ON BEHAVIOR STRATEGY SOLUTIONS OF FINITE TWO-PERSON CONSTANT-SUM EXTENDED GAMES,
Abstract
Through the introduction of a concept called recall-sensitivity, it is demonstrated that perfect recall (each player remembers all of its past actions and past knowledge of the other player's and nature's actions) is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the existence of behavior strategy solutions and epsilon-solutions in finite two-person constant-sum extended games. A method is presented by which behavior strategies meeting a necessary condition for solutions or epsilon-solutions may be generated. Comments are made on the practical implications of the material presented. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 1970
- Accession Number
- AD0706916
Entities
People
- R. L. Kashyap
- V. A. Utgoff
Organizations
- Purdue University