A PENETRATION GAME MODEL WITH HOMING BUT NO COUNTING FOR THE DEFENSE
Abstract
The paper presents an investigation of the question of how valuable it is to the offense to have countermeasures to prevent the defense from counting the number of units in the force of an air attack. An attacker has a force of bombers or missiles that he is trying to get past a defense position defended by homing missiles; he can split up his force into one or more groups of different weights. The attacker's countermeasures prevent the defense from counting the number of units in each group. The defense can salvo up to k times at a given group with shoot-look-shoot tactics. Total attack and defense size are known to both sides. A game theoretic solution is presented for the case of k equals 1, with one defense salvo per group. The case of k greater than 1 is discussed and solved for several small examples.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Oct 01, 1969
- Accession Number
- AD0700031
Entities
People
- Selmer M. Johnson
Organizations
- RAND Corporation