1869. In the Spanish-American war, it was one of the units which stormed San Juan hill at Santiago, Cuba. On its disbandment now, it can look back to a splendid and honorable record.

The most enlightened students of racial problems in America recognize the fact that no overnight miracle will ever end Jim Crowism. It's ending will follow a slow, slow process, but gains are steady year by year. This new order by the army chalks up another.

From
Times
New York, N. Y.

AN OLD REGIMENT PASSES

The long history of the Army's oldest and last Negro regiment ended on Thursday with the disbandment of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, which has been fighting as part of the Twenty-fifth Division throughout the Korean campaign. The Twenty-fourth came into existence in 1869 as a combination of two existing Negro regiments; it saw hard and tedious service on the old Southwestern frontier; it had its moment of glory on San Juan Hill in 1898, where it charged with Theodore Roosevelt's Rough Riders; but like any unit based on race or color its very existence was evidence of discrimination. The Twenty-fourth Infantry was a year older than the Fifteenth Amendment; the Twenty-fourth could well be sacrificed if the principle of equality of rights embodied in the amendment were at last fully accepted.

The Twenty-fourth labored under a disadvantage. If at any time its record, or the record of any of its Negro officers, was not good the fact swiftly became known; if the regiment or any of its members did something beyond the call of duty there would often be surprised and patronizing comment. Today's situation demands a new approach. The soldier should be first an American, not a member of any race or an adherent of any religion. He should be judged by what he does, not by any non-military group to which he belongs.

Equality of treatment, which rules out segregation, has been for three years a policy in our armed forces. It has not been fully carried out. In the Army some units of battalion or lesser size still exist. The sooner they disappear—the sooner every soldier is rated solely according to his abilities, qualities and achievements—the better

From
Star
Lincoln, Nebraska
July 31, 1951

End Of The Deuce-Four

The Twenty-Fourth Infantry regiment has a glorious history. It was created in 1866 with Civil war veterans as its nucleus, it fought in the bloody Indian wars which won the West for the pioneer settlers, and it was at San Juan Hill in the Spanish-American war with Teddy Roosevelt's Rough Riders. The Twenty-Fourth later fought guerillas in the Philippines, and served for more than 20 years as show troops at the Fort Benning army infantry school in Georgia. It fought the bitter battles on Bougainville, then hopped to New Georgia, to Guadalcanal, to Saipan in World war II.

Last summer, the Twenty-Fourth won the first local American victory in Korea, repulsing the North Korean communists after a savage fight at Yechon.

Throughout its 85-year history the Twenty-Fourth, known to the soldiers in its ranks and to those who were familiar with it as the "Deuce-Four," has had its times of glory and its moments of defeat.

The Deuce-Four" is an all-Negro regiment, one of four established at the end of the Civil war. The army is disbanding it and transferring its soldiers into regular army units, where they will serve with other Americans who have different colors of skin.

Since the end of World war II the army has been moving progressively to eliminate segregation among the troops. There have been the usual difficulties, the to-be-expected opposition, and many unexpected troubles. But the plan has worked, is working more smoothly all the time, and will—in time—work even better.

According to a news report from Korea, one of the "Deuce-Four" soldiers, a stocky lad from Cleveland, hitched his rifle sling and observed that "most of the boys will be pretty happy" about the news. They have a right to be; segregation in the army has never served as an expression of American democracy, and its elimination is a step forward in the relations between races in a nation based upon justice and equality.

From
News & Courier
Charleston, S. C.
July 31, 1951

Negro Outfits Abolished

The decision of the Army to break up the last of the Negro outfits in Korea and scatter its members among white troops conforms with the political thought of the Truman government. It will be applauded also in many quarters that do not follow the Truman-FEPC line exclusively, but where understanding of the race question has been obscured by propaganda.

An article in The Saturday Evening Post recently discussed with candor, and for all we know with accuracy, the qualities of the Negro fighting man in Korea. The gist of it was that the Negro soldiers were undependable in their own units because they did not trust one another to stand the gaff. But when sprinkled among white troops, they fought well because they had more faith in the white soldiers than in their own race.

Perhaps these things are true, though the story of some Negro outfits officered by white men is creditable and once was accepted with pride by the Negroes.

The 24th regiment, for instance, the last Negro unit in Korea that now is being broken up, was organized in 1869, four years after the slaves were set free. It fought the Indians in the West, and stormed San Juan Hill in the War with Spain. In 1942 it was the first Negro outfit to go into action in the Pacific, fighting in the Solomons, the Marianas and Okinawa. No longer can Negroes point to it as one of their own.

We do not believe that white men in the United States would willingly give up their own identities, or at least they have not felt that way heretofore. The British, from whom we Americans inherit most of our traditions, have not mixed races as the Spanish colonizers did. One result is that North America is white while Central and South America have a wide variety of colors. The native British troops in India and those recruited from other races were organized as units of similar peoples with British officers.

Throughout history, the right to bear arms and the prestige of the fighting man have been highly esteemed. In the United States, nobody has suggested that the Negro be regarded as a "second class citizen", not good enough to fight and to die for his country. But the mixing of the races in the armed forces, whatever may be the military consequence, may have far-reaching social effects. What these effects will be The News and Courier is not now prepared to say. As President Roosevelt once said about the country in general, "We are on our way."

From
Daily Worker
New York, N. Y.

'INTEGRATION' ORDER FREEZES JIMCROW

White Officers to Command; All-Negro Service Units Maintained

By ABNER W. BERRY

IN A BACK-HANDED SLAP at Negro soldiers last week the Army Brass announced with quite some press fanfare that segregation in the armed forces was ended in Korea and throughout the Far East Command. The order, on which the announcement was based, was a slick Army public relations job designed to answer cheaply the mass anti-jimcrow demands of the Negro people.

The emptiness of the army's answer is evident from the first objective of the Army order—abolish the all-Negro 24th Regiment of the 25th Division. The reason: "It has been demonstrated that in combat in Korea, Negro soldiers served more efficiently in integrated units."

★

BUT THE ARMY ORDER does not have in mind real integration. Actually disbanding the 24th Infantry Regiment only "integrates" Negro enlisted personnel and junior officers under white commanders, a continuation of the same old jimcrow pattern upholding white supremacy. And the army quickly assures its white supremacy Old Guard that Negroes will still serve in separate units in the United States and in Europe. But back to Korea.

★

THE FRAUD of the Army's announcement is further indicated in the fact that it doesn't mention the numerous all-Negro outfits in Korea—numbering more men than the 24th Regiment—in its "integration" program. How about the Negro army outfits who handle the GI's laundry and showers and graves registration? What about the 77th Engineer Combat Company which landed in Korea in July, 1950? Or the 73rd Engineer Combat Battalion? Or the trucking companies? Or the Ordnance companies and Battalions? "Integration" or not Negro soldiers are going to be kept in the "housecleaning" and service units.

Of course the writer of the Army's directive could have started closer to home. It would have been more convincing if the order to abolish segregation in the Army had been directed to Fort Lee, Va., just a stone's throw from the Pentagon so to speak. In Fort Lee, the Baltimore Afro-American reporter, James L. Hicks, has revealed, everything is jimcrow. A $500,000 officers' club there is barred to the use of Negro officers, while $60,000 is being spent to build a "colored" club. Why not start there?

★

WHY DID the directive have nothing to say about the jimcrow National Guard units in 42 states of the Union? These units are now under the supervision of the Army's National Guard Bureau and they are as jimcrowed as the railroad station in Birmingham, Ala. This includes all of the guard units from New York State, whose all-Negro 715 AAA Battalion from Brooklyn is now training (or was) in jimcrow Fort Benning, Ga.

From Fort Devens, Mass., a group of Negro soldiers wrote in to the Pittsburgh Courier recently: "We belong to the ——th QM Laundry Company. It is a segregated outfit. All of the outfits that we have seen at Fort Devens are segregated except for a couple of training units. . . ."

★

ARE WE to assume that Negro and white soldiers are to train in an atmosphere of jimcrow and anti-Negro practices in order to fight in an "integrated" Army? No sincere fighter against jimcrow is going to be fooled into thinking that jimcrow is going to be killed by disbanding one all-Negro regiment.

The Army "integration" announcement follows the appointment by President Truman of a three-man courts-martial review board. He had been requested to place a Negro on the board to safeguard the rights of the disproportionate number of Negro soldiers who are railroaded by the big white brass. The review board is all-white.

★

A NEGRO REPORTER, concluding a cross-country tour of Army installations, recently wrote: "The only place in the world where the U. S. uniform can be insulted with impunity is in the southern states of the United States." News items from the Negro press fully document this statement. Just two weeks ago 21 Negro soldiers, headed for Korea, refused to sit in the rear of a bus in Nashville. White military policemen arrested the entire group and escorted them, under guard, to St. Louis. These incidents of humiliation and violence, too numerous to mention, will not be covered up by the Army announcement.

An official of the NAACP in Washington greeted the Army directive and declared it "will knock the props from under much of the Anti-American propaganda in Korea." That may be true. It may be good public relations in Korea and Japan. But it's quite another matter to a Negro soldier who is offered the prospect of manhood only when he becomes the occupant of a Korean foxhole.

Appendix C

REVIEW OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION

by

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REVIEW OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION

HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE USE OF NEGRO TROOPS IN THE ARMY

Introduction

Negro troops have been used in the US Army in ever-increasing numbers since the American Revolution. Until the period following World War II, there was a tendency to look upon them as second-class soldiers, despite the brilliant exploits of a few of the Negro units. For the most part they were used in servic units. In 1945 a reexamination of the use of Negro soldiers was begun, and in 1950 recommendations were made that resulted in a shift of Army policy designed to make more efficient use of the Negro soldier. Under this new policy, Negro troops are taking part in the war in Korea and their experiences there are being carefully studied with a view to possible changes in the employment of Negro forces in the future.

Negro Troops in the Revolution and the War of 1812

Negro troops were held liable to service with the local militia in several colonies prior to the American Revolution. With the outbreak of hostilities in 1775, proposals were made that they be brought into the Revolutionary Army. General Washington suggested caution in adopting this measure because of a fear of political disharmony which might arise from the proposal, and a decision was made to delay any action in this matter. While the step was being debated, however, Negroes as individuals were being taken into white battalions. No attempt was made to stop this action, and Negroes served throughout the war as slave substitutes or as freemen in integrated units. A strength report of 24 Aug 1778 showed that 755 Negroes were being carried on the rolls of fourteen units in that part of the Continental Army under Washington's immediate control. In addition to these forces, there were other Negroes used for service duties and at least one colony had a separate Negro battalion. It appears that several thousand Negroes in all may have been used by the Continental forces.*

Negro units were not used in great numbers in the War of 1812. The chief occasion of their employment seems to have been near the end of 1814 when General And·· Jackson issued a call for Negro freedmen in the vicinity of Mobile to form a volunteer unit. The men thus raised fought in engagements around New Orleans at the close of the year.

Negro Troops in the Civil War, Spanish-American War, and World War I

With the coming of Civil War, the Negro was considered far more seriously as a soldier than he had been previously. Motivated in part by the idea that the Negro should have a right to fight for the freedom of his colored brothers in the South, the Federal Government decided in 1863 to employ Negro regiments in the Union Army. Altogether some

* Woodward, Elon A., "The Negro in the Military Service of the United States," ms. in War Records Branch, National Archives. On estimate of total see L. D. Reddick, "Negro Policy of the United States Army," *Journal of Negro History*, Vol. 34, p. 14 (1949).

154 Negro combat units were set up, totaling 123,000 soldiers. Nearly 200,000 Negro soldiers were employed in services of supply activities.* Use of the Negro for military duties was not confined to the North. The Southern leaders, who had always feared the prospect of arming Negroes, came gradually to favor their use in labor battalions and later for supply services.†

Northern Negro units fought with distinction at Fort Pillow and at the Battle of the Crater at Petersburg. In an effort to honor the Negroes for their efforts, Congress at the end of the Civil War created six Negro regiments in the Regular Army. The number was later reduced to two infantry and two cavalry regiments. The later act, passed in 1869, had the effect of compelling the Army to keep some elements of these regiments on the rolls at all times.‡

Negro units served for a number of years in the western frontier posts and proved valuable in actions against the Indians. Frequent complaints were made by their officers, however, because of the lack of literate Negro troops who could make out routine records and reports. During the Spanish-American War, the four Regular Army Negro regiments, the 9th and 10th Cav and the 24th and 25th Inf, fought creditably in Cuba under white officers. The 10th Cav won particular acclaim because of its service in the battle of San Juan Hill.

Although most of the Negroes inducted in World War I were used in service units, two Negro divisions were activated under white officers and sent to France. Their combat record was generally regarded as unsatisfactory and as a result, Army officers developed the view that Negro soldiers should be placed mainly in services of supply, that they should be used in segregated units, and that they should not exceed 9 percent of the total Army Forces.

Negro Troops in World War II

More than 2.5 million Negroes registered for the draft in World War II. Of this number, about 909,000 served in the Army. The peak strength came in Sep 1944 when 701,678 officers and men were listed on the Army's rolls. This amounted to 8.7 percent of the total strength of the Army at that time. The Negro percentage of total strength had varied on a quarterly basis from 5.9 percent in Dec 1941 to a high of 8.7 percent in Sep 1944 and then dropped to 8.4 percent in Jun 1945, shortly after the close of the war in Europe. The percentage actually rose slightly — to 8.6 percent in Sep 1945 — shortly after the Japanese surrender. Thus at no time during the war, even under selective service, did the percentage of Negroes to whites in the Army ever rise to 9.

After the passage of the Selective Service Act and the drafting of large numbers of Negroes, Negro organizations called on the President and the Army to change existing policies relating to colored troops in order that they might feel they had something worth fighting for. Manifestations of Negro discontent prior to the Pearl Harbor attack made obvious the need for a reexamination of the Army's policy. President Roosevelt expressed his personal interest in the matter, and the Secretary of War decided to meet some of the objections by appointing a Negro lawyer, Dean William Hastie of Howard University's Law School, as civilian aide in charge of Negro problems. This action was followed by specific actions to meet many of the main objections to existing policy. As a result of these

* Gillem Board Report, Part II A.
† Freeman, Douglas S., *Robert E. Lee*, III, pp. 499, 507, 512, 544, 542.
‡ Lee, Maj Ulysses G., "The Employment of Negro Troops," Ch. I, ms. in Office of Chief of Military History.

efforts opportunities were given Negro soldiers to enter certain military specialties from which they had formerly been excluded, and additional openings were made available to Negro officers. An all-Negro air squadron was activated and the first Negro general was appointed. One step, which may have been regarded as a concession to Negroes — the

Month		Negro percentage
1941	Dec	5.9
1942	Mar	6.0
	Jun	5.8
	Sep	6.4
	Dec	7.4
1943	Mar	7.8
	Jun	7.9
	Sep	8.2
	Dec	8.5
1944	Mar	8.7
	Jun	8.7
	Sep	8.7
	Dec	8.5
1945	Mar	8.5
	Jun	8.4
	Sep	8.6

reactivation of two Negro regiments — was not well received by Negro leaders who felt that it strengthened the principle of segregation in the Army. Studies of the Negro manpower problem were made from the end of Aug 1942 to the end of the war by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy's Advisory Committee on Troop Policies.*

In retaining its past policies regarding the use of Negro troops, the Army frankly sought to avoid changes which might lead to friction. This attitude was expressed more than once in the statement that the Army was not a laboratory for social experimentation. It was argued that any attempt to integrate whites and Negroes would lead to the lessened efficiency of the unit in which the experiment was tried. As a result, the Army throughout World War II held to the principle of segregation. It also tended to assign most of its Negroes to service units, which were to have on their rolls some 78.1 percent of the Negroes in the Army.

Two important exceptions were made to the policy of segregation during the war. Negro officer candidates were admitted to certain classes with white officer candidates, and in the course of the Ardennes battle some 2500 Negro volunteers were accepted into white regiments. The units were set up initially as all-Negro platoons and then integrated into white companies. When replacements were needed, white soldiers were integrated with the Negro troops. Despite the excellent combat record of these volunteers, there was a feeling that the experience offered no true basis for evaluating the worth of Negroes as combat troops, inasmuch as the number was small and the men were volunteers of better than average intelligence.

The experience of the Army with Negro troops in World War I was repeated to a considerable degree in World War II. At peak strength at the close of the war in Europe, only 12 percent of the Negroes were in the ground combat arms of the Army. This number,

* Lee, *op. cit.*, Ch. IV, pp. 11, 15, and 21. The Committee was also known as the Negro Troop Committee, The Special Troop Policies Committee, and the McCloy Committee.

moreover, constituted only 1.2 percent of the entire army strength in these forces. A large part of them were in the 92d and 93d Div,* which had been reactivated at the beginning of the war despite some protest by Negroes that the Army was strengthening its segregation policy.

The 92d Div, committed to combat in the Mediterranean Theater, gained the reputation of lacking the will to fight in close combat. Its record throughout the War was disappointing and studies of its actions suggested that Negro troops could not be made into satisfactory infantry divisions. The 93d Div and the 24th Inf Regt in the Pacific area saw little combat action, and there were few data on which to base any final conclusions as to their performance under battle conditions.

In smaller units, Negro troops performed more satisfactorily. A tank battalion, an antiaircraft battalion, tank destroyer units, and field artillery units all gained praise for their work in the European Theater. Also commended were the 2500 Negro volunteers who were organized into platoons at the time of the Ardennes counterattack and assigned to divisions of the First and Seventh Armies. While praising the work of these platoons, there was a tendency for commanders to point out that the troops in these units were of somewhat higher intelligence than the average Negro soldier, and that they were not typical.

The general reaction on the part of commanders was that large Negro units were not effective, that they were not dependable in close combat, and that they were best fitted for services of supply assignments. For these and other reasons, the Army tended to shift the bulk of the Negroes to the services of supply. As a result 78.1 percent of all male Negro strength in the Army was in the service branches. This was in contrast to the 39.7 percent of white troops in the service branches of the Army. Both the Quartermaster Corps and the Transportation Corps had large percentages of Negro personnel. (For a comparison of male Negro and white strengths of the Army by branch and service as of 30 Jun 1945, see Table C1. Strength totals are further illustrated in Figs. C1-C6.)

At the close of the war, the Army found it necessary to reexamine a number of its policies in regard to Negro troops. This came in part because a number of Negroes desired to remain in the Army at a time when many whites were clamoring to be released. Although many of these troops believed that the Army was unfair, they still preferred its opportunities to those of civilian life. The question therefore arose whether the customary practice could be changed so that more than 10 percent of the soldiers could be Negroes. No information was available on the wisdom of such a practice, inasmuch as the percentage of Negroes in the Army had never gone above 9 percent.

Policy on Negroes Since World War II

Pressure from Negro organizations on the national administration and the Army for a liberalization of Army policy regarding Negroes became increasingly strong in the middle and late 1940's. In the spring of 1945, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy urged that a thorough field study be made of the Army's racial policy and that the policy be revised on the basis of experience. In Oct 1945, therefore, an all-Army board, headed by Lt Gen Alvan C. Gillem, Jr., was set up to investigate means of developing the efficiency of the manpower of the nation by preparing a policy for the better utilization of Negro soldiers. Thus, for the first time, the Army approached the Negro question as a part of the entire manpower problem.

The Gillem Board, despite its intentions of treating the Negro soldier as part of an over-all manpower question, soon found itself back at the old practice of discussing the Negro soldier in terms of the social problems involved. Instead, therefore, of stressing the

* The 2d Cav had also been activated, but was converted into noncombatant units in 1943.

TABLE C1

COMPARISON OF MALE NEGRO AND WHITE[a] STRENGTHS OF ARMY BY BRANCH AND SERVICE, 30 JUN 1945

Combat arms and services	Officers		Enlisted men		Total (officer and enlisted)		Branch total (Negro and white)	Negroes in branch, %	Negroes in branch as % of total Negroes in group	Whites in branch, %	Whites in branch as % of total whites in group
	Negro	White	Negro	White	Negro	White					
Armor	0	0	2,456	110,170	2,456	110,170	112,626	2.2	3.2	97.8	4.1
Cavalry	37	9,188	650	81,023	687	90,211	90,898	0.8	0.9	99.1	3.4
Coast Artillery	169	22,105	10,456	283,391	10,625	305,496	316,121	3.4	14.0	96.6	11.4
Field Artillery	241	38,566	11,061	445,670	11,302	484,236	495,538	2.3	14.9	97.7	18.0
Infantry	1,173	103,336	49,673	1,590,800	50,846	1,694,136	1,744,982	2.9	67.0	97.1	63.1
Subtotal	1,620	173,195	74,296	2,511,054	75,916	2,684,249	2,760,165	2.8	100.0	97.2	100.0
Quartermaster	749	28,187	216,419	231,389	217,168	259,576	476,744	45.6	40.3	54.4	8.8
Engineers	485	40,191	134,295	515,750	134,780	555,941	690,721	19.5	25.0	80.5	18.9
Transportation	296	22,152	84,622	156,069	84,918	178,221	263,139	32.3	15.8	67.7	6.0
Ordnance	166	24,932	29,748	255,111	29,914	280,043	309,957	9.7	5.5	90.3	9.5
No branch assigned	24	10,718	25,554	359,886	25,578	370,604	396,182	6.5	4.8	93.5	12.7
Medical	0	0	18,534	502,748	18,534	502,748	521,282	3.6	3.4	96.4	17.1
Signal	73	26,944	14,927	276,297	15,000	303,241	318,241	4.7	2.8	95.3	10.3
Other	1,739	97,532	11,370	396,016	13,109	493,548	506,657	2.6	2.4	97.4	16.8
Subtotal	3,532	250,656	535,469	2,693,266	539,001	2,943,922	3,482,923	15.5	100.0	84.5	100.0
Total male strength, not including USAAF personnel	5,152	423,851	609,765	5,204,320	614,917	5,628,171	6,243,088	9.8	—	—	—
USAAF, total	1,242	342,338	74,436	1,451,779	75,568	1,794,117	1,869,685	4.0	—	96.0	—
Total male strength, all branches	6,394	766,189	684,091	6,656,099	690,485	7,422,288	8,112,773	8.5	—	—	—

[a] Includes all races other than Negro.




Fig. C1—Comparison of Negro-White Percentages in Ground Service Branches, Jun 1945




Fig. C2—Negro-White Percentage in Combat Units




Fig. C3—Ground Combat Strength of Army, Jun 1945




Fig. C4—Male Strength of Army, Jun 1945




Fig. C5—Comparison of Negro and White Strength in Ground Combat Arms, Jun 1945




Fig. C6—Distribution of Negro Percentages in Ground Combat Arms and Services, Jun 1945

means by which the Negro might be used in a different system more efficiently, the board discussed how the Negro could be used in the traditional framework of segregation more efficiently. On the basis of World War II experience, as applied to segregated units, the Gillem Board concluded that the Negro was least effective in close combat, that small Negro units which were teamed up with larger white units worked better than large independent Negro units.*

Proceeding from the premise that the Negro soldier suffered from certain defects not of his own making, the Gillem Board concluded that the Army must deal with the problem by limiting Negro enlistments to 10 percent of the total number of troops and by continuing the policy of segregation.

The board added that ultimately the Army should consider the use of all the nation's manpower without regard to race or color. It was willing to approach such an end by recommending that new Negro units be established to give Negroes broader opportunities to use their skills in fields hitherto closed to them in the Army. Basically, however, the Gillem Board, while showing sympathy for the Negro, had recommended no fundamental change in the Army's racial policy. Segregation was maintained and the quota system was retained.

The Negro press promptly assailed the Gillem Board's report and demanded a more thorough examination of the subject. The President in 1948 established the Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces under Mr. Charles Fahy to study the question of the Negro soldiers. The committee, entirely civilian in its makeup, was instructed to start its investigations from the standpoint of giving the Negro greater opportunities and of making better use of the potential Negro reserves in the United States. While this committee was still considering these questions, the Army established another all-Army board headed by Lt Gen S. J. Chamberlin to study the Negro manpower problem.

The Fahy Committee insisted that the environmental background of Negroes which created special problems in their use imposed a feeling of insecurity on Negroes which was increased by the Army's system of segregation. The committee believed, therefore, that the more efficient use of Negroes could be achieved only by complete integration. They also attacked the segregation system because of its failure to make the best possible use of the skill and specialties of Negroes. The multiplication of units merely to give a few Negroes a chance to use rare specialties or skills was not regarded as an efficient solution of the problem. The committee also attacked the quota system, urging that the ratio of 9 to 1 between whites and blacks be changed.†

Before making its final report to the President, the Fahy Committee in May 1949 recommended that the Army do the following: (a) open all Army jobs to qualified personnel regardless of race or color; (b) open all Army schools on the same basis; (c) assign all Army personnel according to ability and need; and (d) abolish the racial quota. The Army on 1 Oct 1949 took steps in the direction recommended by opening all jobs and schools in the Army to qualified soldiers regardless of race or color and by abolishing racial quotas for attendance at schools.‡

Other measures intended to give "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Army without regard to race, color, religion or national origin" were set forth

* See detailed discussion under "Department of the Army Studies on the Use of Negro Troops," p C-I-18.

† *Freedom to Serve*, A Report by the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, Washington, 1950.

‡ *Freedom to Serve*, p. 61; cable, DA to all commands, WCL 45586, 1 Oct 1949.

as basic Army policy in special regulations of January 16, 1950.* Two months later the Army abolished the recruiting quota system for enlistments in the Army.†

The Chamberlin Board made its recommendations on 9 Feb 1950 while the Army was changing its policy to meet some of the proposals of the Fahy Committee. The Board decided to stick close to the Army's traditional policy of segregation and racial quotas. It pointed out that the Army represented a cross-section of the nation in customs, attitudes, and standards, and added that "No revolutionary changes will occur during the period of military service."‡ It was clear that the Chamberlin Board was not using the Fahy Committee's approach of finding how wider opportunities for Negroes would increase their efficiency and make available a larger reserve of manpower for the Army. Rather it was worried about the way in which increased opportunities for Negroes might affect the fighting spirit and morale of the Army as a whole.

The Chamberlin Board accepted the fact that more opportunities should be offered to Negroes and it listed the ways in which the Army since 1945 had activated new units in order that Negroes might be given greater opportunities. It strongly opposed any widespread adoption of integration and held that if the efficiency of the Army as a whole was to be considered, the abolition of segregation, however desirable as a social measure, was an unsound policy for the Army to adopt. The board also favored the retention of the 10 percent quota system.

Thus three months before the Fahy Committee's final report of 22 May 1950, the Chamberlin Board reiterated the Army's traditional policies of segregation and racial quotas. Presidential support of the almost diametrically opposed views of the Fahy Committee made necessary a further reexamination of the Army's position. The outbreak of war in Korea and the commitment of American forces there also required a study of Army policy as the result of new Army manpower requirements. The Chamberlin Board was asked in Feb 1951 for a new report based on the performance of integrated units under combat conditions. After studying statements from units which had been committed to battle in Korea, the Chamberlin Board concluded that units in combat did better if they were integrated. There was also evidence that white-black friction was decreased as a result of the fighting man's reaction that any replacement who would fight was acceptable, regardless of race or color.§

While making this concession concerning Korea, the Chamberlin Board was dissatisfied about other parts of the new policy. Its members were concerned over the abolition of the 10 percent quota, and the consequent increase of Negroes in the Army. The board expressed anxiety lest: (a) Negro troops be brought into the Army in such quantities that they could not be assimilated, and (b) the growing number of Negroes with low intelligence scores would seriously reduce the efficiency of the units to which they were assigned. The Chamberlin Board in its second report concluded that it was necessary to reimpose the 10 percent quota system and to retain separate Negro units for the Army. This report was not approved inasmuch as the Army G-3 held that no new units should be activated and that Negroes should be assigned to existing units, while the Army G-1 insisted that since many units, particularly the Southern ones, had already taken more Negroes than they wanted, it would not be possible to assimilate the new Negro soldiers.

* Special Regulations 600-629-1, 16 Jan 1950.
† Cable, DA to all commands, WCL 44600, 27 Mar 1950.
‡ Report of Chamberlin Board, 9 Feb 1950 (see detailed discussion under "Department of the Army Studies on the Use of Negro Troops," p C-I-18).
§ Second Chamberlin Report, 1951.

The Negro Soldier in Korea

The war in Korea brought an increase in the number of Negroes taken into the Army. The outbreak of hostilities coincided almost exactly with the beginning of integrated units and the abolition of the racial quota. These two new policies were to be tested, therefore, under conditions somewhat different from those envisaged by the policy makers.

The lifting of the quota system was accompanied by a sharp rise in the percentage which Negro troops bore to the total strength of the Army. Negro enlistments in the first few months after the quota was removed jumped rapidly to 28 percent of the total number of enlistments, although at the end of nine months this percentage began to level off (see Table C2). It is possible that the rush to enlist was, as in the case of many whites, due to a belief that enlistees could get their choice of branches of service much more easily than could draftees. In the case of Negro draftees the rise was not as sharp, the percentage leveling off to an average of 11–14 percent of the total intake of draftees and new enlistments.

The Korean war permitted the Army to start integration of white and Negro troops under combat conditions, and to contrast the activities of all-Negro units like the 24th Inf Regt under almost identical conditions with the performance of Negroes in integrated units. Studies now (1951) in progress have pointed to the acceptance of Negroes by whites in integrated units, and indicate that Negroes in such units are giving better accounts of themselves than those in segregated units.

TABLE C2

INPUT FROM SELECTIVE SERVICE AND ORIGINAL ENLISTMENTS, FEB 1950–MAR 1951

Month		Total SS and enlistment			Selective Service				Original enlistment			
		Total	White	Negro	Total	White	Negro	%	Total	White	Negro	%
1950	Feb	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4,831	4,327	504	10.4
	Mar	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6,344	5,824	520	8.2
	Apr	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6,187	4,833	1,354	21.9
	May	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6,044	4,721	1,323	21.9
	June	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6,344	4,861	1,483	23.4
	July	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	15,595	11,684	3,911	25.1
	Aug	15,351	11,634	3,717	1,558	1,315	243	15.6	13,793	10,319	3,474	25.2
	Sept	60,056	50,979	9,077	49,499	42,613	6,886	13.9	10,557	8,366	2,191	20.8
	Oct	66,940	57,464	9,476	55,667	48,365	7,302	13.1	11,273	9,099	2,174	19.3
	Nov	82,774	71,804	10,970	71,980	63,217	8,763	12.2	10,794	8,587	2,207	20.4
	Dec	50,159	43,042	7,117	42,225	36,784	5,441	12.9	7,934	6,258	1,676	21.1
1951	Jan	113,183	98,909	14,274	86,171	75,363	10,808	12.5	27,012	23,546	3,466	12.8
	Feb	104,777	92,441	12,336	84,512[a]	74,512	10,000	11.8	20,265	17,929	2,336	11.5
	Mar	103,274	90,530	12,744	86,583[a]	76,583	10,000	11.5	16,691	13,947	2,744	16.4

[a] Totals from Selective Service for Feb and Mar 1951 are based on preliminary reports.

This testimony has not sufficed to change the views of some Army commanders, who feel that the Korean experience merely emphasizes the need to return to the Army's traditional practices relative to the use of Negro troops.

Negroes are being used in Korea in more varied fields than ever before and greater opportunities have been offered for their advancement. Despite these efforts, however, the great majority have found themselves in service units. At the outbreak of war in Korea,

Negroes overseas furnished 36.3 percent of special services, and 61.6 percent of the transportation corps, as compared to 17.1 percent of antiaircraft artillery units, 12.6 percent of engineer units, 9.6 percent infantry, and 13.5 percent quartermaster units.

Existing Policies on Use of Negro Troops

At the present time the Army's official policy is still that outlined in the special regulations of 16 Jan 1950. They state that "there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Army without regard to race, color, religion or national origin," and that all manpower "will be utilized to obtain maximum efficiency in the Army." The first part of the statement commits the Army to a policy similar to that of the Fahy Committee. The second statement, while in keeping with the views of the Fahy Committee, can be used to justify the Gillem and Chamberlin Board theses. If it can be established that nonsegregation and nonquota arrangements reduce the efficiency of the Army as a whole, while raising that of the Negro soldiers, it is possible for the Army to call for a return to the older policy on that ground. The matter of efficiency can be made to work both ways, however, and if the recent experiences show that the policy outlined in January 1950 has increased not only Negro efficiency, but has actually aided the effectiveness of units where the integrated system has been tried, the Army will have good grounds for continuing its new policy of nonsegregation.

The Korean War has given the Army an excellent opportunity to experiment with its new policies and to test their workings. To a greater extent than ever before, the Negro has been used with white troops. He has been thrown into combat in many cases because there was no alternative, and has been accepted into white divisions because of a real need for his services. Conditions have, therefore, been conducive to a fair test of the system. Observers conducting studies have found their tasks somewhat lightened because of the absence of tensions which often exist in the Zone of Interior between white and Negro troops. The sharing of combat perils, the lack of a native white or Negro population, and the lack of any off-duty social contacts eliminated several factors which otherwise might have prejudiced the success of the integration program.

Total enlisted strength in US ground forces in Korea, for the week of 17 May 1951, was 205,752. Of this, white enlisted strength was 177,532, and Negro was 27,710 (13.5%).*

In Table C3 Negro strength is broken down by reporting command into combat or service (combat 47.8%, service 52.2%). In this particular table all divisional units are carried under the *combat* heading. Using this breakdown, Negro combat strength is 47.8 percent of the total Negro strength in the Eighth Army and X Corps. However, Table C4 contains a more detailed breakdown by branch. The total Negro combat strength by this system still remains at 46.0 percent of their total in these organizations. These percentages conform remarkably closely to those of whites during World War II. A discrepancy of 107 exists between Tables C3 and C4. This is due to the errors in the basic data used. Table C5 indicates the distribution of Negro personnel by arm and service in Korea as of 17 May 1951.

Negro Personnel in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps

The Air Force and Navy instituted changes in their policy relative to segregation of Negro and white forces either prior to or at the same time as the Army, but have succeeded in speeding up the degree of integration to a point not yet achieved by the Army. While this has been made possible in part because of the tendency of these two services to depend

* All Korean strength figures are based on an uncorrected copy of MRU strength report for the week of 17 May 1951.

TABLE C3

NEGRO STRENGTH IN KOREA, MAY 1951[a]

Unit	Combat	Service	Total
Eighth Army	189	9501	9690
I Corps	749	46	795
IX Corps	0	0	0
X Corps	588	0	588
1st Cav Div	191	0	191
2d Inf Div	1895[b]	0	1895
7th Inf Div	351	0	351
24th Inf Div	241	0	241
25th Inf Div	5553	0	5553
3d Inf Div	3027	0	3027
187th RCT	198	0	198
2d Log Command	260	4904	5164
3d Log Command	0	17	17
Total	13,242	14,468	27,710

[a] Based on Eighth Army weekly report, 17 May 1951.
[b] One unit, 9th Inf Regt.

TABLE C4

NEGRO STRENGTH BY BRANCHES AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NEGRO STRENGTH IN KOREA, 17 MAY 1951

Combat arms and services	Negro strength	Branch strength as percentage of grand total
Infantry	7752	28.1
Field artillery	3275	11.9
Antiaircraft	903	3.3
Armor	759	2.7
Total	12,689	46.0
Engineers	4629	16.8
Transportation	4042	14.6
Quartermaster	1965	7.1
Ordnance	1698	6.2
Medical	1093	4.0
Military police	729	2.6
Signal Corps	522	1.9
Chemical	128	0.4
Miscellaneous	108	0.4
	14,914	54.0
Grand total	27,603	

TABLE C5

DISTRIBUTION OF NEGRO PERSONNEL BY ARM AND SERVICE IN KOREA, 17 MAY 1951

Arm or service	Integrated	Reverse integrated[a]	Segregated	Total
Infantry	1995	767	4990	7752
Engineers	82	489	4058	4629
Transportation	0	415	3627	4042
Field artillery	137	0	3138	3275
Quartermaster	135	105	1725	1965
Ordnance	31	364	1303	1698
Medical	234	165	694	1093
Antiaircraft	51	0	852	903
Armor	21	325	413	759
Military police	101	0	628	729
Signal Corps	48	0	474	522
Chemical	42	0	86	128
Miscellaneous	43	0	65	108
Total	2920	2630	22,053	27,603

[a] These are units which are predominantly Negro, but which have a limited number of whites assigned.

on volunteer recruiting and because of their ability to get men with higher intelligence scores among their enlistees, the experiences of the Air Force and Navy may offer some experience of value to the Army in its study of plans for granting equality of treatment and opportunity to Negroes.

The Air Force. During World War II, the Army Air Force followed the Army's policy of segregation, a rigid application of the 10 percent racial quota, and a limitation of job opportunities for Negroes. In the course of the war some 140,000 Negroes were in the Air Force, making up approximately 8 percent of the total. Three Negro fighting units were organized in the course of the war. Of these the 99th Fighter Sq and the 352d Fighter Gp were committed in the Mediterranean Theater; the 477th Bombardment Sq was just completing its training at the war's end. For the most part, Negro troops in the Air Force were assigned to service units.*

The Air Force reported its experience with Negro fighting units to be something similar to that of the Army with Negro combat units. It was found that the Negro units were less efficient than neighboring white units. Lack of aggressiveness, poor maintenance, and technical deficiencies were noted. High praise was expressed of the commanding officer of the 332d Fighter Sq, Col Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., who was given credit for the degree of success achieved by the squadron.

In 1948, in response to the President's directive for a study of means of equalizing treatment and opportunity of Negroes in the Armed Forces, the Air Force outlined a new policy providing for the abandonment of racial quotas for enlistments and attendance at schools, the opening of occupational specialties to qualified personnel without reference to race or color, and the placing of enlistment, school attendance, assignment, and promotion on a basis of personal merit and ability.

By mid-Jan 1950, seven air bases inspected by the President's Committee were found to have made significant progress in giving greater equality of treatment to Negroes. Only

* Gillem Board Report, II, A.

one of the seven was still being run on a segregated basis. At six of the bases, the Negro Air Base Service Squadrons had been broken up and members of the units sent to school if they were qualified or else sent to white units. Whites and Negroes were integrated as to work, classes, living quarters, and messes.*

The Air Force reported in midyear 1950 that of approximately 26,000 Negro officers and airmen, some 19,000 had been assigned to units previously made up of whites alone. The Department of Defense declared that this program was resulting in increased efficiency and improved use of manpower.†

The Navy. Negroes were enlisted in the Navy for general service for many years prior to World War I, and were used throughout the fleet. Enlistment of Negro seamen was stopped at the end of World War I, however, and not reopened until 1932. Even then service was restricted to the messman's branch of the service. The provision in the Selective Service Act of 1940 barring discrimination in the Armed Forces on account of race or color made no immediate change in the Navy's policy, inasmuch as the Navy depended on volunteers until Feb 1943.

A change in policy toward Negroes had been announced by the Navy as early as the spring of 1942 when it was agreed that volunteers would be accepted for general service with the understanding that segregation would prevail and assignments would be limited to shore installations and harbor craft. When, in Feb 1943, the Selective Service organization began to allot Negro personnel to the Navy, a decision was made to assign Negroes to the fleet. After an initial attempt to man a destroyer escort and a patrol craft with predominantly Negro crews under white officers, the Navy turned to a policy of assigning Negroes with whites to auxiliary fleet vessels. A 10 percent quota was established, however, for each ship.

Segregated advanced training schools for Negroes were abolished in Jul 1944, and separate training camps were given up in the summer of the following year. In Feb 1946, the Navy took the further step of making Negroes eligible for assignments in all ratings in all activities and in all ships of the naval service.‡

In the course of the war, a total of 150,000 Negroes served in the naval establishment. Approximately 46 Negro Reserve Officers were on duty during the war. The first Negro Regular Navy officer was commissioned after the close of the war.§

The Marine Corps. The first Negroes taken in the Marines entered in Aug 1942. Approximately 1000 were trained and organized into a composite battalion. By the close of the war, the number had been increased to 17,000, who were placed in all-Negro units, mostly of the service variety. It was found that a longer training time was necessary for Negro trainees than for whites, that Negro noncommissioned officers required closer supervision, and that their equipment losses were greater than for whites. More than 75 percent of Negro troops served overseas. The officers in all cases were whites, inasmuch as the three Negro officer candidates taking training during the war failed to complete their courses.‖

Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Policy since 1948. When the President issued his memorandum in 1948 directing a study of equality of treatment and opportunity for

* President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, *Freedom to Serve*, pp. 33–44.

† *Department of Defense, Semi-annual Report of the Secretary of Defense and Semi-annual Reports of Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force*, Jan 1 to June 30, 1950, p. 175.

‡ President's Committee, *Freedom to Serve*, pp. 17 and 20.

§ Gillem Board Report, II, A.

‖ *Ibid.*

Negroes, it was found that the Navy had already made considerable strides in that direction. From 1945 on an attempt had been made to shift Negroes from the messman's branch to other branches. Thus, the end of 1945 saw something like 5 percent of the Negroes holding general ratings while something like 95 percent were in the messman's branch. By 1950, this had changed to 42.6 percent in general service and 57.4 percent in the messman's branch. As a result of this activity, Negro organizations and the Fahy Committee expressed greater satisfaction with the Navy's policy regarding Negroes than they did concerning the program of the Army. The chief criticisms made by the Fahy Committee in 1949–50 were that the Navy was not attracting more Negroes to volunteer for general service and was not giving sufficient opportunities to Negroes in the field of officer training. The Committee also pointed out that while the Marines had abolished segregation in basic training, they still assigned some Negro marines to all-Negro units, thus failing to carry out completely the Navy's policy on this point.*

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY STUDIES ON THE USE OF NEGRO TROOPS

Report of the Gillem Board

Mission. At the direction of the Secretary of War on 1 Oct 1945, three general officers, Alvan C. Gillem Jr., Lt Gen, USA, Lewis A. Pick, Maj Gen, USA, and Winslow A. Morse, Brig Gen, USA, were charged with the mission:

> To prepare a policy for the use of the authorized Negro manpower potential during the post-war period including the complete development of the means required to derive the maximum efficiency from the full authorized manpower of the nation in the event of a national emergency.

Problem. The board visualized its problem as including the following considerations: (a) the method for utilizing Negro personnel in the event of national emergency; (b) the nucleus of Negro personnel necessary in the postwar Army to provide for rapid expansion in time of war; (c) the responsibility of the War Department General Staff and of subordinate commanders in implementing any policy adopted; (d) the method for selecting, processing, training, and assigning authorized Negro personnel; (e) the advisability of immediately adopting and promulgating changes in policy.

Procedure. In an intensive study of these questions, the board consulted 63 documents made available by the War Department, all treating in some way the utilization of Negroes in the military establishment, and eleven civilian publications containing pertinent information. The board heard testimony from more than 60 military and civilian witnesses selected because of their experience and knowledge of the subject. The type of evidence obtained from these sources consisted largely of opinions, historical material, observations based on experience and reports of combat activities; there were, however, a few broad studies included in the list of documents.

Conclusions. On 17 Nov 1945, the board submitted its report† to various reviewing agencies. In accordance with suggestions made by such agencies, the conclusions and recommendations were revised and presented in a supplementary report‡ of 26 Jan 1946. The supplementary report contained the following conclusions:

1. A comparison of the Selective Service Records in two wars indicates that the Negro manpower which may be expected to become available to the Army in case of another national emergency will no doubt exceed that of World War II.

* President's Committee, *Freedom to Serve.*

† *Policy for Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army: With Recommendations for Development of Means Required and a Plan for Implementation of the Same,* Report of War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower, Nov 1945 (Gillem Board Report).

‡ *Policy for Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Post-War Army,* Supplemental Report of War Department Special Board on Negro Manpower, Jan 1946 (Supplemental Report).

2. Considering the advances made by the Negro civilian during the period between World War I and World War II and the increase in numbers available for military service, it is concluded that adequate plans were not prepared for the ultimate utilization of this manpower.

3. The advancement of the Negro in education, skills and crafts and resultant economic betterment definitely indicate that if prompt and adequate steps are taken at this time, a greater and more efficient use can be realized from this manpower in the military establishment of the future.

4. In the light of past experiences, it is believed that many of the difficulties and much of the confusion encountered in the placement of the Negro manpower during the Selective Service period of World War II could have been eliminated had War Department policies been fully implemented.

5. The experiences gained in the utilization of the Negro manpower in two major wars lead to the definite conclusion that if remedial action is taken by the War Department at this time, many of the apparent deficiencies of the Negro Soldier can be eliminated and more efficient results derived from this manpower in the future.

6. Many of the deficiencies of leadership attributed to the Negro Soldier in the past can be eliminated by creating in the post-war Army, for purposes of expansion, a broader Negro base of both officers and enlisted men, to assist in the training of the peace-time Army and to provide cadres and leaders to meet more efficiently the requirements of the Army in the event of a national emergency.

7. Creation of a broader Negro base in the post-war Army logically includes organization of appropriate elements of any female component.

8. To insure understanding and a basis for planning purposes there must be established a ratio of Negro to white manpower in the post-war Army. This ratio, for the present, should be that which exists in the civil population.

9. In World War II, some types of Negro units demonstrated greater proficiency than others. In general, service units have performed in a more satisfactory manner than combat units. Likewise, some units have consistently better combat records than others. In organizing or activating Negro units to create a broader base in the post-war Army, it is concluded that combat units be stressed.

10. For efficient results, the implementation and progressive development of a general policy in preparation for full utilization of Negro manpower in a national emergency will require the closest cooperation and coordination with the War Department, between the War Department and field commanders, and between local commanders and local civil officials.

11. Creation of a War Department General Staff Group of selected officers, experienced in command, who can devote their entire time to problems involving minority racial elements in the military establishment is necessary to insure adequate and continuous coordination and cooperation in implementing policy. Creation for the same purpose of a similar group on the staff of each major command is necessary.

12. The *War Department policy* announced for the administration and utilization of minority groups in the post-war Army should be carefully *coordinated* with *policies of the sister* services.

13. Testimony before this Board has indicated that units composed largely of personnel classified in the two lowest grades on the A.G.C.T. scale require more officer supervision in training and in the field than units composed of personnel of normal distribution. It is concluded, therefore, that attachment of officers to units including abnormal proportions of personnel in Grades IV and V on the A.G.C.T. scale is necessary when time is the critical factor, as it will be under war conditions or under a system of universal military training. This procedure is not necessary in the Regular Army in peace-time.

14. The training advantages accruing from a favorable climatic or terrain condition should be evaluated against the factor of unfavorable community attitude with its resultant effect on both training and morale. Troop locations should be selected after a consideration of these opposing factors, due regard being given in all cases to the fact that small civilian communities are incapable of absorbing large numbers of military personnel regardless of race. Exceptions to this principle may be necessary in the event of universal military training, for general efficiency of the military establishment, or in the interest of national security.

15. Regardless of source of procurement and of racial antecedents all officers of all components of the Army should be accorded equal rights and opportunities for advancement and professional improvement as prescribed by law and regulation; and all officers should be required to meet the same standard for appointment, promotion, and retention in all components of the Army.

16. The sources of potential officer material can be extended and fostered through the medium of a more comprehensive ROTC and an Army leadership school program.

17. Processing of all personnel entering the Army, whether volunteers or selectees, through reception and training centers promote and maintain the efficiency of the Army and will insure proper assignment of individuals.

18. The high re-enlistment rate of professional privates in Negro units has in the past denied entry into the service to much potential officer and non-commissioned officer material. Economy and efficiency demand that men of low intelligence and education who have been proven incapable of developing into specialists or leaders be eliminated from the service at termination of the first enlistment. Any policy implemented should include all races.

19. There are many places in the framework of the overhead units at Army installations where Negro personnel with special skills can be utilized to advantage as individuals. Periodic surveys of the installations are necessary to determine such positions.

20. Experiments and other experiences of World War II indicate clearly that the most successful employment of Negro units occurred when they were employed as units closely associated with white units on similar tasks, and a greater degree of success was obtained when small Negro organizations were so employed.

21. Experience, education and tolerance on the part of all personnel of the Army will serve to rectify many of the difficulties inherent in a mixed or composite unit.

22. Present War Department policies pertaining to the administration of educational, recreational and messing facilities and of officers' clubs at posts, camps and stations where racial minority elements are located are considered adequate for the present and should be continued in effect.

23. The adoption and promulgation without delay of a broad, comprehensive, and progressive policy for the utilization of Negro manpower in the post-war Army will stimulate the Negro's interest, eliminate some of the frustrations, improve morale, and facilitate the development of individual ability and leadership.

24. The adoption and promulgation of a policy for utilization of Negro manpower in the military establishment will not in itself achieve the desired result. Steps must be taken concurrently to inform and indoctrinate all ranks of the military establishment concerning the importance to the national security of the successful accomplishment of the program.

25. The approval and promulgation of a constructive and progressive policy involving the utilization of this manpower potential should be effected without delay. By such procedure the War Department will indicate clearly an endeavor to capitalize on and benefit from the lessons learned in the school of war.

26. Existing laws, regulations and official publications should be examined for determination of any conflict with the proposed policy envisioning a greater utilization of Negro manpower.

27. Publication of the approved policy by the War Department will facilitate an understanding attitude insofar as the press of the nation is concerned and thereby indicate that a progressive program aimed directly at the objective of more effective manpower utilization is being implemented.

Recommendations. In view of its conclusions the board recommended that the War Department adopt the following policy:

To utilize the Negro manpower in the post-war Army on a broader professional scale than has obtained heretofore and, through the medium of installations and organizations, to facilitate the development of leaders and specialists to meet effectively the requirements of an expanded war Army

The other recommendations set forth to implement the proposed policy are, in large part, paraphrasings of the conclusions listed.

Comments on the Board's Report

Quota. The use of Negro troops has usually been associated with some prescribed quota for their numbers within the military establishment. Any evaluation of the Army's policy respecting Negro manpower should consider whether such a quota is valid and, if so, what that quota should be. A comparison of the board's original report with its supplementary report brings to light two changes in the recommendations discussing the quota. The original report recommended that, as a matter of policy, Negro manpower be used "within proportions corresponding to those in the civil population." The first implement

ing recommendation advised that the quota of Negro manpower in the postwar Army not exceed the percentage existing in the Army during World War II.*

John J. McCloy, then Assistant Secretary of War, viewed the problem differently from the board, and expressed objections to the quota as defined in the original report. The World War II percentage of Negro troops was, he pointed out, less than the percentage of Negroes in the civil population.†

Subsequently, the board eliminated the quota statement in its recommended *policy*, but included it in the *implementing recommendations*.

The supplemental report dropped the World War II percentage in favor of a percentage to correspond with that in the civil population.‡ This made it possible for future increases in the Negro ratio of the population to be reflected in corresponding increases in their representation within the military establishment.

By making this change the board recognized that there was controversy surrounding the quota. The tendency to favor a quota of any kind reflects a belief that the Army would be better off with a limited rather than an unlimited influx of Negroes.

The board emphasized, in its revised recommendations, uniform standards for the appointment, promotion and retention of all officers.§ This served to prevent an inference which might have been drawn from the original report, namely that a specific percentage of Army officers should be Negroes.

Performance. In some of its recommendations for the more efficient use of Negro manpower, the board's report suggests methods for raising the level of performance of all enlisted personnel. Recognizing that a rise in the quality of Regular Army enlistees would provide a better nucleus for expansion of the Army in time of national emergency, the board recommended that "professional privates" who failed to demonstrate the qualifications for advancement to positions of leadership be denied the opportunity to reenlist. This recommendation would have special application to Negro units with their unusually high rates for reenlistment.

The board also recommended that all inductees be "routed through reception and training centers . . . to assure proper classification and assignment of individuals."

This was to correct faulty assignment and inadequate training of many inductees who had been sent to units directly from induction centers.

Furthermore, it was advised that, in the event of Universal Military Training, "additional officer supervision be supplied to units which have a greater than normal percentage of personnel falling into A.G.C.T. classifications IV and V."# This recommendation was based upon the experience that units with low-grade personnel required closer officer supervision than other units. The recommendation had special pertinence to Negro units, in which large concentrations of personnel are in the lower grades.

These three suggestions for improving the efficiency of enlisted personnel are significant since they imply that some of the difficulties attendant upon the utilization of Negroes in the Army are not racial problems but problems encountered with enlisted personnel generally when expansion of the military establishment requires the processing and training of large quantities of new inductees, including many of low intelligence.

Integration. The social problem involved in the widespread use of Negro personnel within the military establishment has two principal facets. The Negro population of an Army camp or station necessarily comes into contact, during time spent away from the

* Gillem Board Report, p. 15.
† *Supplemental Report*, Tab C.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 11.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 12.
# *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13.

post, with the local civil population. Secondly, facilities must be provided on the post for the off-duty recreation of personnel. In its recommendations involving the social problems likely to arise in the utilization of Negro personnel, the report of the board is least specific.

In reviewing the original report, the Army Service Forces pointed out that there would be an inevitable burden upon the local civil population wherever Negro units were stationed.* The Army Air Forces reported that they had attempted for two years to find some suitable location where a Negro tactical unit might be permanently established, but that each time a location was selected, vehement opposition from the community compelled that the selection be abandoned.† The board's revised recommendation, that community attitude be carefully considered except when military necessity or the requirements of national security require that it be ignored,‡ provides no clearly defined guide for the selection of Negro camp locations.

The report of the board reaffirms the then existent Army policies in respect to recreational facilities on military posts and stations. One such policy clearly states that officers' clubs and messes in public buildings are open to all officers.§ The policy relevant to those post recreational facilities available to enlisted personnel is of the sort likely to provoke difficulties. Furthermore it is ambiguous. Under its provisions, local commanders are permitted to establish separate recreational facilities, such as Army exchanges, theaters, sections of theaters, etc., for the use of "particular military units." The provision of separate facilities does not, however, permit the exclusion, on the basis of race or color, of any member of the military service from using any of all such facilities.# Should facilities shared by Negroes and whites be considered undesirable, therefore, by the commander of an organization including a Negro battalion or company, he would presumably seek to provide for racial segregation in the guise of unit segregation. The resulting system of segregated facilities would be likely to collapse before individual assertions of rights and before the indiscriminate use of such facilities by visiting or transient personnel.

In addition to the activation of Negro combat and service units in the postwar Army, the board recommended that qualified Negroes be assigned as individuals to special and overhead units. In this, the board apparently recognized that all-Negro units would not provide jobs sufficiently varied to correspond to the qualifications of Negro specialists. Surveys of manpower by the War Department should, it was proposed, include recommendations covering the positions in each installation of the Army which could be filled by Negro military personnel. Although Negro units were, according to the board's recommendation, to conform in general to other units in the postwar Army, they were not to exceed an infantry regiment in size.** The testimony of witnesses had indicated that Negroes performed most effectively when grouped in small units and associated with white units on similar tasks. The existence of Negro regiments long since established by Congress and the need to provide commands for Negro officers, however, influenced the board's decision to recommend units as large as infantry regiments. All these recommendations indicate that special consideration of the Negro soldier as a Negro rather than as an individual soldier necessitates cumbersome and special arrangements not calculated to improve the over-all efficiency of the military establishment. Special surveys conducted to fit Negro personnel into units are time-consuming. Furthermore, the value of tailoring the job to the individual instead of the individual to the job is always questionable. If Negro infan-

* *Ibid.*, Tab J.
† *Ibid.*, Tab H.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 13.
§ Par. 19, AR 210-10, quoted in *Report*, Tab J.
# War Department Memo 600-45, quoted in *Ibid.*, Tab M.
** *Supplemental Report*, pp. 11 and 13.

try regiments have been indicated to be ineffective in combat, their retention for reasons other than ultimate combat efficiency appears injudicious.

Staff Section. Another of the Gillem Board's recommendations was to set up a special staff group within the War Department's General Staff and each major command that would assist in planning, promulgation, implementation, and revision of policies affecting all racial minorities. The board felt that the creation of such a staff group composed of officers, experienced in command, that could devote their entire time to problems involving minority racial elements in the military establishment was necessary to insure adequate and continuous coordination and cooperation in implementing policy. The authorization of such a staff group was deemed vitally necessary. Evidence presented to the board indicated that if such a staff element had functioned in the interval between World Wars I and II, more efficient planning for the initial utilization of the racial minorities, especially the Negro manpower, would have resulted. Subsequent planning likewise would have been facilitated.

The supplemental Gillem Board report of 26 Jan 1946 contains a comment by WDGS, G-1, which did not believe a special group in the personnel division was desirable or necessary. The WDGS, G-3, concurred with the board's recommendation in the proposed establishment of a staff group to handle racial minority policy matters.

After discussions with members of G-1 and G-3, the Gillem Board recommended the group be formed in WDGS, G-1.

The Chamberlin report of 9 Feb 1950, which is considered in the following section, stated that this recommendation was implemented and a limited staff group was placed in the P&A (G-1), Military Personnel Management Group. Secondary functions, under the coordination of the P&A Division, were found elsewhere in the P&A Division, and in other staff agencies. Thus, there was no single agency having all information on the subject readily available. The Chamberlin Board in its efforts to study all aspects of the question had been seriously handicapped by the lack of a central agency which would have available all data on the subject.

Report of the Chamberlin Board, 1950

Mission. The authority for, and the composition of this board of officers, consisting of Maj Gen W. A. Burress, Maj Gen J. M. Devine, and Col M. Van Voorst, headed by Lt Gen Stephen J. Chamberlin, was set forth in letter from the Secretary of the Army, dated 18 Nov 1949, File AGPA-EG 334, Subject: Board to Study Utilization of Negro Manpower. The mission of this Board was:

1. To review the current progress under existing policies and procedures and the fundamental Army policies for utilization of Negro manpower.
2. To examine and review these policies in the light of changing conditions and experiences of this day and time.
3. To submit recommendations concerning any existing policies or procedures which should be adopted in connection with the utilization of Negro manpower.

Problem. The Board recognized that the following factors were of major importance in analysis of the problem: (a) Combat effectiveness is the overriding consideration in the utilization of Negro manpower in the Army. (b) Total war requires the full use of all manpower including the sizable Negro element. (c) Only trained individuals increase the combat effectiveness. Individuals, Negro or white, who are incapable of becoming soldiers, could better be used on the home front. (d) Customs, attitudes, and standards of the whole nation are fairly well represented in the Army. No revolutionary changes will occur during the period of military service.

Procedure. In an intensive study of these questions, the board consulted 21 documents made available by the DA and other governmental agencies, all treating in some way the utilization of Negroes in the military establishment. The board heard testimony from more than 180 military and civilian witnesses selected because of their experience and knowledge of the subject. In addition to the above, 140 field- and company-grade officers, and 147 enlisted men, were interviewed by board members or their representatives.* The type of evidence obtained from these sources consisted largely of opinions, historical material, observations based on experience, and reports of combat activities. All statements and interviews made were evaluated en masse, not permitting the use of detailed analysis.

Conclusions. On 9 Feb 1950, the board submitted its report to the Secretary of the Army. The report contained the following conclusions:

1. Special Regulations 600-629-1, Department of the Army, 16 January 1950, have been in effect too short a time to permit their evaluation.

2. Marked progress has been made in the utilization of Negro manpower under the Department of the Army policies established by War Department Circular 124 (1946) as amended, and Army Regulations 210-10, and letter AGO, 8 July 1944, pertaining to recreation, and the Gillem Board Report. The policy is sound, is increasingly effective, and should be continued.

3. The 10% limitation on Negro manpower in the Army should be maintained. Negro units should likewise be continued.

4. There is a continuing requirement to improve the standards of the enlisted personnel of the Army. Steps should be taken to raise the Negro GCT level to that of whites, even if in the process the number of Negro soldiers should fall below 10% of the total.

5. There is a genuine need for a special group in the Department of the Army General Staff to keep under continuous study the problem of the efficient employment of Negro troops. This group should consolidate and coordinate all studies on the question, should be familiar with the solutions attempted or achieved in civil life, and should, in general, assist in the planning, promulgation, and revision of current policies.

6. Effort should be continued to perfect plans for the full utilization of Negro manpower on mobilization and in war.

7. There is no evidence at this time of changed conditions which might indicate the desirability of a further revision of Army policy. The most profound changes have occurred in the Army itself where the Negro has achieved increased opportunity for advancement. Further change should await evaluation of the experience gained from the policies announced in Special Regulations 600-629-1, Department of the Army, 16 January 1950.

Recommendations. In view of its conclusions the board recommended that the DA adopt the following policy:

1. The policies established by War Department Circular 124 (1946) as amended, and Army Regulation 210-10 and letter AGO 8 July 1944, pertaining to recreation, wherein not in conflict with recent changes of policy, continue in effect.

2. That the 10% limitation on Negro manpower in the Army be continued and that Negro units be continued.

3. That efforts be continued to improve the standards of enlisted men in the Army and that steps be taken to raise the Negro GCT level to that of whites, even if in the process the number of Negro soldiers should fall below 10% of the total.

4. That efforts be continued to perfect plans for the full utilization of Negro manpower for mobilization and war.

5. That no further changes be made in Department of the Army policies in the utilization of Negro manpower pending evaluation of experiences gained from the policies announced in Special Regulations 600-629-1, Department of the Army, 16 January 1950.

* See App A, Part IV, "History and Distribution of Negro Troops in Korea," p A-IV-11.

6. That a special group in the Department of the Army be established to keep under continuous study the problem of the efficient employment of Negro troops, and to assist in the planning, promulgation and revision of current policies.

Comments on the Board of Officers Report

Quota. It was the opinion of this board, confirmed by the testimony of responsible commanders, that the white component of the Army should not fall below the percentage found in our civilian population. The quota of 10 percent Negro should be regarded as a ceiling and not as a floor. The peacetime Army has two missions. It is a force in being and is also a cadre to provide the leadership and skills which an emergency may require. While it is true that Negroes comprise 10 percent of the population, it is equally true that they possess well under 10 percent of the leadership and skills of the nation as a whole. In the Army the white man must supply this deficiency, and in time of emergency the deficiency to be supplied will be considerable. Dropping the white components below 90 percent in peacetime would markedly reduce the combat effectiveness of both white and Negro units due to resultant shortage of trained cadre. The board examined various methods other than the 10 percent limit to preserve the proper proportion, but was unable to find an acceptable substitute.

Utilization. The plans for full utilization of Negro manpower had not been worked out as of the date of this report. Whereas in 1939 there were in the Army only about 4500 Negroes organized in two skeleton infantry and two cavalry regiments, there were in 1949 56,000 Negroes, or approximately 10 percent of the total strength, organized in 215 units including 58 types of TO&E units. In addition to their employment in Negro units, many Negroes were assigned to special or overhead units. Such assignments were predicated on the MOS and abilities of the individual, as the Army policy prescribed that the organization, designation, and filling of table of distribution units were to be accomplished without reference to race or color. About 17,000 Negroes were so assigned and constituted approximately 7.9 percent of the total personnel of TD units and 30.7 percent of all Negroes in the Army.

Integration. The Gillem Board investigations show that in combat, Negroes were more effective in small units working in close proximity to white troops. The testimony of experienced commanders interviewed by this board confirms that conclusion. It might be inferred that if the Negro is apt to achieve greater combat effectiveness in small units the ultimate and logical solution would be the complete amalgamation of Negroes and whites in the same organizations.* The fundamental decision as between the amalgamated (integrated) and the all-Negro unit must be based on the combat effectiveness of the Army as a whole, and not on the exploitation of all Negro manpower. The board interviewed 322 officers who almost without exception vigorously opposed amalgamation and strongly urged the retention of the Negro unit. There is no reference to individual testimonies taken, therefore it is impossible to assess the validity of the board's conclusions. Furthermore at the time the board convened, there was no integration practiced through the Army, and it can be safely assumed that no officers had had any experience in this respect.

Size of Negro Units. This board believed the battalion to be the most satisfactory size for all-Negro units as general practice, but believed also that the Negro regiments should be continued in the Army as a whole, in order to provide increased opportunity for the development of leadership on the part of Negro officers.

Performance. The board felt that the problem of raising the general educational level of the Negro soldier with its allied problem of eliminating the inept and unfit was of great

* *Ibid.*

magnitude. The Army policy denied reenlistment to soldiers who had not qualified for Grade III, if single, and Grade IV, if married (Gillem Board recommendations). This policy has not been in effect long enough to permit conclusions as to its effectiveness. It appears doubtful, however, that it will have any substantial effect in elevating the GCT level of the Army as a whole. The board believed that *further measures had to be found in order to achieve the objective of parity of GCT levels between Negro and white soldiers.*

Opinions of Officers and DA Officials

In the spring of 1951, in an attempt to sound the opinions of various field grade officers and divisional commanders regarding the best utilization of Negro manpower, the G-1 took testimony from 22 officers and 2 civilian officials with extensive and recent experience relative to this problem. The number of individuals who testified was necessarily small because of the limited number who had experience with Negro troops. In rank the military personnel included: 12 major generals, 5 brigadier generals, 3 colonels, and 2 majors. In the typical pattern of scientific opinion survey this inquiry falls short in number of cases involved, in the structure of a scientifically stratified sample, and in the use of a standardized series of questions. Against these criteria must be weighed the authority and experience of the officers, and the military system of daily reports on which their opinions were based.

The officers whose testimony was taken spoke regarding their individual experiences, which involved different units, different circumstances, and different incidents.

Utilization. A majority of the officers expressed their opinions on the current policy of the DA as outlined by Special Regulations 600-629-1 and amended by subsequent modifications pertinent to quotas, administration of the promotion system without regard to race or color, attendance of all ROTC students in summer training camps, and utilization of skills and qualifications in any TD or TO&E unit without regard to race or color. Some of their comments ran as follows:

Since we have not been allowed sufficient Negro units to take care of the input we have had to resort to overstrength.

The Army is doing nothing which would cause the Negroes not to reenlist.

G-3 advocates using Negroes in company size units. They are believed to be better for fighting, easier to handle organizationally, and if any weakness develops the liability is less in a company than it is in a battalion.

I recommend that no extensions of the DA policy (re: integration) be made until such time as the Army is assured a fair proportion of the higher intelligence levels of available manpower.

The Department of Defense is now committed to an equalization of the manpower available to the three services, however, we are stuck with what we already have.

As I understand it the DA policy is that if a man has a skill such as Armor he is to be so assigned without regard to race.

Our recruiting system should be changed to the end that the Army recruits only the better classes.

Integration. Most of the officers gave their views on integration and segregation in combat units and training. Korea furnished only a limited test of the Army's policy regarding utilization of Negro manpower integrated with whites in combat units. The same could be said in respect to experimental integration within the ZI. Although the reports regarding the performance of Negro units are limited in scope and coverage, a somewhat generalized conclusion was reached that the most effective way to utilize the Negroes is to integrate them completely with whites. This view was shared by the officers interviewed who expressed their opinions as follows: 12 officers testified in favor of integration in both combat and training units; another 5 endorsed integration in combat units without mentioning training units. Only 1 officer suggested the utilization of Negro units as parts of

larger white organizations. Among the remaining officers, 3 favored segregation in combat units. The comments made regarding this problem ran as follows:

Integration has worked one hundred percent.
I believe in complete integration for efficiency if we have to take Negroes.
If I were a regimental commander I would prefer integration to segregated units.
I can't say how the integration of Negroes affects the combat efficiency of a squad. However, it has been tested in Korea and apparently is a satisfactory solution.
I would want no Negro unit larger than a battalion but prefer integration and would not put poor Negroes in combat units.
Integration works well in combat, but would be difficult to administer in time of peace.
I believe that segregation increases the racial friction. I prefer to integrate them but the quality of the Negro must be equal to that of the white and percentage should not exceed the national average.
Forced integration is contrary to God's law of nature.
I am against integration. The people now in Korea do not have sufficient experience on which to base a decision.

Quotas. The various commanders testified that efficiency in integrated combat and training units requires limitation on percentage of Negroes assigned. They were emphatic in the opinion that with composition of units with no ceiling set for Negroes, either the mass of those with low GCT will fail to absorb the necessary training, or those with high GCT will be unduly held back. Among officers who recommended integration of Negroes and whites, seven favored a ratio of one Negro to nine whites, approximating the national average; three suggested a ratio of from 1 to 9 to 1 to 7; two believed a ratio of from 1 to 7 to 1 to 5 would be just as effective. Such comments as: "We should not have over 10 percent and the majority of these would naturally gravitate to such jobs as cooking, ammunition carrying, etc."; or "Negroes exceeding the 10–15 percent quota will cause trouble"; or "I would rather have all white units, but have no fear of a division that is 10 percent or less Negro" are attributable to the officers favoring integration.

Performance. The performance of all-Negro units both in training and combat was considered below par. The experimental integration taking place in Korea and in some training camps within the ZI indicated that performance levels of Negro soldiers integrated with whites rose considerably. The effects of integration on the general combat efficiency of whites were mentioned by nine officers queried. Two-thirds of them expressed the opinion that the integration decreases the combat efficiency of whites in integrated units, and one-third stated that the efficiency of whites remains the same. The performance of all-Negro units in combat was reported by ten of the officers with the following results: Seven stated flatly that Negro units were less effective than white units; two officers commented that one Negro unit, the 3d Bn, 9th Inf Regt, performed better than white units on the average.

Quality. Educational standards of Negroes entering the Army were also of concern to these officers. Five officers stated that the Army is getting a disproportionately large share of low-AGCT Negroes; eight officers commented that groups I, II, III, and high-IV Grade Negroes should be shared proportionately by the Army, Navy, and Air Force; nine officers stated that the training of Negroes requires more time than the training of whites and that Grade V Negroes should not be accepted by the services.

Views of Other Officers Familiar with the Problem

A major with experience with Negro engineer units in Africa during World War II commented that the performance of Negroes was below that of comparable white units having the same AGCT distribution. However, he felt that Negro units were worth the time and effort spent on them, simply because they could do the humdrum routine jobs

that became monotonous to whites. He further believed that integration made the Negro rise up to the level of the white man, simply because he knew he had to in order to exist.

A brigadier general with combat experience with Negro units in Korea sums up his views regarding Negro soldiers as follows:

> In limited attack does job *barely*. There on out, no good. Will not defend. Will not stay up on line. Colored man does not respect other blacks as fighting men, *but does white* and if *mixed with whites will stay and fight*. Should be mixed in white units in about 15% proportion. Some colored make good leaders and where demonstrated capable there should be no discrimination in command, responsibilities, or color, *but they must be proven*.

Student Reports at Army Staff Colleges

Of nine studies prepared by the Army War College, three were completed during the 1937–40 period, three immediately following termination of World War II, and three during the 1950–51 period. The first two groups treat the problem of Negro manpower utilization with basically the same approach, e.g., assumption that the Army will follow the policy of full segregation. The third group of studies includes the problem of integration and carefully weighs its advantages and disadvantages.

A review of two studies prepared by the Industrial College of the Armed Forces revealed no pertinent information regarding the problem.

Review of Army and Other Military Studies

The Army War College employed a committee system of problem solution in studying the various aspects of Negro manpower utilization in the peacetime Army or in event of a national emergency. As a rule, groups of senior officers were assigned to various committees headed by a chairman, to study and explore the questions of segregation vs integration of Negroes, their utilization, performance, quality, and efficiency. The following aspects were considered in formulating reports: (a) the announced policy of the President of the United States; (b) current Army policy regarding the employment of Negro manpower; (c) assignment policies concerning Negroes in the Army during World War II; (d) performance of Negro units in World War II; (e) a comparison of the average educational level and skill of whites and Negroes.

The Negro, always recognized as a source of manpower, has become an increasingly vital concern in a realistic effort to use our total manpower resources. The predominant theme of the studies of Negro manpower prepared within the military establishment is how to improve our utilization of this portion of our total resources in a future national emergency. Most of the studies consider the characteristics, availability, past performance, and the present and future potentialities of Negro troops. Practically all of them used the same basic approach, namely surveys of opinion concerning the efficiency and performance of Negro troops during World War II. Their findings have been that *Negro troops are less reliable and perform less well than white troops.*

Negro enlisted men in the military service during World War II were assigned to Negro units, on a completely segregated basis. This practice failed to produce a satisfactory level of performance on the part of the Negro units. These studies report that the efficiency and effectiveness of Negro troops in World War II were farthest below the standard of white elements when employed in large segregated combat units, but made their best records in small all-Negro units assigned as components of larger white organizations.

The various studies conclude that:

1. The Negro must be utilized to contribute an equitable proportion of combat units as well as combat support and service units,

2. Higher type Negro officers and NCOs should be provided as leaders, thus forming a sound and broad base for future expansion, and that stress be placed on their continuous development,
3. The caliber of white officers assigned with Negro units must be improved,
4. The formation of composite organizations is a practical and sound solution,
5. The utilization of Negroes should be on the basis of complete equality with whites, and
6. Optimum military effectiveness in the use of all military personnel available to the Army can be accomplished only by the gradual elimination of segregation.

A number of studies reviewed point out inequitable distribution of Grade I, II, and III Negroes among the three services. The Army, with the largest number of Negroes, never received a proportionate share of the higher AGCT Grades. These usually went to the Air Force or Navy. Difficulties and delays were usually encountered in training Grade IV and V Negroes, and several opinions were voiced to eliminate Grade V altogether from the Armed Services. A recommendation was carried out to create engineer general service battalions in which Grade IV and V Negro soldiers could be effectively utilized. These units proved useful for certain types of construction jobs, and served the further useful purpose of reducing the excessive ratio of Grade V personnel in combat units, thus improving the efficiency of the combat units as well.

It is to be noted that these studies indicate improved efficiency in the performance of Negro units when used: in smaller, rather than larger, segregated units; in service, rather than combat units; and in less, rather than more specialized duties. No integrated units were in existence at the time these studies were conducted and hence no experience of this type could be considered.

RESEARCH STUDIES CONDUCTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

The morale of personnel is one of the major variables determining the efficiency of the armed services. Morale may be defined as an over-all mental attitude resulting from a complex of personal attitudes. During World War II, the Army conducted a number of statistical studies to measure some of these attitudes.*

Among the results which the surveys provided are some which are related to the Army's racial policy. The importance of these figures should not, however, be overemphasized in considerations of policy and practice at this date, for it is not safe to assume that the attitudes of either Negroes or whites have remained static during the postwar years. Figures gleaned from World War II questionnaires should be considered in connection with the results of similar and more recent studies and/or with other information which is currently valid.

Attitude of Negro Soldiers Toward Military Service

The Army made several attempts to elicit through questionnaires the attitude of Negro soldiers toward their military service. The results of a survey conducted among enlisted men serving in the United Kingdom, in Nov 1943, indicated that morale was lower among Negro than white soldiers. One aspect of lower morale was the Negro's comparative lack of feeling that he was personally identified with the war effort. Almost twice as many Negro as white enlisted men reported that they "sometimes" or "very often" felt the war was not worth fighting. Only a third of the Negro soldiers, in contrast to more than half the white, believed the men in their outfits knew why they were fighting. Of the

* *See also* S. A. Stouffer, *et al.*, *The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life*, Vol. I, pp. 486–599.

Negroes, 35 percent thought they had as great a stake in the war as anyone else, as opposed to 67 percent of the whites who held that belief.*

Similar questions were put to a sample of former members of the all-Negro 2d Cav Div after that unit was broken up. The answers disclosed that, among these men, personal identification with the war was greater than among those previously tested in the United Kingdom. Sixty percent or more, grouped according to region of origin and education, thought the war was as much their affair as anyone else's. Among all Southern Negroes and those Northern Negroes with grammar school education or less, about half claimed they never felt the war was not worth fighting. Of the Northern Negroes with at least some high school education, however, only 35 percent made a similar claim.†

If it can be assumed that the Army's ideal description of a soldier includes eagerness to get into the fight, the Negro soldier's attitude toward his role in the Army merits attention. A survey conducted among Negro and white enlisted men in the US in 1943 disclosed that only 27 percent of the Negroes as opposed to 40 percent of the whites thought they could do more for their country as soldiers than as civilian war workers. Further breakdowns indicated that the percentage of Negro enlisted men who preferred to be soldiers was greater among those who felt that Negroes were fairly treated in the Army. Among both Southern and Northern Negroes, the feeling that soldiering was a more effective personal contribution than civilian war work increased, as among white soldiers, with the level of education.‡

Among men of the dismembered 2d Cav Div, 27 percent indicated that they would volunteer for transfer from service to combat units if they had the opportunity. Preferences for combat duty were lowest among Southern Negroes, higher among those from the border states and highest among the Northerners. Whatever the region of origin, those who had received some high school education were more eager for combat than the less educated. Ninety percent of the Negroes who said that they wanted to be assigned to combat units also stated that Negroes were not being given a fair chance to help win the war. The Northern soldiers were more likely than the Southerners to indicate that they had not been given a fair chance; and those with some high school education, both Northern and Southern, held this feeling more strongly than the less well educated.§

Statistics gathered in the survey of the 2d Cav Div personnel should not be considered representative of all Negro units serving in the war. Dissatisfaction with assignment to service units and general low morale could, in part, be attributed to the fact that their division was trained for combat, then suddenly dismembered into several small service units. Lack of experience in actual combat possibly raised the percentage of those who signified a preference for combat assignments.

Certain broad conclusions regarding the Negro's attitude toward service are warranted. Satisfaction with military service as opposed to civilian war work increased with the Negro's feeling of being fairly treated and with his level of education. Once in the service, the preference for actual combat was greatest among Northern Negroes and, whatever the region of origin, increased with the level of education. The high incidence of feeling that they were being unfairly treated among combat-eager men of the 2d Cav Div suggests

* "A Preliminary Report on Attitudes of Negro Soldiers in ETO," Research Branch, G-1 Division, HQ, ETOUSA, 7 Feb 1944, pp. 2-3.

† "Desire for Combat and Other Aspects of Morale, A Further Study of the Attitudes of Enlisted Personnel of the Former Second Cavalry Division," I&E Sec, HQ, COMZONE, NATOUSA, 12 Oct 1944, p. 32.

‡ "What the Soldier Thinks," quarterly report of research studies indicating the attitudes, prejudices, and desires of American troops, Special Service Div, Research Branch, ASF, War Dept, Washington, D. C., No. 2, pp. 14-5, 32-3 (Aug 1943).

§ "Desire for Combat," pp. 7-8, 12, 19, 33.

that those Negroes who bridled under discrimination were generally more aggressive and, consequently, more likely to prefer combat.

Dissatisfaction and the resulting low morale among Negro troops were partially attributable to their resentment of racial discrimination not only at home but also within the Army. Sixty-six percent of all men in the 2d Cav Div thought that they, as Negroes, were not being given a fair chance to do as much as they wanted to help win the war.* The answers to questions concerning their complaints about life in the Army, given to white and Negro enlisted men in the Aleutians, indicated that white soldiers most frequently resented the poor operation of the rotation and furlough system. Negro soldiers, however, objected first to racial discrimination and, secondly, to the low opinion which their officers had of Negro soldiers. These two complaints, of discrimination within the Army generally and of their officers' low estimate of them, totaled 46 percent of all the complaints they listed.†

Many of those Negro soldiers in the United Kingdom who answered the attitude survey mentioned above used the spaces provided on the questionnaire for additional remarks. Two-thirds of their comments were complaints dealing either directly or indirectly with racial discrimination. Northerners and men with at least some high school education were the most articulate in this respect.‡

Attitude of Negro Soldiers Toward Segregation

The surveys previously mentioned were all conducted among Negro soldiers in segregated units. Segregation was undoubtedly a factor contributing toward the Negro soldier's feeling that he was being discriminated against because of his race. The feeling of inferiority which the Negro had acquired in civilian life was emphasized by his separation from white personnel within the Army. Furthermore, complaints common to all soldiers about their officers, their food, their promotions, and their furloughs were likely to be associated with racial prejudice by the men congregated in Negro units.

A survey conducted to ascertain attitudes of enlisted men toward racial segregation disclosed that Negroes were much less likely than whites to regard separate service clubs, separate post exchanges, and separate outfits as desirable. They were more favorably disposed toward separate service clubs than toward separate outfits. Nevertheless, a substantial minority of Negroes thought that separation in all three, service clubs, post exchanges and outfits, was a good idea. Among this minority, many indicated that, though they opposed segregation in principle, they considered it a necessary method for avoiding friction. The Southern Negroes with least education were more favorably disposed toward segregation within the Army. Most opposed were the better-educated Negroes from Northern states.§ The results of this survey imply that a large majority of Negroes would have preferred shared facilities and integrated units if they had considered such an arrangement practicable.

Attitude of White Soldiers Toward Segregation

An overwhelming majority of the white enlisted men responding to the same questions favored separate service clubs, separate post exchanges, and separate outfits.# In 1942, a

* *Ibid.*, p. 18.
† "Attitudes of Negro Soldiers," A report based on answers given in Apr and May 1944 by 250 Negro enlisted men who constituted a sample of Negro troops in the Alaskan Dept, HQ, Alaskan Dept, Morale Services Div, Research Unit, Aug 1944, pp. 4-6.
‡ "A Preliminary Report on Attitudes of Negro Soldiers in ETO."
§ "What the Soldier Thinks," No. 2, pp. 58-9.
# *Ibid.*

sample of 5872 white enlisted men in the Air Force were asked for their opinions toward Negroes being trained for air assignments and toward racial segregation within the Air Force. The prevailing opinion was that Negroes should be trained as pilots, bombardiers, and navigators, but that they should be grouped in separate training schools, combat units, and ground crews. Although the percentage of men approving segregation was somewhat smaller among Northerners, men from both the North and South indicated a strong preference for segregation. Less than half of the men questioned indicated that they would object personally to working with Negroes in mixed ground crews;* this was a lower percentage than those who opposed integration in principle. Two-thirds of the Southern men had personal objections to mixed ground crews as opposed to slightly over one-third of the Northerners. Opinions in all parts of the questionnaire varied little with the level of education. Differences in attitude according to region of origin were much more pronounced.†

In May 1942, a sample of 2360 white enlisted men from three divisions stationed in the South answered questions about their attitudes toward the sharing of post facilities with Negroes. Whatever the area of their origin, the majority indicated a reluctance to share with Negroes on equal terms the post exchanges, the recreation buildings and service clubs, and the camp movie houses. In respect to all these facilities, the prevailing opinion was that Negroes should be allowed to use the same facilities if necessary, but at specific times and in restricted sections of the building.‡

Only in respect to the post exchange did the majority of Southern soldiers indicate that Negroes should be excluded altogether. When asked whether white and Negro baseball and basketball teams should compete in the same post leagues, a majority of Northerners answered, "Yes." Among men from the border states and Southern states, a majority were opposed.§

The results of these surveys indicate that white enlisted men did not generally object to the Negro's receiving equal training or equal opportunity to use recreational facilities. They did, however, oppose the integration of the two races either in units or in recreation buildings. Those men who had personal objections to integration were fewer than those who objected on principle. This suggests that, as was the case with the Negroes questioned, the theoretical objections resulted partly from a desire to avoid friction.

The preceding surveys were conducted among white soldiers who had never served with Negroes in composite units. The later assignment of volunteer Negro platoons to white infantry companies in the ETO provided an opportunity to question white soldiers who had actually served with Negroes. Eighty-four percent of the white company officers and 81 percent of the white enlisted men reported that the Negro soldiers had performed very well.# Only 7 percent of the white infantrymen serving in the same companies with Negroes stated that they objected to such an arrangement. The percentage was somewhat higher among men in all-white companies in the same regiment and among men in other all-white components of the same division. Only among men in those field force units which had never included a Negro platoon did a majority object to the idea of composite units; there was

* "Attitudes of Enlisted Men toward Negroes for Air Force Duty," based on a survey of a representative cross section of 5872 white enlisted men in six Army Air Force tactical units and three Army Air Force training schools, Research Branch, Special Service Div, Services of Supply, War Dept, 30 Nov 1942.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 4, and 7–10.

‡ "Attitudes of White Enlisted Men toward Sharing Facilities with Negro Troops," based on a survey of representative cross-sections of three divisions in May 1942, Research Branch, Special Service Div, Services of Supply, War Dept, 30 Jul 1942, pp. 2–4.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 2 and 5.

"The Utilization of Negro Infantry Platoons in White Companies," a report of interviews with white officer and enlisted personnel in seven infantry divisions, Research Branch, I&E Div, HQ, ETOUSA, Jun 1945, pp. 4, 6, 8–12, and 16–18.

roughly the same proportion of Southern white personnel in those units which contained Negro platoons as in those with which they were compared.

Sixty percent of the white enlisted men and 73 percent of the officers who had served in composite companies reported that the white and colored soldiers had gotten along "very well" together. None reported that they had not gotten along well. There were some side comments, however, to the effect that strained relations were more apt to occur in garrison than in combat. Sixty-four percent of both officers and enlisted men admitted that they had formerly regarded the inclusion of Negroes in their units with disfavor. Seventy-seven percent of all the white personnel, however, claimed that their opinions of the Negro soldier had become more favorable since such inclusion. The Negroes incorporated into white infantry companies were all volunteers and, on the average, younger than the white men in their companies, better-educated and more intelligent than the average Negro in ETO. Although their AGCT scores were substantially lower than those of white enlisted men in the same companies, their combat performance was estimated to have been as good.

Appendix C, Part II

DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FACTORS

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INTRODUCTION

This part of App C undertakes to provide a background analysis of the demographic, social, and economic characteristics of the Negro and white populations. Particular attention is given to recent developments, but the historical trends are studied with regard to the light they may throw on likely changes during the next decade or so.

The section entitled "Basic Demographic Trends" gives attention to the comparative rates of population growth, the changing regional distribution of whites and Negroes, the role of birth and death rates as factors in population growth, the patterns of internal migration, and the shifting urban and rural distribution.

The section "Related Social Trends" goes on to consider the social trends that are related to the demographic changes. The data on age composition, educational status, school attendance, and dependency status as measured by family and household composition and marital status are all presented.

Finally, "Economic Trends" examines the various economic trends which are ascertainable from studies of the occupational, industrial, and labor force statistics as reported in the decennial censuses of population.

In some of the analyses and results that are presented, the nonwhite population has been considered; in others, the Negro population. Since the Negroes comprise better than 95 percent of the nonwhite population, however, most characteristics and trends in the nonwhite population do reflect the trends and characteristics of the Negro population.

Some of the analyses are based on the total population and some on the male population; since the primary interest here is in the male population, attempts have been made to emphasize the analyses of that group. However, since in certain instances data were most conveniently available for the total population rather than for each sex, in those instances data were used for the total. By and large, however, analyses based on the total population — either total white or total nonwhite or total Negro — will reveal the basic trends in the characteristics of the male population.

In general the analysis shows that the Negro population has been growing closer to the white population in practically every way in which change of socioeconomic status or basic characteristics has been measured in this study. This is true with reference to geographical distribution, age structure, degree of urbanization, educational attainment, dependency status, and occupational and industrial composition. This fundamental and long-run development shows every indication of continuing, and it is felt to be of fundamental importance in understanding future manpower potentialities.

BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

POPULATION GROWTH AND REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION

Growth of the Total Population

Of the approximately 150.5 million persons living in continental US in 1950, about 135 million were white and 15 million Negro. The number of persons of other races such as Indian, Oriental, etc., numbered but about 600,000. In short then, the Negro population constituted just about 10 percent of the total population of 1950 (Table C6).

TABLE C6

DISTRIBUTION OF WHITE AND NEGRO POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1820–1950

(Numbers in thousands)

Region and color	1950	1940	1930	1900	1820
Total US	150,698	131,669	122,775	75,995	9,638
White	135,215	118,215	110,286	66,809	7,867
Negro	14,894	12,865	11,891	8,834	1,773
Northeast	39,478	35,977	34,427	21,047	4,360
White	37,456	34,567	33,244	20,638	4,249
Negro	1,975	1,370	1,147	385	111
North Central	44,461	40,143	38,594	26,333	859
White	42,248	38,640	37,249	25,776	841
Negro	2,134	1,420	1,262	496	19
South	47,197	41,666	37,858	24,524	4,419
White	36,881	31,658	28,372	16,522	2,777
Negro	10,208	9,904	9,362	7,923	1,643
West	19,562	13,883	11,896	4,091	—
White	18,631	13,350	11,421	3,873	—
Negro	576	171	120	30	—

Sources: *Negro Population in the United States, 1790–1915; Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–1945; Statistical Abstract of the United States 1949; 1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC–7, Nos. 1 and 3, Table 1.

This distribution by color is in very marked contrast to that of the early nineteenth century. In 1820, almost one person in five in the US was Negro. Out of a total population of a little less than 10 million at that date, about 1.75 million were Negro. Accordingly, over the last century and a third, the white population has increased some 17 times, whereas the Negro has increased only about 9 times. This difference in the rate of increase reflects, in very large measure, the effects of immigration. Since 1820, some 40 million

white Europeans have immigrated to the US. There has been no such corresponding large-scale immigration among the Negroes since the slave trade was stopped in the early nineteenth century. Accordingly, the European immigrants and their descendants have helped to boost the rate of growth of the white population at a much faster rate than occurred among the Negro population. Indeed, it is quite possible that in the absence of such immigration, the rates of growth of the white and Negro populations may more nearly have approximated each other. The increase of the Negro and white populations for different periods is shown by the following percentages:

Period	Whites, %	Negroes, %
1820–1860	242	151
1860–1900	148	99
1900–1930	65	35
1930–1940	7	8
1940–1950	14	16

From these figures it is clearly evident that the white population increased at a considerably faster rate during the periods of greatest European immigration. Since 1930 there has been but little of such immigration and accordingly the rates of growth of the two races have been very similar.

Regional Distribution

In 1950, about 10 million, or two-thirds, of the Negro population lived in the South,* as contrasted with only about one-fourth of the white population. The Negroes are thus seen to be much more concentrated in the South than are the whites. Indeed, in 1950, over one person in five in the South was Negro (Table C7). In the other major regions of the country, the proportion of the Negro population was much smaller, being only about 5 percent in the Northeast and North Central regions, and only about 3 percent in the West.

TABLE C7

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION THAT IS NEGRO, BY REGION, 1820–1950

Region	Negro percentages				
	1950	1940	1930	1900	1820
Total US	9.9	9.8	9.7	11.6	18.4
Northeast	5.0	3.8	3.3	1.8	2.5
North Central	4.8	3.5	3.3	1.9	2.1
South	21.6	23.8	24.7	32.3	37.2
West	2.9	1.2	1.0	0.7	—

Sources: See Table C6.

Those Negroes not living in the South were almost equally divided between the states of the Northeast and North Central regions, there being approximately 2 million Negroes in each of these regions in 1950. The West had comparatively few Negroes—only about 0.5 million.

In 1820, by contrast, almost all the Negroes were living in the South; hardly more than 100,000 lived outside of the South, and these were all concentrated in the Northeast.

* The South includes the states in the South Atlantic and the East and West South Central divisions.

Indeed, there has been a steady diminution, particularly since the Civil War, in the proportion of the total Negro population living in the South, as can be seen from the following figures. The white population was never concentrated to such an extent in the South; nevertheless the proportion of the whites living in this region has also decreased during the nineteenth century.

Period	Negroes, %	Whites, %
1820	92.7	35.3
1870	90.6	23.4
1900	89.7	23.9
1930	78.7	25.7
1940	77.0	26.8
1950	68.5	27.3

Although there has been an exodus of Negroes from the South all through these years, the decade of the 1940's seems to have been a period of major out-movement. This may be judged from the fact that in 1940 about 77 percent were still in the South, whereas in 1950 only about 68 percent were reported there. This out-migration will be further analyzed in the discussion of internal migration, to be presented in the section on patterns in internal migration.

Future Possibilities

Since the Negro population has constituted about 10 percent of the total population since about the turn of the century, it can be estimated that it will continue to constitute approximately this proportion for several decades into the future.

As will be seen in the section on trends in birth and death rates, the rate of natural increase of the Negro population may be somewhat higher than that of the whites. In the absence of foreign immigration, such differential rate of increase should tend to result in the Negro population growing faster than the white population. However, the number of European immigrants, small though they may be at present relative to past decades, nevertheless may be sufficiently large to counterbalance the excess natural increase among the Negroes so that the total population may remain distributed substantially as at present (90 percent white and 10 percent Negro with only a very small and numerically insignificant element of other nonwhites).

It can also be expected that the Negro population will distribute itself geographically much more nearly in accordance with the distribution of the total population than has been the case heretofore. In future decades it can be expected that the South will contain an increasingly smaller proportion of the total Negro population, the North an increasingly larger proportion. Although there seems to be a movement to the Far West of the Negro population, this westward movement has not as yet assumed the importance which it has among the whites. Decided increases can be expected in the Negro population living in the Far West in future decades, but probably even larger increases in the population living in the Northeast and North Central regions.

TRENDS IN BIRTH AND DEATH RATES

Collection of vital statistics, i.e. births and deaths, in the US prior to about a generation ago was highly deficient. Indeed it was not until 1933 that the last of the states was included in the birth and death registration areas. Even then, it was known that there was not complete registering of all births and deaths in all states.

Hence, for the nineteenth century as a whole, fragmentary information exists on levels and trends in vital rates; indeed, not until the 1940's did data exist which are probably relatively accurate and complete for both the Negro and white population for the total country.

Trends in the Birth Rate

The Negro birth rate has probably always been higher than the white. In 1948, for example, among the whites there were about 24 births per thousand population, whereas among nonwhites there were about 34 births (Table C8). This difference between the crude birth rates has persisted since World War I, which is the earliest time for which usable data are available for both races.

TABLE C8

BIRTH AND DEATH RATES, AND RATES OF NATURAL INCREASE, FOR WHITE AND NONWHITE POPULATION, 1917–1948
(Rates per 1000 population)

Year	Whites			Nonwhites		
	Births	Deaths	Natural increase	Births	Deaths	Natural increase
1948	24.3	9.7	14.6	34.4	11.3	23.1
1947	26.3	9.9	16.4	33.1	11.3	21.8
1945	19.9	10.5	9.4	28.0	12.0	16.0
1940	18.6	10.4	8.2	26.7	13.8	12.9
1935	17.9	10.6	7.3	25.8	14.3	11.5
1930	20.6	10.8	9.8	27.5	16.3	11.2
1925	24.1	11.1	13.0	34.2	17.4	16.8
1920	26.9	12.6	14.3	35.0	17.7	17.3
1917	28.0	13.5	14.5	32.9	20.4	12.5

Sources: *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1798–1945*, p. 47; *Statistical Abstract, 1950*, p. 70; *Vital Statistics*, Special Reports, Vol. 33, No. 8, Table 1.

In earlier decades also, judged from the data on the ratio of children to women,* it would seem that the Negro population had a higher birth rate than the white population. In 1890, for example, the ratios were 517 children per 1000 white women as compared with 620 children per 1000 Negro women. It is difficult, however, to reconstruct comparable longrun trends in fertility for the Negroes and whites, since these two measures of fertility — the crude birth rate and the ratio of children to women — cannot be compared directly. The birth rates for both races have undoubtedly been falling over the last century or so, but exactly how much cannot be said. Further, it is difficult even to guess whether the two rates are or are not approaching each other; it can be concluded only that the white birth rate has been consistently lower than the nonwhite.

The birth rates for both groups reached their lowest point during the depression years of the thirties. Following World War II, both recovered substantially, so that in 1947, for example, the birth rates were about as high as they had been in 1920 (Table C8). In all probability this upswing in the late forties does not represent a permanent state of affairs, but whether both birth rates will stabilize at the levels of the late thirties or early forties, or perhaps decline even below those levels, is a matter which cannot be estimated on the basis of present knowledge of the subject.

* The number of children under 5 years of age per thousand women aged 15–44

The Death Rate

Negroes have consistently experienced a higher death rate than the whites. In 1920, for example, it is estimated that among the whites there were about 13 deaths per thousand population, and among the nonwhites, 18. As was the case with fertility, there is very little valid information which permits study of the white and nonwhite death rates in the nineteenth century; however, the fragments of information available do suggest that the death rate among the nonwhites has fallen faster than that among the whites, so that by 1948 the two rates were very much closer than they had been a generation earlier. In 1948, for example, among the whites there were 10 deaths per thousand, whereas among nonwhites the death rate was about 11 per thousand (Table C8).

Further evidence that the white and Negro death rates are more closely approaching each other can be seen from the following data on life expectancy for males:

Year	Life expectancy for males, years		Nonwhite as proportion of white, %
	Whites	Nonwhites	
1900	46.6	32.5	70
1915	53.1	37.5	70
1925	59.3	44.9	76
1935	61.0	51.3	84
1940	62.1	51.5	83
1945	64.4	56.1	87
1948	65.5	58.1	89

Rates of Natural Increase

The crude rate of natural increase is defined as the crude birth rate minus the crude death rate (Table C8). Hence, it is a function of both rates. A high birth rate and high death rate, for example, will produce a low rate of natural increase. Similarly, low birth and death rates will produce a low rate of natural increase.

Over the last generation, judging from the available data, it would seem that the crude rate of natural increase for the nonwhite population has been consistently higher than for the whites. In 1948, for example, the nonwhite population had a rate of 23 per thousand, whereas the white had a rate of 15 per thousand. These rates might be interpreted as saying that, in that year, the nonwhite population was increasing by 2.3 percent and the white population 1.5 percent.

For earlier periods it is difficult to say what the rate of natural increase was, since the required birth and death rates are not available. It is possible that the rate of natural increase among the nonwhites was not higher than that among the whites in the nineteenth century, since the death rate then may have been high enough to compensate for the higher levels of fertility among the nonwhites. Indeed it is entirely possible that the higher rate of natural increase in the nonwhite population currently observed is the result of the decrease in mortality, a decrease which occurred most sharply after World War I.

Future Possibilities

The crude death rate for the white population seems to have already reached almost the lowest levels possible short of drastically new and unanticipated medical discoveries. The crude death rate of 10 may be reduced by 1 or possibly even 2 points to around 8 per thousand population, but it is very unlikely, given present knowledge, that the crude death rate will be reduced below this figure. Accordingly, any very marked reductions in

the death rate of the white population cannot be anticipated. The nonwhite population is also reaching the point at which its death rate is not likely to be reduced by any considerable amount. Under the most favorable conditions, given present knowledge, the death rate of 11 observed in 1948 can be reduced at the most by 3 points, to 8 per thousand population.

It follows, therefore, that the major factor in future rates of natural increase will be that of the birth rate. To the extent that the nonwhite birth rate should continue to be higher than the white birth rate, it is expected that the rate of natural increase among the nonwhites will be higher. Indeed, it is to be expected that in future years the rate of natural increase will fluctuate almost entirely with changes in the birth rate.

It is possible that the nonwhite birth rate will continue to maintain itself at higher levels than the white birth rate if for no other reason than that nonwhites are still poorer and less well educated than the whites. Three important variables which affect the level of the birth rate are: economic level, educational level, and the degree of urbanization. As will be seen in the section on urban and rural distribution, the Negroes today are about as highly urbanized as the whites. They are, however, still decidedly poorer and less well educated and accordingly, their birth rate may be expected to remain higher than that of the whites for some time in the future.

It is to be expected, notwithstanding the preceding remarks, that the nonwhite birth rate may more closely approximate the white birth rate, in light of the fact that by 1950 the Negroes were as urbanized as the whites. In earlier decades, particularly during the nineteenth century, the Negroes lived in the rural South where conditions were highly conducive to high fertility rates. By migrating out of this area and into northern and urban areas more conducive to lowered fertility, it is expected that some decrease in their fertility will occur. Insofar as the nonwhite birth rate may fall in the future, then the rate of natural increase of this group will also fall. It should be noted that both of these possibilities can occur, i.e., the nonwhite birth rate can fall considerably and still be higher than the white birth rate. Under such conditions as these, however, it is possible that the two birth rates may more nearly approach each other and hence the rates of natural increase will more nearly approach each other. The reader should recall, however, that the slightly higher natural increase of the Negro population will probably be compensated for by a somewhat greater white immigration, so that the actual population growth of the Negro contingent will be no greater than that of the white.

PATTERNS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION

As should be apparent on the basis of the analysis presented in the section on population growth and regional distribution, there has been a very large out-migration of Negroes from the South, particularly to the Northeast and North Central States. For example, the proportion of Negroes who lived in the South decreased from 92 percent in 1820 to 68 percent in 1950.

That there was an out-migration of the whites from the South also is suggested by the data in Table C6. In 1820 of all the whites in the US, 35 percent lived in the South, whereas in 1950, 27 percent lived in that region. Since it is known from other evidence that the birth rate and the rate of natural increase has been consistently higher in the South than in other regions, it should be deduced that there has been a net migration of whites also from the South. Since a number of studies have examined this question in detail, not much time shall be spent in describing the pattern of migration of the whites.

The decennial censuses for a number of decades have provided statistics comparing place of birth with place of residence at the time of the census enumeration. A person, for

example, might be living in New York at the time of the 1940 census, and have been born in Massachusetts. In such a case it is obvious that he has migrated from Massachusetts to New York at some time during his lifetime. Detailed analysis of these statistics provide some clues as to patterns of internal migration between one census period and another.

Migration Prior to World War II

Throughout the twentieth century, there has been a steady outflow of nonwhites from the South as revealed by the state of birth statistics. At the beginning of the century, the net out-migration seems to have been rather small, but swelled considerably during the period of World War I and during the prosperous 1920's. During the depression decade of the 1930's there seems to have been a considerable diminution in out-migration from the South. Between 1930 and 1940, hardly any more nonwhites left that region than did so between 1890 and 1900 (Table C9).

TABLE C9

ESTIMATED INTERNAL MIGRATION FOR WHITES AND NONWHITES FOR REGIONS, 1890–1940[a]

Period	Whites				Nonwhites			
	North-east	North Central	South	West	North-east	North Central	South	West
	Numbers (in thousands)							
1930–40	+98	−620	−226	+748	+62	+22	−115	+31
1920–30	+136	−383	−629	+877	+278	+325	−637	+34
1910–20	+51	−450	−149	+549	+111	+206	−336	+20
1900–10	+124	−1361	+79	+1157	+45	+23	−82	+13
1890–1900	+306	−853	+295	+251	+81	+16	−96	−1
	Migrants as percentage of regional population at beginning of decade							
1930–40	0.4	−1.9	−0.8	7.8	5.8	1.7	−1.2	9.3
1920–30	0.6	−1.3	−2.7	12.5	44.0	39.0	−7.1	15.8
1910–20	0.3	−1.8	−0.8	10.6	23.7	34.9	−3.8	11.9
1900–10	0.8	−6.3	0.5	37.6	11.8	4.2	−1.0	10.0
1890–1900	2.3	−4.8	2.4	11.6	30.9	3.7	−1.4	−1.8

Source: *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1798–1945*, p. 31.

[a] Estimated from data on state of birth. These computations made only for the native population.

Prior to World War I, the majority of nonwhites who left the South tended to go to the Northeast states and but a few to the Far West. During the period of World War I and during the 1920's, many more nonwhites migrated to North Central states than to Northeastern states. During this period there still continued to be but relatively few who migrated to the Far West.

In summary, the pattern of internal migration for the nonwhites during the twentieth century and prior to World War II, was out of the South; in the early part of the century, the larger movement was to the Northeast region and in more recent years to the North Central region.

In contrast to the pattern of nonwhite migration, the white population exhibited a somewhat different pattern. In the early part of the twentieth century there was still a net movement into the South, particularly the Southwestern states. Only with the period beginning with World War I, was there a heavy net out-migration from the South.

During this entire period, the North Central states consistently lost large numbers of people.

There was a small net migration of whites to the Northeast region but by far the heaviest migration, particularly since World War I, has been to the Far West, the region to which very few nonwhites migrated. In other words, the whites and nonwhites have shown different directions of movement. The nonwhites have left the South more consistently and have moved into some areas from which the whites were leaving. The net result has been to equalize more nearly the distribution of the two races.

Migration Pattern 1940-50

During the last decade, data comparable to those used in studying previous decades are not available; instead this office has estimated the extent of internal migration on the basis of the age distribution of the white and nonwhite populations in the South as contrasted with the rest of the country.

On the basis of this analysis it is clear that there was a very large out-migration from the South — a much greater out-migration than occurred during the 1930's, and perhaps as large, if not larger than that which occurred during the 1920's. This is particularly true for the nonwhite population. Apparently the out-migration of nonwhites from the South occurred among both sexes and all ages. Altogether the net number of nonwhites who left the South might have been double that of whites. Indeed, the net number of nonwhites who left the South since 1940 may constitute between 11 and 12 percent of all those living in that region in 1940. In contrast, among the whites, the net out-migration constituted perhaps 2 percent of the 1940 population. Although data are not available for the North and West separately, it is inferred, on the basis of the 1940 and 1950 distributions, that the nonwhites who left the South went mainly to the North; perhaps almost equal numbers migrated to the Northeast and North Central regions. For the whites who left the South, however, the migration pattern seems to have been westward.

Future Possibilities

The migration pattern between 1940 and 1950 seems to be, by and large, a continuation of the pattern of previous decades. The volume of migration has fluctuated with the business conditions and employment opportunities, and accordingly there was much more migration in the last decade than in the preceding one. The direction of migration, however, seems to be unchanged.

On the basis of these longtime trends, then, a continued net migration may be expected out of the South of both whites and nonwhites. The nonwhites will probably continue migrating to the North in large numbers whereas the whites will show a greater propensity to migrate to the Far West.

The volume of migration in the future will, of course, depend upon employment opportunities. The more jobs which open up in the North and West, the more migration there will be out of the South. In the event of a very large depression, such migration will be slowed down and may almost come to a halt. It is very unlikely, however, that there will be any reversal of longtime trends and any net migration of either whites or nonwhites into the South within the near future cannot be expected. During the 1940's there was considerable economic development in the South. There was also considerable economic development in other parts of the country and at this moment it seems unlikely that the South will develop economically at a much faster rate than other parts of the nation; therefore, it seems unlikely that there will be any significant net migration into the South.

Another element which is likely to maintain net outward movement from the South is the differential rate of natural increase. The South has (and has had) a higher rate than

other parts of the country. As a result, the population entering the labor force ages each year is relatively larger there than in areas with lower birth rates. Accordingly, even under conditions of similar rates of economic progress among the various regions of the country, there still would be out-migration from the South. Only if the South were to develop much faster than other parts of the country so that its employment opportunities would increase faster than its working force, is the South likely to attract migrants from other regions. Since it seems unlikely that the South will experience such a marked economic advantage over other regions, continued out-migration from this area may be expected. Also it remains highly probable, because of other circumstances, that the Negroes will continue to move from the South in greater proportion than the whites and that their geographic distribution will continue to become more comparable to that of the whites.

URBAN AND RURAL DISTRIBUTION

About 6 out of 10 of the whites and Negroes were living in urban areas in 1950; the Negroes were urbanized to practically the same degree as the whites. The present situation is in marked contrast to that of a generation ago and earlier when the Negroes were predominantly a rural people and the whites were already considerably urbanized (Table C10).

TABLE C10

URBAN AND RURAL DISTRIBUTION FOR WHITE AND NEGRO MALES, 1910–1950
(Numbers in millions)

Year	Urban			Rural			Urban, %		
	Total	Whites	Negroes	Total	Whites	Negroes	Total	Whites	Negroes
1950[a]	46.5	42.0	4.4	28.1	25.0	3.0	62.4	62.7	59.9
1940	36.4	33.3	2.9	29.7	26.1	3.4	55.0	56.0	46.7
1930	34.2	31.5	2.5	27.9	24.4	3.4	55.0	56.4	42.3
1920	27.2	25.4	1.7	26.7	23.0	3.5	50.5	52.4	33.4
1910	21.5	20.1	1.3	25.8	22.1	3.6	45.4	47.7	26.2

Sources: *1940 Census of Population*, Table 3; *1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC-7, No. 1, Table 1, and No. 3, Tables 1 and 3.

[a] The definition of "urban" as employed by 1950 Census of Population differs slightly from that employed in earlier censuses. The size of the urban population under the new definition is about 8.5 percent larger than that under the previous definition. The effects of this change upon white-Negro comparisons, however, are probably minor. The main effect is to exaggerate the increase in urban population between 1940 and 1950, for both races.

It would seem clear, on the basis of this analysis plus that presented in the preceding section, that the heavy out-migration from the South has tended to be from the rural South to the urban North in the case of the Negroes. This movement has probably been supplemented by another movement within the South from rural to urban areas. Among the whites, in contrast, urbanization during the 1940's was not as marked as among the Negroes. This trend toward increasing urbanization is particularly significant in the case of the Negroes, since it reflects very fundamental changes in the economic structure of the Negro community and also suggests that certain other highly significant derivative effects will follow from this urbanization.

From the viewpoint the economic structure, this trend of increasing urbanization implies that there has been a shift from agriculture to nonagriculture. (This will be examined in more detail in the section on industrial and occupational trends.) Such a shift

reflects in large measure the needs of the national economy for additional nonagricultural working force rather than for agricultural labor.

On the other hand, the urbanization of the Negro population should result in decreases in the birth rate in the future as was mentioned previously, increases in literacy and education (to be discussed in more detail in the section on educational level and school attendance), as well as other changes in the social structure.

Regional Distribution in 1950

Practically all the rural Negroes were concentrated in the South in 1950. In the other three regions at this date about 92 percent were living in urban areas whereas in the South less than half, 45 percent, were urban. Among the whites there were substantial proportions living in rural areas in all regions. From one-quarter to one-third of the white population of the North and West was rural; in the South, however, over half of the whites lived in rural areas (Table C11).

TABLE C11

URBAN AND RURAL DISTRIBUTION FOR WHITE AND NEGRO MALES BY REGION, 1950
(Numbers in millions)

Region	Urban			Rural			Urban, %		
	Total	Whites	Negroes	Total	Whites	Negroes	Total	Whites	Negroes
US	46.5	42.0	4.4	28.1	25.0	3.0	62.4	62.7	59.9
Northeast	15.2	14.3	0.9	4.2	4.1	0.1	78.2	77.6	91.7
North Central	13.9	12.9	1.0	8.1	8.0	0.1	63.1	61.6	91.5
South	10.9	8.5	2.3	12.5	9.8	2.8	46.3	46.6	45.4
West	6.6	6.3	0.3	13.0	12.3	0.3	67.9	67.5	91.5

Sources: See Table C10.

Future Possibilities

The marked urbanization of the Negroes during the 1940's seems to be but a continuation of longtime trends which have taken the Negro out of the rural South and deposited him in the urban North and urban South. Since this trend seems to reflect that of the employment opportunities available to the Negroes, it is quite likely that this trend of increasing urbanization will continue into future decades. It is so surmised since the expanding employment opportunities are in nonagriculture rather than in agriculture. Under conditions of full employment, then, it can be predicted that there will be a steady diminution in the number of rural agricultural workers and steady increases in the number of employed urbanites. Under conditions of mass unemployment, the flow to the urban areas will be slowed down considerably and may even be temporarily reversed, as occurred in the 1930's. In the long run, however, a continued increase can be expected in the degree of urbanization of both whites and Negroes, and possibly of the Negroes in particular.

RELATED SOCIAL TRENDS

AGE COMPOSITION

The age composition of a population which has experienced little, if any, migration always reflects past birth and death rates. Under conditions of very high birth and death rates, the population will be young and the median age may be as low as 16 years, as was the case in the US 150 years ago. Conversely, under conditions of low fertility and low mortality, the population will be considerably older and the median age may well be as much as 35 years, if not more.

In the case of the US, the age structure of the white population has been affected to some extent by foreign immigration. The age composition of the Negro population today, however, is practically entirely a product of past fertility and mortality trends.

Increasing Age of the Population

It is common knowledge that the American population is gradually becoming older. From a low of some 16 years in 1790, the median age has increased to almost 32 years by 1950. Increases in average age have occurred among both whites and nonwhites. The median age of white males increased from 22.9 years in 1890 to 29.5 in 1940 and to 29.4 years in 1950. For nonwhite males, the corresponding median ages were 18.1, 25.4, and 25.1 years.

Decrease in Youth

During the past decades, there has been a marked decrease in the proportion of the population under 18 years of age. Among the whites in 1950, about 3 in 10 were under 18 years of age as compared with 4 in 10 in 1890. Among the nonwhites in 1950, about 4 in 10 were under 18 years of age, as compared with 5 in 10 in 1890 (Table C12).

On the basis of these figures it is clearly seen that the nonwhite population is younger than the white. Such is to be expected on the basis of the previous analysis of birth and death rates. The nonwhite population in the past had higher fertility and mortality than the white population and accordingly should have a younger age composition.

The Middle Years

In the age bracket 18–29 years, there was an actual decrease in the number of white males between 1940 and 1950, and but a very slight increase in the number of nonwhite males. The proportion of the total male population that this age group constituted has decreased slightly since 1890, from 22 percent to 18 percent.

In the age groups 30–44, there have been some increases both among white and nonwhite males since 1940. The greater increases have occurred in the older ages, namely 35–44 years. The greater increase in the population aged 35–44 than in the younger populations aged 18–29, and 30–34, reveals the aging of both the white and nonwhite populations.

Older Population

Over the decades, the sharpest increases have occurred among the population 45 years of age and over. In 1950 this group constituted almost 3 out of 10 of white males, and 2 out of 10 of the nonwhite males. These are substantially higher proportions than this age group constituted in earlier decades (Table C12).

TABLE C12

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF WHITE AND NONWHITE MALES, 1890-1950

Age and color	Numbers (in thousands)			Percentage distribution		
	1950	1940	1890	1950	1940	1890
Total	74,633	66,062	31,966	100.0	100.0	100.0
0–17 yr	23,987	20,434	13,239	32.1	30.9	41.4
18–29	13,502	13,615	7,103	18.1	20.6	22.2
30–34	5,735	5,070	2,426	7.7	7.7	7.6
35–44	10,505	9,165	3,706	14.1	13.9	11.6
45 and over	20,904	17,778	5,492	28.0	26.9	17.2
White	66,961	59,449	28,258	100.0	100.0	100.0
0–17 yr	21,028	18,016	11,381	31.4	30.3	40.3
18–29	12,013	12,211	6,312	17.9	20.5	22.3
30–34	5,220	4,573	2,223	7.8	7.7	7.9
35–44	9,431	8,250	3,362	14.1	13.8	11.9
45 and over	19,269	16,399	4,980	28.8	27.6	17.6
Nonwhite[a]	7,672	6,613	3,708	100.0	100.0	100.0
0–17 yr	2,959	2,418	1,858	38.6	36.6	50.1
18–29	1,489	1,404	791	19.4	21.2	21.3
30–34	515	497	203	6.7	7.5	5.5
35–44	1,074	915	344	14.0	13.8	9.3
45 and over	1,635	1,379	512	21.3	20.9	13.8

Sources: *1950 Census of Population*, Vol. II, p. 576; *1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC-7, No. 1, Table 1.

[a] Data for 1890 are for the Negro population.

Future Possibilities

The nonwhite population is sure to continue increasing in age for the next several decades if for no other reason than that its mortality rates have decreased in the last two decades. If the birth rate should also fall, then the aging of the nonwhite population will continue even more rapidly.

Among the white population, the rise in the birth rate following World War II if sustained over a number of years in the future, will probably result in the age composition of that population remaining approximately as it was in 1950, or increasing but little. If the white birth rate should decrease considerably, then that population will age more than under conditions of high fertility.

With respect to the age group 18–37 years, it can be expected that the number of males will remain substantially around 22–23 million for some time to come. Projections of the 1950 population suggest that there will be an actual decrease of perhaps 400,000 white males in this age group between 1950 and 1955, and an increase of perhaps 100,000

nonwhite males. Table C13 shows the numbers for 1940 and 1950, and the estimated number for 1955.

The marked decrease in the birth rate during the depression of the 1930's has helped to retard increases in the absolute number of males in the 18–37 age group. Until the large baby crop of the 1940's becomes of age, which will be in the 1960's, it is unlikely that this middle age range will increase to any marked degree.

TABLE C13

AGE DISTRIBUTION OF WHITE AND NONWHITE MALES, 1940–1955
(Numbers in thousands)

Age	Total			White			Nonwhite		
	1955[a]	1950	1940	1955[a]	1950	1940	1955[a]	1950	1940
Total	22,170	22,523	21,547	19,740	20,174	19,368	2,430	2,349	2,179
18–19 yr	2,260	2,121	2,495	1,960	1,870	2,232	300	251	263
20–24	5,260	5,457	5,693	4,640	4,840	5,114	620	617	579
25–29	5,400	5,924	5,448	4,800	5,303	4,892	600	621	556
30–34	5,860	5,735	5,070	5,250	5,220	4,573	610	515	497
35–37	3,390	3,286	2,841	3,090	2,941	2,557	300	345	284

[a] Estimated.

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

Increasing school attendance rates and higher levels of educational achievement are concomitants of urbanization and increasingly higher planes of living. Accordingly, at any given moment of time, those population groups which are the most urbanized (and have been so for the longest period of time) and economically the most well off, should be expected to have the highest educational achievements. The children and teen-agers in such a population should be expected to have the highest rates of school attendance. When viewing this subject over time, it should be expected that as a people becomes urbanized and advances economically, more of its members will achieve a better education. Accordingly, examine the educational achievements of white and nonwhite males in this light and in light of the longtime trends.

Educational Levels

White males are much better educated than are nonwhite males. In 1940 (for the population 20 years of age and over) the median number of years of schooling completed by the former was 7.8, and for the nonwhites 4.6. The younger persons were better educated than the older; the age group 20–24 years of age had completed from two to three years more of schooling than had the age group 35 years of age and over (Table C14).

Completion of less than six years of schooling is sometimes equated with functional illiteracy. The person who has had but two or three years of schooling may be able to read and write very simple materials, but in the light of the literacy requirements of this modern age, he is considered to be illiterate for most practical purposes. Accordingly, it is pertinent to note the percentage of whites and nonwhites who have failed to complete this minimum amount of schooling.

In 1940 about 15 percent of all white males 20 years of age and over had less than this amount of schooling. Among nonwhites, however, 55 percent had less than this amount. Among the youngest age group, 20–24 years, only 5 percent of the whites had this little

education, whereas among the nonwhites over 40 percent were so poorly educated. Conversely, the better educated were far more frequent among the whites than among the nonwhites. Among the former some 12 percent had some college education whereas among the nonwhites only 3 percent had attended college.

TABLE C14

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF WHITE AND NONWHITE MALES BY AGE, 1940

Age	Median number years school	Numbers (in thousands)			Percentage completed	
		Population	Years of school completed		Under 5 years	Any college
			None	1–5		
Total, 20 yr and over	7.7	43,156	1,529	6,326	18.2	10.8
20–24	9.9	5,693	58	448	8.9	13.2
25–29	9.1	5,451	63	471	9.8	13.7
30–34	8.2	5,070	73	504	11.4	13.8
35 and over	7.4	26,942	1,335	4,904	23.2	9.1
White, 20 yr and over	7.8	39,228	1,120	4,636	14.9	11.6
20–24	10.3	5,114	34	237	5.3	14.3
25–29	9.5	4,892	36	256	6.0	14.8
30–34	8.7	4,573	44	300	7.6	14.9
35 and over	7.5	24,649	1,007	3,843	20.0	9.7
Nonwhite, 20 yr and over	4.6	3,928	409	1,690	54.5	3.1
20–24	5.8	579	24	211	41.1	3.7
25–29	5.5	559	27	215	44.1	3.8
30–34	5.2	497	29	204	47.6	3.7
35 and over	3.9	2,294	328	1,061	62.0	2.7

Source: *1940 Census of Population*, Vol. IV, Part I, Table 39.

School Attendance

In view of these differentials in educational levels, there should be less school attendance among the nonwhites than among the whites. This is the case among the persons of high school and college age in 1950. Among persons 5–13 years of age, the elementary school age, there was almost no difference between the two races. Indeed, if the preliminary results of the 1950 census of population are correct, in this age group there was somewhat higher school attendance among the nonwhites in the South than among the whites. In the ages 14–24 years, however, there are very marked differences for the total US, considerably larger proportions of the whites being in school (Table C15).

The fact that in the South in 1950 as large a proportion of the nonwhites as of the whites in the age group 18–24 years was in school is, probably, a reflection of the census procedures rather than of school attendance propensities of the Southern native nonwhites. In 1950 for the first time, college students were enumerated as of their place of residence rather than of the place of residence of their families. Accordingly, those Northern students who attended Southern colleges would be enumerated in the South rather than at their Northern family homes. It is possible, then, that the relatively large degree of school attendance of nonwhites in the age group 18–24 years in the South may represent Northern Negro students who have gone to Southern colleges. Of the native Southern nonwhites, in

contrast to the Southern whites, significantly smaller proportions attended school, which for this age generally means college.

Between 1940 and 1950 there were significant increases in school attendance at both the high school and college age levels, for both whites and nonwhites. For the group 18-24 years, this increase probably reflects in large measure the attendance of veterans under the GI bill. For the younger age group the increase in school attendance probably reflects in part the increasing degree of urbanization for both racial groups, and in part perhaps the prosperity of the 1940's.

TABLE C15
PERCENT OF POPULATION ENROLLED IN SCHOOL, FOR WHITES AND NONWHITES, BY AGE AND REGION, 1940 AND 1950

Age	1950			1940		
	US	South	Other regions	US	South	Other regions
Total						
5-13 yr	81.4	79.4	82.6	84.1	77.4	88.1
14-17	84.4	78.2	87.9	79.3	70.1	84.3
18-24	18.6	15.3	20.2	13.3	11.4	14.3
White						
5-13 yr	81.4	78.8	82.6	84.8	77.5	88.2
14-17	85.7	80.2	88.1	80.7	72.0	84.4
18-24	19.1	15.2	20.7	13.8	12.5	14.3
Nonwhite						
5-13 yr	81.4	81.0	82.7	79.0	77.0	86.5
14-17	75.6	72.3	85.0	68.3	64.2	82.8
18-24	14.6	15.7	12.2	9.1	8.0	12.7

Source: *1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC-7, Nos. 1 and 3, Table 1.

Future Possibilities

The urbanization of the nonwhites and their migration out of the rural South and into the urban North means movement into an area where school facilities are available and where possibly greater efforts are made to enforce the school attendance laws. Full employment and prosperity also mean that more teen-age youth can afford to go to school, i.e., their parents do not have to send them to work at such an early age. The operation of the GI bill means that many men who otherwise would not have considered going to school now attend. Taking these three factors into account in estimating the future suggests that school attendance among the nonwhites will continue to increase and that the educational level will continue to rise. Among the whites also these trends will continue in this direction; accordingly, it is difficult to estimate how closely the nonwhites will approach the whites. It does seem clear, however, that the low educational levels and the high degree of functional illiteracy of 1940 for the nonwhites will be much improved in future decades.

Such a trend toward increasingly higher education levels suggests also, as intimated in the section on trends in birth and death rates, decreasing fertility for the nonwhites in particular. Such decreases may take several decades to occur, but they seem quite probable. Such a change in the level of fertility, in turn, should affect the age composition of the nonwhites and, perhaps, make it approach more nearly that of the white population.

The extent to which an individual has dependents is in part a function of the family and social structure, and in part a function of his own commitments. In some societies the clan or tribe may in effect underwrite the family responsibilities of the individual so that the father is only partly responsible for the financial support of his wife and children. In other societies the father may be solely responsible for the welfare of his family. In both societies, of course, he may be able to delimit his responsibilities by refraining from marriage and the formation of a family.

This section will examine three aspects of the dependency status of white and nonwhite males: marital status, paternal status, and household composition.

TABLE C16

MARITAL STATUS OF WHITE AND NONWHITE MALES, 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, BY REGION, 1940 AND 1950
(Numbers in thousands)

Color and region	Total	Married		Single	Widowed and divorced
		Number	Percentage		
		1950			
US	53,786	37,238	69.2	13,261	3,287
White	48,686	33,909	69.6	11,879	2,898
Nonwhite	5,100	3,329	65.3	1,382	389
South	16,050	11,415	71.1	3,771	864
White	12,792	9,257	72.4	2,894	641
Nonwhite	3,258	2,158	66.2	877	223
Other regions	37,736	25,823	68.4	9,490	2,423
White	35,894	24,652	68.7	8,985	2,257
Nonwhite	1,842	1,171	63.6	505	166
		1940			
US	49,363	30,192	61.2	16,403	2,768
White	44,771	27,438	61.3	14,864	2,469
Nonwhite	4,592	2,754	60.0	1,539	299
South	14,561	9,178	63.0	4,634	749
White	11,277	7,173	63.6	3,562	542
Nonwhite	3,284	2,005	61.1	1,072	207
Other regions	34,802	21,014	60.4	11,769	2,019
White	33,494	20,265	60.5	11,302	1,927
Nonwhite	1,308	749	57.3	467	92

Sources: *1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC-7, Nos. 1 and 3, Table 1.

Marital Status

About 70 percent of the white males in 1950 (who were 15 years of age and over) were married. Among the nonwhites, about 65 percent were married (Table C16). In the South, larger proportions of both groups were married, and in the other regions somewhat smaller proportions.

Since 1940 there have been very significant increases in the percentage married for both races. In large measure, these increases probably reflect the war and postwar conditions

of the 1940's, including the full employment of this period. This decided increase in the percentage married is also related to the higher birth rate of the later 1940's (referred to in the section on trends in birth and death rates). In short, then, since 1940 a larger proportion of the male population has assumed dependency burdens in the form of wives and children; a somewhat larger proportion of the whites than of the nonwhites are so responsible.

The higher proportion married among the white males, as compared with the nonwhite males, is probably in very large measure a reflection of the differences in the age composition of the two groups. It is entirely possible that at each specific age there is comparatively small difference between the two races. In 1940 also a somewhat larger proportion of the white than of the nonwhite males was reported married. However, examination of the data by age revealed that up to about age 29 a larger proportion of the nonwhites were married, and above that age a larger proportion of the whites. What happened is that the nonwhites were somewhat younger than the white males (in 1950 the median age of white males 15 years of age and over was 38.4 years as compared with 35.4 years for nonwhite males), and also became married at a somewhat younger age. Further analysis of the 1940 data reveals that standardizing for age composition removed practically all differences between the two groups with respect to the percentage married.

TABLE C17

ESTIMATED BIRTH RATE BY AGE, FOR WHITE AND NONWHITE MALES, 1948

Age	Births per 1,000 men	
	Whites	Nonwhites
Total, 15–44 yr	100.0	108.0
15–19	10.1	25.2
20–24	135.2	170.8
25–29	178.9	172.4
30–34	134.4	129.2
35–39	84.7	89.6
40–44	43.0	55.8

Sources: *Vital Statistics of the United States, 1948*, Part II, p. 168; *1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC-7, No. 1 (interpolating for 1948).

In short, then, it can be assumed that in 1950 there were very probably no differences of really practical significance between the two races. Possibly a larger proportion of the younger nonwhites than of the whites were married, but if so the differences probably are of but little import.

Paternal Status

It has been seen that the nonwhite population has a higher birth rate than the white. Accordingly a larger proportion of the nonwhite males should be expected to be fathers. That such is the case is shown by the paternal birth rates presented in Table C17. From age 15 to 24 the nonwhite males had a higher paternity rate in 1948; from age 25 to 34 the white males experienced higher rates; and above age 35 the nonwhites again had higher rates. This suggests that the nonwhite males begin their paternal career at a somewhat younger age than do the white males and continue such until an older age. Age for age, however, the differences between the two groups are not very large, and may have but small practical import.

Household Composition

Another measure of the possible extent of the burden of dependency upon the male in a social structure in which each family sets up its own household is the maintenance of a separate household. The head of the household, who is in most cases the husband and father, is financially responsible for the maintenance of that household. Under other conditions in which two or more families may live in the same housing unit the burden of dependency may not fall so heavily upon the individual head of the household.

It would seem that the dependency burden is somewhat heavier for whites than nonwhites. In 1950 about 94 percent of the white married couples were living in their own households, for which the husbands were presumably financially responsible. Among nonwhite families only about 84 percent were living in their own households, the balance living as secondary families within households headed by other persons (Table C18).

TABLE C18

FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION, FOR WHITES AND NONWHITES, BY REGION, 1940 AND 1950

(Numbers in thousands)

Region and family status	1950			1940		
	Total	White	Nonwhite	Total	White	Nonwhite
US						
Number households	42,520	38,782	3,738	34,949	31,680	3,269
Population per household	3.4	3.4	3.9	3.7	3.6	4.0
Number married couples						
Living in own household	35,320	32,505	2,815	28,517	26,108	2,409
Not living in own household	33,054	30,642	2,412	26,570	24,435	2,135
Number	2,265	1,862	403	1,947	1,673	274
Percent	6.4	5.7	14.3	6.8	6.4	11.4
South						
Number households	12,795	10,308	2,487	10,305	7,895	2,410
Population per household	3.6	3.5	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.1
Number married couples						
Living in own household	10,749	8,896	1,853	8,653	6,852	1,801
Not living in own household	10,054	8,413	1,641	7,975	6,354	1,621
Number	695	483	212	679	498	181
Percent	6.5	5.4	11.4	7.8	7.3	10.0
Other regions						
Number households	29,725	28,474	1,251	24,644	23,785	859
Population per household	3.3	3.3	3.8	3.6	3.5	3.8
Number married couples						
Living in own household	24,570	23,608	962	19,864	19,256	608
Not living in own household	23,000	22,229	771	18,596	18,081	515
Number	1,570	1,379	191	1,268	1,175	93
Percent	6.4	5.8	19.9	6.4	6.1	15.3

Sources: *1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC-7, No. 1, Table 2, and No. 3, Tables 5 and 6.

This larger proportion of the nonwhite families not living in their own households reflects involuntary doubling up due to the housing shortage, as well as voluntary community living. To the extent, however, that more of the nonwhite families are forced to double up, the dependency burden may be no lighter for the nonwhites than for the white males.

It is difficult to estimate from these figures what difference, if any, there may be in the dependency burden of the two races. If the whites have a slightly higher dependency burden than the nonwhites, the difference is probably of small practical import.

The average number of persons in a household is larger among the nonwhites than among the whites (Table C18). For the total US, the respective figures are 3.9 and 3.4 persons.

Summary

Considering together the various possible criteria of the extent of the dependency burden, there would seem to be very little, if any, difference between the two races. Possibly more whites than nonwhites are married; on the other hand, nonwhites have relatively more children to support. It is true that among the nonwhites more of the married women work than is the case with married white women. However, this difference in the labor force participation rates of the two groups results in large measure from the considerably lower earnings of the nonwhite males. The nonwhite female also earns but a comparatively small amount relative to the earnings of other groups and relative to the needs of supporting a family. Accordingly, then, it seems highly unlikely that any significant proportion of the dependency burden of the nonwhite male can be shifted to the nonwhite female.

A smaller proportion of nonwhite males is directly responsible to the landlord for the monthly rent; on the other hand, the average number of persons in the household for which he is responsible is larger. Accordingly, in taking an over-all view of this problem, it is concluded that any advantage which one race may have in one respect seems to be counteracted by the advantages of the other race in other respects. In short, very possibly neither race enjoys any particular net advantage over the other race. Insofar as can be estimated at the present, it is likely that this lack of any real difference in the dependency burdens of the white and nonwhite males will continue unchanged.

ECONOMIC TRENDS

TRENDS IN WORKING FORCE PARTICIPATION

Most adult men between the ages of about 20 and 65 in almost all nations of the world participate in the working force. As seen in the preceding section, most men in this age group have financial dependents, and so are forced into the working force. Further, in most societies it is customary for adult men to work, whether they have dependents or not. Accordingly there are but very few men who can avoid participation in the working force.

Labor Force Rates in 1950

In 1950 about 79 percent of white civilian males, 14 years of age and over (and who were not confined in institutions), were in the labor force, as compared with about 74 percent of the nonwhite males. These rates were almost identical in the South and in the remainder of the country (Table C19).

The apparently higher rate of labor force participation among the whites may be due in part to the differences in age composition, and in part to the inadequacies of the census data. The white population is somewhat older (among those 15 years of age and over, the median age for white males was 38.4 years, and for nonwhite males 35.4 years). Examination of the data by age, which are available for 1940, clearly reveals that age for age, the labor force participation rates for nonwhites are as high, if not higher, than for whites. However, if one population is more heavily weighted with teen-agers and men in their early 20's than is the other population, that first population will have a lower labor force participation rate than will the second.

However, if the pattern of labor force participation observed in 1940 still persists, it is safe to say that in any particular age group about equal proportions of white and nonwhite men will be found in the labor force. Between ages 25 and 54 (in 1950) over 95 percent of the men were in the labor force. In the younger and older ages the participation rates were somewhat smaller. At age 20–24, between 85 and 90 percent were in the labor force, the balance being for the most part in school. In the teen ages the rates were still lower, at ages 18 and 19 between 70 and 75 percent being in the labor force.

Changes between 1940 and 1950

The reported census statistics for these two periods suggest a decrease in the rate of labor force participation for the nonwhites from about 80 to 74 percent (Table C19). In light of other known facts about the labor force, it would seem that the only real decrease which may have occurred would be occasioned by the younger veterans who were still in school (at the time of the 1950 census enumeration).

What might be termed a fictitious decrease may have occurred among the youngest teen-agers, as follows: For youth living on farms there is a tendency to report them as unpaid family workers; as long as the youth is on the farm, he will be put to doing some work, and

as long as he is doing some work he can be reported as in the labor force. In 1950 the census requirements for allocating a person in the labor force as an unpaid family worker were more exacting than they were in 1940. Accordingly, the combination of youth moving away from the farms in the South, together with changes in enumeration and labor force procedures, could have acted to reduce the reported amount of labor force participation.

The only real decrease which is likely to have occurred would be that occasioned by nonwhite youth continuing in school to later ages. It was seen that there were substantial increases in the numbers of those aged 14–24 who were in school. This increase in school attendance, however, is unlikely to account for the reported decrease in the proportion in the labor force. Indeed, the absolute increase in the number of reported nonwhite male workers between 1940 and 1950 was only 100,000, a number which appears entirely too low for credence. As a practical measure, in interpreting these labor force figures for any particular age group, it would seem best to assume that practically all of the civilian males not confined to institutions, and who are not in school, are in the labor force — they are either employed or seeking employment.

TABLE C19

LABOR FORCE STATUS OF WHITE AND NONWHITE CIVILIAN MALES, 14 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, BY REGION, 1940 AND 1950
(Numbers in thousands)

Region and race	1950		1940	
	Number in labor force	Percentage of population in labor force	Number in labor force	Percentage of population in labor force
US	43,268	78.8	39,944	79.0
Whites	39,386	79.3	36,167	78.9
Nonwhites	3,882	73.9	3,777	79.8
South	12,908	78.3	11,967	79.8
Whites	10,408	79.4	9,221	79.5
Nonwhites	2,500	74.2	2,746	80.9
Other regions	30,360	79.0	27,977	78.7
Whites	28,978	79.3	26,946	78.7
Nonwhites	1,382	73.5	1,031	77.1

Sources: *1940 Census of Population*, Vol. III, Part 1, Tables 1 and 7; *1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC-7, No. 2, Tables 1, 3, and 4.

INDUSTRIAL AND OCCUPATIONAL TRENDS

There have been significant changes in the distribution of the nonwhite population among the regions of the US and as between the rural and urban areas. In general, these changes have tended to decrease the differences between the whites and nonwhites; for example, by 1950 about equal proportions of both races were living in urban areas. It should be expected that such drastic shifts in place of residence would be both a response to changes in employment opportunities and a significant shift in type of employment, i.e., in the nature of the industry and occupation in which the man participates. Accordingly, these industrial and occupational shifts are examined in this section.

Industrial Trends

Historically one of the most significant shifts which has occurred has been that from agriculture to nonagriculture. In 1840 perhaps some 80 percent of the workers were engaged in agriculture. By 1910 the proportion of white male workers so engaged had decreased to about 31 percent. After that time the proportion so engaged decreased still more, until in 1950 only some 15 percent of the white men were in agriculture. Indeed, in 1950 the absolute number of farmers was some 3 million less than in 1910 (Table C20).

TABLE C20

MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUPS OF EMPLOYED WHITE AND NONWHITE MALES, 1910–1950
(Numbers in thousands)

Occupation	White			Nonwhite		
	1950	1940	1910	1950	1940	1910
Total	36,829	30,661	26,402	3,488	3,089	3,080
Nonagriculture, total	31,334	24,171	18,095	2,626	1,817	1,396
Professional, technical, and kindred workers	2,917	2,009	878	77	57	36
Managers, officers, and proprietors	4,276	3,253	2,291	70	51	33
Clerical and sales	4,954	4,079	2,691	173	68	32
Craftsmen, foremen, etc.	7,116	4,885	4,153	264	135	114
Operatives, service workers, laborers, etc.	12,071	9,945	8,082	2,042	1,506	1,181
Agriculture, total	5,495	6,490	8,307	862	1,272	1,684
Farmers and farm managers	3,857	4,339	5,056	470	653	803
Farm laborers	1,638	2,151	3,251	392	619	881
Percent in: total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Nonagriculture	85.1	78.8	68.5	75.3	58.8	45.3
Operatives, service workers, laborers, etc.	32.8	32.4	30.6	58.6	47.7	38.3
All other	52.3	46.4	37.9	16.7	10.1	7.0
Agriculture	14.9	21.2	31.5	24.7	41.2	54.7

Sources: *1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC–7, No. 2, Table 6; *Socio-Economic Grouping of Gainful Workers in the United States, 1930*, p. 13; *Comparative Occupational Statistics, 1870–1940*, p. 187.

Among the nonwhite men this decrease in the importance of agriculture as a means of livelihood did not proceed as rapidly as among the whites. In 1910 over half of the nonwhite men were still engaged in agriculture, and in 1940 over 40 percent. Between 1940 and 1950, however, under the impetus of war conditions and the full employment of the postwar period, there was a very large exodus of nonwhite males from agriculture. Indeed, the shift out of agriculture in this last decade appears to have been as great as was the shift in the entire preceding generation, from 1910 to 1940 (Table C20). By 1950 only one-quarter of the nonwhite males were still engaged in agriculture. This trend out of agriculture, of course, is exactly what would have been expected on the basis of the marked urbanization of the nonwhite population observed previously.

Since most of the nonwhites engaged in agriculture lived in the South, practically the entire decrease occurred in this region. In 1940 there were about 1,200,000 nonwhites so engaged in this region; in 1950 there were only 800,000, which represents a decrease of one-third. There was a decrease in the number of white males engaged in agriculture in the

South also (as well as in the remainder of the US), but this decrease was relatively much less among them than among the nonwhites.

Despite this decrease, however, agriculture was still the leading industry for nonwhite males in 1950. Manufacturing, however, was a very close second, and engaged almost as many men as did agriculture. Indeed, between 1910 and 1950 there was a very marked increase in the number engaged in manufacturing, an increase of about 60 percent. Although there was some increase in the number of white men so employed, this increase was much less, having been but about 26 percent.

Among the nonwhite males there were significant increases between 1940 and 1950 in almost all of the nonagricultural industries; there were slight decreases only in the numbers reported in mining and perhaps also in personal services. The major increase, nevertheless, was in manufacturing, both for the South and for the other regions. Among white males there appears to have been increases in all industries, both in the South and elsewhere.

Part of these increases between 1940 and 1950 reflect the shift from large-scale unemployment in 1940 to full employment a decade later. It is very likely that under conditions of equal employment opportunities at both dates many of the observed increases, particularly in manufacturing, would have been minimized. Nevertheless, substantial shifts in industrial composition had to occur as a result of the increased urbanization of both the whites and nonwhites, shifts in the direction indicated by the previous analysis.

Occupational Trends

There were important increases in the numbers of whites and nonwhites engaged in all nonagricultural occupations, between 1910 and 1950 (Table C20). Among the nonwhite males the great bulk of the nonagricultural workers were concentrated in the group "operatives, service workers, laborers, etc.," namely the semiskilled and unskilled jobs. This held true for 1950 as well as 1910. In 1950 just under 8 in 10 nonwhite workers were in this category as compared with just over 8 in 10 forty years earlier (Table C21).

TABLE C21

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NONAGRICULTURAL WORKERS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUPS, FOR EMPLOYED WHITE AND NONWHITE MALES, 1910–1950

Occupation	Whites			Nonwhites		
	1950	1940	1910	1950	1940	1910
Total, nonagriculture	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Professional, technical, and kindred workers	9.3	8.3	4.8	2.9	3.1	2.6
Managers, officers, and proprietors	13.7	13.5	12.7	2.7	2.8	2.3
Clerical and sales	15.8	16.9	14.9	6.6	3.8	2.3
Craftsmen, foremen, etc.	22.7	20.2	22.9	10.0	7.4	8.2
Operatives, service workers, laborers, etc.	38.5	41.1	44.7	77.8	82.9	84.6

Sources: See Table C20.

The white males were more evenly distributed among the various nonagricultural occupations than were the nonwhites. Only half as large a proportion of them were in these semiskilled and unskilled jobs as were noted among the nonwhites. Conversely, the whites were much better represented among the white-collar jobs than were the nonwhites. In 1950 only about 12 percent of the nonwhites in nonagricultural employment held white-collar jobs as compared with about 40 percent of the whites. Essentially the same patterns were observed in 1910 (Table C21).

TABLE C22

MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUPS OF EMPLOYED WHITE AND NONWHITE MALES, BY REGION, 1940 AND 1950

(Numbers in thousands)

Occupation	US				South				Other regions			
	Whites		Nonwhites		Whites		Nonwhites		Whites		Nonwhites	
	1950	1940	1950	1940	1950	1940	1950	1940	1950	1940	1950	1940
Grand total	36,829	30,661	3,488	3,089	9,789	8,007	2,333	2,391	27,040	22,654	1,555	698
Nonagriculture, total	31,334	24,171	2,626	1,817	7,579	5,272	1,529	1,200	23,755	18,899	1,097	617
Professional, technical, kindred	2,917	2,009	77	57	661	440	43	37	2,256	1,569	34	20
Managers, office, proprietors	4,276	3,253	70	51	1,169	799	34	23	3,107	2,454	36	28
Clerical, sales	4,954	4,079	173	68	1,262	893	63	28	3,692	3,186	110	40
Craftsmen, foremen, etc.	7,116	4,885	264	135	1,729	1,034	149	88	5,387	3,851	115	47
Operatives, service, labor, etc.	12,071	9,945	2,042	1,506	2,758	2,106	1,240	1,024	9,313	7,839	802	482
Agriculture, total	5,495	6,490	862	1,272	2,210	2,735	804	1,191	3,285	3,755	58	81
Farmers and farm managers	3,857	4,339	470	653	1,573	1,868	446	621	2,284	2,471	24	32
Farm laborers	1,638	2,151	392	619	637	867	358	570	1,001	1,284	34	49
Percent in: total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Nonagriculture	85.1	78.8	75.3	58.8	77.4	65.8	65.5	50.2	87.9	83.4	95.0	88.4
Operatives, service workers, etc.	32.8	32.4	58.6	48.7	28.2	26.3	53.1	42.8	34.5	34.6	69.4	69.1
All other	52.3	46.4	16.7	10.1	49.2	39.5	12.4	7.4	53.4	48.8	25.6	19.3
Agriculture	14.9	21.2	24.7	41.2	22.6	34.2	34.5	49.8	12.1	16.6	5.0	11.6

Sources: See Table C20.

Summary of Industrial and Occupational Trends

The single most significant trend which emerges for the nonwhite males is the shift out of agriculture and into the lower-level nonagricultural jobs. Although this trend has been going on for some time, the changes which occurred in the last decade seem to be as large as the changes which transpired in the entire preceding generation. Whether this trend can be considered as "improvement," or a rise in vertical mobility, is debatable. Ordinarily a shift from agriculture into the lowest rungs of the nonagricultural social structure does not appear to be much "improvement." In the case of the nonwhites, however, such a shift may represent a real betterment of living conditions. As we shall see in the section on income levels, such a shift does result in significant increases in cash income. It also results in introducing the person to a whole new way of life, whose ultimate results may far transcend the immediate results of increased cash income.

TABLE C23

MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUPS OF EMPLOYED WHITE AND NONWHITE MALES FOR THE SOUTH AND FOR THE NATION, 1940 AND 1950
(Numbers in thousands)

Industry	US				South			
	Whites		Nonwhites		Whites		Nonwhites	
	1950	1940	1950	1940	1950	1940	1950	1940
Total	36,829	30,661	3,488	3,089	9,789	8,007	2,333	2,391
Agriculture	5,638	6,599	878	1,288	2,248	2,765	820	1,202
Mining	909	848	40	51	421	324	35	47
Construction	3,096	1,877	279	145	912	496	184	108
Manufacturing	9,787	7,775	779	476	1,854	1,387	447	333
Transportation, communications, and public utilities	3,257	2,549	297	200	779	554	161	133
Wholesale and retail trade	6,446	5,189	487	320	1,662	1,203	281	198
Service industries	5,397	4,265	525	491	1,227	864	296	292
All other	1,844	1,156	160	68	567	324	84	44
Not reported	455	403	43	47	119	90	25	34

Source: *1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC-7, No. 2, Table 8.

Among white males there has also been the shift out of agriculture, but many more of the whites have managed eventually to reach the higher level nonagricultural jobs than was the case with the nonwhites. Actually, in examining the industrial and occupational composition of the whites and nonwhites employed in nonagriculture, comparatively little change is found over the last 40 years (Tables C21 and C24). The occupational and industrial distribution of the nonagricultural workers in 1950 was not very different from that of 1940 or 1910. This holds true for both whites and nonwhites and for the South and for other regions (Tables C22 and C23).

There have been some changes which can be construed as occupational upgrading plus a rise in the level of living. For example, among the white nonagricultural workers, some 5 percent were professionals in 1910 as compared with 9 percent in 1950. Among the nonwhites some 2.3 percent were in clerical and sales jobs in 1910 as compared with 6.6 percent in 1950. These changes, however, particularly for the nonwhites, have been overshadowed by the shift out of agriculture. The white men, as a result, have entered jobs of both a

higher social status and higher pay. Although the nonwhite men have been largely concentrated in the semiskilled and unskilled jobs, these nonagricultural jobs to which they have been moving provide more income than do the agricultural jobs which they left.

TABLE C24

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NONAGRICULTURAL WORKERS, BY MAJOR INDUSTRY GROUP FOR EMPLOYED WHITE AND NONWHITE MALES, FOR THE SOUTH AND FOR THE NATION, 1940 AND 1950

Industry	US				South			
	Whites		Nonwhites		Whites		Nonwhites	
	1950	1940	1950	1940	1950	1940	1950	1940
Total, nonagricultural	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mining	3.0	3.6	1.6	3.1	5.7	6.3	2.4	4.1
Construction	10.1	7.9	10.9	8.3	12.3	9.6	12.4	9.4
Manufacturing	31.8	32.9	30.3	27.1	25.0	26.9	30.0	28.8
Transportation, communications, and public utilities	10.6	10.8	11.6	11.4	10.5	10.7	10.8	11.5
Wholesale and retail trade	21.0	21.9	19.0	18.2	22.4	23.4	18.9	17.1
Service industries	17.5	18.0	20.4	28.0	16.5	16.8	19.9	25.3
All other	6.0	4.9	6.2	3.9	7.6	6.3	5.6	3.8

Source: See Table C23.

Future possibilities

Just as the trend toward increased urbanism can be expected to continue into the future, so the trend out of agriculture can be expected to continue, at least for the next couple of decades. Initially, the nonwhites will probably continue to enter the lowest levels of the nonagricultural ladder. However, as their level of education rises and as they become more familiar with modern urban industry and the urban way of life, it is possible that their occupational and industrial distribution will more nearly approximate that of the whites. In short, the nonwhites may be recapitulating much of the process of urban adjustment through which so many of the European immigrants to the US passed.

INCOME LEVELS

In the preceding section it was seen that the whites tended to occupy the jobs with higher status and better pay. There is still a larger proportion of nonwhites in agriculture than whites. Accordingly, it should be expected that the annual earnings of the whites would be greater than that of the nonwhites. Even if both races were paid identical rates for the identical job (a statement which is partially true), the fact that the nonwhites are so largely concentrated in the semiskilled and unskilled jobs, or tend to be farm laborers or farm tenants rather than prosperous farm owners, would result in lower average income for this race as compared with the white.

This was clearly the case in 1949 (Table C25). The average earnings of white families and individuals averaged just under $3000, whereas nonwhites averaged only about $1400, or less than half. In the South the respective medians were about $2700 and $1200, and in the other regions about $3000 and $1800. These averages are all medians and refer to the population living in urban and rural nonfarm areas. They were collected by the Census bureau and are supposed to represent the total cash earnings for the year 1949.

These figures represent family income rather than the income of individuals, for they were compiled by adding together the total income of families, together with the income of only those individuals who were living alone and not as members of families.

TABLE C25

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME FOR WHITE AND NONWHITE FAMILIES AND INDIVIDUALS LIVING IN URBAN AND RURAL NONFARM AREAS, BY REGION, 1949

Income	US		South		Other regions	
	Whites	Nonwhites	Whites	Nonwhites	Whites	Nonwhites
Number reporting (in thousands)	36,409	3,935	8,601	2,232	27,808	1,703
Percent distribution	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under $500	12.0	21.6	12.9	24.0	11.6	18.5
$500-999	7.1	17.4	8.0	20.4	6.9	13.4
1000-1999	13.8	28.1	16.7	31.8	12.9	23.3
2000-2999	17.8	18.9	18.8	15.4	17.5	23.4
3000-4999	30.7	11.2	27.4	6.4	31.7	17.6
5000 and over	18.6	2.8	16.2	2.0	19.4	3.8
Median income	$2961	$1389	$2655	$1174	$3035	$1775

Source: *1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC-7, No. 2, Table 9.

For farmers it is much more difficult to estimate annual earnings since a large proportion of the farmer's income comes from the food which he raises and consumes and from the imputed rental value of his farm home. Most income studies of necessity have to limit themselves to analysis of cash income since it is so very difficult to obtain income in kind. The Census data on 1949 income do not include such income in kind, and therefore direct comparison of the income of farm and nonfarm families is impossible. It may simply be noted that, on the average, among farmers cash income is estimated to represent between two-thirds and three-quarters of total income. Accordingly, the reported Census income for the rural-farm population (which is approximately equivalent with the agricultural population) can be increased by about one-third, to obtain roughly comparable figures with those previously presented for the urban and rural nonfarm population.

Such calculations reveal that the average incomes of white families and individuals in the rural farm areas may have been around $2400, and that of nonwhites around $900. From this it would appear that the nonwhite family which migrated from the rural South to the urban North may have doubled its annual income, from perhaps $900 to some $1800. A white family which so migrated would not have quite doubled its income, but nevertheless may have increased it from around $1800 to $3000. That is to say, by migrating out of the rural South, the nonwhites tended to narrow somewhat the discrepancy in income between them and the whites. Insofar as the nonwhites continue to urbanize, to shift from agriculture to nonagriculture, and to improve their education, the income differentials between the two races may continue to decrease somewhat. Nevertheless, the whites will continue to be better off than the nonwhites for an indefinite time into the future.

QUALITY OF NEGRO POPULATION AVAILABLE FOR WORLD WAR II MILITARY SERVICE

This section deals with the kind of Negro manpower resources available to the Army in World War II. The section on differential rejection rates of Negroes and whites in World War II compares the wastage for military purposes from the white and the Negro pools of males of military age, giving attention to the proportions of the two racial groups partially or totally disqualified for military service, and to the bases for such rejection. The section on adequacy of Negroes accepted for service in World War II discusses the relative adequacy of the Negroes and whites who were actually accepted for military service. Their adequacy for soldiering will be measured in terms of their physical condition, level of ability, and psychological adequacy.

The number and kind of Negro personnel available in World War II as military manpower are a function of the demographic trends described previously. The size of the group of Negro males who were of military age during World War II depended upon the historical birth, death, and migration patterns of the group in the US. It was seen that, in 1940, 12,865,000, or 9.8 percent of the total population of approximately 132 million, were Negroes. The portion of these of concern here is the 2,179,000 who were males in the age group eligible for military service (18-37). This group of eligible Negro men constituted 10.11 percent of the total number of males 18-37, or just slightly more (0.3 percent) than all Negroes constituted of the total population. It is with the relative adequacy of this Negro manpower resource during the war years that the remainder of this section will be concerned.

Data were not readily available on the entire group of men who were inducted into the Armed Forces from the beginning to the end of World War II. Therefore, the analyses are based on time samples of the war experience and on samples of personnel within these time samples.

In dealing with the total amount of loss to the Army of defectives in the Negro and white groups, an attempt has been made to: (a) discover whether certain subgroups within the Negro manpower pool were more subject to defects than other segments of the race, or whether all the subgroups available for analysis were equally susceptible to defect; and (b) answer the question whether the same subgroups among whites and among Negroes had high rates of rejection for military service. In the section on kinds of deficiencies found in Negroes and whites, a comparison will be made of the kinds of deficiencies which caused Negroes and whites to be lost to the Army as military manpower.

COMPARATIVE REJECTION OF NEGROES AND WHITES

Over-all Rejection and Acceptance Rates

The Selective Service registration of Sep 1941 totaled 17,370,355. Of these, 10.6 percent (1,842,364) were Negroes; a 10 percent sample of registrants from Nov 1940 to

Dec 1943 (Table C26) indicated that 14 percent of the registrants were Negroes.* This 10.6 percent and 14.0 percent may be compared with the 9.8 percent that Negroes constituted of the total population. However, while Negroes composed a slightly larger portion of the registration than their share of the total population, their high rates of rejection for service tended to counterbalance this. Table C26 shows that 19.6 percent of those disqualified were Negroes. This can be seen from a different point of view in Table C27.

TABLE C26

SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSES BY RACE

Race	Total	General service	1-A remediable	Limited service	Disqualified	Total acceptable
Numbers						
All	981,290	565,876	15,698	110,591	289,125	692,165
White	843,551	500,599	12,637	97,735	232,580	610,971
Negro	137,739	65,277	3,061	12,856	56,545	81,194
Percentages						
All	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
White	86.0	88.5	80.5	88.4	88.4	88.3
Negro	14.0	11.5	19.5	11.6	19.6	11.7

Source: *Physical Examination of Selective Service Registrants*, Monograph 15, Vol. III, App F, pp. 10–11, 1948.

TABLE C27

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION IN THE SELECTIVE SERVICE CLASSES OF WHITES AND NEGROES

Race	Total	General service	1-A remediable	Limited service	Disqualified
All	100.00	57.7	1.6	11.3	29.4
White	100.00	59.3	1.5	11.6	27.6
Negro	100.00	47.4	2.2	9.3	41.1

Source: See Table C26.

Here it is found that 41.1 percent of the Negroes who registered were disqualified for service compared to 27.6 percent of the whites.† Both tables are based on a 10 percent sample of first examinations recorded on DSS Form 200, Reports of Physical Examination for Nov 1940–Sep 1941 and approximately 7 percent of those recorded on DSS Form 221, Reports of Physical Examination and Induction, for Apr 1942–Dec 1943. Reports for registrants examined and later deferred for other than physical or mental reasons are excluded from the sample. Data are for continental US. In these tables, the white race includes all races other than Negro.

Another group of men not available to the Army as military manpower were those classified as necessary to civilian activities of community or nation (II-A) or necessary to the National Defense Program (II-B). Due primarily to the lower level of skills possessed

* *Physical Examination of Selective Service Registrants*, Special Monograph No. 15, Vol. III, App F, Selective Service System, 1947.

† For the total war period up to 1 Aug 1945, 47 percent of the Negroes and 27 percent of the whites examined were rejected. Of those disqualified, 19 percent were Negroes and 81 percent whites. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, App A-C, pp. 154–6.

by Negroes as a group, they were infrequently placed in these categories. (Between Nov 1940 and Nov 1942, 3.0 percent of the II-A group and 1.3 percent of the II-B were Negroes).* Thus, the white manpower pool was proportionately more depleted by occupational deferment than the Negro group.

The men who were accepted for service must be studied in terms of their distribution in the three levels of acceptance: general service, I-A remediable, and limited service. By far the most important of these classes is the general service group, for four-fifths of the men of all races who were accepted were placed in this class. Table C28 indicates how closely the two races correspond in the distribution of those accepted into the general service category. The limited service class was the next most important in size, containing about 16 percent of those accepted. An almost identical proportion of the Negroes and whites who were accepted were placed in this class. The third level of acceptance was of those men who had defects that the Army considered it could remedy. Negroes and whites do differ in the proportions who were placed in this class (3.8 percent and 2.1 percent, respectively), but the group constituted only a small portion of the total number classified. Thus it is clear that the Negroes differed from the whites primarily in their greater rate of total disqualification.

TABLE C28

NEGRO AND WHITE ACCEPTABLE SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS PLACED IN THREE SERVICE CLASSES

Race	Total accepted	General service	1-A remediable	Limited service
Numbers				
All	692,165	565,876	15,698	110,591
White	610,971	500,599	12,637	97,735
Negro	81,194	65,277	3,061	12,856
Percentages				
All	200.0	162.3	5.9	31.8
White	100.0	81.9	2.1	16.0
Negro	100.0	80.4	3.8	15.8

Source: See Table C26.

Adequacy of Age Groups

Among both whites and Negroes the lowest rate of rejection for service occurred in the 21–25-year group, and the next lowest in the 18–20-year group (as shown in Tables C29 and C30). The rejection rate of the Negroes aged 20–25 was 30.6 percent, and of those aged 18–20, the rate was 37.2 percent, as compared with the 41.1 percent for all Negroes. Aside from this one prominent exception in which the youngest group had a higher rejection rate than the older, there was consistently a higher rate of rejection the older the age group, the peak being reached in the Negro group 38 or older, where three-fifths were disqualified. However, even in the two youngest age groups, there was a smaller total *number* of defects per 1000 men in the 18–20-year group: for Negroes there were 789 defects per 1000 18–20-year registrants, compared with 978 defects per 1000 21–25-year olds.

* *Selective Service in Wartime*, Second Report of the Director of Selective Service, p. 280, 1941–42.

TABLE C29

RESULTS OF EXAMINATION OF WHITE AND NEGRO SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS BY AGE GROUP, NOV 1940–DEC 1943

Age and race	Percentage				
	Total	General service	1-A remediable	Limited service	Disqualified
All ages					
All races	100.00	57.7	1.6	11.3	29.4
White	100.00	59.3	1.5	11.6	27.6
Negro	100.00	47.4	2.2	9.3	41.1
18–20 yr					
All races	100.00	70.7	1.4	3.6	24.3
White	100.00	72.3	1.4	3.8	22.5
Negro	100.00	59.3	1.6	1.9	37.2
21–25 yr					
All races	100.00	65.1	1.3	12.2	21.4
White	100.00	66.3	1.2	12.6	19.9
Negro	100.00	57.3	2.4	9.7	30.6
26–29 yr					
All races	100.00	55.5	1.1	15.2	28.2
White	100.00	57.2	1.0	15.5	26.3
Negro	100.00	45.1	1.8	13.1	40.0
30–37 yr					
All races	100.00	45.1	1.6	13.2	40.1
White	100.00	47.1	1.6	13.5	37.8
Negro	100.00	35.2	2.1	11.2	51.5
38 and over					
All races	100.00	35.3	4.0	10.9	49.8
White	100.00	36.7	4.1	11.2	48.0
Negro	100.00	25.8	3.6	8.8	61.8
Age unknown					
All races	100.00	39.5	1.5	11.9	47.1
White	100.00	44.6	1.2	12.2	42.0
Negro	100.00	25.6	2.2	11.1	61.1

Source: See Table C26.

TABLE C30

PREVALENCE OF DEFECTS PER 1000 SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS PHYSICALLY EXAMINED, BY RACE AND AGE GROUP, NOV 1940–DEC 1943

Age group	All races	White	Negro
All ages	1105.7	1105.2	1108.6
18–20 yr	746.8	740.9	788.9
21–25	1035.9	1044.9	977.6
26–29	1270.9	1271.0	1270.2
30–37	1356.6	1356.9	1354.8
38 and over	1205.2	1208.5	1183.2

Source: *Physical Examination of Selective Service Registrants*, Monograph 15, Vol. III, App F, p. 116, Table 90, and pp. 164–68, Table 91.

There was no age group in which Negroes had as low a rate of rejection as whites of the same age. However, the Negro groups between the ages of 18 and 25 yielded a higher proportion of manpower than did any white age group of 30 or older. Also, while more Negroes than whites in the age group 21–25 were disqualified for service, there was a larger total *number* of defects among whites than among Negroes of this age, 1045 for whites and 978 for Negroes.

The 21–25-year Negro group was proportionately a little more productive of military manpower than the 18–20-year group. However, it is also important to consider the proportions of acceptable men who were qualified for only limited service or who had remediable defects. For Negroes 21–25, the larger proportion that was found acceptable for service were augmented by the size of the limited service group, which left the proportion in the general service class just slightly smaller (57.3 percent) than the proportion of the 18–20-year olds who were general service (59.3 percent). Only 1.9 percent of the 18–20-year registrants, compared to 9.7 percent of the 21–25 group, fell into limited service. Thus, though the 21–25-year Negro group yielded a larger proportion of men for service, the surplus yield was not of fully qualified men, but was distributed in the limited service and remediable classifications.

It is necessary to know not only which age groups had the lowest rate of loss through rejection, but also how many in these ages were available for selection. The percentage age distribution of white and Negro Selective Service registrants is as follows:*

Ages	Whites	Negroes
All ages	100.00	100.00
18–20 yr	17.72	15.35
21–25	30.87	34.89
26–29	15.94	16.04
30–37	20.38	24.96
38 and over	8.71	7.96
Age unknown	0.35	0.77

It may be seen that a somewhat smaller proportion of the Negro than of the white registrants were in the age groups which produced high proportions of acceptable men. Of the Negro registrants, only 50.2 percent were within the ages of 18 and 25, whereas for the whites the figure was 54.6.

Adequacy of Men from Different Regions

Evidence is presented in Table C31 of the ability of the regions of the US to produce men who are adequate for military service. The outstanding fact observable from the figures is the high rate of rejection from Region IV, which composes the Southern states. For Negroes, 44.5 percent of the men examined were disqualified for any type of service. The same proportion (44.1 percent) were acceptable for general service from this region. The other three areas of the country had Negro rates which were very similar to one another, and range between 31.5 and 33.7 percent rejected.

Also significant is the fact that the difference between the rejection rate in Region IV and the rates in other regions was more extreme for Negroes than for whites. For Negroes, the rejection rate in Region IV was 10.8 percent higher than the region with the next highest rate; for whites there was a 4.8 percent difference. This is in line with what is known about

* Source: *Physical Examination of Selective Service Registrants*, Monograph 15, Vol. III, App F, p. 10.

Southern social organization: while its educational and health facilities are at a lower level of development than those of other areas of the country, these facilities are used more disproportionately in favor of the whites.

TABLE C31

DISTRIBUTION OF WHITE AND NEGRO SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS IN SERVICE CLASSES, BY REGION, NOV 1940–DEC 1943

Region[a]	Percentage				
	Total	General service	1-A remediable	Limited service	Disqualified
I. Northeast					
All races	100.00	59.1	1.3	13.4	26.2
White	100.00	59.4	1.3	13.5	25.8
Negro	100.00	54.9	1.8	11.8	31.5
II. Middle West					
All races	100.00	60.6	1.3	11.3	26.8
White	100.00	60.9	1.3	11.4	26.4
Negro	100.00	56.2	1.4	8.7	33.7
III. West					
All races	100.00	58.5	2.3	12.0	27.2
White	100.00	58.6	2.3	12.0	27.1
Negro	100.00	54.3	2.5	10.1	33.1
IV. South					
All races	100.00	52.9	2.0	9.0	36.1
White	100.00	57.3	1.8	9.0	31.9
Negro	100.00	44.1	2.5	8.9	44.5

Source: *Physical Examination of Selective Service Registrants*, Monograph 15, Vol. III, App F, pp. 13, 15, 17, and 19.

[a]Region I includes: Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Region II includes: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Region III includes: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Region IV includes: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.

The differences in Negro rejection rates by region were not randomly distributed throughout all the age groups. Computations have been made from Table C32 for Negroes which indicate that while Region IV had the highest rejection rate in all age groups, the differences were more marked for some ages than others. There was less difference between the South and the rest of the country for the younger ages than for the older. The three youngest age groups in Region IV differed from the other regions to about the same extent. It is in the 30–37 and the 38 and older age groups in which Region IV gave its poorest showing.* Thus, the more years during which the conditions of Southern life have been experienced, the greater the disqualification rate of the group.

* The differences between the percent rejected in Region IV and the percent rejected from the region with the next highest rate are as follows for the five age groups:

18–20	10.8 percent
21–25	10.9 percent
26–29	12.0 percent
30–37	17.3 percent
38 and older	15.8 percent

The differences for whites between the South and other regions did not follow the same pattern, for the largest difference was for the 18–20 group (8 percent). Even this difference was smaller than for any Negro age group. Thus, for all ages of Negroes, the difference between living in the South and any other area of the country was much more pronounced than it was for whites.

TABLE C32

PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO AND WHITE SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS DISQUALIFIED FOR ANY TYPE OF SERVICE, BY REGION AND AGE GROUP, NOV 1940–DEC 1943

Region	All races	White	Negro
I. Northeast			
All ages	26.2	25.8	31.5
18–20 yr	19.1	18.7	24.0
21–25	19.0	18.8	21.4
26–29	25.2	25.0	27.8
30–37	35.5	35.2	38.7
38 and over	48.3	47.7	54.7
Age unknown	39.5	37.5	56.3
II. Middle West			
All ages	26.8	26.4	33.7
18–20 yr	21.7	21.5	26.0
21–25	18.8	18.6	21.4
26–29	25.1	24.9	29.1
30–37	37.7	37.3	43.3
38 and over	48.1	47.4	58.5
Age unknown	40.6	39.3	[a]
III. West			
All ages	27.2	27.1	33.1
18–20 yr	19.6	19.6	22.2
21–25	19.0	19.7	22.8
26–29	25.8	25.6	32.7
30–37	36.5	36.4	39.7
38 and over	43.3	43.1	49.3
Age unknown	41.9	41.3	[a]
IV. South			
All ages	36.1	31.9	44.5
18–20 yr	33.0	29.5	41.4
21–25	26.8	23.4	33.7
26–29	35.6	30.7	44.7
30–37	48.2	43.1	57.0
38 and over	56.8	52.8	65.5
Age unknown	56.3	50.2	62.0

Source: See Table C31.

[a] Fewer than 100 registrants examined.

It should also be noted that among the Southern Negro registrants, the 21–25 group had a considerably lower percentage of rejection than the other age classes. Of this group, 7.7 percent more were acceptable for service than among the 18–20 group in the same region. This same pattern was found among whites from Region IV.

Adequacy of Men from Different Sizes of Community

The higher the level of urbanization, the more adequate were the personnel produced. For both whites and Negroes, the proportions who were rejected for service were lowest for cities of 100,000 and over and were consistently higher for less urbanized places, except that rural nonfarm ranked with cities 25,000–100,000. Fully one-half of the Negro registrants from rural farm areas were disqualified for service. Again, as was found with regional variations, the differences between the good and the poor areas were more extreme for Negroes than for whites. There was a 15.8 percent higher rate of rejection for Negroes from farms than for Negroes from the largest cities; on the other hand, only 3.9 percent more whites were rejected from farms than from cities of 100,000 or more.

While not shown in Table C33, it was found that the same pattern with respect to the urban-rural range held true for the proportions who were fully acceptable for general service. That is, the higher the degree of urbanization, the larger the proportion placed in general service. Again, the difference for Negroes was more extreme than that for whites: 8.1 percent more Negroes from the largest cities were general service than from farms, compared to 2.1 percent more for whites.

TABLE C33

PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO AND WHITE SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS DISQUALIFIED FOR ANY TYPE OF SERVICE, BY SIZE OF COMMUNITY[a]

Community	All races	White	Negro
Urban			
100,000 and over	24.6	23.9	29.1
25,000–99,999	26.3	25.0	34.9
10,000–24,999	26.9	25.6	35.2
2,500–9,999	27.7	26.0	37.6
Rural	28.1	26.2	38.0
Farm[b]	31.2	27.8	44.9
Nonfarm	26.6	25.5	33.5

Source: *Physical Examinations of Selective Service Registrants*, Special Monograph 13, Vol. III, App F, p. 27.

[a] Based on a 10 percent sample of first examinations recorded on DSS Form 200, Reports of Physical Examination for Nov 1940-Sep 1941, and approximately 20 percent of examinations made during Nov-Dec 1943. City-size data not available for Apr 1942-Sep 1943. Data are for continental US.

[b] Residents of areas with less than 2500 population for whom farming was listed as the occupation.

Urban-Rural Differences in Regions

An analysis of size of community within the various regions should serve to point up the relative contributions of the factors of regionality and rurality to the inadequacy of Negro manpower production. Table C34 shows that there was considerable overlapping between these two characteristics, for the rejection rate among Negroes from the farms of the South was 45.6, a rate very similar to the 44.5 percent of Negroes rejected from the entire Southern region, and the 44.9 percent for Negroes from farms throughout the country. However, regionalism was of significance in itself, for the percentage of Negroes rejected from all sizes of community in the South was greater than the percent rejected from any size of community in any other area, with one exception: Southern cities of 100,000 or more were more favorable for manpower production than were the farms of Region II

TABLE C34

PERCENTAGE OF NEGRO AND WHITE SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS DISQUALIFIED FOR ANY KIND OF SERVICE, BY REGION AND COMMUNITY SIZE, NOV 1940–DEC 1943

Region	All races	White	Negro
I: Northeast			
Urban			
100,000 and over	24.7	24.5	25.6
25,000–99,999	25.2	24.8	31.9
10,000–24,999	24.4	24.2	27.8
2,500–9,999	24.6	24.6	24.9
Rural	25.0	24.9	27.4
Farm	30.5	30.3	31.6
Nonfarm	24.1	24.0	26.1
II: Middle West			
Urban			
100,000 and over	23.2	22.8	26.9
25,000–99,999	24.4	24.3	27.7
10,000–24,999	24.9	24.8	26.1
2,500–9,999	25.1	25.2	22.9
Rural	24.4	24.4	26.6
Farm	24.3	24.2	36.1
Nonfarm	24.5	24.5	24.8
III: West			
Urban			
100,000 and over	24.5	24.3	28.5
25,000–99,999	25.8	25.8	26.2
10,000–24,999	24.6	24.5	[a]
2,500–9,999	24.0	23.8	[a]
Rural	23.8	23.7	31.5
Farm	23.3	23.2	[a]
Nonfarm	24.0	23.9	[a]
IV: South			
Urban			
100,000 and over	28.2	24.6	34.5
25,000–99,999	30.2	26.0	36.8
10,000–24,999	33.1	30.4	37.5
2,500–9,999	32.8	29.3	39.4
Rural	32.6	29.4	39.3
Farm	36.9	31.9	45.6
Nonfarm	30.0	28.0	34.7

Source: *Physical Examination of Selective Service Registrants*, Special Monograph 15, Vol. III, App F, pp. 29–31.

[a] Less than 100 registrants examined.

(the Middle West). Further, the farms within each region tended to produce larger proportions of disqualified personnel than did other sizes of community. This was most extreme for the Midwest and the South.

This picture may be contrasted with that of the whites. In two regions, the Northeast and the South, a larger share of disqualified persons came from farms than from nonfarm areas. However, the differences were not very pronounced. Further, in the West (Region III), the farms yielded the highest proportions who were acceptable for military service. In the Midwest all sizes of community were about the same.

In the Northeast region, urban Negroes compared favorably with any group of whites. For all sizes of city in this region, except 25,000-100,000, the Negro rejection rates ranged from about 25 to 28 percent, which is comparable to the white range of 24-25. Indeed, the most favorable rate for whites, that of the Midwest region, was about 23 percent for those from cities of 100,000 and over. Further, urban Negroes from Regions II and III had rejection rates that ranged from 23 to 29, or not much higher than white groups.

In summary, then, it was primarily the Southern area, and partly the farms of the Northeast and Midwest, which were responsible for the high rejection record of Negroes. And rurality was not so destructive of white manpower as it was for Negroes, the white rejection rates being lower and less diverse for different sizes of community than the Negro rates.

KINDS OF DEFICIENCIES FOUND IN NEGROES AND WHITES

Principal Defects of Negroes and Whites

The question of major concern in this section is what were the types of defects responsible for the rejection of Negroes for military service. Table C35 presents the proportions of the rejected Negro and white groups who were disqualified for various reasons. Only 56.4 percent of the Negroes who were disqualified for service had as their principal deficiency a *physical* defect compared to 73.3 percent of the rejected whites. It was mental and educational deficiencies which accounted for a large share of the Negro rejections: 32.2 percent of Negroes compared to 8.8 percent of whites had this as principal defect. This was the largest single basis for rejection among Negroes. The rural and Southern origin of a large proportion of the Negroes (68 percent came from the South), together with the Negro's poorer opportunity for education and mental development, provided the background from which this large group of defective men came.

Among the physical defects, the first in significance among the Negro group, and the second most important single category, was syphilis. Sixteen percent of the rejected Negroes had this disease as their principal defect. Only 1.9 percent of the whites were rejected on this ground. Syphilis and educational and mental deficiencies combined accounted for almost one-half of the rejections of Negroes. It is significant that techniques for correcting both of these deficiencies are well-developed, if the syphilis is in an early stage and if "mental deficiency" is primarily an educational deficiency. Thus, it may be possible in the future to utilize Negro manpower much more efficiently. It should be noted that the maximum opportunity for reducing the white disqualification rate through correction of these two defects is only 10.7 percent.

There were several defects for which Negroes were less frequently rejected than whites. The major ones were mental disease, musculoskeletal, neurological and cardiovascular defects, problems of the eyes, the ears and the teeth, and tuberculosis. While mental disease and cardiovascular problems were less often the cause of rejection of Negroes than of whites, these defects did each account for ten percent of the rejections of Negroes.

TABLE C35

PRINCIPAL DEFECTS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS DISQUALIFIED FOR SERVICE[a]

Principal defect	Disqualified		
	All races	White[b]	Negro
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Eyes	5.4	6.0	3.3
Ears	5.5	6.6	0.9
Teeth	3.0	3.4	1.1
Mouth and gums	0.4	0.5	0.2
Nose	0.8	0.9	0.2
Throat	0.1	0.1	0.1
Lungs	2.1	2.2	1.4
Tuberculosis	3.7	4.1	2.0
Cardiovascular	11.3	11.7	9.6
Blood and blood-forming	0.1	0.1	[c]
Hernia	4.1	4.4	2.9
Kidney and urinary	1.2	1.4	0.6
Abdominal viscera	1.7	2.0	0.5
Genitalia	0.7	0.7	0.7
Syphilis	4.7	1.9	16.0
Gonorrhea and other venereal	0.2	0.1	0.6
Skin	0.6	0.5	0.5
Hemorrhoids	0.3	0.3	0.3
Varicose veins	1.0	1.1	0.8
Neurological	6.6	7.4	3.6
Musculoskeletal	9.2	10.6	6.4
Feet	1.9	1.7	2.8
Endocrine	1.6	1.9	0.4
Other medical	2.6	3.0	1.3
Neoplasms	0.5	0.6	0.2
Infectious and parasitic	0.1	0.1	[c]
Subtotal	70.0	73.3	56.4
Mental deficiency[d]	13.3	8.8	32.2
Mental disease	15.0	16.2	10.0
Nonmedical	1.6	1.7	1.3
No defects and not stated	0.1	[c]	0.1
Subtotal	30.0	26.7	43.6

Source: *Physical Examination of Selective Service Registrants*, Special Monograph 15, Vol. III, App F, p. 44.

[a] Based on a 10 percent sample of first examinations recorded in DSS Form 200, Report of Physical Examinations for Nov 1940–Sep 1941; and approximately 7 percent of those recorded on DSS Form 221, Report of Physical Examination and Induction for Apr 1942–Dec 1943. Reports for registrants examined and later deferred for other than physical or mental reasons are excluded from sample. Data are for continental US.

[b] Includes all races other than Negro.

[c] Less than 0.05 percent.

[d] Includes registrants recorded as educationally deficient prior to 1 Jun 1943 and as failing to meet the minimum intelligence standards after that date. Also includes morons, imbeciles, idiots, and those with unspecified mental deficiencies.

Combined, the four major causes of rejection among Negroes (education and mental deficiency, syphilis, mental disease, and cardiovascular defects) represent the bases for over two-thirds of the Negro rejections.

TABLE C36

PRINCIPAL DEFECTS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE REGISTRANTS DISQUALIFIED FOR ANY FORM OF MILITARY SERVICE, BY RACE AND AGE GROUP, NOV 1940–DEC 1943

Age group and race	Percentage distribution			
	Syphilis	Mental deficiency[a]	Mental diseases	All other defects
All ages				
All races	4.7	13.3	15.0	67.0
White	1.9	8.8	16.2	73.1
Negro	16.0	32.2	10.0	41.8
18–20 yr				
All races	2.1	19.2	17.8	60.9
White	.6	14.2	18.6	66.6
Negro	8.8	40.7	14.1	36.4
21–25 yr				
All races	3.6	15.1	11.9	69.4
White	1.1	9.7	12.6	76.6
Negro	14.4	38.1	8.9	38.6
26–29 yr				
All races	4.1	12.8	13.1	70.0
White	1.6	7.6	13.9	76.9
Negro	14.6	33.7	10.0	41.7
30–37 yr				
All races	6.4	11.7	16.1	66.8
White	2.4	7.1	17.6	72.9
Negro	16.4	28.5	10.3	44.8
38 and over				
All races	8.3	7.6	17.8	66.3
White	4.2	6.0	19.8	70.3
Negro	29.1	16.1	7.6	47.2

Source: *Physical Examinations of Selective Service Registrants*, Monograph 15, Vol. III, p. 52.

[a] Includes registrants rejected for educational deficiency prior to 1 Jun 1943 and for failure to meet minimum intelligence standards after that date. Also includes morons, imbeciles, idiots, and those with unspecified mental deficiencies.

Types of Inadequacy among Age Groups

Table C36 is presented as a summary of the proportions of the various age groups who were rejected for different reasons. It was found that the rates were similar for all age groups with respect to all the defects which were of minor significance as causes of rejection in the Negro group. Only with respect to the three defects specified, syphilis, mental and educational deficiency, and mental disease, were there important differences

among the age groups. With syphilis, the younger the age group the lower the proportion who were rejected for this reason. Among younger men, the disease might often have been in an early stage and would be considered by the Army to be remediable within the service.* Further it would be expected that older men would have had a longer period in which to contract the disease. And in the Negro group, the disease would operate cumulatively in each older age group, since a large proportion of the cases would go untreated.

The proportions who were rejected on the grounds of mental or educational deficiency also varied by age group, but in an opposite direction. The younger age groups had a larger share of their principal defects of this type. This was true for both Negroes and whites. Among Negroes, mental disease was also found to be the cause of rejection of a larger proportion of the 18–20 group than it was in the older ages.

Regional Differences in Type of Defect

Data were not available on the percentages of the white and Negro groups in various regions who were *disqualified* for different reasons. The information that is available is the *number of times each defect* occurred in every 1000 men who were *examined* by race and by region. These data are summarized in Table C37.

The two defects which together accounted for one-half of all Negro rejections were highly concentrated in the South. The number of Negro men in the other three regions rated as not completely adequate mentally or educationally ranges from a low of 59.5 per 1000 men examined in the Midwest, up to 93 per 1000 in the Northeast. This rate for the Northeast was only one-half the rate of 181.3 in the South. Negroes from other sections of the country fared much better than those from the South, but the Negro rate in each region was two to four times that of whites from the same region. However, the white Southern rate of 69.2 was slightly higher than the rate for Negroes from the Middle West and the West. Thus, Negroes from these two regions came closer to meeting the educational-mental standards of the Army than did whites from the South.

The incidence of syphilis among Negroes was also found to be highest in the South. The rate there was 166 per 1000 men examined. The difference between Negroes from the South and those from other regions was not so great with respect to syphilis as it was with respect to educational-mental deficiencies: the lowest rate of syphilis was the 121.6 recorded in the Middle West. Further, the national difference between whites and Negroes was tremendously greater in prevalence of syphilis than it was in educational-mental defects: for all Negroes the syphilis rate was 158.1 per 1000, and that for whites was 13.5 per 1000. While the highest rate for both whites and Negroes occurred in the South, the white Southern rate was only 20.7 per 1000; yet the lowest regional rate for Negroes (in the Middle West) was as high as 121.6.

While syphilis and mental and educational deficiency seem consistently to diminish with increasing urbanization, there is one prominent defect which tends to increase with urbanization. This is mental disease. Thus, while we find that whites, who were more urbanized at the time, had a lower incidence of the first two defects than did Negroes, the more rural Negroes had a lower rate of mental disease (48 per 1000 for Negroes and 57.1 per 1000 for whites). Further, the most rural regions of the country, the South and West,

* The War Department held the following standards in relation to syphilis:
Oct 1940–14 Mar 1942 — Syphilis barred acceptance in general service; latent syphilis was acceptable for limited service. 15 Mar 1942–14 Oct 1942 — Syphilis, adequately treated, was accepted in general service; inadequately treated syphilis, except advanced and complicated, was permitted in limited service. 15 Oct 1942–18 Apr 1944 — Syphilis, except advanced and complicated, was permissible in general service; these men were to be deferred until facilities were available for their care. After 19 Apr 1944 — Any venereal disease barred selection for limited service.

reflected this pattern, at least for Negroes. The rate of mental disease among Southern and Western Negroes was 44 to 45 per 1000, compared to the 59 per 1000 for the more urban North East and Middle West.

TABLE C37

PREVALENCE OF DEFECTS PER 1000 REGISTRANTS EXAMINED, BY RACE AND REGION[a]

Region and race	All other defects[b]	Defect and rate per 1000 men		
		Educational and mental deficiency[c]	Mental disease	Syphilis
Continental US				
All races	966.8	49.4	55.8	33.7
White[d]	1001.7	32.9	57.1	13.5
Negro	791.6	150.9	48.0	158.1
Region I: Northeast				
All races	1034.8	26.6	61.4	195.5
White	1222.7	21.5	61.5	9.0
Negro	1506.2	93.0	58.9	154.6
Region II: Middle West				
All races	893.5	25.3	54.0	17.4
White	906.5	21.0	53.7	11.3
Negro	708.7	61.3	58.6	121.6
Region III: West				
All races	907.1	26.8	42.6	21.6
White	909.4	26.0	42.5	18.7
Negro	821.1	59.5	44.8	130.7
Region IV: South				
All races	827.2	106.2	56.3	68.6
White	879.1	69.2	62.4	20.7
Negro	691.0	181.3	43.9	166.0

Source: *Physical Examinations of Selective Service Registrants*, Monograph 15, Vol. III, pp. 39-42.

[a] Based on a 10 percent sample of first examinations recorded on DSS Form 200, Reports of Physical Examinations for Nov 1940-Sep 1941, and approximately 7 percent of those recorded on DSS Form 201, Reports of Physical Examinations and Inductions, for Apr 1942-Dec 1943. Reports for registrants examined and later deferred for other than physical reasons or mental reasons are excluded from this sample. Data are for the continental US.

[b] Does not include educational and mental deficiencies, mental disease, and syphilis, which are separately totaled.

[c] Includes all registrants recorded as educationally deficient prior to 1 Jun 1943, and as failing to meet minimum intelligence standards after that date; also includes morons, imbeciles, idiots, and those with unspecified mental deficiencies.

[d] Includes all races other than Negro.

Summary

At the time when men were being selected for service in World War II, Negroes constituted 9.8 percent of the population in the US and 14 percent of the Selective Service registrants. The high rejection rate of Negroes reduced the proportion that Negroes were of the total group who were accepted to 11.7, but this figure was still higher than the total

Negro group's representation in the population. While Negro men had a higher rate of rejection for any type of military service than whites, the same proportions of Negroes and whites were admitted to the general service class.

Every subgroup of Negroes that was analyzed was found to have had a higher rate of rejection than the comparable white group. However, some of the Negro subgroups with the most favorable rates were found to compare well with the average white rates. Negroes aged 21–25 had a rejection rate of 31 percent compared to the over-all white rejection rate of 28 percent. Northeastern urban Negroes compared very favorably with any group of whites. Southern registrants of both races made the poorest showing, but the difference between Negroes from the South and Negroes from other regions of the country was much more sharp than it was for whites.

The kinds of defects found in Negroes differed from those of whites. When combined, educational and mental deficiency and syphilis accounted for half of the rejections of Negroes, compared to only a tenth of the disqualifications of whites. These defects were described as characteristic of groups at a low level of urbanization. This was brought out strongly by the fact that within the Negro group, these two deficiencies were proportionately more important as causes of rejection in the more rural South than in other regions.

ADEQUACY OF NEGROES ACCEPTED FOR WORLD WAR II SERVICE

The problem to be discussed in this section is the quality of the men with whom the Army actually had to deal as soldiers. Several aspects of "quality" of soldiers are of importance. Although there is a serious lack of data on their physical adequacy, mental development, skill level, psychological adequacy, and behavioral adjustment to service, each of these problems will be taken up in turn insofar as data are available. The discussion will focus on a comparison of the degree of adequacy of Negroes and whites.

It is suggested that when the Negro group is shown to be defective in certain respects, this should not be considered as constituting a defect for all Army purposes, but only for specific Army objectives. Thus, when it is found that Negro soldiers had a high proportion of foot defects, it is known that Negroes were less adequate than whites for those Army specialties requiring perfect feet, but not less adequate for other kinds of combat jobs. For example, for those jobs requiring faultless vision, Negroes would be found better qualified than whites. In making effective use of Negroes as manpower, it would be possible systematically to assign Negroes to those occupational specialties for which Negroes seldom had disqualifying defects, with a known probability of getting adequate personnel for the job.

It is further suggested that inadequacy of personnel be thought of in terms of: (a) inability to fulfill a job's specifications; (b) man-hours lost by the defective personnel in hospitalization time and in lowered work efficiency; and (c) cost to the Army in facilities and personnel required for treating the defectives.

PHYSICAL AND MENTAL DEFICIENCIES

It should be recalled from the section on basic demographic trends that, as between Negroes and whites, approximately the same proportion (four-fifths) of those who were accepted for service were placed in the general service class. This might be used as a rough measure indicating that whites and Negroes within the service were about equally adequate. However, it is desirable to use a more precise measure of the degree of deficiency of whites and Negroes within the service classes. The following figures show the total number of defects per 1000 of those accepted for general service and for remediable and limited service.*

Service type	White	Negro
General service	686.1	600.6
Limited service and 1-A remediable	1809.9	1845.4

These figures indicate that in total number of defects recorded, general service Negroes made a better showing than whites, while limited service and 1-A remediable Negroes were worse than whites. Further, other data indicate that of the Negroes accepted in general service, 60 percent were without defect, while 57 percent of the whites were without

* Source: *Physical Examination of Selective Service Registrants*, Monograph 15, Vol. III, App F, p. 116. Data are for Nov 1940–Dec 1943, continental US.

a recorded defect.* This should be compared with the relative proportions of all examined Negroes and whites who had no defects: there were only 28.5 percent of the Negroes but 33.9 percent of the whites examined who were reported free of defects. Thus, while fewer of the Negroes examined were without defects, more of those assigned to general service had no defects, indicating that a larger proportion of the Negroes than of the whites with defects were screened out at the examination stage.

An even more complete picture of the relative physical and mental adequacy of Negroes and whites will be obtained by adding information on the *type* of defects which characterized soldiers of the two races. Table C38 presents the prevalence of various types of defects among Negroes and whites in general service, and Table C39 in limited service and 1-A remediable. Consider first the general service classification with respect to the prevalence of various defects. This class is an important index to the relative quality of Negro and white soldiers, first, because numerically it constitutes four-fifths of all the accepted men, and second, because qualitatively it represents the most nearly perfect men.

It is found that the Negro rate exceeded the white rate with respect to only six categories of defects: defects of the mouth and gums, of the throat, and of the feet, syphilis, other venereal diseases, and educational and mental deficiency. (Those defects in which Negroes exceeded whites are listed first in Table C38.) These six defects combined were found among 274.6 in every 1000 general service Negroes, compared to 145.9 per 1000 general service whites. Thus, the Negro rate for these six defects exceeded the white by 1.3 for every 10 men. In other terms, 46 percent of all the defects among general service Negroes were one of these six types, compared to only 22 percent among the general service whites. This is a clear indication that the rates for mouth and gum, throat, and foot defects, syphilis, other venereal diseases, and educational and mental deficiency were significant differentia between Negroes and whites. Two defects, problems of the feet and syphilis, with a combined rate of 174.6 per 1000 general service Negroes, accounted for the major part of this Negro-white difference: 90.7 per 1000 more general service Negroes than whites had either foot trouble or syphilis. The higher rates of these two defects among Negroes than among whites in the general service class were due primarily to the greater incidence of the defects in the total Negro group examined, but in the case of foot defects, they were also due partly to the nondebilitating nature of the foot problems of many of the Negroes.

The six defects described previously do not exactly coincide with the list of the six leading defects among general service Negroes. The leading ones, in order of prevalence, were: feet, teeth, syphilis, eyes, genitalia, and musculoskeletal defects. These accounted for 58 percent of all the defects among general service Negroes (compared to the 46 percent accounted for by the defects in which Negroes exceeded whites). It can be seen that problems of the feet and syphilis were repeated in this list. Thus, these two defects not only sharply differentiated Negroes from whites, but also accounted for a large proportion (29 percent) of the defectiveness of Negroes in general service.

A list of the six principal defects found among general service whites includes approximately the same defects as the list for Negroes: teeth, feet, eyes, musculoskeletal, nose, and genitalia defects. Nasal problems did not appear on the Negro list and syphilis was not found on the white list. Foot defects were more frequent among Negroes than whites, though second in importance for whites. As with Negroes, the six most prevalent defects accounted for 58 percent of all defects found among general service whites.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 44 and 68.

TABLE C38

PREVALENCE OF DEFECTS PER 1000 MEN CLASSIFIED AS GENERAL SERVICE[a]

Defect	White	Negro
Total defects	686.1	600.6
Defects in which Negro rate exceeded white rate:		
Mouth and gums	27.5	35.6
Throat	28.1	34.0
Syphilis	3.5	43.8
Gonorrhea and other venereal	1.3	15.9
Educational and mental deficiency[b]	5.1	14.5
Feet	80.4	130.8
Subtotal	145.9	274.6
Defects in which white rate exceeded Negro rate:		
Eyes	79.8	41.8
Ears	19.4	10.4
Teeth	105.4	61.0
Nose	43.1	14.7
Lungs	4.7	3.6
Tuberculosis	2.1	1.6
Cardiovascular	17.7	16.2
Blood and blood-forming	0.2	[c]
Hernia	23.3	15.0
Kidney and urinary	3.4	2.8
Abdominal viscera	13.7	4.8
Genitalia	42.5	40.0
Skin	37.8	15.3
Hemorrhoids	14.3	10.4
Varicose veins	14.0	7.9
Mental disease	6.4	2.8
Neurological	1.9	1.1
Musculoskeletal	45.0	30.6
Endocrine	3.5	1.3
Neoplasma	8.2	5.9
Infectious and parasitic	0.1	[c]
Other medical and nonmedical	53.7	38.8
Subtotal	540.2	326.0

Source: *Physical Examination of Selective Service Registrants*, Monograph 15, Vol. III, App F, p. 116.

[a] Based on a 10 percent sample of first examinations recorded on DSS Form 200, Reports of Physical Examination for Nov 1940–Sep 1941, and approximately 7 percent of those recorded on DSS Form 221, Reports of Physical Examinations and Induction, for Apr 1942–Dec 1943. Reports for registrants examined and later deferred for other than physical or mental reasons are excluded from the sample.

[b] Includes registrants recorded as educationally deficient prior to 1 Jun 1943, and as failing to meet minimum intelligence standards after that date. Also includes morons, imbeciles, idiots, and those with unspecified mental deficiencies.

[c] Less than 0.05 percent.

TABLE C39

PREVALENCE OF DEFECTS PER 1000 MEN CLASSIFIED AS REMEDIAL AND LIMITED SERVICE[a]

Defects	White	Negro
Total defects	1809.9	1845.5
Defects in which Negro rate exceeded white rate:		
Mouth and gums	60.5	91.6
Throat	41.7	64.0
Syphilis	25.4	389.3
Gonorrhea and other venereal diseases	6.7	109.0
Educational and mental deficiency[b]	7.2	13.4
Feet	136.0	209.1
Subtotal	277.5	876.4
Tuberculosis	9.3	12.5
Cardiovascular	44.4	45.3
Kidney and urinary	12.0	13.7
Genitalia	75.7	132.2
Infectious and parasitic	1.4	2.3
Subtotal for all 11 defects in which Negroes exceed whites	420.3	1,082.4
Defects in which white rate exceeded Negro rate:		
Eyes	344.1	142.9
Ears	54.1	22.0
Teeth	261.1	126.8
Nose	73.6	25.1
Lungs	20.4	15.4
Blood and blood-forming	1.1	.5
Hernia	139.6	126.4
Abdominal viscera	34.4	13.1
Skin	61.1	38.5
Hemorrhoids	32.7	30.1
Varicose veins	36.9	27.4
Mental disease	20.2	6.4
Neurological	15.6	7.4
Musculoskeletal	155.2	98.7
Endocrine	15.9	5.3
Neoplasma	18.2	11.5
Other medical and nonmedical	105.4	65.5
Subtotal	1389.6	763.0

Source: *Physical Examination of Selective Service Registrants*, Monograph 15, Vol. III, App F, p. 116.

[a] Based on a 10 percent sample of first examinations recorded on DSS Form 200, Reports of Physical Examination for Nov 1940 Sep 1941, and approximately 7 percent of those recorded on DSS Form 221, Reports of Physical Examinations and Induction, for Apr 1942 Dec 1943. Reports for registrants examined and later deferred for other than physical or mental reasons are excluded from the sample.

[b] Includes registrants recorded as educationally deficient prior to 1 Jun 1943, and as failing to meet minimum intelligence standards after that date. Also includes morons, imbeciles, idiots, and those with unspecified mental deficiencies.

Limited Service and 1-A Remediable Soldiers

It will be recalled that Negroes in limited service or 1-A remediable had a slightly higher defect rate than that of whites. There were 35.5 more defects per 1000 Negroes than whites in this class. The same six defects were among those in which limited service Negroes exceeded whites as were among those in which general service Negroes exceeded whites, but five other ones were found. They were tuberculosis, cardiovascular, kidney and urinary, infectious and parasitic, and genitalia defects. However, none of these except defects of the genitalia were found in many men, nor did they clearly differentiate Negroes from whites. Thus, the kinds of defects in which Negro limited service men exceeded whites were about the same as the defects which distinguished Negro from white general service men. Each 1000 Negroes had 277.5 more of these six defects than each 1000 whites. This was an even greater contrast than was found among general service men. This contrast can also be seen from the fact that 48 percent of the Negroes with limited service defects had one of these six types, compared to only 15 percent of whites. Thus, Negroes in limited service or 1-A remediable were more clearly distinguished from whites by their own characteristic types of defects than general service Negroes and whites. This fact is accentuated when the rates are examined for the two leading defects among Negro and white limited service soldiers. These defects and their rates per 1000 are as follows:

Two highest defects	White	Negro
White		
Eyes	344.1	142.9
Teeth	261.1	126.8
Negro		
Syphilis	25.4	389.3
Feet	136.0	201.1

Defects of the eyes and teeth accounted for 33 percent of the defects among limited service whites, compared to only 15 percent among Negroes. On the other hand, the proportion of whites in limited service whose defect was syphilis or a foot defect was only 9 percent, compared to 32 percent among Negroes.

Summary and Interpretation

An evaluation should be made of the relative quality of Negro and white soldiers accepted in the terms of the degree to which their characteristic defects would have interfered with the satisfactory performance of military duties. However, it is difficult to determine the significance of the various defects for the Army's requirements because of the diverse occupations included in the military occupational structure, occupations in which satisfactory performance demands that the personnel be adequate in different respects. Nevertheless some interpretations will be offered. Effective vision is important in the performance of both desk and combat jobs, but it is a *sine qua non* of many combat jobs.* It will be recalled that only one-half as many of the Negroes as of the whites in general service had eye defects. Defective feet may also be a serious impediment in the performance of combat jobs. Here the Negro rate was close to twice that of the white in general service. The rates for these two defects followed the same pattern among Negroes and whites in limited service. However, neither defect would be so detrimental to the performance of a limited service job as to one in general service. The type of eye deficiency

* After Feb 1942 visual standards for service in noncombatant branches were reduced to 20/200 provided the vision was correctable to 20/40 in each eye.

found in limited service Negroes was most often a disease of the eye, while among whites it was defective vision.

Syphilis was a defect found concentrated among Negroes, both in the general service and in the limited service class. The cost to the Army due to this defect should be measured not only in terms of the man-hours lost during the hospitalization and in the lowered efficiency of the victims, but also in terms of the cost in medical personnel and facilities required for treating the victims. This disease is thus a hindrance to the Army's operations when it is present in limited service men as well as in general service men.

Defects of the teeth were more often found among general service whites than Negroes. While this type of defect is not extremely incapacitating, its treatment is costly to the Army.

An analysis of the characteristic types of defects found among Negro and white soldiers is probably more useful than an enumeration of the total defect rate in the two racial groups. However, for a complete picture of the relative adequacy of the two groups it is best to keep in mind not only their peculiar kinds of inadequacy, but also the fact that the general service Negroes had a lower total defect rate than whites, while the reverse was true among limited service and remediable men.

The purpose of this section has been, first, to give a picture of the extent and type of physical deficiency found in the Negro soldiers of World War II. It has been, second, to suggest that the relative adequacy of the group should be viewed in terms of the seriousness of their characteristic defects for the performance of general service jobs and limited service jobs, as expressed in lost man-hours and lowered efficiency of the victims. And third, the suggestion was made that adequacy should also be in terms of the cost to the Army of correcting the defects either before or after induction, as expressed in the value of medical personnel and facilities required for the treatment.

LEVEL OF ABILITY

Three kinds of information are proposed as measures of the level of ability or skill of Negro soldiers: The first, number of years attained in school, reflects the amount of skill developed in adapting to the problems presented by American society, and is thus, to a degree, a measure of ability to perform in the Army. The second measure of ability is the Army General Classification Test. Dr. Walter V. Bingham, Chief Psychologist, AGO, describes the nature of this test as follows: "Its purpose is to classify soldiers into categories according to how ready they are to pick up soldiering — how likely they are to learn easily the facts, skills, and techniques necessary for carrying out Army duties."* Davenport says this about the test: "The AGCT apparently measures the individual achievement resulting from (1) native capacity, (2) effective schooling and educational opportunities, (3) socio-economic status, and (4) cultural background."† The third measure of ability which is proposed is the civilian occupational background with which the individual entered the Army. Certain levels of skill and certain kinds of skill practiced and developed in his civilian life would make a man a more valuable soldier than certain other skills. All three measures indicate something of an individual's or group's ability to meet the Army's occupational requirements. Each measure will be taken up in turn in this section, insofar as data are available.

Level of Education

The educational level of Negro soldiers in World War II was lower than that of whites, and Southern Negroes stood lower in this regard than Northern Negroes. These levels for

* Source: Caliver, A., *Postwar Education of Negroes*, Office of Education, Federal Security Agency, p. 25.
† Source: Davenport, R. K., "Implications of Military Selection and Classification in Relation to Universal Military Training," *Journal of Negro Education*, p. 590 (Fall 1946).

31 Dec 1941 are shown in Table C40.* Here it is seen that 13.5 percent of the Southern Negroes, 23.5 percent of the Northern Negroes, and 41 percent of the white selectees were at least high school graduates. Figures are also given for members of the "Old Regular Army,"† which indicate that there is scarcely any difference between the proportion in this group (25 percent) and the proportion in the Northern Negro group with a high school education. The proportion with no more than grade school training is even smaller (by 4 percent) for the Northern Negro group than it is for the Regular Army whites. Nor does the proportion of Northern Negroes with only grade school training differ radically from the proportion among white selectees: 37 percent of the Northern Negroes and 31 percent of the white selectees had no more than a grade school education. Thus, the level of training among Negroes from the North compares rather well with the white level. This is in marked contrast, however, with the status of the Southern Negroes: two-thirds of this group had no more than grade school training, and only 13.5 percent graduated from high school.

TABLE C40

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF NEGRO AND WHITE ENLISTED MEN

Education	Percentage			
	Negroes		Whites	
	North	South	"Old Regular" in World War II[a]	Selectee in World War II[b]
College	23.5	13.5	4	11
High school graduates			21	30
Some high school	39.5	19.5	34	28
Grade school	37	67	41	31

Source: Stouffer, A., *et al.*, *American Soldier*, Vol. I, p. 59 for whites, and p. 490 for Negroes.

[a] Men in Army as of 31 Dec 1941, who enlisted prior to 1 Jul 1940.
[b] Selectees in Army as of 31 Dec 1941.

The level of education among Negro soldiers was considerably better than the level for all the Negroes examined. Not only were some men rejected for educational deficiency, but also there is known to be a relationship between physical and educational deficiency. The men who were rejected for service on physical grounds had a lower proportion of high school graduates than did the group who were found physically acceptable.‡ A picture of the extent to which the Army was able to weed out the educationally inferior can be gained from the following figures, which provide a comparison of the educational level of all Negro males in the US in 1940§ with that of Negro selectees, June 1941–Feb 1942:‖

Educational level	Negro males in US, %	Negro selectees, %
Some schooling	69	44
Completed grade school	22	40
Completed high school or college	9	16

* Another study of colored and white selectees processed Jun 1941–Feb 1942 gives substantially the same distributions: Davenport, R. K., *op. cit.*

† Men in Army as of 31 Dec 1941 who enlisted prior to 1 Jul 1940.

‡ Results of psychological examinations among Selective Service registrants, based upon the report, "Psychological Examining at Armed Forces Induction Stations," WD, AGO Form 219, Apr–Sep 1945.

§ Source: *1940 Census of Population*, Vol. IV, Part I, Table 39.

‖ Davenport, *op cit.*

It is clear that the Army was able to make use of a group with a higher level of education than that found in the entire Negro male population.

Army General Classification Test Scores

The AGCT is made up of three parts, the first part testing verbal ability, the second, arithmetical ability, and the third part measuring the ability to visualize relationships of things in space. Scores for the separate parts are sometimes used, but in most cases (and in the data to be presented here), a composite score is used. The scores are customarily converted to standard scores and grouped into five grades which are based on standard deviation distances with the score of 100 as the center of the distribution.

Approximately 10 million men were scored on the AGCT during the five years from Mar 1941 to Mar 1946. This group did not include 32 percent of World War II officers, for only those officers who at one time served as enlisted men had occasion to take the test. Nor did it include men who were not actually inducted, that is, those who were rejected or deferred. The distribution of the 10 million men into the five AGCT grades is shown in the last column of Table C41. This provides a useful comparison with the Negro and white experience.

TABLE C41

AGCT DISTRIBUTION FOR NEGROES AND WHITES, MAR 1945, AND DISTRIBUTION FOR ALL MEN INDUCTED, MAR 1941–MAR 1945

AGCT class[a]	Percentage		
	Negro	White	Total Army experience
I	1	6	5.8
II	6	32	26.2
III	14	32	30.7
IV	45	23	28.5
V	28	3	8.8
Unknown	6	4	0.0
Total	100	100	100.0

Source: Stouffer, S. A., *et al.*, *American Soldier*, Vol. I, p. 492. Data taken from an AGO 2 percent sample of Army in Mar 1945; "Inequalities in Adult Capacity — From Military Data," *Science*, p. 149 (Aug 1946).

[a] Classes represent scores as follows: Grade I — scores 130 and over; Grade II — scores 110–129; Grade III — scores 90–109; Grade IV — scores 60–89; Grade V — scores 59 and lower.

The AGCT scores for Negroes and for whites are also presented in Table C41. These data are from a 2 percent sample of the Army as of Mar 1945. There is a radical difference in the distributions for Negroes and whites: about three-fourths of the Negroes, compared to only about one-fourth of the whites, were in Grades IV and V. Correspondingly, there were only one-fifth as many Negroes as whites in Grade I or II. An examination of the experience for the 10 million men indicates that 37 percent of the entire Army fell into the bottom two grades, and 32 percent in the top two grades.

AGCT and Education

It is possible that a more precise notion of the level of ability of a group can be obtained by combining the two measuring tools — level of education and AGCT scores. There has been computed for each race the proportion of the group that fell in each AGCT grade

within each level of education. This information is provided in Table C42. Two kinds of information are yielded by these calculations: first, the extent to which the two measures of ability overlap and second, the distribution of the two racial groups in these ability classes.

An examination of the table indicates that there is overlap, with high education associated with high AGCT score and low education with low AGCT score for both Negroes and whites. However, there is far from complete overlap between the two measures: within each level of education, men were found distributed in all five AGCT classes (except that no whites who had completed college fell in AGCT class V). This indicates that the two measures cover somewhat different aspects of ability and that combination of the two measuring tools can provide information that neither of them can give by itself. It indicates further that a low level of formal training does not completely preclude getting a fairly good score in ability as measured by the AGCT.

TABLE C42

PERCENTAGE IN EACH EDUCATION-AGCT CLASS FOR NEGROES AND WHITES, JUN 1941–FEB 1942

Education — AGCT classes	White	Negro
Completed college		
AGCT Class I	2.15	0.02
II	1.98	0.52
III	0.31	0.63
IV	0.01	0.17
V	0.00	0.02
Completed high school		
AGCT Class I	5.43	0.23
II	18.16	2.47
III	10.25	6.22
IV	1.94	4.89
V	0.17	1.16
Completed grade school		
AGCT Class I	0.86	0.11
II	9.40	1.43
III	18.46	7.73
IV	11.90	17.30
V	2.50	13.20
Some schooling		
AGCT Class I	0.04	0.08
II	0.57	0.48
III	3.10	2.13
IV	7.04	9.03
V	5.64	31.90
Total	100.00	100.00

Source: Davenport, R. K., *op. cit.*, p. 591.

In regard to the second type of information, it is seen that at no level of education was the Negro group comparable to the white AGCT level. Observe the AGCT class which held the largest proportion within each education level: moving from high to low level of education, the predominant AGCT levels were I, II, III, and IV. For Negroes, on the other hand, the largest AGCT classes for each education level were II, III, IV, and V. Negroes

and whites with comparable amounts of schooling did not attain comparable AGCT scores. Standards of training for Negroes and whites were clearly not equivalent.

The largest single ability group within the Negro soldier population was the very lowest category, AGCT Class V with less than grade school education. This group contained 32 percent of all Negroes. On the other hand, the two largest ability groups among the whites were the men in AGCT Class II who completed high school and AGCT Class III who completed grade school. Eighteen percent of the whites were in each of these ability classes. The comparative ability of the Negroes and the whites can also be seen by finding the proportions of Negroes compared to the proportions of whites in the lowest AGCT-education classes. Seventy-one percent of the Negroes compared to only 27 percent of the whites were in AGCT classes IV and V with grade school education or less. The differences are marked, but not as extreme, when AGCT Class III is included. Four-fifths of the Negroes and half of the whites were included in AGCT Class III, IV, or V with grade school education or less. Fully as significant was the scarcity of Negroes in the high ability levels: only 3 percent of the Negro soldiers were found in AGCT classes I or II with at least a full high school education. This compares poorly with the 28 percent of the whites who fell in this top ability range.


This Negro-white difference in level of ability can largely be explained by the poorer opportunities for education for Negroes than whites. The lower standard of living of Negroes was partly responsible for their inability to take advantage of educational facilities. The median income for whites in the US in 1940 was $1806, compared to $696 for all Negroes. Southern Negroes were even lower, with a median income of only $674. Sixty-eight percent of the Negro soldiers came from the South, an area where school facilities were less adequate than in other areas of the country. The educational expenditure per child in the Southern region ranged from a low of $17 in Arkansas to a high of $41 in Oklahoma.* This compares poorly with the expenditures for the rest of the country: Maryland spent the least ($41) and California spent the most ($95), and the US average was $52. Not only were there poorer facilities in the South, but there was also a lower school attainment. For example, the median year of school attainment in the population aged 18–29 was 8 for the group of states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee; it was 12 years for the West Coast states. Whites in the seven Southeastern states attained an average of 10.3 years of school compared to only 8.5 for Negroes.

The lower level of the educational facilities for Negroes in the South than for other groups in the country explains not only the low education level of Negro soldiers but also partly explains their low AGCT scores. Figure C7 demonstrates that a larger proportion of Southern Negroes than Northern Negroes were in the lowest AGCT class, and that at every level of education there were more Southerners than Northerners in Class V. Since there is no reason to suspect that Southern Negroes would be biologically inferior to the Northerners, the data of this chart point to the system of training Southern youth as the responsible factor.

Another factor should be considered in evaluating the differences found between Negro and white AGCT scores. When Selective Service officials found that Negroes often got lower scores on tests than would have been expected on the basis of their level of education, they offered the following explanation: "This has been found to be due in part to the conditions under which the tests were given and, in some cases, to the attitudes of the

* "Results of Inequality of Educational Opportunity in the United States as revealed by Army General Classification Test Scores in World War II," *Federal Aid Series*, Nos. 5 and 6, Mar 1948, prepared by the Research Division of the National Education Association. Figures are averages of 1920, 1930, and 1940 expenditures.

testers. Community morale and Negro soldier morale entered into the problem by creating noncooperative attitudes on the part of registrants." It was undoubtedly true that the situation in which a Negro was examined in his own Southern community was not conducive to highest performance on the test. On the other hand, such a large difference between Negroes and whites could not be entirely explained by this one factor, but must also be due in part to the lower ability of the Negroes to perform on the test.



Source: Stouffer, S. A., *et al.*; *The American Soldier*, Vol. I, p. 493. Data from Research Branch survey made in Mar 1943.

Fig. C7—Relation of Negro AGCT Scores to Grade Completed in School, by Region of Origin

Civilian Occupational Background

The third proposed measure of ability was civilian occupational background. Data are not now available for the desired analysis of the skills of the Negro and white men with whom the Army had to work in World War II. It is believed that the inclusion of this information is extremely important for a thorough analysis of the relative adequacy of Negro and white soldiers, for it would provide an excellent index of the degree to which the men were ready to step into the jobs that the Army needed to have performed.

The occupational distributions for white and nonwhite males in the US in 1940 are given in Table C43. It can be seen that Negroes were more highly concentrated in the agricultural occupations than the whites. Within agriculture, Negroes were found more frequently as farm laborers than were whites; outside of agriculture, they were found concentrated mainly as operatives, service workers, and laborers, while whites were distributed more abundantly in professional, managerial, craftsman and foreman, and clerical and sales jobs.

These distributions indicate that a smaller proportion of Negro than of white men in the US in 1940 were in the more skilled occupational categories. It is probably true that in rejecting the mentally and physically unfit from the Negro group, the Army was able in the same process to cast aside a group of men who were also low in occupational skill. However, the exact skill distributions for Army manpower can be determined only if we have information on the civilian occupations of Negro and white soldiers.

Table C44 shows the distribution of civilian occupations for all inductees regardless of race. A comparison of Table C43 with Table C44 indicates that the occupational distribution of inductees was not the same as that for either all Negro or all white males in the US. Due to deferments and to the high rejection rates in rural areas, the Army selected few farmers. Operatives, service workers, and laborers were highly represented in the Army, compared to their representation in the white US population. A racial breakdown of the occupations of inductees would provide the information needed for an analysis of the degree to which Negroes and whites were prepared by their civilian training to fill Army jobs.

TABLE C43

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUPS OF EMPLOYED WHITE AND NONWHITE MALES, 1940

Occupation	White	Nonwhite
Nonagricultural	78.8	58.9
Professional, technical, and kindred	6.6	1.8
Managers, officers, and proprietors	10.6	1.7
Clerical and sales	13.3	2.2
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred	15.9	4.4
Operatives, service workers, laborers (except farm and mine), occupation not reported	32.4	48.8
Agricultural	21.2	41.1
Farmers, farm managers	14.2	21.1
Farm laborers	7.0	20.0

Source: *1950 Census of Population*, Preliminary Reports, Series PC-7, No. 2, Table 6.

TABLE C44

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONS OF INDUCTEES AND ENLISTEES THROUGH JUN 1945

Occupation	Percentage
Professional and semiprofessional	3.6
Managers and officers	2.5
Clerical and sales	12.2
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred	14.1
Operatives, service workers, and laborers (except farm)	44.0
Farmers and farm laborers	11.0
Students and nonclassifiable	12.6

Source: *Selective Service and Victory*, Fourth Report of the Director of Selective Service, 1948, pp. 614-16.

One fragment of evidence is available which bears indirectly on the question of the relative level of skill of Negro and white soldiers in World War II. In a 1943 survey by the Research Branch, soldiers were asked the following question: "Do you think that after the war the training you are getting in the Army will or will not help you get a better job than you had before you went into the Army?"* Sixty-one percent of the Negroes and only 39 percent of the whites answered that they thought their Army training would help them

* Stouffer, S. A., *op. cit.*; Vol. 1, p. 537.

to get a better job. Since Negroes more frequently than whites felt that their qualifications for a job were being raised by Army training, this suggests that the Negroes may have entered the Army at a lower level of skill than did the whites.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ADEQUACY

It is of considerable importance to know something about the mental outlook of the Negro soldier in World War II, and in particular, the extent to which his psychological condition was conducive to good soldiering. An analysis of several areas of attitude and belief will shed light on this problem of the psychological adequacy of the Negro soldier.

What was the Negro soldier's feeling of personal well-being within the service? Did he have confidence in the operation of the Army system? Did a feeling of membership in another group (race) interfere with his identification with the Army of the US? How strongly did he believe in the value of the war? How complete a commitment of himself was he interested in making to the war? All these questions can be summed up into the one broad problem of whether the Negro soldier felt and behaved like an integrated part of the system and of the whole war effort.

Personal Adjustment

One aspect of the soldier's integration in the system is his own feeling of adjustment to his situation. One type of measure of the individual adjustment is his own evaluation of his general happiness and of his tendency to be upset. Several questions which were asked of soldiers during the war by the Research Branch shed light on the degree of personal adjustment of Negro soldiers.* Data are as follows:

> "In general, how would you say you feel most of the time, satisfied and in good spirits or in low spirits?" Percentage answering "I am usually satisfied and in good spirits": white, 44; Negro, 36.
>
> "In general, what sort of a time do you have in the Army?" Percentage answering "I have a pretty good time": white, 33; Negro, 29.
>
> "Are you ever worried or upset?" Percentage responding "I am hardly ever worried or upset": white, 29; Negro, 23.
>
> "In general, what sort of physical condition would you say you are in at the present time?" Percentage saying they were in "very good" or "good" physical condition: white, 58; Negro, 49.

The preceding information indicates that the Negro soldiers were a little lower in general satisfaction with their situation in the Army than were the white soldiers. This held true whether the question was how much the soldier worried, how satisfied and in good spirits he was, what kind of time he had in the Army, or his sense of physical well-being.

Satisfaction with Role

Closely related to the soldier's general feeling of contentment is the question of his satisfaction with the particular role he was assigned to perform in the Army, and with the kind of treatment he received. Relevant to this problem are the Negro soldier's job satisfaction, his approval of promotion and furlough policies, and satisfaction with his

* *Ibid.*, pp. 537–39, three questions asked Mar 1943 and the fourth in the summer of 1944.

treatment as a member of the Negro race. The Research Branch asked the following questions:

> "How interested are you in your Army job?" Percentage who answered "Very much interested":* white, 64; Negro, 78.
>
> "Would you change your Army job if you had a chance? Percentage answering that they would change:† white, 57; Negro, 60.

Thirteen percent more of the Negro soldiers than of the whites found the work they were doing very interesting. However, this is not a conclusive measure of complete job satisfaction among Negroes, because a few more Negroes than whites said they would change their job if given a chance. However, further evidence of the higher satisfaction of Negroes with their Army placement is found in the fact that dissatisfaction with job assignment was the most frequently mentioned complaint of white soldiers, while it ranked third among Negroes.

Direct information is not available on the proportions of Negroes and whites who were satisfied with the Army's policies with regard to promotions, discharge, furloughs, and rotation. Available are the free comments of Negro and white soldiers on the kind of deal they felt they were getting in the Army. There are clear differences in the kinds of complaints made by Negroes and those made by whites. These complaints are listed in their rank order of frequency:‡

White	Negro
1. Job assignment	1. Racial discrimination
2. Promotion policies	2. Discharge policies
3. Outfit or branch criticism	3. Job assignment
4. Discharge policies	4. Promotion policies
5. Rotation, furlough, pass	5. Outfit or branch criticisms
6. Politics and favoritism	6. Rotation, furlough, pass
7. Officers	7. Officers
8. Miscellaneous	8. Miscellaneous

It can be seen from this list of complaints that discharge policies ranked higher as an irritant for Negroes than for whites. On the other hand, promotion and rotation, furlough, and pass policies were the source of complaint for a larger proportion of the whites than the Negroes. However, while promotion complaints were higher on the white list than on that of the Negroes, the 1943 study shows that a larger proportion of Negroes than whites felt that their chances of promotion were low. Only 32 percent of the Negroes compared to 49 percent of the whites felt they had "a very good chance" for promotion.

This list also provides about the best evidence available as to the extent to which Negro soldiers felt mistreated as members of the Negro racial group. Information on this subject is important because it gives clues to the extent to which the Negro soldier's identification with his race interfered with his identification with the Army and with the war being waged by the US. It is seen that more Negroes complained of racial discrimination in the Army than complained of anything else. Racial discrimination was not among the eight most frequent complaints by whites. Other information comes from a question asked in the 1943 survey: "If you could talk with the President of the United States, what are the three most important questions you would ask him about the war and your part in it?"§ Questions about racial discrimination were foremost for 50 percent of the Negroes and for practically no whites.

* *Ibid.*, p. 537, question asked Mar 1943.
† *Ibid.*, p. 538, question asked in Jul 1944.
‡ *Ibid.*, p. 541, asked Jun 1945.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 504.

The extent to which Negroes actually enlisted in the Army can also be used as a measure of the Negro's satisfaction with the way he was treated in the Army. By the end of the war, the Army's reputation for the kind of deal it offered to Negroes was probably established. If, then, Negroes enlist in greater numbers than their proportion of the total population (about 11 percent), it is probably correct to assume that the reports about the Army by the wartime Negro soldiers were fairly favorable. Seventeen percent of the men who enlisted between Sep 1945 and Feb 1946 were Negroes. While this does not tell whether Negro soldiers felt as well treated in the Army as white soldiers did, it does indicate that the Negro felt his situation in the Army was better than his situation in the civilian world.

By means of another question asked of soldiers in 1944–45, the reaction of whites and of Negroes can be compared to the kind of deal they felt they got in the Army. The question was "In general, do you think that you yourself have gotten a square deal from the Army?" The proportions replying "Yes, in most ways I have" were:*

Period of questioning	Whites	Negroes
Summer 1944	29	32
Jun 1945	35	26

In 1944 Negroes and whites were quite similar, with just a slightly larger proportion of Negroes giving a favorable response. In 1945, however, there was a clear trend in the opposite direction, with more whites favorable. This information for 1945 is more in line with the figures presented which showed Negroes had made a poorer adjustment to the Army system.

Commitment to the War

Three closely related types of evidence are available as measures of the extent to which the Negro soldier was willing to commit himself to the war effort: (a) the numbers of Negroes compared to the numbers of whites who wanted to get into combat; (b) a measure of the extent to which Negro and white soldiers felt the fighting of the war was their responsibility; (c) measures of the stake that Negro and white soldiers felt they had in the winning of the war. The following question pertains to (a):

> "If your outfit went overseas, would you rather have an actual fighting job or have some other job?" The percentages answering "I would rather have an actual fighting job":† white cross-section, 50; white matched sample, 45;‡ Negro cross-section, 28.

Even when the two racial groups were equated for education, region, and branch of service, the Negro sample was considerably less interested in engaging in combat than was the white group.

The following question was asked in Mar 1943 concerning the extent to which the men felt that the war was "their war."

> "Do you think the war is as much your affair as it is anybody else's?"§ Percentages giving favorable responses: white cross-section, 89; white matched sample, 86; Negro cross-section, 66

Again it is seen that the Negroes were committing themselves less fully to the war than were the whites.

* *Ibid.*, p. 541.
† *Ibid.*, p. 522 question asked Mar 1943.
‡ Sample drawn from white cross-section to match Negro sample on education, region of origin, and branch of service.
§ *Ibid.*, p. 508, question asked Mar 1943.

The responses to the following four questions indicate something of the extent to which Negro and white soldiers felt personally involved in the war — the extent to which they felt a personal stake in the winning of the war.

Questions	Percentages giving favorable responses		
	White cross-section	White matched sample	Negro cross-section
"The United States is fighting for the protection of the rights of free speech of everyone." Percentage agreeing.*	89	90	70
"The United States is fighting for a fair chance for everyone to make a decent living." Percentage agreeing.*	82	83	66
"The United States is fighting for the benefit of the rich people of America." Percentage disagreeing.*	72	68	57
"Do you ever get the feeling that the War is not worth fighting?" Percentage answering "No never."†	Whites		Negroes
US	51		36
European Theater	43		47
Mediterranean Theater	44		40
Pacific Areas	46		40
India-Burma	47		37

It can be seen from the responses to these four questions that Negroes less frequently believed in the benefit of the war to them. Considerably fewer Negroes were convinced that the war was being waged to gain free speech and economic opportunities for everyone. A somewhat larger proportion of Negroes than whites agreed with the rather extreme statement that the war was being waged merely for the benefit of the rich. Shortly after the surrender of the Germans, fewer Negroes than whites in every theater except the European were convinced that the war was worth fighting. Only 36 percent of the Negroes stationed in the US said they never got the feeling that the war was not worth fighting. It was among soldiers stationed in the US that the Negro-white difference was most extreme. Thus, all indications point to a lower sense of personal involvement of Negro than of white soldiers in the war effort.

Summary

In general, it appears that the Negro soldier was less thoroughly integrated into the Army system and the war effort than the white soldier. The Negro's feeling of personal adjustment to life in the Army was lower than that of the white's. Further (and of primary importance) is the fact that Negro soldiers did not as frequently feel a responsibility for fighting the war as did whites. This was associated with the Negroes' feeling that the war was not being fought for their benefit, which, in turn was due at least in part to their feeling that members of the Negro race received discriminatory treatment.

* *Ibid.*, p. 508, question asked Mar 1943.
† *Ibid.*, p. 509, asked Jun 1945.

Unfortunately, the data available do not differentiate the attitude of Negro troops according to the degree of integration and segregation they were experiencing in the Army. The tenor of the findings does suggest the possibility that the proportion of negative attitudes among Negro troops would be reduced by integration, a possibility that field research on Negro attitudes in segregated and nonsegregated units should prove or disprove.*

* A question asked by the Research Branch in 1943 indicates that those Negro soldiers who served under white lieutenants exclusively were more often interested in becoming officers than were the Negroes who served under all-Negro lieutenants or under both white and Negro lieutenants. (See *American Soldier*, Vol. I, p. 585.) This might suggest that the Negro soldier develops more ambition in the situation where whites are the officers and Negroes the enlisted men, than in the situation where the attempt to integrate Negro and white enlisted men and Negro and white officers on an equalitarian basis is imperfectly carried out. However, a thoroughgoing attempt at integrating Negro and white officers and enlisted men could prove to be much superior for Negro morale to the situation in which Negro enlisted men serve under white officers. This is strongly suggested by the fact that the Negro enlisted men's preference was not for white officers but for Negro officers. If Negroes felt that not only Negro enlisted men but also Negro officers were treated as equals with whites, they might come to feel a fully integrated part of the system.

Note: Classifications noted here are those existing at the time (1951) the original study was made.

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