

AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT CONFLICTS

Research Contribution 144

**Center
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Institute of Naval Studies

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DAVID B. KASSING
Director
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ERRATA SHEET

The abstract contained in the 1972 reprint of CRC 144 is in error. The correct abstract is:

Three hundred eighty conflicts initiated during the years 1946-1964 are analyzed. The analysis of recent conflicts has 3 major objectives: (1) To confirm or counter assumptions about limited warfare situations in the period 1946-1964 in order to provide greater validity in predicting such situations in the future; (2) To identify the major variables involved in the various kinds of recent conflicts so that these variables will be used appropriately in the analysis of future conflicts of a similar type; and (3) To provide a data base from which important implications about the nature of recent conflicts may be derived so that effective processes of deterrence and control may be perceived for future application.

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coup d' etat
civil disorder
insurrection
guerrilla war
civil war
border conflict
blockade
show of force
threat

ABSTRACT

380 conflicts initiated during the years 1946-1964 were analyzed. The analysis of recent conflicts has three major objectives: 1) to confirm or counter assumptions about limited warfare situations in the period 1946-1964 in order to provide greater validity in predicting such situations in the future; 2) to identify the major variables involved in the various kinds of recent conflicts so that these variables will be used appropriately in the analysis of future conflicts of a similar type; 3) to provide a data base from which important implications about the nature of recent conflicts may be derived so that effective processes of deterrence and control may be perceived for future application.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background and Objectives

1. Need for the Inquiry

The study of the deterrence and control of future conflicts inherently requires identification of the expected needs for action and the ways and means of achieving the objectives of such action. The action requirements derive from projections of future conflict situations that are anticipated to be of interest to, and to result in response by, the United States.

In projecting the future, the past is always relevant. Any inquiry into the future that is not cognizant of the relevant past runs a serious risk of failing to recognize all of the pertinent variables and treat them in an appropriate, systematic relationship. In cases where study of the past enables the abstraction from it of a set of models, the analysis of variables in the future context is almost inevitably facilitated and made more effective. In this connection, historical inquiry often makes it possible to develop trend data, which in turn demonstrate discernable shifts in the nature of the processes under investigation.

On occasion doctrines for the use of force, threatened or actual, have been based on an imprecise image of the past. A striking example of the price that must sometimes be paid for failure to analyze the recent past has been offered by Norman Gibbs, Professor of Military History at Oxford University. Professor Gibbs writes, with respect to World War I:

"Illustrations of the proposition (that strategic thinking often develops from inadequate data) . . . are not difficult to find. The development of a strategy of 'l'offensive a l'outrance', culminating in the notorious Plan 17, is a case in point. It is true that Foch was aware of the destructive effects of modern weapons; yet, in practice, the doctrine of the offensive was based on the assumption that (to quote Foch) 'all improvements in firearms add to the strength of an offensive intelligently planned because the attackers, choosing their ground, can concentrate on it so much greater a volume of fire.' Nearly every phase of World War I proved that assumption wrong. Had the French general staff based their strategic doctrine on a more detailed analysis of both some fairly recent and relevant experience in the Far East and in the United States and of the nature of French elan, their wartime experiences may have been less painful." (Emphasis added.)

The work reported in this Annex is an effort to provide just such a "more detailed analysis of both some fairly recent and relevant experience." Specifically, it was undertaken to conduct a thorough study of the world conflicts that have occurred since World

War II. As such, it provides a comprehensive data source and associated analyses with direct application to most portions of the present study.

2. Objectives

The analysis of recent conflicts has three major objectives:

First, to confirm or counter, where possible, assumptions about limited warfare situations in the period 1946-64 to provide, as an example, greater validity in predicting such situations in the future.

Second, to identify the major variables involved in the various kinds of recent conflicts so that these variables will be used appropriately in the analysis of future conflicts of a similar type.

Third, to provide a data base from which important implications about the nature of post-war conflicts may be derived so that effective processes of deterrence and control may be perceived for future application.

In pursuit of these objectives, the study has focused on five areas for investigation:

- a. The nature, and spatial and temporal distributions of conflicts since 1946.
- b. The major characteristics of these conflicts organized under a meaningful typology of conflicts.
- c. The interaction of crucial variables affecting the initiation, prosecution and resolution of these conflicts.
- d. Those variables that have implications for the optimal application of American military power (particularly Naval) to the deterrence and control of various types of conflict.
- e. Trends in the interrelationships among the variables arising from a statistical analysis of systematically collected and organized data.

B. The Scope of the Inquiry

1. Time Period: 1946-64

All except three of the conflicts included in the study were initiated in the period 1 January 1946 to 31 December 1964. Using the benefits of hindsight, the end of World War II was viewed as the beginning of a new period of international relations. The profound changes in the distribution of world power and influence arising from the Second World War thus led to exclusion of the period prior to 1946. In addition to this changed environment and to the greater remoteness in time and hence applicability of the pre-1946 period, conflicts in that period were not included because they have already received greater attention in the literature from recognized authorities such as Dr. Lewis F. Richardson.

The terminal date of 31 December 1964 came as close to the present as was believed possible, in view of difficulties both in securing data and resolving ambiguities. There was a marked tendency in the conflicts examined for important variables to be ambiguous in the early stages, crystalizing, if ever, at a later point.

2. Geographic Area Covered

The study covers all areas of the world. Internal conflicts in the U.S. and Canada were, however, excluded as irrelevant to the problem under investigation. The data were collected in such a way as to facilitate the analysis of geographic distribution by both land and ocean areas.

There is one important qualification to the geographic comprehensiveness of the study. It is possible that some civil disorders occurring in Europe may have been excluded while the same type of conflict, occurring elsewhere, very likely found its way into the study. This is a result not only of certain limitations on the available data, but also of the differing effects of civil disorder in stable and unstable states. Where the effects and consequences of civil disorders (e.g., riots, general strikes) are relatively slight and do not threaten the existence of the state, they are likely to elicit little interest. However, what might be treated as a public nuisance in Western Europe could bring down a government or precipitate civil war in a less developed and less stable area of the world.

C. Sources of Information

Only unclassified sources were used in this conflict study. The great diversity of classified material on recent conflicts would have made it very difficult to obtain roughly comparable information for all of the 380 conflicts studied.

The major source of information used was Keesing's Contemporary Archives, a semi-monthly British publication issued in London and widely available in research libraries in this country. Keesing's is a unique reporting service that relies heavily on press accounts in the compilation of material on events of international significance. Keesing's is distinguished from other press reporting services by its painstaking effort to resolve inconsistencies among conflicting journalistic accounts, provide relevant background data from detailed and highly accurate files, and wait sufficiently long after an event to gain some perspective of the relationship among seemingly unrelated occurrences and factors. Keesing's itself relies on virtually all of the world's press, so that major international newspapers, news services and press agencies, as well as local publications, are used in presenting a detailed, integrated and diverse coverage.

Facts on File, New York Times, London Economist and other similar periodicals were also employed to provide material used for certain conflicts. A number of other sources were used, but by far the most important source was the substantial file of reports taken from Keesing's.

It should be added that the choice of Keesing's as the major source of information in no way implies doubt about the reliability of the best available American publications. Keesing's was chosen rather than, say, the New York Times, because it is, by nature,

more likely to be free of inaccuracies that result from pressing, daily newspaper deadlines. Had this research relied on the Times (as other research efforts along similar lines have), it would have been necessary to check conflicting daily reports, a service that is well performed by Keesing's. Moreover, the choice of Keesing's, even after allowing for the bias inherent in the selection of a British publication, provided a far greater representation of the international press than would otherwise have been available. Where the bias in Keesing's was apparent, as, for example, in its de-emphasis on Latin American Affairs (reflecting, no doubt, the lack of British interest in this area), this analysis turned elsewhere for supplementary material.

A sample report taken from Keesing's Contemporary Archives is included. This particular report, while shorter than most, adequately represents the style and format of their approach.

D. Terms and Variables Used in the Inquiry

1. Background

The problems encountered in defining the various terms and variables are summarized in section H. Various decisions that were faced and approaches that were adopted in arriving at the definitions are briefly discussed below.

First, it was found necessary to devise a set of definitions that were useful to this particular research. This resulted because many of the important terms used in the analysis of conflict situations have, during the past few years, taken on a variety of meanings that are sufficiently ambiguous and overlapping as to be virtually useless for any serious research program.

Next, in order to classify the variables in such a way as to make aggregation, factoring and statistical analysis possible, it was necessary to define the variables somewhat broadly. For example, the definition of types of conflict required a compromise with reality in the sense that two conflicts are seldom if ever characterized by precisely the same cluster of values of variables used in designating a type. In order to distinguish types of conflict so as to make all conflicts falling into a single category identical in every respect it would have been necessary to define a large number of discrete types. This would have made it difficult to discern patterns, establish correlations among the variables or, indeed, conduct any systematic analysis. Thus, an attempt was made to satisfy the requirement for precision while at the same time limiting the number of categories to facilitate statistical analysis. The general tendency was to sacrifice some precision in order to develop analytically useful definitions. Thus, for example, the levels of weapons were defined as "makeshift," "hand-carried," and "heavy". This is not as fine a breakdown as might be desired, but it is one that preserves meaningful distinctions (for purposes of the analysis) while yielding a statistically significant distribution. The reason for preferring some loss of precision to a large number of definitions is obvious: imprecision can be accounted for and its effects minimized by careful interpretations of the findings.

The terms used had to be defined so as to be mutually exclusive. This means that no two terms within a variable set could define the same conflict. Failure to make the

A CONGO REPUBLIC (Brazzaville). — Overthrow of President Youlou. — Formation of Provisional Government under M. Massamba-Débat.

President Fulbert Youlou was compelled to resign on Aug. 15 after nearly three days' demonstrations against his regime in Brazzaville. A new provisional Government, backed by Army and trade union leaders, was formed on Aug. 10 by a former Minister, M. Alphonse Massamba-Débat.

Following the National Assembly's approval in April of President Youlou's project for a one-party system [see 19560], round-table discussions had opened on Aug. 6 under the President's chairmanship to settle final details of the new single-party structure with a view to its entry into force on Aug. 15, the third anniversary of Congolese independence. In addition to the representatives of Abbé Youlou's own majority party, the *Union Démocratique de Défense des Interêts Africains*, the meetings were attended by leaders of the *Mouvement Socialiste Africain* (whose leading personality was the Minister of State and former Vice-President, M. Opangault) and the *Parti Progressiste Congolais* (founded by the late M. Jean Félix-Tchicava), as well as by trade union and Army representatives. Differences rapidly developed, however, between President Youlou and certain of the trade union delegates, the latter demanding that the President should "immediately" form a new and smaller Government, hold fresh elections, and carry out urgent reforms. President Youlou, on the other hand, maintained that any changes must await the inauguration of the new party and the creation of a party executive bureau which would have ultimate authority. The dispute was exacerbated by the Government's decision, announced on Aug. 8, to ban all political meetings until the new party had been formally established.

The disagreement was brought to a head on the evening of Aug. 12 by the arrest of four trade union leaders, who were detained in Brazzaville gaol — where some other trade unionists were already imprisoned following incidents during a visit to Brazzaville on June 3-6 by President Touré of Guinea, when they were alleged to have encouraged demonstrations against the Abbé Youlou and in favour of M. Touré as "President of Africa." The remaining trade union leadership at once called a general strike to begin on Aug. 13, and announced that a public protest demonstration would be held in defiance of the official ban on meetings.

Some 3,000 demonstrators assembled outside the railway station on the morning of Aug. 13, where they were addressed by union speakers who strongly attacked the Government for alleged corruption and personal enrichment of its members, condemned the single-party scheme, and demanded better pay for the workers. The crowd, breaking through police cordons, then marched on the prison, apparently with the intention of demonstrating outside it. As the bulk of the demonstrators reached the prison, however, the police and gendarmerie opened fire in a final attempt to halt them, killing three persons, whereupon the demonstration developed into an open assault on Brazzaville gaol. After forcing their way in the crowd released all the prisoners, believed to number nearly 500 and including both ordinary criminals and the detained union leaders. Among the latter were MM. Aimé Matsika and Julien Boukambou, of the *Confédération Générale Africaine des Travailleurs* — affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions — and M. Gilbert Pangault, one of the two principal leaders of the supra-national Christian *Union Panafricaine des Travailleurs Croyants*.

After setting the prison buildings on fire the demonstrators moved on to the Congo Radio station, breaking in the doors and assaulting the director, while others set fire to the homes of members of the Government. The security forces eventually succeeded in forcing the crowds to withdraw to the two main African quarters of the city, Bankongo and Poto-Poto.

Late in the afternoon the Government declared a state of siege and imposed a curfew, while President Youlou made a broadcast asserting that the disorders arose from "a plot against State security fomented by discontented and jealous men." Following this broadcast, the Government decided to call into operation the special court created in 1959 to deal with cases of disorder and rebellion [see page 17055].

French troops appeared in Brazzaville before the end of the day, taking up guard duties outside the presidential palace and other public buildings. It was learned that the Congolese Government had requested this assistance under the terms of a 1961 defense agreement providing for the use of French troops to assist in maintaining internal security, and that President de

Gaulle had agreed to the request after an emergency meeting of French Ministers in Paris.

The French forces available formed part of the units stationed in former French Equatorial Africa under mutual defence arrangements [see 18303 A], numbering up to 3,000 men normally employed in communications and infra-structure duties. In addition to these units — still known as "[French] Community troops" — many French cadres are serving with the Congolese Army and gendarmerie.

After further incidents on Aug. 14, including the burning of more homes of leading supporters of the regime, President Youlou made another broadcast in which he said that in view of the seriousness of the situation he was "personally taking over all civil and military power," aided by a small committee, in order to "re-establish order, ensure a return to work, and put into operation the reforms which have become necessary." Three hours later the President announced that he had decided (1) to "postpone to a later date" the introduction of the one-party system, since such a system could "only operate under conditions of national reconciliation"; (2) to form a new Government of "technicians and men of goodwill"; and (3) to hold urgent consultations with representatives of all shades of national opinion. It was subsequently announced that President Youlou had relieved all his Ministers of their duties, with three exceptions — M. Opangault; M. Stéphane Tehiehelle, the Vice-President and Foreign Minister; and M. Dominique Nzalakanda, the Minister of Justice (the last-named, however, resigned this post the following morning). Despite these moves, the situation in Brazzaville remained tense, further demonstrations took place in the afternoon in which several cars were burnt, and French armoured vehicles patrolled the Bakongo and Poto-Poto quarters. In the evening demonstrators burned the home of President Youlou's mother on the outskirts of the city.

With the lifting of the curfew on the morning of Aug. 15, large crowds began to assemble outside the presidential palace, demanding M. Youlou's resignation; French troops who had been assisting the Congolese gendarmes guarding the palace were withdrawn, although French units continued security duties outside other public buildings. According to later eyewitness accounts, the Abbé Youlou had meanwhile telephoned to President de Gaulle at Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, and asked him to order the French forces to take direct action to support his Government's continuance in office, which, however, General de Gaulle refused to do. After this, President Youlou had held a 40-minute meeting with the trade unionist leaders of the demonstrations, at the end of which his resignation was announced — the President himself again telephoning General de Gaulle to inform him of this. (It was widely believed that the Abbé's final decision to resign was motivated not only by the French refusal to intervene, but also by the news of the attack on his mother's home the previous night.)

President Youlou's resignation was announced to the country by Captain Mouzabakani, a senior Army officer. Appealing for calm and a return to work, Captain Monzabakani said that "power is entrusted to the national Congolese Army pending a new Constitution and a new Government," and declared the National Assembly dissolved. President Youlou left his palace later the same day, being taken into military custody at Camp Fulbert Youlou outside Brazzaville. M. Opangault and M. Tehiehelle were also subsequently detained in the camp, despite the former's past record of opposition to M. Youlou, while two other former Ministers, M. Victor Sathoud (Industrial Production) and M. Prosper Gandziou (Education) were arrested on Aug. 19.

M. Fulbert Youlou had been the dominating personality in the Congo since 1958 — for biography see 18149 B. Although suspended from his priestly office for entering politics in defiance of an ecclesiastical order to the contrary, he had continued to wear the soutane and to use the title of Abbé.

After discussions between Army and trade union leaders, a provisional Government was formed on Aug. 16 under the leadership of M. Alphonse Massamba-Débat (42), a former schoolteacher and a Protestant, who had been president of the Assembly and subsequently Minister of Planning, a post which he had given up in May, reportedly as a result of his opposition to the increasingly authoritarian nature of President Youlou's regime. M. Massamba-Débat, who took the Defence portfolio in addition to the Premiership, belonged to M. Youlou's U.D.D.I.A. party; like the former President, he is a member of the Lari tribe.

Apart from the new Premier, the only former Minister in the new Cabinet was M. Germain Iliconnat (*Parti Progressiste*

terms mutually exclusive would have meant that more or less arbitrary judgments would have been the basis for assignment of a conflict variable to one or another category. This effect would have largely invalidated the results. If, for example, level of weapons had been defined in a fashion that would have left no clear basis for categorizing the use of, say, mortars, it would not have been possible to come to a meaningful conclusion about the outcome of a conflict as a function of the level of weapons employed. It became particularly important to define mutually exclusive categories since several individuals had a part in coding the conflicts, and it was necessary to insure to the greatest extent possible that the data would be assigned to the same category regardless of who did the assigning.

The effort to provide consistency in the analysis resulted in considerable rewording of the definitions. A number of conferences were held in which, at one time or another, virtually all the definitions were examined and either reformulated or "shared understandings" were adopted which had the effect of resolving ambiguities and making the definitions more fully operational. For example, in collecting data on the distance in miles from the "point of conflict to the nearest reasonable point of sea access," the interpretation of the term "point of conflict" required discussion. This question was resolved by deciding under precisely what circumstances an average figure would be taken, when to settle upon the origin of the operations as the decisive figure, and when to leave a figure out altogether rather than risk a misleading judgment. It is because so many of the operational definitions necessarily included a large element of judgmental guidelines that one must, in considering the results, constantly bear in mind the operational definitions as they were used and understood.

A further consideration was the requirement that the definitions bear a direct relationship to the data. This simply meant that the terms had to be defined with the limitations of the data in mind. To be operational the terms could not require more detail than could be expected to be available in the data, nor could they rest upon conventional definitions where these were used carelessly in the sources.

2. The Definitions

Each of the terms defined below must be understood to bear the preface "for purposes of this study." The terms may be, and often are, at variance with the understanding attached to them in other contexts and by other authorities. They differ, for example, from the definitions offered in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dictionary for Joint Usage. Where it appears useful, examples are included in the definitions.

Conflict: A conflict is any event involving two or more groups in which the use of force or the threat of the use of force was a significant factor in the event, and the event itself was of at least national significance. Under this definition mobilization along a frontier was considered to constitute a conflict, even though an actual engagement of forces may never have taken place. The term was held to include internal events as well as events taking place across national borders.

a. International Conflicts*

A limited war is an engagement of the military forces of two or more nations, exclusive of general war (i.e., exclusive of a direct military confrontation of the United States and the USSR involving a major commitment of their resources and their survival as a major power) and the other forms of international war defined below.

A border war is a conflict between two or more nations in which the action is constrained to the vicinity of the border which separates the contenders. It is generally characterized by an unwillingness of the party seeking to alter the status quo to advance beyond points necessary to secure the border claims, even if there is little or no military opposition. Conventional military tactics, including armed raids, are employed.

A blockade is the use of force or the threat of force to control, limit or end transportation or communication of personnel or goods between the blockaded party and one or more other parties.

A threat or show of force is an action by one party against another in which the actual employment of potential military power is conditionally withheld in return for compliance with tacit or expressed demands.

An unconventional or covert invasion is an international conflict in which the party seeking to alter the status quo employs unconventional military tactics or irregular forces or both. It may take place along a border between contiguous powers.

b. Internal Conflicts

A civil disorder is an internal conflict resulting from a violent expression of dissatisfaction (political, religious, economic, racial, tribal, etc.) by forces which are essentially uncontrolled while fighting.

A coup d'etat is a highly organized internal conflict beginning with direct action against crucial political leaders or means of political control. It is invariably over within a matter of days.

A military revolt or mutiny is a localized internal conflict, other than a coup d'etat, initiated and fought primarily by organized military forces using conventional tactics.

An insurrection is a localized internal conflict, other than a coup d'etat, fought primarily by non-military forces which are under control of established leadership and which exercise clear control over a limited, well-defined area. An insurrection generally tends to become either a guerrilla war or a civil war if not concluded within a few months.

*General war lies outside the scope of this study.

A civil war is a prolonged internal conflict involving organized conventional military forces and tactics on both sides, and fought along a conventional front behind which each party exerts de facto control over his own territory.

A guerrilla war is a prolonged, widespread internal conflict characterized by organized unconventional military operations, terrorism and propaganda, in which an initially weaker force seeks to gain superiority by alienating the people from their government and by demoralizing government forces. Typically, it is carried out in territory ostensibly controlled by the government forces.

c. Other Definitions

Date of Origin: The earliest date on which the conditions defining a conflict can be observed to have been realized. Under this definition, a political situation that eventuates in the use or threat of force originates as a conflict then and only then.

Degree of Control: The extent to which the actions of participants in a conflict are determined by a higher authority. Control here refers to internal control within a participant group and not to the control exercised by one party vis-a-vis the other.

Distance to Point of Sea Access: The number of nautical miles from a point of sea access to the point of conflict. This point is taken as the focal point of the conflict, if one exists, or as an average point in the conflict area when no single focal point applies.

Disruptive Effects: The interference with normal conditions directly attributable to the conflict. Included are such affects as limitations on mobility, security, political activity; interruption in the flow of manufactured and agricultural goods; and disruption of normal transportation and communication services. The distinction between localized and widespread disruptive effects limits localized disruptive effects to those occurring at the point or points of conflict as opposed to a general condition of disruption.

Duration: The number of years, months and days during which the conditions defining a conflict were observed to exist.

Force Size: The maximum number of combatants actually engaged in operations or mobilized as a concrete threat.

Level of Weapons: The maximum level of weapons actually employed in the conflict; including makeshift weapons (bricks, knives, hunting rifles), other handcarried weapons (small arms and automatic weapons), and heavy weapons (artillery, naval guns, armor, aircraft).

Motivation: The issues on behalf of which a party attempting to alter the status quo enters into a conflict. These issues may be the assertion of a religious or ethnic status, economic, territorial gain, nationalist, political or ideological. The designation of a motivation is to be understood as the primary motivation of the group attempting to change the status quo by participation in a conflict, and does not imply the absence of other motivations.

Outcome: The result of a conflict defined in terms of the objectives of the parties.

Party Identification: The status of, or predominant attitude or set of attitudes that are shared by participants in a conflict.

Sea Access: The occurrence of conflict in a country which borders on a sea, making it possible to reach the point of conflict without violating the territorial integrity of any other state.

Status Quo Party: The party attempting to maintain the existing structure and distribution of values. The status quo party is generally, but not always, the established government. In those few cases, for example, where established governments have acted to redistribute values in their favor, they have been categorized as the threat party to a conflict.

Tempo of Operations: The extent and frequency of actual military engagements over the duration of a conflict.

Threat Party: The party attempting to alter the status quo (e.g., economical, political, territorial) by participation in a conflict. The threat party generally initiates a conflict.

Total Fatalities: The number of persons, military and civilian, killed as a direct result of the conflict.

Ultimate Objective: The goal or goals for which a conflict is carried out which define the extent to which a participant will continue the conflict.

Warning: An indication, prior to the outbreak of a conflict, that the threat or use of force is imminent. The sources of warnings include intensive propaganda attacks; threats or ultimatums; intelligence; military concentrations, mobilization, or deployment; and other precipitous events.

It should be noted that not all of the definitions employed in the study have been given above. Only those terms that lack an agreed common understanding have been presented. Clarification of many of the variables will be found in the following section which treats them individually.

3. Discussion of the Variables

The variables chosen for analysis are those which describe the ends, ways, and means of conflict and, in combination, describe the process itself. The decision to investigate the variables here included was necessarily based upon a number of hypotheses about the nature of conflict, after proper consideration was given to the potential of each variable for empirical investigation. Certain variables other than those included in the analysis were rejected even though they may have proved of interest, because despite best efforts to cast them as operational definitions, the doubt about their potential "researchability" nonetheless remained. Early in the study, for example, a serious effort was made to include some measure of the legitimacy of the various claims that resulted

in conflict. Even after making the definition of the term "legitimacy" reasonably operational, the decision was made not to include it because the variable judgment necessary to classify the claims was too unreliable.

To a certain extent, the nature of the findings contains an implicit explanation of the hypotheses that eventuated in the selection of the variables. In some cases, the basis for inclusion of a variable is self-evident. The geographic area or duration variables are cases in point. It is for this reason that not all the variables considered in the study are discussed below. However, most of the variables are discussed, together with reasons for their inclusion and their relevance to the objectives of the study. The range of the variables, or the discrete values that they were allowed to assume, are presented in Section III of this Annex.

Date of Origin: The inclusion of this variable reflected the interest in the incidence of conflict over the 19 year period covered by the study. In addition to indicating whether conflicts are becoming more or less frequent, it enabled the analysis of trends in all of the other variables by relating the incidence of each of them to a point in time or to a bench-mark time period.

Duration: This important variable has enabled consideration of a number of aspects of post-war conflicts. Are they longer or shorter now than at some previous time? Is there a discernible trend in the duration of these conflicts? What other factors seem to influence the duration of a conflict? Does the duration of a conflict affect the outcome? How do fatalities compare with duration? Are certain types of conflict likely to be of longer duration than others? What are the implications for American participation in lower range conflicts that arise out of the relationship between third party intervention and duration?

Magnitude: The number of fatalities was adopted as the best indication of the magnitude of a conflict, after rejecting a number of composite-variable approaches. Of interest was the determination of how the number of fatalities varied with such factors as the type of conflict, the part of the world in which it occurred, its duration, the level of weapons, the outcome, and the ultimate objective. Because the expected number of fatalities may, on occasion, influence U.S. willingness to participate in a conflict, this variable was considered of particular interest.

Disruptive Effects: Where conflicts are conducted with little or no disruptive effect on the life of the indigenous population, the political difficulties arising from third party intervention are likely to be less severe. For this reason the extent of disruption resulting during post-war conflicts was of interest.

World Location: The geographical distribution of the 380 post-World War II conflicts under consideration was linked to a number of factors, all of which carried implications about the deployment of United States naval power around the world. The kind of force needed in an area finds a basis in the expected type of conflict associated with that area, as well as a number of the more specific variables associated with it. Almost all the variables included in the study have been related to the geographical distribution of their occurrence.

Sea Access: This variable is of interest with respect to naval participation. It has been analyzed in combination with other variables, and helps to define the circumstances under which naval operations will have to be carried out if in the future they exhibit the tendency of recent trends.

Type of Conflict: This variable really represents a combination of factors related in such a way as to give a capsule description of the conflict situation it defines. Central to the study was the identification of broad categories of conflict situations, each of which carried with it implications about the nature of potential United States participation in controlling the course, extent and outcome of the conflict. For this reason, virtually all the variables examined in the study have been related to the distribution of types of conflict.

Some of the other variables duplicate, in a sense, that complex of factors that define the types. The effect of this duplication was to provide a kind of internal check on the utility and validity of the definitions of types themselves. For example, a conflict designated as banditry would almost certainly be characterized, in another variable, as having little or no central direction and control. Or, again, a coup d'etat would almost certainly be of brief duration. It is thus possible to learn a great deal by looking exclusively at the distribution of types of conflict without further, more specific reference to the variables that indicate other detailed characteristics of these conflicts.

Warning: This variable was of interest in determining the effect of rapid reaction time on a number of factors present in post-war conflicts. If, for example, it could be shown that the probability of success in initiating a conflict against a central government varied inversely with the extent of warning time available to the government, then it might safely be concluded that the rapidity of response to a threat is crucial to the outcome of the conflict. If, on the other hand, the internal characteristics and outcome of conflicts appeared to be unaffected by the presence or absence of warning, then it might be concluded that arguments emphasizing the need for rapid response have overstated the importance of this variable in the larger picture. The study was interested in how warning time affected duration, magnitude, and outcome, as well as various other factors.

Tempo of Operations: Information on warning time may be combined with information about the tempo of operations to aid in determining the importance of reaction time. There may be some conflicts which progress such that it is possible to intervene at some point, even if there was no warning prior to the initial engagement. On the other hand, those conflicts that are characterized by a single brief engagement afford little opportunity for intervention, except where prior information was available.

U.S. Interest: This variable is included primarily to facilitate the separate analysis of conflicts in which the United States became involved, while, at the same time, identifying conflicts in which there was substantial U.S. interest but no direct action was taken. A major problem in employing this variable was the choice of perspective from which U.S. interest could be evaluated, particularly in cases where no action was taken. It was decided, after much deliberation, to consider U.S. interest to have been present if there would be U.S. interest in the outcome were the conflict to occur today. Such things as communist involvement, U.S. investment, American citizens residing in the area, American bases, and formal treaty arrangements were considered in making this judgment.

Outcome: A major purpose of the study is to gain some insight into the factors affecting the outcome of conflicts in the period examined. Each conflict outcome was described in terms of whether the threat party could be said to have won, lost or drawn. The later case is taken to mean that the threat party secured appreciable gains, but the outcome did not satisfy its objectives.

Some conflicts were found to be either in progress or temporarily quiescent at the end of the period examined, and were therefore coded as "conflict continuing." Other conflicts were coded as "inconclusive" as neither side secured an appreciable gain. The relationships among type of conflict, the internal dynamics of the conflict, the objectives and nature of the participants, and the outcome were examined. In addition to categorizing the outcome of each conflict, an estimate was made of the likelihood of renewal. This was based on an assessment of the outcome and its relationship to the underlying objectives and motivations of each side. Thus, for example, conflicts motivated primarily by religious or ethnic differences were generally judged highly subject to renewal. Successful coups d'etat were, on the other hand, generally coded "renewal unlikely" since the situations which give rise to coups are generally fundamentally changed after the event.

Party Identification: This variable, like those which follow, was coded twice: once to categorize each of the threat party and the status quo party. The variables discussed up to this point have dealt with the conflict as a whole and did not reflect possible distinctions between the nature and operations of the opposing sides. Party identification was needed as an aid in determining whether characteristics of conflicts varied with the forces engaged in them. It was, for example, of interest to determine whether conflicts initiated by indigenous Communist forces tended to be different from conflicts initiated by legitimate opposition parties or by military forces dissociated from a legitimate government. Nine possible parties to conflict were distinguished, ranging from legitimate central governments to bandit groups and spontaneous rioters. It should be borne in mind in interpreting the results that depend on this variable that the primary participants have been identified. Diverse elements may have joined the primary group in response to a common ultimate objective, or, where objectives differ, for instrumental purposes.

Ultimate Objectives: The interest in the ultimate objectives of the participants in conflict was based on the feeling that such factors as duration, degree of control, magnitude and outcome were in part determined by the objectives of the participants. In particular, it was expected that the response of the status quo party in a conflict would be very much influenced by the threat party objectives. For example, efforts by a threat party to reform government policy would very likely call forth a less determined effort by the government to resist demands than would an action designed to overthrow the existing form of government.

Degree of Control: The inclusion of degree of control as a variable was based on the notion that the kind of force useful in dealing with a conflict situation is directly related to the nature of the control structure of the participants. Other things being equal, it is more difficult to bring pre-conflict pressure to bear against a group having no systematic direction and control than against a group having central, unified control of operations. Moreover, the techniques necessary for dealing militarily with groups lacking systematic control (e.g., rioters, bandits) are very different from those employed

against national armed forces under the direct control of established governments.

Employment of Force: This set of variables was included to determine the kind of operations that have been involved in post-war conflicts. Three types of operations were considered: ground, sea and air (as well as the basing for air operations where that was relevant). These variables were directly related to interest in the nature of potential American involvement and were particularly useful in distinguishing between operations marked by destruction as opposed to operations marked by policing or other highly limited operations. Of central interest was the nature and extent of sea operations in post-war conflicts, including consideration of the frequency with which sea operations were carried out in limited conflicts. This variable enabled some judgments to be made about the role of sea power as it has been employed both by parties attempting to alter the status quo, and by established forces attempting to preserve it. Information was collected on both the frequency and nature of the use of air power. Such considerations as whether the outcome of limited conflict is related to the possession of aircraft by one side or the other were dealt with through the analysis of this variable. The categories were designed in such a way as to display the range of possible operations beginning in each case (sea and air) with show of force only and moving through higher levels of force up to, for example, "the full range of strategic and tactical operations," in the case of air power. Where air power was a factor in a conflict, the data also indicates whether it was land- or sea-based or both.

Level of Weapons: The possible effect of differing levels of weapons on the outcome and characteristics of various conflicts produced the interest in this variable. Of interest was the hypothesis that the presence of sophisticated heavy weapons in the arsenals of a status quo power tends to have a deterrent effect on parties with a lower level of weapons who might have wished to alter the status quo by force.

Movement of Troops and Supplies: This variable is of interest in establishing patterns of logistics for post-war conflicts. It was also desired to determine whether the deployment of troops in the initiation of conflicts tended to be rapid or slow, by ground, sea or air, or irrelevant (cases where forces were effectively in position at the outset). Resupply data involved determining whether it was accomplished primarily by land, sea or air or some combination of these. The analysis also sought to distinguish those conflicts in which resupply was unimportant due to either the short duration of the conflict or the needs and methods of the combatants.

Third Party Support: The interest in third party support centered about three major categories, each of which may be considered a distinct variable. First it was desired to identify the parties that had intervened in local conflicts. Second, the basis of third party intervention was sought. Finally, the analysis attempted to distinguish the nature of the support rendered by third parties. In those cases where third party intervention was carried out by the United States, France and the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the Chinese Peoples Republic or the United Nations, the third party was indicated by name. "General Communist Support" and regional and extra-regional support given by other parties were also noted. This enabled isolation, for purposes of analysis, of those conflicts in which the major, and some specific secondary powers, have been involved.

The nature of military support was divided into three major classes designated as non-military support, military non-combatant support, and military combatant support. This division was organized to reflect increasing commitment ranging from, under non-military support, propaganda and generalized threats, to, under military combatant support, the full range of force, support, and direction of operations. It can be assumed that the assignment of third party support to one of these categories usually implies the inclusion of all other forms of third party support listed prior to that level. Thus, for example, a conflict in which the Soviet Union gave material support to one party, would likely have included other military non-combatant support as well as the full range of non-military support. The intention was to determine the effect of third party support on other variables considered in the analysis and to identify the extent to which certain specific states have been involved in local conflicts.

It should be noted that while every variable included in the foregoing list was given careful consideration as to its relevance and potential utility in generating instructive patterns of post-war conflict, not all received the thorough analysis that is characteristic of some of them. This is the case because some variables turned out to be less conclusive than anticipated, and also because more data was obtained than could possibly be analyzed in the time available.

E. The Analytical Technique

Having indicated the variables considered in the study, it remains to discuss the analytical technique that was used, and to consider generally the constraints and problems under which the analysis was carried out, and the resulting limitations on the interpretation of the findings. After the variables were selected on the basis of a theoretical analysis of post-war conflicts, they were formulated in operational definitions, as was discussed earlier. A large quantity of data was then collected consisting of one or more reports on each of the 380 conflicts considered in the study.

The first analytical operation performed on this data was perhaps one of the most difficult. This consisted of separating this large number of conflicts, some of them covering almost the whole of the 19-year period under examination, into analytically distinct conflicts. The problem was that, in cases where conflicts ranged over a long period of time, it became clear that it would be necessary to distinguish separate phases for purposes of analysis. The criterion on which this breakdown was made turned on the variables themselves. Wherever a change in the nature or direction of a conflict was of such significance as to present a picture in which essential variables were different, a distinct conflict was isolated. Thus, for example, the continuing conflict between Communist China and Tibet over control of Tibet was for purposes of the analysis divided into 3 distinct conflicts, and each was treated as an independent case.

Once this was accomplished, and after giving an identifying number to each conflict, the sometimes quite lengthy reports on these conflicts were reduced to a series of digits, each representing the categorization of a single variable. A coding scheme had been devised which enabled recording a great deal of information by single digits. For example, the number 6 appearing in column 51 of the coding sheet indicates that in the conflict so coded the party attempting to alter the status quo engaged in air operations involving direct support and/or interdiction.

Each of the 380 conflicts that had been reduced to a series of digits were than analyzed in 3 basic ways. First, a number of frequency counts were made on most of the variables. The statement that, "out of 380 conflicts occurring between the years 1946 and 1964, 63 involved significant sea operations," is an example of such a frequency count.

Second, the data were examined for clustering effects, a kind of factor analysis. In this type of analysis, an effort is made to determine whether certain of the variables tend to appear in combination.

Third, basic correlations aimed at determining the extent to which one variable affected another were examined. The extent to which the outcome of a conflict was a function of the level of weapons employed by one side or the other is an example of this type of correlational analysis.

Finally, certain of the variables were approached with a view to testing specific hypotheses which had from the beginning informed the direction of the research. An example of such a hypothesis might be the statement "the outcome of a coup d'etat is a function of the amount of warning time available to the established government."

F. Problems and Constraints

A number of problems and constraints discussed here have been mentioned previously, but it is essential that they be emphasized since a proper interpretation of the findings is only possible with an awareness of these difficulties clearly in mind.

First, the fact that this analysis was but one segment of the overall study necessarily placed limits on the time and manpower that could be applied to it. These limitations were manifested in terms of the amount of effort that could be devoted to confirming the reliability of the collected data and to the number of analytical operations that could be carried out on the data. Since it was not possible to check systematically each piece of data for errors of fact, the study team was forced to rely on spot checks. At various phases of the research, errors were discovered and corrected. Further, the available data sources made it difficult to obtain information on some variables, and there was only limited time to examine multiple sources to expand the data base. In cases where the best readily available information was incomplete or internally inconsistent and unresolvable, the variable was coded as "not available." This was judged to be a preferable alternative to making guesses that would have weakened the results. The large amount of data collected makes it possible to extend the analysis beyond the analytical operations that have been conducted and reported herein. The use of multivariate analysis techniques, would, in particular, permit a more comprehensive examination of conflict outcomes and characteristics as a function of many combinations of variables than has been possible to date.

The second problem encountered in the study was mentioned previously: that was the breakdown of large conflicts into separate phases which could then be analyzed as distinct entities. The tendency of many conflicts to change in important respects over time made it difficult to determine in some cases whether a conflict had terminated or simply taken a new, perhaps short-lived, direction.

Third, certain difficulties of analysis follow from the limited sample size. While the sample was large enough for most of the analytical operations carried out in the study, the effort to establish detailed correlations was hindered by the fact that as the number of correlated factors increased the size of the sample got smaller. Relating two or even three variables in many cases presented no real difficulty. As larger numbers of variables were concurrently examined, however, the number of cases exhibiting the relationship under investigation was often too small to permit a reliable judgment.

Fourth, any effort to reduce a large number of distinct situations to a series of statistically significant conclusions tends to obscure the fact that the conflicts examined were very different and ranged in importance from urban rioting to large scale international war. For example, the Korean War and a civil disorder in Japan each count as one in the data aggregation for "conflicts accessible from the Western Pacific."

Fifth, and perhaps the most significant problem in the analysis, was the latitude for judgment that remained even after the best efforts to formulate precise, unambiguous operational definitions. Despite the effort to ensure consistency, it was not possible to eliminate all of the effects of varying personal judgment. As has been mentioned earlier, the responsibility for coding the conflicts and reducing them to a series of digits was distributed among a number of people. Ideally, the coding process should have been replicated enough times to ensure that perfect consistency resulted. It is believed, however, that the size of the sample and the reasonably effective measures taken to improve consistency have minimized the effect of this problem.

Sixth, the study team noticed what was termed a "shadow effect" which at two or three periods over the years analyzed made it difficult to be certain that some conflicts were not omitted. What is involved here is that during the course of a major conflict attention is diverted from relatively less important conflicts which, consequently, may not be adequately reported.

Seventh, it was impossible to design a coding scheme capable of taking into account all of the variables that might usefully contribute to the understanding of the problem. The dealing with 380 conflicts, no two of which are alike in all respects, resulted in the failure to include variables that may have been of even decisive importance in any one of them. This is a natural consequence of the nature of the problem to which the only possible corrective is a detailed investigation of every conflict as a discrete case. This in turn renders statistical analysis impossible. In a word, the choice was between a classification scheme that has imperfections or none at all. It is believed, however, that the classification scheme that was employed reflects, with sufficient reliability, those variables that are central to any conflict. The study has thus worked with a model of reality and attempted to interpret the real world in light of that mode.

Eighth, the variables selected for analysis are not strictly comparable in the sense that some are quantitative and other qualitative. For the quantitative variables, the major problem encountered was in securing reliable data. For the qualitative variables, on the other hand, the major difficulty was resolving ambiguities and insuring some uniformity of judgment.

The ninth problem area was that of providing definitions of all the terms and variables used. As was mentioned previously, considerable effort was directed to the preparation of definitions that would be unambiguous, mutually exclusive, compatible with the existing data, and fully operational from the standpoint of the subsequent analytical effort. One facet of this problem was that of limiting the number of variables to facilitate statistical analyses, while at the same time developing definitions that were adequately precise. The terms and variables that were found to be most difficult to define (and to code, in some cases) included the types of conflicts, warning and warning time, objectives of the parties involved, degree of control, and nature of third party support. Warning and warning time, in particular, were difficult to assess because of the lack of agreement on what constituted warning at the time of the event and because open literature sources may not accurately present the warning indicators that were available to governments. As problems of interpretation of definitions arose, conferences were held to examine and either reformulate the definitions or adopt "shared understandings" of their meanings. Through this approach, definitions evolved that were clearer, less overlapping, and easier to interpret and apply.

G. Summary Comments on the Analysis

The foregoing discussion of problems in the analysis should serve to indicate some of the limitations that must be placed on the interpretation of the results. Nevertheless, it is necessary to make a few additional comments along these lines.

First, the necessity of reading the results in light of the foregoing discussion of the structure, method and problems of the analysis cannot be too strongly emphasized. The results cannot be disassociated from the method without a great risk that they will be misunderstood. This is so not only because a specific research design and terminology has been created for this analysis, but also because of the important qualifications on the data that have been alluded to in a number of places.

Second, the inadequacies in the data, both inherent and arising out of variable judgments, prohibit claiming more than these results than that they are tentative. They are no more reliable than the data. The fact that high speed computers have been used in facilitating statistical operations on the data in no way serves to guarantee that the output is any more "scientific" than the input.

Finally, the preceding discussion has indicated the important difficulties encountered in the course of this research. In spite of the convincing case that can be made for studies such as this, little has been done previously in this area. Consequently, it has been necessary to design and execute the research upon which this study is based without the benefit of well-developed methodology, definitions, data and techniques. Nevertheless, the approach taken here is a promising one. Of greatest significance is the fact that the analysis has satisfied, in a substantial sense, the objectives for which it was undertaken and produced results that have been of immediate interest and value in the overall study. The analysis has also led to the development of both techniques and data that might be usefully employed in further research along similar lines.

II. SUMMARY

1. 377 conflicts that were initiated during the years 1946 through 1964 were analyzed. Three additional conflicts that started before 1 January 1965 were included in the analysis. Twelve of the 380 conflicts were in progress at the end of 1964.

2. The types of conflicts and the numbers and percentages of each that occurred are shown below. The time distribution is based on the conflict starting date.

Type of conflict	Number/Time period			Total number	Percentages	
	A	B	C			
	1/01/46 to 4/30/52	5/01/52 to 8/31/58	9/01/58 to 12/31/64			
Internal						
Civil disorder	35	32	55	122	32.1	32.1
Localized internal						
Coup d'etat	26	18	43	87	22.9	
Military revolt/mutiny	8	6	17	31	8.2	41.3
Insurrection	15	12	12	39	10.2	
Widespread internal						
Guerrilla war	12	10	5	27	7.1	11.6
Civil war	4	7	6	17	4.5	
				323		85.0
International						
Conventional						
Border conflict	7	12	9	28	7.4	9.2
Limited war	3	2	2	7	1.8	
Other						
Covert invasion	6	3	6	15	4.0	
Blockade quarantine	2	1	1	4	1.0	5.8
Threat (show of force)	0	2	1	3	0.8	
				57		15.0
Totals	118	105	157	380		100.0

Eighty-five percent of these post World War II conflicts were internal. About 1/3 of all the conflicts were civil disorders. Coups d'etat and civil disorders accounted for more than 1/2 of all conflicts. There was a 10% decrease in the initiated number of conflicts from period A to B but a 50% increase from period B to C. The frequency of international conflicts was essentially constant over these periods. Thus, the increase in number of conflicts in the most recent time period was at the lower end of the conflict intensity spectrum. Civil disorders increased by 75%; coups, revolts and mutinies by factors of 2-1/2 to 3.

3. The median force size for each party was in the 2,000-3,000 participant range. Twenty-one percent of the conflicts involved no fatalities, and nearly half had 10 fatalities or less. There were five conflicts that produced in excess of 100,000 fatalities. Thirty percent of the conflicts resulted in essentially no disruptive effects in the normal civilian mode of life in the area; 46% produced localized disruptive effects and 24% widespread disruptive effects.

4. The number of conflicts started per year has increased erratically from a low of 13 during the Korean War to a high of 30. However, the number of conflicts started per independent country per year has oscillated about a fixed value (0.2) during most of this period. The number of conflicts in progress simultaneously varied within a range of 5 to 23, with a mean of 13.6.

5. More than 50% of the conflicts lasted one week or less; about 2/3 were over in one month or less. There was a shift to more short conflicts in the most recent of the three time periods. Short conflicts (one week or less) were particularly prevalent in Latin America. Long conflicts (one year or more) occurred most often, on a percentage basis, in East Asia. Over 50% of the conflicts were judged to occur without warning and for another 18% it was not possible to determine whether there was warning or not. In cases where warning occurred and the amount of warning was known, the median warning time was 14 days.

6. The percent of conflicts in which significant ground, sea, and air operations (excluding logistics operations) were noted to have occurred were:

	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Sea</u>	<u>Air</u>
Threat party	88	9	11
Status quo party	80	12	25

In the case of international conflicts, sea and air operations were used, on a percentage basis, over twice the percentage indicated above.

7. By far the greatest number of conflicts (over 40%) were motivated by political considerations. Ideological and ethnic factors each motivated about 10% of the conflicts. No other factor motivated as many as 10%. In 31% of the conflicts the objective of the threat party was to overthrow the government by force but maintain the current form of government. Overthrow of the form of government by force was the objective in 23% of all conflicts.

8. The threat party lost 40% of the conflicts and won 26%. It failed to obtain its objectives but made appreciable gains in another 14%. The remainder of the conflicts terminated inconclusively or are still continuing.

9. In about 70% of the conflicts there was no significant third party (other country) support for either side. In 75% of the cases where U.S. support was provided, it was for the status quo party, whereas 81% of Communist support was for the threat party. The frequency of U.S. support has increased over the time period studied. Where support was provided, it was in the form of combatant forces in about half of the cases.

Non-military and military non-combatant types of support made up the remainder.

10. A large number of conflicts took place close to major bodies of water, 31% being within 20 miles and 42% within 50 miles. Only 13% were located at distances greater than 500 miles from sea coasts.

11. The world location of the conflicts by land area was as follows:

Latin America	-30%
Europe	- 8%
Near East	-15%
Africa	-18%
Asia (less S.E.)	-13%
S.E. Asia	-16%

In terms of sea areas, approximately 1/3 of all conflicts were adjacent to the Indian Ocean (although many of these were accessible from the South China Sea also). One conflict in nine was adjacent to the South Atlantic and one in six to the Caribbean.

12. The above mentioned major increase in number of conflicts in period C (1958-64) over period B (1952-58) resulted from a more than 200% increase in Africa, as well as large increases in Latin America and Southeast Asia. The major increase in conflicts in Africa resulted almost entirely from a large upsurge in civil disorders and coups d'etat as the number of new nations increased significantly. In Latin America there were large increases in the same two types, as well as in occurrence of military revolts and covert invasions. The most significant increase in Southeast Asia was in numbers of coups d'etat. Over the entire 19 year span the largest number of guerrilla wars occurred in Africa, and the largest number of border conflicts were in Asia (less S.E.) and the Near East. Thirty-five percent of the conflicts in Asia (less S.E.) were classified as international conflicts.

13. Sixty-seven percent of conflicts accessible from the Caribbean and almost 1/2 of those most convenient to the Atlantic Ocean were within 20 miles of the coast. Less than 10% of conflicts were farther than 300 miles inland in the case of all ocean areas except the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. However, over 40% of conflicts taking place in interior countries were greater than 500 miles from the sea. With respect to world locations (rather than oceans), most conflicts were within 300 miles of the sea except in Africa and Asia (less S.E.) where 20% and 35%, respectively were greater than 500 miles inland.

14. The U.S. took action in 49 conflicts, or 13% of the sample. Significant U.S. interest, but without action, was judged to exist in the case of an additional 52% of the conflicts. The geographical and type of conflict distribution of the conflicts in which the U.S. took action are as follows:

<u>Conflict Type</u>	<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Near East</u>	<u>Africa</u>	<u>Asia (-S.E.)</u>	<u>S.E. Asia</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Internal</u>							
Civil Disorder	5	-	-	-	-	4	9
Coup d'etat	3	1	-	-	-	5	9
Revolt/Mutiny	1	-	1	-	-	-	2
Insurrection	3	-	1	-	-	-	4
Guerrilla War	-	-	1	-	-	3	4
Civil War	-	2	1	1	1	2	7
							<u>35</u>
<u>International</u>							
Border Conflict	-	-	1	-	-	2	3
Limited War	-	-	1	-	-	2	3
Covert Invasion	2	-	-	-	1	-	3
Blockade	1	1	1	-	1	-	4
Show of Force	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
							<u>14</u>

In nearly a third of the cases in which the U.S. took action, the action was limited to non-military support (e.g., propaganda, diplomatic) of one side. In 42% of the cases non-combatant military support was provided. In 29% combatant military action was taken. Naval involvement in conflicts in which the U.S. acted was as follows:

<u>Military, Non-Combatant</u>	<u>Cases of Naval Action</u>	<u>Out of Total Cases</u>
Threat/show of force	2	6
<u>Military Combat</u>		
Unofficial/covert	2	3
Limited combat forces	1	2
Limited strategic support	5	5
Full range of operations	4	4
	<u>14</u>	<u>20</u>

The outcomes of conflicts in which the U.S. acted were as follows:

U.S. Supported	Threat Party					Total
	Contin.	Inconcl.	Lost	"Tie"	Won	
Threat Party	1	1	1	1	5	9
Status Quo	3	6	10	5	9	33
Itself (S.Q.)			6	1		7

Thus in terms of conflicts clearly lost or won, the U.S. had a very good record when it supported the threat party and when it acted alone. The score was roughly even when it supported the status quo party. There was Communist support for one party or the other in 23 of these 49 conflicts. Five out of six conflicts in which the U.S. was interested but took no action were internal conflicts. Roughly a third of the interest-no action conflicts took place in Latin America.

15. Substantial Communist involvement, either by internal Communist groups or by Communist nations, was noted in 84 conflicts occurring about equally frequently in the three time periods. Communist third party support to other nations took place in 63 of the 84 conflicts. Twenty-nine percent of the conflicts occurred in Latin America and 26% in Southeast Asia. There was a significant increase in Latin America from time period B to C. The average number of conflicts in progress with Communist involvement decreased from 4.9 in period A to 4.3 in period B and to 3.7 in period C. Considering only those conflicts which one party clearly won, the Communist side won 26%; 20% when involvement was with the threat party, 67% when with the status quo party. Communist involvement was most successful (victories in 50%) in coups d'etat and military revolts.

16. The page locations of the statistical relationship between each conflict type and all of the variables are presented in table 1. The data for each type of conflict are summarized in table 2.

17. The analysis of past conflicts has failed to indicate a need for a specially designed force for initial quick reaction in the period studied. In those conflicts in which it was felt necessary to act, the U.S. had forces in the area as part of its strategic deployment. Where the U.S. did not act, the lack of action resulted from lack of need rather than lack of capability. While it cannot be asserted that a very quick reaction force would never have found appropriate use if it had been available, this analysis does not identify such uses, suggesting that they may well have been rare.

18. The conflict analysis data were examined to determine the extent of correlation of the comparative weapons capabilities of the two parties with the outcome of the conflicts. Good agreement between weapons advantage* and outcome was found in coups

*Defined as advantage in level of weapons used and/or more use of ground/sea/air operations by one party than by the other.

TABLE 1
TYPES OF CONFLICTS VS. SELECTED VARIABLES

Type of Conflict	Motivation & Objective (Threat Party)	Participants	Warning Times	Duration	Force Size
Civil Disorder	Motivation: No clear pattern. Objective: overthrow of government primary goal in over half of these conflicts.	Threat Party: diverse. Status Quo: government. Third Party Support: 24-29%. U.S. Participation: negligible U.S. Interest: 53%. Communist Involvement: 17%.	None: 71%. ≥1 Week: 13%.	≥1 Week: 46%.	Median: 1000-3000 for both parties.
Coup D'etat	Motivation: Nearly always political factors. Objective: Overthrow of government in more than 90% of coups.	Threat Party: military. Status Quo: non-colonial government. Third Party Support: unimportant, 10-13%. U.S. Participation: 7%. U.S. Interest: 50%. Communist Involvement: 7%.	None: 66%. 1-5 Days: 18%.	≤1 Day: 60%.	Threat: ≥1000 people in one-third of cases. Status Quo: <10 people in most cases.
Military Revolt	Motivation: In majority of cases, political factors. Objective: Commonly overthrow of existing government but maintaining its present form.	Threat Party: rebellious military. Status Quo: non-colonial government. Third Party Support: 16-32%. U.S. Participation: 6%. U.S. Interest: 50%. Communist Involvement: 20%.	Very short.	Very short. ≥1 Week: 25%.	Median: Threat Party: ≈500. Status Quo: >1000
Insurrection	Motivation: Political reasons 65% of the time. Objective: Typically, overthrow of existing government, but maintaining its present form.	Threat Party: political/ideological 49%. Status Quo: mainly non-colonial government. Third Party Support: 23%. U.S. Participation: 10%. U.S. Interest: 64%. Communist Involvement: 23%.	None: 71%. ≥1 Month: 26%.	<1 Week: 46%. ≥1 Month: 26%.	Threat: >1000 in ≈30%. Status Quo: >1000 in ≈67%.
Guerrilla War	Motivation: Nationalist and political reasons about equally responsible for two-thirds of wars. Objective: Overthrow of government.	Threat Party: nationalist or other political group in at least 66% of the cases. Status Quo: government. Third Party Support: ≈50%. U.S. Participation: 11%. U.S. Interest: 62%. Communist Involvement: 22%.	None: 63%. >1 Month: 21%.	<1 Year: 13%. ≥5 Years: 36%.	Very large: Threat Party median slightly less than 10,000. Status Quo median 50,000 with more than 100,000 in 4 conflicts.
Civil War	Motivation: Political and ideological causes. Objective: Most often a violent expression of frustration or overthrow of government.	Threat Party: Ethnically or religiously based 35%, 24% indigenous Communist and 24% rebellious military groups. Status Quo: usually non-colonial government. Third Party Support: >75%. U.S. Participation: 30%. U.S. Interest: 59%. Communist Involvement: 35%.	None: 13%. 1-5 Days: 19%. >10 Days: 66%.	Lengthy. 1-5 Years: 67%.	Large: All Threat forces >1000. Status Quo: ≥10,000 in 69% of cases.
Border Conflict.	Motivation: Territorial gain in greatest number. Objective: Acquire territory or other valuable interests.	Both Parties: non-colonial governments. Third Party Support: 40%. U.S. Participation: 10%. U.S. Interest: 70%. Communist Involvement: 40%.	None: 55%. ≥1 Week: 40%.	≥1 Week: 76%. ≥1 Year: 20%.	Similar for both parties but status quo had slightly larger forces. Median ≈1000.
Limited War	Motivation: Usually political reasons or nationalism. Objective: Overthrow of government in majority of cases.	Both Parties: usually non-colonial governments. Third Party Support: 43 to 86%, threat party in 3 of 7 cases, status quo in 6 of the 7. U.S. Participation: 3. U.S. Interest: 4. Communist involvement: 4.	None: 3 of 7. 1 Day: 1 of 7. ≥10 Days: 3 of 7.	≥6 Months: 3 of 7. ≥5 Years: 1 of 7.	Large: Status Quo party median about 10,000, but threat party larger in several conflicts.
Other International Conflicts	Motivation: No predominant motives. Objectives: Overthrow of government, acquiring territory and increase internal political control.	Both Parties: usually non-colonial governments. Third Party Support: 55%. U.S. Participation: 22%. U.S. Interest: 57%. Communist Involvement: 35%.	None: 59%. ≥6 Days: 41%.	≤1 Week: 33%. 1 to 5 Yrs: 24%.	Threat Party median about 2000; status quo median about 10,000

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

<u>Type of Conflict</u>	<u>Fatalities</u>	<u>Disruptive Effects</u>	<u>Tempo of Operations</u>	<u>Weapons</u>
Civil Disorder	Median: $\approx$ 10 for both parties.	Mostly localized, occasionally widespread.	Single or sporadic engagements.	Threat Party: mostly makeshift. Status Quo: mostly hand carried. Little use of heavy weapons, almost no use of sea and air.
Coup D'etat	Very few. None: 40%. $\geq$ 10: 15%.	Usually none, localized in 24% of conflicts.	No actual engagement of forces in 50%. Single engagement in remaining cases.	Hand carried or heavy weapons available to each side in majority of cases, little use of sea or air.
Military Revolt	Median: 15. >100: 36%. >1000: 7%	Usually localized. No substantial effects in 29%.	Single engagement about 55% of revolts, continual separate engagements in 16%.	Heavy weapons on both sides in most conflicts. Threat Party conducted sea operations in 26% of cases, status quo air operations in 35%.
Insurrection	Median: $\approx$ 10.	74% produced no disruptions or localized, others widespread.	21% sporadic, 47% single engagements and 24% continual separate engagements.	Threat Party: little use of sea or air operations, heavy weapons in 24% of conflicts. Status Quo: generally superior using heavy weapons 63% of time, sea in 15% and air in 38% of operations.
Guerrilla War	Very large. >10,000: 32%.	Widespread in over 70% of these conflicts.	Continual separate engagements in 81% with escalation in about 50% of conflicts.	Threat Party: hand carried weapons, no sea or air operations. Status Quo: heavy weapons in 65%; hand carried weapons in 35%. Seapower employed in 26% and air operations in 52%.
Civil War	Large. Median: $\geq$ 1000.	Widespread in 71% of wars.	47% sporadic engagements, and 41% continual engagements without escalation.	Threat Party: heavy weapons in 67%, sea and air operations in 48%. Status Quo: heavy weapons in 80%, sea operations in 35%, air in 71%.
Border Conflict	Generally low. Median: $\approx$ 10. >100: 19%.	93% caused either localized or no disruptive effects.	61% sporadic engagements, 18% continual separate engagements.	Threat Party: heavy weapons in about 74%, sea operations in 11% and air in 46% of conflicts. Status Quo: heavy weapons in nearly 67%, sea operations negligible, but air operations involved in 39% of conflicts.
Limited War	Median: $\approx$ 2000.	Widespread effects in most cases.	5 of 7 cases involved sporadic engagements or occurred as single engagements enduring throughout the conflict.	Both parties used heavy weapons in all cases. Sea and air operations used in a high percentage of cases.
Other International Conflicts	Fairly low. Median: $\approx$ 30.	55% localized. 36% insignificant.	Relatively low level: 27% no actual engagement; 18% sporadic engagements, and 32% single engagement.	Threat Party: mostly heavy weapons, hand carried in 31%. Some use of sea and air operations. Status Quo: mostly heavy weapons, hand carried 21%, sea operations 45%, air operations 59%.

TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

Type of Conflict	Initial Movement of Combat Forces and Resupply	Degree of Control (Threat Party)	Outcome (Threat Party)
Civil Disorder	Movement of forces not a prime factor. Resupply: insignificant due to short duration and general lack of need.	Generally no systematic control over forces.	Won: 14%. Lost/Made Gains: 21%. Lost: 39%. Continuing/Inconclusive: 24%. Unknown: 7%.
Coup D'etat	Forces usually in position at start of conflict. Threat Party used rapid land deployment in about 10% of cases. Resupply normally unimportant due to short duration.	Nearly always under control unified control.	Won: 70%. Lost/Made Gains: 2%. Lost: 28%.
Military Revolt	Threat Party generally in position, but Status Quo forces rapidly deployed by land in almost one half conflicts. Resupply inconsequential because of short duration.	Exercised central unified control in most cases.	Won: 10%. Lost/Made Gains: 6%. Lost: 71%. Inconclusive: 13%.
Insurrection	Threat Party utilized sea/air deployment in 10% with resupply important in 21% of conflicts. Status Quo deployed by land in 30%, and sea or air 10%, resupply was important 37% of time.	Highly centralized control in 61% of insurrections, and occasional central control under autonomous command in nearly all of remaining conflicts.	Won: 5%. Lost/Made Gains: 15%. Lost: 72%. Inconclusive: 8%.
Guerrilla War	Threat Party usually in position initially, resupplied by land. Status Quo used rapid land, sea or air deployment in 30% with resupply by all types of transport.	Occasional central control but with operational commanders essentially autonomous.	Won: 30%. Lost/Made Gains: 15%. Lost: 26%. Continuing/Inconclusive: 26%. Unknown: 3%.
Civil War	Threat Party deployed by land or sea in 30%. Status Quo used land, sea or air deployment in about 50%. Resupply was important in over 85% of wars.	Threat Party under occasional central control in over half of conflicts, status quo under a central unified control in nearly 80%.	Won: 29%. Lost/Made Gains: 24%. Lost: 29%. Continuing/Inconclusive: 18%.
Border Conflict	Threat Party used rapid deployment by land in 46%, resupply required in 65%, mostly by land. Status Quo made rapid deployments by land in 27%, resupply in 55%.	Central unified control exercised in over 60% of these conflicts.	Lost/Made Gains: 11%. Lost: 14%. Continuing/Inconclusive: 75%.
Limited War	Both parties used rapid deployment in about 3 or 4 of 7 cases. Resupply was important in 4 of the 7 conflicts.	Normally central unified control over its operations.	Won: 29%. Lost/Made Gains: 14%. Lost: 57%.
Other International Conflicts	Threat Party utilized land deployment in 32%, sea delivery in 37%, and air delivery in 5%. Resupply was important in 60% of cases. Status Quo made some use of rapid movement by sea and land. Resupply in 57%.	Central unified control was exercised in most cases.	Won: 9%. Lost/Made Gains: 18%. Lost: 41%. Continuing/Inconclusive: 32%.

TABLE 2

INDEX - STATISTICAL ANALYSES

	Starting Time	Force Size	Total Fatalities	Disruptive Effects	Duration	Tempo of Operations	Warning Time	Motivation	Ultimate Objectives	Party Identification
Total Conflicts	B-14, B-17 B-69, B-71 B-99	B-18, B-64 B-266	B-19, B-64	B-17, B-22 B-67	B-18, B-21 B-74, B-79	B-19, B-25 B-83	B-19, B-24 B-80	B-18, B-89	B-19, B-27 B-90	B-18, B-27
Civil Disorders	B-61, B-103 B-186	B-130, B-187	B-134, B-145, B-188	B-136, B-189	B-139, B-186	B-142, B-189	B-139, B-148 B-186	B-150, B-186	B-152, B-186	B-154, B-195
Coup D'etat	B-61, B-103 B-191	B-130, B-192	B-134, B-145, B-193	B-136, B-193	B-139, B-191	B-142, B-193	B-139, B-148, B-191	B-150, B-191	B-152, B-191	B-154, B-191
Military Revolt	B-61, B-103 B-195	B-130, B-196	B-134, B-145, B-196	B-136, B-197	B-139, B-195	B-142, B-197	B-139, B-148, B-195	B-150, B-195	B-152, B-195	B-154, B-195
Insurrec- tion	B-61, B-103 B-199	B-131, B-200	B-134, B-146, B-200	B-136, B-200	B-140, B-199	B-142, B-201	B-140, B-148, B-199	B-150, B-199	B-152, B-199	B-154, B-199
Guerrilla War	B-61, B-103 B-203	B-131, B-204	B-134, B-146, B-203	B-136, B-205	B-140, B-203	B-142, B-206	B-140, B-148, B-203	B-150, B-203	B-152, B-203	B-154, B-203
Civil War	B-61, B-103 B-208	B-131, B-209	B-135, B-146, B-209	B-136, B-210	B-140, B-208	B-142, B-210	B-140, B-148, B-208	B-150, B-208	B-152, B-208	B-154, B-208
Border War	B-61, B-103 B-212	B-132, B-213	B-135, B-147, B-214	B-136, B-214	B-141, B-212	B-142, B-215	B-141, B-148, B-212	B-150, B-212	B-152, B-212	B-154, B-212
Limited War	B-61, B-103 B-217	B-132, B-218	B-135, B-147 B-218	B-136, B-219	B-141, B-217	B-142, B-217	B-141, B-148, B-217	B-150, B-217	B-152, B-217	B-154, B-217
Other In- ternational Conflicts	B-61, B-103 B-221	B-132, B-222	B-135 B-147	B-136 B-223	B-141, B-221	B-142, B-223	B-141, B-148, B-221	B-150, B-221	B-152, B-221	B-154, B-221

TABLE 2 (Cont'd)

	Third Party Support	Level of Weapons	Employment of Forces	Initial Movement of Forces	Resupply	Cutcome	Likelihood Of Renewal	Sea Access	Degree of Control	World Location
Total Conflicts	B-31 B-94,B-108 B-141 B-278	B-18,B-30 B-88,B-238	B-29, B-85 B-249	B-30,B-87	B-30, B-87	B-18,B-26 B-92	B-26	B-18,B-23 B-78,B-97 B-99,B-105 B-107	B-17,B-28 B-82	B-23,B-67 B-78,B-99 B-105,B-107
Civil Disorders	B-154 B-186	B-165,B-189	B-167,B-189	B-171 B-189	B-174 B-190	B-176,B-190	B-182,B-190		B-163 B-190	B-104 B-186
Coup D'etat	B-154 B-191	B-165,B-193	B-167,B-194	B-171 B-194	B-174 B-194	B-176,B-194	B-182,B-194		B-163 B-194	B-104 B-191
Military Revolt	B-154 B-195	B-165,B-197	B-167,B-197	B-171 B-197	B-174 B-197	B-176,B-198	B-182,B-198		B-163 B-198	B-104 B-195
Insurrection	B-154 B-199	B-165,B-201	B-167,B-201	B-171 B-201	B-174 B-201	B-176,B-202	B-182,B-202		B-163, B-202	B-104 B-199
Guerrilla War	B-154 B-203	B-165,B-206	B-167,B-206	B-171 B-206	B-174 B-206	B-176,B-207	B-182,B-207		B-163 B-207	B-104 B-203
Civil War	B-154 B-208	B-165,B-210	B-167,B-210	B-171 B-210	B-174 B-210	B-176,B-211	B-182,B-211		B-163 B-211	B-104 B-208
Border War	B-154 B-212	B-165,B-215	B-167,B-215	B-171 B-215	B-174 B-215	B-176,B-216	B-182,B-216		B-163 B-216	B-104 B-212
Limited War	B-154 B-217	B-165,B-219	B-167,B-219	B-171 B-219	B-174 B-219	B-176,B-220	B-182,B-220		B-163 B-220	B-104 B-217
Other In- ternational Conflicts	B-154 B-221	B-165,B-223	B-167,B-223	B-171 B-223	B-174 B-223	B-176,B-224	B-182,B-224		B-163 B-224	B-104 B-221

d'etat and insurrections with noticeable but less conclusive agreement in the case of civil disorders. In these types of conflicts the side with an advantage in types of weapons normally won, and the inference is that these are "weapons controlled" conflicts. In guerrilla wars, the only other type of conflict in which one party normally had a distinct advantage, the outcomes display a lack of correlation with arms advantage. Finally, there are the types of conflicts which characteristically involve ground control fighting (and on occasions sea and air control) and relatively equal types of weapons. These are the military revolts, civil wars, and most classes of international conflicts. The outcomes of these conflicts cannot be adequately explained on the basis of weapons data, and the controlling factors must be sought in some other parameter or combination of parameters.

19. The relationship of force size ratios to conflict outcome was investigated. The data suggest that the status quo party can achieve a high record of victories in civil disorders with small (considerably less than 1:1) relative force sizes. In coups d'etat force size advantages normally accompany weapons advantages in the case of threat party victories, which are the most likely outcome. The outcomes of guerrilla wars are not adequately explained on either a weapons or force size basis. In the more conventional conflicts (military revolts, insurrections, civil wars, and international wars) the types of weapons used tend to be more evenly matched, and conflict outcome was shown to correlate with force size.

III. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS

A. Plan for Presentation of Data

The first section gives an over-all view of the conflicts in the 19-year period studied. This section tells how many and what kinds of conflicts occurred and how the numbers and types changed with time. It describes sizes and durations of these conflicts. It attempts to ascribe motives to the participants and tells how the conflicts were resolved or terminated. Finally, the use of military force is described briefly.

The second section is focussed on the geographical aspects of the analysis. The location of conflicts is described both in terms of land areas and in terms of access from the sea. Conflict types endemic to various areas of the world are listed, together with changes in the incidence of various types. Distances from point of conflict to the nearest ocean or sea are provided as a function of world location.

The third section provides information on the conflicts in which the United States has had an interest or has taken action. The nature of U.S. involvement is covered. This section also describes the involvement of Communist nations and internal Communist organizations in conflicts in this time period.

The fourth section characterizes the conflicts which have occurred, in terms of size; duration; tempo of operations; warning; motivation, objectives and outcome; participants; and the kinds of force employed. This information is first presented by characteristics for all conflict types and then the characteristics are assembled by conflict type.

The fifth section examines in greater detail the use of military force. The interaction between warning time and response time is examined in detail. The interactions among level of weapons, force employment and size, and conflict outcome are studied. Trends in the frequency of future conflicts are projected in this section.

The sixth section provides a print-out of the titles of all the conflicts used in the analysis.

B. Summary Data for All Conflicts

1. Number of Countries Involved

Of the 131 independent countries in existence by the end of the period studied, 101 either had experienced internal conflicts or had engaged in conflict with other nations for other than U.N. purposes. If one leaves out the three "pseudo countries" (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) which the free world continues to pretend have an independent existence, and the five very small principalities (Monaco, Andorra, etc.), the basic list was composed of 123 countries. Five out of six (82%) of these countries thus had internal or international conflicts during the nineteen year period studied.

Some of the above countries also engaged in conflict on behalf of the U.N. In addition, an undetermined number of the "peaceful" nations participated in U.N. actions.

It should be mentioned that internal conflicts in the United States and Canada are not included in the study, in spite of the fact that such events as the Los Angeles riots of 1965 were larger than many conflicts which were included.

2. Numbers and Types of Conflict

a. Number of Conflicts Examined

The period examined (1946-64) started with three conflicts continuing from 1945 or earlier. During the nineteen years 377 new conflicts originated and twelve of these continued beyond the date at which the examination stopped.

b. Distribution of Conflicts by Type

The distribution of all conflicts in the sample is shown in table 3, by conflict type as defined earlier. The table indicates that about 85 percent of the post World War II conflicts have been internal and only 15 percent have been international conflicts.

Approximately 1/3 of all the conflicts were civil disorders of one type or another. More than 40 percent of all conflicts were coups, revolutions, mutinies and other localized internal conflicts. Coups are the second most numerous type of conflict; coups and civil disorders together account for more than one half the data. Internal guerilla and civil wars account for one conflict in nine. Conventional international conflicts form less than 10 percent of the sample. Covert invasions, blockades and threats account for 6 percent.

c. The Changing Distribution of Conflict Types

The distribution of conflict types has been changing over the period studied. In order to see how the incidence of various types of conflict changed over the period, the time interval was divided into 3 equal pieces. The first period began in 1946, with three conflicts held over from 1945, and ended in April 1952. The second period ended in August 1958 and the third period ended on 31 December 1964. In the tables these periods are designated: A, B, and C. The middle period begins during the Korean war and ends shortly before the number of independent nations in Africa increased rapidly.

Table 3 shows the time variation of the number of conflicts of various types. There was a slight decrease (10 percent) in the number of all types of conflicts from period A to B, but about a 50 percent increase from period B to C. The frequency of international conflicts has been essentially constant. The number of guerilla and civil wars actually decreased from period B to C in spite of the fact that the total frequency of conflicts was significantly increasing. The number of insurrections remained constant over periods B and C.

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF ALL CONFLICTS BY TYPE AND TIME PERIOD
(Based on starting date of conflict)

<u>Type of Conflict</u>	<u>Number/Time Period</u>			<u>Total Number</u>	<u>Percentages</u>	
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>			
	<u>1/01/46</u>	<u>5/01/52</u>	<u>9/01/58</u>			
	<u>to</u>	<u>to</u>	<u>to</u>			
	<u>4/30/52</u>	<u>8/31/58</u>	<u>12/31/64</u>			
Internal						
Civil Disorder	35	32	55	122	32.1	32.1
Localized Internal						
Coup d'etat	26	18	43	87	22.9	
Military Revolt/Mutiny	8	6	17	31	8.2	41.3
Insurrection	15	12	12	39	10.2	
Widespread Internal						
Guerrilla War	12	10	5	27	7.1	11.6
Civil War	4	7	6	17	4.5	
				323		85.0
International						
Conventional						
Border Conflict	7	12	9	28	7.4	9.2
Limited War	3	2	2	7	1.8	
Other						
Covert Invasion	6	3	6	15	4.0	
Blockade, Quarantine	2	1	1	4	1.0	5.8
Threat (show of force)	0	2	1	3	0.8	
				57		15.0
TOTALS	118	105	157	380		100.0

The total increase in conflicts in period C over period B was at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Civil disorders increased by 75 percent; coups, revolts and mutinies increased by factors of 2.5 to 3.

3. Conflict Magnitude

There are many dimensions by which the magnitude of a conflict may be characterized. In later sections such variables as level of weapons are discussed as a function of type of conflict. In the overall view taken here, only numbers of participants, numbers of casualties, and side effects on the life of the country are considered.

a. Force Size for Each Side

Figure 1 shows cumulative distributions of force size for threat and status quo parties, using data for all conflicts. The scale for number of participants is logarithmic. For either party, threat or status quo, the distribution of number of participants is roughly the same when there were more than 1000. Many more status quo than threat party force sizes were small, however. The status quo party had ten people or less in 30 percent of the cases but the threat party was this small in only a few percent of the conflicts.

b. Fatalities

It was possible to determine the number of fatalities resulting from each conflict for 330 cases. Of these there were 21 percent with no fatalities, and nearly half resulted in 10 fatalities or fewer. Roughly 75 percent of the conflicts resulted in 100 or fewer fatalities. From that level the number rose to the very high level of the Korean War. The cumulative distribution of fatalities for all conflicts for which data were available is shown in figure 2.

c. Disruptive Effects

A conflict is defined as disruptive if it interferes with the economic or political operations of the locale. Interruptions of transportation, public utilities, food supply and police control are typical examples of disruptive effects. Figure 3 indicates that there were no disruptive effects in 30 percent of the conflicts studied. Such effects were primarily localized in the conflicts where they occurred (46 percent).

Latin America was the world area with the highest proportion of "peaceful" conflicts, in terms of disruptive effects. This reflects the high incidence of coups d'etat in the area.

4. Frequency of Occurrence

a. Number of Conflicts as a Function of Time

There are 2 ways to describe the number of conflicts as a function of time. The first is to look at how many were started in a particular time interval, the second is to ask how many were actually in progress at a given time.





FIG. 1: PERCENTAGE OF CASES IN WHICH THREAT PARTY OR STATUS QUO PARTY WAS OF SIZE " N " OR LARGER




FIG. 2: DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICT FATALITIES




FIG. 3: DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS BY MAJOR LAND AREAS

b. Conflicts Initiated

Figure 4 is a plot of the number of conflicts started in each year from 1946 through 1964. The figure also shows the dates for the Korean War. It is evident that the number of other conflicts started during the Korean War was depressed from the general average outside of that period. Since the Korean War the number of conflicts started per year has varied from 13 to 30 but the trend has drifted erratically upward.

The number of conflicts started per year has risen since the Korean War but so has the number of independent countries. It was shown above that the increase in frequency of conflicts has been primarily because of the internal ones. This observation suggests that the upward trend with time may have resulted because there are more countries in which no outside power is acting to suppress internal strife.

Figure 4 shows the number of conflicts started each year, normalized to the number of independent countries existing at that time. It is evident that the number of conflicts started per country each year has been oscillating about a fixed value for the past decade.

c. Conflicts in Progress

Figure 5 shows the number of conflicts in progress at any time during the period studied. From 1948 to 1952 the number of conflicts in progress fluctuated around 10. Between 1953 and 1956 the number in progress rose steadily to roughly 20. From then until 1961 the number varied from 15 to 20 and in the last few years has gone down to vary between 10 and 15. Combined with the information on the previous figure, this chart indicates that although the conflicts started are becoming more numerous, their duration must be decreasing.

d. Distribution of Number of Conflicts in Progress

Figure 6 provides a plot of the number of months in which the indicated number of simultaneous conflicts occurred. The number of simultaneous conflicts ranged from a low of 5 to a high of 23. A conflict contributed to the total for a given month if it occurred at any time during the month; therefore, a coup d'etat lasting only one day was counted as a conflict in the month in which it took place. Ten conflicts in a month occurred the maximum number of times (28). The mean number of conflicts per month was 13.6.

5. Duration: Distribution and Trends with Time

More than 50 percent of all the conflicts studied were over in one week or less. Two thirds of the conflicts were over in one month or less. The cumulative distribution of durations is shown in figure 7. There has been a shift in the distribution of conflict durations over the period studied. The number of short conflicts has increased markedly and short conflicts form a larger percentage of the sample in period C, compared to periods B or A. The change in distributions is shown in figure 8.

Table 4 gives the distribution of conflict durations as percentages of the sample for each time period.




FIG. 4: NUMBER OF CONFLICTS STARTED EACH YEAR AND NUMBER OF CONFLICT STARTS NORMALIZED TO THE NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES




FIG. 5: NUMBER OF CONFLICTS IN PROGRESS AT ANY TIME




FIG. 6: DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF CONFLICTS IN PROGRESS




FIG. 7: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICT DURATIONS




FIG. 8: DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICT DURATIONS BY TIME PERIOD

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICT DURATIONS
WITHIN EACH TIME PERIOD, 1946-64

Time Periods: A - 01/01/46 through 04/30/52
 B - 05/01/52 through 08/31/58
 C - 09/01/58 through 12/31/64

Duration (d)	<u>Time Periods</u>		
	A	B	C
d=1	21.6	19.4	23.5
1 < d < 8 } days	31.9	27.3	36.7
8 ≤ d < 32	12.1	15.5	12.3
1 ≤ d < 6 } months	13.8	9.7	17.0
6 ≤ d < 13	6.9	2.9	2.7
1 ≤ x < 5 } years	10.3	18.4	4.8
5 ≤ x < 20	3.4	6.8	0.0
	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

a. Variations in Duration with World Location

Table 5 indicates that the brief conflicts have occurred largely in Latin America, in terms of land areas. In terms of ocean areas, the largest numbers of conflicts of all lengths have occurred adjacent to the Indian Ocean. Conflicts that are currently in progress or that have unknown durations are not included in table 5.

b. Time Variation of Duration by World Location

The data on conflict duration in the various world locations was examined over the three time periods. The only part of the world in which there has been a significant shift in the distribution of conflict duration is Africa. There the number of short conflicts (one week or less) has increased much more rapidly than the increase in total numbers.

TABLE 5

DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS BY DURATION AND WORLD LOCATION

<u>Duration</u>		<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Near East</u>	<u>Africa</u>	<u>Asia</u>	<u>S.E. Asia</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 day		39	4	14	9	5	13	84
1 < x < 8	days	44	10	18	22	14	13	119
8 ≤ x < 32		16	3	8	11	5	4	48
1 ≤ x < 6	months	9	5	6	11	11	9	51
6 ≤ x < 13		3	2	3	1	4	2	15
1 ≤ x < 5	years	3	3	6	8	7	11	38
5 ≤ x < 20		<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>11</u>
TOTAL		115	29	54	65	47	56	366

DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS BY DURATION AND OCEAN/SEA ACCESSIBILITY

<u>Duration</u>		<u>Caribbean</u>	<u>Atlantic</u>	<u>Pacific</u>	<u>Indian</u>	<u>Medit.</u>	<u>Int.</u>	<u>Total</u>
1 day		18	12	11	24	5	14	84
1 < x < 8	days	25	15	20	34	7	18	119
8 < x < 32		11	7	8	12	2	8	48
1 ≤ x < 6	months	5	9	6	20	3	8	51
6 ≤ x < 13		3	3	0	7	0	2	15
1 ≤ x < 5	years	2	3	12	18	1	2	38
5 ≤ x < 20		<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>11</u>
		65	51	59	121	18	52	366

6. Warning Time

More than half the conflicts were judged to have no warning. For another 18 percent it was not possible to determine whether there was warning or not. In about one-third of the conflicts there was warning, although in about 6 percent of all cases the exact amount of warning was unknown.

For the one-third of all conflicts for which warning occurred and the amount of warning time is known, the median warning time was 14 days. The cumulative distribution of warning times is shown in figure 9.

Combining all the above information on warning: there is either no warning at all, or ample warning. In only about one case in eight is warning, when it is known, too short to allow reaction by Naval forces, if the latter is assumed to be five days. This factor is discussed in more detail in a later section.

7. Degree of Control (Threat Party)

In 20 percent of the conflicts examined, no control was exercised over the threat party participants. In 9 percent the hostile acts were committed by units ostensibly under control. In the largest number of cases the threat party was under central, unified control at all times (40 percent) or much of the time (16.5 percent). With a few exceptions the status quo party was under central control in each conflict.

Table 6 provides the number and percentage of conflicts associated with each level of control by the threat party.

8. Tempo of Operations

The data on the operational tempo of the conflicts is given in table 7. In 15 percent of the conflicts there was no actual engagement of forces. The largest number of conflicts were characterized as sporadic engagements. However, almost as many were considered to be best described as a single engagement at one or more locations lasting the duration of the conflict.

Escalation is defined as an increase in scope of violence of a conflict and can be assessed in terms of force employed, targets attacked, damage produced, and geographical area involved. Out of 64 conflicts involving continual separate engagements, 21 appeared to escalate. Since the coding format did not make explicit whether escalation occurred in the case of sporadic or lengthy single engagements, there were undoubtedly more than a total of 21 conflicts that experienced some form of escalation.




FIG. 9: CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF CONFLICTS*
WITH WARNING TIME $\leq N$ DAYS

*Note: applies for cases where warning occurred and the amount of warning time was known.

TABLE 6

DEGREE OF CONTROL EXERCISED BY THREAT PARTY

<u>Type of Control</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Percent</u>
No Systematic Control	76	20.0
Unauthorized Actions by Units Ostensibly Under Control	34	9.0
No Control Exercised Over Operational Commander	10	2.5
Occasional Central Control	61	16.5
Central, Unified Control	153	40.0
Not Known	46	12.0

TABLE 7

TEMPO OF OPERATIONS

<u>Description</u>	<u>No. of Cases</u>	<u>Percent</u>
No engagement of forces	58	15
Sporadic engagements	130	35
Single engagement at one or more locations lasting duration of conflict	121	32
Continual separate engagements without a clear increase in magnitude or intensity	43	11
Continual separate engagements with apparent "escalation"	21	5
Data unavailable	<u>7</u> 380	<u>2</u> 100

9. Force Employment

a. Use of Ground, Sea and Air Operations

The uses of ground, sea and air operations were included in the coding scheme through the following variables:

employment of forces
initial movement of combat forces
resupply of combat forces.

The variable "employment of forces" was designed to provide a single summary statement that best characterized the employment of the ground, sea, and air forces, as applicable, for each party for the entire conflict. The extent of use of these forces for all conflicts was as follows:

	Percent of Conflicts in Which Significant Operations Occurred		
	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Sea</u>	<u>Air</u>
Threat Party	88	9	11
Status Quo Party	80	12	25

Figure 10 shows the variation of conflicts involving ground, sea and air operations with time. The greater use of sea and air operations by the status quo party reflects the fact that in internal conflicts the government, which normally had the more sophisticated weapons, was usually the status quo party. The use of sea and air operations was more common in the case of international conflicts. For example, the threat and status quo parties used sea operations in 26 percent and 28 percent respectively, and air operations in 42 percent and 51 percent, respectively, of all international conflicts.

b. Initial Movement of Forces

The data for initial movement of forces indicated that combatant forces were essentially in position at the onset of the conflict in at least 55 percent of all conflicts. Information on initial movement was not available in a number of conflicts (about 15 percent of the total). The more interesting values of this variable, rapid deployment by land, air delivery (paratroop or transport), and sea delivery (amphibious landing or administrative landings), occurred for the threat party in 11 percent, 1 percent and 4 percent, respectively, of all conflicts and for the status quo party in 15 percent, 3 percent, and 4 percent, respectively, of all conflicts. Initial deployments occurred in a larger percentage of these international conflicts than in internal conflicts.

THREAT PARTY	A	92%
	B	82%
	C	89%
STATUS QUO PARTY	A	83%
	B	78%
	C	79%

GROUND OPERATIONS

THREAT PARTY	A	8%
	B	9%
	C	8%
STATUS QUO PARTY	A	14%
	B	11%
	C	10%

SEA OPERATIONS

THREAT PARTY	A	8%
	B	12%
	C	12%
STATUS QUO PARTY	A	23%
	B	26%
	C	24%

AIR OPERATIONS

FIG. 10: SIGNIFICANT USE OF LAND, SEA AND AIR OPERATIONS
BY TIME PERIOD AND PARTICIPANT

c. Resupply of Forces

In over 70 percent of the conflicts resupply of forces was evaluated to be unimportant due either to the short duration of the conflicts or to the needs or methods of the combatants. This observation was not unexpected in view of the large number of civil disorders (122) and coups d'etat (87). Land resupply was judged to be important in about 15 percent of the conflicts, and either sea or air forms of resupply were used by at least one party in roughly 10 percent of the total conflicts.

10. Level of Weapons

Data on level of weapons was not available for roughly one-third of the conflicts. In conflicts for which data were available, the status quo party used hand-carried or heavy weapons equally, and very seldom was restricted to makeshift weapons. In contrast, the threat party used makeshift weapons in about one-third of the cases for which data were available. Data are shown in table 8.

TABLE 8
DISTRIBUTION OF LEVEL OF WEAPONS
BY TIME PERIOD

		<u>TIME PERIOD</u>				
<u>Level of Weapons</u>		<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<u>Threat Party</u>						
Makeshift		25	26	39	90	24
Hand-carried		35	23	40	98	26
Heavy		22	25	37	84	22
Not Available		36	31	41	108	28
<u>Status Quo Party</u>						
Makeshift		7	9	5	21	5
Hand-carried		34	29	52	115	30
Heavy		36	37	47	120	32
Not Available		41	30	53	124	33

11. Motivations

Table 9 indicates that the largest number of conflicts was motivated by political considerations. Ideological motives account for the second largest group. Together, these motives were associated with more than half the conflicts.

Ethnic and religious disagreements motivated 12 percent of the conflicts, while economic considerations entered only 5.5 percent.

TABLE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF MOTIVATIONS

<u>Motivation</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Ethnic	37	10
Religious	8	2
Economic	21	5.5
Nationalist	33	8.5
Political	164	43.1
Territorial Gain	29	8
Ideological	40	10.5
Other Sociological	1	--
Not Clear/Not Available	<u>47</u>	<u>12.4</u>
	380	100.0

12. Objectives

On the reasonable assumption that the objective of the status quo party is obvious, only the objective of the threat party is considered here. Table 10 shows the distribution of objectives of the threat party.

The threat party objective of the largest number of conflicts was to overthrow the government by force while retaining the form of government. The second largest number of conflicts were attempts to overthrow the form of government as well as the incumbents. Thus the objective of more than half the conflicts was to overthrow the government.

TABLE 10
OBJECTIVE OF THREAT PARTY

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Preserve status quo	2	0.5
Increase internal political control	22	6.0
Reform government policy or lawfully change government	45	12.0
Acquire territory or other valuables	59	15.5
Express frustration with violence	36	9.5
Overthrow government by force but maintain form of government	119	31.0
Overthrow form of government by force	88	23.0
Not available	9	2.5
	<u>380</u>	<u>100.0</u>

The two cases in which the threat party's objective was to preserve the status quo deserve explanation. One was the British-French-Israeli-Egyptian war of 1955 which was an apparent reaction by Israel to redress covert invasions and violence by Arab (threat party) marauders. The other was a violent series of demonstrations against President Arias of Panama in 1951, protesting his attempt to abrogate the constitution and culminating in a coup d'etat.

The attempts by the threat party to increase internal political control include such events as the pro-Peron riots in Argentina in 1953.

13. Outcomes

Table 11 indicates that three percent of the conflicts were continuing at the end of the period studied. Of this group, half were actually in progress at the end of the period and the other half were temporarily quiescent. One conflict in six of the whole sample terminated inconclusively. The threat party lost in 40 percent of all cases and won in 26 percent. The threat party made some gains but lost the conflict in 14 percent of the cases.

TABLE 11
OUTCOME BY WORLD LOCATION

<u>Location</u>	<u>Outcome Code</u>						<u>Totals</u>	<u>Percent</u>
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>		
Latin America	1	5	62	4	44	0	116	30
Europe	0	6	12	6	5	0	29	8
Near East	2	13	15	6	20	0	56	15
Africa	4	13	24	14	11	4	70	18
Asia (less S.E.Asia)	2	16	14	12	5	0	49	13
S. E. Asia	<u>3</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>16</u>
Totals	12	60	151	52	100	5	380	100
Percent	3	16	40	14	26	1		

Code

1. Conflict continuing
2. Conflict terminated inconclusively
3. Threat party lost
4. Threat party failed to achieve objective but secured some gain
5. Threat party won
6. Not known

The distribution of conflict outcomes by world location is given in table 11. The Near East is shown to be the only location where the threat party won more conflicts than it lost. The status quo party had its best win-loss ratios in Asia (less S.E. Asia), Europe and Africa.

14. Third Party Support

a. Identity

Table 12 identifies third party support, by time period, to the threat and status quo parties. The most significant fact from this table is that in 70 percent of the conflicts there was no significant third party support for either side.

In terms of numbers of conflicts, 75 percent of U.S. support was to status quo parties, whereas 81 percent of Communist support was to threat parties. U.N. and other international support, although shown to be usually for the status quo party, was generally applied in the interests of restoring order.

U.S. support to either party has become more frequent over the time period studied, again in terms of numbers. Communist support was only to threat parties in the immediate post war period but in later years they occasionally supported the status quo.

b. Nature of Support

Table 13 shows the nature of third party support, by time period, for threat and status quo party. For both parties, when support was provided, it was in the form of combatants in roughly half the cases. The only significant time trend has been the increase in military combatant support given to the status quo party.

15. Accessibility from the Sea

In determining the distance from the point of conflict to the nearest point of sea access, the point of conflict was taken as the key point in the conflict. In the conflicts where there appear to be no single key point at which the conflict was focused, an average was taken over the area in which combat took place. The nearest reasonable point of sea access normally was located in the Atlantic, Pacific or Indian Oceans or in the Caribbean or Mediterranean Seas, but in a few cases this distance was measured from adjoining bodies of water, such as the Persian Gulf or Adriatic Sea, and credited to the major sea or ocean,

Figure 11 provides a cumulative plot for the entire time period of the number of conflicts versus the sea access distance (in nautical miles). A large number of the conflicts took place close to navigable waters, 31 percent being within 20 miles and 42 percent within 50 miles. Only 13 percent of the conflicts had their setting at distances greater than 500 miles from sea coasts.

TABLE 12

IDENTIFICATION OF THIRD PARTY SUPPORT BY TIME PERIOD

<u>Support To:</u>	<u>Time Period</u>			<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>		
<u>Threat Party</u>					
United States	1	2	5	8	2
United Kingdom/ France	3	1	1	5	1
Communist Bloc	19	17	15	51	13
United Nations/Other International	1	1	1	3	1
Other Regional	14	13	17	44	12
Other extra-regional	1	0	2	3	1
No significant support	79	71	116	266	70
<u>Status Quo Party</u>					
United States	7	7	10	24	6
United Kingdom/France	10	8	13	31	8
Communist Bloc	0	8	4	12	4
United Nations/Other International	9	5	4	18	5
Other Regional	5	3	12	20	5
Other extra-regional	4	3	1	8	2
No significant support	83	71	113	267	70

TABLE 13

NATURE OF THIRD PARTY SUPPORT BY TIME PERIOD

<u>Type of Support</u>	<u>Time Period</u>			<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>		
<u>Status Quo Party</u>					
Non-military	10	2	9	21	6
Military non-combatant	10	13	7	30	8
Military combatant	15	19	27	61	16
Not known	3	1	5	9	2
Not applicable	80	70	109	259	68
<u>Threat Party</u>					
Non-military	7	4	7	18	5
Military non-combatant	14	8	16	38	10
Military combatant	16	18	18	52	14
Not known	4	3	6	13	3
Not applicable	77	72	110	259	68




FIG. 11: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF DISTANCES FROM POINT OF CONFLICT TO NEAREST SEA ACCESS

C. Geographical Aspects

1. Distribution of Conflicts by World Location

Figure 12 shows the world location of all the conflicts studied, by land area. The largest number of conflicts was in Latin America, with Africa and Southeast Asia being next.

The sea access to these many conflicts is shown in figure 13. Approximately 1/3 of all the conflicts were adjacent to the Indian Ocean. One in nine was adjacent to the South Atlantic and one in six to the Caribbean. One conflict in seven was located in an interior country.

2. Changing World Location of Conflicts

The frequency of conflicts changed differently in the various world locations over the 1946-64 time period. Table 14 shows that the decrease in total number of conflicts in period B as compared with period A resulted primarily from decreases in Latin America and Southeast Asia. The major increase in conflicts in period C over B resulted from a more than 200 percent increase in Africa, plus large increases in Latin America and Southeast Asia. In terms of proximity to various ocean areas, the large increases were in the Caribbean, Indian and the South Atlantic as shown in table 15. The number of conflicts in interior countries were 50 percent higher in period C than in period A.

3. Time Distribution of Conflict Types by World Location

Table 16 shows the change in number of conflicts of each type with time. In Latin America there was a significant increase in civil disorders, coups d'etat, military revolts, insurrections and unconventional invasions (included under "other international") from time period B to C. About 60 percent of conflicts in Latin America were civil disorders and coups d'etat. There was a gradual decrease in total conflicts in Europe over the three time periods, with no international conflicts in Period C. International conflicts constituted 23 percent of the conflicts in the Near East, although there was a decrease from period B to C. The significant increase in number of conflicts in Africa in period C resulted almost entirely from a large upsurge in civil disorders and coups d'etat as the number of new nations increased significantly. Over the 19 year span there were a larger number of guerrilla wars in Africa than in any of the other locations. The largest percentage (35 percent) of international wars occurred in Asia (less Southeast Asia). Border conflicts were particularly prevalent in this area. In Southeast Asia there was over a 100 percent increase in civil disorders and coups d'etat in period C over periods A and B. The other types of conflicts, taken as a group, decreased in number from period A to C.




FIG. 12: DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS BY MAJOR LAND AREAS




FIG. 13: DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS BY SEA OR OCEAN ACCESS

TABLE 14
WORLD LOCATION AND TIME DISTRIBUTION BY LAND AREA

<u>Location</u>	<u>Time Periods</u>			<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>		
Latin America	37	28	51	116	30
Europe	11	10	8	29	8
Near East	14	23	19	56	15
Africa	13	14	43	70	18
Asia (Less S. E.)	19	15	15	49	13
S. E. Asia	<u>24</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>16</u>
	118	105	157	380	100

TABLE 15
WORLD LOCATION AND TIME DISTRIBUTION BY SEA AREA

	<u>Total Number</u>	<u>Time Periods</u>			<u>70 Percent</u>
		<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	
Caribbean	66	19	16	31	17.4
S. W. Atlantic	20	9	11	22	11.1
S. E. Atlantic	22				
North Atlantic	11				
Mediterranean	61	17	24	20	16.0
W. Indian Ocean	11	45	34	50	33.9
N. W. Indian Ocean	26				
N. Indian Ocean	38				
E. Indian Ocean-S. China Sea	54				
W. Pacific	6	8	2	8	4.8
S. E. Pacific	12				
Interior	<u>53</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>13.9</u>
	380	118	105	157	100.0

TABLE 16
TIME DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS BY WORLD LOCATION
AND TYPE OF CONFLICT

TIME PERIOD

Type Conflict	A	B	C	Total	A	B	C	Total
LATIN AMERICA					AFRICA			
Civil Disorder	9	6	13	28	10	5	25	40
Coup d'etat	15	10	15	40	0	0	7	7
Military Revolt	3	2	8	13	0	1	3	4
Insurrection	6	6	9	21	0	0	1	1
Guerrilla War	1	1	0	2	3	6	4	13
Civil War	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Border War	1	1	0	2	0	1	2	3
Limited War	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other International	1	2	6	9	0	1	0	1
TOTAL	37	28	51	116	13	14	43	70
EUROPE					ASIA (Less S.E. Asia)			
Civil Disorder	5	4	3	12	7	8	5	20
Coup d'etat	2	0	2	4	1	0	3	4
Military Revolt	1	0	2	3	1	1	1	3
Insurrection	1	3	0	4	1	0	1	2
Guerrilla War	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	2
Civil War	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	1
Border War	0	2	0	2	3	3	4	10
Limited War	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Other International	1	0	0	1	4	2	0	6
TOTAL	11	10	8	29	19	15	15	49
NEAR EAST					SOUTHEAST ASIA			
Civil Disorder	2	5	4	11	2	4	5	11
Coup d'etat	4	6	7	17	4	2	9	15
Military Revolt	0	2	2	4	3	0	1	4
Insurrection	4	1	0	5	3	2	1	6
Guerrilla War	1	0	0	1	6	1	1	8
Civil War	0	2	3	5	1	5	1	7
Border War	1	5	2	8	2	0	1	3
Limited War	1	1	0	2	2	1	1	4
Other International	1	1	1	3	1	0	1	2
TOTAL	14	23	19	56	24	15	21	60

4. Conflict Range from the Sea by Major Oceans and Seas

About 86 percent of the conflicts that have occurred, table 17, are directly accessible from the sea. Of those in the Caribbean area, 97 percent were no more than 300 miles inland. In the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, over 60 percent of the conflicts were within 100 miles of the coastline and about 90 percent occurred at less than 300 miles. Also, note that almost one-half of the conflicts in the Atlantic were nearer than 20 miles from the sea. Most of the conflicts that could be reached from the Mediterranean Sea were within 300 miles, with more than 66 percent at a range less than 100 miles. About 60 percent of the indicated conflicts were within 100 miles of the Indian Ocean and 80 percent were within 300 miles. The category designated as "Interior" refers to those areas of conflict not directly accessible from the sea, thus normally requiring transit over or through another country. The coding format, however, resulted in two exceptions to this definition; these were Sudan and China. If the conflicts included in this category are assigned to the nearest ocean or sea, the distribution of sea access distances is as shown in table 18.

5. Conflict Range from the Sea by World Location

Nearly 85 percent of all of the conflicts considered have been within 300 miles from the coastline. About 51 percent of the conflicts in Latin America were at the sea's edge and nearly 87 percent were within 300 miles of the sea. In Europe 41 percent were at 20 miles or less and an additional 28 percent occurred in the 100-300 miles range. Relatively few conflicts in the Near East were immediately adjacent to the sea, but about 66 percent were at distances between 50 and 300 miles of the coast. In Africa, almost 80 percent of all the conflicts were over 50 miles inland, including some 20 percent that were over 500 miles. Distances in Asia (excluding Southeast Asia) are characterized by the extremes; almost 37 percent were within 20 miles of the coast while 35 percent were 500 miles or over from the sea. Eighty-two percent of the conflicts in Southeast Asia occurred within 100 miles of the coast, and about 97 percent within 300 miles. These data are shown in table 19.

D. United States and Communist Involvement

1. U.S. Involvement

Involvement of the United States in the conflicts studied was divided into 3 categories: no interest; interest but no action; and interest with action. The percentage of the 380 conflicts in each category is shown in figure 14.

Examples of conflicts in these categories are:

Category	Conflict Title
No interest	India - Navy Mutiny
Interest/no action	Berlin - Uprisings in Eastern Zone
Action	Greece - Civil War

U.S. action in a conflict does not necessarily mean U.S. military combatant activity. Other types of action that were coded were non-military support and military non-combatant participation.

TABLE 17

DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS BY SEA
ACCESS DISTANCE AND OCEANS/SEAS

Distance (r) (n. miles)	Caribbean	Atlantic	Pacific	Indian	Mediterranean	Interior
0 < r < 20	44	25	12	30	2	4
20 < r < 50	10	2	9	17	4	0
50 < r < 100	5	5	23	28	6	0
100 < r < 300	5	14	13	30	5	15
300 < r < 500	0	4	0	10	1	9
500 < r < 999	0	1	0	14	0	23
r > 999	2	2	4	0	0	2

TABLE 18

DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS BY SEA
ACCESS DISTANCE AND OCEANS/SEAS*

Distance (r) (n. miles)	Caribbean	Atlantic	Pacific	Indian	Mediterranean
0 < r < 20	44	26	12	30	2
20 < r < 50	10	2	9	17	4
50 < r < 100	5	5	23	28	6
100 < r < 300	5	17	31	30	6
300 < r < 500	0	5	1	13	1
500 < r < 999	0	9	0	30	0
r > 999					

*Conflicts in interior countries are assigned to the nearest ocean or sea.

TABLE 19

DISTRIBUTION OF DISTANCES FROM POINT
OF CONFLICT TO NEAREST SEA ACCESS

Distance (r) (n. miles)	Latin America	Europe	Near East	Africa	Asia	S.E.Asia
r < 20	59	12	3	14	18	11
20 < r < 50	12	3	8	1	4	14
50 < r < 100	9	1	19	12	2	24
100 < r < 300	21	8	18	18	8	9
300 < r < 500	5	1	5	11	0	2
500 < r < 999	5	0	3	14	16	0
r > 999	5	4	0	0	1	0




FIG. 14: U.S. INVOLVEMENT, ALL CONFLICTS

Figure 15 shows the total number of conflicts in progress at any time, plus the number of conflicts in which the United States had interest but took no action, and the number of conflicts in which the United States acted. The total number of conflicts is repeated from figure 5. The number of interest/no action conflicts rose steadily in the post-war period until the middle 50's, after which it fluctuated about a level of 7 or 8 simultaneous conflicts. These conflicts (interest/no action) formed an increasing fraction of all conflicts in progress in the last few years, since the total number of simultaneous conflicts has decreased somewhat.

The number of conflicts in which the U.S. was involved at any time decreased steadily in the post-war period, reaching a minimum in the middle '50's. From 1954 to 1959 there were many months when the United States was not engaged in any conflict. Since 1958 the trend has been upward and the United States is currently engaged in 3 or 4 conflicts at any time.

The conflicts in which the United States acted are listed by geographical area and by date of origin in table 20. The table gives the identification number for each conflict as well as the date of initiation and a descriptive title. The identification numbers are provided for use with a later table.

Roughly 1/3rd of the conflicts in which the United States acted were in Latin America, slightly more than a third were in South-East Asia, and the rest were widespread, as shown in table 21.

During the period studied, the United States was involved in every type of conflict as shown by table 21. Most of the United States participation was in internal conflicts with civil disorders, coups and civil wars accounting for most of the action. Table 21 also shows the distribution of conflict types in which the United States participated, by area.




FIG. 15: NUMBER OF CONFLICTS IN PROGRESS

TABLE 20
CONFLICTS IN WHICH UNITED STATES ACTED
ARRANGED BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA AND DATE OF ORIGIN

LATIN AMERICA

209	471210	PANAMA RIOTS
228	491120	PANAMA-SUCCESSFUL POLICE COUP FOLLOWED BY DISORDERS
258	501030	PUERTO RICO-NATIONALIST UPRISING
107	540618	GUATEMALA-INVASION BY US SUPPORTED INSURGENTS
071	550111	COSTA RICA-NICARAGUAN INVASION USING COSTA RICAN NATIONALS
231	590426	PANAMA-INVASION BY CUBAN AND PANAMANIAN INSURGENTS
232	591103	PANAMA-ANTI US RIOTS
222	601109	NICARAGUA-ABORTIVE CUBAN-BACKED INVASION BY EXILES IN COSTA RICA
256	610123	PORTUGAL-SANTA MARIA INCIDENT
077	610517	CUBA-BAY OF PIGS INVASION
083	610701	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-DISORDERS AFTER TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION
249	620718	PERU-MILITARY COUP SIEZES POWER AFTER HAYA DE LA TORRE ELECTED
078	621022	CUBA-THE MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962
116	631003	HONDURAS-VILLEDA MORALES DISPLACED BY MILITARY COUP
233	640109	PANAMA-ANTI US RIOTS TRIGGERED BY STUDENT FLAG RAISING

EUROPE

105	460101	GREECE-CIVIL WAR
253	470119	POLAND-COMMUNIST TAKEOVER
016	480714	BERLIN-1948 BLOCKADE AND AIRLIFT
080	631221	CYPRUS CIVIL WAR

NEAR EAST

152	460101	ISRAEL-WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
238	461016	IRAN-RUSSIAN SUPPORTED REBELLION IN AZERBAIJAN
349	511015	BRITISH-EGYPTIAN SUEZ CANAL ZONE CONFLICT
350	550703	PRE-SUEZ BRITISH-FRENCH-ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN WAR
351	561029	SUEZ WAR BETWEEN EGYPT AND ENGLAND, FRANCE, ISRAEL
157	570413	JORDAN-ALLEGED ARMY PLOT AND INTERNAL DISORDERS
290	570915	SYRIA-TURKEY
195	580509	LEBANON- CIVIL WAR

TABLE 20 (cont'd)

AFRICA	
040 600706	CONGO(L) CIVIL WAR
ASIA (LESS S.E. ASIA)	
052 460101	CHINA-CIVIL WAR
053 540903	CHINA-QUEMOY-MATSU-TACHEN ISLANDS-NANCHI SHELLING
056 580823	CHINA-FORMOSA+QUEMOY CRISES
S.E. ASIA	
251 460101	PHILIPPINE GUERRILLA WAR
328 461120	VIETNAM-WAR WITH FRANCE
165 490515	KOREA-BORDER CLASHES BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
166 500625	KOREAN WAR
161 520501	JAPAN-UPRISING
329 550329	SOUTH VIETNAM-INTERNAL UNREST
187 590716	LAOS-GUERRILLA ACTION NEAR NORTH VIETNAM BORDER
331 591201	SOUTH VIETNAM-VIET CONG GUERRILLA WAR
167 600315	SO. KOREA - RIOTS FOLLOWING RE-ELECTION OF RHEE
191 601129	LAOS-CIVIL WAR - PHOUMI NOSOVAN V. 'NEUTRALISTS'/PATHET LAO
168 610516	SOUTH KOREA-MILITARY COUP
335 630505	SOUTH VIETNAM-BUDDIST PROTEST CAMPAIGN
333 631101	SOUTH VIETNAM-MILITARY COUP (DIEM)
375 640310	CAMBODIA-SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER INCIDENTS
194 640419	LAOS- RIGHT WING MILITARY COUP
338 640802	NORTH VIETNAM- ATTACKS ON US DESTROYERS AND RETALIATION
336 640913	SOUTH VIETNAM-ABORTIVE MILITARY COUP
373 641220	SOUTH VIETNAM-CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT OVERTHROWN

TABLE 21
CONFLICTS IN WHICH UNITED STATES PARTICIPATED, BY TYPE AND AREA

<u>Conflict type</u>	<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Near East</u>	<u>Africa</u>	<u>Asia (-S.E.)</u>	<u>S.E. Asia</u>	<u>Total</u>
Internal							
Civil Disorder	5	-	-	-	-	4	9
Coup d'etat	3	1	-	-	-	5	9
Revolt/Mutiny	1	-	1	-	-	-	2
Insurrection	3	-	1	-	-	-	4
Guerrilla War	-	-	1	-	-	3	4
Civil war	-	2	1	1	1	2	7
SUBTOTAL	<u>12</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>35</u>
International							
Border War	-	-	1	-	-	2	3
Limited War	-	-	1	-	-	2	3
Covert Invasion	2	-	-	-	1	-	3
Blockade	1	1	1	-	1	-	4
Show of Force	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
SUBTOTAL	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>14</u>
GRAND TOTAL	15	4	8	1	3	18	49
Percent	31	8	16	2	6	37	100

In nearly a third of the cases in which the United States took action, the action was limited to non-military support of one side or the other. In 42 percent of the cases non-combatant military support was provided. In 29 percent of the cases combatant military action was taken. The distribution of specific types of action is shown in table 22.

In the conflicts in which the United States acted, there was naval involvement in 14 cases. Two non-combatant actions out of 6 involving show of force were made with naval units. In the cases where military combat actually took place, all but 2 of the conflicts used naval forces. The particular applications are shown in table 22.

In 9 of the 49 conflicts in which the United States participated, support was given to the threat party. In 33 cases, support was given to the status quo and in 7 cases the conflict involved only the United States and one other party. When the United States supported the threat party it won in every case except one, the Bay of Pigs affair. When the United States supported the status quo, the score was roughly even. The status quo won slightly more than it lost but there were many more inconclusive or half-won outcomes. When the United States supported itself the threat party never won. The facts just stated are shown in table 23 with the identification numbers given for each of the conflicts.

TABLE 22
TYPE OF U. S. ACTION

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Cases Of Naval Action</u>
<u>Non-Military Support</u>			
Propaganda, threats	2	4	
Diplomatic	11	23	
Social/economic	1	2	
<u>Military, Non-Combatant</u>			
Police action	6	12	
Material support	9	19	
Threat/show of force	6	12	2
<u>Military Combatant</u>			
Unofficial/covert	3	6	2
Limited combat forces	2	4	1
Limited strategic support	5	10	5
Full range of operations	<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>4</u>
	49	100	14

TABLE 23

INFLUENCE ON OUTCOME OF U. S. PARTICIPATION
(by conflict identification number)

<u>U.S. Supported</u>	<u>Conflict</u>		<u>Threat Party</u>			<u>Total</u>
	<u>Cont.</u>	<u>Inconcl.</u>	<u>Lost</u>	<u>$\frac{1}{2}/\frac{1}{2}$*</u>	<u>Won</u>	
Threat Party	375	290	077	335	083	9
					228	
					107	
					167	
					333	
Status Quo	040	080	256	349	249	33
	331	238	231	329	116	
		351	222	056	253	
		053	071	194	152	
		187	105	191	195	
		165	016	350	052	
			157		373	
			336		168	
			166		328	
			251			
Itself			232	233		
			209			
			258			
			078			
			161			
			338			
						<u>7</u>
						49

* threat party lost but made appreciable gains

Table 24 shows the distribution of conflicts in which the United States had an interest but took no action, both by type of conflict and by area of the world. Of the 199 such conflicts roughly 1/3 were in Latin America and most of these were internal conflicts. About five out of six of all the conflicts in this category were internal. Over half the total were civil disorders and coups. Of the 36 international conflicts in which the United States had an interest, 20 were border conflicts in which it would have been difficult to effect a resolution.

TABLE 24
CONFLICTS IN WHICH UNITED STATES HAD INTEREST
BUT TOOK NO ACTION, BY TYPE AND AREA

<u>Conflict type</u>	<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Near East</u>	<u>Africa</u>	<u>Asia (-S.E.)</u>	<u>S.E. Asia</u>	<u>Total</u>
Internal							
Civil Disorder	20	11	5	14	8	3	61
Coup d'etat	20	2	9	4	-	5	40
Revolt/Mutiny	8	1	2	1	1	2	15
Insurrection	12	3	4	1	2	2	24
Guerrilla War	-	-	4	8	1	3	15
Civil War	-	-	4	-	-	4	8
							<u>163</u>
International							
Border War	2	1	7	2	8	-	20
Limited War	-	-	1	-	1	2	4
Covert Invasion	4	-	-	1	2	3	10
Blockade	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Show of Force	1	-	1	-	-	-	2
	<u>69</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>199</u>

Of the 49 conflicts in which the United States acted there was Communist support for one side or the other in 23 cases. In 19 cases the Communists were supporting the threat party and in four cases they supported the status quo. The latter group includes USSR support of: Guatemala in an invasion by U.S. -supported insurgents; Syria in the 1957 conflict with Turkey; Egypt in the 1956 conflict with England, France and Israel; and PRC support of Cambodia in border clashes with South Vietnam in 1964.

2. Communist Involvement

The involvement of Communist internal groups or Communist nations in the 380 conflicts has been determined by analysis of the data for the following variables: motivation, threat and status quo identification (I.D.) numbers, and third party support identification (I.D.) numbers. The coding was such that for certain variables Communist influence was noted only if it were the principal factor operating in the subject area covered by the variable. An example was conflict #370, "Columbia-Banditry and Guerrilla Fighting." Communist influence is not indicated by the coding (even though local Communists were active in attempting to exploit the outbreak of violence) because the coding reflects the fundamental issue, which was the struggle between the liberal and conservative political groups. Therefore, while the conflicts included in the ensuing tables do not set forth a precise tally of every conflict in which Communist groups had some interest or participation, they are believed to present a substantially correct indication of those conflicts in which Communist influence or participation played a major role.

Communist involvement in internal and international conflicts by time periods (starting dates) is shown in table 25. These conflicts total 84, about 22 percent of all conflicts of the 1946-64 period.

TABLE 25
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT 1946-64

	Number of Conflicts (by Starting Date)		
	Period A (Jan. 1946-Apr. 1952)	Period B (May 1952-Aug. 1958)	Period C (Sept. 1958-Dec. 1964)
Internal Conflicts	24	17	20
International Conflicts	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>
Total	29	26	29

A more detailed breakdown of these conflicts, including distribution by type of conflict and world location, is shown in table 26.

Most of the types of conflicts were nearly uniformly distributed over the three time periods. Exceptions were noted in the upsurge of international conflicts in the 1952-58 period and in the fact that four of the five guerrilla wars were initiated in the first time period.

TABLE 26

CONFLICTS INVOLVING SIGNIFICANT COMMUNIST INFLUENCE
(For each type of conflict, world location, and time period)

Type of Conflict	Latin America	Europe	Near East	Africa	Asia (less S.E.Asia)	Southeast Asia	Totals
PERIOD A	Civil Dis-order	5	3		1		9
	Coup D'etat		2				2
	Military Revolt	1	1			1	3
	Insurrection	1		2		1	4
	Guerrilla War					4	4
	Civil War		1		1		2
	Border Conflict				2	1	3
	Limited War					1	1
	Other International Conflict		1				1
	SUB TOTAL	7	8	2	4	8	29
PERIOD B	Civil Dis-order	1	3		2	3	9
	Coup D'etat	1					1
	Military Revolt			1	1		2
	Insurrection		2				2
	Guerrilla War						0
	Civil War					3	3
	Border Conflict		1	2			3
	Limited War			1		1	2
	Other International Conflict	1		1	2		4
	SUB TOTAL	3	6	5	5	7	26
PERIOD C	Civil Dis-order	7				1	8
	Coup D'etat	1		1			3
	Military Revolt	2		1	1		4
	Insurrection	3					3
	Guerrilla War					1	1
	Civil War					1	1
	Border Conflict				3	1	5
	Limited War					1	1
	Other International Conflict	1				2	3
	SUB TOTAL	14	0	2	4	7	29
TOTALS	24	14	9	2	13	22	84

The distribution of the conflicts by geographical location was as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Latin America	29
Europe	17
Near East	11
Africa	2
Asia (less S. E. Asia)	15
Southeast Asia	26

It was of interest to note that major Communist influence in African conflicts is not indicated until the most recent of the three time periods. The data presented in table 26 also indicates a continuing decrease of Communist influence in conflicts in Europe and a significant increase in the most recent period in Latin America.

Communist third party support occurred in 63 of the 84 conflicts in this sample. The source of this support and the time period in which it was provided (by conflict starting dates) is shown in table 27.

TABLE 27
COMMUNIST THIRD PARTY SUPPORT

<u>Provided by</u>	<u>Number of Conflicts</u>					
	<u>Period A</u>		<u>Period B</u>		<u>Period C</u>	
	<u>To Threat Party</u>	<u>To S.Q. Party</u>	<u>To Threat Party</u>	<u>To S.Q. Party</u>	<u>To Threat Party</u>	<u>To S.Q. Party</u>
General Communist Nations	10	0	13	2	12	2
Russia	8	0	4	5	3	1
Peoples Republic of China	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
Totals	19	0	17	8	15	4
U.S.(to opposing party)	0	6	2	4	1	4

Third party support solely by Red China is shown to have occurred in very few conflicts. Russia's support (viewed as a single supplier) in terms of numbers of conflicts was shown to decrease substantially in the most recent time period. However, USSR support or P.R.C. support are included in several cases of general Communist support. A rather striking feature of this data is the changing aspect of the party supported. The support went completely to the threat party in conflicts in the 1946-52 time frame but shifted to aid to status quo parties (half of which were incumbent Communist regimes) in substantial numbers in the last two periods. U.S. support was provided in opposition to Communist support in over 20 percent of these conflicts.

Figure 16 shows the number of in-progress internal and international conflicts in which there was Communist involvement. The peak numbers of internal and external conflicts in progress in any month are shown to be 8 and 4, respectively. The annual average number of conflicts occurring simultaneously, computed on a monthly basis, are provided in table 28.

TABLE 28
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CONFLICTS IN PROGRESS
HAVING COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT

<u>Year</u>	<u>Internal Conflicts</u>	<u>International Conflicts</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Internal Conflicts</u>	<u>International Conflicts</u>
1946	3.8	0.0	1956	2.0	3.0
1947	4.6	0.1	1957	2.1	2.2
1948	6.3	0.5	1958	1.8	1.9
1949	5.3	0.8	1959	2.2	1.8
1950	4.1	0.8	1960	1.8	1.3
1951	2.0	1.7	1961	2.2	1.3
1952	2.3	1.0	1962	2.0	1.0
1953	2.9	0.8	1963	2.3	0.9
1954	2.7	1.3	1964	2.2	2.3
1955	2.4	3.3			

The total number of concurrent conflicts, based on these averages, ranged from a low of 3.0 conflicts in 1962 to a high of 6.8 in 1948. Looking at the average total number of concurrent conflicts on the basis of the three previously introduced time periods, the number decreased from 4.90 in period A (1946-52) to 4.32 in period B (1952-58) and to 3.67 in period C (1958-64).

The outcomes of conflicts in which there was Communist involvement are given in table 29. This table identifies type of conflict, time period, and the party with which the Communists were aligned. A summary of the Communist success record is as follows:

<u>Time Period</u>	<u>Won</u>	<u>Lost</u>	<u>Percent Won</u>
A	5	16	24
B	4	9	31
C	4	12	25

The conflicts in the above table are only those in which one party clearly won and hence do not include inconclusive or "tie" results.




FIG. 16: NUMBER OF CONFLICTS WITH COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT 1946-1964

TABLE 29

DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES OF CONFLICTS HAVING COMMUNIST INVOLVEMENT

Type of Conflict	Number of Conflicts						TOTAL	
	Involved with Threat Party			Involved with S.Q. Party			Outcomes For Comm. Party	Lost
	S.Q. Won	Threat Won	Other Outcomes	S.Q. Won	Threat Won	Other Outcomes		
Period A	Civil Disorders	6		3				6
	Coup D'Etat		2				2	
	Military Revolt	2	1				1	2
	Insurrection	3		1				3
	Guerrilla War	2	1	1			1	2
	Civil War	1	1				1	1
	Border Conflict		2					
	Limited War	1						1
	Other International Conflict	1						1
Period B	Civil Disorders	6		2		1		6
	Coup D'Etat	1						1
	Military Revolt	1		1			1	1
	Insurrection			1		1	1	
	Guerrilla War							
	Civil War		2	1			1	
	Border Conflict							
	Limited War		1	1		2	1	
	Other International Conflict			3	1			1
Period C	Civil Disorders	5	1	2			1	5
	Coup D'Etat	1	1				1	2
	Military Revolt	1	1	1	1		2	1
	Insurrection	3						3
	Guerrilla War			1				
	Civil War			1				
	Border Conflict			1				
	Limited War	1				2		1
	Other International Conflict			2				
TOTALS		35	9	23	4	2	6	37

When Communist involvement was with the threat party, that party won 9 and lost 35 (20 percent won). Communist involvement in the case of the status quo party produced 4 wins and 2 losses, or 67 percent won. Communist involvement was most successful in coups d'etat and military revolts; in each case the Communist group won 50 percent of the conflicts that were clearly won by one side. At the other extreme, the Communist party won only 1 of 18 civil disorders in which it was involved (all with the threat party). In the case of those conflicts in which Communist involvement consisted of third party support being provided by a Communist nation, the resulting record was 11 wins and 27 losses, or 29 percent won.

E. Characteristics of Conflicts

The objective of this section is to describe the characteristics of the various types of conflicts in terms of the pertinent variables used in the coding. The conflict types will therefore be characterized, based on the collected data, with regard to their most fundamental dimensions, including size, length, intensity, military resources committed, objectives, and results. First, the data on each variable will be presented for all types of conflicts. Then each type of conflict will be covered in terms of all of its variables. Trends with time will be discussed where significant.

1. Description by Variables

a. Conflict Size

(1) Force Size

Force sizes for both parties are shown in figures 17a, b, c in terms of their cumulative distributions. The curves in these figures indicate that percent of conflicts of the designated type that have force sizes of the related abscissa value (logarithmic scale) or higher. In computing percentages, only those conflicts in which a party's force size was known were used.

Force sizes were known for the threat party in 32 percent of civil disorders; for the status quo party in only 8 percent. The 50 percent point for both curves was at roughly the same force size level, but the range of threat party force sizes extended to higher levels than that for the status quo party.

Force sizes for the status quo party in coups d'etat were unusually low, with 87 percent being reported as 10 men or less. This reflects the fact that in many coups d'etat no support is observed for the few individuals in political control at the time of the coup. Force sizes were known in only about 30 percent of coups.

Force sizes for the status quo party, in the limited number of conflicts where known, were higher in military revolts than were the threat party force sizes. Also, in insurrections the median (50 percent point) status quo force size exceeded that of the threat party.




FIG. 17a: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF FORCE SIZES
FOR STATUS QUO AND THREAT PARTIES,
AS A FUNCTION OF CONFLICT TYPE




FIG. 17b: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF FORCE SIZES
FOR STATUS QUO AND THREAT PARTIES,
AS A FUNCTION OF CONFLICT TYPE




FIG. 17c: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF FORCE SIZES
FOR STATUS QUO AND THREAT PARTIES,
AS A FUNCTION OF CONFLICT TYPE

Status quo party force sizes were considerably larger than threat party force sizes in guerrilla wars. It was possible to estimate force sizes of one or both parties in over 50 percent of conflicts of this type. In civil wars the majority of force sizes for both parties involved 10,000 - 100,000 participants.

Forces in limited wars (conventional frontal international conflicts) were large, being above 10,000 participants in most cases. Limited wars, guerrilla wars, and civil wars were the types of conflicts involving the largest force sizes. Because of the magnitude and importance of these conflicts, they were well reported and force sizes were usually available.

(2) Fatalities

Cumulative distributions of total fatalities for each type of conflict are shown in figures 18a, b. Included in these distributions are 330 conflicts for which fatalities could be estimated. The smallest fatality levels occurred in coups d'etat; 55 percent of coups resulted in no fatalities and 85 percent experienced 10 fatalities or less. Also, in the case of other international conflicts, which include blockades and show of force, over 30 percent of the conflicts involved no fatalities.

The distributions for civil disorders, military revolts, insurrections, and border conflicts were similar; the median value in each was slightly greater than 10 fatalities. The major fatality levels took place in guerrilla wars, civil wars, and limited wars. No guerrilla wars involved less than 100 fatalities, and only one civil war and two limited wars resulted in as few as 100 deaths. The only conflicts that were known to have resulted in over 100,000 fatalities were four guerrilla wars and one limited war. Conflicts that produced 10,000 to 100,000 fatalities were one insurrection, two guerrilla wars, and one civil war. Only 2.7 percent of the 330 conflicts involved total fatalities of 10,000 or more. In this connection it may be noted that fatality totals were not known in about 36 percent of the guerrilla and civil wars.

(3) Disruptive Effects

The variable disruptive effects was introduced into the coding procedure to provide a means of assessing the size or scope of the conflict in terms of its effect on normal civilian activities. The data on disruptive effects are presented in table 30. By far the least disruptive type of conflict was the coup d'etat; about 65 percent of such conflicts produced no substantial interruptions of the civilian mode of life. About 60 percent of the civil disorders, military revolts, border conflicts, and other international conflicts (generally non-frontal international conflicts) produced substantial disruptions in local areas (e.g., in a city) only. However, about 70 percent of guerrilla and civil wars and 85 percent of limited wars resulted in widespread (often country-wide) disruptive effects. Insurrections were the type of conflict that was most evenly distributed across all three categories of disruptive effects.

b. Duration

In figures 19a, b, and c cumulative distributions of conflict warning times and durations as a function of conflict type are plotted.




FIG. 18a: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF FATALITIES:
PERCENT OF CONFLICTS HAVING N FATALITIES OR GREATER




FIG. 18b: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF FATALITIES:
PERCENT OF CONFLICTS HAVING N FATALITIES OR GREATER

TABLE 30
DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF CONFLICTS BY
DISRUPTIVE EFFECTS FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT

Type of Conflict	Total	No Substan- tial Effects		Disruptive Effects				Not Known	
				Localized		Widespread			
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Civil Disorder	122	14	11.5	76	62.3	31	25.4	1	0.8
Coup D'etat	87	58	66.7	22	24.1	7	8.1	1	1.1
Military Revolt	31	9	29.0	19	61.3	3	9.7	0	0.0
Insurrection	39	13	33.4	16	41.0	10	25.6	0	0.0
Guerrilla War	27	0	0.0	8	29.6	19	70.4	0	0.0
Civil War	17	2	11.8	3	17.6	12	70.6	0	0.0
Border War	28	9	32.1	17	60.8	2	7.1	0	0.0
Limited War	7	1	14.3	1	14.3	5	71.4	0	0.0
Other International Conflicts	22	8	36.4	12	54.5	2	9.1	0	0.0




FIG. 19a: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF WARNING TIMES AND CONFLICT DURATIONS, AS A FUNCTION OF CONFLICT TYPES




FIG. 19b: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF WARNING TIMES AND CONFLICT DURATIONS, AS A FUNCTION OF CONFLICT TYPE




FIG. 19c: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF WARNING TIMES AND CONFLICT DURATIONS, AS A FUNCTION OF CONFLICT TYPE

The cumulative distribution functions for the conflict durations appear to fall into three types of distribution. Civil disorders, coups d'etat, military revolts, and insurrections show cumulative distribution functions characterized by relatively short durations. About 60 percent of coups d'etat terminated within one day, over 94 percent within one week. In excess of 77 percent of military revolts were over within one week. About 70 percent of civil disorders and insurrections lasted one month or less. Border wars, limited wars, and other international conflicts show somewhat longer durations, 50 percent of these types of conflicts lasting from one month up to about 10 weeks. Finally, guerrilla wars and civil wars show the greatest durations with 50 percent or more lasting longer than 100 weeks. About 44 percent of guerrilla wars lasted 5 years or more.

The data on duration and sea access range were examined to see whether there was a difference in duration of conflicts of each type related to the distance from the ocean. The conclusion was negative.

c. Conflict Pace

(1) Tempo of Operations

The data on the tempo of operations of each type of conflict are displayed in table 31. Civil disorders are shown to be characterized by either single or sporadic engagements, while the largest number of coups d'etat involved no actual engagement of forces. Roughly 50 percent of military revolts and insurrections were classed as single engagements lasting for the duration of the conflict. Guerrilla wars, many of which were lengthy, normally involved continual separate engagements and many had escalation. Civil wars and border wars were usually sporadic in tempo or involved continual engagements without noticeable escalation. Limited wars and covert invasions had diverse operational tempos, but many were judged to be best described as single engagements at one or more locations. A total of 5 blockade or show of force international situations involved no actual engagement of force.

(2) Fatality Rate

Fatality rate, number of fatalities per day of conflict duration, provides another measure of the pace or intensity of the type of conflict. On the basis of median fatality rate, limited war at 33.0 was by far the most violent form of conflict considered. The maximum fatality rate for limited war was about 142. Military revolts and insurrections, with respective median rates of 8.3 and 7.6, ranked next, though their maximum rates of approximately 1500 fatalities per day were over ten times that of limited war. The median fatality rate of civil disorders was near 2.3, with a highest rate nearly 1100. The civil war median was 5.4, and it had a range of from 0.9 to over 34.0. Guerrilla war produced fatality rates as large as 76, but the median rate was a low of 1.4. Because this type of conflict had very long duration periods, the total number of fatalities resulting tended to be much greater than for other modes of conflict. A median casualty rate of 1.0 was noted for border conflicts; an isolated example yielded a maximum rate of 312.5. The lowest median casualty rate, 0.6, was obtained from the other international conflicts category. Cumulative distributions of fatality rate are shown in figures 20 a, b, and c.

TABLE 31

TEMPO OF OPERATIONS AS A
FUNCTION OF CONFLICT TYPES

Conflict Type	Code*						<u>Totals</u>
	1	2	3	4	5	N.A.	
Civil Disorder	1	69	42	4	1	5	122
Coup D'etat	42	12	30	0	1	2	87
Military revolt	4	5	17	3	2	0	31
Insurrection	3	8	18	10	0	0	39
Guerrilla War	0	5	0	10	12	0	27
Civil War	0	8	1	7	1	0	17
Border War	2	17	3	5	1	0	28
Limited War	0	2	3	1	1	0	7
Covert Invasion	1	4	7	3	1	0	15
Blockade	2	1	0	0	1	0	4
Show of force	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
	<u>58</u>	<u>130</u>	<u>121</u>	<u>43</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>380</u>

*1 No engagement of force

2 Sporadic engagements

3 Single engagement at one or more locations lasting duration of conflict

4 Continual separate engagements without a clear increase in magnitude or intensity

5 Continual separate engagements with apparent "escalation."

N.A. Data unavailable






FIG. 20a: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF FATALITY RATES






FIG. 20b: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF FATALITY RATES






FIG. 20c: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF FATALITY RATES

d. Warning Time

The cumulative distributions of warning times for each type of conflict were shown previously in figures 19a, b, c. Sixty percent or more of civil disorders, coups d'etat, military revolts, insurrections, guerrilla wars, and other international conflicts has essentially zero warning time. Seventy to eighty percent of conflicts of these types had warning times of no greater than one day. Also, 29 percent of border conflicts and 43 percent of limited wars had zero warning times. The distribution of warning times for civil wars differed from that of the other types: 13 percent were zero warning, 13 percent one day warning, and 50 percent had over 50 days warning time. A detailed compilation of warning times is provided in table 32.

e. Motivation

Political reasons provided the most common motivation of the party attempting to alter the status quo. In conflicts where the motivation was known, political motivation was considered to be most important in 35 percent of civil disorders, 90 percent of coups d'etat, 60 percent of military revolts, 68 percent of insurrections, 31 percent of guerrilla wars and 40 percent of civil wars. Ethnic motivation was deemed to be primary in over 10 percent of civil disorders, military revolts, guerrilla wars, civil wars, border conflicts, and international limited wars. Religious motivation was noted in 5 percent of civil disorders. Economic factors motivated 13 percent of civil disorders. Nationalism was a motivation in conflicts of every type except military revolts and civil wars. Territorial gain was the major motivation in over 60 percent of border conflicts, over 40 percent of limited wars, 50 percent of covert invasions, 25 percent of blockades, and 33 percent of shows of force (threat conflicts). Ideological (Communist) motivations occurred significantly in every category of conflict except border conflicts; it was present in 20 percent of military revolts, 33 percent of civil wars, and almost 15 percent of blockade and threat (international) conflicts. The distribution of conflict motivations is provided in table 33.

f. Ultimate Objective

The data on the ultimate objective of the threat party are shown for each type of conflict in table 34. The two cases in which the objective was to preserve the status quo were commented on in paragraph II.B.12. Increase of internal political control was the objective of the threat party in only a few conflicts. Reform of government policy or lawful change of governing party occurred frequently (about 25 percent) in civil disorders and was also judged to be the objective of 20 percent of military revolts. The objective of acquiring territory (or other valuable interests) was most noticeable in border wars, where it occurred in 26 of 28 conflicts. Most of the cases of violent expression of frustration applied to civil disorders. The two most common objectives involved overthrow of the government by force. The objective in about 65 percent of coups d'etat was overthrow of the government but with the desire to maintain the current form of government. In almost 70 percent of guerrilla wars, however, the threat party wished to change the form of government by force; this correlates well with the previous observation that a large percentage of guerrilla wars are motivated by nationalist or ideological factors.

TABLE 32
WARNING TIME VERSUS TYPE OF CONFLICT 1946-64

Warning Time (In Days)	Civil Disorder	Coup D'etat	Military Revolt & Mutiny	Insur- rection	Guerrilla War	Civil War	Border War	Limited War	Other Internat. Conflicts
0	76	45	19	24	12	2	11	3	10
1	10	8	1	1	1	2	-	1	-
2	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
3	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4	2	2	1	1	-	1	-	-	-
5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
6	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
7	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
8	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
10	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	2
11-20	-	-	1	2	2	1	1	-	-
21-30	4	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	-
31-40	2	0	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
41-50	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
51-60	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	-
61-70	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
71-80	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
81-90	1	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-
91-97	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
98 or more	5	1	1	3	4	5	2	1	2
Not known	15	19	5	5	8	2	8	-	5
	<u>122</u>	<u>87</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>22</u>

TABLE 33

DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF CONFLICTS BY MOTIVATION
FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT

Type of Conflict	MOTIVATION								
	Ethnic	Religious	Economic	Nationalist	Political	Territorial Gain	Ideological	Other Sociological	Not Clear/ Unavailable
Civil Disorder	22	6	14	12	39	0	16	1	12
Coup D'etat	0	0	1	2	66	0	4	0	14
Military Revolt	3	0	2	0	15	0	5	0	6
Insurrection	1	0	2	3	22	1	3	0	7
Guerrilla War	3	0	2	9	8	1	3	0	1
Civil War	3	0	0	0	6	1	5	0	2
Border War	4	1	0	2	3	16	0	0	2
Limited War	1	0	0	2	0	3	1	0	0
Other International Conflicts	0	1	0	3	5	7	3	0	3

TABLE 34

DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF CONFLICTS BY ULTIMATE
OBJECTIVE OF THE THREAT PARTY FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT

ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE (SEE KEY)

TYPE OF CONFLICT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Civil Disorder	0	9	30	10	33	18	16	6
Coup D'etat	1	2	2	1	0	56	24	1
Military Revolt	0	2	6	1	1	14	6	1
Insurrection	0	2	3	6	0	19	9	0
Guerrilla War	0	2	1	3	1	2	18	0
Civil War	0	1	2	5	1	2	6	0
Border War	0	1	0	26	0	0	1	0
Limited War	0	0	0	1	0	1	5	0
Other International Conflicts	1	3	1	6	0	7	3	1

KEY:

1. Preserve the Status Quo
2. Increase Internal Political Control
3. Reform Government Policy or Lawfully Change Governing Party
4. Acquire Territory or Other Valuable Interests with or without Overthrowing Government
5. Violent Expression of Frustration
6. Overthrow Existing Government by Force but Maintain Current Form of Government
7. Overthrow Existing Form of Government by Force
8. Not Known

g. Participants

(1) Party Identification

The major participating groups comprising the threat and status quo parties are presented in tables 35 and 36. The status quo party in every type of conflict was virtually always a legitimate central government. Considerable diversity existed in the make-up of the threat party. Military forces disassociated from the legitimate government were the threat party in a large percentage of coups d'etat, military revolts, and civil wars. Nationalist forces were predominant in guerrilla wars. Indigenous communist forces initiated at least one conflict in each type of internal conflict; communist parties were particularly noticeable in terms of percentage of conflicts in guerrilla and civil wars. The threat party was a politically based group in over 40 percent of the insurrections. An ethnically or religiously based group was noted in a significant number of civil disorders, insurrections, guerrilla wars, and civil wars. Socially or economically based groups were involved in civil disorders and insurrections. In most international conflicts the threat party was a non-colonial government.

(2) Third Party Support

Countries providing support to conflict participants are shown in tables 37 and 38 for each type of conflict. These tables also indicate the change in each country's third party participation over the three time periods. It is of interest to note the increasing United States role in providing support, both to threat and status quo parties. United Kingdom or French support has been preponderantly for the status quo party, often former colonies or protectorates. Communist support (general, USSR, or PRC) has been heavily on the side of the threat party, although increased support for status quo parties is noted in the last two time periods. The support of international organizations, although coded most often on the status quo side, has usually been applied to restore order between parties. Each party operated without outside support in about two-thirds of the conflicts.

Third party support examined from the standpoint of world location is compiled in tables 39 and 40. Increasing United States support in Southeast Asia (both parties) and Latin America (status quo party) is indicated. Similarly, increased United Kingdom or French support in Africa (status quo party) and increased general Communist participation in Latin American conflicts is evident.

The nature of third party support is shown in table 41 in terms of the following classes of support: non-military (e.g., propaganda support), military non-combatant (e.g., material support), and military combatant (e.g., full range of combatant forces). Military combatant support occurred most often. However, non-military support occurred significantly in civil disorders (threat party only), coups d'etat, border wars (status quo party only), and in the category other international conflicts. Military non-combatant support was popular in many types of conflicts, especially for the threat party.

TABLE 35
IDENTIFICATION OF CONFLICT PARTICIPANTS (PARTIES) FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT
--Threat Party--

Party Identification	Civil Disorder	Coup D'etat	Military Revolt	Insurrection	Guerrilla War	Civil War	Border War	Limited War	Other Conflicts	International
Non-Colonial Government	0	1	0	0	0	1	24	4		16
Colonial Government	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0		0
Rebellious Military Forces	0	66	27	4	2	4	0	0		1
Nationalist Forces	5	0	0	2	9	0	2	2		1
Indigenous Communist Forces	10	2	1	2	5	4	0	1		1
Other Political/Ideological Groups	35	10	1	16	6	2	0	0		3
Ethnic or Religious Group	32	0	0	6	5	6	0	0		0
Socially/Economically Based Groups	18	0	0	3	0	0	0	0		0
Not Fitting Above Categories or Not Known	21	8	2	6	0	0	0	0		0

TABLE 36
IDENTIFICATION OF CONFLICT PARTICIPANTS (PARTIES) FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT
--Status Quo Party--

Party Identification	Civil Disorder	Coup D'etat	Military Revolt	Insurrection	Guerrilla War	Civil War	Border War	Limited War	Other International Conflicts
Non-Colonial Government	70	85	28	35	15	14	25	5	18
Colonial Government	30	0	1	3	11	1	3	2	4
Rebellious Military Forces	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Nationalist Forces	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indigenous Communist Forces	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other Political/Ideological Groups	6	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ethnic or Religious Group	10	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Socially/Economically Based Groups	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Not Fitting Above Categories or Not Known	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

TABLE 37

THIRD PARTY SUPPORT (PARTY I. D.) OF THE THREAT PARTY FOR EACH TYPE
OF CONFLICT BY TIME PERIODS (A, B, C)

<u>Type of Conflict</u>	<u>United States</u>			<u>UK-France</u>			<u>Communist (General)</u>			<u>Soviet Union</u>			<u>PRC</u>			<u>UN or Other Int'l</u>			<u>Other Regional</u>			<u>Other Extra Regional</u>			<u>No sig-nificant Support</u>		
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>
Civil Disorder	0	0	3	3	0	1	5	8	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	4	0	0	1	22	22	40
Coup D'etat	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	23	16	37
Military Revolt	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	6	5	15
Insurrection	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	11	10	9
Guerrilla War	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	4	2	3	0	0	0	6	7	1
Civil War	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	2	0	0	1	2	1	1
Border Conflict	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	4	8	6
Limited War	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1
Other Int'l Conflicts	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	1	1	0	0	0	3	1	6
TOTAL	1	2	5	3	1	1	10	13	12	8	4	3	1	0	0	1	1	1	14	13	17	1	0	2	73	71	115

TABLE 38

THIRD PARTY SUPPORT (PARTY I.D.) OF THE STATUS QUO PARTY FOR EACH TYPE
OF CONFLICT BY TIME PERIODS (A, B, C)

<u>Type of Conflict</u>	<u>United States</u>			<u>UK-France</u>			<u>Communist (General)</u>			<u>Soviet Union</u>			<u>PRC</u>			<u>UN or Other Int'l</u>			<u>Other Regional</u>			<u>Other Extra Regional</u>			<u>No sig-nificant Support</u>		
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>
Civil Disorder	0	0	1	5	2	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	1	7	1	0	1	25	27	41
Coup D'etat	0	0	4	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	25	17	35
Military Revolt	0	1	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	6	4	11
Insurrection	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	12	9	10
Guerrilla War	2	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	7	6	3
Civil War	2	2	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	2	0	1
Border Conflict	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	7	5
Limited War	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	0	1
Other Int'l Conflicts	1	3	0	3	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	6
TOTAL	7	7	10	10	8	13	0	2	2	0	5	1	0	1	1	9	5	4	5	3	12	4	3	1	53	71	113

TABLE 39
THIRD PARTY SUPPORT (PARTY I. D.) OF THE THREAT PARTY IN EACH WORLD LOCATION
BY TIME PERIODS (A, B, C)

	<u>Party Providing Support</u>												No sig- nificant Support																	
	<u>United States</u>			<u>UK-France</u>			<u>Communist (General)</u>			<u>Soviet Union</u>						<u>PRC</u>			<u>UN or Other Int'nl</u>			<u>Other Regional</u>			<u>Other Extra Regional</u>					
<u>Location</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>						
Latin America	1	1	1	0	0	0	4	3	9	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	3	0	0	0	27	23	39		
Europe	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	7
Near East	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	7	0	0	0	10	13	12		
Africa	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	5	0	0	2	8	11	35		
Asia(less S.E.)	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	13	11	13		
So. East Asia	0	0	4	0	0	0	2	5	3	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	2	1	1	0	0	16	7	11		
TOTAL	1	2	5	3	1	1	10	13	12	8	4	3	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	14	13	17	1	0	2	78	71	117		

TABLE 40
THIRD PARTY SUPPORT (PARTY I.D.) OF THE STATUS QUO PARTY IN EACH WORLD LOCATION
BY TIME PERIODS (A, B, C)

		<u>Party Providing Support</u>																										
	<u>United States</u>			<u>UK-France</u>			<u>Communist (General)</u>			<u>Soviet Union</u>			<u>PRC</u>			<u>UN or Other Int'l</u>			<u>Other Regional</u>			<u>Other Extra Regional</u>			<u>No sig-nificant Support</u>			
<u>Location</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	
Latin America	0	1	4	0	0	3	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	0	35	26	41	
Europe	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	5	7	
Near East	2	3	0	1	5	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	2	1	1	0	5	1	0	0	6	11	12	
Africa	0	0	0	2	1	7	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	10	11	32	
Asia(less S.E.)	1	2	0	4	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	9	11	12	
So. East Asia	2	1	6	2	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	1	2	3	2	0	15	7	10	
TOTAL	6	7	10	10	8	14	0	2	2	0	5	1	0	1	1	9	5	4	5	3	12	4	3	1	83	71	114	

TABLE 41
NATURE OF THIRD PARTY SUPPORT AS A FUNCTION OF CONFLICT TYPE

Type of Conflict	Number of Conflicts Nature of Support for Threat Party				
	Non-Military	Military-Non-Combatant	Military, Combatant	Not Known	No Support Provided
Civil Disorder	5	7	22	5	83
Coup D'Etat	4	5	2	2	74
Military Revolt	1	0	4	2	24
Insurrection	1	5	3	1	29
Guerrilla War	2	4	7	0	14
Civil War	1	6	5	1	4
Border War	0	5	5	1	17
Limited War	0	2	1	0	4
Other International Conflicts	4	4	3	1	10
TOTAL	18	38	52	13	259

Type of Conflict	Nature of Support for Status Quo Party				
	Non-Military	Military-Non-Combatant	Military, Combatant	Not Known	No Support Provided
Civil Disorder	0	5	24	3	90
Coup D'Etat	7	1	1	1	77
Military Revolt	1	2	6	3	19
Insurrection	2	3	4	1	29
Guerrilla War	1	3	7	0	16
Civil War	1	7	6	0	3
Border War	5	5	3	1	14
Limited War	0	2	4	0	1
Other International Conflicts	4	2	6	0	10
TOTAL	21	30	61	9	259

h. Degree of Control

The degree of control that was exercised over threat party combatants is shown in table 42. Status quo party operations were consistently characterized by central control and therefore are not shown. Table 42 shows the marked contrast in degree of control between civil disorder and coup d'etat situations. Coups d'etat and limited wars were the types of conflicts in which the threat party demonstrated the tightest control over its forces, although central control was also shown to be present in many military revolts, insurrections, border wars, and other international conflicts. Occasional central control, but with operational commanders largely autonomous, typified the threat party organizational approach in most guerrilla wars and in many civil wars, insurrections, and border conflicts.

TABLE 42
DEGREE OF CONTROL VERSUS TYPE OF CONFLICT
THREAT PARTY

Type	Degree					Not Available
	1	2	3	4	5	
Civil Disorder	73	11	5	13	3	17
Coup D'Etat	0	8	0	0	72	7
Military Revolt	1	7	0	2	19	2
Insurrection	2	3	1	7	19	7
Guerrilla War	0	2	3	18	1	3
Civil War	0	0	1	9	4	3
Border War	0	1	0	8	15	4
Limited War	0	1	0	1	5	0
Other Int. Conflict	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>3</u>
Total	76	~~34~~	10	61	153	46

- (1) No systematic control present
- (2) Unauthorized actions by units ostensibly under control
- (3) No control exercised over operational commander
- (4) Occasional central control, but operational commander largely autonomous
- (5) Central, unified control of operations

i. Use of Force

The force sizes of the conflict participants were described in section III.E.1.a. Type of weapons and operational employment are discussed below.

(1) Level of Weapons

The distribution of the number of conflicts involving the various levels of weapons for each type of conflict is provided in table 43. There was insufficient information to enable the type of weapons to be estimated in about 30 percent of the conflicts. Table 43 shows the status quo party to have enjoyed an advantage in type of weapons in all internal conflicts except coups d'etat. Status quo party superiority was particularly pronounced in civil disorders, in which the threat party most often had makeshift weapons or none at all, and in insurrections and guerrilla wars, in which the threat party seldom had heavy weapons. Relative equality of weapons existed in international wars. Both parties employed heavy weapons in each international limited war.

(2) Employment of Forces

Information on the over-all nature of the employment of ground, sea, and air operations was provided by the coding of the variable, employment of forces. Table 44 summarizes results for this variable by providing the number and percentage of conflicts of each type in which each party made significant use of ground, sea, and air forces. As noted in the table, these data do not include the use of these forces for logistics purposes or for the movement of units at the start of conflicts, as these activities are treated separately.

Significant ground operations occurred in a large percentage of conflicts, in fact in essentially 100 percent of many types of conflicts. The one limited war that did not involve ground operations was conflict #338, which was the sea attack by North Vietnam on U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf of Tonkin and the subsequent U.S. air and sea retaliation. This conflict marked the commencement of U.S. operations into North Vietnam and, for the purposes of the analysis, was handled as a conflict separate from the guerrilla war in South Vietnam. The less extensive use of ground forces by the status quo party derives from the fact that this party was not able to mount a counter effort in many coups d'etat.

The status quo party made greater use of sea and air operations than did the threat party. Only a very few civil disorders or coups d'etat involved either sea or air operations, and the threat party did not have air support in any of the 27 guerrilla wars. Air combat operations were used extensively (in 35 percent or more of the conflicts) by the status quo party in all types of conflicts except civil disorders and coups d'etat. A significant number (25 percent or more) of civil wars, limited wars, and the other forms of international conflict involved considerable use of sea forces by both parties. Border wars were characterized by use of air units but little use of sea units.

TABLE 43
DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICTS BY LEVEL OF WEAPONS FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT

Type of Conflict	Threat Party				Status Quo Party			
	Make Shift Weapons*	Hand Carried Weapons	Heavy Weapons	Not Known	Make Shift Weapons*	Hand Carried Weapons	Heavy Weapons	Not Known
Civil Dis-order	81	21	3	17	7	70	16	29
Coup D'etat	3	23	21	40	11	12	11	53
Military Revolt	1	7	11	12	0	5	17	9
Insurrection	3	13	5	18	1	8	15	15
Guerrilla War	1	20	1	5	0	8	15	4
Civil War	0	5	10	2	0	3	12	2
Border War	1	5	17	5	2	6	16	4
Limited War	0	0	7	0	0	0	7	0
Other Inter-national Conflicts	0	4	9	9	0	3	11	8

*or no weapons

TABLE 44
USE OF GROUND, SEA, AND AIR OPERATIONS FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT

Type of Conflict	Total Conflicts	<u>Conflicts in Which Significant Operations Occurred</u>											
		Significant Ground Operations*				Significant Sea Operations*				Significant Air Operations*			
		Threat Party No.	%	S.Q. Party No.	%	Threat Party No.	%	S.Q. Party No.	%	Threat Party No.	%	S.Q. Party No.	%
Civil Disorder	122	109	89	112	92	0	0	3	2	0	0	7	6
Coup D'etat	87	64	74	34	39	5	6	3	3	5	6	5	6
Military Revolt	31	27	87	28	90	8	26	3	10	4	13	11	35
Insurrection	39	39	100	34	87	1	3	6	15	5	13	15	38
Guerrilla War	27	27	100	27	100	0	0	7	26	0	0	14	52
Civil War	17	17	100	17	100	4	24	6	35	4	24	12	71
Border War	28	28	100	27	96	3	11	1	4	13	46	11	39
Limited War	7	6	86	6	86	5	71	5	71	5	71	5	71
Other Internat. Conflict	22	19	86	20	91	7	32	10	45	6	27	13	59
TOTALS	380	336	88	306	81	33	9	44	12	42	11	93	24

* Does not include Resupply or Initial Force Movement. These factors were handled as separate variables.

The coded data also provided information on whether air operations utilized sea or air basing which is summarized below:

BASING FOR AIR OPERATIONS

<u>Type of Basing</u>	<u>Threat Party</u>	<u>Status Quo Party</u>
Land	36	79
Sea	0	2
Both	3	7
Not Known	3	6

As shown, land basing was used in a predominant number of conflicts. This result was expected in view of the limited number of countries with aircraft carriers. Further, countries so equipped participated actively in only a modest fraction of the total conflicts. It was also apparent that sea-based air, if it had been available, could have been employed in a large percentage of conflicts to replace or supplement the land-based air operations. In conflicts where significant air operations occurred and where the type of basing was known, sea basing (alone or together with land basing) was employed by the threat party in 8 percent of conflicts and by the status quo party in 10 percent.

(3) Initial Movement of Combat Forces

Table 45 provides data on the number of conflicts of each type in which the initial deployment of forces to the scene of combat was by rapid land transportation, sea delivery or air delivery. Sea delivery includes either amphibious assault or administrative landing. Air delivery applies for either of parachute assault or air transport delivery involving landing.

The other "values" of this variable were 1) no significant combatant forces involved, 2) forces essentially in position - no movement required, 3) delayed deployment of forces, and 4) not known or available. It was found that information on initial movement was not available in about 15% of the conflicts. Threat party forces were essentially in position at the start of hostilities in a large percentage (about 55 percent) of conflicts, the status quo party in about 46 percent. Delayed deployment was judged to be pertinent for the status quo party in six conflicts but did not apply to threat party operations in any conflict.

Table 45 shows rapid land, air, or sea movement of forces to have been used to a greater extent by the status quo party (18 percent of conflicts versus 14 percent for the threat party). Rapid deployment by land saw considerably greater use than air or sea movement. The threat party made greater use of initial deployment by sea movement in international conflicts, while the status quo party used this mode of movement more often in internal conflicts. The threat party made very little use of air assault.

(4) Resupply of Combat Forces

Information on resupply is contained in table 46 for all conflicts except those in which information was inadequate or not available.

TABLE 45
INITIAL MOVEMENT OF COMBAT FORCES FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT

Type of Conflict	Total Conflicts	Threat Party			Status Quo Party		
		Rapid Deployment by Land	Air Delivery	Sea Delivery	Rapid Deployment by Land	Air Delivery	Sea Delivery
Civil Disorder	122	2	0	1	7	1	0
Coup D'etat	87	8	0	0	3	1	0
Military Revolt	31	2	0	0	7	3	1
Insurrection	39	2	2	2	11	1	2
Guerrilla War	27	2	0	0	3	2	3
Civil War	17	3	0	2	4	1	3
Border War	28	10	1	0	6	0	0
Limited War	7	2	0	1	1	2	0
Other International Conflict	22	6	1	7	4	0	4
TOTALS	380	37	4	13	46	11	13
Percent	100	10%	1%	3%	12%	3%	3%

TABLE 46
RESUPPLY OF COMBAT FORCES FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT

Type	Total Conflicts	<u>Threat Party</u>						<u>Status Quo Party</u>					
		Primarily by				Unimportant		Primarily by				Unimportant	
		Air	Sea	Land	All	Due to Duration	Due to Needs	Air	Sea	Land	All	Due to Duration	Due to Needs
Civil Disorder	122	1	1	1	0	31	62	1	0	3	0	43	42
Coup, D'etat	87	1	0	0	0	47	15	0	0	0	0	40	17
Military Revolt	31	0	0	1	0	21	3	0	0	2	1	21	1
Insurrection	39	2	1	3	0	18	4	1	1	7	1	17	0
Guerrilla War	27	0	1	11	1	0	8	0	8	4	5	0	2
Civil War	17	0	2	6	5	0	2	3	3	5	3	1	0
Border War	28	0	1	12	2	6	2	0	1	11	0	6	4
Limited War	7	1	0	2	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1
Other Int. Conflict	22	0	4	6	1	5	1	1	3	2	2	6	1
TOTALS	390	5	10	42	10	129	98	6	18	33	13	135	68

The resupply function was not considered to be of importance in most civil disorders, coups d'etat, and military revolts. The reasons for this judgment are shown in the table. Increased dependence on resupply is shown to have occurred in insurrections. A majority of guerrilla wars, civil wars, and border wars required significant resupply operations. The threat party relied heavily on resupply by land in guerrilla wars, but the status quo party made extensive use of sea and air (includes the "all" category). Both sides depended almost exclusively on land resupply routes in border wars. However, in the other two categories of international wars, the data indicated considerable diversity in modes of resupply.

The data indicates that the status quo party used sea and air resupply considerably more than the threat party did. Sea resupply is shown to have had greater use than the air mode. For all conflicts, resupply was unimportant due to short duration of the conflict in about 1 conflict in 3 and due to the needs or methods of the combatants in about 1 conflict in 5. Data on resupply was not available in roughly 100 conflicts.

j. Outcome

A summary of the outcomes of each type of conflict is contained in table 47. A specific outcome was assigned in every conflict except five.

A large number of civil disorders ended inconclusively or by the threat party losing but making appreciable gains (the last category may be thought of as a "tie" in many conflicts). The threat party win-to-loss ratio in civil disorders was roughly 1 to 3. Coups d'etat resulted in a definite win for one party or the other 98 percent of the time, with the threat party win-to-loss ratio being 2.5 to 1. The threat party had its greatest success in this type of conflict.

The status quo party was exceptionally successful in stamping out military revolts and insurrections. The threat groups had a better record in guerrilla conflict, winning more than they lost. Five guerrilla wars were either continuing actively or were in an inactive state at the end of 1964. Victories in civil wars were evenly divided.

A large percentage (75 percent) of border wars were either continuing or terminated inconclusively. Conventional international limited wars are shown to have been brought to conclusive terminations, with the threat party losing twice the number it won. The data also show that the status quo party had a high win probability in the case of covert invasions. The numbers of blockades and threat (show of force) type conflicts were small. The two threat party losses in blockade situations were to the United States (Berlin airlift and Cuba missile crises).

(1) Change in Outcome Over Time by World Location

The data were examined to see whether there were changes in outcome over time for any world locations. In both Africa and Latin America the win-loss ratio for the threat party has moved downward over the period studied. In Asia, including South East Asia, the reverse has happened: the record of threat party success has improved.

TABLE 47
OUTCOME AS A FUNCTION OF CONFLICT TYPE

OUTCOME						
Type	Conflict Continuing	Inconclusive	Party who Started			Not Known
			Lost	Made Gains	Won	
Civil Disorder	3	25	48	26	17	3
Coup D'etat	0	0	24	2	61	0
Military Re-volt	0	4	22	2	3	0
Insurrection	0	3	28	6	2	0
Guerrilla War	3	3	7	4	8	2
Civil War	2	1	5	4	5	0
Border War	3	18	4	3	0	0
Limited War	0	0	4	1	2	0
Covert In-vasion	1	5	7	1	1	0
Blockade, Quarantine	0	0	2	2	0	0
Threat	0	1	0	1	1	0
Total	12	60	151	52	100	5
Percent	3	16	40	14	26	1

(2) Outcome versus Duration as a Function of Conflict Type

The threat party failed to win any civil disorders of duration one day or less. It tended to improve its win-loss ratio with increase in conflict length. However, in the case of coups d'etat the threat party enjoyed a very high success record in conflicts of no greater than one day duration, but the status quo party record improved as duration increased. The outcomes of military revolts, insurrections, guerrilla wars, civil wars, and international conflicts were either insensitive to the duration of the conflict or there were insufficient data points to establish a clear trend.

(3) Outcome versus Duration as a Function of World Location

In Latin America the threat party had an equal probability of winning or losing the very short conflicts (one day duration), but its win-to-loss ratio improved with increasing conflict duration up to a duration of 6 months. For durations of greater than 6 months, both sides did about equally well. In Europe the sample size was relatively small, but the data indicates that the status quo party had the better record in very short and in very long conflicts, while the threat party won at least 50 percent of the conflicts of duration greater than 1 week but less than 6 months. In the Near East the threat party won in conflicts of duration one day or less by a factor of five to one but the status quo party won by a factor of two to one in the case of conflicts of duration of one week to one month. There was a mixed pattern of outcomes in the longer duration conflicts. In Africa the threat party won about as many conflicts as it lost in the one day duration class and won more than it lost in cases where duration exceeded one year, but the status quo party had a much superior record in the greater than one day but less than one year range. In Asia the status quo party won four times as many conflicts as the threat party where duration was less than one year; the threat party had two clear victories in longer conflicts versus none for the status quo. In Southeast Asia the threat party was the predominant winner in conflicts of one day or less but the status quo party won most of the conflicts of greater length, except in the five to twenty year range where both won equally.

k. Likelihood of Renewal

This variable was introduced into the coding scheme to provide an indication of the probability that the fundamental issues that had created the conflict situation had been resolved at the termination of the conflict. In coding this variable the analyst based the likelihood of renewal of the conflict on the situation that existed at the time the conflict came to an end. Therefore, from the standpoint of any country or organization that was interested in deterring violence and preserving order, the data presents a perspective of the unresolved, hence potentially reoccurring, conflict situations in this time period.

The results of the coding of this information are shown in table 48. It is of considerable interest to note that renewal was estimated to be unlikely or impossible in 40 percent of all conflicts in the 1946-64 period.

TABLE 48

LIKELIHOOD OF RENEWAL BY TYPE OF CONFLICT

Type	Conflict Cont.	Renewal Unlikely	Renewal Along Sim. Lines	Renewal Likely but Manner Uncertain	Renewal Impossible	Not Available
Civil Disorder	5	8	53	40	13	3
Coup D'etat	0	10	33	14	30	0
Military Revolt	0	8	12	5	6	0
Insurrection	0	3	21	10	5	0
Guerrilla War	5	6	6	5	4	1
Civil War	1	4	8	4	0	0
Border War	3	1	18	6	0	0
Limited War	0	4	1	2	0	0
Other Int. Con.	2	2	10	5	3	0

About 4 percent of all conflicts fell in the categories of not available or conflict continuing. If these conflicts are not considered, the likelihood of renewal (in some form) of the various types of conflicts was judged to be as follows:

<u>Type of Conflict</u>	<u>Percent of Conflicts Considered Likely to Reoccur</u>
Civil Disorder	82
Coup D'etat	54
Military Revolt	55
Insurrection	79
Guerrilla War	52
Civil War	75
Border War	96
Limited War	43
Other International Conflicts	75

The issues in coup d'etat, military revolts, guerrilla wars, and conventional international limited wars were shown most likely to be resolved, even though almost half of these types represented possible future trouble situations. Conflicts involving border disputes did not lend themselves to conclusive settlement, as evidenced by the fact that all but one were deemed likely to be renewed. A high percentage of civil disorders and insurrections likewise ended without a really effective solution of the festering problem.

1. U.S. and Communist Involvement

The involvement of the United States and of Communist organizations in terms of types of conflicts has been given in paragraph D above. Note particularly tables 21 and 26.

2. Description by Types of Conflicts

a. Civil Disorder

(1) Number and Location

	<u>Time Period</u>				
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	
Latin America	9	6	13	28	Civil disorders accounted for more than 32 percent of all conflicts. There was a notable increase in the occurrence of civil disorders in the latest time period, resulting principally from the large increase of this type conflict in Africa and to a lesser degree in Latin America.
Europe	5	4	3	12	
Middle East	2	5	4	11	
Africa	10	5	25	40	
Asia (less S.E.)	7	8	5	20	
Southeast Asia	<u>-2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>11</u>	
TOTAL	35	32	55	122	

(2) Motivation and Objectives


Political reasons were the motivation of about 35 percent of these conflicts, ethnic about 20 percent, and economic, nationalist and ideological causes were each responsible for approximately 12 percent of the conflicts. A violent expression of frustration was classified as the objective of 28 percent of the disorders and reform of government policy or lawful change of the government the ultimate objective of 26 percent. Overthrow of the existing form of government by force and overthrow of the existing government by force but maintaining its present form were equal objectives of another 29 percent of the conflicts.

(3) Participants


The threat party was a political or noncommunist ideological group in 35 percent of civil disorders and an ethnically or religiously based group in 32 percent. The status quo party was a non-colonial government in 58 percent of disorders and a colonial government in 25 percent. The threat party received third party support in 29 percent, the status quo party in 24 percent. The United States was involved as a third party in 4 civil disorders, all in the most recent time period. Sixty-five additional disorders evoked U.S. interest but no action. General Communist or USSR support occurred in 21 cases, 20 on the threat party side.

(4) Warning Time and Duration

The length of warning time was not known in 12 percent of the civil disorders. Considering only the conflicts where warning time was known, 71 percent had no warning time and 13 percent had one week or more. About 13 percent of civil disorders lasted one day; about 46 percent had a duration of one week or more. Cumulative distributions of these variables are as follow:




(5) Force Sizes



The status quo party had a force size of 1000 or over in 60 percent of conflicts of this class; the threat party in 64 percent. However, in about 10 percent of these cases the threat party force size was over 100,000 participants, and the status quo party had no force sizes of this level.

(6) Total Fatalities



Deaths in this type of conflict were characteristically low; only about 13 percent of civil disorders resulted in over 100 fatalities.

(7) Disruptive Effects

No substantial disruptive effects were noted in 11 percent of the civil disorders, but 62 percent resulted in localized and 25 percent in widespread disruptive effects.

(8) Tempo of Operations

Virtually all of these conflicts were classed as either sporadic engagements (59 percent) or as single engagements at one or more locations lasting the duration of the conflict (36 percent).

(9) Level of Weapons

Percent of Conflicts in which the Indicated Weapons Were Used

	<u>Makeshift Weapons</u>	<u>Hand-Carried Weapons</u>	<u>Heavy Weapons</u>
Threat Party	77	20	3
Status Quo Party	8	75	17

The threat party typically used makeshift weapons, and the status quo party generally employed hand-carried weapons. These data do not include those conflicts for which the level of weapons is unknown.

(10) Force Employment

Percent of Conflicts in which Significant Operations Occurred

	<u>Ground Operations</u>	<u>Sea Operations</u>	<u>Air Operations</u>
Threat Party	89	0	0
Status Quo Party	92	2	5

Civil disorders witnessed virtually no use of sea or air operations.

(11) Initial Movement of Combat Forces

Movement of forces was not a prime factor in civil disorders. In practically every disorder the forces were either in position or no significant combatants were involved.

(12) Resupply

Resupply was characteristically unimportant in civil disorders because of either their short duration or the basic lack of need for supplies.

(13) Degree of Control (Threat Party)

In some 70 percent of civil disorders, the threat party had no systematic control over its forces.

(14) Outcome

<u>Result</u>	<u>Percent of Conflicts</u>
Continuing	3
Terminated Inconclusively	21
Status Quo Party Won	39
Threat Party Lost but Made Gains	21
Threat Party Won	14
Not Known	2

The fundamental issues in civil disorders were seldom resolved at the termination of the conflict; 81 percent were considered likely to be renewed.

b. Coup D'etat

(1) Number and Location

	<u>Time Period</u>			
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Latin Americ	15	10	15	40
Europe	2	0	2	4
Middle East	4	6	7	17
Africa	0	0	7	7
Asia (less S.E.)	1	0	3	4
Southeast Asia	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>15</u>
TOTAL	26	18	43	87

Almost 23 percent of the conflicts have been coups d'etat, nearly one half of which took place during the most recent time period. The major increases in this form of conflict were in Asia and Africa, although occurring most frequently in Latin America.

(2) Motivation and Objectives

Over 90 percent of the coups were motivated by political factors. The objective of the threat party in 93 percent of cases was the overthrow of the existing form of government by force or the overthrow of the existing government by force but maintaining the current form of government.


(3) Participants

Coups d'etat were initiated by military forces 83 percent of the time. In virtually every case the status quo party was a non-colonial government. Third party support was not generally a factor; the threat party received such support in 13 percent of the


conflicts, the status quo party in only 10 percent. The United States provided support to the threat group twice and to the status quo group 4 times, all of the latter in the most recent time period. The United States was judged to have had interest in an additional 42 coups d'etat. Communist groups were involved in 6 conflicts, 4 of which involved outside support by a Communist nation.

(4) Warning Time and Duration


The length of warning time was not known in 22 percent of coups d'etat. Of the remaining coups, 66 percent involved no warning time, 18 percent had from one to five days warning, and another 9 percent had six to ten days warning. Conflict duration was at a minimum in the case of coups d'etat; about 60 percent lasted only one day and only 7 percent lasted one week or more.




PERCENT OF CONFLICTS WITH TIME PERIOD $\geq$ X WEEKS



(5) Force Sizes




PERCENT OF CONFLICTS WITH FORCE SIZE $\geq$ X PARTICIPANTS



The status quo party force was typically small; it was estimated to be less than 10 participants in most cases. The threat party had a force of at least 1000 in 33 percent of coups d'etat.

(6) Total Fatalities



Only about 15 percent of coups d'etat resulted in more than 10 deaths.

(7) Disruptive Effects

Coups d'etat did not usually produce substantial disruptive effects. Sixty-seven percent caused no significant disruption, and only 24 percent resulted in significant localized disruptive effects.

(8) Tempo of Operations

About 50 percent of these conflicts involved no significant engagement of forces. Another 35 percent were classed as single engagements at one or more locations lasting the duration of the conflict.

(9) Level of Weapons

Percent of Conflicts in which the Indicated Weapons Were Used

	<u>Makeshift Weapons</u>	<u>Hand-Carried Weapons</u>	<u>Heavy Weapons</u>
Threat Party	6	49	45
Status Quo Party	31	36	33

The threat party generally had superior weapons in coups. These data do not include those conflicts for which the level of weapons is unknown.

(10) Force Employment

Percent of Conflicts in which Significant Operations Occurred

	<u>Ground Operations</u>	<u>Sea Operations</u>	<u>Air Operations</u>
Threat Party	74	6	6
Status Quo Party	39	3	6

Neither party made significant use of sea or air operations in coups d'etat.

(11) Initial Movement of Combat Forces

In many conflicts (almost 40 percent) there were no significant numbers of combatants involved. In another 45-50 percent the forces were initially in position. Rapid deployment by land was customary when initial movement was required.

(12) Resupply

Coups d'etat were characterized by having no need for resupply due primarily to the short duration of the conflicts.

(13) Degree of Control (Threat Party)

Ninety percent of the coups for which data were available were under central, unified control by the threat party.

(14) Outcome

<u>Result</u>	<u>Percent of Conflicts</u>
Status Quo Party Won	28
Threat Party Lost but Made Gains	2
Threat Party Won	70

53 percent of coups d'etat were considered likely to be renewed.

c. Military Revolt

(1) Number and Location

	<u>Time Period</u>			<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	
Latin America	3	2	8	13
Europe	1	0	2	3
Middle East	0	2	2	4
Africa	0	1	3	4
Asia (less S. E.)	1	1	1	3
Southeast Asia	<u>3</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	8	6	17	31

About 8 percent of all conflicts were military revolts, 42 percent of which occurred in Latin America. Military revolts include 8 mutinies, half of which were in Africa. The number of military revolts increased appreciably in the 1958-64 period.

(2) Motivation and Objectives



48 percent of military revolts were motivated by political factors. Motivation was considered ideological in 16 percent and was not known in 19 percent. The most common threat party objective, occurring in 45 percent of the cases, was to overthrow the existing government by force but maintain the current form of government.

(3) Participants

In 93 percent of military revolts, the threat party was -- as the conflict title indicates -- a rebellious military force. The status quo party was identified as a non-colonial government in 93 percent of these conflicts. The threat party received some form of third party support in 5 of these conflicts (by Communist countries in 4 cases); the status quo received outside support in 9 (by the U. S., U. K., or France in 6 of these cases). U. S. interest (without actual involvement) was considered to exist in 15 additional military revolts.



(4) Warning Time and Duration

The length of warning time was not known in 16 percent of military revolts, and there was no warning time in 73 percent of the remaining conflicts of this type. There was a warning of one to five days in 8 percent of military revolts. Eighty-seven percent of these conflicts lasted one day or more; 23 percent one week or more. Thus, military revolts tended to be short-lived, with 65 percent lasting from two days to one week.



PERCENT OF CONFLICTS WITH TIME PERIOD $\geq$ X WEEKS


(5) Force Sizes



PERCENT OF CONFLICTS WITH FORCE SIZE $\geq$ X PARTICIPANTS

The status quo party force size was 1000 or greater in 67 percent of these conflicts; the threat party in 40 percent.

(6) Total Fatalities



About 36 percent of military revolts had 100 fatalities or more but only 7 percent had over 1000 fatalities.

(7) Disruptive Effects

Only 10 percent of military revolts caused widespread disruptive effects but 61 percent resulted in localized disruptions.

(8) Tempo of Operations

55 percent of this type of conflict were classified as a single engagement at one or more locations lasting the duration of the conflict. Sixteen percent were sporadic engagements and another 10 percent involved continual separate engagements.

(9) Level of Weapons

Percent of Conflicts in which the Indicated Weapons Were Used

	<u>Makeshift Weapons</u>	<u>Hand-Carried Weapons</u>	<u>Heavy Weapons</u>
Threat Party	5	37	58
Status Quo Party	0	23	77

The status quo party generally had superior weapons in military revolts. Each party used heavy weapons in a majority of these conflicts.

(10) Force Employment

Percent of Conflicts in which Significant Operations Occurred

	<u>Ground Operations</u>	<u>Sea Operations</u>	<u>Air Operations</u>
Threat Party	87	26	13
Status Quo Party	90	10	35

There was greater use of sea and air operations than in civil disorders and coups d'etat but generally less than in other types of conflict.

(11) Initial Movement of Combat Forces

In conflicts where information on this variable was available, the threat party was initially in position 88 percent of the time. However, the status quo party used rapid deployment by land in 28 percent of the conflicts and either air or sea initial movement in 16 percent.

(12) Resupply

The data indicate that there was little need for resupply in military revolts, due primarily to the short duration of conflict.

(13) Degree of Control (Threat Party)

The threat party exercised central, unified control of operations in most (66 percent) military revolts.

(14) Outcome

<u>Result</u>	<u>Percent of Conflicts</u>
Terminated Inconclusively	13
Status Quo Party Won	71
Threat Party Lost but Made Gains	6
Threat Party Won	10

About 55 percent of military revolts were judged likely to be renewed.

d. Insurrection

(1) Number and Location

	Time Period			
	A	B	C	TOTAL
Latin America	6	6	9	21
Europe	1	3	0	4
Middle East	4	1	0	5
Africa	0	0	1	1
Asia (less S. E.)	1	0	1	2
Southeast Asia	3	2	1	6
TOTAL	15	12	12	39

About 10 percent of all conflicts were insurrections, 54 percent of which occurred in Latin America. The frequency of insurrections changed little over the three time periods. One banditry conflict is included in this category.


(2) Motivation and Objectives

Sixty-five percent of insurrections were motivated by political reasons; no other motivation occurred in as many as 10 percent of the insurrections. The most common threat party objective, occurring in 49 percent of the cases, was to overthrow the existing government by force but maintain the current form of government.

(3) Participants


In 49 percent of insurrections the threat party was a political or ideological group; 18 percent were ethnic or religious groups. The status quo party was identified as a non-colonial government in 90 percent of insurrections. Both the threat party and status quo party received some form of third party support in 9 of the 39 insurrections. The United States supported the status quo party 4 times, the threat party none. U.S. interest (without action) was considered to be present in 25 additional insurrections.

(4) Warning Time and Duration




The length of warning was not known in 13 percent of these conflicts, and there was no warning time in 71 percent of the remaining insurrections. There was a one day to one week warning period in about 9 percent of insurrections. Fifty-four percent of insurrections lasted one week or more; 26 percent lasted in excess of a month. Duration was only one day in 28 percent of the insurrections.

(5) Force Sizes



For the conflicts in which force sizes (peak) were known, the status quo party had 1000 men or more in 67 percent of the conflicts, the threat party had 1000 men or more in only about 30 percent.

(6) Total Fatalities



In the insurrections in which fatalities were known, about 40 percent involved no more than 10 deaths; 87 percent, no more than 1000 deaths.

(7) Disruptive Effects

In terms of percentage of all insurrections, 33 percent involved no substantial disruptive effects, 41 percent localized disruptive effects, and 26 percent wide-spread disruption.

(8) Tempo of Operations

Twenty-one percent of insurrections involved sporadic engagements only, 47 percent were characterized as a single engagement lasting the duration of the conflict, and 24 percent involved continual separate engagements without a clear indication of escalation.

(9) Level of Weapons

Percent of Conflicts in which the Indicated Weapons Were Used

	<u>Makeshift Weapons</u>	<u>Hand-Carried Weapons</u>	<u>Heavy Weapons</u>
Threat Party	14	62	24
Status Quo Party	4	33	63

The threat party generally had inferior weapons in insurrections.

(10) Force Employment

Percent of Conflicts in which Significant Operations Occurred

	<u>Ground Operations</u>	<u>Sea Operations</u>	<u>Air Operations</u>
Threat Party	100	3	13
Status Quo Party	87	15	38

The status quo party made considerably greater use of sea and air operations than did the threat party.

(11) Initial Movement of Combat Forces

Air or sea delivery of initial forces were used by each party in about 5 percent of insurrections. The status quo party used rapid deployment of ground forces in almost 30 percent of insurrections.

(12) Resupply

Resupply was judged to be of importance in 21 percent of insurrections for the threat party; 37 percent in the case of the status quo party. The threat party used sea or air modes of resupply in 3 insurrections and the status quo, 2.

(13) Degree of Control (Threat Party)

The threat party had centralized control of operations or occasional central control (but with operational commanders largely autonomous) in 61 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of the insurrections.

(14) Outcome

<u>Result</u>	<u>Percent of Conflicts</u>
Terminated Inconclusively	8
Status Quo Party Won	72
Threat Party Lost but Made Gains	15
Threat party Won	5

The issues underlying insurrections tended to remain; in 31 of 39 insurrections renewal was judged likely to occur.

e. Guerrilla War

(1) Number and Location

	Time Period			
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Latin America	1	1	0	2
Europe	0	1	0	1
Middle East	1	0	0	1
Africa	3	6	4	13
Asia (less S. E.)	1	1	0	2
S. E. Asia	<u>6</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>
TOTAL	12	10	5	27

A steady decline in the initiation of guerrilla warfare over the three time periods is apparent. This mode of conflict accounts for only 7 percent of all the conflicts considered, of which approximately 48 percent were in Africa.

(2) Motivation and Objectives


Guerrilla wars were about equally motivated by nationalist (35 percent) and political (31 percent) reasons. Ethnic, economic, and ideological reasons each motivated around 10 percent of these wars. About 67 percent of the time the threat party objective was overthrow of the existing form of government by force.

(3) Participants


The threat party was a nationalist group in the largest number of cases (33 percent). Indigenous communist forces, other political groups, or ethnically or religiously based groups were each the threat party in about 19 percent of guerrilla wars. The status quo party was a non-colonial government in 58 percent of these wars, a colonial government in 42 percent. The threat party received third party support (mostly from regional countries) in about half of the cases, the status quo party in 41 percent. The United States provided support to the status quo party in 3 conflicts; it was interested in an additional 15 conflicts. The Communist movement was significantly involved in 6 conflicts, including the providing of external support (all to threat groups) in 3 cases.

(4) Warning Time and Duration

Guerrilla wars were shown to have either no warnings or considerable warning: 63 percent had zero warning and 21 percent an indicated warning of at least one month. Guerrilla wars had long durations. For those wars in which durations were known, only about 13 percent lasted less than one year and 36 percent lasted at least five years.




(5) Force Sizes



Guerrilla wars were characterized by large force sizes, particularly on the status quo party side, which had forces of over 100,000 men in five conflicts. In conflicts in which number of participants was known, the status quo party had over 10,000 men in 87 percent of conflicts; the threat party in almost 40 percent of the cases.

(6) Total Fatalities



Four of the five 1946-64 conflicts producing over 100,000 deaths were guerrilla wars. Thirty-two percent of the guerrilla wars in which fatalities were known resulted in over 10,000 deaths.

(7) Disruptive Effects

There were substantial disruptive effects in all guerrilla wars. Widespread effects occurred in 70 percent of these conflicts.

(8) Tempo of Operations

Eighty-one percent of these wars were characterized by continual separate engagements, with nearly one-half of all guerrilla wars involving apparent escalation. The remainder of the conflicts were classed as sporadic engagements.

(9) Level of Weapons

Percent of Conflicts in which the Indicated Weapons Were Used

	<u>Makeshift Weapons</u>	<u>Hand-Carried Weapons</u>	<u>Heavy Weapons</u>
Threat Party	5	90	5
Status Quo Party	0	35	65

The threat party weapons were typically hand-carried weapons, while the status quo party used heavy weapons in many guerrilla wars. These data do not include those conflicts for which the level of weapons is unknown.

(10) Force Employment

Percent of Conflicts in which Significant Operations Occurred

	<u>Ground Operations</u>	<u>Sea Operations</u>	<u>Air Operations</u>
Threat Party	100	0	0
Status Quo Party	100	26	52

The status quo party made considerable use of sea and air operations, while the threat party did not use sea or air operations at all.

(11) Initial Movement of Combat Forces

Threat party forces were essentially in position initially in all but 2 of the 27 guerrilla wars. The status quo used rapid deployment by land in 3 conflicts, sea deployment in 2, and air assault in 3.

(12) Resupply

Resupply operations were important to both parties in the majority of these conflicts. The threat party primarily employed land routes in 85 percent of the conflicts in which it used resupply. The status quo forces depended primarily on resupply by sea in 8 conflicts, land routes in 4, and used all of land, sea, and air in 5 additional guerrilla wars. In nearly one-third of these conflicts, the needs of the threat party were such that it did not require resupply.

(13) Degree of Control (Threat Party)

Occasional central control but with the operational commander essentially autonomous was considered to describe threat party operations in 63 percent of guerrilla wars.

(14) Outcome

<u>Result</u>	<u>Percent of Conflicts</u>
Continuing	15
Terminated Inconclusively	11
Status Quo Party Won	26
Threat Party Lost but Made Gains	15
Threat Party Won	30
Not Known	3

Renewal was considered likely in 50 percent of the guerrilla wars.

f. Civil War

(1) Number and Location

	<u>Time Period</u>			
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Latin America	1	0	0	1
Europe	1	0	1	2
Middle East	0	2	3	5
Africa	0	0	1	1
Asia (less S. E.)	1	0	0	1
S. E. Asia	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>
TOTAL	4	7	6	17

4.5 percent of all conflicts were civil wars, occurring mainly in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

(2) Motivation and Objectives


Some 65 percent of the civil wars were motivated by political or ideological factors. The principal threat party objective was, in 53 percent of the cases, either a violent expression of frustration or overthrow of the existing form of government by force.

(3) Participants


The threat party was identified as being an ethnically or religiously based group in 35 percent of civil wars, an indigenous Communist group in 24 percent, and a rebellious military force in 24 percent. In 14 of 17 civil wars the status quo party was a non-colonial government. Third party support was normally a factor in civil wars: 77 percent of conflicts for threat party, 82 percent for status quo party. The United States was active (5 conflicts) in providing support for the status quo party, and U.S. interest extended to an additional 10 conflicts. Communist support was extended to the threat party 5 times, the status quo once.

(4) Warning Time and Duration

For the conflicts in which warning time could be estimated, 13 percent had zero days warning, 13 percent one day warning, 6 percent two to five days warning, and 66 percent over 10 days warning. Civil wars were lengthy: only one conflict lasted less than a month, and 67 percent of the completed civil wars (2 are in progress) lasted from one to five years.




(5) Force Sizes



Civil wars were characterized by large force sizes, particularly on the part of the threat party. In every case where force size was known the threat party had a force of greater than 1,000. The status quo party had a force size of at least 10,000 in 77 percent of civil wars.

(6) Total Fatalities



Casualties in civil wars were significant; 56 percent of the conflicts on which data was available produced 1000 deaths or greater.

(7) Disruptive Effects

Seventy-one percent of all civil wars created widespread disruptive effects.

(8) Tempo of Operations

The tempo of operations was described as sporadic engagements in 47 percent of the conflicts and as continual separate engagements without a clear increase in intensity in 41 percent.

(9) Level of Weapons

Percent of Conflicts in which the Indicated Weapons Were Used

	<u>Makeshift Weapons</u>	<u>Hand-carried Weapons</u>	<u>Heavy Weapons</u>
Threat Party	0	33	67
Status Quo Party	0	20	80

The status quo party employed a slightly superior level of weapons in civil wars. These data do not include those conflicts for which the level of weapons was unknown.

(10) Force Employment

Percent of Conflicts in which Significant Operations Occurred

	<u>Ground Operations</u>	<u>Sea Operations</u>	<u>Air Operations</u>
Threat Party	100	24	24
Status Quo Party	100	35	71

The status quo party made considerably greater use of sea and air operations than did the threat party.

(11) Initial Movement of Combat Troops

In about 30 percent of the civil wars, threat party forces were initially deployed by rapid land movement or by sea. Status quo party initial force deployments were by land in 25 percent of civil wars, by sea in 18 percent and by air in 6 percent.

(12) Resupply

Information was inadequate to enable the coding of this variable in 2 civil wars. Resupply was important in over 85% of the other civil wars. The threat party relied primarily on either land and sea modes in over half of these wars and used all available methods some 33 percent of the time. The status quo party relied about equally on all methods.

(13) Degree of Control (Threat Party)

The threat party exercised occasional central control but with the operational commander largely autonomous in over half of the civil wars. About 80 percent of the remaining wars were under a central, unified control of operations.

(14) Outcome

<u>Result</u>	<u>Percent of Conflicts</u>
Continuing	12
Terminated Inconclusively	6
Status Quo Party Won	29
Threat Party Lost but Made Gains	24
Threat Party Won	29

Seventy-five percent of the civil wars that terminated in this period were considered likely to be renewed.

g. Border War

(1) Number and Location

	Time Period				
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	
Latin America	1	1	0	2	Border wars amounted to 7 percent of all conflicts. Thirty-six percent occurred in Asia (less S. E.) and 29 percent in the Middle East.
Europe	0	2	0	2	
Middle East	1	5	2	8	
Africa	0	1	2	3	
Asia (less S. E.)	3	3	4	10	
S. E. Asia	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	
TOTAL	7	12	9	28	

(2) Motivation and Objectives


By far the greatest number (64 percent) of all border wars were motivated by territorial gains. Also, the threat party objective in 93 percent of the conflicts was to acquire territory or other valuable interests, with or without overthrowing the government.

(3) Participants


The participants in most border conflicts were non-colonial governments: the threat party in 86 percent and the status quo party in about 90 percent. The threat party received third party support in 10 border wars, the status quo in 13. The United States supported the threat party two times and the status quo party once. The United States was interested in another 20 conflicts of this type but took no action. There was Communist involvement in 11 conflicts, 7 of which included Communist third party support.

(4) Warning Time and Duration

In the 20 border wars in which warning time could be estimated, 55 percent had no warning and 40 percent had a warning of one week or more. Seventy-six percent of border wars in which duration was known were of a length greater than one week and 20 percent lasted longer than one year.




(5) Force Sizes



Force size distributions for the two parties were similar but indicate that the status quo party had slightly larger forces.

(6) Total Fatalities



Casualties in border wars tended to be low; only 19 percent of conflicts on which data was available had over 100 deaths.

(7) Disruptive Effects

Sixty-one percent of the border wars produced localized disruptive effects, while 32 percent had essentially no disruptive effects at all.

(8) Tempo of Operations

Sporadic engagements were most often (61 percent) characteristic of border wars. The tempo of 18 percent was considered to be continual separate engagements without increase in intensity.

(9) Level of Weapons

Percent of Conflicts in which the Indicated Weapons Were Used

	<u>Makeshift Weapons</u>	<u>Hand-Carried Weapons</u>	<u>Heavy Weapons</u>
Threat Party	4	22	74
Status Quo Party	8	25	67

There were no significant differences between the levels of weapon utilized by both parties. These data do not include those conflicts for which the level of weapons is unknown.

(10) Force Employment

Percent of Conflicts in which Significant Operations Occurred

	<u>Ground Operations</u>	<u>Sea Operations</u>	<u>Air Operations</u>
Threat Party	100	11	46
Status Quo Party	96	4	39

The threat party made slightly greater use of sea and air operations than did the status quo party.

(11) Initial Movement of Conflict Forces

Initial movement data was not available in 6 border wars. Rapid deployment by land was used by the threat party in 46 percent of the remaining conflicts and by the status quo party in 36 percent. There was only one case of air deployment and none of sea delivery.

(12) Resupply

In conflicts in which resupply information was available, the threat party required resupply in 65 percent of the cases and usually relied on land routes. The status quo combat forces were shown to require significant resupply in 55 percent of the conflicts, and they also used land routes in practically every case.

(13) Degree of Control (Threat Party)

The threat party enforced central, unified control over its forces in over 60 percent of border wars in which information was available.

(14) Outcome

<u>Result</u>	<u>Percent of Conflicts</u>
Continuing	11
Terminated Inconclusively	64
Status Quo Party Won	14
Threat Party Lost but Made Gains	11
Threat Party Won	0

Almost all border wars (96 percent) were judged likely to be renewed.

b. Limited War

(1) Number and Location

	<u>Time Period</u>			
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Latin America	0	0	0	0
Europe	0	0	0	0
Middle East	1	1	0	2
Africa	0	0	0	0
Asia (less S. E.)	0	0	1	1
Southeast Asia	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	3	2	2	7

Limited war as used here means a conventional frontal international conflict. Less than 2 percent of all conflicts have been of the limited war type, all occurring in Asia and the Middle East. These conflicts were essentially equally distributed over the three time periods.

(2) Motivation and Objectives


Of the seven limited wars, three were motivated by political reasons and two by nationalism. The threat party objective was to overthrow the existing form of government in 5 of the 7 cases.

(3) Participants


The threat party was a non-colonial government in four of the seven conflicts. The status quo party was either a non-colonial or colonial government in all seven cases. The threat party received third party support in 3 conflicts (all by Communist governments), the status quo party in 6. The United States was a participant in 3 of these conflicts and had interest in the other 4. There was communist involvement in some significant form in 4 conflicts.

(4) Warning Time and Duration

Three of the limited wars were initiated without warning time. One conflict had one day warning and the remainder had over 10 days warning. Three of the limited wars lasted over 6 months and one of these lasted over 5 years.




(5) Force Size



Limited wars were characterized by large force sizes. From the data on conflicts where force sizes could be determined, the threat party is shown to have typically had larger forces.

(6) Total Fatalities



Five of seven limited wars had no greater than 1000 fatalities but one limited war (Korea) produced in excess of 100,000 deaths.

(7) Disruptive Effects

Over 70 percent of the limited war treated widespread disruptive effects.

(8) Tempo of Operations

Over 70 percent of limited wars were classed as sporadic engagements or as single engagements lasting the duration of the conflict.

(9) Level of Weapons

Percent of Conflicts in which the Indicated Weapons Were Used

	<u>Makeshift Weapons</u>	<u>Hand-Carried Weapons</u>	<u>Heavy Weapons</u>
Threat Party	0	0	100
Status Quo Party	0	0	100

Both parties used heavy weapons in every limited war.

(10) Force Employment

Percent of Conflicts in which Significant Operations Occurred

	<u>Ground Operations</u>	<u>Sea Operations</u>	<u>Air Operations</u>
Threat Party	86	71	71
Status Quo Party	86	71	71

A greater percentage of limited wars involved use of sea and air operations than any other class of conflicts.

(11) Initial Movement of Combat Troops

Both parties made significant initial movements of forces in three of the seven limited wars. Threat party forces made rapid land deployments in two of these three conflicts and used sea delivery in the other case. Status quo forces were moved by land in one conflict, by air in two others.

(12) Resupply

Limited war combat forces needed resupply in four of the seven conflicts. The threat party primarily used land and air operations and the status quo party sea and land routes.

(13) Degree of Control (Threat Party)

In five of the seven limited wars the threat party exercised a central unified control of operations.

(14) Outcomes

<u>Results</u>	<u>Percent of Conflicts</u>
Status Quo Party Won	57
Threat Party Lost but Made Gains	14
Threat Party Won	29

In four of the seven conflicts, renewal was considered likely.

i. Other International Conflicts

(1) Number and Location

	Time Period			<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>	
Latin America	1	2	6	9
Europe	1	0	0	1
Middle East	1	1	1	3
Africa	0	1	0	1
Asia (less S. E.)	4	2	0	6
S. E. Asia	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	8	6	8	22

International conflicts within this grouping included covert invasions, blockades, and threats (show of force), and they totaled 6 percent of all conflicts. Over 6 percent of these conflicts took place in Latin America or Asia (less S. E.). The frequency of these forms of conflict increased in Latin America, but a decrease occurred in Asia (less S. E.), so that the totals were reasonably constant for all time periods.

(2) Motivation and Objectives



The motivations for these conflicts were territorial gain 32 percent, political 23 percent, and nationalist and ideological 14 percent each. Acquisition of territory or other valuable interests with or without overthrowing the government and overthrow of the existing government by force but maintaining the current form of government were the objectives of 62 percent of the conflicts. Another 29 percent had as an objective the increase of internal political control or overthrow of the existing form of government by force.

(3) Participants

In 73 percent of these conflicts the threat party was a non-colonial government; the status quo party was a non-colonial government in 82 percent. Each side received third party support in 12 conflicts. The United States provided support in 5 cases, 4 on the side of the status quo party. The United States was considered to be interested in an additional 13 conflicts. Communist involvement was noted in 8 conflicts, 6 of which involved third party support by Communist nations.



(4) Warning Time and Duration

In the case of conflicts in which warning time estimates could be made, 59 percent had zero warning, and the remaining 41 percent had six days warning or greater. Thirty-three percent of the conflicts had durations of no greater than one week. On the other hand, 24 percent lasted from one to five years.



PERCENT OF CONFLICTS WITH TIME PERIOD > X WEEKS


(5) Force Sizes



PERCENT OF CONFLICTS WITH FORCE SIZE $\geq$ X PARTICIPANTS

For conflicts in which the peak force sizes were known, the distributions indicate that the status quo party tended to have larger forces. In 90 percent of the conflicts the status quo party had 1000 men or more, while the threat party had a similar force in about 60 percent of the conflicts.

(6) Total Fatalities



In the conflicts in which fatalities were known, about 44 percent involved no more than 10 deaths; only 12 percent had 1000 or more deaths.

(7) Disruptive Effects

The disruptive effects of these international conflicts were largely localized (55 percent) or insignificant (36 percent).

(8) Tempo of Operations

The tempo of operations was of a relatively low order: no engagement of forces in 27 percent of the situations, sporadic engagements in about 18 percent and a single-engagement at one or more locations lasting the duration of conflict in 32 percent.

(9) Level of Weapons

Percent of Conflicts in which the Indicated Weapons Were Used

	<u>Makeshift Weapons</u>	<u>Hand-Carried Weapons</u>	<u>Heavy Weapons</u>
Threat Party	0	31	69
Status Quo Party	0	21	79

The status quo party had slightly superior weapons in these types of conflicts. These data do not include those conflicts for which the level of weapons is unknown.

(10) Force Employment

Percent of Conflicts in which Significant Operations Occurred

	<u>Ground Operations</u>	<u>Sea Operations</u>	<u>Air Operations</u>
Threat Party	86	32	27
Status Quo Party	91	45	59

The status quo party made considerable greater use of sea and air operations than did the threat party.

(11) Initial Movement of Conflict Troops

The threat party used rapid deployment by land in 32 percent of the cases, sea delivery 37 percent of the time, and air movement once. Status quo party forces were delivered by sea in 22 percent of the conflicts and deployed by land in 22 percent.

(12) Resupply

Land and sea modes of resupply were important to the threat party in nearly 60 percent of these conflicts, while the status quo party used all methods (land, sea and air) in 57 percent of the conflicts.

(13) Degree of Control (Threat Party)

In conflicts of these types in which degree of control could be determined, central, unified control of operations by the threat party was exercised in over 80 percent of the cases.

(14) Outcome

<u>Result</u>	<u>Percent of Conflicts</u>
Continuing	5
Terminated Inconclusively	27
Status Quo Party Won	41
Threat Party Lost but Made Gains	18
Threat Party Won	9

Seventy-five percent of these international conflicts were judged likely to reoccur.

F. Selected Topics

The foregoing data on recent conflicts provide a number of implications that relate to the need for and nature of the use of force in both internal and international conflicts. For example, the frequency of conflicts, the geographical distribution of the numbers and types

of conflicts, and the characteristics of the various types of conflicts are in many ways suggestive of military force requirements. It is also apparent that the collected data can be probed in many additional ways to provide information of potential value to military planners. Of interest in this respect are specific correlations between variables and a wide range of cause and effect relationships. The number of variables and amount of data available, plus the extensive number of hypotheses that may be developed for testing, indicate that these studies could represent a significant effort. An initial group of analyses are included in the following material. This work investigates the need for prompt response forces, the relationship of certain military variables to conflict outcome, and conflict frequency trends. For the most part these investigations examine the relationship between two variables. The recognized complexity of assigning causal factors to conflict outcome and in fact the results of these analyses make it apparent that multivariate studies would be of value if research is to proceed beyond this study.

1. Response Time Analysis

a. The Value of Response Time

There are many conflicts which are of brief duration and develop with little or no warning. It has been assumed that a quick-response military system would be desirable to cope with such conflicts. Conflicts in which the United States acted, plus those in which the United States had an interest but took no action, have been examined to see whether a quick-response force might have been used had it been available.

Present deployment of U.S. forces allows military capabilities to be brought by sea to any point in the world within 5 days. It has therefore been assumed that the United States could take action in any conflict of duration 5 days or less only if the sum of warning time plus duration exceeded 5 days.

b. Conflicts with U. S. Action

Table 49 shows the combinations of warning time and duration for conflicts in which the United States acted. Conflicts above and to the left of the dashed line are characterized by having the sum of warning time and duration equal to five days or less. The United States acted in 10 cases with zero warning time and conflict duration 5 days or less. These conflicts were:

333	South Vietnam coup (Diem) 1963
194	Laos military coup 1964
168	South Korean military coup 1961
373	South Vietnam - Civilian government overthrown - 1964
161	Japan uprisings - 1962
336	South Vietnam - abortive coup - 1964
258	Puerto Rico - nationalist uprising - 1950
338	North Vietnam - Tonkin Gulf 1964

TABLE 49

WARNING TIME/DURATION FOR CONFLICTS
IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES ACTED

		Duration in Days					
		1	2	3	4	5	> 5
Warning Time	0	5	2	1	1	1	12
	1	1	0	0	0	0	4
	2	0	0	0	0	1	0
	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
> 5		0	0	1	0	0	12
?		1	0	0	0	0	7

077 Bay of Pigs 1961
222 Nicaragua - Cuban-backed invasion - 1960

Of the conflicts listed here as having no warning, on the basis of public record, three are suspect. It is clear that the Bay of Pigs incident of 1961 was known ahead of time at least to the CIA. The South Vietnam coup which removed Diem in 1963 was also known to the United States a day or two before it happened. The Cuban-backed invasion of Nicaragua in 1960 was possibly known to the CIA but this possibility has not been corroborated.

In addition to the cases listed above, the United States acted in one conflict with one day warning and one day duration:

249 Peru - Military coup 1962, no U. S. military action.

There is also shown in table 49 one day conflict in which the warning time was not known. This was a riot in Panama and U. S. forces were already on the scene.

The eleven conflicts discussed above are shown in table 50 assigned to the proper warning time/duration cells. Of these eleven conflicts the military acted in four (077, 338, 161, and 222). In each of the cases in which the U. S. military was employed it was already at or near the scene. In the other conflicts U. S. action was limited to non-military means. For the conflicts in which the United States acted, the requirement for a quick-response force was obviated by existence of force on the spot.

c. Conflicts with U. S. Interest and No Action

The next question is: in cases of U. S. interest where the United States failed to act, did this failure result from a lack of capability or from other causes?

Table 51 shows the combinations of warning time and conflict duration for conflicts in which the United States had an interest but took no action. There were seventy-five such conflicts for which the sum of warning time and duration was five days or less. These are shown above and to the left of the dashed line. These 75 conflicts were examined in detail to determine whether the lack of U. S. action in any case resulted from the lack of time, particularly warning time, in which to take action. U. S. intentions and actions in these conflicts were checked in detail with the intelligence section of the Department of State.

As a result of the analysis, these conflicts have been divided into nine different categories, as listed in table 52. For all the conflicts in the first four categories, it was considered politically infeasible for the United States to take any action. In category five the conflict was considered to be the responsibility of a U. S. ally. Category six covers cases of UN responsibility: category seven -- OAS responsibility. Category eight contains a single case in which diplomatic pressures from other sources succeeded in dealing with the conflict successfully.

TABLE 50

CONFLICT IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS
FOR CONFLICTS IN WHICH UNITED STATES ACTED

D + W $\leq$ 5 days

D = Duration in Days

W = warning in days	1	2	3	4	5
0	333	336	338	077	222
	194	258			
	168				
	373				
	161				
1	249				

TABLE 51

WARNING TIME/DURATION FOR CONFLICTS
OF U.S. INTEREST IN WHICH NO ACTION WAS TAKEN

		Duration in Days					
		1	2	3	4	5	> 5
Warning Time in Days	0	27	10	11	9	3	49
	1	4	4	1	0	1	10
	2	1	0	2	0	0	0
	3	2	0	1	0	0	1
	4	1	0	0	0	0	5
	5	0	0	0	0	0	0
	> 5	2	2	2	2	1	31
?		1	0	4	1	0	13

201 cases
in all

TABLE 52

REASONS* FOR "NON-INTERVENTION" IN CERTAIN CONFLICTS OF U.S. INTEREST

<u>GROUP 1</u>		
330 601111	SOUTH VIETNAM-ABORTIVE COUP	
297 510629	ATTEMPTED NAVAL COUP D'ETAT - SIAM	
268 490113	SOUTH AFRICA-DURBAN RACE RIOTS	
245 630604	IRAN-RIOTS AGAINST REFORM PROGRAM	
189 600809	LAOS - SUCCESSFUL COUP BY KONGLAE	
306 530830	ITALIAN-YUGOSLAV BORDER CONFLICT	
159 500109	ITALY-STRIKES AND DEMONSTRATIONS	
020 520409	BOLIVIA-ESTENSORO INSTALLED BY SUCCESSFUL NRM-ARMY REVOLT	
125 460816	INDIA-RELIGIOUS RIOTS	
188 520528	FRANCE PARIS RIOTS	
069 620216	BRITISH GUIANA-GEORGETOWN RIOTS OF 1962	
217 600628	NEPAL-CHINA BORDER INCIDENT	
158 480714	ITALY-COMMUNIST UPRISINGS	
017 530616	BERLIN-UPRISINGS IN EASTERN ZONE	
272 600124	SOUTH AFRICA-RIOTS IN DURBAN	
254 560628	POLAND-POZNAN RIOTS	
055 570524	CHINA-ANTI-AMERICAN RIOTS IN TAIPEH	
<u>GROUP 2</u>		
322 580907	VENEZUELA-ABORTIVE INSURRECTION	
054 580521	BOLIVA-UNSUCCESSFUL SOCIALIST INSURRECTION IN SANTA CRUZ	
022 590419	BOLIVIA-UNSUCCESSFUL SOCIALIST INSURRECTION IN LA PAZ	
018 590627	BOLIVA-UNSUCCESSFUL SOCIALIST INSURRECTION IN SANTA CRUZ	
320 501111	VENEZUELA-ASSASSINATION AND ABORTIVE COUP	
295 530613	COLOMBIA COUP	
065 630402	ARGENTINA-UNSUCCESSFUL REVOLT BY HARDLINE ANTIPERON GENERALS	
033 630102	PERU-COMMUNIST INSPIRED DISORDERS	
034 490816	CHILE-RIOTS-ALLEGEDLY COMMUNIST INSPIRED	
294 521130	VENEZUELA COUP	
319 481123	VENEZUELA-BLOODLESS COUP BY JIMENEZ	
012 551113	ARGENTINA-BLOODLESS COUP BY GENERAL ARAMBURU	
013 560610	ARGENTINA-ABORTIVE PERONISTA UPRISING	
324 620504	VENEZUELA-NAVAL REVOLT AT CARUPANO	

*Cf. the notes beginning on page 159.

TABLE 52 (cont'd)

164	481020	SO. KOREA - ARMY REVOLT
357	520807	SARAWAK-COMMUNIST TERRORISM
123	541026	EGYPT-MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD REBELLION
GROUP 3		
354	581021	BOLIVIA-UNSUCCESSFUL SOCIALIST UPRISING IN LA PAZ
359	610220	VENEZUELA-ABORTIVE MILITARY COUP
006	480923	ARGENTINA-ALLEGED PLOT TO ASSASSINATE PERON
318	610110	URUGUAY-PRO CASTRO RIOTING
086	630925	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-MILITARY COUP OUSTS BOSCH
087	590619	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CUBAN INVASION CRUSHED
111	601113	GUATEMALA-ABORTIVE LEFT-WING MILITARY REVOLT
355	590302	BOLIVIA-ANTIAMERICAN RIOTS OVER TIME MAGAZINE ARTICLE
025	500518	BOLIVIA-NRM AND ALLEGEDLY COMMUNIST BACKED RIDING
325	620603	VENEZUELA-LEFTWING NAVAL REVOLT AT PUERTO CABELLO
309	631219	TUNISIA-ASSASSINATION PLOT
GROUP 4		
366	561021	HONDURAS COUP
010	550616	ARGENTINA-UNSUCCESSFUL ANTI-PERON REVOLT BY NAVY
008	510923	ARGENTINA-UNSUCCESSFUL MILITARY COUP AGAINST PERON
279	581117	SUDAN-MILITARY COUP
342	620925	YEMEN - MILITARY COUP
334	640130	SOUTH VIETNAM- MILITARY COUP (VAN MINH)
257	620101	PORTUGAL-ABORTIVE MILITARY REVOLT (BEJA INCIDENT)
179	561116	INDONESIA-MILITARY CONSPIRACY
358	580101	VENEZUELA-ABORTIVE AIRFORCE REVOLT
011	550915	ARGENTINA-PERON OVERTHROWN BY MILITARY REVOLT
019	460718	BOLIVIA-INSURRECTION BY STUDENTS AND UNIONS GAINS POWER
085	620116	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-ABORTIVE MILITARY COUP
063	620328	ARGENTINA-BLOODLESS MILITARY COUP DEPOSING FRONDISI
229	510509	PANAMA-COUP FOLLOWING GENERAL STRIKE OUSTS ARIAS
151	630208	IRAQ- KASSEM OVERTHROWN BY COUP
340	550402	YEMEN-MILITARY REVOLT

TABLE 52 (cont'd)

<u>GROUP 5</u>	
239 460714	IRAN- RIOTING IN ABADAN
347 640112	ZANZIBAR-OVERTHROW OF REGIME
304 630113	TOGO-ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT OLYMPIO
212 551026	MUSCAT-ABU DHABI-SAUDI ARABIA DISPUTE OVER BURAIMI OASIS
201 550500	MALAYA CHINESE STUDENT RIOTS
057 561010	CHINA-HONG KONG KOWLOON RIOTS
291 640120	TANGANYIKA-ARMY MUTINY
<u>GROUP 6</u>	
184 620316	ISRAEL-SYRIA -BORDER INCIDENTS
313 531104	CIVIL DISORDER IN TRIESTE
<u>GROUP 7</u>	
327 600624	VENEZUELA-DOMINICAN BACKED ATTEMPTED COUP
368 620121	HONDURAS-GUATEMALA INVASION
035 480409	COLOMBIA-ASSASSINATION AND DISORDER DURING BOGOTA CONFERENCE
<u>GROUP 8</u>	
244 530815	IRAN-ROYALIST REVOLT AND COUP
<u>GROUP 9</u>	
147 580714	IRAQ- ARMY REVOLT

Notes:

Group 1: 17 cases in which it was considered politically infeasible or undesirable to act.

Group 2: 17 cases in which the U.S. considered the conflict an "internal" problem properly to be handled by the local government's forces. (Note that these cases, too, may be considered as "politically infeasible").

Group 3: 11 cases in which the U.S. did not consider the situation serious enough to warrant intervention even if we had been inclined to do so.

TABLE 52 (cont'd)

Notes: (Continued)

Group 4: 16 cases in which the U.S. was happy to see the threat succeed. (Note that the 60 conflicts in the above four groups may all have been "politically infeasible").

Group 5: 8 cases in which the conflict was the primary concern of our allies rather than the U.S.

Group 6: Two cases of U.N. responsibility.

Group 7: Three cases of action properly to be taken through O.A.S.

Group 8: One case where diplomatic pressures succeeded.

Group 9: One case in which U.S. considered action and would have acted if we could have found someone to support.

The final category includes one case in which the United States would have acted if it could have established a legitimate reason to do so. For that case, a revolt in Iraq, U.S. forces were already adjacent to the area and the problem was not one of warning or reaction time.

The politically infeasible cases may be broken into four subgroups. The first group includes those such as riots in Poland or the Republic of South Africa in which, in an absolute sense, it was impossible to interfere. The second group includes cases in which the conflict was considered an internal problem properly handled by the local government. The third group includes cases in which the outcome, although of interest, was of relatively small importance. The fourth group consists of cases in which the United States was in favor of the threat party's success.

It is concluded that in only one of these 75 cases where the warning time and/or the duration of the conflict would have made it difficult for the United States to act was there a real need or intention to do so. The single exception was the case of Iraq, in which force was already deployed as mentioned above.

In summary: The evidence of this analysis of past conflicts has failed to indicate a need for a specially designed force for initial quick reaction in the period studied. In those conflicts in which it was felt necessary to act, the United States had forces in the area as part of its strategic deployment. Where the United States did not act, the lack of action resulted from lack of need rather than lack of capability. While it cannot be asserted that a very quick reaction force would never have found appropriate use if it had been available, this analysis does not identify such uses, suggesting that they may well have been rare.

2. Relationship of Level of Weapons Employed to Conflict Outcome

a. General

Tables 53 and 54 present data for those 166 conflicts on which there was sufficient information to assess the level of weapons used by both parties and which had an outcome of one of the 3 types indicated. In table 54 a distinction is made between those cases in which a party enjoyed an advantage in level of weapons and those in which both parties' weapons were reported to be of the same general level. This latter case was identified as a no advantage situation. It is stressed that in the discussion in this section advantage is in terms of general types of weapons employed and does not consider the total number of weapons available.

Summary data on weapons advantage is as follows:

<u>Advantage in Level of Weapons</u>	<u>Number of Conflicts</u>	<u>Percent of Conflicts</u>
Threat Party	14	8
No Advantage	74	45
Status Quo Party	78	47

TABLE 53
DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES BY LEVEL OF WEAPONS
FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT

Key: MSW - Makeshift Weapons
HCW - Other Hand-Carried Weapons
HW - Heavy Weapons

		OUTCOME OF CONFLICT								
		Status Quo Party Won			No Clear Winner; Threat Party Made Gains			Threat Party Won		
		Level of Weapons Status Quo			Level of Weapons Status Quo			Level of Weapons Status Quo		
		MSW	HCW	HW	MSW	HCW	HW	MSW	HCW	HW
<u>Civil Disorder:</u>										
	Threat	MSW	2	23	4	1	15	3	6	
		HCW	0	4	0		1		1	2
		HW	0	0	0				0	2
<u>Coup D'Etat:</u>										
	Threat	MSW	2	0	0				1	
		HCW	0	3	2				7	2
		HW	0	0	4		1		1	4
<u>Military Revolts:</u>										
	Threat	MSW		1						
		HCW		3			1			
		HW			5					3
<u>Insurrections:</u>										
	Threat	MSW				1				
		HCW		5	5	1				
		HW			2					1
<u>Guerrilla War</u>										
	Threat	MSW								
		HCW		1	4	2			1	6
		HW								1

TABLE 53 (cont'd)

Key: MSW - Makeshift Weapons
 HCW - Other Hand-Carried Weapons
 HW - Heavy Weapons

OUTCOME OF CONFLICT


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<u>Other Inter- national Conflicts</u>	<table><tr><th colspan="3">Status Quo</th></tr><tr><th>MSW</th><th>HCW</th><th>HW</th></tr><tr><td>MSW</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>HCW</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>HW</td><td></td><td>2</td></tr></table>	Status Quo			MSW	HCW	HW	MSW			HCW			HW		2	<table><tr><th colspan="3">Status Quo</th></tr><tr><th>MSW</th><th>HCW</th><th>HW</th></tr><tr><td>MSW</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>HCW</td><td></td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>HW</td><td></td><td>2</td></tr></table>	Status Quo			MSW	HCW	HW	MSW			HCW		1	HW		2	<table><tr><th colspan="3">Status Quo</th></tr><tr><th>MSW</th><th>HCW</th><th>HW</th></tr><tr><td>MSW</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>HCW</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>HW</td><td>1</td><td></td></tr></table>	Status Quo			MSW	HCW	HW	MSW			HCW			HW	1	
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TABLE 54

DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES BY LEVEL OF WEAPONS
FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT
(where level of weapons known on both sides)

Type of Conflict	Status Quo Party Won			No Clear Winner; Threat Made Gains			Threat Party Won			Totals		
	T.A.	N.A.	S.Q.A.	T.A.	N.A.	S.Q.A.	T.A.	N.A.	S.Q.A.	T.A.	N.A.	S.Q.A.
Civil Disorder	0	6	27	0	1	19	0	3	8	0	10	54
Coup d'etat	0	9	2	1	0	0	12	7	0	13	16	2
Military Revolt	0	8	1	0	0	1	0	3	0	0	11	2
Insurrection	0	7	5	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	9	6
Guerrilla War	0	1	4	0	2	0	0	2	6	0	5	10
Civil War	0	4	0	0	3	0	0	1	3	0	8	3
Border War	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
Conventional International Conflict	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	7	0
Other Int. Conflicts	0	2	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	1	4	1
SUBTOTALS	0	42	39	1	13	22	13	19	17	14	74	78
TOTALS		81			36			49			166	

NOTE: Advantage is based on the matrices presented in table B-III:



Thus, the status quo party had more sophisticated weapons in almost 50 percent of these conflicts. Further, 13 of the 14 conflicts in which the threat party had superior types of weapons were in the one category, coup d'etat. The threat party had an advantage in type of weapons in less than 1% of the conflicts other than coup d'etat. From the standpoint of deterrence, these data indicate that the party that was dissatisfied with the status quo was not deterred by the fact that it seldom had an advantage in weapon types, and in about half of the conflicts it even faced a weapons disadvantage. Even if civil disorders are not considered (on the basis that many erupt spontaneously rather than by plan) the data indicates that the threat party initiated the conflict from a position of superiority in types of weapons in only 1 conflict out of the remaining 71. It is apparent that the threat party either did not appreciate the difference in weapons sophistication or, and perhaps more likely, did not care. It also provides evidence that the party seeking to deter the other needed to present a deterrence posture which involved considerably more than mere extent advantage in types of weapons. Since the coding scheme used did not present a dynamic characterization of the conflicts, it is not possible at this point to analyze how the level of weapons changed with time. Such information would, of course, provide information of greater value in reconstructing the actual level of weapons in the pre-conflict (deterrence) period.

The relationship between level of weapons and conflict outcome is discussed below for each type of conflict and summarized at the end of section F.3.

b. Civil Disorder

There were a total of 122 conflicts classified as civil disorders in the 380 conflicts for 1946-64; 64 of these civil disorders satisfied the criteria for inclusion in these tables. Where status quo party weapons advantage existed, that party won a large portion of the conflicts (27 out of 35, or 77 percent) in which one party was judged to be clearly victorious. The threat party's win record improved to 3 out of 9 (or 33 percent) in clearly won conflicts in which there was equality in level of weapons available. Thus, although the threat party had some success in conflicts where it had a weapons disadvantage, there was reasonably good agreement between weapons superiority and conflict outcome in civil disorders.

One question of possible interest is whether heavy weapons are effective in civil disorders. Table 54 reveals that in the case of clearly won civil disorders the status quo party won only 50 percent when it used heavy weapons, as compared with 75 percent of such conflicts independent of weapons used. The data thus suggest that the use of heavy weapons is not the most effective approach in quelling civil disorders. However, the threat party win performance improved in cases where it was armed with heavy or hand-carried weapons.

c. Coup d'etat

The status quo party won about 35 percent of the 31 coups d'etat listed in table 54, and the threat party won 61 percent. It is thus apparent that most conflicts of this type end in a clear decision for one party, unlike civil disorders. The observation that the status quo party had a type of weapon advantage in only 2 of the 31 conflicts suggests that the threat party was deterred except in cases where it had at least equality of weapons. Superiority in weapon types was highly beneficial to the threat party: it won

12 of the 13 conflicts in which it had a weapons advantage. On the other hand, the status quo party triumphed in the two cases where it had the advantage and did somewhat better than its over-all win-loss record in this type of conflict in cases where weapons parity existed, winning 9 of 16. These numbers may indicate poor execution on the part of the threat party, or, more specifically, that outcome is uncertain in cases where the individuals planning the coup win only partial, rather than complete, support of the armed elements (e.g., Army, police) that can be brought to bear. Possession of heavy weapons is indicated to be of importance in coups in that in no case did a party having heavy weapons lose if the other party had less than heavy weapons. The status quo party won in 6 of 10 cases in which it had heavy weapons, and the threat party in 9 of the 14 cases when it possessed heavy weapons.

d. Military Revolt

The military revolts compiled in table 54 represent 13/31 (or 42 percent) of all military revolts identified. In these 13 conflicts, the status quo party won 9 (or 69 percent) and the threat party 3 (or 23 percent). It is of interest to note that in no case did the party initiating the conflict have an advantage in type of weapons; however, in 11 of the 13 conflicts parity in weapons types was judged to exist. Thus the fact that it did not enjoy a weapons advantage did not deter the threat party. Because military forces tend to be involved actively on both sides of this type of conflict, the level of weapons employed was commensurately higher than for civil disorders and coups d'etat: 8 out of the 13 conflicts (62 percent) saw the use of heavy weapons for both parties, and there were no cases of the use of makeshift weapons. In view of the relative equality of weapons in this sample, type of weapons employed does not provide a cause for the relatively one-sided success record of the status quo party. It is noted that the threat party's success in coups d'etat, where force is normally brought to bear at a nation's focal point of political control, has been shown to be considerably greater (61 percent versus 23 percent) than in military revolts, where dissenting force normally develops at much less sensitive geographical points.

e. Insurrection

Outcomes are shown for 15 insurrections in which level of weapons of both parties are known. There were 39 insurrections in the entire time period. The status quo party won 12/15 (or 80 percent) of these and the threat party 1/15 (or 7 percent). Again, it is noted that the threat party was not deterred by the fact that it did not have superior weapons, although it did have equality of weapons in 9/15 (or 60 percent) of these conflicts. The status quo party won 5 of 6 conflicts in which it had a weapons advantage and 7 of 9 conflicts which involved equality in weapons types. The win-loss records of the threat party in military revolts and insurrections indicate that these types of conflicts did not have a major effect in the overthrow of existing regimes in the 1946-64 time period. If all conflicts of these types are considered, including those in which one or both parties' force sizes were not known, there are a total of 70 cases with the threat party emerging victorious in 5 (or 7 percent) and the status quo party in 50 (or 70 percent).

f. Guerrilla War

The 15 guerrilla wars shown in table 54 are from a total of 27 wars of this type over the entire period. However, 5 of these 27 conflicts are currently in progress. In none of the 15 conflicts did the threat party have a level of weapons advantage; in fact

it had a disadvantage in 10 of the 15, with parity in 5 cases. In terms of outcome, however, the status quo party was only able to win 5 conflicts. The outcomes do not appear to have been affected by relative level of weapons since the threat party did about as well in situations where the status quo party had a weapon advantage as in cases where equality existed. In 10 of these 15 conflicts the status quo party had heavy weapons. It lost 7 of these 10 and in only one of these 7 conflicts did the threat party itself have heavy weapons.

g. Civil War

Eleven (11) civil wars are included in this sample of a total of 17 in the 19 year period. Again there were no conflicts in which the threat party had superior types of weapons, although equality was judged to exist in 8 conflicts (or 73 percent). The threat party had heavy weapons in each of these 8 conflicts and the status quo had heavy weapons in all 11. Each party won 4 of the 11 conflicts; it was somewhat surprising to note that the threat party won all 3 of the conflicts in which it had an inferior class of weapons (hand-carried versus the status quo's heavy). In view of the generally equal levels of weapons shown in this data, it would not be reasonable to expect the status quo party's weapons to have been an effective deterrent without more detailed information on the specific composition of the respective forces.

h. International Conflict - Border War

There were a total of 28 border wars in the entire time period but 21 of them are continuing or were terminated inconclusively. The conflict participants had equal levels of weapons in each of the 4 remaining conflicts. Thus, viewing these conflicts from the standpoint of the opposing parties' general weapons levels, there appears to have been no fundamental reason the threat party should have been deterred. Conflict outcome was generally a standoff, with 3 of the 4 conflicts falling under the "no clear winner" code. Although this is a small sample size and other possibly significant factors are not made evident, the outcome data suggest either that border wars simply tend to return to a generally pre-conflict status or that they are brought to an ultimate decision by negotiation or through transition into other forms of conflict, such as by guerrilla war or conventional limited war (see below).

i. Conventional International Conflict (Limited War)

The 7 conflicts shown in table 54 constitute all of the conflicts in this category for the entire time period. The status quo party enjoyed a reasonable measure of success in such conflicts, winning 4 of the 7, with one conflict judged to end in the "no clear winner" category. All 7 conflicts witnessed heavy weapons being used by both parties so it is unlikely that type of weapon by itself was a major factor in either the deterrence or initiation of the conflicts. It will also be necessary to look beyond this variable to gain insight into the unbalanced win-loss results. The data do indicate that participants in waging frontal, ground control warfare of this type recognized the need for either having or of obtaining heavy weapons.

j. Other International Conflicts

This category includes several types of conflicts -- e.g., covert invasions, blockades, and show of force. Only 6 conflicts (of the total of 22 that occurred 1946-64)

met the criteria for inclusion in table 54. Three of the conflicts fell in the "no clear winner" category, with the status quo party winning two and the threat party achieving its objectives in the other. Advantage in level of weapons is shown for threat party in 1 conflict, no advantage 4 and status quo 1, with the threat party achieving its objectives in the case where it had superior types of weapons. Each party employed heavy weapons in 5 of the 6 conflicts.

3. Relationship of Force Employment to Conflict Outcome

As noted above, more detailed weapons information is desired than is provided by the three broad categories used in the coding of "level of weapons." To a certain extent this information is available through the variable "force employment," which provides an over-all description of the nature of ground, sea, and air operations. Therefore, where the level of weapons was classified as heavy, it was possible to determine whether only heavy ground weapons were used or whether sea or air weapons were employed. This sorting is possible since significant sea or air operations resulted (by definition) in the level of weapons being classified as heavy, except in those few cases where sea or air personnel were used only in ground operations.

Therefore, all of the conflicts of tables 53 and 54 that involved use of heavy weapons have been examined to see if significant ground, sea, or air operations were conducted. This force employment information reveals that of the 80 conflicts in which heavy weapons were used by at least one side, there were:

- a. only 5 conflicts in which the status quo party did not employ significant ground operations.
- b. only 2 conflicts in which the threat party did not employ significant ground operations, and
- c. only one conflict in which neither side used significant ground operations.

Figures 21a - h have been prepared to display conflict outcome as a function of the force employment of each party. Each type of conflict is shown separately. The conflicts included in these figures meet the following conditions:

- a. The level of weapons for both parties were known,
- b. heavy weapons were used by at least one party, and
- c. the outcome was either status quo party won, threat party won, or threat party failed to achieve its objective but made appreciable gains (abbreviated as "no clear winner.")

The symbols used on the axes in the figures indicate force employment (and, indirectly, level of weapons) for each opposing party as follows:

g - other than heavy weapons were used. (This normally means use of make-shift or other hand-carried weapons. The symbol was also used in 4 coups d'etat in which the status quo party employed no weapons.)


G - ground operations were used and level of weapons was classified as heavy.

S - sea operations were used.

A - air operations were used.

GS, GA, SA, and GSA - combinations of ground, sea, and air operations were used as indicated by the symbols.

The entries in the figures provide the number of conflicts of the designated type which involved use of the kinds of force indicated by the above symbols. The figures thus provide a finer structure indication of weapons and operations than was suggested by the level of weapons variable. It also enables advantage in level of weapons to be placed on a different, more precise basis than was used in section III.F.2. Three quadrants of each figure are utilized for the three above mentioned conflict outcomes. The areas within each quadrant may be viewed as follows:



KEY:

S-Force employment favors status quo party

T-Force employment favors threat party

■-Force employment favors neither party

The implication resulting from a conflict being listed within an area is provided by the key. This implication derives solely from the scope or diversity of each party's operations and is not set forth as an absolute gauge of weapons superiority. However, it is proposed as a measure of relative advantage in force sophistication and employment. It indicates for example, that a party that made significant use of ground, sea, and air operations had an advantage in type of weapons over another party that used only heavy or hand-carried ground weapons. Thus, this approach does provide another means of exploring the relationship between types of force used and conflict outcome.

A gross summary of the data in figures 21a - h is contained in table 55. The results of using the above force employment approach to indicate force advantage are partially shown by the fact that the number of no advantage situations are reduced to 18 conflicts from the total of 41 which would have been so labeled under the level of weapons categorization. This decrease results from the fact that many of the heavy weapon versus heavy weapon situations (previously classified as equal) are shown to favor one party when full force employment (as defined) is examined.

Table 55 shows that over all conflicts the threat party did better than the status quo party when a position of force advantage was enjoyed: the threat party won 9/14 (or 64 percent) while the status quo party won only 25/48 (or 52 percent). The two parties did about equally well when no advantage was judged to exist.

In civil disorders in which it had force advantage, the status quo party won 4 of the 6 conflicts that had a clear winner. Outcome of coups d'etat correlated well with force advantage: the status quo party won 4 of 4 and the threat party 6 of 8. The data for these two lower intensity conflict types do not, of course, reflect the results for the numerous conflicts of these types involving less than heavy weapons. The results for military revolts are mixed, but in the case of insurrections, advantage in force diversification is shown to be highly beneficial to the status quo party. The status quo had this type of advantage in all guerrilla wars included in this sample but the threat party nonetheless won 7 of 11 conflicts. More will be said about this situation later. Looking at the remaining types of conflicts as a group, the status quo party won about 40 percent of the conflicts in which it had an advantage and about the same percentage of the group in which no advantage or threat advantage prevailed.

Table 56 is provided to enable examination of the relationship of the use of sea and air operations to conflict outcome. The only conflicts included in this compilation (source of data: figures 21a - h) are those which were clearly won by one party or the other. Thus, although the table is constructed from the standpoint of status quo party win probability (defined here to be the ratio of conflicts won by the status quo to those won by both parties), it is easy to convert the data to the threat party point of view. For the two outcomes under scrutiny here there were 48 conflicts involving use of sea or air operations by either party; 20 of these included use of sea or air by the threat party, 42 by the status quo party. Goodness-of-fit tests have not been made here because of the small sample sizes for the various conflict types. However, a number of observations may be made.

Of interest here are conflicts in which either or both of sea and air employment occurred, since both are of significance to naval forces. The relatively small number of conflicts involving sea and air have not made it worthwhile to explore sea and air as separate factors except in one or two cases.

FIG. B-21c: FORCE
EMPLOYMENT* AND CON-
FLICT OUTCOME FOR
MILITARY REVOLT







FIG. B-21d: FORCE
EMPLOYMENT* AND CON-
FLICT OUTCOME FOR
INSURRECTION



* See text for key to abbreviations.



* See text for key to abbreviations.

TABLE 55

SUMMARY OF OUTCOMES BY FORCE EMPLOYMENT
FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT

(to be used in conjunction with figures 21a - h)

	SQ Party Won			No Clear Winner			Threat Party Won		
	TA	NA	SQA	TA	NA	SQA	TA	NA	SQA
Civil Disorder	-	-	4	-	-	4	-	2	2
Coup D'Etat	1	1	4	1	-	-	6	3	-
Military Revolt	1	2	2	-	-	1	1	2	-
Insurrection		2	5	-	-	-	-	1	-
Guerrilla War	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	7
Civil War	-	1	3	-	2	1	-	-	4
Conventional International Conflict (border and limited wars)	1	-	2	1	-	1	1	-	1
Other International Conflicts	-	1	1	-	1	2	1	-	-
TOTALS	3	7	25	2	3	9	9	8	14

TA -- Threat party advantage
 NA -- No advantage
 SQA -- Status Quo party advantage

TABLE 56

DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOME AND HEAVY WEAPONS FORCE EMPLOYMENT
FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT*

Status Quo Party Win Ratio**							
Type of Conflict	Total Conflicts		Conflicts in Which Heavy Weapons Were Used	S.Q.-No Sea or Air		S.Q. Used Sea or Air	
	Ratio	%		Threat-No	Threat-Yes	Threat-No	Threat-Yes
Civil Disorder	47/65	72	4/8	3/6	---	1/2	---
Coup D'etat	24/86	28	6/15	2/8	1/2	2/3	1/2
Military Revolt	22/25	88	5/8	1/2	1/2	2/2	1/2
Insurrection	28/30	93	7/8	0/1	---	5/5	2/2
Guerrilla War	7/15	47	4/11	---	---	4/11	---
Civil War	5/10	50	4/8	1/1	---	1/4	2/3
Conventional International Conflicts	7/8	88	3/5	---	1/1	0/1	2/3
Other International Conflict	9/11	82	2/3	---	0/1	---	2/2
TOTALS	149/250	60	35/66	7/18	3/6	15/28	10/14

* Conflicts in this compilation are only those in which the outcome indicated a clear win for one party.

** S.Q. Party Win Ratio = (Conflicts won by S.Q. Party) / (Conflicts won by both parties)

The first data column in table 56 provides the win ratio for all conflicts of each type that ended in one of the two outcomes. This probability is also provided in the third data column for conflicts where level of weapons was known and sea or air employment was possible (i.e., at least one party used heavy weapons). Finally, this probability is shown for various combinations of both parties' use of sea and air weapons employment, within the heavy weapons context.

As would be expected, a few civil disorders involved use of heavy weapons. In the eight conflicts in which heavy weapons were used, the status quo win probability was less than for the total (col. 1) of the type. Further, there is nothing in the data to suggest that use of sea or air operations provide any particular benefits to the user in this form of conflict.

It may, however, be observed that some improvement in status quo party win probability in coups d'etat accrued when that party used sea or air (won 3 of 5 versus 0.28 win probability for all coups d'etat).

It is interesting to note that the party that had air support in coups d'etat had good success: in the 6 coups d'etat involving use of air by a party, that party won 5 times (3 for status quo, 2 for threat party). This observation attaches some importance to the value of gaining or holding the allegiance of a nation's air capability in coups d'etat situations. On the other hand, the threat party won 6 of 8 conflicts involving heavy weapons where only ground heavy weapons were used. The importance to the threat party of controlling all heavy ground weapons is shown by the observation that the threat party was victorious in all 5 cases in which it had heavy ground support and the status quo party had only light ground support or none at all. In the other 3 cases (of these 8) the status quo party had heavy ground support and won 2 of the 3.

The status quo party had very high success ratios in military revolts and insurrections. The data for these types of conflicts indicate that the majority were suppressed by the status quo party without resorting to heavy weapons. The different nature of these types of conflicts is shown by the following:

<u>Type of Conflict</u>	<u>No. Involving Heavy Weapons</u>	<u>Party Having Heavy Weapons</u>		<u>Party Having Sea or Air Operations</u>	
		<u>S.Q.</u>	<u>Threat</u>	<u>S.Q.</u>	<u>Threat</u>
Military Revolt	8	8	8	4	4
Insurrection	8	8	3	7	2

The rebels' forces in these military revolts are thus comparable in type to those of the defender; this, however, is not true of insurrections. The data on the use of air and sea operations in military revolts provide no observations of a conclusive nature regarding outcome, thereby suggesting that force size considerations may dominate here. In insurrections the status quo party won every conflict in which it employed sea or air operations (having air in all conflicts, sea in one), providing results slightly better than, but consistent with, insurrection results as a whole.

Outcomes in guerrilla wars are not correlated with force employment. The status quo party was able to achieve victory in only 4 of the 11 conflicts involving heavy weapons, even though it had such weapons in each conflict (including use of air in all 11, sea in 3 of the 11) and the guerrillas had heavy weapons (ground only) in only 1 conflict.

Win-loss results for the civil wars in which sea and air operations were employed appear consistent with outcomes for such wars as a whole. The data suggest that other factors, such as force sizes and the effectiveness of ground operations (both sides had heavy ground operations in 8 conflicts), were decisive here.

Although some border wars involved use of lower level weapons, the remaining conventional international limited wars were characterized by extensive use of sea and air operations. In fact, one of the parties made use of both sea and air forces in each of the 5 conflicts shown in the table. The results derived from the limited data neither establish nor deny particular correlation between the use of sea and air forces (as by one party and not for the other) and conflict victory in this type of conflict, or in other international conflict.

Examination of the data of table 58 (conflicts involving heavy weapons) from the standpoint of deterrence yields several observations. In these samples there were no civil disorders, insurrections, guerrilla wars, or civil wars in which it is indicated that the threat party initiated a conflict from a position of advantage in types of force available. This observation is consistent with the fact that civil disorders and insurrections tend to be ignited spontaneously and that guerrilla wars are characteristically commenced from a position of weakness. Perhaps the best explanation for the presence of civil war on this list is the fact that many civil wars begin as insurrections and thus share their characteristics. The threat party had a distinct advantage in force sophistication in coups d'etat and approximate equality in military revolts and international wars, and thus there is no apparent reason that weapons capability should have served as a deterrent in these cases.

In summarizing all of the discussion on level of weapons and force employment, it is concluded that there is good agreement between weapons advantage* and outcome in coups d'etat and insurrections. There is noticeable, but less conclusive, agreement in the case of civil disorders. In these types of conflicts the side with an advantage in types of weapons normally won, and the inference is that these are "weapons controlled" conflicts. In guerrilla wars, the only other type of conflict in which one party normally had a distinct advantage, the outcomes display a lack of correlation with arms advantage. Finally, there are the types of conflicts which characteristically involve ground control fighting (and on occasions sea and air control) and relatively equal types of weapons. These are the military revolts, civil wars, and most classes of international conflicts. The outcomes of these conflicts cannot be adequately explained on the basis of weapons data, and the controlling factors must be sought in some other parameter or combination of parameters.

*Defined as advantage in level of weapons used and/or more use of ground/sea/air operations by one party than by the other.

4. Relationship of Force Size Ratio to Conflict Outcome

a. General

There have been several difficulties in making an analysis of the effect of relative force sizes on conflict outcome. One problem is that of accuracy; in many cases it is difficult to know how accurate a force estimate may be. Sources may differ in their basis for defining combatants, and on occasions an estimate in one source conflicts with that in another. In many conflicts force size information is just not available. The relatively small number of conflicts covered in this discussion resulted from the fact that the only conflicts that were included were (1) those in which force size estimates for both parties were available, and (2) those that ended in victory for one party (inconclusive and "tie" results were not used). The impact of these criteria is shown in table 57. This table indicates that force sizes of both parties were known in only about one conflict in seven and where both force sizes were known, about two-thirds had outcomes that indicated a clear victory for one party or the other. The fact that the sample is a larger percentage of the population in the case of the higher level types of conflicts reflects the more complete coverage of these types of conflicts in the literature. The ratio of status quo party victories to threat party victories for both the population and the sample are shown in the table to permit comparison of outcomes in the two groups. In this table the grouping "international conventional conflicts" includes border wars and limited wars.

b. Results

Force ratios of individual conflicts for the various types of conflicts and for the indicated outcomes are shown in table 58. The ratios provided in this table are determined on the basis of status quo party force size to threat party force size.

The results for civil disorders suggest that the status quo party was able to obtain success with relatively small comparative force sizes. Based on the information in section III. E. 2. a. this relationship was not unexpected since many civil disorders were characterized by reasonably large crowds, that were poorly organized and armed, being opposed by sometimes smaller, but usually better armed and trained police or military personnel.

In many coups d'etat (section III. E. 2. b.) the chief of state and his immediate associates represent the only participants on the status quo side. Therefore, although the force ratios in several conflicts were heavily in favor of the threat party, only modest numbers of personnel in the threat forces were actually involved in most cases. Nonetheless, the data indicate that threat party victories in coups d'etat were marked by their having significant force size advantage.

The force size ratios obtained for military revolts and insurrections are applicable only for the status quo party winning. On the basis of this limited number of conflicts the ratio of status quo to threat party forces was slightly higher for suppressing military revolts than insurrections, even if the ratio of 50 in one revolt is not considered. The conflict (Yemen, 1955 revolt) in which this ratio occurred could undoubtedly have been won with considerably smaller force advantage. The difference in ratios for the two types of conflicts may simply indicate that more force is required to defeat opposing military force

TABLE 57

TOTAL CONFLICTS VERSUS THOSE USED IN FORCE SIZE ANALYSIS

Type of conflict	Total Conflict Population, 1946-64				Sample, Both Force Sizes Known			
	No. of Conflicts	Status Quo Party Won (a)	Threat Party Won (b)	a/b	No. of Conflicts	Status Quo Party Won (a)	Threat Party Won (b)	a/b
Civil Disorders	122	48	17	2.82	5	3	0	3/0
Coup d'etat	87	24	66	0.39	5	1	4	0.25
Military Revolt	31	22	3	7.3	3	3	0	3/0
Insurrection	39	28	2	14.0	5	3	0	3/0
Guerrilla War	27	7	8	0.88	13	4	4	1.0
Civil War	17	5	5	1.00	10	3	4	.75
International Conv. Conflict	35	8	2	4.00	10	4	2	2.00
Other International Conflict	22	9	2	4.50	6	3	1	3.00

TABLE 58

RATIO OF STATUS QUO PARTY FORCE SIZE TO THREAT PARTY
FORCE SIZE FOR INDIVIDUAL CONFLICTS

Type of Conflict	Force Size Ratio ($F=F_{sq}/F_t$)	
	Party Winning Conflict	
	Status Quo	Threat
● INTERNAL		
- Localized Internal Conflict		
- Civil Disorder	0.06	
	0.13	
	2.00	
- Coup d'etat	1.00	0.10
		0.027
		0.016
		0.01
- Military Revolt	1.00	
	3.13	
	50.00	
- Insurrection	0.13	
	0.50	
	2.50	
- Widespread Internal Conflict		
- Guerrilla War	2.00	1.70
	2.50	2.50
	3.13	6.30
	13.30	16.70
- Civil War	2.50	1.0
	9.10	1.27
	19.95	1.28
		1.59
● INTERNATIONAL		
- Conventional Conflict	1.00	0.15
(Border and Limited War)	1.00	0.25
	10.00	
- Other International Conflicts	3.03	10.00
	10.00	
	25.00	

than is required to defeat predominantly non-military forces, particularly when ground control type of combat is involved.

In the case of guerrilla and civil wars the data is more evenly balanced between victories for each side. In the guerrilla wars where a ratio was determinable and where the threat party won, the ratios reflect the fact that the status quo party had force size advantages from 1.7 to 16.7 but still lost. On the other hand, the data indicate that the status quo party won conflicts with force ratios ranging from 2.0 to 13.3. Thus, the question of precisely what status quo force ratio is required to win remains subject to question and suggests that force size data must be supplemented with information of subjects such as leadership, support of the populace, methods of operating, and local environmental conditions.

The ratios for the 4 civil wars which the threat party won are clustered in the range 1.0 to 1.59. Thus, these conflicts witnessed near equality of forces. However, the sample indicates that the status quo party was more successful in cases in which it enjoyed a more significant force size advantage.

The force ratio and win-loss information for guerrilla and civil wars indicate that the initiating party seldom had an advantage in numbers of combatants. The disadvantage was particularly marked in guerrilla wars. Although it was apparent in most of these conflicts that the force disadvantage existed or would probably occur as the conflict progressed, the initiating party was not deterred. Thus, in considering deterrence in this context, full consideration needs be accorded to the often inexorable motivation pressures underlying the incipient conflict and to the advantages the threat party may see in being able to choose the time, place, and form of conflict. In fact, the data support the view that the combination of pressure to fight and a serious disadvantage in combat resources may force the party wishing to change the status quo to adopt guerrilla types of conflict. In other words, in cases where the insurgent's force size to the status quo party force size is appreciably less than 1.0, the insurgent has often been shown to avoid frontal, ground control warfare, where probability of winning is low, and to pursue a form of warfare in which the smaller force has historically had a higher degree of success.

The threat party's general lack of success in open types of fighting when operating with the force ratio against it is shown again in international conflicts. Although there are only a modest number of conflicts in this category, most of them involved actual or threatened ground control combat, and most saw the status quo party have a force advantage and win.

To enable conventional, frontal warfare to be examined without regard to the individual types of conflicts, the results for military revolts, insurrections, civil wars, and international wars were grouped. Although differing somewhat in detail, these conflicts may be generally characterized as ground control warfare. The ratio (F) of status quo party force size to threat party force size in those conflicts where the status quo party won provided the following:

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Value of F</u>
Mean F	9.3
Mean F (less highest and lowest F values)	6.8
Mean F (in cases where $F > 10$, set $F=10$)	4.9
Median F	3.03

The force size ratios (F) in those conflicts where the threat party won were also examined:

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Value of F</u>
Mean F	2.22
Mean F (less highest and lowest F values)	1.08
Median F	1.27

The information presented above in this section is summarized in figure 22, which shows the median force size ratios for civil disorders, coups d'etat, guerrilla wars, and conventional, frontal warfare. In this figure the force size ratio is that of the winning party force size over the losing party force size; thus, in the lower half of the figure (conflicts won by the threat party) the force ratio is $1/F$. The numbers of conflicts in each sample are indicated in parentheses. Where the sample had an even number of points, the median was established as the average of the two points at mid-sample. The status quo win probability $\lfloor (\text{conflicts won by S.Q.})/(\text{conflicts won by both parties}) \rfloor$ for all 1946-64 conflicts of each type is shown at the top to enable comparison with the sample results.

The information in this figure, as well as the data on F shown previously, show that the ratio of status quo force size to threat party force size is appreciably higher in cases where the status quo won than when it lost in all conflicts except guerrilla wars. Since weapons advantage information had not proved to be a consistently reliable indicator of outcomes in frontal conflict (except in the case of insurrections), these results infer that force size is a key factor in control of this class of conflicts.

Figure 23 provides additional information on the conventional conflicts. The status quo party win probability is indicated for all force ratios (F) falling within the ranges that are bounded at the upper end by the indicated F values (0.5, 2.5, 10.0, 50.0). Thus the data indicates that an F of 2.5 would be expected to yield a win probability of at least 0.55, since this win ratio was achieved in the case of all conflicts in which $1 \leq F \leq 2.5$. (The broken line is not a cumulative P_s curve.) Also shown on the figure is the probability of status quo party loss (P_L) in all conflicts in which $F \geq$ a selected F value. This data shows that there was a distinct improvement in the probability that the status quo party could win ($1 - P_L$) as the F was increased from 1.0 to 2.5. There was but little incremental increase in win probability in values of F greater than 2.5 (the data indicated several losses in the $1 < F < 2.5$ range but only one loss at $F \geq 2.5$).




FIG. 22: FORCE SIZE RATIO (MEDIAN) FOR WINNING PARTY




FIG. 23: STATUS QUO PARTY WIN-LOSS RECORD IN CONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Summarizing the previous section on weapons indicated good agreement between weapons data and outcome in the case of coups d'etat and insurrections and fair agreement in civil disorders. The data here on force sizes suggests that the winning party (status quo) in civil disorders can operate with small relative force sizes. However, the inherent trait of coups is that force size advantages normally accompany weapons advantages in the case of threat party victories, which are the most likely outcome. The outcomes of guerilla wars are inadequately explained on an arms or force size basis. In the more conventional wars, the types of weapons tend to become more evenly matched and outcomes are shown to correlate with force size. Based on the conflict analysis data, the status quo party has been shown to expect a high probability of success if the ratio of its force size to that of the threat party is about 2.5 or greater.

5. Relationship of Third Party Support to Conflict Outcome

In this paragraph the relationship between third party support and conflict outcome will be investigated briefly. The coding of the 380 conflicts revealed that third party support occurred as follows:

Total conflicts involving third party support:	165
Conflicts in which only the threat party had support:	53
Conflicts in which only the status quo party had support:	50
Conflicts in which both parties had support:	62

In the data described here the only conflicts in the above compilation that were considered were those in which the outcome was a clear win for the threat or status quo party. This list of conflicts was then further reduced by striking those third party situations in which the support was impartially administered to both sides, as in many cases of United Nations intervention and in a few cases where colonial powers intervened in a policing function between two internal factions.

The results are shown in table 59. The table enables comparison, on the basis of the status quo party win ratio, of conflicts involving third party support with all conflicts of each type that ended with either party winning.

The status quo party's win ratio in all conflicts in which support occurred was about 15 percent higher when only it received third party support than for the average of the cases where both received support or only the threat party received it. The threat party's best win ratio was for the cases where both parties received support, although this was not much higher than when only it received support. Actually, although the results in each type of conflict show slight improvement for the status quo party when it had support over the ratios for "total conflicts," these results are nonetheless quite similar on a comparative basis. Concomitantly, the outcomes for the threat party are only slightly worse than in the "total conflicts" results. Although the sample size is small, it is noted that the type of conflict in which outside support was indicated to be most beneficial to the threat party on a comparative basis was guerrilla war.

TABLE 59

DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES FOR EACH TYPE OF CONFLICT
ON THE BASIS OF THIRD PARTY SUPPORT*

Status Quo Party Win Ratio**						
Type of Conflict	Total Conflicts		Only S.Q. Received Support	Both Received Support	Only Threat Received Support	All Conflicts in Which Support Occurred
	Ratio					
Civil Disorder	47/65	0.72	3/4	1/1	14/18	0.78
Coup D'etat	24/86	0.28	2/6	0/2	4/9	0.35
Military Revolts	22/25	0.88	6/6	1/1	2/3	0.90
Insurrection	28/30	0.93	2/2	5/5	3/3	1.00
Guerrilla War	7/15	0.47	1/2	2/4	1/4	0.40
Civil War	5/10	0.50	---	3/7	---	0.43
Conventional International Conflict	7/8	0.88	2/2	2/3	---	0.80
Other International Conflict	9/11	0.82	1/1	2/3	2/2	0.83
TOTALS	149/250	0.60	17/23	16/26	26/39	
	Ratio:		0.74	0.62	0.67	0.67

* Only considers those conflicts where one party was the clear winner.

** S.Q. party win ratio = (Conflicts won by S.Q. Party)/(Conflict won by both parties)

The data show that in lower level conflicts third party support occurs in only a small percentage of the conflicts and tends to be provided to one party, most often the threat party. In the higher intensity conflicts, third parties are more inclined to become involved, and support is provided to both parties in a higher percentage of conflicts.

6. Conflict Frequency Trends

a. Trend of Conflict Starts

The data used to analyze the time trends in conflict starts are tabulated in the first five columns of table 60. With the exception of the column that lists the number of independent nations, these data are taken directly from the conflict analysis.

The conflicts starting in a given year are lumped together. Since 19 years are analyzed, the effect on the long-term time trends of aggregating conflicts starts on an annual basis should be small. The meaning of "U. S. interest" and "U. S. participation" were discussed in section I. D.

The basic data from table 60 are plotted in figure 24. It is evident that there has been a general increase in the number of conflict starts as well as the number of independent nations. Accordingly, the ratio of number of conflicts to number of independent nations has been determined (column 6 of table 60) and plotted as a function of year in figure 24.

A linear regression analysis was performed on the conflicts-per-nation data and the regression line is also plotted on figure 25. The regression coefficient, or slope of the regression line, is essentially zero, at least tentatively supporting the assumption of proportionality between number of independent nations and conflict starts. The data indicates that the number of conflicts starts per independent nation per year was about 0.2. The 80 percent confidence limit lines for the average conflicts per country from 1946 to 1964 are shown in the inserted panel. These limits assume that there would be a normal distribution of conflict starts about the regression line if the past 19 years were "replayed" a number of times.

To the extent that it can be assumed that the basic factors causing conflicts will not change, the 80 percent confidence limits can be used to estimate the range of the average number of future conflict starts. This does not imply that at some future date the actual number of conflicts would fall within this range. It says merely that a new regression line computed at that time would have an 80 percent chance of falling within this range. Alternately, in 80 percent of the "possible futures" the regression line will lie in this range.

In 1975 there is an 80 percent assurance that the average number of conflict starts will be between about .12 and .28 per country per year. The number of independent nations is probably stabilizing at around 135 to 140. Assuming a value of 140, there is an 80 percent chance that there will be between 17 and 39 conflict starts on the average, in 1975.

TABLE 60
CONFLICT STARTS

<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Indep. Nations</u>	<u>Total Conflicts Started</u>	<u>Conflicts of Interest to U.S.</u>	<u>Conflicts in Which U.S. Participated</u>	<u>Conflicts per Indepen. Nation</u>	<u>Fraction of Total Conflicts in Which U.S. was Interested or Participated</u>	<u>Fraction of Total Conflicts in Which U.S. Participated</u>
46	81	20	10	6	.247	.800	.300
47	82	11	2	2	.134	.363	.182
48	83	28	15	1	.337	.572	.036
49	86	21	8	2	.244	.477	.095
50	89	20	9	2	.225	.550	.100
51	89	12	7	1	.135	.667	.083
52	90	13	9	1	.144	.770	.077
53	90	13	8	0	.144	.473	.000
54	90	18	9	2	.200	.611	.111
55	95	22	12	3	.231	.682	.135
56	95	19	12	1	.200	.685	.053
57	99	13	8	2	.131	.770	.153
58	99	16	9	2	.162	.687	.125
59	100	23	11	4	.230	.653	.174
60	100	27	13	4	.270	.630	.148
61	119	20	10	4	.168	.737	.210
62	122	29	18	2	.237	.690	.069
63	129	30	17	4	.233	.770	.134
64	131	24	11	6	.183	.710	.250




FIG. 24: BASIC DATA ON CONFLICT STARTS AS A FUNCTION OF YEAR




FIG. 25: CONFLICTS STARTED PER INDEPENDENT NATION

b. Trends in U. S. Interest in Conflicts

While the number of conflicts per country per year has tended to be constant over the last 19 years, the portion of conflicts in which the United States has an interest has risen, on the average. Since the number of conflicts has also risen, the absolute number of conflict of interest to the United States has risen even more sharply.

The fraction of total conflicts in which the United States has been interested has been computed in table 60. The resultant points are plotted on figure 26. The linear regression line is also plotted. It indicates that the United States has indeed increased its interest in world conflicts; in fact it approaches being interested in practically all conflicts.

Eighty percent confidence limits are shown in the inserted panel on figure 26. The qualifying remarks made in the preceding section apply to these confidence limit lines as well as those of the previous figure. The limit predicts with 80 percent assurance that the United States will on the average be interested in from 65 to 95 percent of all conflicts by 1975. If the regression line is assumed to be the best projection of U. S. interest, if the figure of 0.2 per country is accepted as a projection of total conflicts, and if there are 140 independent countries, on the average about 25 conflicts a year will start in 1975 that are of interest to the United States.

c. Trend of U. S. Participation in Conflicts

The portion of conflicts in which the United States has participated is smaller than the portion of conflicts in which it is interested. The evidence is, however, that this fraction is also increasing. The fraction of total conflicts that the United States has participated in, as a function of year that the conflicts start, is tabulated on table 60 and plotted on figure 27. The linear regression line shows a gradual increase in participation with time.

The inserted panel contains 80 percent confidence limits for the fraction of conflicts in which the United States has participated or might participate, again with the previous caveats. Subject to the assumptions of section a, there is, on the average, 80 percent assurance that in 1975 the United States will participate in 7 to 23 percent of all conflicts.

Assuming that the regression line is the best estimate of the trend in U. S. participation, (assuming also 140 countries and a conflict rate of 0.2 per year per country) the U. S. will participate, on the average, in about 4.2 conflicts that start in 1975.

d. Trend of Conflict Starts by Conflict Type

It was shown in section a. that the number of conflict starts per year per independent nation has tended to be constant with time. The different type of conflicts were not considered, however. It is also of interest to investigate how the distribution of conflict types has changed with time.




FIG. 26: FRACTION OF TOTAL CONFLICTS IN WHICH UNITED STATES PARTICIPATED OR WAS INTERESTED




FIG. 27: FRACTION OF TOTAL CONFLICTS IN WHICH UNITED STATES PARTICIPATED

The basic data tabulated on table 3 were used to determine time trends for individual types of conflicts. The number of conflicts starts have been summed over the time periods A, B and C. To remove the effect of trends in the absolute number of conflict within a time period, the ratio of conflicts of a given type to total conflicts within a time period was computed. The results of this computation are plotted in figure 28.

If the data of figure 28 are analyzed it becomes apparent that there are four groups of conflicts: those whose relative frequency has increased recently, those whose relative frequency has decreased recently, those with an inconclusive change in relative frequency and those whose relative frequency seems to be decreasing over the long term.

As a general rule it appears that there is a proportional increase in the number of low intensity internal conflicts. There are either recent or long term decreases in the relative number of widespread internal and international conflicts. Covert invasions and threats show no conclusive trend.

G. List of Conflicts

The titles and starting dates of all 380 conflicts used in the analysis are compiled in table 61 in order of conflict identification numbers. These conflicts all started in the 1946-64 time period with the exception of three that were initiated in late 1945 and that are assigned 1 January 1946 starting dates in this compilation. The list contains no conflicts that took place in the United States or Canada in this period.




FIG. 28: TRENDS IN CONFLICT STARTS BY CONFLICT TYPE

TABLE 61

CONFLICTS LISTED BY IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

001	490617	AFGHANISTAN-DEMAND FOR INDEPENDENT 'PATHANISTAN'
002	550101	TUNISTIA-YOUSSEFISTS, TERRORISTS, AND COUNTER-TERRORISTS
003	600901	AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN BORDER INCIDENTS IN 'PAKHTOONISTAN'
004	541101	ALGERIA-FRANCE
005	610201	ANGOLA-PORTUGAL
006	480923	ARGENTINA-ALLEGED PLOT TO ASSASSINATE PERON
007	510227	ARGENTINA-VIOLENCE ATTENDING CLOSURE OF LA PRENSA
008	510928	ARGENTINA-UNSUCCESSFUL MILITARY COUP AGAINST PERON
009	530415	ARGENTINA-RIOTING TO STRENGTHEN PERON GOVT CONTROL
010	550616	ARGENTINA-UNSUCCESSFUL ANTI-PERON REVOLT BY NAVY
011	550916	ARGENTINA-PERON OVERTHROWN BY MILITARY REVOLT
012	551113	ARGENTINA-BLOODLESS COUP BY GENERAL ARAMBURU
013	560610	ARGENTINA-ABORTIVE PERONISTA UPRISING
014	500324	BELGIUM RIOTS AND STRIKES
015	601220	BELGIUM AUSTERITY STRIKES
016	480714	BERLIN-1948 BLOCKADE AND AIRLIFT
017	530616	BERLIN-UPRISINGS IN EASTERN ZONE
018	590627	BOLIVIA-UNSUCCESSFUL SOCIALIST INSURRECTION IN SANTA CRUZ
019	460713	BOLIVIA-INSURRECTION BY STUDENTS AND UNIONS GAINS POWER
020	520400	BOLIVIA-ESTENSORO INSTALLED BY SUCCESSFUL NRM-ARMY REVOLT
021	531109	BOLIVIA-UNSUCCESSFUL RIGHT-WING INSURRECTION
022	590419	BOLIVIA-UNSUCCESSFUL SOCIALIST INSURRECTION IN LA PAZ
023	490528	BOLIVIA-INSURRECTION BY TIN MINERS
024	490827	BOLIVIA-NRM INSURRECTION DEFEATED AFTER HOLDING 1/3 OF COUNTRY
025	500518	BOLIVIA-NRM AND ALLEGEDLY COMMUNIST BACKED RIDING
026	630915	SUDAN-SOUTHERN REVOLT AND KHARTOUM COMMUNAL RIOTS
027	430415	BRAZIL - COMMUNIST ARRESTS FOLLOWING ARSENAL EXPLOSION
028	540805	BRAZIL - CIVIL DISORDER
029	551111	BRAZIL - ARMY COUP D'ETAT
030	531006	BRITISH GUIANA-COMMUNIST COLONIAL GOVT SUSPENDED/BRIT TROOPS
031	621208	BRUNEI-REVOLT AGAINST BRITISH PROTECTORATE
032	561201	CAMEROON-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
033	630102	PERU-COMMUNIST INSPIRED DISORDERS

TABLE 61 (cont'd)

~~034~~	~~490813~~	~~CHILE-RIOTS-ALLEGEDLY COMMUNIST INSPIRED~~
035	480409	COLOMBIA-ASSASSINATION AND DISORDER DURING BOGOTA CONFERENCE
~~036~~	~~490522~~	~~COLOMBIA-SPORADIC RIOTING AND POLITICAL DISORDERS-1949~~
037	590104	CONGO - RIOTS
~~038~~	~~591029~~	~~CONGO- RIOTS BY LAMUMBA FOLLOWERS~~
039	591207	CONGO-LULUA-BALUBA TRIBAL DISORDERS
~~040~~	~~600706~~	~~CONGO(LEOPOLDVILLE)-CIVIL WAR~~
041	641026	BOLIVIA-WIDESPREAD ANTIGOV'T RIOTING BY STUDENTS AND MINERS
~~042~~	~~500101~~	~~BURMA-NATIONALIST CHINESE~~
043	560721	BURMA-COMMUNIST CHINESE BORDER CLASH
~~044~~	~~470719~~	~~BURMESE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ASSASSINATIONS~~
045	480813	BURMA- GUERRILLA WAR
~~046~~	~~620302~~	~~BURMA- MILITARY COUP~~
047	500521	CAMBODIA-GUERRILLA WAR (VIETMINH AND OTHER REBELS)
~~048~~	~~560605~~	~~CEYLON-LANGUAGE RIOT~~
049	580522	CEYLON LANGUAGE RIOT
~~050~~	~~610102~~	~~CEYLON LANGUAGE RIOTS~~
051	620128	CEYLON-ATTEMPTED MILITARY COUP
052	460101	CHINA-CIVIL WAR
053	540903	CHINA-QUEMOY-MATSU-TACHEN ISLANDS-NANCHI SHELLING
~~054~~	~~580521~~	~~BOLIVA-UNSUCCESSFUL SOCIALIST INSURRECTION IN SANTA CRUZ~~
055	570524	CHINA-ANTI-AMERICAN RIOTS IN TAIPEH
~~056~~	~~580823~~	~~CHINA-FORMOSA+QUEMOY CRISES~~
057	561010	CHINA-HONG KONG KOWLOON RIOTS
058	640301	BRITISH GUIANA-CONTINUING RACIAL AND POLITICAL DISORDERS
059	580817	ARGENTIAN-SPORADIC PERONISTA DISORDERS 1958-60
~~060~~	~~601130~~	~~ARGENTINA-ABORTIVE PERONISTA INSURRECTION~~
061	640228	ARGENTIAN-DISORDERS BEFORE ATTEMPT TO RETURN BY PERON
062	600613	ARGENTINA-ABORTIVE REVOLT BY NATIONALIST OFFICERS
063	620328	ARGENTINA-BLOODLESS MILITARY COUP DEPOSING FRONDISI
064	620803	ARGENTINA-MUTINIES OVER CONTROL OF ARMY
065	630402	ARGENTINA-UNSUCCESSFUL REVOLT BY HARDLINE ANTIPERON GENERALS

TABLE 61 (cont'd)

066	620725	ALGERIA-POST INDEPENDENCE INTERNAL DISTURBANCES
067	470605	CHINA-MONGOLIA FRONTIER INCIDENT
068	640401	BRAZIL - MILITARY COUP D'ETAT
069	620216	BRITISH GUIANA-GEORGETOWN RIOTS OF 1962
070	630405	BRITISH GUIANA-GENERAL STRIKE AND RIOTS OF 1963
071	550111	COSTA RICA-NICARAGUAN INVASION USING COSTA RICAN NATIONALS
072	491211	COSTA RICA-INVASION FROM NICARAGUA BY INSURGENT CALDERONISTAS
073	520310	CUBA-COUP BRINGS BATISTA TO POWER
074	530726	CUBA-ABORTIVE CASTRO INSURRECTION OF 26 JULY 1953
075	561202	CUBA-GUERRILLA WAR BY CASTRO OUSTS BATISTA IN 1959
076	481027	PERU-RIGHT WING MILITARY REVOLT BY GENL ODRIA OUSTS BUSTAMANTE
077	610517	CUBA-BAY OF PIGS INVASION
078	621022	CUBA-THE MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962
079	541218	CYPRUS - GUERRILLA WAR
080	631221	CYPRUS-CIVIL WAR
081	480221	CZECHOSLOVAKIA COUP
082	470601	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CUBAN, GUATEMALAN CARIB LEGION INVASION HALTED
083	610701	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-DISORDERS AFTER TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION
084	610530	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION
085	620116	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-ABORTIVE MILITARY COUP
086	630925	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-MILITARY COUP OUSTS BOSCH
087	590619	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-CUBAN INVASION CRUSHED
088	470823	ECUADOR-MILITARY COUP PUT DOWN BY COUNTER-REVOLT
089	611103	ECUADOR-ROSEMENA COMES TO POWER IN MILITARY REVOLT AFTER RIOTS
090	630711	ECUADOR-ROSEMENA OVERTHROWN BY BLOODLESS COUP
091	481214	EL SALVADOR-SUCCESSFUL ARMY COUP
092	601023	EL SALVADOR-SUCCESSFUL COUP FOLLOWING DISTURBANCES
093	610125	EL SALVADOR-SUCCESSFUL RIGHT WING COUP
094	491001	ERITREA-TERRORISM BY PRO-ETHIOPIA ELEMENTS
095	611214	ETHIOPIA-ABORTIVE COUP
096	640111	ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA BORDER DISPUTE
097	480909	FRANCE WIDESPREAD STRIKES

TABLE 61 (cont'd)

098	640217	GABON-ABORTIVE COUP
099	480223	GHANA (GOLD COAST) ACCRA RIOTS
100	500109	GOLD COAST(GHANA)-RIOTING
101	620802	GHANA-BOMBINGS
102	550625	GOA-INDIAN INVASION
103	611213	GOA-INDIAN INVASION AND LIBERATION
104	460127	GREECE-ROYALIST REVOLT
105	460101	GREECE-CIVIL WAR
106	490718	GUATEMALA-ABORTIVE ARMY REVOLT
107	540618	GUATEMALA-INVASION BY US SUPPORTED INSURGENTS
108	550120	GUATEMALA-ABORTIVE COUP
109	571022	GUATEMALA-YDIGORAS DISORDERS DISLODGE GOVERNMENT AFTER ELECTIONS
110	630330	GUATEMALA-YDIGORAS DEPOSED BY MILITARY COUP
111	601113	GUATEMALA-ABORTIVE LEFT-WING MILITARY REVOLT
112	621103	GUINEA-ALLEGED PLOT
113	500510	HAITI-BLOODLESS ARMY COUP DEPOSES ESTIME AFTER RIOTING
114	561201	HAITI-DUVALIER COMES TO POWER AFTER LENGTHY DISORDERS
115	590813	HAITI-ABORTIVE INVASION BY CUBA
116	631003	HONDURAS-VILLEDA MORALES DISPLACED BY MILITARY COUP
117	570418	HONDURAS-NICARAGUAN INVASION OF DISPUTED BORDER TERRITORY
118	561024	HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION
119	620705	ALGERIA-ORAN RIOTS
120	560201	ALGERIA-FNF AND OAS TERRORISM
121	520723	EGYPT- FAROUK ABDICATES FOLLOWING MILITARY COUP
122	540222	EGYPT-SEMI COUP
123	541026	EGYPT-MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD REBELLION
124	460211	INDIA - INA RIOTS
125	460816	INDIA-RELIGIOUS RIOTS

TABLE 61 (cont'd)

126	460219	INDIA-NAVY MUTINY
127	480912	HYDERABAD FIGHTING
128	481022	INDIA-MAHE INVASION
129	480101	INDIA-COMMUNIST AGITATIONS
130	510419	INDIA-FOOD RIOTS
131	550301	INDIA-NAGA REBELLION
132	551121	INDIA COMMUNIST RIOTS
133	580601	INDIA KERALA UPRISINGS
134	590831	INDIA-FOOD RIOTS
135	600701	INDIA-LANGUAGE RIOT
136	590825	SINO-INDIAN-LONGJU-LADAKH INCIDENTS
137	621020	SINO-INDIAN HIMALAYAN BORDER CRISIS
138	460111	HAITI COUP
139	471001	KASHMIR
140	500124	INDIA-PAKISTAN COMMUNAL RIOTING
141	540101	KASHMIR
142	640101	INDIA-PAKISTANI COMMUNAL RIOTING
143	611003	INDIA-COMMUNAL RIOTS
144	540612	IRELAND-IRA BANDITRY
145	570101	IRELAND-IRA TERRORIST CAMPAIGN
146	521206	IRAQ-RIOTING IN BAGHDAD -- DISSOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
147	580714	IRAQ- ARMY REVOLT
148	590307	IRAQ- SUPPRESSION OF MILITARY REVOLT AT MOSUL
149	590714	IRAQ- THE KIRKUK MASSACRE
150	540226	SYRIA- DISORDER AND RIOTS IN DAMASCUS
151	630208	IRAQ- KASSEM OVERTHROWN BY COUP
152	460101	ISRAEL-WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
153	550228	ISRAEL-EGYPT DISPUTE BEFORE SUEZ CRISIS
154	530122	ISRAEL-JORDAN DISPUTE
155	510313	ISRAEL-SYRIA -BORDER INCIDENTS
156	551215	JORDAN-RIOTS AGAINST ACCESSION TO BAGHDAD PACT
157	570413	JORDAN-ALLEGED ARMY PLOT AND INTERNAL DISORDERS
158	480714	ITALY-COMMUNIST UPRISINGS

TABLE 61 (cont'd)

159	500109	ITALY-STRIKES AND DEMONSTRATIONS
160	500139	IVORY COAST UPRISING
161	520501	JAPAN-UPRISING
162	520925	KENYA-MAU MAU TERRORISM
163	631113	KENYA-BORDER INCIDENTS-SOMALI TRIBES
164	481020	SO. KOREA - ARMY REVOLT
165	490515	KOREA-BORDER CLASHES BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
166	500625	KOREAN WAR
167	600315	SO. KOREA - RIOTS FOLLOWING RE-ELECTION OF RHEE
168	610516	SOUTH KOREA-MILITARY COUP
169	480514	ISRAELI-ARAB WAR
170	610630	KUWAIT-IRAQI CLAIMS PROMPT BRITISH MOBILIZATION
171	460101	INDONESIA-PERIOD OF ANGLO-INDIAN OCCUPATION
172	460602	INDONESIA-ANTI-CHINESE TERRORISM
173	461115	INDONESIA-EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES AND DUTCH POLICE ACTIONS
174	480917	INDONESIA-COMMUNIST REVOLT
175	541021	INDONESIA-DUTCH NEW GUINEA DISPUTE
176	500123	INDONESIA-MILITARY UPRISINGS IN WEST JAVA AND MACASSAR
177	530920	INDONESIA - MOSLEM REVOLT IN NORTH SUMATRA
178	500928	INDONESIA- INDONESIAN OCCUPATION OF AMBOINA
179	561116	INDONESIA-MILITARY CONSPIRACY
180	561220	INDONESIA-REVOLTS IN SUMATRA
181	551115	INDONESIA-ACTION AGAINST DAR-UL-ISLAM IN CELEBES
182	630412	INDONESIA-MALAYSIA CONFRONTATION
183	530413	LAOS-VIETMINH INVASION TO ASSIST LAOTIAN GUERRILLAS
184	620316	ISRAEL-SYRIA -BORDER INCIDENTS
185	541201	LAOS -ROYALIST VS. PATHET LAO
186	640415	SYRIA-CIVIL DISORDER AT HAMMA- OLD TOWN DESTROYED
187	590716	LAOS-GUERRILLA ACTION NEAR NORTH VIETNAM BORDER
188	520528	FRANCE PARIS RIOTS
189	600809	LAOS - SUCCESSFUL COUP BY KONGLAE

TABLE 61 (cont'd)

190	600920	LAOS - ACTION BY 'SAVANNAKHET REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE'
191	601129	LAOS-CIVIL WAR - PHOUMI NOSOVAN V. 'NEUTRALISTS' / PATHET LAO
192	500805	INDONESIA-FIGHTING AT MACASSAR
193	500714	INDONESIA-OCCUPATION OF BURU AND CERAM
194	640419	LAOS- RIGHT WING MILITARY COUP
195	580509	LEBANON- CIVIL WAR
196	611231	LEBANON-ABORTIVE COUP
197	490511	LIBYA-TRIPOLI RIOTS AGAINST BEVIN-SFORZA PLAN
198	520219	LIBYA-ELECTION RIOTING
199	470329	MADAGASCAR-ANTI-FRENCH ATTACKS
200	480501	MALAYA-TERRORIST CAMPAIGN
201	550511	MALAYA-CHINESE STUDENT RIOTS
202	620727	MALI-DEMONSTRATION
203	590227	MALTA DOCKYARD STRIKES AND RIOTS
204	511101	MOROCCO-STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE FROM FRANCE
205	630812	CONGO REPUBLIC(BRAZZAVILLE)-OVERTHROW OF PRESIDENT YOULOU
206	560301	MOROCCAN LIBERATION ARMY-FRENCH ARMY ENGAGEMENTS
207	571023	MOROCCO-MEKNES RIOTS
208	571123	SPAIN-MOROCCO ATTACK ON IFNI
209	471210	PANAMA-RIOTS
210	581015	MOROCCO-UNREST IN THE RIF AND MIDDLE ATLAS
211	631008	ALGERIA-MOROCCO BORDER DISPUTE
212	551026	MUSCAT-ABU DHABI-SAUDI ARABIA DISPUTE OVER BURAIMI OASIS
213	551215	MUSCAT AND OMAN-SULTAN RE-ESTABLISHES SOVEREIGNTY OVER OMAN
214	570715	MUSCAT AND OMAN-IMAN'S REVOLT AGAINST SULTAN
215	501110	NEPAL-INSURRECTION
216	520122	NEPAL-ABORTIVE LEFT-WING REVOLT
217	600628	NEPAL-CHINA BORDER INCIDENT
218	601215	NEPAL- ROYAL COUP
219	610301	NEPAL-CONGRESS REBEL ACTIVITIES
220	470525	NICARAGUA-SOMOZA ARMY COUP OVERTHROWS GOVERNMENT
221	590601	NICARAGUA-ABORTIVE AIRBORNE INVASION BY CUBAN-BACKED INSURGENTS

TABLE 61 (cont'd)

222	601109	NICARAGUA-ABORTIVE CUBAN-BACKED INVASION BY EXILES IN COSTA RICA
223	491115	NIGERIA- MINE DISPUTE
224	600312	CONGO-ELIZABETHVILLE DISORDERS
225	480106	PAKISTAN-COMMUNAL RIOTING IN KARACHI
226	540330	PAKISTAN-BENGAL RIOTS
227	480509	PANAMA-DISORDERS FOLLOWING NATIONAL ELECTION
228	491120	PANAMA-SUCCESSFUL POLICE COUP FOLLOWED BY DISORDERS
229	510509	PANAMA-COUP FOLLOWING GENERAL STRIKE OUSTS ARIAS
230	550102	PANAMA-PRESIDENT ASSASSINATED BY VICE-PRESIDENT
231	590426	PANAMA-INVASION BY CUBAN AND PANAMANIAN INSURGENTS
232	591103	PANAMA-ANTI US RIOTS
233	640109	PANAMA-ANTI US RIOTS TRIGGERED BY STUDENT FLAG RAISING
234	470307	PARAGUAY-UNSUCCESSFUL CIVIL WAR FOLLOWING ARMY REVOLT
235	481230	PARAGUAY-BLOODLESS COUP BY OTHER COLORADO PARTY MEMBERS
236	490225	PARAGUAY-STILL ANOTHER BLOODLESS COUP BY COLORADANS
237	540505	PARAGUAY-STROESNER COMES TO POWER IN ARMY COUP
238	461016	IRAN-RUSSIAN SUPPORTED REBELLION IN AZERBAIJAN
239	460714	IRAN- RIOTING IN ABADAN
240	460921	IRAN- TRIBAL OUTBREAK IN FARS PROVINCE
241	461205	IRAN-NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN AZERBEIJAN
242	510412	IRAN-RIOTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH OIL INDUSTRY NATIONALIZATION
243	480312	COSTA RICAN REBELLION
244	530816	IRAN-ROYALIST REVOLT AND COUP
245	630604	IRAN-RIOTS AGAINST REFORM PROGRAM
246	510818	ECUADOR-PERU BORDER DISPUTE (ZIMBA INCIDENTS)
247	481003	PERU-NAVAL REVOLT ALLEGEDLY STARTED BY APRISTAS
248	560216	PERU-UNSUCCESSFUL RIGHT WING ARMY REVOLT
249	620718	PERU-MILITARY COUP SIEZES POWER AFTER HAYA DE LA TORRE ELECTED
250	630303	PERU-BLOODLESS MILITARY COUP
251	460101	PHILIPPINE GUERRILLA WAR
252	491119	PHILIPPINE REVOLT + GUERRILLA FIGHTING
253	470119	POLAND-COMMUNIST TAKEOVER

TABLE 61 (cont'd)

254	560628	POLAND-POZNAN RIOTS
255	461010	PORTUGAL-REVOLT AND DEMONSTRATIONS
256	610123	PORTUGAL-SANTA MARIA INCIDENT
257	620101	PORTUGAL-ABORTIVE MILITARY REVOLT (BEJA INCIDENT)
258	501030	PUERTO RICO-NATIONALIST UPRISING
259	590211	NYASALAND AND RHODESIA (MALAWI AND ZAMBIA) DISTURBANCES
260	620715	NORTHERN RHODESIA (ZAMBIA) DISTURBANCES
261	600720	SOUTHERN RHODESIA-RIOTS IN SALISBURY AND BULAWAYO
262	601003	SOUTHERN RHODESIA-ADDITIONAL RIOTS
263	591103	RUANDA-URANDI TRIBAL WARFARE
264	631221	RWANDA-RAIDS AND REPRISALS
265	631217	SENEGAL-ABORTIVE COUP
266	550211	SIERRA LEONE-FREETOWN RIOTS
267	480113	SOMALIA-ANTI ITALIAN RIOTS
268	490113	SOUTH AFRICA-DURBAN RACE RIOTS
269	531101	SOUTH AFRICA-RIOTS
270	590618	SOUTH AFRICA-RIOTS IN DURBAN AND OTHER LOCATIONS
271	601109	SOUTH AFRICA-RIOTS IN PAARL
272	600121	SOUTH AFRICA-RIOTS IN DURBAN
273	600321	SOUTH AFRICA-SHARPEVILLE AND LANGA INCIDENTS AND PROTEST STRIKES
274	620721	SOUTH AFRICA-POQO TERRORISM
275	550301	SPAIN-STRIKES
276	540301	SUDAN-KARTOUM RIOTS
277	550818	SUDAN-ARMY MUTINY IN SOUTHERN SUDAN
278	560218	SUDAN-KOSTI INCIDENT
279	581117	SUDAN-MILITARY COUP
280	490330	SYRIA- BLOODLESS COUP NO. 1
281	490814	SYRIA- BLOODLESS COUP NO. 2
282	491217	SYRIA- BLOODLESS COUP NO. 3
283	511128	SYRIA- BLOODLESS COUP NO. 4
284	540127	SYRIA- DISORDER IN THE JEBEL DRUSE AREA
285	540225	SYRIA- BLOODLESS COUP NO. 5

TABLE 61 (cont'd)

286	610928	SYRIA- COUP LEADS TO SUCCESSION FROM UAR
287	620328	SYRIA - MILITARY COUP
288	620401	SYRIA -ABORTIVE MILITARY REVOLT AT ALEPPO
289	630308	SYRIA-MILITARY COUP OVERTHROWS AZEM GOVERNMENT
290	570915	SYRIA-TURKEY
291	640120	TANGANYIKA-ARMY MUTINY
292	460524	SIAMESE-FRENCH BORDER INCIDENT
293	471109	SIAM-COUP D'ETAT
294	521130	VENEZUELA COUP
295	530613	COLOMBIA COUP
296	490227	SIAM-INSURRECTION
297	510629	ATTEMPTED NAVAL COUP D'ETAT - SIAM
298	511129	COUP D'ETAT - SIAM
299	570916	COUP D'ETAT SIAM
300	581020	SIAM-COUP D'ETAT
301	501024	TIBET-RED CHINA INVASION
302	560301	TIBET-GOLOR TRIBE RIOTING
303	590317	TIBET-REVOLT VS CHINA RULE
304	630113	TOGO-ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT OLYMPIO
305	520320	CIVIL DISORDER IN TRIESTE
306	530830	ITALIAN-YUGOSLAV BORDER CONFLICT
307	520115	TUNISIA-STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE FROM FRANCE
308	570531	TUNISIA-POST-INDEPENDENCE CLASHES WITH FRENCH FORCES
309	631219	TUNISIA-ASSASSINATION PLOT
310	600521	TURKEY-MILITARY REVOLT
311	600428	TURKEY-CIVIL DISORDER THROUGHOUT
312	620222	ANKARA-UNSUCCESSFUL MILITARY COUP
313	531104	TRIESTE-CIVIL DISORDER
314	630520	TURKEY - ATTEMPTED MILITARY RISING
315	490425	UGANDA-DISTURBANCES IN BUGANDA PROVINCE
316	600117	UGANDA-RIOTS IN BUKEDI DISTRICT
317	640123	UGANDA-TROOP MUTINY

TABLE 61 (cont'd)

318	610110	URUGUAY-PRO CASTRO RIOTING
319	481123	VENEZUELA-BLOODLESS COUP BY JIMENEZ
320	501111	VENEZUELA-ASSASSINATION AND ABORTIVE COUP
321	580114	VENEZUELA-JIMENEZ OVERTHROWN BY POPULAR UPRISING
322	580907	VENEZUELA-ABORTIVE INSURRECTION
323	601024	VENEZUELA-DISORDERS BY LEFTIST STUDENTS
324	620504	VENEZUELA-NAVAL REVOLT AT CARUPANO
325	620603	VENEZUELA-LEFTWING NAVAL REVOLT AT PUERTO CABELLO
326	621027	VENEZUELA-PROLONGED FALN TERRORISM BEFORE LEONI ELECTION
327	600624	VENEZUELA-DOMINICAN BACKED ATTEMPTED COUP
328	461120	VIETNAM-WAR WITH FRANCE
329	550329	SOUTH VIETNAM-INTERNAL UNREST
330	601111	SOUTH VIETNAM-ABORTIVE COUP
331	591201	SOUTH VIETNAM-VIET CONG GUERRILLA WAR
332	630821	SOUTH VIETNAM-STUDENT, BUDDHIST AND CATHOLIC RIOTS
333	631101	SOUTH VIETNAM-MILITARY COUP (DIEM)
334	640130	SOUTH VIETNAM-MILITARY COUP (VAN MINH)
335	630505	SOUTH VIETNAM-BUDDHIST PROTEST CAMPAIGN
336	640913	SOUTH VIETNAM-ABORTIVE MILITARY COUP
337	561111	NORTH VIETNAM- DISTURBANCES IN RURAL AREAS
338	640802	NORTH VIETNAM- ATTACKS ON US DESTROYERS AND RETALIATION
339	480217	YEMEN- ASSASSINATION OF IMAM
340	550402	YEMEN-MILITARY REVOLT
341	580502	ADEN- INTERNAL DISTURBANCES
342	620923	YEMEN - MILITARY COUP
343	621005	YEMEN- CIVIL WAR (REPUBLICANS VS. ROYALISTS)
344	540501	YEMEN- ADEN BORDER INCIDENTS
345	631211	ADEN - BOMB OUTRAGE
346	610601	ZANZIBAR-ELECTION RIOTS
347	640112	ZANZIBAR-OVERTHROW OF REGIME
348	480603	PARAGUAY-BLOODLESS RIGHT-WING COUP BY COLORADO PARTY MEMBERS
349	511015	BRITISH-EGYPTIAN SUEZ CANAL ZONE CONFLICT
350	550703	PRE-SUEZ BRITISH-FRENCH-ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN WAR
351	561029	SUEZ WAR BETWEEN EGYPT AND ENGLAND, FRANCE, ISRAEL

TABLE 61 (cont'd)

352	531812	CEYLON TERRORISM
353	491203	SARAWAK-ASSASSINATION OF BRITISH GOVERNOR
354	581021	BOLIVIA-UNSUCCESSFUL SOCIALIST UPRISING IN LA PAZ
355	590302	BOLIVIA-ANTIAMERICAN RIOTS OVER TIME MAGAZINE ARTICLE
356	641103	BOLIVIA-BLOODLESS MILITARY COUP DEPOSES ESTENSORO
357	520807	SARAWAK-COMMUNIST TERRORISM
358	580101	VENEZUELA-ABORTIVE AIRFORCE REVOLT
359	610220	VENEZUELA-ABORTIVE MILITARY COUP
360	590627	CAMEROON-BAMILEKE TERRORISM
361	640123	KENYA-ARMY MUTINY
362	500425	INDONESIA-MILITARY COUP ON AMBOINA
363	501103	INDONESIA- GUERRILLA ACTIVITY ON AMBOINA AND CERAM
364	580523	INDONESIA- GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN SUMATRA
365	570302	INDONESIA- UPRISINGS IN CELEBES AND THE MOLUCCAS
366	561021	HONDURAS-COUP
367	570510	COLOMBIA-COUP
368	620121	HONDURAS-GUATEMALA INVASION
369	620115	PERU INSURRECTION
370	480412	Colombia-Banditry and Guerrilla Fighting
371	630805	HAITI INVASION
372	630701	ALGERIA-BERBER INSURRECTION
373	641220	SOUTH VIETNAM-CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT OVERTHROWN
374	641022	SUDAN-OVERTHROW OF ABBUD MILITARY REGIME
375	640310	CAMBODIA-SOUTH VIETNAM BORDER INCIDENTS
376	640721	MALAYSIA-COMMUNAL RIOTING IN SINGAPORE
377	640613	ISRAEL-SYRIA BORDER INCIDENTS
378	630610	IRAQ-MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE KURDS
379	610315	IRAQ-THE KURDISH REBELLION
380	631118	IRAQ-BAATHIST REGIME OVERTHROWN